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CWE-923: Improper Restriction of Communication Channel to Intended Endpoints
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Edit Custom FilterThe product establishes a communication channel to (or from) an endpoint for privileged or protected operations, but it does not properly ensure that it is communicating with the correct endpoint. 
        Attackers might be able to spoof the intended endpoint from a different system or process, thus gaining the same level of access as the intended endpoint. While this issue frequently involves authentication between network-based clients and servers, other types of communication channels and endpoints can have this weakness.  This table specifies different individual consequences
                        associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is
                        violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an
                        adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about
                        how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other
                        consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be
                        exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to
                        achieve a different impact.
              
  
                        This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this
                            weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to
                            similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition,
                            relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user
                            may want to explore.
                    
         
                            Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
                            
  
                            Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
                            
  The different Modes of Introduction provide information
                        about how and when this
                        weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which
                        introduction
                        may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the
                        given
                        phase.
                
  This listing shows possible areas for which the given
                        weakness could appear. These
                        may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms,
                        Technologies,
                        or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given
                        weakness appears for that instance.
                
 Example 1 These cross-domain policy files mean to allow Flash and Silverlight applications hosted on other domains to access its data: Flash crossdomain.xml : (bad code) 
                                
                                    
                                    Example Language: XML 
                                    
                                 
                            <cross-domain-policy xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" 
               
                            xsi:noNamespaceSchemaLocation="http://www.adobe.com/xml/schemas/PolicyFile.xsd"> <allow-access-from domain="*.example.com"/> <allow-access-from domain="*"/> </cross-domain-policy> Silverlight clientaccesspolicy.xml : (bad code) 
                                
                                    
                                    Example Language: XML 
                                    
                                 
                            <?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> 
               
                            <access-policy> <cross-domain-access> <policy> <allow-from http-request-headers="SOAPAction"> <domain uri="*"/> </allow-from> <grant-to> <resource path="/" include-subpaths="true"/> </grant-to> </policy> </cross-domain-access> </access-policy> These entries are far too permissive, allowing any Flash or Silverlight application to send requests. A malicious application hosted on any other web site will be able to send requests on behalf of any user tricked into executing it. Example 2 This Android application will remove a user account when it receives an intent to do so: (bad code) 
                                
                                    
                                    Example Language: Java 
                                    
                                 
                            IntentFilter filter = new IntentFilter("com.example.RemoveUser"); 
               
                            MyReceiver receiver = new MyReceiver(); registerReceiver(receiver, filter); public class DeleteReceiver extends BroadcastReceiver { @Override }public void onReceive(Context context, Intent intent) { int userID = intent.getIntExtra("userID"); }destroyUserData(userID); This application does not check the origin of the intent, thus allowing any malicious application to remove a user. Always check the origin of an intent, or create an allowlist of trusted applications using the manifest.xml file. Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry. 
 
  This MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that
                                reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a
                                weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
                        
 
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