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ID

CWE-329: Generation of Predictable IV with CBC Mode

Weakness ID: 329
Abstraction: Variant
Structure: Simple
Status: Draft
Presentation Filter:
+ Description
The product generates and uses a predictable initialization Vector (IV) with Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) Mode, which causes algorithms to be susceptible to dictionary attacks when they are encrypted under the same key.
+ Extended Description

CBC mode eliminates a weakness of Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode by allowing identical plaintext blocks to be encrypted to different ciphertext blocks. This is possible by the XOR-ing of an IV with the initial plaintext block so that every plaintext block in the chain is XOR'd with a different value before encryption. If IVs are reused, then identical plaintexts would be encrypted to identical ciphertexts. However, even if IVs are not identical but are predictable, then they still break the security of CBC mode against Chosen Plaintext Attacks (CPA).

+ Relationships
Section HelpThis table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (CWE-1000)
NatureTypeIDName
ChildOfClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.573Improper Following of Specification by Caller
ChildOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.1204Generation of Weak Initialization Vector (IV)
+ Background Details

CBC mode is a commonly used mode of operation for a block cipher. It works by XOR-ing an IV with the initial block of a plaintext prior to encryption and then XOR-ing each successive block of plaintext with the previous block of ciphertext before encryption.

C_0 = IV
C_i = E_k{M_i XOR C_{i-1}}

When used properly, CBC mode provides security against chosen plaintext attacks. Having an unpredictable IV is a crucial underpinning of this. See [REF-1171].

+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
PhaseNote
Architecture and DesignDesigners might assume a non-cryptographic context for a cryptographic variable.
ImplementationDevelopers might dismiss the importance of an unpredictable IV and choose an easier implementation to save effort, weakening the scheme in the process.
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.

Languages

Class: Language-Independent (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
ScopeImpactLikelihood
Confidentiality

Technical Impact: Read Application Data

If the IV is not properly initialized, data that is encrypted can be compromised and leak information.
+ Likelihood Of Exploit
Medium
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1

In the following examples, CBC mode is used when encrypting data:

(bad code)
Example Language:
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
RAND_bytes(key, b);
memset(iv,0,EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH);
EVP_EncryptInit(&ctx,EVP_bf_cbc(), key,iv);
(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
public class SymmetricCipherTest {
public static void main() {

byte[] text ="Secret".getBytes();
byte[] iv ={
0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00
};
KeyGenerator kg = KeyGenerator.getInstance("DES");
kg.init(56);
SecretKey key = kg.generateKey();
Cipher cipher = Cipher.getInstance("DES/CBC/PKCS5Padding");
IvParameterSpec ips = new IvParameterSpec(iv);
cipher.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, key, ips);
return cipher.doFinal(inpBytes);
}
}

In both of these examples, the initialization vector (IV) is always a block of zeros. This makes the resulting cipher text much more predictable and susceptible to a dictionary attack.

+ Observed Examples
ReferenceDescription
encryption functionality in an authentication framework uses a fixed null IV with CBC mode, allowing attackers to decrypt traffic in applications that use this functionality
messages for a door-unlocking product use a fixed IV in CBC mode, which is the same after each restart
application uses AES in CBC mode, but the pseudo-random secret and IV are generated using math.random, which is not cryptographically strong.
Blowfish-CBC implementation constructs an IV where each byte is calculated modulo 8 instead of modulo 256, resulting in less than 12 bits for the effective IV length, and less than 4096 possible IV values.
BEAST attack in SSL 3.0 / TLS 1.0. In CBC mode, chained initialization vectors are non-random, allowing decryption of HTTPS traffic using a chosen plaintext attack.
+ Potential Mitigations

Phase: Implementation

NIST recommends two methods of generating unpredictable IVs for CBC mode [REF-1172]. The first is to generate the IV randomly. The second method is to encrypt a nonce with the same key and cipher to be used to encrypt the plaintext. In this case the nonce must be unique but can be predictable, since the block cipher will act as a pseudo random permutation.
+ Functional Areas
  • Cryptography
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
NatureTypeIDName
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.959SFP Secondary Cluster: Weak Cryptography
+ Notes

Maintenance

As of CWE 4.5, terminology related to randomness, entropy, and predictability can vary widely. Within the developer and other communities, "randomness" is used heavily. However, within cryptography, "entropy" is distinct, typically implied as a measurement. There are no commonly-used definitions, even within standards documents and cryptography papers. Future versions of CWE will attempt to define these terms and, if necessary, distinguish between them in ways that are appropriate for different communities but do not reduce the usability of CWE for mapping, understanding, or other scenarios.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy NameNode IDFitMapped Node Name
CLASPNot using a random IV with CBC mode
+ References
[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 2, "Initialization Vectors", Page 42. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
[REF-18] Secure Software, Inc.. "The CLASP Application Security Process". 2005. <https://cwe.mitre.org/documents/sources/TheCLASPApplicationSecurityProcess.pdf>.
[REF-1171] Matthew Green. "Why IND-CPA implies randomized encryption". 2018-08-24. <https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/why-ind-cpa-implies-randomized-encryption/>.
[REF-1172] NIST. "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation". Appendix C. 2001-12. <https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-38a.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission DateSubmitterOrganization
2006-07-19CLASP
+ Modifications
Modification DateModifierOrganization
2008-07-01Eric DalciCigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
2008-09-08CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Background_Details, Common_Consequences, Functional_Areas, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-01CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2012-05-11CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated References, Relationships
2012-10-30CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Potential_Mitigations
2014-07-30CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2017-11-08CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples
2019-06-20CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2020-02-24CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2021-03-15CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Background_Details, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Modes_of_Introduction, Name, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
2021-07-20CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Description, Maintenance_Notes, Name, References
+ Previous Entry Names
Change DatePrevious Entry Name
2021-03-15Not Using a Random IV with CBC Mode
2021-07-20Not Using an Unpredictable IV with CBC Mode
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Page Last Updated: July 20, 2021