CWE-843: Access of Resource Using Incompatible Type ('Type Confusion')
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Edit Custom FilterThe product allocates or initializes a resource such as a pointer, object, or variable using one type, but it later accesses that resource using a type that is incompatible with the original type.
When the product accesses the resource using an incompatible type, this could trigger logical errors because the resource does not have expected properties. In languages without memory safety, such as C and C++, type confusion can lead to out-of-bounds memory access. While this weakness is frequently associated with unions when parsing data with many different embedded object types in C, it can be present in any application that can interpret the same variable or memory location in multiple ways. This weakness is not unique to C and C++. For example, errors in PHP applications can be triggered by providing array parameters when scalars are expected, or vice versa. Languages such as Perl, which perform automatic conversion of a variable of one type when it is accessed as if it were another type, can also contain these issues. This table specifies different individual consequences
associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is
violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an
adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about
how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other
consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be
exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to
achieve a different impact.
This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this
weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to
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Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (CWE-1000)
Relevant to the view "Software Development" (CWE-699)
Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (CWE-1003)
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weakness could appear. These
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weakness appears for that instance.
Languages C (Undetermined Prevalence) C++ (Undetermined Prevalence) Example 1 The following code uses a union to support the representation of different types of messages. It formats messages differently, depending on their type. (bad code)
Example Language: C
#define NAME_TYPE 1
#define ID_TYPE 2 struct MessageBuffer { int msgType; };union { char *name; };int nameID; int main (int argc, char **argv) { struct MessageBuffer buf;
char *defaultMessage = "Hello World"; buf.msgType = NAME_TYPE; buf.name = defaultMessage; printf("Pointer of buf.name is %p\n", buf.name); /* This particular value for nameID is used to make the code architecture-independent. If coming from untrusted input, it could be any value. */ buf.nameID = (int)(defaultMessage + 1); printf("Pointer of buf.name is now %p\n", buf.name); if (buf.msgType == NAME_TYPE) { printf("Message: %s\n", buf.name); }else { printf("Message: Use ID %d\n", buf.nameID); }The code intends to process the message as a NAME_TYPE, and sets the default message to "Hello World." However, since both buf.name and buf.nameID are part of the same union, they can act as aliases for the same memory location, depending on memory layout after compilation. As a result, modification of buf.nameID - an int - can effectively modify the pointer that is stored in buf.name - a string. Execution of the program might generate output such as:
Pointer of name is 10830
Pointer of name is now 10831
Message: ello World
Notice how the pointer for buf.name was changed, even though buf.name was not explicitly modified. In this case, the first "H" character of the message is omitted. However, if an attacker is able to fully control the value of buf.nameID, then buf.name could contain an arbitrary pointer, leading to out-of-bounds reads or writes. Example 2 The following PHP code accepts a value, adds 5, and prints the sum. (bad code)
Example Language: PHP
$value = $_GET['value'];
$sum = $value + 5; echo "value parameter is '$value'<p>"; echo "SUM is $sum"; When called with the following query string:
value=123
the program calculates the sum and prints out:
SUM is 128
However, the attacker could supply a query string such as:
value[]=123
The "[]" array syntax causes $value to be treated as an array type, which then generates a fatal error when calculating $sum:
Fatal error: Unsupported operand types in program.php on line 2
Example 3 The following Perl code is intended to look up the privileges for user ID's between 0 and 3, by performing an access of the $UserPrivilegeArray reference. It is expected that only userID 3 is an admin (since this is listed in the third element of the array). (bad code)
Example Language: Perl
my $UserPrivilegeArray = ["user", "user", "admin", "user"];
my $userID = get_current_user_ID(); if ($UserPrivilegeArray eq "user") { print "Regular user!\n"; }else { print "Admin!\n"; }print "\$UserPrivilegeArray = $UserPrivilegeArray\n"; In this case, the programmer intended to use "$UserPrivilegeArray->{$userID}" to access the proper position in the array. But because the subscript was omitted, the "user" string was compared to the scalar representation of the $UserPrivilegeArray reference, which might be of the form "ARRAY(0x229e8)" or similar. Since the logic also "fails open" (CWE-636), the result of this bug is that all users are assigned administrator privileges. While this is a forced example, it demonstrates how type confusion can have security consequences, even in memory-safe languages.
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weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Applicable Platform This weakness is possible in any type-unsafe programming language. Research Gap Type confusion weaknesses have received some attention by applied researchers and major software vendors for C and C++ code. Some publicly-reported vulnerabilities probably have type confusion as a root-cause weakness, but these may be described as "memory corruption" instead. For other languages, there are very few public reports of type confusion weaknesses. These are probably under-studied. Since many programs rely directly or indirectly on loose typing, a potential "type confusion" behavior might be intentional, possibly requiring more manual analysis.
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