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CWE-784: Reliance on Cookies without Validation and Integrity Checking in a Security Decision
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Edit Custom FilterThe product uses a protection mechanism that relies on the existence or values of a cookie, but it does not properly ensure that the cookie is valid for the associated user.
Attackers can easily modify cookies, within the browser or by implementing the client-side code outside of the browser. Attackers can bypass protection mechanisms such as authorization and authentication by modifying the cookie to contain an expected value.
This table specifies different individual consequences
associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is
violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an
adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about
how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other
consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be
exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to
achieve a different impact.
This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this
weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to
similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition,
relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user
may want to explore.
Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (CWE-1000)
Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (CWE-1008)
The different Modes of Introduction provide information
about how and when this
weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which
introduction
may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the
given
phase.
This listing shows possible areas for which the given
weakness could appear. These
may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms,
Technologies,
or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given
weakness appears for that instance.
Languages Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence) Technologies Class: Web Based (Often Prevalent) Example 1 The following code excerpt reads a value from a browser cookie to determine the role of the user. (bad code)
Example Language: Java
Cookie[] cookies = request.getCookies();
for (int i =0; i< cookies.length; i++) { Cookie c = cookies[i]; }if (c.getName().equals("role")) { userRole = c.getValue(); }Example 2 The following code could be for a medical records application. It performs authentication by checking if a cookie has been set. (bad code)
Example Language: PHP
$auth = $_COOKIES['authenticated'];
if (! $auth) { if (AuthenticateUser($_POST['user'], $_POST['password']) == "success") { }// save the cookie to send out in future responses }setcookie("authenticated", "1", time()+60*60*2); else { ShowLoginScreen(); }die("\n"); DisplayMedicalHistory($_POST['patient_ID']); The programmer expects that the AuthenticateUser() check will always be applied, and the "authenticated" cookie will only be set when authentication succeeds. The programmer even diligently specifies a 2-hour expiration for the cookie. However, the attacker can set the "authenticated" cookie to a non-zero value such as 1. As a result, the $auth variable is 1, and the AuthenticateUser() check is not even performed. The attacker has bypassed the authentication. Example 3 In the following example, an authentication flag is read from a browser cookie, thus allowing for external control of user state data. (bad code)
Example Language: Java
Cookie[] cookies = request.getCookies();
for (int i =0; i< cookies.length; i++) { Cookie c = cookies[i]; }if (c.getName().equals("authenticated") && Boolean.TRUE.equals(c.getValue())) { authenticated = true; }
This MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that
reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a
weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Maintenance
A new parent might need to be defined for this entry. This entry is specific to cookies, which reflects the significant number of vulnerabilities being reported for cookie-based authentication in CVE during 2008 and 2009. However, other types of inputs - such as parameters or headers - could also be used for similar authentication or authorization. Similar issues (under the Research view) include CWE-247 and CWE-472.
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