CWE - CWE-307: Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts (4.9)

Weakness ID: 307

Abstraction: Base
Structure: Simple

View customized information:

Description

The product does not implement sufficient measures to prevent multiple failed authentication attempts within a short time frame, making it more susceptible to brute force attacks.

Relationships

This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.

Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (CWE-1000)

Nature	Type	ID	Name
ChildOf	Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.	799	Improper Control of Interaction Frequency
ChildOf	Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.	1390	Weak Authentication

Relevant to the view "Software Development" (CWE-699)

Nature	Type	ID	Name
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	1211	Authentication Errors

Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (CWE-1003)

Nature	Type	ID	Name
ChildOf	Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.	287	Improper Authentication

Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (CWE-1008)

Nature	Type	ID	Name
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	1010	Authenticate Actors

Modes Of Introduction

The different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.

Phase	Note
Architecture and Design	COMMISSION: This weakness refers to an incorrect design related to an architectural security tactic.

Applicable Platforms

This listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.

Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Common Consequences

This table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.

Scope	Impact	Likelihood
Access Control	Technical Impact: Bypass Protection Mechanism An attacker could perform an arbitrary number of authentication attempts using different passwords, and eventually gain access to the targeted account.

Demonstrative Examples

Example 1

In January 2009, an attacker was able to gain administrator access to a Twitter server because the server did not restrict the number of login attempts [REF-236]. The attacker targeted a member of Twitter's support team and was able to successfully guess the member's password using a brute force attack by guessing a large number of common words. After gaining access as the member of the support staff, the attacker used the administrator panel to gain access to 33 accounts that belonged to celebrities and politicians. Ultimately, fake Twitter messages were sent that appeared to come from the compromised accounts.

Example 1 References:

[REF-236] Kim Zetter. "Weak Password Brings 'Happiness' to Twitter Hacker". 2009-01-09. <http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/01/professed-twitt/>.

Example 2

The following code, extracted from a servlet's doPost() method, performs an authentication lookup every time the servlet is invoked.

(bad code)

Example Language: Java

String username = request.getParameter("username");
String password = request.getParameter("password");

int authResult = authenticateUser(username, password);

However, the software makes no attempt to restrict excessive authentication attempts.

Example 3

This code attempts to limit the number of login attempts by causing the process to sleep before completing the authentication.

(bad code)

Example Language: PHP

$username = $_POST['username'];
$password = $_POST['password'];
sleep(2000);
$isAuthenticated = authenticateUser($username, $password);

However, there is no limit on parallel connections, so this does not increase the amount of time an attacker needs to complete an attack.

Example 4

In the following C/C++ example the validateUser method opens a socket connection, reads a username and password from the socket and attempts to authenticate the username and password.

(bad code)

Example Language: C

int validateUser(char *host, int port)
{

int socket = openSocketConnection(host, port);
if (socket < 0) {

printf("Unable to open socket connection");
return(FAIL);

}

int isValidUser = 0;
char username[USERNAME_SIZE];
char password[PASSWORD_SIZE];

while (isValidUser == 0) {

if (getNextMessage(socket, username, USERNAME_SIZE) > 0) {

if (getNextMessage(socket, password, PASSWORD_SIZE) > 0) {

isValidUser = AuthenticateUser(username, password);

}

}
return(SUCCESS);

}

The validateUser method will continuously check for a valid username and password without any restriction on the number of authentication attempts made. The method should limit the number of authentication attempts made to prevent brute force attacks as in the following example code.

(good code)

Example Language: C

int validateUser(char *host, int port)
{

...

int count = 0;
while ((isValidUser == 0) && (count < MAX_ATTEMPTS)) {

if (getNextMessage(socket, username, USERNAME_SIZE) > 0) {

if (getNextMessage(socket, password, PASSWORD_SIZE) > 0) {

isValidUser = AuthenticateUser(username, password);

}

}
count++;

}
if (isValidUser) {

return(SUCCESS);

}
else {

return(FAIL);

}

Example 5

Consider this example from a real-world attack against the iPhone [REF-1218]. An attacker can use brute force methods; each time there is a failed guess, the attacker quickly cuts the power before the failed entry is recorded, effectively bypassing the intended limit on the number of failed authentication attempts. Note that this attack requires removal of the cell phone battery and connecting directly to the phone's power source, and the brute force attack is still time-consuming.

Observed Examples

Reference	Description
CVE-2019-0039	the REST API for a network OS has a high limit for number of connections, allowing brute force password guessing
CVE-1999-1152	Product does not disconnect or timeout after multiple failed logins.
CVE-2001-1291	Product does not disconnect or timeout after multiple failed logins.
CVE-2001-0395	Product does not disconnect or timeout after multiple failed logins.
CVE-2001-1339	Product does not disconnect or timeout after multiple failed logins.
CVE-2002-0628	Product does not disconnect or timeout after multiple failed logins.
CVE-1999-1324	User accounts not disabled when they exceed a threshold; possibly a resultant problem.

Potential Mitigations

Phase: Architecture and Design

Common protection mechanisms include:

Disconnecting the user after a small number of failed attempts

Implementing a timeout

Locking out a targeted account

Requiring a computational task on the user's part.

Phase: Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

Consider using libraries with authentication capabilities such as OpenSSL or the ESAPI Authenticator. [REF-45]

Detection Methods

Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:

Web Application Scanner

Web Services Scanner

Database Scanners

Cost effective for partial coverage:

Host-based Vulnerability Scanners - Examine configuration for flaws, verifying that audit mechanisms work, ensure host configuration meets certain predefined criteria

Effectiveness: High

Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:

Fuzz Tester

Framework-based Fuzzer

Cost effective for partial coverage:

Forced Path Execution

Effectiveness: High

Manual Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:

Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source

Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)

Effectiveness: High

Automated Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:

Source code Weakness Analyzer

Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Automated Static Analysis

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:

Configuration Checker

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Architecture or Design Review

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:

Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction

Cost effective for partial coverage:

Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)

Effectiveness: High

Memberships

This MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.

Nature	Type	ID	Name
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	724	OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A3 - Broken Authentication and Session Management
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	808	2010 Top 25 - Weaknesses On the Cusp
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	812	OWASP Top Ten 2010 Category A3 - Broken Authentication and Session Management
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	866	2011 Top 25 - Porous Defenses
MemberOf	View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries).	884	CWE Cross-section
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	955	SFP Secondary Cluster: Unrestricted Authentication
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	1353	OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A07:2021 - Identification and Authentication Failures

Taxonomy Mappings

Mapped Taxonomy Name	Node ID	Fit	Mapped Node Name
PLOVER	AUTHENT.MULTFAIL		Multiple Failed Authentication Attempts not Prevented
Software Fault Patterns	SFP34		Unrestricted authentication

Related Attack Patterns

CAPEC-ID	Attack Pattern Name
CAPEC-16	Dictionary-based Password Attack
CAPEC-49	Password Brute Forcing
CAPEC-560	Use of Known Domain Credentials
CAPEC-565	Password Spraying
CAPEC-600	Credential Stuffing
CAPEC-652	Use of Known Kerberos Credentials
CAPEC-653	Use of Known Operating System Credentials

References

[REF-45] OWASP. "OWASP Enterprise Security API (ESAPI) Project". <http://www.owasp.org/index.php/ESAPI>.

[REF-236] Kim Zetter. "Weak Password Brings 'Happiness' to Twitter Hacker". 2009-01-09. <http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/01/professed-twitt/>.

[REF-1218] Graham Cluley. "This Black Box Can Brute Force Crack iPhone PIN Passcodes". The Mac Security Blog. 2015-03-16. <https://www.intego.com/mac-security-blog/iphone-pin-pass-code/>.

Content History

Submissions
Submission Date	Submitter	Organization
2006-07-19	PLOVER
2006-07-19
Modifications
Modification Date	Modifier	Organization
2008-07-01	Sean Eidemiller	Cigital
2008-07-01	added/updated demonstrative examples
2008-09-08	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2008-09-08	updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2009-03-10	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2009-03-10	updated Relationships
2009-07-27	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2009-07-27	updated Observed_Examples
2009-12-28	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2009-12-28	updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Potential_Mitigations
2010-02-16	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2010-02-16	updated Demonstrative_Examples, Name, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2010-04-05	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2010-04-05	updated Demonstrative_Examples
2011-03-29	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2011-03-29	updated Demonstrative_Examples
2011-06-01	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2011-06-01	updated Common_Consequences
2011-06-27	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2011-06-27	updated Common_Consequences, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2011-09-13	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2011-09-13	updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
2012-05-11	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2012-05-11	updated Relationships
2014-07-30	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2014-07-30	updated Detection_Factors, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2017-11-08	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2017-11-08	updated Demonstrative_Examples, Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships
2019-06-20	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2019-06-20	updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships
2020-02-24	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2020-02-24	updated Detection_Factors, Relationships
2020-08-20	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2020-08-20	updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2021-10-28	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2021-10-28	updated Demonstrative_Examples, References, Relationships
2022-10-13	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2022-10-13	updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Observed_Examples, References, Relationships
Previous Entry Names
Change Date	Previous Entry Name
2008-04-11	Multiple Failed Authentication Attempts not Prevented

2010-02-16	Failure to Restrict Excessive Authentication Attempts


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Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-307: Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts