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CWE-384: Session Fixation

Compound Element ID: 384
Abstraction: Base
Structure: Composite
Status: Incomplete
Presentation Filter:
+ Description

Description Summary

Authenticating a user, or otherwise establishing a new user session, without invalidating any existing session identifier gives an attacker the opportunity to steal authenticated sessions.

Extended Description

Such a scenario is commonly observed when:

1. A web application authenticates a user without first invalidating the existing session, thereby continuing to use the session already associated with the user.

2. An attacker is able to force a known session identifier on a user so that, once the user authenticates, the attacker has access to the authenticated session.

3. The application or container uses predictable session identifiers. In the generic exploit of session fixation vulnerabilities, an attacker creates a new session on a web application and records the associated session identifier. The attacker then causes the victim to associate, and possibly authenticate, against the server using that session identifier, giving the attacker access to the user's account through the active session.

+ Time of Introduction
  • Architecture and Design
  • Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms



+ Common Consequences
Access Control

Technical Impact: Gain privileges / assume identity

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1

The following example shows a snippet of code from a J2EE web application where the application authenticates users with LoginContext.login() without first calling HttpSession.invalidate().

(Bad Code)
Example Language: Java 
private void auth(LoginContext lc, HttpSession session) throws LoginException {

In order to exploit the code above, an attacker could first create a session (perhaps by logging into the application) from a public terminal, record the session identifier assigned by the application, and reset the browser to the login page. Next, a victim sits down at the same public terminal, notices the browser open to the login page of the site, and enters credentials to authenticate against the application. The code responsible for authenticating the victim continues to use the pre-existing session identifier, now the attacker simply uses the session identifier recorded earlier to access the victim's active session, providing nearly unrestricted access to the victim's account for the lifetime of the session. Even given a vulnerable application, the success of the specific attack described here is dependent on several factors working in the favor of the attacker: access to an unmonitored public terminal, the ability to keep the compromised session active and a victim interested in logging into the vulnerable application on the public terminal.

In most circumstances, the first two challenges are surmountable given a sufficient investment of time. Finding a victim who is both using a public terminal and interested in logging into the vulnerable application is possible as well, so long as the site is reasonably popular. The less well known the site is, the lower the odds of an interested victim using the public terminal and the lower the chance of success for the attack vector described above. The biggest challenge an attacker faces in exploiting session fixation vulnerabilities is inducing victims to authenticate against the vulnerable application using a session identifier known to the attacker.

In the example above, the attacker did this through a direct method that is not subtle and does not scale suitably for attacks involving less well-known web sites. However, do not be lulled into complacency; attackers have many tools in their belts that help bypass the limitations of this attack vector. The most common technique employed by attackers involves taking advantage of cross-site scripting or HTTP response splitting vulnerabilities in the target site [12]. By tricking the victim into submitting a malicious request to a vulnerable application that reflects JavaScript or other code back to the victim's browser, an attacker can create a cookie that will cause the victim to reuse a session identifier controlled by the attacker. It is worth noting that cookies are often tied to the top level domain associated with a given URL. If multiple applications reside on the same top level domain, such as and, a vulnerability in one application can allow an attacker to set a cookie with a fixed session identifier that will be used in all interactions with any application on the domain [29].

Example 2

The following example shows a snippet of code from a J2EE web application where the application authenticates users with a direct post to the <code>j_security_check</code>, which typically does not invalidate the existing session before processing the login request.

(Bad Code)
Example Language: HTML 
<form method="POST" action="j_security_check">
<input type="text" name="j_username">
<input type="text" name="j_password">
+ Potential Mitigations

Phase: Architecture and Design

Invalidate any existing session identifiers prior to authorizing a new user session.

Phase: Architecture and Design

For platforms such as ASP that do not generate new values for sessionid cookies, utilize a secondary cookie. In this approach, set a secondary cookie on the user's browser to a random value and set a session variable to the same value. If the session variable and the cookie value ever don't match, invalidate the session, and force the user to log on again.

+ Other Notes

Other attack vectors include DNS poisoning and related network based attacks where an attacker causes the user to visit a malicious site by redirecting a request for a valid site. Network based attacks typically involve a physical presence on the victim's network or control of a compromised machine on the network, which makes them harder to exploit remotely, but their significance should not be overlooked. Less secure session management mechanisms, such as the default implementation in Apache Tomcat, allow session identifiers normally expected in a cookie to be specified on the URL as well, which enables an attacker to cause a victim to use a fixed session identifier simply by emailing a malicious URL.

+ Relationships
NatureTypeIDNameView(s) this relationship pertains toView(s)
RequiresWeakness BaseWeakness Base346Origin Validation Error
Research Concepts1000
RequiresWeakness ClassWeakness Class441Unintended Proxy or Intermediary ('Confused Deputy')
Research Concepts1000
RequiresWeakness BaseWeakness Base472External Control of Assumed-Immutable Web Parameter
Research Concepts1000
ChildOfWeakness ClassWeakness Class287Improper Authentication
Development Concepts699
Research Concepts (primary)1000
Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities (primary)1003
ChildOfCategoryCategory361Time and State
Development Concepts (primary)699
Seven Pernicious Kingdoms (primary)700
ChildOfCategoryCategory724OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A3 - Broken Authentication and Session Management
Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004) (primary)711
ChildOfCategoryCategory930OWASP Top Ten 2013 Category A2 - Broken Authentication and Session Management
Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2013) (primary)928
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy NameNode IDFitMapped Node Name
7 Pernicious KingdomsSession Fixation
OWASP Top Ten 2004A3CWE More SpecificBroken Authentication and Session Management
WASC37Session Fixation
+ Content History
Submission DateSubmitterOrganizationSource
7 Pernicious KingdomsExternally Mined
Modification DateModifierOrganizationSource
2008-07-01Eric DalciCigitalExternal
updated Time_of_Introduction
Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping
2008-09-08CWE Content TeamMITREInternal
updated Description, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2009-07-27CWE Content TeamMITREInternal
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns
2010-02-16CWE Content TeamMITREInternal
updated Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-01CWE Content TeamMITREInternal
updated Common_Consequences
2012-10-30CWE Content TeamMITREInternal
updated Potential_Mitigations
2013-07-17CWE Content TeamMITREInternal
updated Relationships
2015-12-07CWE Content TeamMITREInternal
updated Relationships

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Page Last Updated: January 18, 2017