Status: Draft Compound Element ID: 352 (Compound Element Variant: Composite)Summary The web application does not, or can not, sufficiently verify whether a well-formed, valid, consistent request was intentionally provided by the user who submitted the request. Extended Description When a web server is designed to receive a request from a client without any mechanism for verifying that it was intentionally sent, then it might be possible for an attacker to trick a client into making an unintentional request to the web server which will be treated as an authentic request. This can be done via a URL, image load, XMLHttpRequest, etc. and can result in data disclosure or unintended code execution. This example PHP code attempts to secure the form submission process by validating that the user submitting the form has a valid session. A CSRF attack would not be prevented by this countermeasure because the attacker forges a request through the user's web browser in which a valid session already exists. The following HTML is intended to allow a user to update a profile. HTML Example: <form action="/url/profile.php"
method="post"> <input type="text" name="firstname"/> <input type="text" name="lastname"/> <br/> input type="text" name="email"/> <input type="submit" name="submit" value="Update"
/> </form> profile.php contains the following code. // initiate the session in order to validate sessions session_start(); //if the session is registered to a valid user then allow
update if (! session_is_registered("username")) { echo "invalid session detected!"; // Redirect user to login page [...] exit; } // The user session is valid, so process the request // and update the information update_profile(); function update_profile { // read in the data from $POST and send an update // to the database SendUpdateToDatabase($_SESSION['username'],
$_POST['email']); [...] echo "Your profile has been successfully updated."; } This code may look protected since it checks for a valid session. However, CSRF attacks can be staged from virtually any tag or HTML construct, including image tags, links, embed or object tags, or other attributes that load background images. The attacker can then host code that will silently change the username and email address of any user that visits the page while remaining logged in to the target web application. The code might be an innocent-looking web page such as: HTML Example: <SCRIPT> function SendAttack () { form.email = "attacker@example.com"; // send to profile.php form.submit(); } </SCRIPT> <BODY
onload="javascript:SendAttack();"> <form action="http://victim.example.com/profile.php"
id="form" method="post"> <input type="hidden" name="firstname"
value="Funny"> <input type="hidden" name="lastname"
value="Joke"> <br/> <input type="hidden" name="email"> </form> Notice how the form contains hidden fields, so when it is loaded into the browser, the user will not notice it. Because SendAttack() is defined in the body's onload attribute, it will be automatically called when the victim loads the web page. Assuming that the user is already logged in to victim.example.com, profile.php will see that a valid user session has been established, then update the email address to the attacker's own address. At this stage, the user's identity has been compromised, and messages sent through this profile could be sent to the attacker's address.
Architecture and Design Use anti-CSRF packages such as the OWASP CSRFGuard. Implementation Ensure that your application is free of cross-site scripting issues (CWE-79), because most CSRF defenses can be bypassed using attacker-controlled script. Architecture and Design Generate a unique nonce for each form, place the nonce into the form, and verify the nonce upon receipt of the form. Be sure that the nonce is not predictable (CWE-330). Note that this can be bypassed using XSS (CWE-79). Architecture and Design Identify especially dangerous operations. When the user performs a dangerous operation, send a separate confirmation request to ensure that the user intended to perform that operation. Note that this can be bypassed using XSS (CWE-79). Architecture and Design Use the "double-submitted cookie" method as described by Felten and Zeller. Note that this can probably be bypassed using XSS (CWE-79). Architecture and Design Use the ESAPI Session Management control. This control includes a component for CSRF. Architecture and Design Do not use the GET method for any request that triggers a state change. Implementation Check the HTTP Referer header to see if the request originated from an expected page. This could break legitimate functionality, because users or proxies may have disabled sending the Referer for privacy reasons. Note that this can be bypassed using XSS (CWE-79). An attacker could use XSS to generate a spoofed Referer, or to generate a malicious request from a page whose Referer would be allowed. Testing Use tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session. These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules. Use OWASP CSRFTester to identify potential issues.
This issue was under-reported in CVE until around 2008, when it began to gain prominence. It is likely to be present in most web applications. The CSRF topology is multi-channel: 1. Attacker (as outsider) to intermediary (as user). The interaction point is either an external or internal channel. 2. Intermediary (as user) to server (as victim). The activation point is an internal channel.
Peter W. "Cross-Site Request Forgeries (Re: The Dangers of Allowing Users
to Post Images)". Bugtraq. <http:/ Edward W. Felten and
William Zeller. "Cross-Site Request Forgeries: Exploitation and
Prevention". 2008-10-18. <http:/ Robert Auger. "CSRF - The Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF/XSRF)
FAQ". <http:/ "Cross-site request forgery". Wikipedia. 2008-12-22. <http:/ Submissions PLOVER. (Externally Mined) Modifications Eric Dalci. Cigital. 2008-07-01. (External) updated Time_of_Introduction CWE Content Team. MITRE. 2008-09-08. (Internal) updated Alternate_Terms, Description, Relationships,
Other_Notes, Relationship_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings CWE Content Team. MITRE. 2009-01-12. (Internal) updated Applicable_Platforms, Description,
Likelihood_of_Exploit, Observed_Examples, Other_Notes,
Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationship_Notes, Relationships,
Research_Gaps, Theoretical_Notes CWE Content Team. MITRE. 2009-03-10. (Internal) updated Potential_Mitigations Tom Stracener. 2009-05-20. (External) Added demonstrative example for
profile. CWE Content Team. MITRE. 2009-05-27. (Internal) updated Demonstrative_Examples,
Related_Attack_Patterns |
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Page Last Updated:
May 26, 2009
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