CWE-1290: Incorrect Decoding of Security Identifiers
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Edit Custom FilterMore information is available — Please edit the custom filter or select a different filter. The product implements a decoding mechanism to decode certain bus-transaction signals to security identifiers, but it decodes an untrusted agent's security identifier into a trusted agent's security identifier.
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This table specifies different individual consequences
associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is
violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an
adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about
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exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to
achieve a different impact.
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Example 1
Consider a system that has four bus masters and a decoder. The decoder is supposed to decode every bus transaction and assign a corresponding security identifier. The security identifier is used to determine accesses to the assets. The bus transaction that contains the security information is Bus_transaction [15:14], and the bits 15 through 14 contain the security identifier information. The table below provides bus masters as well as their security identifiers and trust assumptions:
The assets are the AES-Key registers for encryption or decryption. The key is 128 bits implemented as a set of four 32-bit registers. The AES_KEY_ACCESS_POLICY is used to define which agents with a security identifier in the transaction can access the AES-key registers. The size of the security identifier is 4 bits (i.e., bit 3 through 0). Each bit in these 4 bits defines a security identifier. There are only 4 security identifiers that are allowed accesses to the AES-key registers. The number of the bit when set (i.e., "1") allows respective action from an agent whose identity matches the number of the bit. If clear (i.e., "0"), disallows the respective action to that corresponding agent.
The following Pseudo code outlines the process of checking the value of the Security Identifier within the AES_KEY_ACCESS_POLICY register: (informative)
Example Language: Other
If (AES_KEY_ACCESS_POLICY[Security_Identifier] == "1")
Allow access to AES-Key registers
Else
Deny access to AES-Key registers
Below is a decoder's Pseudo code that only checks for bit [14] of the bus transaction to determine what Security Identifier it must assign. (bad code)
Example Language: Other
If (Bus_transaction[14] == "1")
Security_Identifier == "1"
Else
Security_Identifier == "0"
The security identifier is two bits, but the decoder code above only checks the value of one bit. Two Masters have their bit 0 set to "1" - Master_1 and Master_3. Master_1 is trusted, while Master_3 is not. The code above would therefore allow an untrusted agent, Master_3, access to the AES-Key registers in addition to intended trusted Master_1.
(good code)
Example Language: Other
If (Bus_transaction[15:14] == "00")
Security_Identifier == "0"
If (Bus_transaction[15:14] == "01")
Security_Identifier == "1"
If (Bus_transaction[15:14] == "10")
Security_Identifier == "2"
If (Bus_transaction[15:14] == "11")
Security_Identifier == "3"
This MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that
reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a
weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
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