CWE - CWE-1231: Improper Prevention of Lock Bit Modification (4.16)

Weakness ID: 1231

Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.

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Description

The product uses a trusted lock bit for restricting access to registers, address regions, or other resources, but the product does not prevent the value of the lock bit from being modified after it has been set.

Extended Description

In integrated circuits and hardware intellectual property (IP) cores, device configuration controls are commonly programmed after a device power reset by a trusted firmware or software module (e.g., BIOS/bootloader) and then locked from any further modification.

This behavior is commonly implemented using a trusted lock bit. When set, the lock bit disables writes to a protected set of registers or address regions. Design or coding errors in the implementation of the lock bit protection feature may allow the lock bit to be modified or cleared by software after it has been set. Attackers might be able to unlock the system and features that the bit is intended to protect.

Common Consequences

This table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.

Scope	Impact	Likelihood
Access Control	Technical Impact: Modify Memory Registers protected by lock bit can be modified even when lock is set.	High

Potential Mitigations

Phases: Architecture and Design; Implementation; Testing

Security lock bit protections must be reviewed for design inconsistency and common weaknesses.
Security lock programming flow and lock properties must be tested in pre-silicon and post-silicon testing.

Effectiveness: High

Relationships

This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.

Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (CWE-1000)

Nature	Type	ID	Name
ChildOf	Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things.	284	Improper Access Control

Relevant to the view "Hardware Design" (CWE-1194)

Nature	Type	ID	Name
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	1199	General Circuit and Logic Design Concerns

Modes Of Introduction

The different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.

Phase	Note
Architecture and Design	Such issues could be introduced during hardware architecture and design and identified later during Testing or System Configuration phases.
Implementation	Such issues could be introduced during implementation and identified later during Testing or System Configuration phases.

Applicable Platforms

This listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.

Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Operating Systems

Class: Not OS-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Architectures

Class: Not Architecture-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Demonstrative Examples

Example 1

Consider the example design below for a digital thermal sensor that detects overheating of the silicon and triggers system shutdown. The system critical temperature limit (CRITICAL_TEMP_LIMIT) and thermal sensor calibration (TEMP_SENSOR_CALIB) data have to be programmed by firmware, and then the register needs to be locked (TEMP_SENSOR_LOCK).

(bad code)

Example Language: Other

Register	Field description
CRITICAL_TEMP_LIMIT	[31:8] Reserved field; Read only; Default 0 [7:0] Critical temp 0-255 Centigrade; Read-write-lock; Default 125
TEMP_SENSOR_CALIB	[31:0] Thermal sensor calibration data. Slope value used to map sensor reading to degrees Centigrade.
TEMP_SENSOR_LOCK	[31:1] Reserved field; Read only; Default 0 [0] Lock bit, locks CRITICAL_TEMP_LIMIT and TEMP_SENSOR_CALIB registers; Write-1-once; Default 0
TEMP_HW_SHUTDOWN	[31:2] Reserved field; Read only; Default 0 [1] Enable hardware shutdown on critical temperature detection; Read-write; Default 0
CURRENT_TEMP	[31:8] Reserved field; Read only; Default 0 [7:0] Current Temp 0-255 Centigrade; Read-only; Default 0

In this example, note that if the system heats to critical temperature, the response of the system is controlled by the TEMP_HW_SHUTDOWN bit [1], which is not lockable. Thus, the intended security property of the critical temperature sensor cannot be fully protected, since software can misconfigure the TEMP_HW_SHUTDOWN register even after the lock bit is set to disable the shutdown response.

(good code)

To fix this weakness, one could change the TEMP_HW_SHUTDOWN field to be locked by TEMP_SENSOR_LOCK.

TEMP_HW_SHUTDOWN

[31:2] Reserved field; Read only; Default 0
[1] Enable hardware shutdown on critical temperature detection; Read-write-Lock; Default 0
[0] Locked by TEMP_SENSOR_LOCK

Example 2

The following example code is a snippet from the register locks inside the buggy OpenPiton SoC of HACK@DAC'21 [REF-1350]. Register locks help prevent SoC peripherals' registers from malicious use of resources. The registers that can potentially leak secret data are locked by register locks.

In the vulnerable code, the reglk_mem is used for locking information. If one of its bits toggle to 1, the corresponding peripheral's registers will be locked. In the context of the HACK@DAC System-on-Chip (SoC), it is pertinent to note the existence of two distinct categories of reset signals.

First, there is a global reset signal denoted as "rst_ni," which possesses the capability to simultaneously reset all peripherals to their respective initial states.

Second, we have peripheral-specific reset signals, such as "rst_9," which exclusively reset individual peripherals back to their initial states. The administration of these reset signals is the responsibility of the reset controller module.

(bad code)

Example Language: Verilog

always @(posedge clk_i)

begin

if(~(rst_ni && ~jtag_unlock && ~rst_9))

begin

for (j=0; j < 6; j=j+1) begin

reglk_mem[j] <= 'h0;

end

end
...

In the buggy SoC architecture during HACK@DAC'21, a critical issue arises within the reset controller module. Specifically, the reset controller can inadvertently transmit a peripheral reset signal to the register lock within the user privilege domain.

This unintentional action can result in the reset of the register locks, potentially exposing private data from all other peripherals, rendering them accessible and readable.

To mitigate the issue, remove the extra reset signal rst_9 from the register lock if condition. [REF-1351]

(good code)

Example Language: Verilog

always @(posedge clk_i)

begin

if(~(rst_ni && ~jtag_unlock))

begin

for (j=0; j < 6; j=j+1) begin

reglk_mem[j] <= 'h0;

end

end
...

Observed Examples

Reference	Description
CVE-2017-6283	chip reset clears critical read/write lock permissions for RSA function

Weakness Ordinalities

Ordinality	Description
Primary	(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)

Detection Methods

Manual Analysis

Set the lock bit. Power cycle the device. Attempt to clear the lock bit. If the information is changed, implement a design fix. Retest. Also, attempt to indirectly clear the lock bit or bypass it.

Effectiveness: High

Memberships

This MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.

Nature	Type	ID	Name
MemberOf	View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries).	1343	Weaknesses in the 2021 CWE Most Important Hardware Weaknesses List
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	1372	ICS Supply Chain: OT Counterfeit and Malicious Corruption
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	1396	Comprehensive Categorization: Access Control

Vulnerability Mapping Notes

Usage: ALLOWED

(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)

Reason: Acceptable-Use

Rationale:

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments:

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.

Related Attack Patterns

CAPEC-ID	Attack Pattern Name
CAPEC-680	Exploitation of Improperly Controlled Registers

References

[REF-1350] "reglk_wrapper.sv". 2021. <https://github.com/HACK-EVENT/hackatdac21/blob/b9ecdf6068445d76d6bee692d163fededf7a9d9b/piton/design/chip/tile/ariane/src/reglk/reglk_wrapper.sv#L80C1-L80C48>. URL validated: 2023-09-18.

[REF-1351] "fix cwe 1199 in reglk". 2023. <https://github.com/HACK-EVENT/hackatdac21/commit/5928add42895b57341ae8fc1f9b8351c35aed865#diff-1c2b09dd092a56e5fb2be431a3849e72ff489d2ae4f4a6bb9c0ea6b7d450135aR80>. URL validated: 2023-09-18.

Content History

Submissions
Submission Date	Submitter	Organization
2020-01-15 (CWE 4.0, 2020-02-24)	Arun Kanuparthi, Hareesh Khattri, Parbati Kumar Manna, Narasimha Kumar V Mangipudi	Intel Corporation
2020-01-15 (CWE 4.0, 2020-02-24)
Contributions
Contribution Date	Contributor	Organization
2021-10-20	Narasimha Kumar V Mangipudi	Lattice Semiconductor
2021-10-20	reviewed content changes
2021-10-22	Hareesh Khattri	Intel Corporation
2021-10-22	provided observed example
2023-06-21	Shaza Zeitouni, Mohamadreza Rostami, Pouya Mahmoody, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi	Technical University of Darmstadt
2023-06-21	suggested demonstrative example
2023-06-21	Rahul Kande, Chen Chen, Jeyavijayan Rajendran	Texas A&M University
2023-06-21	suggested demonstrative example
Modifications
Modification Date	Modifier	Organization
2020-06-25	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2020-06-25	updated Demonstrative_Examples
2020-08-20	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2020-08-20	updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2021-10-28	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2021-10-28	updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Detection_Factors, Name, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities
2022-04-28	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2022-04-28	updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2023-04-27	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2023-04-27	updated Relationships
2023-06-29	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2023-06-29	updated Mapping_Notes
2023-10-26	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2023-10-26	updated Demonstrative_Examples, References
Previous Entry Names
Change Date	Previous Entry Name
2021-10-28	Improper Implementation of Lock Protection Registers


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Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-1231: Improper Prevention of Lock Bit Modification

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