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CWE-336: Same Seed in PRNG

 
Same Seed in PRNG
Weakness ID: 336 (Weakness Base)Status: Draft
+ Description

Description Summary

A PRNG uses the same seed each time the product is initialized. If an attacker can guess (or knows) the seed, then he/she may be able to determine the "random" number produced from the PRNG.
+ Time of Introduction
  • Architecture and Design
  • Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms

Languages

All

+ Common Consequences
ScopeEffect
Other
Access Control

Technical Impact: Other; Bypass protection mechanism

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1

The following Java code uses the same seed value for a statistical PRNG on every invocation.

(Bad Code)
Example Language: Java 
private static final long SEED = 1234567890;
public int generateAccountID() {
Random random = new Random(SEED);
return random.nextInt();
}
+ Potential Mitigations

Phase: Architecture and Design

Do not reuse PRNG seeds. Consider a PRNG that periodically re-seeds itself as needed from a high quality pseudo-random output, such as hardware devices.

Phases: Architecture and Design; Requirements

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

Use products or modules that conform to FIPS 140-2 [R.336.1] to avoid obvious entropy problems. Consult FIPS 140-2 Annex C ("Approved Random Number Generators").

+ Relationships
NatureTypeIDNameView(s) this relationship pertains toView(s)
ChildOfWeakness ClassWeakness Class335PRNG Seed Error
Development Concepts (primary)699
Research Concepts (primary)1000
ChildOfCategoryCategory861CERT Java Secure Coding Section 49 - Miscellaneous (MSC)
Weaknesses Addressed by the CERT Java Secure Coding Standard (primary)844
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy NameNode IDFitMapped Node Name
PLOVERSame Seed in PRNG
CERT Java Secure CodingMSC02-JGenerate strong random numbers
+ References
[R.336.1] [REF-1] Information Technology Laboratory, National Institute of Standards and Technology. "SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULES". 2001-05-25. <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips140-2/fips1402.pdf>.
+ Content History
Submissions
Submission DateSubmitterOrganizationSource
PLOVERExternally Mined
Modifications
Modification DateModifierOrganizationSource
2008-07-01Sean EidemillerCigitalExternal
added/updated demonstrative examples
2008-07-01Eric DalciCigitalExternal
updated Time_of_Introduction
2008-09-08CWE Content TeamMITREInternal
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2009-03-10CWE Content TeamMITREInternal
updated Potential_Mitigations
2009-12-28CWE Content TeamMITREInternal
updated Potential_Mitigations
2010-06-21CWE Content TeamMITREInternal
updated Potential_Mitigations
2011-06-01CWE Content TeamMITREInternal
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-09-13CWE Content TeamMITREInternal
updated Potential_Mitigations, References
Page Last Updated: September 12, 2011