CWE-1255: Comparison Logic is Vulnerable to Power Side-Channel Attacks
Weakness ID: 1255
Vulnerability Mapping:
ALLOWEDThis CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities Abstraction: VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers.For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts.For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers.For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry.For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
×
Edit Custom Filter
Description
A device's real time power consumption may be monitored during security token evaluation and the information gleaned may be used to determine the value of the reference token.
Extended Description
The power consumed by a device may be instrumented and monitored in real time. If the algorithm for evaluating security tokens is not sufficiently robust, the power consumption may vary by token entry comparison against the reference value. Further, if retries are unlimited, the power difference between a "good" entry and a "bad" entry may be observed and used to determine whether each entry itself is correct thereby allowing unauthorized parties to calculate the reference value.
Common Consequences
This table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Scope
Impact
Likelihood
Confidentiality Integrity Availability Access Control Accountability Authentication Authorization Non-Repudiation
Technical Impact: Modify Memory; Read Memory; Read Files or Directories; Modify Files or Directories; Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands; Gain Privileges or Assume Identity; Bypass Protection Mechanism; Read Application Data; Modify Application Data; Hide Activities
As compromising a security token may result in complete system control, the impacts are relatively universal.
Potential Mitigations
Phase: Architecture and Design
The design phase must consider each check of a security token against a standard and the amount of power consumed during the check of a good token versus a bad token. The alternative is an all at once check where a retry counter is incremented PRIOR to the check.
Phase: Architecture and Design
Another potential mitigation is to parallelize shifting of secret data (see example 2 below). Note that the wider the bus the more effective the result.
Phase: Architecture and Design
An additional potential mitigation is to add random data to each crypto operation then subtract it out afterwards. This is highly effective but costly in performance, area, and power consumption. It also requires a random number generator.
Phase: Implementation
If the architecture is unable to prevent the attack, using filtering components may reduce the ability to implement an attack, however, consideration must be given to the physical removal of the filter elements.
Phase: Integration
During integration, avoid use of a single secret for an extended period (e.g. frequent key updates). This limits the amount of data compromised but at the cost of complexity of use.
Relationships
This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (CWE-1000)
Nature
Type
ID
Name
ChildOf
Base - a weakness
that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
Relevant to the view "Hardware Design" (CWE-1194)
Nature
Type
ID
Name
MemberOf
Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.
Base - a weakness
that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
The different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase
Note
Architecture and Design
The design of the algorithm itself may intrinsically allow the power side channel attack to be effective
Implementation
This weakness may be introduced during implementation despite a robust design that otherwise prevents exploitation
Applicable Platforms
This listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages
Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)
Operating Systems
Class: Not OS-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)
Architectures
Class: Not Architecture-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)
Technologies
Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)
Demonstrative Examples
Example 1
Consider an example hardware module that checks a user-provided password (or PIN) to grant access to a user. The user-provided password is compared against a stored value byte-by-byte.
(bad code)
Example Language: C
static nonvolatile password_tries = NUM_RETRIES;
do
while (password_tries == 0) ; // Hang here if no more password tries
password_ok = 0;
for (i = 0; i < NUM_PW_DIGITS; i++)
if (GetPasswordByte() == stored_password([i])
password_ok |= 1; // Power consumption is different here
Since the algorithm uses a different number of 1's and 0's for password validation, a different amount of power is consumed for the good byte versus the bad byte comparison. Using this information, an attacker may be able to guess the correct password for that byte-by-byte iteration with several repeated attempts by stopping the password evaluation before it completes.
Among various options for mitigating the string comparison is obscuring the power consumption by having opposing bit flips during bit operations. Note that in this example, the initial change of the bit values could still provide power indication depending upon the hardware itself. This possibility needs to be measured for verification.
(good code)
Example Language: C
static nonvolatile password_tries = NUM_RETRIES;
do
while (password_tries == 0) ; // Hang here if no more password tries
password_tries--; // Put retry code here to catch partial retries
password_ok = 0;
for (i = 0; i < NUM_PW_DIGITS; i++)
This code demonstrates the transfer of a secret key using Serial-In/Serial-Out shift. It's easy to extract the secret using simple power analysis as each shift gives data on a single bit of the key.
(bad code)
Example Language: Verilog
module siso(clk,rst,a,q);
input a;
input clk,rst;
output q;
reg q;
always@(posedge clk,posedge rst)
begin
if(rst==1'b1)
q<1'b0;
else
q<a;
end
endmodule
This code demonstrates the transfer of a secret key using a Parallel-In/Parallel-Out shift. In a parallel shift, data confounded by multiple bits of the key, not just one.
CMAC verification vulnerable to timing and power attacks.
Functional Areas
Power
Memberships
This MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature
Type
ID
Name
MemberOf
Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.
(this CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason: Acceptable-Use
Rationale:
This CWE entry is at the Variant level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
Comments:
Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
Accellera IP Security Assurance (IPSA) Working Group
Accellera Systems Initiative
Submitted new material that could be added to already-existing entry CWE-1255. Added new Potential Mitigations, a new example, an observed example, and an additional reference.
Description
This table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
