The software uses external input to construct a pathname that
should be within a restricted directory, but it does not properly sanitize
'.../...//' (doubled triple dot slash) sequences that can resolve to a location
that is outside of that directory.
Extended Description
This allows attackers to traverse the file system to access files or
directories that are outside of the restricted directory.
The '.../...//' manipulation is useful for bypassing some path traversal
protection schemes. If "../" is filtered in a sequential fashion, as done by
some regular expression engines, then ".../...//" can collapse into the
"../" unsafe value (CWE-182). Removing the first "../" yields "....//"; the
second removal yields "../". Depending on the algorithm, the software could
be susceptible to CWE-34 but not CWE-35, or vice versa.
chain: ".../...//" bypasses protection mechanism
using regexp's that remove "../" resulting in collapse into an unsafe value
"../" (CWE-182) and resultant path traversal.
".../....///" bypasses regexp's that remove "./"
and "../"
Potential Mitigations
Phase
Description
Assume all input is malicious. Attackers can insert paths into input
vectors and traverse the file system. Use an appropriate combination of
black lists and white lists to ensure only valid and expected input is
processed by the system. Warning: if you attempt to cleanse your data,
then do so that the end result is not in the form that can be dangerous.
A sanitizing mechanism can remove characters such as '.' and ';' which
may be required for some exploits. An attacker can try to fool the
sanitizing mechanism into "cleaning" data into a dangerous form. Suppose
the attacker injects a '.' inside a filename (e.g. "sensi.tiveFile") and
the sanitizing mechanism removes the character resulting in the valid
filename, "sensitiveFile". If the input data are now assumed to be safe,
then the file may be compromised. See CWE-182 (Collapse of Data Into
Unsafe Value).
Architecture and Design
Assume all input is malicious. Use a standard input validation
mechanism to validate all input for length, type, syntax, and business
rules before accepting the data to be displayed or stored. Use an
"accept known good" validation strategy. Input (specifically, unexpected
CRLFs) that is not appropriate should not be processed into HTTP
headers.
Use and specify a strong input/output encoding (such as ISO 8859-1 or
UTF 8).
Do not rely exclusively on blacklist validation to detect malicious
input or to encode output. There are too many variants to encode a
character; you're likely to miss some variants.
Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's
current internal representation before being validated. Make sure that
your application does not decode the same input twice. Such errors could
be used to bypass whitelist schemes by introducing dangerous inputs
after they have been checked.