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Common Weakness Enumeration

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ID

CWE-768: Incorrect Short Circuit Evaluation

Weakness ID: 768
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWEDThis CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
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+ Description
The product contains a conditional statement with multiple logical expressions in which one of the non-leading expressions may produce side effects. This may lead to an unexpected state in the program after the execution of the conditional, because short-circuiting logic may prevent the side effects from occurring.
+ Extended Description

Usage of short circuit evaluation, though well-defined in the C standard, may alter control flow in a way that introduces logic errors that are difficult to detect, possibly causing errors later during the product's execution. If an attacker can discover such an inconsistency, it may be exploitable to gain arbitrary control over a system.

If the first condition of an "or" statement is assumed to be true under normal circumstances, or if the first condition of an "and" statement is assumed to be false, then any subsequent conditional may contain its own logic errors that are not detected during code review or testing.

Finally, the usage of short circuit evaluation may decrease the maintainability of the code.

+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
ScopeImpactLikelihood
Confidentiality
Integrity
Availability

Technical Impact: Varies by Context

Widely varied consequences are possible if an attacker is aware of an unexpected state in the product after a conditional. It may lead to information exposure, a system crash, or even complete attacker control of the system.
+ Potential Mitigations

Phase: Implementation

Minimizing the number of statements in a conditional that produce side effects will help to prevent the likelihood of short circuit evaluation to alter control flow in an unexpected way.
+ Relationships
Section HelpThis table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (CWE-1000)
NatureTypeIDName
ChildOfPillarPillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things.691Insufficient Control Flow Management
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
PhaseNote
Implementation
+ Likelihood Of Exploit
Low
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1

The following function attempts to take a size value from a user and allocate an array of that size (we ignore bounds checking for simplicity). The function tries to initialize each spot with the value of its index, that is, A[len-1] = len - 1; A[len-2] = len - 2; ... A[1] = 1; A[0] = 0; However, since the programmer uses the prefix decrement operator, when the conditional is evaluated with i == 1, the decrement will result in a 0 value for the first part of the predicate, causing the second portion to be bypassed via short-circuit evaluation. This means we cannot be sure of what value will be in A[0] when we return the array to the user.

(bad code)
Example Language:
#define PRIV_ADMIN 0
#define PRIV_REGULAR 1
typedef struct{
int privileges;
int id;
} user_t;
user_t *Add_Regular_Users(int num_users){
user_t* users = (user_t*)calloc(num_users, sizeof(user_t));
int i = num_users;
while( --i && (users[i].privileges = PRIV_REGULAR) ){
users[i].id = i;
}
return users;
}
int main(){
user_t* test;
int i;
test = Add_Regular_Users(25);
for(i = 0; i < 25; i++) printf("user %d has privilege level %d\n", test[i].id, test[i].privileges);
}

When compiled and run, the above code will output a privilege level of 1, or PRIV_REGULAR for every user but the user with id 0 since the prefix increment operator used in the if statement will reach zero and short circuit before setting the 0th user's privilege level. Since we used calloc, this privilege will be set to 0, or PRIV_ADMIN.


+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
NatureTypeIDName
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.871CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 03 - Expressions (EXP)
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.998SFP Secondary Cluster: Glitch in Computation
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1410Comprehensive Categorization: Insufficient Control Flow Management
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes

Usage: ALLOWED

(this CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)

Reason: Acceptable-Use

Rationale:

This CWE entry is at the Variant level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments:

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy NameNode IDFitMapped Node Name
CLASPFailure to protect stored data from modification
Software Fault PatternsSFP1Glitch in computation
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission DateSubmitterOrganization
2009-03-03
(CWE 1.4, 2009-05-27)
CWE Content TeamMITRE
+ Modifications
Modification DateModifierOrganization
2010-09-27CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Description
2011-09-13CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2012-05-11CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2014-07-30CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2017-11-08CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Likelihood_of_Exploit, Taxonomy_Mappings
2020-02-24CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2023-01-31CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Description
2023-04-27CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2023-06-29CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-10-26CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Common_Consequences
Page Last Updated: July 16, 2024