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CWE-173 Individual Dictionary Definition (Draft 9)
Weakness ID
| Status: Draft 173 (Weakness Variant) | | Description | Summary The software does not properly
handle when an input uses an alternate
encoding that is valid for the control sphere to which
the input is being sent. | | Potential Mitigations | Avoid making decisions based on names of resources (e.g. files) if those resources can
have alternate names. Assume all input is malicious. Use an appropriate combination of black lists and white
lists to ensure only valid, expected and appropriate input is processed by the system. For
example, valid input may be in the form of an absolute pathname(s). You can also limit
pathnames to exist on selected drives, have the format specified to include only separator
characters (forward or backward slashes) and alphanumeric characters, and follow a naming
convention such as having a maximum of 32 characters followed by a '.' and ending with
specified extensions. Canonicalize the name to match that of the file system's representation of the name.
This can sometimes be achieved with an available API (e.g. in Win32 the GetFullPathName
function). | | Relationships | | | Source Taxonomies | PLOVER - Alternate Encoding | | Applicable Platforms | All | | Related Attack Patterns | | CAPEC-ID | Attack Pattern Name |
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| 80 | Using UTF-8 Encoding to Bypass Validation Logic | | 79 | Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding | | 71 | Using Unicode Encoding to Bypass Validation Logic | | 53 | Postfix, Null Terminate, and Backslash | | 72 | URL Encoding | | 64 | Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic | | 3 | Using Leading 'Ghost' Character Sequences to Bypass Input Filters | | 78 | Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding | | 52 | Embedding NULL Bytes |
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- Weakness
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- Variant
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- Deprecated
