CWE

Common Weakness Enumeration

A community-developed list of SW & HW weaknesses that can become vulnerabilities
New to CWE? click here!
CWE Most Important Hardware Weaknesses
CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Weaknesses
Home > CWE List > CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption (4.16)  
ID

CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption

Weakness ID: 400
Vulnerability Mapping: DISCOURAGED This CWE ID should not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
×

Edit Custom Filter


+ Description
The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources.
+ Extended Description

Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the product, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.

There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:

  • Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
  • Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
  • Not closing/returning a resource after processing

Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:

  • Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
  • Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
+ Alternate Terms
Resource Exhaustion
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Scope Impact Likelihood
Availability

Technical Impact: DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart; DoS: Resource Consumption (CPU); DoS: Resource Consumption (Memory); DoS: Resource Consumption (Other)

The most common result of resource exhaustion is denial of service. The product may slow down, crash due to unhandled errors, or lock out legitimate users.
Access Control
Other

Technical Impact: Bypass Protection Mechanism; Other

In some cases it may be possible to force the product to "fail open" in the event of resource exhaustion. The state of the product -- and possibly the security functionality - may then be compromised.
+ Potential Mitigations

Phase: Architecture and Design

Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.

Phase: Architecture and Design

Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either:

  • recognizes the attack and denies that user further access for a given amount of time, or
  • uniformly throttles all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed.

The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question.

The second solution is simply difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply makes the attack require more resources on the part of the attacker.

Phase: Architecture and Design

Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.

Phase: Implementation

Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (CWE-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 664 Improper Control of a Resource Through its Lifetime
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 405 Asymmetric Resource Consumption (Amplification)
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 770 Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 771 Missing Reference to Active Allocated Resource
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 779 Logging of Excessive Data
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 920 Improper Restriction of Power Consumption
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1235 Incorrect Use of Autoboxing and Unboxing for Performance Critical Operations
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1246 Improper Write Handling in Limited-write Non-Volatile Memories
CanFollow Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 410 Insufficient Resource Pool
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (CWE-1003)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf View View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1003 Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 770 Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 920 Improper Restriction of Power Consumption
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Operation
Architecture and Design
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.

Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
High
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1

The following example demonstrates the weakness.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
class Worker implements Executor {
...
public void execute(Runnable r) {

try {
...
}
catch (InterruptedException ie) {

// postpone response
Thread.currentThread().interrupt();
}
}

public Worker(Channel ch, int nworkers) {
...
}

protected void activate() {

Runnable loop = new Runnable() {

public void run() {

try {
for (;;) {
Runnable r = ...;
r.run();
}
}
catch (InterruptedException ie) {
...
}
}
};
new Thread(loop).start();
}
}

There are no limits to runnables. Potentially an attacker could cause resource problems very quickly.


Example 2

This code allocates a socket and forks each time it receives a new connection.

(bad code)
Example Language: C 
sock=socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
while (1) {
newsock=accept(sock, ...);
printf("A connection has been accepted\n");
pid = fork();
}

The program does not track how many connections have been made, and it does not limit the number of connections. Because forking is a relatively expensive operation, an attacker would be able to cause the system to run out of CPU, processes, or memory by making a large number of connections. Alternatively, an attacker could consume all available connections, preventing others from accessing the system remotely.


Example 3

In the following example a server socket connection is used to accept a request to store data on the local file system using a specified filename. The method openSocketConnection establishes a server socket to accept requests from a client. When a client establishes a connection to this service the getNextMessage method is first used to retrieve from the socket the name of the file to store the data, the openFileToWrite method will validate the filename and open a file to write to on the local file system. The getNextMessage is then used within a while loop to continuously read data from the socket and output the data to the file until there is no longer any data from the socket.

(bad code)
Example Language: C 
int writeDataFromSocketToFile(char *host, int port)
{

char filename[FILENAME_SIZE];
char buffer[BUFFER_SIZE];
int socket = openSocketConnection(host, port);

if (socket < 0) {
printf("Unable to open socket connection");
return(FAIL);
}
if (getNextMessage(socket, filename, FILENAME_SIZE) > 0) {
if (openFileToWrite(filename) > 0) {
while (getNextMessage(socket, buffer, BUFFER_SIZE) > 0){
if (!(writeToFile(buffer) > 0))
break;
}
}
closeFile();
}
closeSocket(socket);
}

This example creates a situation where data can be dumped to a file on the local file system without any limits on the size of the file. This could potentially exhaust file or disk resources and/or limit other clients' ability to access the service.


Example 4

In the following example, the processMessage method receives a two dimensional character array containing the message to be processed. The two-dimensional character array contains the length of the message in the first character array and the message body in the second character array. The getMessageLength method retrieves the integer value of the length from the first character array. After validating that the message length is greater than zero, the body character array pointer points to the start of the second character array of the two-dimensional character array and memory is allocated for the new body character array.

(bad code)
Example Language: C 

/* process message accepts a two-dimensional character array of the form [length][body] containing the message to be processed */
int processMessage(char **message)
{
char *body;

int length = getMessageLength(message[0]);

if (length > 0) {
body = &message[1][0];
processMessageBody(body);
return(SUCCESS);
}
else {
printf("Unable to process message; invalid message length");
return(FAIL);
}
}

This example creates a situation where the length of the body character array can be very large and will consume excessive memory, exhausting system resources. This can be avoided by restricting the length of the second character array with a maximum length check

Also, consider changing the type from 'int' to 'unsigned int', so that you are always guaranteed that the number is positive. This might not be possible if the protocol specifically requires allowing negative values, or if you cannot control the return value from getMessageLength(), but it could simplify the check to ensure the input is positive, and eliminate other errors such as signed-to-unsigned conversion errors (CWE-195) that may occur elsewhere in the code.

(good code)
Example Language: C 
unsigned int length = getMessageLength(message[0]);
if ((length > 0) && (length < MAX_LENGTH)) {...}

Example 5

In the following example, a server object creates a server socket and accepts client connections to the socket. For every client connection to the socket a separate thread object is generated using the ClientSocketThread class that handles request made by the client through the socket.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
public void acceptConnections() {
try {
ServerSocket serverSocket = new ServerSocket(SERVER_PORT);
int counter = 0;
boolean hasConnections = true;
while (hasConnections) {
Socket client = serverSocket.accept();
Thread t = new Thread(new ClientSocketThread(client));
t.setName(client.getInetAddress().getHostName() + ":" + counter++);
t.start();
}
serverSocket.close();


} catch (IOException ex) {...}
}

In this example there is no limit to the number of client connections and client threads that are created. Allowing an unlimited number of client connections and threads could potentially overwhelm the system and system resources.

The server should limit the number of client connections and the client threads that are created. This can be easily done by creating a thread pool object that limits the number of threads that are generated.

(good code)
Example Language: Java 
public static final int SERVER_PORT = 4444;
public static final int MAX_CONNECTIONS = 10;
...

public void acceptConnections() {
try {
ServerSocket serverSocket = new ServerSocket(SERVER_PORT);
int counter = 0;
boolean hasConnections = true;
while (hasConnections) {
hasConnections = checkForMoreConnections();
Socket client = serverSocket.accept();
Thread t = new Thread(new ClientSocketThread(client));
t.setName(client.getInetAddress().getHostName() + ":" + counter++);
ExecutorService pool = Executors.newFixedThreadPool(MAX_CONNECTIONS);
pool.execute(t);
}
serverSocket.close();


} catch (IOException ex) {...}
}

Example 6

In the following example, the serve function receives an http request and an http response writer. It reads the entire request body.

(bad code)
Example Language: Go 
func serve(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
var body []byte
if r.Body != nil {
if data, err := io.ReadAll(r.Body); err == nil {
body = data
}
}
}

Because ReadAll is defined to read from src until EOF, it does not treat an EOF from Read as an error to be reported. This example creates a situation where the length of the body supplied can be very large and will consume excessive memory, exhausting system resources. This can be avoided by ensuring the body does not exceed a predetermined length of bytes.

MaxBytesReader prevents clients from accidentally or maliciously sending a large request and wasting server resources. If possible, the code could be changed to tell ResponseWriter to close the connection after the limit has been reached.

(good code)
Example Language: Go 
func serve(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
var body []byte
const MaxRespBodyLength = 1e6
if r.Body != nil {
r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, MaxRespBodyLength)
if data, err := io.ReadAll(r.Body); err == nil {
body = data
}
}
}

+ Observed Examples
Reference Description
Chain: Python library does not limit the resources used to process images that specify a very large number of bands (CWE-1284), leading to excessive memory consumption (CWE-789) or an integer overflow (CWE-190).
Go-based workload orchestrator does not limit resource usage with unauthenticated connections, allowing a DoS by flooding the service
Resource exhaustion in distributed OS because of "insufficient" IGMP queue management, as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
Product allows attackers to cause a crash via a large number of connections.
Malformed request triggers uncontrolled recursion, leading to stack exhaustion.
Chain: memory leak (CWE-404) leads to resource exhaustion.
Driver does not use a maximum width when invoking sscanf style functions, causing stack consumption.
Large integer value for a length property in an object causes a large amount of memory allocation.
Web application firewall consumes excessive memory when an HTTP request contains a large Content-Length value but no POST data.
Product allows exhaustion of file descriptors when processing a large number of TCP packets.
Communication product allows memory consumption with a large number of SIP requests, which cause many sessions to be created.
TCP implementation allows attackers to consume CPU and prevent new connections using a TCP SYN flood attack.
Port scan triggers CPU consumption with processes that attempt to read data from closed sockets.
Product allows attackers to cause a denial of service via a large number of directives, each of which opens a separate window.
Product allows resource exhaustion via a large number of calls that do not complete a 3-way handshake.
Mail server does not properly handle deeply nested multipart MIME messages, leading to stack exhaustion.
Chain: anti-virus product encounters a malformed file but returns from a function without closing a file descriptor (CWE-775) leading to file descriptor consumption (CWE-400) and failed scans.
+ Detection Methods

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis typically has limited utility in recognizing resource exhaustion problems, except for program-independent system resources such as files, sockets, and processes. For system resources, automated static analysis may be able to detect circumstances in which resources are not released after they have expired. Automated analysis of configuration files may be able to detect settings that do not specify a maximum value.

Automated static analysis tools will not be appropriate for detecting exhaustion of custom resources, such as an intended security policy in which a bulletin board user is only allowed to make a limited number of posts per day.

Effectiveness: Limited

Automated Dynamic Analysis

Certain automated dynamic analysis techniques may be effective in spotting resource exhaustion problems, especially with resources such as processes, memory, and connections. The technique may involve generating a large number of requests to the product within a short time frame.

Effectiveness: Moderate

Fuzzing

While fuzzing is typically geared toward finding low-level implementation bugs, it can inadvertently find resource exhaustion problems. This can occur when the fuzzer generates a large number of test cases but does not restart the targeted product in between test cases. If an individual test case produces a crash, but it does not do so reliably, then an inability to handle resource exhaustion may be the cause.

Effectiveness: Opportunistic
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 730 OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A9 - Denial of Service
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 858 The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) Chapter 15 - Serialization (SER)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 861 The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) Chapter 18 - Miscellaneous (MSC)
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 985 SFP Secondary Cluster: Unrestricted Consumption
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1148 SEI CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java - Guidelines 14. Serialization (SER)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1152 SEI CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java - Guidelines 49. Miscellaneous (MSC)
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1200 Weaknesses in the 2019 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1350 Weaknesses in the 2020 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1387 Weaknesses in the 2022 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1416 Comprehensive Categorization: Resource Lifecycle Management
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1430 Weaknesses in the 2024 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes

Usage: DISCOURAGED

(this CWE ID should not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)

Reason: Frequent Misuse

Rationale:

CWE-400 is intended for incorrect behaviors in which the product is expected to track and restrict how many resources it consumes, but CWE-400 is often misused because it is conflated with the "technical impact" of vulnerabilities in which resource consumption occurs. It is sometimes used for low-information vulnerability reports. It is a level-1 Class (i.e., a child of a Pillar).

Comments:

Closely analyze the specific mistake that is causing resource consumption, and perform a CWE mapping for that mistake. Consider children/descendants such as CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling, CWE-771: Missing Reference to Active Allocated Resource, CWE-410: Insufficient Resource Pool, CWE-772: Missing Release of Resource after Effective Lifetime, CWE-834: Excessive Iteration, CWE-405: Asymmetric Resource Consumption (Amplification), and others.
+ Notes

Theoretical

Vulnerability theory is largely about how behaviors and resources interact. "Resource exhaustion" can be regarded as either a consequence or an attack, depending on the perspective. This entry is an attempt to reflect the underlying weaknesses that enable these attacks (or consequences) to take place.

Other

Database queries that take a long time to process are good DoS targets. An attacker would have to write a few lines of Perl code to generate enough traffic to exceed the site's ability to keep up. This would effectively prevent authorized users from using the site at all. Resources can be exploited simply by ensuring that the target machine must do much more work and consume more resources in order to service a request than the attacker must do to initiate a request.

A prime example of this can be found in old switches that were vulnerable to "macof" attacks (so named for a tool developed by Dugsong). These attacks flooded a switch with random IP and MAC address combinations, therefore exhausting the switch's cache, which held the information of which port corresponded to which MAC addresses. Once this cache was exhausted, the switch would fail in an insecure way and would begin to act simply as a hub, broadcasting all traffic on all ports and allowing for basic sniffing attacks.

Maintenance

"Resource consumption" could be interpreted as a consequence instead of an insecure behavior, so this entry is being considered for modification. It appears to be referenced too frequently when more precise mappings are available. Some of its children, such as CWE-771, might be better considered as a chain.

Maintenance

The Taxonomy_Mappings to ISA/IEC 62443 were added in CWE 4.10, but they are still under review and might change in future CWE versions. These draft mappings were performed by members of the "Mapping CWE to 62443" subgroup of the CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT Special Interest Group (SIG), and their work is incomplete as of CWE 4.10. The mappings are included to facilitate discussion and review by the broader ICS/OT community, and they are likely to change in future CWE versions.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
CLASP Resource exhaustion (file descriptor, disk space, sockets, ...)
OWASP Top Ten 2004 A9 CWE More Specific Denial of Service
WASC 10 Denial of Service
WASC 41 XML Attribute Blowup
The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) SER12-J Avoid memory and resource leaks during serialization
The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) MSC05-J Do not exhaust heap space
Software Fault Patterns SFP13 Unrestricted Consumption
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 3-3 Req SR 7.1
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 3-3 Req SR 7.2
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-1 Req SI-1
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-1 Req SVV-3
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-2 Req CR 7.1
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-2 Req CR 7.2
+ References
[REF-18] Secure Software, Inc.. "The CLASP Application Security Process". 2005. <https://cwe.mitre.org/documents/sources/TheCLASPApplicationSecurityProcess.pdf>. URL validated: 2024-11-17.
[REF-386] Joao Antunes, Nuno Ferreira Neves and Paulo Verissimo. "Detection and Prediction of Resource-Exhaustion Vulnerabilities". Proceedings of the IEEE International Symposium on Software Reliability Engineering (ISSRE). 2008-11. <http://homepages.di.fc.ul.pt/~nuno/PAPERS/ISSRE08.pdf>.
[REF-387] D.J. Bernstein. "Resource exhaustion". <http://cr.yp.to/docs/resources.html>.
[REF-388] Pascal Meunier. "Resource exhaustion". Secure Programming Educational Material. 2004. <http://homes.cerias.purdue.edu/~pmeunier/secprog/sanitized/class1/6.resource%20exhaustion.ppt>.
[REF-7] Michael Howard and David LeBlanc. "Writing Secure Code". Chapter 17, "Protecting Against Denial of Service Attacks" Page 517. 2nd Edition. Microsoft Press. 2002-12-04. <https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/store/writing-secure-code-9780735617223>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19) 		CLASP
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2023-01-24
(CWE 4.10, 2023-01-31) 		"Mapping CWE to 62443" Sub-Working Group CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT SIG
Suggested mappings to ISA/IEC 62443.
2023-04-25 "Mapping CWE to 62443" Sub-Working Group CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT SIG
Suggested mappings to ISA/IEC 62443.
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
2008-08-15 Veracode
Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-10-14 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Name, Relationships
2009-01-12 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2009-05-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Name, Relationships
2009-07-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Relationships
2009-10-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2009-12-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Detection_Factors, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Observed_Examples, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, References
2010-02-16 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References, Taxonomy_Mappings
2010-04-05 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2010-06-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2010-09-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2013-07-17 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2015-12-07 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2017-01-19 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
2018-03-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Type
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Alternate_Terms, Description, Name, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings, Theoretical_Notes
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2019-09-19 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2020-06-25 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Maintenance_Notes
2020-08-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2022-04-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2022-06-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Detection_Factors, Maintenance_Notes, Related_Attack_Patterns, Taxonomy_Mappings
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
2024-11-19
(CWE 4.16, 2024-11-19) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2008-10-14 Resource Exhaustion
2009-05-27 Uncontrolled Resource Consumption (aka 'Resource Exhaustion')
2019-01-03 Uncontrolled Resource Consumption ('Resource Exhaustion')
Page Last Updated: November 19, 2024
 

Use of the Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE™) and the associated references from this website are subject to the Terms of Use. CWE is sponsored by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and managed by the Homeland Security Systems Engineering and Development Institute (HSSEDI) which is operated by The MITRE Corporation (MITRE). Copyright © 2006–2024, The MITRE Corporation. CWE, CWSS, CWRAF, and the CWE logo are trademarks of The MITRE Corporation.