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Common Weakness Enumeration

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ID

CWE-444: Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling')

Weakness ID: 444
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWEDThis CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
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+ Description
The product acts as an intermediary HTTP agent (such as a proxy or firewall) in the data flow between two entities such as a client and server, but it does not interpret malformed HTTP requests or responses in ways that are consistent with how the messages will be processed by those entities that are at the ultimate destination.
+ Extended Description

HTTP requests or responses ("messages") can be malformed or unexpected in ways that cause web servers or clients to interpret the messages in different ways than intermediary HTTP agents such as load balancers, reverse proxies, web caching proxies, application firewalls, etc. For example, an adversary may be able to add duplicate or different header fields that a client or server might interpret as one set of messages, whereas the intermediary might interpret the same sequence of bytes as a different set of messages. For example, discrepancies can arise in how to handle duplicate headers like two Transfer-encoding (TE) or two Content-length (CL), or the malicious HTTP message will have different headers for TE and CL.

The inconsistent parsing and interpretation of messages can allow the adversary to "smuggle" a message to the client/server without the intermediary being aware of it.

This weakness is usually the result of the usage of outdated or incompatible HTTP protocol versions in the HTTP agents.

+ Alternate Terms
HTTP Request Smuggling
HTTP Response Smuggling
HTTP Smuggling
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
ScopeImpactLikelihood
Integrity
Non-Repudiation
Access Control

Technical Impact: Unexpected State; Hide Activities; Bypass Protection Mechanism

An attacker could create HTTP messages to exploit a number of weaknesses including 1) the message can trick the web server to associate a URL with another URL's webpage and caching the contents of the webpage (web cache poisoning attack), 2) the message can be structured to bypass the firewall protection mechanisms and gain unauthorized access to a web application, and 3) the message can invoke a script or a page that returns client credentials (similar to a Cross Site Scripting attack).
+ Potential Mitigations

Phase: Implementation

Use a web server that employs a strict HTTP parsing procedure, such as Apache [REF-433].

Phase: Implementation

Use only SSL communication.

Phase: Implementation

Terminate the client session after each request.

Phase: System Configuration

Turn all pages to non-cacheable.
+ Relationships
Section HelpThis table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (CWE-1000)
NatureTypeIDName
ChildOfClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.436Interpretation Conflict
Section HelpThis table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (CWE-699)
NatureTypeIDName
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.438Behavioral Problems
Section HelpThis table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (CWE-1003)
NatureTypeIDName
ChildOfClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.436Interpretation Conflict
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
PhaseNote
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.

Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: Web Based (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1

In the following example, a malformed HTTP request is sent to a website that includes a proxy server and a web server with the intent of poisoning the cache to associate one webpage with another malicious webpage.

(attack code)
 
POST http://www.website.com/foobar.html HTTP/1.1
Host: www.website.com
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 0
Content-Length: 54

GET /poison.html HTTP/1.1
Host: www.website.com
Bla: GET http://www.website.com/page_to_poison.html HTTP/1.1
Host: www.website.com
Connection: Keep-Alive

When this request is sent to the proxy server, the proxy server parses the first four lines of the POST request and encounters the two "Content-Length" headers. The proxy server ignores the first header, so it assumes the request has a body of length 54 bytes. Therefore, it treats the data in the next three lines that contain exactly 54 bytes as the first request's body:

(result)
 
GET /poison.html HTTP/1.1
Host: www.website.com
Bla:

The proxy then parses the remaining bytes, which it treats as the client's second request:

(attack code)
 
GET http://www.website.com/page_to_poison.html HTTP/1.1
Host: www.website.com
Connection: Keep-Alive

The original request is forwarded by the proxy server to the web server. Unlike the proxy, the web server uses the first "Content-Length" header and considers that the first POST request has no body.

(attack code)
 
POST http://www.website.com/foobar.html HTTP/1.1
Host: www.website.com
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 0
Content-Length: 54 (ignored by server)

Because the web server has assumed the original POST request was length 0, it parses the second request that follows, i.e. for GET /poison.html:

(attack code)
 
GET /poison.html HTTP/1.1
Host: www.website.com
Bla: GET http://www.website.com/page_to_poison.html HTTP/1.1
Host: www.website.com
Connection: Keep-Alive

Note that the "Bla:" header is treated as a regular header, so it is not parsed as a separate GET request.

The requests the web server sees are "POST /foobar.html" and "GET /poison.html", so it sends back two responses with the contents of the "foobar.html" page and the "poison.html" page, respectively. The proxy matches these responses to the two requests it thinks were sent by the client - "POST /foobar.html" and "GET /page_to_poison.html". If the response is cacheable, the proxy caches the contents of "poison.html" under the URL "page_to_poison.html", and the cache is poisoned! Any client requesting "page_to_poison.html" from the proxy would receive the "poison.html" page.

When a website includes both a proxy server and a web server, some protection against this type of attack can be achieved by installing a web application firewall, or using a web server that includes a stricter HTTP parsing procedure or make all webpages non-cacheable.

Additionally, if a web application includes a Java servlet for processing requests, the servlet can check for multiple "Content-Length" headers and if they are found the servlet can return an error response thereby preventing the poison page to be cached, as shown below.

(good code)
Example Language: Java 
protected void processRequest(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response) throws ServletException, IOException {

// Set up response writer object
...
try {
// check for multiple content length headers
Enumeration contentLengthHeaders = request.getHeaders("Content-Length");
int count = 0;
while (contentLengthHeaders.hasMoreElements()) {
count++;
}
if (count > 1) {
// output error response
}
else {
// process request
}
} catch (Exception ex) {...}
}

Example 2

In the following example, a malformed HTTP request is sent to a website that includes a web server with a firewall with the intent of bypassing the web server firewall to smuggle malicious code into the system.

(attack code)
 
POST /page.asp HTTP/1.1
Host: www.website.com
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Length: 49223

zzz...zzz ["z" x 49152]
POST /page.asp HTTP/1.0
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Length: 30

POST /page.asp HTTP/1.0
Bla: POST /page.asp?cmd.exe HTTP/1.0
Connection: Keep-Alive

When this request is sent to the web server, the first POST request has a content-length of 49,223 bytes, and the firewall treats the line with 49,152 copies of "z" and the lines with an additional lines with 71 bytes as its body (49,152+71=49,223). The firewall then continues to parse what it thinks is the second request starting with the line with the third POST request.

Note that there is no CRLF after the "Bla: " header so the POST in the line is parsed as the value of the "Bla:" header. Although the line contains the pattern identified with a worm ("cmd.exe"), it is not blocked, since it is considered part of a header value. Therefore, "cmd.exe" is smuggled through the firewall.

When the request is passed through the firewall the web server the first request is ignored because the web server does not find an expected "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" header, and starts parsing the second request.

This second request has a content-length of 30 bytes, which is exactly the length of the next two lines up to the space after the "Bla:" header. And unlike the firewall, the web server processes the final POST as a separate third request and the "cmd.exe" worm is smuggled through the firewall to the web server.

To avoid this attack a Web server firewall product must be used that is designed to prevent this type of attack.


Example 3

The interpretation of HTTP responses can be manipulated if response headers include a space between the header name and colon, or if HTTP 1.1 headers are sent through a proxy configured for HTTP 1.0, allowing for HTTP response smuggling. This can be exploited in web browsers and other applications when used in combination with various proxy servers. For instance, the HTTP response interpreted by the front-end/client HTTP agent/entity - in this case the web browser - can interpret a single response from an adversary-compromised web server as being two responses from two different web sites. In the Example below, notice the extra space after the Content-Length and Set-Cookie headers.

(attack code)
 
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Fri, 08 Aug 2016 08:12:31 GMT
Server: Apache (Unix)
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Encoding: gzip
Content-Type: text/html
Content-Length : 2345
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Set-Cookie : token="Malicious Code"

<HTML> ... "Malicious Code"

+ Observed Examples
ReferenceDescription
SSL/TLS-capable proxy allows HTTP smuggling when used in tandem with HTTP/1.0 services, due to inconsistent interpretation and input sanitization of HTTP messages within the body of another message
Chain: caching proxy server has improper input validation (CWE-20) of headers, allowing HTTP response smuggling (CWE-444) using an "LF line ending"
Node.js platform allows request smuggling via two Transfer-Encoding headers
Web servers allow request smuggling via inconsistent HTTP headers.
HTTP server allows request smuggling with both a "Transfer-Encoding: chunked" header and a Content-Length header
HTTP server allows request smuggling with both a "Transfer-Encoding: chunked" header and a Content-Length header
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
NatureTypeIDName
MemberOfViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries).884CWE Cross-section
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.990SFP Secondary Cluster: Tainted Input to Command
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1348OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A04:2021 - Insecure Design
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1398Comprehensive Categorization: Component Interaction
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes

Usage: ALLOWED

(this CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)

Reason: Acceptable-Use

Rationale:

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments:

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Notes

Theoretical

Request smuggling can be performed due to a multiple interpretation error, where the target is an intermediary or monitor, via a consistency manipulation (Transfer-Encoding and Content-Length headers).
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy NameNode IDFitMapped Node Name
PLOVERHTTP Request Smuggling
WASC26HTTP Request Smuggling
WASC27HTTP Response Smuggling
+ References
[REF-433] Chaim Linhart, Amit Klein, Ronen Heled and Steve Orrin. "HTTP Request Smuggling". <https://www.cgisecurity.com/lib/HTTP-Request-Smuggling.pdf>. URL validated: 2023-04-07.
[REF-1273] Robert Auger. "HTTP Response Smuggling". 2011-02-01. <http://projects.webappsec.org/w/page/13246930/HTTP%20Response%20Smuggling>.
[REF-1274] Dzevad Alibegovic. "HTTP Request Smuggling: Complete Guide to Attack Types and Prevention". 2021-08-23. <https://brightsec.com/blog/http-request-smuggling-hrs/>.
[REF-1275] Busra Demir. "A Pentester's Guide to HTTP Request Smuggling". 2020-10-15. <https://www.cobalt.io/blog/a-pentesters-guide-to-http-request-smuggling>.
[REF-1276] Edi Kogan and Daniel Kerman. "HTTP Desync Attacks in the Wild and How to Defend Against Them". 2019-10-29. <https://www.imperva.com/blog/http-desync-attacks-and-defence-methods/>.
[REF-1277] James Kettle. "HTTP Desync Attacks: Request Smuggling Reborn". 2019-08-07. <https://portswigger.net/research/http-desync-attacks-request-smuggling-reborn>. URL validated: 2023-04-07.
[REF-1278] PortSwigger. "HTTP request smuggling". <https://portswigger.net/web-security/request-smuggling>. URL validated: 2023-04-07.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission DateSubmitterOrganization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
PLOVER
+ Modifications
Modification DateModifierOrganization
2008-07-01Eric DalciCigital
updated Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction
2008-09-08CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Name, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2009-05-27CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Name, Related_Attack_Patterns
2010-02-16CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-01CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2012-05-11CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships
2012-10-30CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Potential_Mitigations
2014-06-23CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, Theoretical_Notes
2014-07-30CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2015-12-07CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2017-11-08CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms
2020-02-24CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships
2021-10-28CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2022-04-28CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2022-06-28CWE Content TeamMITRE
Extended the abstraction of this entry to include both HTTP request and response smuggling.
2022-06-28CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Alternate_Terms, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Name, Observed_Examples, References, Taxonomy_Mappings
2022-10-13CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2023-04-27CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated References, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction
2023-06-29CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
+ Previous Entry Names
Change DatePrevious Entry Name
2008-04-11HTTP Request Smuggling
2008-09-09Interpretation Conflict in Web Traffic (aka 'HTTP Request Smuggling')
2009-05-27Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests (aka 'HTTP Request Smuggling')
2022-06-28Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request Smuggling')
Page Last Updated: July 16, 2024