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CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')

 
Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')
Weakness ID: 94 (Weakness Class)Status: Draft
+ Description

Description Summary

The software constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment.

Extended Description

When software allows a user's input to contain code syntax, it might be possible for an attacker to craft the code in such a way that it will alter the intended control flow of the software. Such an alteration could lead to arbitrary code execution.

Injection problems encompass a wide variety of issues -- all mitigated in very different ways. For this reason, the most effective way to discuss these weaknesses is to note the distinct features which classify them as injection weaknesses. The most important issue to note is that all injection problems share one thing in common -- i.e., they allow for the injection of control plane data into the user-controlled data plane. This means that the execution of the process may be altered by sending code in through legitimate data channels, using no other mechanism. While buffer overflows, and many other flaws, involve the use of some further issue to gain execution, injection problems need only for the data to be parsed. The most classic instantiations of this category of weakness are SQL injection and format string vulnerabilities.

+ Time of Introduction
  • Architecture and Design
  • Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms

Languages

Interpreted languages: (Sometimes)

+ Common Consequences
ScopeEffect
Confidentiality

Technical Impact: Read files or directories; Read application data

The injected code could access restricted data / files.

Access Control

Technical Impact: Bypass protection mechanism

In some cases, injectable code controls authentication; this may lead to a remote vulnerability.

Access Control

Technical Impact: Gain privileges / assume identity

Injected code can access resources that the attacker is directly prevented from accessing.

Integrity
Confidentiality
Availability
Other

Technical Impact: Other; Execute unauthorized code or commands

Code injection attacks can lead to loss of data integrity in nearly all cases as the control-plane data injected is always incidental to data recall or writing. Additionally, code injection can often result in the execution of arbitrary code.

Non-Repudiation

Technical Impact: Hide activities

Often the actions performed by injected control code are unlogged.

+ Likelihood of Exploit

Medium

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1

This example attempts to write user messages to a message file and allow users to view them.

(Bad Code)
Example Language: PHP 
$MessageFile = "cwe-94/messages.out";
if ($_GET["action"] == "NewMessage") {
$name = $_GET["name"];
$message = $_GET["message"];
$handle = fopen($MessageFile, "a+");
fwrite($handle, "<b>$name</b> says '$message'<hr>\n");
fclose($handle);
echo "Message Saved!<p>\n";
}
else if ($_GET["action"] == "ViewMessages") {
include($MessageFile);
}

While the programmer intends for the MessageFile to only include data, an attacker can provide a message such as:

(Attack)
 
name=h4x0r
message=%3C?php%20system(%22/bin/ls%20-l%22);?%3E

which will decode to the following:

(Attack)
 
<?php system("/bin/ls -l");?>

The programmer thought they were just including the contents of a regular data file, but PHP parsed it and executed the code. Now, this code is executed any time people view messages.

Notice that XSS (CWE-79) is also possible in this situation.

+ Potential Mitigations

Phase: Architecture and Design

Refactor your program so that you do not have to dynamically generate code.

Phase: Architecture and Design

Run your code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which code can be executed by your software.

Examples include the Unix chroot jail and AppArmor. In general, managed code may provide some protection.

This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of your application may still be subject to compromise.

Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.

Phase: Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a whitelist of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs (i.e., do not rely on a blacklist). However, blacklists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.

When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if you are expecting colors such as "red" or "blue."

To reduce the likelihood of code injection, use stringent whitelists that limit which constructs are allowed. If you are dynamically constructing code that invokes a function, then verifying that the input is alphanumeric might be insufficient. An attacker might still be able to reference a dangerous function that you did not intend to allow, such as system(), exec(), or exit().

Phase: Testing

Use automated static analysis tools that target this type of weakness. Many modern techniques use data flow analysis to minimize the number of false positives. This is not a perfect solution, since 100% accuracy and coverage are not feasible.

Phase: Testing

Use dynamic tools and techniques that interact with the software using large test suites with many diverse inputs, such as fuzz testing (fuzzing), robustness testing, and fault injection. The software's operation may slow down, but it should not become unstable, crash, or generate incorrect results.

Phase: Operation

Strategy: Compilation or Build Hardening

Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force you to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).

+ Relationships
NatureTypeIDNameView(s) this relationship pertains toView(s)
ChildOfWeakness ClassWeakness Class74Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection')
Development Concepts (primary)699
Research Concepts (primary)1000
ChildOfWeakness ClassWeakness Class691Insufficient Control Flow Management
Research Concepts1000
ChildOfCategoryCategory7522009 Top 25 - Risky Resource Management
Weaknesses in the 2009 CWE/SANS Top 25 Most Dangerous Programming Errors (primary)750
ParentOfWeakness BaseWeakness Base95Improper Neutralization of Directives in Dynamically Evaluated Code ('Eval Injection')
Development Concepts (primary)699
Research Concepts (primary)1000
ParentOfWeakness BaseWeakness Base96Improper Neutralization of Directives in Statically Saved Code ('Static Code Injection')
Development Concepts (primary)699
Research Concepts (primary)1000
ParentOfWeakness BaseWeakness Base621Variable Extraction Error
Research Concepts (primary)1000
ParentOfWeakness BaseWeakness Base627Dynamic Variable Evaluation
Development Concepts (primary)699
Research Concepts (primary)1000
MemberOfViewView635Weaknesses Used by NVD
Weaknesses Used by NVD (primary)635
CanFollowWeakness BaseWeakness Base98Improper Control of Filename for Include/Require Statement in PHP Program ('PHP File Inclusion')
Development Concepts699
Research Concepts1000
+ Research Gaps

Many of these weaknesses are under-studied and under-researched, and terminology is not sufficiently precise.

+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy NameNode IDFitMapped Node Name
PLOVERCODECode Evaluation and Injection
+ Content History
Submissions
Submission DateSubmitterOrganizationSource
PLOVERExternally Mined
Modifications
Modification DateModifierOrganizationSource
2008-07-01Eric DalciCigitalExternal
updated Time_of_Introduction
2008-09-08CWE Content TeamMITREInternal
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships, Research_Gaps, Taxonomy_Mappings
2009-01-12CWE Content TeamMITREInternal
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Name, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
2009-03-10CWE Content TeamMITREInternal
updated Potential_Mitigations
2009-05-27CWE Content TeamMITREInternal
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Name
2010-02-16CWE Content TeamMITREInternal
updated Potential_Mitigations
2010-06-21CWE Content TeamMITREInternal
updated Description, Potential_Mitigations
2011-03-29CWE Content TeamMITREInternal
updated Name
2011-06-01CWE Content TeamMITREInternal
updated Common_Consequences
Previous Entry Names
Change DatePrevious Entry Name
2009-01-12Code Injection
2009-05-27Failure to Control Generation of Code (aka 'Code Injection')
2011-03-29Failure to Control Generation of Code ('Code Injection')
Page Last Updated: September 12, 2011