CWE - CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection') (4.15)

Weakness ID: 94

Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWEDThis CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.

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Description

The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment.

Extended Description

When a product allows a user's input to contain code syntax, it might be possible for an attacker to craft the code in such a way that it will alter the intended control flow of the product. Such an alteration could lead to arbitrary code execution.

Injection problems encompass a wide variety of issues -- all mitigated in very different ways. For this reason, the most effective way to discuss these weaknesses is to note the distinct features which classify them as injection weaknesses. The most important issue to note is that all injection problems share one thing in common -- i.e., they allow for the injection of control plane data into the user-controlled data plane. This means that the execution of the process may be altered by sending code in through legitimate data channels, using no other mechanism. While buffer overflows, and many other flaws, involve the use of some further issue to gain execution, injection problems need only for the data to be parsed. The most classic instantiations of this category of weakness are SQL injection and format string vulnerabilities.

Common Consequences

This table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.

Scope	Impact	Likelihood
Access Control	Technical Impact: Bypass Protection Mechanism In some cases, injectable code controls authentication; this may lead to a remote vulnerability.
Access Control	Technical Impact: Gain Privileges or Assume Identity Injected code can access resources that the attacker is directly prevented from accessing.
Integrity Confidentiality Availability	Technical Impact: Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands Code injection attacks can lead to loss of data integrity in nearly all cases as the control-plane data injected is always incidental to data recall or writing. Additionally, code injection can often result in the execution of arbitrary code.
Non-Repudiation	Technical Impact: Hide Activities Often the actions performed by injected control code are unlogged.

Potential Mitigations

Phase: Architecture and Design

Refactor your program so that you do not have to dynamically generate code.

Phase: Architecture and Design

Run your code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which code can be executed by your product.

Examples include the Unix chroot jail and AppArmor. In general, managed code may provide some protection.

This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of your application may still be subject to compromise.

Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.

Phase: Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.

When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."

Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.

To reduce the likelihood of code injection, use stringent allowlists that limit which constructs are allowed. If you are dynamically constructing code that invokes a function, then verifying that the input is alphanumeric might be insufficient. An attacker might still be able to reference a dangerous function that you did not intend to allow, such as system(), exec(), or exit().

Phase: Testing

Use automated static analysis tools that target this type of weakness. Many modern techniques use data flow analysis to minimize the number of false positives. This is not a perfect solution, since 100% accuracy and coverage are not feasible.

Phase: Testing

Use dynamic tools and techniques that interact with the product using large test suites with many diverse inputs, such as fuzz testing (fuzzing), robustness testing, and fault injection. The product's operation may slow down, but it should not become unstable, crash, or generate incorrect results.

Phase: Operation

Strategy: Compilation or Build Hardening

Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).

Phase: Operation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Phase: Implementation

For Python programs, it is frequently encouraged to use the ast.literal_eval() function instead of eval, since it is intentionally designed to avoid executing code. However, an adversary could still cause excessive memory or stack consumption via deeply nested structures [REF-1372], so the python documentation discourages use of ast.literal_eval() on untrusted data [REF-1373].

Effectiveness: Discouraged Common Practice

Relationships

This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.

Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (CWE-1000)

Nature	Type	ID	Name
ChildOf	Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.	913	Improper Control of Dynamically-Managed Code Resources
ChildOf	Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.	74	Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection')
ParentOf	Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.	95	Improper Neutralization of Directives in Dynamically Evaluated Code ('Eval Injection')
ParentOf	Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.	96	Improper Neutralization of Directives in Statically Saved Code ('Static Code Injection')
ParentOf	Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.	1336	Improper Neutralization of Special Elements Used in a Template Engine
CanFollow	Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.	98	Improper Control of Filename for Include/Require Statement in PHP Program ('PHP Remote File Inclusion')

Relevant to the view "Software Development" (CWE-699)

Nature	Type	ID	Name
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	137	Data Neutralization Issues

Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (CWE-1003)

Nature	Type	ID	Name
ChildOf	Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.	74	Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection')

Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (CWE-1008)

Nature	Type	ID	Name
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	1019	Validate Inputs

Modes Of Introduction

The different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.

Phase	Note
Implementation	REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.

Applicable Platforms

This listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.

Languages

Class: Interpreted (Sometimes Prevalent)

Technologies

AI/ML (Undetermined Prevalence)

Likelihood Of Exploit

Medium

Demonstrative Examples

Example 1

This example attempts to write user messages to a message file and allow users to view them.

(bad code)

Example Language: PHP

$MessageFile = "messages.out";
if ($_GET["action"] == "NewMessage") {

$name = $_GET["name"];
$message = $_GET["message"];
$handle = fopen($MessageFile, "a+");
fwrite($handle, "<b>$name</b> says '$message'<hr>\n");
fclose($handle);
echo "Message Saved!<p>\n";

}
else if ($_GET["action"] == "ViewMessages") {

include($MessageFile);

}

While the programmer intends for the MessageFile to only include data, an attacker can provide a message such as:

(attack code)

name=h4x0r
message=%3C?php%20system(%22/bin/ls%20-l%22);?%3E

which will decode to the following:

(attack code)

<?php system("/bin/ls -l");?>

The programmer thought they were just including the contents of a regular data file, but PHP parsed it and executed the code. Now, this code is executed any time people view messages.

Notice that XSS (CWE-79) is also possible in this situation.

Example 2

edit-config.pl: This CGI script is used to modify settings in a configuration file.

(bad code)

Example Language: Perl

use CGI qw(:standard);

sub config_file_add_key {

my ($fname, $key, $arg) = @_;

# code to add a field/key to a file goes here

}

sub config_file_set_key {

my ($fname, $key, $arg) = @_;

# code to set key to a particular file goes here

}

sub config_file_delete_key {

my ($fname, $key, $arg) = @_;

# code to delete key from a particular file goes here

}

sub handleConfigAction {

my ($fname, $action) = @_;
my $key = param('key');
my $val = param('val');

# this is super-efficient code, especially if you have to invoke

# any one of dozens of different functions!

my $code = "config_file_$action_key(\$fname, \$key, \$val);";
eval($code);

}

$configfile = "/home/cwe/config.txt";
print header;
if (defined(param('action'))) {

handleConfigAction($configfile, param('action'));

}
else {

print "No action specified!\n";

}

The script intends to take the 'action' parameter and invoke one of a variety of functions based on the value of that parameter - config_file_add_key(), config_file_set_key(), or config_file_delete_key(). It could set up a conditional to invoke each function separately, but eval() is a powerful way of doing the same thing in fewer lines of code, especially when a large number of functions or variables are involved. Unfortunately, in this case, the attacker can provide other values in the action parameter, such as:

(attack code)

add_key(",","); system("/bin/ls");

This would produce the following string in handleConfigAction():

(result)

config_file_add_key(",","); system("/bin/ls");

Any arbitrary Perl code could be added after the attacker has "closed off" the construction of the original function call, in order to prevent parsing errors from causing the malicious eval() to fail before the attacker's payload is activated. This particular manipulation would fail after the system() call, because the "_key(\$fname, \$key, \$val)" portion of the string would cause an error, but this is irrelevant to the attack because the payload has already been activated.

Example 3

This simple script asks a user to supply a list of numbers as input and adds them together.

(bad code)

Example Language: Python

def main():

sum = 0
numbers = eval(input("Enter a space-separated list of numbers: "))
for num in numbers:

sum = sum + num

print(f"Sum of {numbers} = {sum}")

main()

The eval() function can take the user-supplied list and convert it into a Python list object, therefore allowing the programmer to use list comprehension methods to work with the data. However, if code is supplied to the eval() function, it will execute that code. For example, a malicious user could supply the following string:

(attack code)

__import__('subprocess').getoutput('rm -r *')

This would delete all the files in the current directory. For this reason, it is not recommended to use eval() with untrusted input.

A way to accomplish this without the use of eval() is to apply an integer conversion on the input within a try/except block. If the user-supplied input is not numeric, this will raise a ValueError. By avoiding eval(), there is no opportunity for the input string to be executed as code.

(good code)

Example Language: Python

def main():

sum = 0
numbers = input("Enter a space-separated list of numbers: ").split(" ")
try:

for num in numbers:

sum = sum + int(num)

print(f"Sum of {numbers} = {sum}")

except ValueError:

print("Error: invalid input")

main()

An alternative, commonly-cited mitigation for this kind of weakness is to use the ast.literal_eval() function, since it is intentionally designed to avoid executing code. However, an adversary could still cause excessive memory or stack consumption via deeply nested structures [REF-1372], so the python documentation discourages use of ast.literal_eval() on untrusted data [REF-1373].

Observed Examples

Reference	Description
CVE-2023-29374	Math component in an LLM framework translates user input into a Python expression that is input into the Python exec() method, allowing code execution - one variant of a "prompt injection" attack.
CVE-2024-5565	Python-based library uses an LLM prompt containing user input to dynamically generate code that is then fed as input into the Python exec() method, allowing code execution - one variant of a "prompt injection" attack.
CVE-2024-4181	Framework for LLM applications allows eval injection via a crafted response from a hosting provider.
CVE-2022-2054	Python compiler uses eval() to execute malicious strings as Python code.
CVE-2021-22204	Chain: regex in EXIF processor code does not correctly determine where a string ends (CWE-625), enabling eval injection (CWE-95), as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
CVE-2020-8218	"Code injection" in VPN product, as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
CVE-2008-5071	Eval injection in PHP program.
CVE-2002-1750	Eval injection in Perl program.
CVE-2008-5305	Eval injection in Perl program using an ID that should only contain hyphens and numbers.
CVE-2002-1752	Direct code injection into Perl eval function.
CVE-2002-1753	Eval injection in Perl program.
CVE-2005-1527	Direct code injection into Perl eval function.
CVE-2005-2837	Direct code injection into Perl eval function.
CVE-2005-1921	MFV. code injection into PHP eval statement using nested constructs that should not be nested.
CVE-2005-2498	MFV. code injection into PHP eval statement using nested constructs that should not be nested.
CVE-2005-3302	Code injection into Python eval statement from a field in a formatted file.
CVE-2007-1253	Eval injection in Python program.
CVE-2001-1471	chain: Resultant eval injection. An invalid value prevents initialization of variables, which can be modified by attacker and later injected into PHP eval statement.
CVE-2002-0495	Perl code directly injected into CGI library file from parameters to another CGI program.
CVE-2005-1876	Direct PHP code injection into supporting template file.
CVE-2005-1894	Direct code injection into PHP script that can be accessed by attacker.
CVE-2003-0395	PHP code from User-Agent HTTP header directly inserted into log file implemented as PHP script.

Detection Methods

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Effectiveness: High

Memberships

This MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.

Nature	Type	ID	Name
MemberOf	View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries).	635	Weaknesses Originally Used by NVD from 2008 to 2016
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	752	2009 Top 25 - Risky Resource Management
MemberOf	View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries).	884	CWE Cross-section
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	991	SFP Secondary Cluster: Tainted Input to Environment
MemberOf	View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries).	1200	Weaknesses in the 2019 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	1347	OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A03:2021 - Injection
MemberOf	View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries).	1350	Weaknesses in the 2020 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf	View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries).	1387	Weaknesses in the 2022 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	1409	Comprehensive Categorization: Injection
MemberOf	View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries).	1425	Weaknesses in the 2023 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses

Vulnerability Mapping Notes

Usage: ALLOWED

(this CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)

Reason: Acceptable-Use

Rationale:

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments:

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.

Taxonomy Mappings

Mapped Taxonomy Name	Node ID	Mapped Node Name
PLOVER	CODE	Code Evaluation and Injection
ISA/IEC 62443	Part 4-2	Req CR 3.5
ISA/IEC 62443	Part 3-3	Req SR 3.5
ISA/IEC 62443	Part 4-1	Req SVV-1
ISA/IEC 62443	Part 4-1	Req SVV-3

Related Attack Patterns

CAPEC-ID	Attack Pattern Name
CAPEC-242	Code Injection
CAPEC-35	Leverage Executable Code in Non-Executable Files
CAPEC-77	Manipulating User-Controlled Variables

References

[REF-44] Michael Howard, David LeBlanc and John Viega. "24 Deadly Sins of Software Security". "Sin 3: Web-Client Related Vulnerabilities (XSS)." Page 63. McGraw-Hill. 2010.

[REF-1372] "How ast.literal_eval can cause memory exhaustion". Reddit. 2022-12-14. <https://www.reddit.com/r/learnpython/comments/zmbhcf/how_astliteral_eval_can_cause_memory_exhaustion/>. URL validated: 2023-11-03.

[REF-1373] "ast - Abstract Syntax Trees". ast.literal_eval(node_or_string). Python. 2023-11-02. <https://docs.python.org/3/library/ast.html#ast.literal_eval>. URL validated: 2023-11-03.

Content History

Submissions
Submission Date	Submitter	Organization
2006-07-19 (CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)	PLOVER
2006-07-19 (CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
Contributions
Contribution Date	Contributor	Organization
2023-06-29 (CWE 4.12, 2023-06-29)	"Mapping CWE to 62443" Sub-Working Group	CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT SIG
2023-06-29 (CWE 4.12, 2023-06-29)	Suggested mappings to ISA/IEC 62443.
2024-02-29 (CWE 4.15, 2024-07-16)	Abhi Balakrishnan
2024-02-29 (CWE 4.15, 2024-07-16)	Provided diagram to improve CWE usability
Modifications
Modification Date	Modifier	Organization
2008-07-01	Eric Dalci	Cigital
2008-07-01	updated Time_of_Introduction
2008-09-08	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2008-09-08	updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships, Research_Gaps, Taxonomy_Mappings
2009-01-12	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2009-01-12	updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Name, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
2009-03-10	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2009-03-10	updated Potential_Mitigations
2009-05-27	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2009-05-27	updated Demonstrative_Examples, Name
2010-02-16	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2010-02-16	updated Potential_Mitigations
2010-06-21	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2010-06-21	updated Description, Potential_Mitigations
2011-03-29	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2011-03-29	updated Name
2011-06-01	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2011-06-01	updated Common_Consequences
2012-05-11	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2012-05-11	updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, References, Relationships
2012-10-30	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2012-10-30	updated Potential_Mitigations
2013-02-21	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2013-02-21	updated Relationships
2014-07-30	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2014-07-30	updated Relationships
2015-12-07	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2015-12-07	updated Relationships
2017-11-08	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2017-11-08	updated Demonstrative_Examples, Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships
2019-06-20	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2019-06-20	updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Type
2019-09-19	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2019-09-19	updated Relationships
2020-02-24	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2020-02-24	updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
2020-06-25	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2020-06-25	updated Potential_Mitigations
2020-08-20	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2020-08-20	updated Relationships
2021-03-15	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2021-03-15	updated Demonstrative_Examples
2021-07-20	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2021-07-20	updated Relationships
2021-10-28	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2021-10-28	updated Relationships
2022-04-28	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2022-04-28	updated Research_Gaps
2022-06-28	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2022-06-28	updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
2022-10-13	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2022-10-13	updated Observed_Examples
2023-01-31	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2023-01-31	updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
2023-04-27	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2023-04-27	updated Demonstrative_Examples, Detection_Factors, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction
2023-06-29	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2023-06-29	updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2024-02-29 (CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29)	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2024-02-29 (CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29)	updated Demonstrative_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References
2024-07-16 (CWE 4.15, 2024-07-16)	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2024-07-16 (CWE 4.15, 2024-07-16)	updated Applicable_Platforms, Observed_Examples
Previous Entry Names
Change Date	Previous Entry Name
2009-01-12	Code Injection

2009-05-27	Failure to Control Generation of Code (aka 'Code Injection')

2011-03-29	Failure to Control Generation of Code ('Code Injection')


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Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')

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