CWE

Common Weakness Enumeration

A Community-Developed List of Software Weakness Types

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ID

CWE-654: Reliance on a Single Factor in a Security Decision

Weakness ID: 654
Abstraction: Base
Structure: Simple
Status: Draft
Presentation Filter:
+ Description
A protection mechanism relies exclusively, or to a large extent, on the evaluation of a single condition or the integrity of a single object or entity in order to make a decision about granting access to restricted resources or functionality.
+ Alternate Terms
Separation of Privilege:
Some people and publications use the term "Separation of Privilege" to describe this weakness, but this term has dual meanings in current usage. While this node is closely associated with the original definition of "Separation of Privilege" by Saltzer and Schroeder, others use the same term to describe poor compartmentalization (CWE-653). Because there are multiple interpretations, use of the "Separation of Privilege" term is discouraged.
+ Relationships

The table(s) below shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.

+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (CWE-1000)
NatureTypeIDName
ChildOfClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More general than a Base weakness.693Protection Mechanism Failure
ChildOfClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More general than a Base weakness.657Violation of Secure Design Principles
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is described in an abstract fashion, but with sufficient details to infer specific methods for detection and prevention. More general than a Variant weakness, but more specific than a Class weakness.308Use of Single-factor Authentication
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is described in an abstract fashion, but with sufficient details to infer specific methods for detection and prevention. More general than a Variant weakness, but more specific than a Class weakness.309Use of Password System for Primary Authentication
+ Relevant to the view "Development Concepts" (CWE-699)
NatureTypeIDName
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.2547PK - Security Features
ChildOfClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More general than a Base weakness.657Violation of Secure Design Principles
+ Modes Of Introduction

The different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the software life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.

PhaseNote
Architecture and Design
Implementation
Operation
+ Applicable Platforms
The listings below show possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.

Languages

Class: Language-Independent (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Common Consequences

The table below specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.

ScopeImpactLikelihood
Access Control

Technical Impact: Gain Privileges or Assume Identity

If the single factor is compromised (e.g. by theft or spoofing), then the integrity of the entire security mechanism can be violated with respect to the user that is identified by that factor.
Non-Repudiation

Technical Impact: Hide Activities

It can become difficult or impossible for the product to be able to distinguish between legitimate activities by the entity who provided the factor, versus illegitimate activities by an attacker.
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1

Password-only authentication is perhaps the most well-known example of use of a single factor. Anybody who knows a user's password can impersonate that user.

Example 2

When authenticating, use multiple factors, such as "something you know" (such as a password) and "something you have" (such as a hardware-based one-time password generator, or a biometric device).

+ Potential Mitigations

Phase: Architecture and Design

Use multiple simultaneous checks before granting access to critical operations or granting critical privileges. A weaker but helpful mitigation is to use several successive checks (multiple layers of security).

Phase: Architecture and Design

Use redundant access rules on different choke points (e.g., firewalls).
+ Weakness Ordinalities
OrdinalityDescription
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Memberships
This MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
NatureTypeIDName
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.975SFP Secondary Cluster: Architecture
+ Notes

Maintenance

This node is closely associated with the term "Separation of Privilege." This term is used in several different ways in the industry, but they generally combine two closely related principles: compartmentalization (CWE-653) and using only one factor in a security decision (this node). Proper compartmentalization implicitly introduces multiple factors into a security decision, but there can be cases in which multiple factors are required for authentication or other mechanisms that do not involve compartmentalization, such as performing all required checks on a submitted certificate. It is likely that CWE-653 and CWE-654 will provoke further discussion.
+ References
[REF-196] Jerome H. Saltzer and Michael D. Schroeder. "The Protection of Information in Computer Systems". Proceedings of the IEEE 63. 1975-09. <http://web.mit.edu/Saltzer/www/publications/protection/>.
[REF-535] Sean Barnum and Michael Gegick. "Separation of Privilege". 2005-12-06. <https://buildsecurityin.us-cert.gov/daisy/bsi/articles/knowledge/principles/357.html>.
+ Content History
Submissions
Submission DateSubmitterOrganization
2008-01-18Pascal MeunierPurdue University
Modifications
Modification DateModifierOrganization
2008-07-01Eric DalciCigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
2008-09-08CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Alternate_Terms, Common_Consequences, Relationships, Other_Notes, Weakness_Ordinalities
2009-01-12CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Description, Name
2009-05-27CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2010-04-05CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2011-06-01CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Maintenance_Notes, Other_Notes
2012-05-11CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2012-10-30CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2013-02-21CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2014-07-30CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2017-11-08CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Causal_Nature
Previous Entry Names
Change DatePrevious Entry Name
2009-01-12Design Principle Violation: Reliance on a Single Factor in a Security Decision

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Page Last Updated: March 29, 2018