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CWE-307: Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts

 
Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts
Weakness ID: 307 (Weakness Base)Status: Draft
+ Description

Description Summary

The software does not implement sufficient measures to prevent multiple failed authentication attempts within in a short time frame, making it more susceptible to brute force attacks.
+ Time of Introduction
  • Architecture and Design
+ Applicable Platforms

Languages

Language-independent

+ Common Consequences
ScopeEffect
Access Control

Technical Impact: Bypass protection mechanism

An attacker could perform an arbitrary number of authentication attempts using different passwords, and eventually gain access to the targeted account.

+ Detection Methods

Dynamic Analysis with automated results interpretation

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:

  • Web Application Scanner

  • Web Services Scanner

  • Database Scanners

Cost effective for partial coverage:

  • Host-based Vulnerability Scanners – Examine configuration for flaws, verifying that audit mechanisms work, ensure host configuration meets certain predefined criteria

Effectiveness: SOAR High

Dynamic Analysis with manual results interpretation

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:

  • Fuzz Tester

  • Framework-based Fuzzer

Cost effective for partial coverage:

  • Forced Path Execution

Effectiveness: SOAR High

Manual Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:

  • Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source

  • Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)

Effectiveness: SOAR High

Automated Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:

  • Source code Weakness Analyzer

  • Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Automated Static Analysis

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:

  • Configuration Checker

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Architecture / Design Review

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:

  • Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction

Cost effective for partial coverage:

  • Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)

Effectiveness: SOAR High

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1

In January 2009, an attacker was able to gain administrator access to a Twitter server because the server did not restrict the number of login attempts. The attacker targeted a member of Twitter's support team and was able to successfully guess the member's password using a brute force attack by guessing a large number of common words. Once the attacker gained access as the member of the support staff, he used the administrator panel to gain access to 33 accounts that belonged to celebrities and politicians. Ultimately, fake Twitter messages were sent that appeared to come from the compromised accounts.

Example 1 References:

Kim Zetter. "Weak Password Brings 'Happiness' to Twitter Hacker". 2009-01-09. <http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/01/professed-twitt/>.

Example 2

The following code, extracted from a servlet's doPost() method, performs an authentication lookup every time the servlet is invoked.

(Bad Code)
Example Language: Java 
String username = request.getParameter("username");
String password = request.getParameter("password");

int authResult = authenticateUser(username, password);

However, the software makes no attempt to restrict excessive authentication attempts.

Example 3

This code attempts to limit the number of login attempts by causing the process to sleep before completing the authentication.

(Bad Code)
Example Language: PHP 
$username = $_POST['username'];
$password = $_POST['password'];
sleep(2000);
$isAuthenticated = authenticateUser($username, $password);

However, there is no limit on parallel connections, so this does not increase the amount of time an attacker needs to complete an attack.

Example 4

In the following C/C++ example the validateUser method opens a socket connection, reads a username and password from the socket and attempts to authenticate the username and password.

(Bad Code)
Example Languages: C and C++ 
int validateUser(char *host, int port)
{
int socket = openSocketConnection(host, port);
if (socket < 0) {
printf("Unable to open socket connection");
return(FAIL);
}

int isValidUser = 0;
char username[USERNAME_SIZE];
char password[PASSWORD_SIZE];

while (isValidUser == 0) {
if (getNextMessage(socket, username, USERNAME_SIZE) > 0) {
if (getNextMessage(socket, password, PASSWORD_SIZE) > 0) {
isValidUser = AuthenticateUser(username, password);
}
}
}
return(SUCCESS);
}

The validateUser method will continuously check for a valid username and password without any restriction on the number of authentication attempts made. The method should limit the number of authentication attempts made to prevent brute force attacks as in the following example code.

(Good Code)
Example Languages: C and C++ 
int validateUser(char *host, int port)
{
...

int count = 0;
while ((isValidUser == 0) && (count < MAX_ATTEMPTS)) {
if (getNextMessage(socket, username, USERNAME_SIZE) > 0) {
if (getNextMessage(socket, password, PASSWORD_SIZE) > 0) {
isValidUser = AuthenticateUser(username, password);
}
}
count++;
}
if (isValidUser) {
return(SUCCESS);
}
else {
return(FAIL);
}
}
+ Observed Examples
ReferenceDescription
Product does not disconnect or timeout after multiple failed logins.
Product does not disconnect or timeout after multiple failed logins.
Product does not disconnect or timeout after multiple failed logins.
Product does not disconnect or timeout after multiple failed logins.
Product does not disconnect or timeout after multiple failed logins.
User accounts not disabled when they exceed a threshold; possibly a resultant problem.
+ Potential Mitigations

Phase: Architecture and Design

Common protection mechanisms include:

  • Disconnecting the user after a small number of failed attempts

  • Implementing a timeout

  • Locking out a targeted account

  • Requiring a computational task on the user's part.

Phase: Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

Consider using libraries with authentication capabilities such as OpenSSL or the ESAPI Authenticator. [R.307.1]

+ Relationships
NatureTypeIDNameView(s) this relationship pertains toView(s)
ChildOfWeakness ClassWeakness Class287Improper Authentication
Development Concepts (primary)699
Research Concepts (primary)1000
ChildOfCategoryCategory724OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A3 - Broken Authentication and Session Management
Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004) (primary)711
ChildOfWeakness ClassWeakness Class799Improper Control of Interaction Frequency
Research Concepts1000
ChildOfCategoryCategory8082010 Top 25 - Weaknesses On the Cusp
Weaknesses in the 2010 CWE/SANS Top 25 Most Dangerous Programming Errors (primary)800
ChildOfCategoryCategory812OWASP Top Ten 2010 Category A3 - Broken Authentication and Session Management
Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2010) (primary)809
ChildOfCategoryCategory8662011 Top 25 - Porous Defenses
Weaknesses in the 2011 CWE/SANS Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors (primary)900
ChildOfCategoryCategory955SFP Secondary Cluster: Unrestricted Authentication
Software Fault Pattern (SFP) Clusters (primary)888
MemberOfViewView884CWE Cross-section
CWE Cross-section (primary)884
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy NameNode IDFitMapped Node Name
PLOVERAUTHENT.MULTFAILMultiple Failed Authentication Attempts not Prevented
Software Fault PatternsSFP34Unrestricted authentication
+ References
[R.307.1] [REF-21] OWASP. "OWASP Enterprise Security API (ESAPI) Project". <http://www.owasp.org/index.php/ESAPI>.
+ Content History
Submissions
Submission DateSubmitterOrganizationSource
PLOVERExternally Mined
Modifications
Modification DateModifierOrganizationSource
2008-07-01Sean EidemillerCigitalExternal
added/updated demonstrative examples
2008-09-08CWE Content TeamMITREInternal
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2009-03-10CWE Content TeamMITREInternal
updated Relationships
2009-07-27CWE Content TeamMITREInternal
updated Observed_Examples
2009-12-28CWE Content TeamMITREInternal
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Potential_Mitigations
2010-02-16CWE Content TeamMITREInternal
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Name, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2010-04-05CWE Content TeamMITREInternal
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2011-03-29CWE Content TeamMITREInternal
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2011-06-01CWE Content TeamMITREInternal
updated Common_Consequences
2011-06-27CWE Content TeamMITREInternal
updated Common_Consequences, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2011-09-13CWE Content TeamMITREInternal
updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
2012-05-11CWE Content TeamMITREInternal
updated Relationships
2014-07-30CWE Content TeamMITREInternal
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
Previous Entry Names
Change DatePrevious Entry Name
2008-04-11Multiple Failed Authentication Attempts not Prevented
2010-02-16Failure to Restrict Excessive Authentication Attempts
Page Last Updated: July 30, 2014