CWE-1270: Generation of Incorrect Security Tokens
 View customized information:  
	
		
		For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers.
	
	
		
        	For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts.
	
	
		
        	For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record).  Example: tool developers, security researchers.
	
	
			
        	For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry.
	
	
		
        	For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
	
    ×
     
Edit Custom FilterThe product implements a Security Token mechanism to differentiate what actions are allowed or disallowed when a transaction originates from an entity. However, the Security Tokens generated in the system are incorrect. 
        Systems-On-a-Chip (SoC) (Integrated circuits and hardware engines) implement Security Tokens to differentiate and identify actions originated from various agents. These actions could be "read", "write", "program", "reset", "fetch", "compute", etc. Security Tokens are generated and assigned to every agent on the SoC that is either capable of generating an action or receiving an action from another agent. Every agent could be assigned a unique, Security Token based on its trust level or privileges. Incorrectly generated Security Tokens could result in the same token used for multiple agents or multiple tokens being used for the same agent. This condition could result in a Denial-of-Service (DoS) or the execution of an action that in turn could result in privilege escalation or unintended access.  This table specifies different individual consequences
                        associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is
                        violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an
                        adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about
                        how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other
                        consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be
                        exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to
                        achieve a different impact.
              
 
  
                        This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this
                            weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to
                            similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition,
                            relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user
                            may want to explore.
                    
         
                            Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
                            
  
                            Relevant to the view "Hardware Design" (View-1194)
                            
  The different Modes of Introduction provide information
                        about how and when this
                        weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which
                        introduction
                        may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the
                        given
                        phase.
                
  This listing shows possible areas for which the given
                        weakness could appear. These
                        may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms,
                        Technologies,
                        or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given
                        weakness appears for that instance.
                
 Example 1 Consider a system with a register for storing an AES key for encryption or decryption. The key is 128 bits long implemented as a set of four 32-bit registers. The key registers are assets, and register, AES_KEY_ACCESS_POLICY, is defined to provide necessary access controls. The access-policy register defines which agents, using a Security Token, may access the AES-key registers. Each bit in this 32-bit register is used to define a Security Token. There could be a maximum of 32 Security Tokens that are allowed access to the AES-key registers. When set (bit = "1") bit number allows action from an agent whose identity matches that bit number. If Clear (bit = "0") the action is disallowed for the corresponding agent. Assume the system has two agents: a Main-controller and an Aux-controller. The respective Security Tokens are "1" and "2". 
 An agent with a Security Token "1" has access to AES_ENC_DEC_KEY_0 through AES_ENC_DEC_KEY_3 registers. As per the above access policy, the AES-Key-access policy allows access to the AES-key registers if the security Token is "1". (bad code) 
                                
                                    
                                    Example Language: Other 
                                    
                                 
                            
                                The SoC incorrectly generates Security Token "1" for every agent. In other words, both Main-controller and Aux-controller are assigned Security Token "1".
                             
                        Both agents have access to the AES-key registers. (good code) 
                                
                                    
                                    Example Language: Other 
                                    
                                 
                            
                                The SoC should correctly generate Security Tokens, assigning "1" to the Main-controller and "2" to the Aux-controller 
                             
                         This MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that
                                reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a
                                weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
                        
 
 More information is available — Please edit the custom filter or select a different filter.  | 
	
  
| 
          
           Use of the Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE™) and the associated references from this website are subject to the Terms of Use. CWE is sponsored by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and managed by the Homeland Security Systems Engineering and Development Institute (HSSEDI) which is operated by The MITRE Corporation (MITRE). Copyright © 2006–2025, The MITRE Corporation. CWE, CWSS, CWRAF, and the CWE logo are trademarks of The MITRE Corporation.  | 
        ||
	                
