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CWE-22: Path Traversal

 
Path Traversal
Weakness ID: 22 (Weakness Class)Status: Draft
+ Description

Description Summary

The software uses external input to construct a pathname that should be within a restricted directory, but it does not properly sanitize special elements that can resolve to a location that is outside of that directory.

Extended Description

This allows attackers to traverse the file system to access files or directories that are outside of the restricted directory.

One of the most common special elements is the ".." sequence, which in most modern operating systems is interpreted as the parent directory of the current location.

+ Alternate Terms
Directory traversal
Path traversal:

"Path traversal" is preferred over "directory traversal."

+ Time of Introduction
  • Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms

Languages

All

+ Potential Mitigations
PhaseDescription

Assume all input is malicious. Attackers can insert paths into input vectors and traverse the file system. Use an appropriate combination of black lists and white lists to ensure only valid and expected input is processed by the system. Warning: if you attempt to cleanse your data, then do so that the end result is not in the form that can be dangerous. A sanitizing mechanism can remove characters such as '.' and ';' which may be required for some exploits. An attacker can try to fool the sanitizing mechanism into "cleaning" data into a dangerous form. Suppose the attacker injects a '.' inside a filename (e.g. "sensi.tiveFile") and the sanitizing mechanism removes the character resulting in the valid filename, "sensitiveFile". If the input data are now assumed to be safe, then the file may be compromised. See CWE-182 (Collapse of Data Into Unsafe Value).

Architecture and Design

Assume all input is malicious. Use a standard input validation mechanism to validate all input for length, type, syntax, and business rules before accepting the data to be displayed or stored. Use an "accept known good" validation strategy. Input (specifically, unexpected CRLFs) that is not appropriate should not be processed into HTTP headers.

Use and specify a strong input/output encoding (such as ISO 8859-1 or UTF 8).

Do not rely exclusively on blacklist validation to detect malicious input or to encode output. There are too many variants to encode a character; you're likely to miss some variants.

Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated. Make sure that your application does not decode the same input twice. Such errors could be used to bypass whitelist schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.

+ Other Notes

Some pathname equivalence issues are not directly related to directory traversal, rather are used to bypass security-relevant checks for whether a file/directory can be accessed by the attacker (e.g. a trailing "/" on a filename could bypass access rules that don't expect a trailing /, causing a server to provide the file when it normally would not).

Incomplete diagnosis or reporting of vulnerabilities can make it difficult to know which variant is affected. For example, a researcher might say that "..\" is vulnerable, but not test "../" which may also be vulnerable.

Any combination of the items below can provide its own variant, e.g. "//../" is not listed (CVE-2004-0325).

Like other Weaknesses, terminology is often based on the types of manipulations used, instead of the underlying Weaknesses.

Some people use "directory traversal" only to refer to the injection of ".." and equivalent sequences whose specific meaning is to traverse directories. Other variants like "absolute pathname" and "drive letter" have the *effect* of directory traversal, but some people may not call it such, since it doesn't involve ".." or equivalent.

+ Weakness Ordinalities
OrdinalityDescription
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Relationships
NatureTypeIDNameView(s) this relationship pertains toView(s)
ChildOfCategoryCategory21Pathname Traversal and Equivalence Errors
Development Concepts (primary)699
ChildOfCategoryCategory632Weaknesses that Affect Files or Directories
Resource-specific Weaknesses (primary)631
ChildOfWeakness ClassWeakness Class668Exposure of Resource to Wrong Sphere
Research Concepts1000
ChildOfWeakness ClassWeakness Class706Use of Incorrectly-Resolved Name or Reference
Research Concepts (primary)1000
ChildOfCategoryCategory715OWASP Top Ten 2007 Category A4 - Insecure Direct Object Reference
Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2007) (primary)629
ChildOfCategoryCategory723OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A2 - Broken Access Control
Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004) (primary)711
ChildOfCategoryCategory743CERT C Secure Coding Section 09 - Input Output (FIO)
Weaknesses Addressed by the CERT C Secure Coding Standard (primary)734
CanFollowWeakness ClassWeakness Class20Improper Input Validation
Research Concepts1000
ParentOfWeakness BaseWeakness Base23Relative Path Traversal
Development Concepts (primary)699
Research Concepts (primary)1000
ParentOfWeakness BaseWeakness Base36Absolute Path Traversal
Development Concepts (primary)699
Research Concepts (primary)1000
CanFollowWeakness ClassWeakness Class73External Control of File Name or Path
Research Concepts1000
CanFollowWeakness ClassWeakness Class172Encoding Error
Research Concepts1000
MemberOfViewView635Weaknesses Used by NVD
Weaknesses Used by NVD (primary)635
+ Relationship Notes

Pathname equivalence can be regarded as a type of canonicalization error.

+ Research Gaps

Most of these issues are probably under-studied

+ Affected Resources
  • File/Directory
+ Relevant Properties
  • Equivalence
+ Functional Areas
  • File processing
+ Causal Nature

Explicit

+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy NameNode IDFitMapped Node Name
PLOVERPath Traversal
OWASP Top Ten 2007A4CWE More SpecificInsecure Direct Object Reference
OWASP Top Ten 2004A2CWE More SpecificBroken Access Control
CERT C Secure CodingFIO02-CCanonicalize path names originating from untrusted sources
+ Content History
Submissions
Submission DateSubmitterOrganizationSource
PLOVERExternally Mined
Modifications
Modification DateModifierOrganizationSource
2008-07-01Eric DalciCigitalExternal
updated Potential Mitigations, Time of Introduction
2008-08-15VeracodeExternal
Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping
2008-09-08CWE Content TeamMITREInternal
updated Alternate Terms, Relationships, Other Notes, Relationship Notes, Relevant Properties, Taxonomy Mappings, Weakness Ordinalities
2008-10-14CWE Content TeamMITREInternal
updated Description
2008-11-24CWE Content TeamMITREInternal
updated Relationships, Taxonomy Mappings
2009-07-27CWE Content TeamMITREInternal
updated Potential Mitigations
Page Last Updated: October 29, 2009