The software does not validate, or incorrectly validates, a certificate.
Extended Description
When a certificate is invalid or malicious, it might allow an attacker to spoof a trusted entity by using a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack. The software might connect to a malicious host while believing it is a trusted host, or the software might be deceived into accepting spoofed data that appears to originate from a trusted host.
Relationships
The table(s) below shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (CWE-1000)
Nature
Type
ID
Name
ChildOf
Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More general than a Base weakness.
Base - a weakness that is described in an abstract fashion, but with sufficient details to infer specific methods for detection and prevention. More general than a Variant weakness, but more specific than a Class weakness.
Variant - a weakness that is described at a very low level of detail, typically limited to a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness.
Variant - a weakness that is described at a very low level of detail, typically limited to a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness.
Base - a weakness that is described in an abstract fashion, but with sufficient details to infer specific methods for detection and prevention. More general than a Variant weakness, but more specific than a Class weakness.
Variant - a weakness that is described at a very low level of detail, typically limited to a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness.
Base - a weakness that is described in an abstract fashion, but with sufficient details to infer specific methods for detection and prevention. More general than a Variant weakness, but more specific than a Class weakness.
Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (CWE-1003)
Nature
Type
ID
Name
ParentOf
Variant - a weakness that is described at a very low level of detail, typically limited to a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness.
Base - a weakness that is described in an abstract fashion, but with sufficient details to infer specific methods for detection and prevention. More general than a Variant weakness, but more specific than a Class weakness.
Variant - a weakness that is described at a very low level of detail, typically limited to a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness.
Variant - a weakness that is described at a very low level of detail, typically limited to a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness.
Base - a weakness that is described in an abstract fashion, but with sufficient details to infer specific methods for detection and prevention. More general than a Variant weakness, but more specific than a Class weakness.
Variant - a weakness that is described at a very low level of detail, typically limited to a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness.
A certificate is a token that associates an identity (principal) to a cryptographic key. Certificates can be used to check if a public key belongs to the assumed owner.
Modes Of Introduction
The different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the software life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase
Note
Architecture and Design
Implementation
REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.
Implementation
When the software uses certificate pinning, the developer might not properly validate all relevant components of the certificate before pinning the certificate. This can make it difficult or expensive to test after the pinning is complete.
Applicable Platforms
The listings below show possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
The table below specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Scope
Impact
Likelihood
Integrity Authentication
Technical Impact: Bypass Protection Mechanism; Gain Privileges or Assume Identity
Web browser uses a TLS-related function incorrectly, preventing it from verifying that a server's certificate is signed by a trusted certification authority (CA)
chain: DNS server does not correctly check return value from the OpenSSL EVP_VerifyFinal function allows bypass of validation of the certificate chain.
chain: OS package manager does not check properly check the return value, allowing bypass using a revoked certificate.
Potential Mitigations
Phases: Architecture and Design; Implementation
Certificates should be carefully managed and checked to assure that data are encrypted with the intended owner's public key.
Phase: Implementation
If certificate pinning is being used, ensure that all relevant properties of the certificate are fully validated before the certificate is pinned, including the hostname.
Detection Methods
Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:
This MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature
Type
ID
Name
MemberOf
Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.
Creating a Rogue Certification Authority Certificate
References
[REF-243] Sascha Fahl, Marian Harbach, Thomas Muders, Matthew Smith and
Lars Baumgärtner, Bernd Freisleben. "Why Eve and Mallory Love Android: An Analysis of Android SSL (In)Security". 2012-10-16.
<http://www2.dcsec.uni-hannover.de/files/android/p50-fahl.pdf>.
[REF-244] M. Bishop. "Computer Security: Art and Science". Addison-Wesley. 2003.
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March 29, 2018
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Description
Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (CWE-1000)
