Description Summary The program uses the chroot() system call to create a jail, but
does not change the working directory afterward. This does not prevent access to
files outside of the jail.
Extended Description Improper use of chroot() may allow attackers to escape from the chroot jail. The chroot() function call does not change the process's current working directory, so relative paths may still refer to file system resources outside of the chroot jail after chroot() has been called. Example 1 Consider the following source code from a (hypothetical) FTP server: (Bad Code) C chroot("/var/ftproot"); ... fgets(filename, sizeof(filename), network); localfile = fopen(filename, "r"); while ((len = fread(buf, 1, sizeof(buf), localfile)) != EOF)
{ fwrite(buf, 1, sizeof(buf), network);
} fclose(localfile); This code is responsible for reading a filename from the network, opening the corresponding file on the local machine, and sending the contents over the network. This code could be used to implement the FTP GET command. The FTP server calls chroot() in its initialization routines in an attempt to prevent access to files outside of /var/ftproot. But because the server fails to change the current working directory by calling chdir("/"), an attacker could request the file "../../../../../etc/passwd" and obtain a copy of the system password file.
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Page Last Updated:
October 29, 2009
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CWE is a Software Assurance strategic initiative sponsored by the National Cyber Security Division of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. This Web site is hosted by The MITRE Corporation. Contact cwe@mitre.org for more information. |
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