CWE-940: Improper Verification of Source of a Communication Channel
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Edit Custom FilterThe product establishes a communication channel to handle an incoming request that has been initiated by an actor, but it does not properly verify that the request is coming from the expected origin.
When an attacker can successfully establish a communication channel from an untrusted origin, the attacker may be able to gain privileges and access unexpected functionality.
This table specifies different individual consequences
associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is
violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an
adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about
how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other
consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be
exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to
achieve a different impact.
This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this
weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to
similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition,
relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user
may want to explore.
Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (CWE-1000)
Relevant to the view "Software Development" (CWE-699)
Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (CWE-1008)
The different Modes of Introduction provide information
about how and when this
weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which
introduction
may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the
given
phase.
This listing shows possible areas for which the given
weakness could appear. These
may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms,
Technologies,
or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given
weakness appears for that instance.
Languages Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence) Technologies Class: Mobile (Undetermined Prevalence) Example 1 This Android application will remove a user account when it receives an intent to do so: (bad code)
Example Language: Java
IntentFilter filter = new IntentFilter("com.example.RemoveUser");
MyReceiver receiver = new MyReceiver(); registerReceiver(receiver, filter); public class DeleteReceiver extends BroadcastReceiver { @Override }public void onReceive(Context context, Intent intent) { int userID = intent.getIntExtra("userID"); }destroyUserData(userID); This application does not check the origin of the intent, thus allowing any malicious application to remove a user. Always check the origin of an intent, or create an allowlist of trusted applications using the manifest.xml file. Example 2 These Android and iOS applications intercept URL loading within a WebView and perform special actions if a particular URL scheme is used, thus allowing the Javascript within the WebView to communicate with the application: (bad code)
Example Language: Java
// Android
@Override public boolean shouldOverrideUrlLoading(WebView view, String url){ if (url.substring(0,14).equalsIgnoreCase("examplescheme:")){
if(url.substring(14,25).equalsIgnoreCase("getUserInfo")){ }writeDataToView(view, UserData); }return false; else{ return true; }(bad code)
Example Language: Objective-C
// iOS
-(BOOL) webView:(UIWebView *)exWebView shouldStartLoadWithRequest:(NSURLRequest *)exRequest navigationType:(UIWebViewNavigationType)exNavigationType { NSURL *URL = [exRequest URL];
if ([[URL scheme] isEqualToString:@"exampleScheme"]) { NSString *functionString = [URL resourceSpecifier];
if ([functionString hasPrefix:@"specialFunction"]) { // Make data available back in webview. UIWebView *webView = [self writeDataToView:[URL query]]; return NO; return YES; A call into native code can then be initiated by passing parameters within the URL: (attack code)
Example Language: JavaScript
window.location = examplescheme://method?parameter=value
Because the application does not check the source, a malicious website loaded within this WebView has the same access to the API as a trusted site.
This MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that
reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a
weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Relationship
While many access control issues involve authenticating the user, this weakness is more about authenticating the actual source of the communication channel itself; there might not be any "user" in such cases.
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