CWE

Common Weakness Enumeration

Celebrating 20 years of community-developed cybersecurity weakness knowledge!

New to CWE? click here!
CWE Most Important Hardware Weaknesses
CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Weaknesses
Home > CWE List > VIEW SLICE: CWE-1460: Weaknesses Addressed by the Top 20 Secure PLC Coding Practices (5.0)  
ID

CWE VIEW: Weaknesses Addressed by the Top 20 Secure PLC Coding Practices

View ID: 1460
Vulnerability Mapping: PROHIBITED This CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Type: Explicit
Downloads: Booklet | CSV | XML | Markdown
+ Objective
CWE entries in this view (graph) are fully or partially eliminated by following the guidance presented in the Top 20 Secure PLC Coding Practices, as published by the Secure PLC Programming project in 2021.
+ Audience
Stakeholder Description
Software Developers By following the practices in the list, PLC developers will be able to fully or partially prevent the weaknesses that are identified in this view. In addition, developers can use a CWE coverage graph to determine which weaknesses are not directly addressed by the guide, which will help identify and resolve remaining gaps in training, tool acquisition, or other approaches for reducing weaknesses.
Product Customers If a developer claims to be following these practices, then customers can search for the weaknesses in this view in order to formulate independent evidence of that claim.
Educators Educators can use this view in multiple ways. For example, if there is a focus on teaching weaknesses, the educator could link them to these practices.
+ Membership
Nature Type ID Name
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 128 Wrap-around Error
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 129 Improper Validation of Array Index
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 190 Integer Overflow or Wraparound
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 345 Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 353 Missing Support for Integrity Check
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 354 Improper Validation of Integrity Check Value
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 369 Divide By Zero
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 653 Improper Isolation or Compartmentalization
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 754 Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 778 Insufficient Logging
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 787 Out-of-bounds Write
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 1120 Excessive Code Complexity
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1320 Improper Protection for Outbound Error Messages and Alert Signals
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage PROHIBITED
(this CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason View

Rationale

This entry is a View. Views are not weaknesses and therefore inappropriate to describe the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Use this View or other Views to search and navigate for the appropriate weakness.
+ Notes

Relationship

The relationships in this view were determined based on specific statements within the rules from the practices. Not all rules have direct relationships to individual weaknesses, although they likely have chaining relationships in specific circumstances.

Research Gap

Some of the rules in the guide did not have clear relationships to existing CWE entries. This suggests that there might be gaps in CWE, or some of the practices in the PLC Top 20 are not specific to weaknesses.
+ References
[REF-1550] Secure PLC Programming project. "Secure PLC Coding Practices: Top 20 List". 2021-06-15. <https://plc-security.com/>. URL validated: 2026-10-07.
+ View Metrics
CWEs in this view Total CWEs
Weaknesses 13 out of 956
Categories 0 out of 396
Views 0 out of 58
Total 13 out of 1410
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2026-10-07
(CWE 5.0, 2026-10-28)
CWE Content Team MITRE

View Components

A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z

CWE-369: Divide By Zero

Weakness ID: 369
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
Shows the description and diagram, platforms, mitigations, consequences, relationships, memberships, and content history. For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
×

Edit Custom Filter


+ Description
The product divides a value by zero.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart

Scope: Availability

A Divide by Zero results in a crash.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf, Overlaps, and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Complete Weakness Hierarchy" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 682 Incorrect Calculation
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Grouping Grouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 189 Numeric Errors
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 682 Incorrect Calculation
+ Relevant to the view "CISQ Quality Measures (2020)" (View-1305)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 682 Incorrect Calculation
+ Relevant to the view "CISQ Data Protection Measures" (View-1340)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 682 Incorrect Calculation
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase(s) Note

Implementation

This weakness typically occurs when an unexpected value is provided to the product, or if an error occurs that is not properly detected. It frequently occurs in calculations involving physical dimensions such as size, length, width, and height.
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Type Applicable Platforms Notes
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
Medium
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


The following Java example contains a function to compute an average but does not validate that the input value used as the denominator is not zero. This will create an exception for attempting to divide by zero. If this error is not handled by Java exception handling, unexpected results can occur.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
public int computeAverageResponseTime (int totalTime, int numRequests) {
return totalTime / numRequests;
}

By validating the input value used as the denominator the following code will ensure that a divide by zero error will not cause unexpected results. The following Java code example will validate the input value, output an error message, and throw an exception.

(good code)
Example Language: Java 
public int computeAverageResponseTime (int totalTime, int numRequests) throws ArithmeticException {
if (numRequests == 0) {
System.out.println("Division by zero attempted!");
throw ArithmeticException;
}
return totalTime / numRequests;
}


Example 2


The following C/C++ example, adapted from [REF-371], contains a function that divides two numeric values without verifying that the input value used as the denominator is not zero. This will create an error for attempting to divide by zero, if this error is not caught by the error handling capabilities of the language, unexpected results can occur.

(bad code)
Example Language: C 
double divide(double x, double y){
return x/y;
}

By validating the input value used as the denominator the following code will ensure that a divide by zero error will not cause unexpected results. If the method is called and a zero is passed as the second argument a DivideByZero error will be thrown and should be caught by the calling block with an output message indicating the error.

(good code)
Example Language: C 
const int DivideByZero = 10;
double divide(double x, double y){
if ( 0 == y ){
throw DivideByZero;
}
return x/y;
}
...
try{
divide(10, 0);
}
catch( int i ){
if(i==DivideByZero) {
cerr<<"Divide by zero error";
}
}


Example 3


The following C# example, adapted from [REF-372], contains a function that divides two numeric values without verifying that the input value used as the denominator is not zero. This will create an error for attempting to divide by zero. If this error is not caught by the error handling capabilities of the language, unexpected results can occur.

(bad code)
Example Language: C# 
int Division(int x, int y){
return (x / y);
}

The method can be modified to raise, catch and handle the DivideByZeroException if the input value used as the denominator is zero.

(good code)
Example Language: C# 
int SafeDivision(int x, int y){
try{
return (x / y);
}
catch (System.DivideByZeroException dbz){
System.Console.WriteLine("Division by zero attempted!");
return 0;
}
}


+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Invalid size value leads to divide by zero.
"Empty" content triggers divide by zero.
Height value of 0 triggers divide by zero.
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Resultant
(where the weakness is typically related to the presence of some other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Effectiveness: High

Fuzzing

Fuzz testing (fuzzing) is a powerful technique for generating large numbers of diverse inputs - either randomly or algorithmically - and dynamically invoking the code with those inputs. Even with random inputs, it is often capable of generating unexpected results such as crashes, memory corruption, or resource consumption. Fuzzing effectively produces repeatable test cases that clearly indicate bugs, which helps developers to diagnose the issues.

Effectiveness: High

+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 730 OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A9 - Denial of Service
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 738 CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 5 - Integers (INT)
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 739 CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 6 - Floating Point (FLP)
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 848 The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) Chapter 5 - Numeric Types and Operations (NUM)
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 872 CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 04 - Integers (INT)
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 873 CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 05 - Floating Point Arithmetic (FLP)
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 998 SFP Secondary Cluster: Glitch in Computation
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1137 SEI CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java - Guidelines 03. Numeric Types and Operations (NUM)
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1158 SEI CERT C Coding Standard - Guidelines 04. Integers (INT)
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1408 Comprehensive Categorization: Incorrect Calculation
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1445 OWASP Top Ten 2025 Category A10:2025 - Mishandling of Exceptional Conditions
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1460 Weaknesses Addressed by the Top 20 Secure PLC Coding Practices
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
OWASP Top Ten 2004 A9 CWE More Specific Denial of Service
CERT C Secure Coding FLP03-C Detect and handle floating point errors
CERT C Secure Coding INT33-C Exact Ensure that division and remainder operations do not result in divide-by-zero errors
The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) NUM02-J Ensure that division and modulo operations do not result in divide-by-zero errors
Software Fault Patterns SFP1 Glitch in computation
PLC Top 20 4 Use PLC flags as integrity checks
+ References
[REF-371] Alex Allain. "Handling Errors Exceptionally Well in C++".
<https://www.cprogramming.com/tutorial/exceptions.html>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-372] Microsoft. "Exceptions and Exception Handling (C# Programming Guide)".
<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/csharp/fundamentals/exceptions/>. (URL validated: 2026-08-14)
[REF-1534] OMG. "Automated Technical Debt Measure, Version 2". 2024-08.
<https://www.omg.org/spec/ATDM2/1.0/PDF>. (URL validated: 2026-07-16)
[REF-1550] Secure PLC Programming project. "Secure PLC Coding Practices: Top 20 List". 2021-06-15.
<https://plc-security.com/>. (URL validated: 2026-10-07)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2008-04-11
(CWE Draft 9, 2008-04-11)
CWE Community
Submitted by members of the CWE community to extend early CWE versions
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2026-10-28
(CWE 5.0, 2026-10-28)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities
2025-04-03
(CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2023-06-29
(CWE 4.12, 2023-06-29)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27
(CWE 4.11, 2023-04-27)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Detection_Factors, References, Relationships
2022-10-13
(CWE 4.9, 2022-10-13)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2020-12-10
(CWE 4.3, 2020-12-10)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-08-20
(CWE 4.2, 2020-08-20)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-02-24
(CWE 4.0, 2020-02-24)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2019-01-03
(CWE 3.2, 2019-01-03)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2017-11-08
(CWE 3.0, 2017-11-08)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Taxonomy_Mappings
2015-12-07
(CWE 2.9, 2015-12-07)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-07-30
(CWE 2.8, 2014-07-31)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2012-05-11
(CWE 2.2, 2012-05-15)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-09-13
(CWE 2.1, 2011-09-13)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-01
(CWE 1.13, 2011-06-01)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2009-10-29
(CWE 1.6, 2009-10-29)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Other_Notes
2009-05-27
(CWE 1.4, 2009-05-27)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2008-11-24
(CWE 1.1, 2008-11-25)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-09-08
(CWE 1.0, 2008-09-09)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-07-01
(CWE 1.0, 2008-09-09)
Sean Eidemiller Cigital
added/updated demonstrative examples
2008-07-01
(CWE 1.0, 2008-09-09)
Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction

CWE-1120: Excessive Code Complexity

Weakness ID: 1120
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities in limited situations requiring careful review (with careful review of mapping notes)
Abstraction: Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.
View customized information:
Shows the description and diagram, platforms, mitigations, consequences, relationships, memberships, and content history. For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
×

Edit Custom Filter


+ Description
The code is too complex, as calculated using a well-defined, quantitative measure.
+ Dimensions
Section HelpThe Dimensions table provides information about the different dimensions associated with this weakness. The Type identifies the dimension type, while the Value provides the specific value for that dimension.
TypeValue
Code-PropertyExcessive
Code-TypeCode
Code-PropertyComplexity
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Reduce Maintainability; Increase Analytical Complexity

Scope: Other

This issue makes it more difficult to understand and/or maintain the product, which indirectly affects security by making it more difficult or time-consuming to find and/or fix vulnerabilities. It also might make it easier to introduce vulnerabilities.

Reduce Performance

Scope: Other

This issue can make the product perform more slowly. If the relevant code is reachable by an attacker, then this performance problem might introduce a vulnerability.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf, Overlaps, and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Complete Weakness Hierarchy" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 710 Improper Adherence to Coding Standards
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1047 Modules with Circular Dependencies
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1056 Invokable Control Element with Variadic Parameters
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1060 Excessive Number of Inefficient Server-Side Data Accesses
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1064 Invokable Control Element with Signature Containing an Excessive Number of Parameters
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1075 Unconditional Control Flow Transfer outside of Switch Block
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1080 Source Code File with Excessive Number of Lines of Code
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1095 Loop Condition Value Update within the Loop
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1119 Excessive Use of Unconditional Branching
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1121 Excessive McCabe Cyclomatic Complexity
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1122 Excessive Halstead Complexity
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1123 Excessive Use of Self-Modifying Code
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1124 Excessively Deep Nesting
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1125 Excessive Attack Surface
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase(s) Note

Implementation

+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Type Applicable Platforms Notes
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Indirect
(where the weakness is a quality issue that might indirectly make it easier to introduce security-relevant weaknesses or make them more difficult to detect)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Effectiveness: High

+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1412 Comprehensive Categorization: Poor Coding Practices
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1460 Weaknesses Addressed by the Top 20 Secure PLC Coding Practices
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED-WITH-REVIEW
(this CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities in limited situations requiring careful review)
Reason Abstraction

Rationale

This CWE entry is a Class and might have Base-level children that would be more appropriate

Comments

Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
PLC Top 20 1 Modularize PLC Code
+ References
[REF-1550] Secure PLC Programming project. "Secure PLC Coding Practices: Top 20 List". 2021-06-15.
<https://plc-security.com/>. (URL validated: 2026-10-07)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2018-07-02
(CWE 3.2, 2019-01-03)
CWE Content Team MITRE
Entry derived from Common Quality Enumeration (CQE) Draft 0.9.
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2026-10-28
(CWE 5.0, 2026-10-28)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Dimensions, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Description, Detection_Factors, Time_of_Introduction
2023-06-29
(CWE 4.12, 2023-06-29)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27
(CWE 4.11, 2023-04-27)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2023-01-31
(CWE 4.10, 2023-01-31)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2020-02-24
(CWE 4.0, 2020-02-24)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships

CWE-754: Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions

Weakness ID: 754
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities in limited situations requiring careful review (with careful review of mapping notes)
Abstraction: Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.
View customized information:
Shows the description and diagram, platforms, mitigations, consequences, relationships, memberships, and content history. For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
×

Edit Custom Filter


+ Description
The product does not check or incorrectly checks for unusual or exceptional conditions that are not expected to occur frequently during day to day operation of the product.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart; Unexpected State

Scope: Integrity, Availability

This could lead to instability, incorrect behavior, or a vulnerability. Any data that was produced as a result of a function call could be in a bad state upon return. If the return value is not checked, then this bad data may be used in operations, possibly leading to a crash or other unintended behaviors.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Requirements

Strategy: Language Selection

Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

Choose languages with features such as exception handling that force the programmer to anticipate unusual conditions that may generate exceptions. Custom exceptions may need to be developed to handle unusual business-logic conditions. Be careful not to pass sensitive exceptions back to the user (CWE-209, CWE-248).

Implementation

Check the results of all functions that return a value and verify that the value is expected.

Effectiveness: High

Note: Checking the return value of the function will typically be sufficient, however beware of race conditions (CWE-362) in a concurrent environment.

Implementation

If using exception handling, catch and throw specific exceptions instead of overly-general exceptions (CWE-396, CWE-397). Catch and handle exceptions as locally as possible so that exceptions do not propagate too far up the call stack (CWE-705). Avoid unchecked or uncaught exceptions where feasible (CWE-248).

Effectiveness: High

Note: Using specific exceptions, and ensuring that exceptions are checked, helps programmers to anticipate and appropriately handle many unusual events that could occur.

Implementation

Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.

If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.

Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.

Exposing additional information to a potential attacker in the context of an exceptional condition can help the attacker determine what attack vectors are most likely to succeed beyond DoS.

Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.

When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."

Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.

Note: Performing extensive input validation does not help with handling unusual conditions, but it will minimize their occurrences and will make it more difficult for attackers to trigger them.

Architecture and Design; Implementation

If the program must fail, ensure that it fails gracefully (fails closed). There may be a temptation to simply let the program fail poorly in cases such as low memory conditions, but an attacker may be able to assert control before the software has fully exited. Alternately, an uncontrolled failure could cause cascading problems with other downstream components; for example, the program could send a signal to a downstream process so the process immediately knows that a problem has occurred and has a better chance of recovery.

Architecture and Design

Use system limits, which should help to prevent resource exhaustion. However, the product should still handle low resource conditions since they may still occur.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf, Overlaps, and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Complete Weakness Hierarchy" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 703 Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 252 Unchecked Return Value
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 253 Incorrect Check of Function Return Value
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 273 Improper Check for Dropped Privileges
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 354 Improper Validation of Integrity Check Value
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 394 Unexpected Status Code or Return Value
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 476 NULL Pointer Dereference
CanPrecede Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 416 Use After Free
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf View View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1003 Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 252 Unchecked Return Value
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 273 Improper Check for Dropped Privileges
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 476 NULL Pointer Dereference
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Grouping Grouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1012 Cross Cutting
+ Background Details
Many functions will return some value about the success of their actions. This will alert the program whether or not to handle any errors caused by that function.
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase(s) Note

Implementation

The programmer may assume that certain events or conditions will never occur or do not need to be worried about, such as low memory conditions, lack of access to resources due to restrictive permissions, or misbehaving clients or components. Attackers may intentionally trigger these unusual conditions, thus violating the programmer's assumptions.

Implementation

REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Type Applicable Platforms Notes
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Python (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
Medium
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


Consider the following code segment:

(bad code)
Example Language: C 
char buf[10], cp_buf[10];
fgets(buf, 10, stdin);
strcpy(cp_buf, buf);

The programmer expects that when fgets() returns, buf will contain a null-terminated string of length 9 or less. But if an I/O error occurs, fgets() will not null-terminate buf. Furthermore, if the end of the file is reached before any characters are read, fgets() returns without writing anything to buf. In both of these situations, fgets() signals that something unusual has happened by returning NULL, but in this code, the warning will not be noticed. The lack of a null terminator in buf can result in a buffer overflow in the subsequent call to strcpy().



Example 2


The following code does not check to see if memory allocation succeeded before attempting to use the pointer returned by malloc().

(bad code)
Example Language: C 
buf = (char*) malloc(req_size);
strncpy(buf, xfer, req_size);

The traditional defense of this coding error is: "If my program runs out of memory, it will fail. It doesn't matter whether I handle the error or simply allow the program to die with a segmentation fault when it tries to dereference the null pointer." This argument ignores three important considerations:

  • Depending upon the type and size of the application, it may be possible to free memory that is being used elsewhere so that execution can continue.
  • It is impossible for the program to perform a graceful exit if required. If the program is performing an atomic operation, it can leave the system in an inconsistent state.
  • The programmer has lost the opportunity to record diagnostic information. Did the call to malloc() fail because req_size was too large or because there were too many requests being handled at the same time? Or was it caused by a memory leak that has built up over time? Without handling the error, there is no way to know.



Example 3


The following examples read a file into a byte array.

(bad code)
Example Language: C# 
char[] byteArray = new char[1024];
for (IEnumerator i=users.GetEnumerator(); i.MoveNext() ;i.Current()) {
String userName = (String) i.Current();
String pFileName = PFILE_ROOT + "/" + userName;
StreamReader sr = new StreamReader(pFileName);
sr.Read(byteArray,0,1024);//the file is always 1k bytes
sr.Close();
processPFile(userName, byteArray);
}
(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
FileInputStream fis;
byte[] byteArray = new byte[1024];
for (Iterator i=users.iterator(); i.hasNext();) {
String userName = (String) i.next();
String pFileName = PFILE_ROOT + "/" + userName;
FileInputStream fis = new FileInputStream(pFileName);
fis.read(byteArray); // the file is always 1k bytes
fis.close();
processPFile(userName, byteArray);

The code loops through a set of users, reading a private data file for each user. The programmer assumes that the files are always 1 kilobyte in size and therefore ignores the return value from Read(). If an attacker can create a smaller file, the program will recycle the remainder of the data from the previous user and treat it as though it belongs to the attacker.



Example 4


The following code does not check to see if the string returned by getParameter() is null before calling the member function compareTo(), potentially causing a NULL dereference.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
String itemName = request.getParameter(ITEM_NAME);
if (itemName.compareTo(IMPORTANT_ITEM) == 0) {
...
}
...

The following code does not check to see if the string returned by the Item property is null before calling the member function Equals(), potentially causing a NULL dereference.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
String itemName = request.Item(ITEM_NAME);
if (itemName.Equals(IMPORTANT_ITEM)) {
...
}
...

The traditional defense of this coding error is: "I know the requested value will always exist because.... If it does not exist, the program cannot perform the desired behavior so it doesn't matter whether I handle the error or simply allow the program to die dereferencing a null value." But attackers are skilled at finding unexpected paths through programs, particularly when exceptions are involved.



Example 5


The following code shows a system property that is set to null and later dereferenced by a programmer who mistakenly assumes it will always be defined.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
System.clearProperty("os.name");
...
String os = System.getProperty("os.name");
if (os.equalsIgnoreCase("Windows 95")) System.out.println("Not supported");

The traditional defense of this coding error is: "I know the requested value will always exist because.... If it does not exist, the program cannot perform the desired behavior so it doesn't matter whether I handle the error or simply allow the program to die dereferencing a null value." But attackers are skilled at finding unexpected paths through programs, particularly when exceptions are involved.



Example 6


The following VB.NET code does not check to make sure that it has read 50 bytes from myfile.txt. This can cause DoDangerousOperation() to operate on an unexpected value.

(bad code)
Example Language: C# 
Dim MyFile As New FileStream("myfile.txt", FileMode.Open, FileAccess.Read, FileShare.Read)
Dim MyArray(50) As Byte
MyFile.Read(MyArray, 0, 50)
DoDangerousOperation(MyArray(20))

In .NET, it is not uncommon for programmers to misunderstand Read() and related methods that are part of many System.IO classes. The stream and reader classes do not consider it to be unusual or exceptional if only a small amount of data becomes available. These classes simply add the small amount of data to the return buffer, and set the return value to the number of bytes or characters read. There is no guarantee that the amount of data returned is equal to the amount of data requested.



Example 7


This example takes an IP address from a user, verifies that it is well formed and then looks up the hostname and copies it into a buffer.

(bad code)
Example Language: C 
void host_lookup(char *user_supplied_addr){
struct hostent *hp;
in_addr_t *addr;
char hostname[64];
in_addr_t inet_addr(const char *cp);

/*routine that ensures user_supplied_addr is in the right format for conversion */

validate_addr_form(user_supplied_addr);
addr = inet_addr(user_supplied_addr);
hp = gethostbyaddr( addr, sizeof(struct in_addr), AF_INET);
strcpy(hostname, hp->h_name);
}

If an attacker provides an address that appears to be well-formed, but the address does not resolve to a hostname, then the call to gethostbyaddr() will return NULL. Since the code does not check the return value from gethostbyaddr (CWE-252), a NULL pointer dereference (CWE-476) would then occur in the call to strcpy().

Note that this code is also vulnerable to a buffer overflow (CWE-119).



Example 8


In the following C/C++ example the method outputStringToFile opens a file in the local filesystem and outputs a string to the file. The input parameters output and filename contain the string to output to the file and the name of the file respectively.

(bad code)
Example Language: C++ 
int outputStringToFile(char *output, char *filename) {

openFileToWrite(filename);
writeToFile(output);
closeFile(filename);
}

However, this code does not check the return values of the methods openFileToWrite, writeToFile, closeFile to verify that the file was properly opened and closed and that the string was successfully written to the file. The return values for these methods should be checked to determine if the method was successful and allow for detection of errors or unexpected conditions as in the following example.

(good code)
Example Language: C++ 
int outputStringToFile(char *output, char *filename) {
int isOutput = SUCCESS;

int isOpen = openFileToWrite(filename);
if (isOpen == FAIL) {
printf("Unable to open file %s", filename);
isOutput = FAIL;
}
else {
int isWrite = writeToFile(output);
if (isWrite == FAIL) {
printf("Unable to write to file %s", filename);
isOutput = FAIL;
}

int isClose = closeFile(filename);
if (isClose == FAIL)
isOutput = FAIL;
}
return isOutput;
}


Example 9


In the following Java example the method readFromFile uses a FileReader object to read the contents of a file. The FileReader object is created using the File object readFile, the readFile object is initialized using the setInputFile method. The setInputFile method should be called before calling the readFromFile method.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
private File readFile = null;

public void setInputFile(String inputFile) {

// create readFile File object from string containing name of file
}

public void readFromFile() {
try {
reader = new FileReader(readFile);

// read input file
} catch (FileNotFoundException ex) {...}
}

However, the readFromFile method does not check to see if the readFile object is null, i.e. has not been initialized, before creating the FileReader object and reading from the input file. The readFromFile method should verify whether the readFile object is null and output an error message and raise an exception if the readFile object is null, as in the following code.

(good code)
Example Language: Java 
private File readFile = null;

public void setInputFile(String inputFile) {

// create readFile File object from string containing name of file
}

public void readFromFile() {
try {
if (readFile == null) {
System.err.println("Input file has not been set, call setInputFile method before calling openInputFile");
throw NullPointerException;
}

reader = new FileReader(readFile);

// read input file
} catch (FileNotFoundException ex) {...}
catch (NullPointerException ex) {...}
}


+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Chain: function in web caching proxy does not correctly check a return value (CWE-253) leading to a reachable assertion (CWE-617)
Unchecked return value leads to resultant integer overflow and code execution.
Program does not check return value when invoking functions to drop privileges, which could leave users with higher privileges than expected by forcing those functions to fail.
Program does not check return value when invoking functions to drop privileges, which could leave users with higher privileges than expected by forcing those functions to fail.
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
Resultant
(where the weakness is typically related to the presence of some other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis may be useful for detecting unusual conditions involving system resources or common programming idioms, but not for violations of business rules.

Effectiveness: Moderate

Manual Dynamic Analysis

Identify error conditions that are not likely to occur during normal usage and trigger them. For example, run the program under low memory conditions, run with insufficient privileges or permissions, interrupt a transaction before it is completed, or disable connectivity to basic network services such as DNS. Monitor the software for any unexpected behavior. If you trigger an unhandled exception or similar error that was discovered and handled by the application's environment, it may still indicate unexpected conditions that were not handled by the application itself.
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 742 CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 9 - Memory Management (MEM)
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 802 2010 Top 25 - Risky Resource Management
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 867 2011 Top 25 - Weaknesses On the Cusp
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 876 CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 08 - Memory Management (MEM)
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 880 CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 12 - Exceptions and Error Handling (ERR)
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 962 SFP Secondary Cluster: Unchecked Status Condition
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1141 SEI CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java - Guidelines 07. Exceptional Behavior (ERR)
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1181 SEI CERT Perl Coding Standard - Guidelines 03. Expressions (EXP)
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1364 ICS Communications: Zone Boundary Failures
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1405 Comprehensive Categorization: Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1445 OWASP Top Ten 2025 Category A10:2025 - Mishandling of Exceptional Conditions
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1455 OpenSSF Secure Coding Guide for Python (2026) - 05 Exception Handling
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1460 Weaknesses Addressed by the Top 20 Secure PLC Coding Practices
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED-WITH-REVIEW
(this CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities in limited situations requiring careful review)
Reasons Abstraction, Frequent Misinterpretation

Rationale

This CWE entry is a Class and might have Base-level children that would be more appropriate

Comments

Important: This entry is not exclusively about the use of exceptions and exception handling, which are just one type of mechanism for both checking and handling unusual or unexpected conditions. Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit.
+ Notes

Relationship

Sometimes, when a return value can be used to indicate an error, an unchecked return value is a code-layer instance of a missing application-layer check for exceptional conditions. However, return values are not always needed to communicate exceptional conditions. For example, expiration of resources, values passed by reference, asynchronously modified data, sockets, etc. may indicate exceptional conditions without the use of a return value.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
SEI CERT Perl Coding Standard EXP31-PL CWE More Abstract Do not suppress or ignore exceptions
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-2 Req CR 3.5
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-2 Req CR 3.7
OpenSSF Secure Coding Guide for Python pyscg-0018 Validate Numeric Data Beyond Type Checking
PLC Top 20 4 Use PLC flags as integrity checks
PLC Top 20 7 Validate and alert for paired inputs / outputs
PLC Top 20 11 Instrument for plausibility checks
PLC Top 20 12 Validate inputs based on physical plausibility
PLC Top 20 16 Summarize PLC cycle times and trend them on the HMI
PLC Top 20 20 Trap false negatives and false positives for critical alerts
+ References
[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 7, "Program Building Blocks" Page 341. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 1, "Exceptional Conditions," Page 22. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
[REF-44] Michael Howard, David LeBlanc and John Viega. "24 Deadly Sins of Software Security". "Sin 11: Failure to Handle Errors Correctly." Page 183. McGraw-Hill. 2010.
[REF-622] Frank Kim. "Top 25 Series - Rank 15 - Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions". SANS Software Security Institute. 2010-03-15.
<https://www.sans.org/blog/top-25-series-rank-15-improper-check-for-unusual-or-exceptional-conditions/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-1541] OpenSSF. "Secure Coding Guide for Python". 05 Exception Handling.
<https://best.openssf.org/Secure-Coding-Guide-for-Python/>. (URL validated: 2026-10-06)
Rationale: Secure-Development-Rules
[REF-1550] Secure PLC Programming project. "Secure PLC Coding Practices: Top 20 List". 2021-06-15.
<https://plc-security.com/>. (URL validated: 2026-10-07)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2009-03-03
(CWE 1.3, 2009-03-10)
CWE Content Team MITRE
New entry for reorganization of CWE-703.
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2023-04-25
(CWE 4.11, 2023-04-27)
"Mapping CWE to 62443" Sub-Working Group CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT SIG
Suggested mappings to ISA/IEC 62443.
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2026-10-28
(CWE 5.0, 2026-10-28)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Description, Mapping_Notes, Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities
2024-07-16
(CWE 4.15, 2024-07-16)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2023-06-29
(CWE 4.12, 2023-06-29)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27
(CWE 4.11, 2023-04-27)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2023-01-31
(CWE 4.10, 2023-01-31)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Potential_Mitigations
2022-04-28
(CWE 4.7, 2022-04-28)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-07-20
(CWE 4.5, 2021-07-20)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-03-15
(CWE 4.4, 2021-03-15)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships
2020-12-10
(CWE 4.3, 2020-12-10)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2020-06-25
(CWE 4.1, 2020-06-25)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2020-02-24
(CWE 4.0, 2020-02-24)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
2019-06-20
(CWE 3.3, 2019-06-20)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Relationships
2019-01-03
(CWE 3.2, 2019-01-03)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2017-11-08
(CWE 3.0, 2017-11-08)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2017-01-19
(CWE 2.10, 2017-01-19)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2015-12-07
(CWE 2.9, 2015-12-07)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-07-30
(CWE 2.8, 2014-07-31)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships
2013-02-21
(CWE 2.4, 2013-02-21)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2012-10-30
(CWE 2.3, 2012-10-30)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11
(CWE 2.2, 2012-05-15)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2011-09-13
(CWE 2.1, 2011-09-13)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-27
(CWE 2.0, 2011-06-27)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2011-06-01
(CWE 1.13, 2011-06-01)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2011-03-29
(CWE 1.12, 2011-03-30)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Relationships
2010-12-13
(CWE 1.11, 2010-12-13)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationship_Notes
2010-09-27
(CWE 1.10, 2010-09-27)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2010-06-21
(CWE 1.9, 2010-06-21)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References
2010-04-05
(CWE 1.8.1, 2010-04-05)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns
2010-02-16
(CWE 1.8, 2010-02-16)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Background_Details, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Detection_Factors, Name, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationship_Notes, Relationships
2009-12-28
(CWE 1.7, 2009-12-28)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Time_of_Introduction
2009-07-27
(CWE 1.5, 2009-07-27)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2010-02-16 Improper Check for Exceptional Conditions

CWE-653: Improper Isolation or Compartmentalization

Weakness ID: 653
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.
View customized information:
Shows the description and diagram, platforms, mitigations, consequences, relationships, memberships, and content history. For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
×

Edit Custom Filter


+ Description
The product does not properly compartmentalize or isolate functionality, processes, or resources that require different privilege levels, rights, or permissions.
+ Dimensions
Section HelpThe Dimensions table provides information about the different dimensions associated with this weakness. The Type identifies the dimension type, while the Value provides the specific value for that dimension.
TypeValue
Behavior-TypeIsolation
Behavior-PropertyCompartmentalization
Resource-TypeImproper
+ Alternate Terms
Separation of Privilege
Some people and publications use the term "Separation of Privilege" to describe this weakness, but this term has dual meanings in current usage. This node conflicts with the original definition of "Separation of Privilege" by Saltzer and Schroeder; that original definition is more closely associated with CWE-654. Because there are multiple interpretations, use of the "Separation of Privilege" term is discouraged.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Gain Privileges or Assume Identity; Bypass Protection Mechanism

Scope: Access Control

The exploitation of a weakness in low-privileged areas of the software can be leveraged to reach higher-privileged areas without having to overcome any additional obstacles, extending the scope of the damage to higher-privileged users..
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design

Break up privileges between different modules, objects, or entities. Minimize the interfaces between modules and require strong access control between them.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf, Overlaps, and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Complete Weakness Hierarchy" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 657 Violation of Secure Design Principles
ChildOf Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 693 Protection Mechanism Failure
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1189 Improper Isolation of Shared Resources on System-on-a-Chip (SoC)
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1331 Improper Isolation of Shared Resources in Network On Chip (NoC)
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Grouping Grouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1212 Authorization Errors
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Grouping Grouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1011 Authorize Actors
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase(s) Note

Architecture and Design

COMMISSION: This weakness refers to an incorrect design related to an architectural security tactic.

Implementation

+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Type Applicable Platforms Notes
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


Single sign-on technology is intended to make it easier for users to access multiple resources or domains without having to authenticate each time. While this is highly convenient for the user and attempts to address problems with psychological acceptability, it also means that a compromise of a user's credentials can provide immediate access to all other resources or domains.



Example 2


The traditional UNIX privilege model provides root with arbitrary access to all resources, but root is frequently the only user that has privileges. As a result, administrative tasks require root privileges, even if those tasks are limited to a small area, such as updating user manpages. Some UNIX flavors have a "bin" user that is the owner of system executables, but since root relies on executables owned by bin, a compromise of the bin account can be leveraged for root privileges by modifying a bin-owned executable, such as CVE-2007-4238.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Improper isolation of shared resource in a network-on-chip leads to denial of service
Baseboard Management Controller (BMC) device implements Advanced High-performance Bus (AHB) bridges that do not require authentication for arbitrary read and write access to the BMC's physical address space from the host, and possibly the network [REF-1138].
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Compare binary / bytecode to application permission manifest

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Manual Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)
Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source

Effectiveness: High

Architecture or Design Review

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)
  • Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Attack Modeling

Effectiveness: High

+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 901 SFP Primary Cluster: Privilege
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1348 OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A04:2021 - Insecure Design
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1418 Comprehensive Categorization: Violation of Secure Design Principles
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1441 OWASP Top Ten 2025 Category A06:2025 - Insecure Design
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1460 Weaknesses Addressed by the Top 20 Secure PLC Coding Practices
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Notes

Relationship

There is a close association with CWE-250 (Execution with Unnecessary Privileges). CWE-653 is about providing separate components for each "privilege"; CWE-250 is about ensuring that each component has the least amount of privileges possible. In this fashion, compartmentalization becomes one mechanism for reducing privileges.

Terminology

The term "Separation of Privilege" is used in several different ways in the industry, but they generally combine two closely related principles: compartmentalization (this node) and using only one factor in a security decision (CWE-654). Proper compartmentalization implicitly introduces multiple factors into a security decision, but there can be cases in which multiple factors are required for authentication or other mechanisms that do not involve compartmentalization, such as performing all required checks on a submitted certificate. It is likely that CWE-653 and CWE-654 will provoke further discussion.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
PLC Top 20 1 Modularize PLC Code
PLC Top 20 10 Assign designated register blocks by function (read/write/validate)
+ References
[REF-196] Jerome H. Saltzer and Michael D. Schroeder. "The Protection of Information in Computer Systems". Proceedings of the IEEE 63. 1975-09.
<http://web.mit.edu/Saltzer/www/publications/protection/>.
[REF-535] Sean Barnum and Michael Gegick. "Separation of Privilege". 2005-12-06.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20220126060047/https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/bsi/articles/knowledge/principles/separation-of-privilege>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-1138] Stewart Smith. "CVE-2019-6260: Gaining control of BMC from the host processor". 2019.
<https://www.flamingspork.com/blog/2019/01/23/cve-2019-6260:-gaining-control-of-bmc-from-the-host-processor/>. (URL validated: 2025-07-29)
[REF-1479] Gregory Larsen, E. Kenneth Hong Fong, David A. Wheeler and Rama S. Moorthy. "State-of-the-Art Resources (SOAR) for Software Vulnerability Detection, Test, and Evaluation". 2014-07.
<https://www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/s/st/stateoftheart-resources-soar-for-software-vulnerability-detection-test-and-evaluation/p-5061.ashx>. (URL validated: 2025-09-05)
[REF-1550] Secure PLC Programming project. "Secure PLC Coding Practices: Top 20 List". 2021-06-15.
<https://plc-security.com/>. (URL validated: 2026-10-07)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2008-01-18
(CWE Draft 8, 2008-01-30)
Pascal Meunier Purdue University
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2026-10-28
(CWE 5.0, 2026-10-28)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Dimensions, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2025-09-09
(CWE 4.18, 2025-09-09)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Type
2023-10-26
(CWE 4.13, 2023-10-26)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples
2023-06-29
(CWE 4.12, 2023-06-29)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27
(CWE 4.11, 2023-04-27)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2022-10-13
(CWE 4.9, 2022-10-13)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2021-10-28
(CWE 4.6, 2021-10-28)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Name, Observed_Examples, References, Relationships
2020-12-10
(CWE 4.3, 2020-12-10)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-02-24
(CWE 4.0, 2020-02-24)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships
2017-11-08
(CWE 3.0, 2017-11-08)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Causal_Nature, Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships
2014-07-30
(CWE 2.8, 2014-07-31)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors
2012-10-30
(CWE 2.3, 2012-10-30)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11
(CWE 2.2, 2012-05-15)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2011-06-01
(CWE 1.13, 2011-06-01)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2010-12-13
(CWE 1.11, 2010-12-13)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Other_Notes, Relationship_Notes, Terminology_Notes
2009-01-12
(CWE 1.2, 2009-01-12)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Name
2008-09-08
(CWE 1.0, 2008-09-09)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Alternate_Terms, Common_Consequences, Description, Relationships, Other_Notes, Weakness_Ordinalities
2008-07-01
(CWE 1.0, 2008-09-09)
Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2021-10-28 Insufficient Compartmentalization
2009-01-12 Design Principle Violation: Insufficient Compartmentalization

CWE-1320: Improper Protection for Outbound Error Messages and Alert Signals

Weakness ID: 1320
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
Shows the description and diagram, platforms, mitigations, consequences, relationships, memberships, and content history. For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
×

Edit Custom Filter


+ Description
Untrusted agents can disable alerts about signal conditions exceeding limits or the response mechanism that handles such alerts.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

DoS: Instability; DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart; Reduce Reliability; Unexpected State

Scope: Availability

Likelihood: High

Warning signals that are not properly secured may be disabled or used to generate spurious alerts, causing degraded performance or denial-of-service (DoS). These alerts may be masked by untrusted software. Examples of these alerts involve thermal and power sensor alerts.

+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design

Alert signals generated by critical events should be protected from access by untrusted agents. Only hardware or trusted firmware modules should be able to alter the alert configuration.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf, Overlaps, and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Complete Weakness Hierarchy" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 284 Improper Access Control
+ Relevant to the view "Hardware Design" (View-1194)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Grouping Grouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1206 Power, Clock, Thermal, and Reset Concerns
+ Background Details

Hardware sensors are used to detect whether a device is operating within design limits. The threshold values for these limits are set by hardware fuses or trusted software such as a BIOS. Modification of these limits may be protected by hardware mechanisms.

When device sensors detect out of bound conditions, alert signals may be generated for remedial action, which may take the form of device shutdown or throttling.

+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase(s) Note

Architecture and Design

Implementation

+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Type Applicable Platforms Notes
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Operating Systems

Class: Not OS-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Architectures

Class: Not Architecture-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: System on Chip (Undetermined Prevalence)

Microcontroller Hardware (Undetermined Prevalence)

Memory Hardware (Undetermined Prevalence)

Power Management Hardware (Undetermined Prevalence)

Processor Hardware (Undetermined Prevalence)

Test/Debug Hardware (Undetermined Prevalence)

Sensor Hardware (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


Consider a platform design where a Digital-Thermal Sensor (DTS) is used to monitor temperature and compare that output against a threshold value. If the temperature output equals or exceeds the threshold value, the DTS unit sends an alert signal to the processor.

The processor, upon getting the alert, input triggers system shutdown. The alert signal is handled as a General-Purpose-I/O (GPIO) pin in input mode.

(bad code)
Example Language: Other 
The processor-GPIO controller exposes software-programmable controls that allow untrusted software to reprogram the state of the GPIO pin.

Reprogramming the state of the GPIO pin allows malicious software to trigger spurious alerts or to set the alert pin to a zero value so that thermal sensor alerts are not received by the processor.

(good code)
Example Language: Other 
The GPIO alert-signal pin is blocked from untrusted software access and is controlled only by trusted software, such as the System BIOS.


+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1396 Comprehensive Categorization: Access Control
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1460 Weaknesses Addressed by the Top 20 Secure PLC Coding Practices
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
PLC Top 20 8 Validate HMI input variables at the PLC level, not only at HMI
+ References
[REF-1550] Secure PLC Programming project. "Secure PLC Coding Practices: Top 20 List". 2021-06-15.
<https://plc-security.com/>. (URL validated: 2026-10-07)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2020-05-29
(CWE 4.3, 2020-12-10)
Hareesh Khattri, Arun Kanuparthi, Parbati K. Manna Intel Corporation
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2026-10-28
(CWE 5.0, 2026-10-28)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Background_Details, Common_Consequences, Description, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Weakness_Ordinalities
2025-04-03
(CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2023-06-29
(CWE 4.12, 2023-06-29)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27
(CWE 4.11, 2023-04-27)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2022-10-13
(CWE 4.9, 2022-10-13)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Name
2022-06-28
(CWE 4.8, 2022-06-28)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms
2022-04-28
(CWE 4.7, 2022-04-28)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2022-10-13 Improper Protection for Out of Bounds Signal Level Alerts

CWE-129: Improper Validation of Array Index

Weakness ID: 129
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
Shows the description and diagram, platforms, mitigations, consequences, relationships, memberships, and content history. For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
×

Edit Custom Filter


+ Description
The product uses untrusted input when calculating or using an array index, but the product does not validate or incorrectly validates the index to ensure the index references a valid position within the array.
+ Alternate Terms
out-of-bounds array index
index-out-of-range
array index underflow
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart

Scope: Integrity, Availability

Use of an index that is outside the bounds of an array will very likely result in the corruption of relevant memory and perhaps instructions, leading to a crash, if the values are outside of the valid memory area.

Modify Memory

Scope: Integrity

If the memory corrupted is data, rather than instructions, the system will continue to function with improper values.

Modify Memory; Read Memory

Scope: Confidentiality, Integrity

Use of an index that is outside the bounds of an array can also trigger out-of-bounds read or write operations, or operations on the wrong objects; i.e., "buffer overflows" are not always the result. This may result in the exposure or modification of sensitive data.

Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands

Scope: Integrity, Confidentiality, Availability

If the memory accessible by the attacker can be effectively controlled, it may be possible to execute arbitrary code, as with a standard buffer overflow and possibly without the use of large inputs if a precise index can be controlled.

DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart; Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands; Read Memory; Modify Memory

Scope: Integrity, Availability, Confidentiality

A single fault could allow either an overflow (CWE-788) or underflow (CWE-786) of the array index. What happens next will depend on the type of operation being performed out of bounds, but can expose sensitive information, cause a system crash, or possibly lead to arbitrary code execution.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design

Strategy: Input Validation

Use an input validation framework such as Struts or the OWASP ESAPI Validation API. Note that using a framework does not automatically address all input validation problems; be mindful of weaknesses that could arise from misusing the framework itself (CWE-1173).

Architecture and Design

For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

Even though client-side checks provide minimal benefits with respect to server-side security, they are still useful. First, they can support intrusion detection. If the server receives input that should have been rejected by the client, then it may be an indication of an attack. Second, client-side error-checking can provide helpful feedback to the user about the expectations for valid input. Third, there may be a reduction in server-side processing time for accidental input errors, although this is typically a small savings.

Requirements

Strategy: Language Selection

Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

For example, Ada allows the programmer to constrain the values of a variable and languages such as Java and Ruby will allow the programmer to handle exceptions when an out-of-bounds index is accessed.

Operation; Build and Compilation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.

Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.

For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].

Effectiveness: Defense in Depth

Note: These techniques do not provide a complete solution. For instance, exploits frequently use a bug that discloses memory addresses in order to maximize reliability of code execution [REF-1337]. It has also been shown that a side-channel attack can bypass ASLR [REF-1333].

Operation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.

For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].

Effectiveness: Defense in Depth

Note: This is not a complete solution, since buffer overflows could be used to overwrite nearby variables to modify the software's state in dangerous ways. In addition, it cannot be used in cases in which self-modifying code is required. Finally, an attack could still cause a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.

Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.

When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."

Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.

When accessing a user-controlled array index, use a stringent range of values that are within the target array. Make sure that you do not allow negative values to be used. That is, verify the minimum as well as the maximum of the range of acceptable values.

Implementation

Be especially careful to validate all input when invoking code that crosses language boundaries, such as from an interpreted language to native code. This could create an unexpected interaction between the language boundaries. Ensure that you are not violating any of the expectations of the language with which you are interfacing. For example, even though Java may not be susceptible to buffer overflows, providing a large argument in a call to native code might trigger an overflow.

Architecture and Design; Operation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.

Architecture and Design; Operation

Strategy: Sandbox or Jail

Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.

OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.

This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.

Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.

Effectiveness: Limited

Note: The effectiveness of this mitigation depends on the prevention capabilities of the specific sandbox or jail being used and might only help to reduce the scope of an attack, such as restricting the attacker to certain system calls or limiting the portion of the file system that can be accessed.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf, Overlaps, and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Complete Weakness Hierarchy" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1285 Improper Validation of Specified Index, Position, or Offset in Input
CanPrecede Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
CanPrecede Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 789 Memory Allocation with Excessive Size Value
CanPrecede Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 823 Use of Out-of-range Pointer Offset
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 20 Improper Input Validation
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase(s) Note

Implementation

+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Type Applicable Platforms Notes
Languages

C (Often Prevalent)

C++ (Often Prevalent)

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
High
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


In the code snippet below, an untrusted integer value is used to reference an object in an array.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
public String getValue(int index) {
return array[index];
}

If index is outside of the range of the array, this may result in an ArrayIndexOutOfBounds Exception being raised.



Example 2


The following example takes a user-supplied value to allocate an array of objects and then operates on the array.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
private void buildList ( int untrustedListSize ){
if ( 0 > untrustedListSize ){
die("Negative value supplied for list size, die evil hacker!");
}
Widget[] list = new Widget [ untrustedListSize ];
list[0] = new Widget();
}

This example attempts to build a list from a user-specified value, and even checks to ensure a non-negative value is supplied. If, however, a 0 value is provided, the code will build an array of size 0 and then try to store a new Widget in the first location, causing an exception to be thrown.



Example 3


In the following code, the method retrieves a value from an array at a specific array index location that is given as an input parameter to the method

(bad code)
Example Language: C 
int getValueFromArray(int *array, int len, int index) {

int value;

// check that the array index is less than the maximum

// length of the array
if (index < len) {
// get the value at the specified index of the array
value = array[index];
}
// if array index is invalid then output error message

// and return value indicating error
else {
printf("Value is: %d\n", array[index]);
value = -1;
}

return value;
}

However, this method only verifies that the given array index is less than the maximum length of the array but does not check for the minimum value (CWE-839). This will allow a negative value to be accepted as the input array index, which will result in reading data before the beginning of the buffer (CWE-127) and may allow access to sensitive memory. The input array index should be checked to verify that is within the maximum and minimum range required for the array (CWE-129). In this example the if statement should be modified to include a minimum range check, as shown below.

(good code)
Example Language: C 

...

// check that the array index is within the correct

// range of values for the array
if (index >= 0 && index < len) {

...


Example 4


The following example retrieves the sizes of messages for a pop3 mail server. The message sizes are retrieved from a socket that returns in a buffer the message number and the message size, the message number (num) and size (size) are extracted from the buffer and the message size is placed into an array using the message number for the array index.

(bad code)
Example Language: C 

/* capture the sizes of all messages */
int getsizes(int sock, int count, int *sizes) {
...
char buf[BUFFER_SIZE];
int ok;
int num, size;

// read values from socket and added to sizes array
while ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))) == 0)
{
// continue read from socket until buf only contains '.'
if (DOTLINE(buf))
break;
else if (sscanf(buf, "%d %d", &num, &size) == 2)
sizes[num - 1] = size;
}
...
}

In this example the message number retrieved from the buffer could be a value that is outside the allowable range of indices for the array and could possibly be a negative number. Without proper validation of the value to be used for the array index an array overflow could occur and could potentially lead to unauthorized access to memory addresses and system crashes. The value of the array index should be validated to ensure that it is within the allowable range of indices for the array as in the following code.

(good code)
Example Language: C 

/* capture the sizes of all messages */
int getsizes(int sock, int count, int *sizes) {
...
char buf[BUFFER_SIZE];
int ok;
int num, size;

// read values from socket and added to sizes array
while ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))) == 0)
{

// continue read from socket until buf only contains '.'
if (DOTLINE(buf))
break;

else if (sscanf(buf, "%d %d", &num, &size) == 2) {
if (num > 0 && num <= (unsigned)count)
sizes[num - 1] = size;

else

/* warn about possible attempt to induce buffer overflow */
report(stderr, "Warning: ignoring bogus data for message sizes returned by server.\n");
}
}
...
}


Example 5


In the following example the method displayProductSummary is called from a Web service servlet to retrieve product summary information for display to the user. The servlet obtains the integer value of the product number from the user and passes it to the displayProductSummary method. The displayProductSummary method passes the integer value of the product number to the getProductSummary method which obtains the product summary from the array object containing the project summaries using the integer value of the product number as the array index.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 

// Method called from servlet to obtain product information
public String displayProductSummary(int index) {
String productSummary = new String("");

try {
String productSummary = getProductSummary(index);


} catch (Exception ex) {...}

return productSummary;
}

public String getProductSummary(int index) {
return products[index];
}

In this example the integer value used as the array index that is provided by the user may be outside the allowable range of indices for the array which may provide unexpected results or cause the application to fail. The integer value used for the array index should be validated to ensure that it is within the allowable range of indices for the array as in the following code.

(good code)
Example Language: Java 

// Method called from servlet to obtain product information
public String displayProductSummary(int index) {
String productSummary = new String("");

try {
String productSummary = getProductSummary(index);


} catch (Exception ex) {...}

return productSummary;
}

public String getProductSummary(int index) {
String productSummary = "";

if ((index >= 0) && (index < MAX_PRODUCTS)) {
productSummary = products[index];
}
else {
System.err.println("index is out of bounds");
throw new IndexOutOfBoundsException();
}

return productSummary;
}

An alternative in Java would be to use one of the collection objects such as ArrayList that will automatically generate an exception if an attempt is made to access an array index that is out of bounds.

(good code)
Example Language: Java 
ArrayList productArray = new ArrayList(MAX_PRODUCTS);
...
try {
productSummary = (String) productArray.get(index);
} catch (IndexOutOfBoundsException ex) {...}


Example 6


The following example asks a user for an offset into an array to select an item.

(bad code)
Example Language: C 

int main (int argc, char **argv) {
char *items[] = {"boat", "car", "truck", "train"};
int index = GetUntrustedOffset();
printf("You selected %s\n", items[index-1]);
}

The programmer allows the user to specify which element in the list to select, however an attacker can provide an out-of-bounds offset, resulting in a buffer over-read (CWE-126).



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
large ID in packet used as array index
negative array index as argument to POP LIST command
Integer signedness error leads to negative array index
product does not properly track a count and a maximum number, which can lead to resultant array index overflow.
Chain: device driver for packet-capturing software allows access to an unintended IOCTL with resultant array index error.
Chain: array index error (CWE-129) leads to deadlock (CWE-833)
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Resultant
(where the weakness is typically related to the presence of some other weaknesses)
The most common condition situation leading to an out-of-bounds array index is the use of loop index variables as buffer indexes. If the end condition for the loop is subject to a flaw, the index can grow or shrink unbounded, therefore causing a buffer overflow or underflow. Another common situation leading to this condition is the use of a function's return value, or the resulting value of a calculation directly as an index in to a buffer.
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis

This weakness can often be detected using automated static analysis tools. Many modern tools use data flow analysis or constraint-based techniques to minimize the number of false positives.

Automated static analysis generally does not account for environmental considerations when reporting out-of-bounds memory operations. This can make it difficult for users to determine which warnings should be investigated first. For example, an analysis tool might report array index errors that originate from command line arguments in a program that is not expected to run with setuid or other special privileges.

Effectiveness: High

Note:This is not a perfect solution, since 100% accuracy and coverage are not feasible.

Automated Dynamic Analysis

This weakness can be detected using dynamic tools and techniques that interact with the software using large test suites with many diverse inputs, such as fuzz testing (fuzzing), robustness testing, and fault injection. The software's operation may slow down, but it should not become unstable, crash, or generate incorrect results.

Automated Dynamic Analysis

Use tools that are integrated during compilation to insert runtime error-checking mechanisms related to memory safety errors, such as AddressSanitizer (ASan) for C/C++ [REF-1518].

Effectiveness: Moderate

Note:Crafted inputs are necessary to reach the code containing the error, such as generated by fuzzers. Also, these tools may reduce performance, and they only report the error condition - not the original mistake that led to the error.

Black Box

Black box methods might not get the needed code coverage within limited time constraints, and a dynamic test might not produce any noticeable side effects even if it is successful.
+ Functional Areas
  • Memory Management
+ Affected Resources
  • Memory
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 738 CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 5 - Integers (INT)
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 740 CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 7 - Arrays (ARR)
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 802 2010 Top 25 - Risky Resource Management
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 867 2011 Top 25 - Weaknesses On the Cusp
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 872 CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 04 - Integers (INT)
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 874 CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 06 - Arrays and the STL (ARR)
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 970 SFP Secondary Cluster: Faulty Buffer Access
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1131 CISQ Quality Measures (2016) - Security
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1160 SEI CERT C Coding Standard - Guidelines 06. Arrays (ARR)
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1179 SEI CERT Perl Coding Standard - Guidelines 01. Input Validation and Data Sanitization (IDS)
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1308 CISQ Quality Measures - Security
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1340 CISQ Data Protection Measures
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1399 Comprehensive Categorization: Memory Safety
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1440 OWASP Top Ten 2025 Category A05:2025 - Injection
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1460 Weaknesses Addressed by the Top 20 Secure PLC Coding Practices
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Variant level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Notes

Relationship

This weakness can precede uncontrolled memory allocation (CWE-789) in languages that automatically expand an array when an index is used that is larger than the size of the array, such as JavaScript.

Theoretical

An improperly validated array index might lead directly to the always-incorrect behavior of "access of array using out-of-bounds index."
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
CLASP Unchecked array indexing
PLOVER INDEX - Array index overflow
CERT C Secure Coding ARR00-C Understand how arrays work
CERT C Secure Coding ARR30-C CWE More Specific Do not form or use out-of-bounds pointers or array subscripts
CERT C Secure Coding ARR38-C Do not add or subtract an integer to a pointer if the resulting value does not refer to a valid array element
CERT C Secure Coding INT32-C Ensure that operations on signed integers do not result in overflow
SEI CERT Perl Coding Standard IDS32-PL Imprecise Validate any integer that is used as an array index
OMG ASCSM ASCSM-CWE-129
Software Fault Patterns SFP8 Faulty Buffer Access
PLC Top 20 9 Validate indirections
+ References
[REF-7] Michael Howard and David LeBlanc. "Writing Secure Code". Chapter 5, "Array Indexing Errors" Page 144. 2nd Edition. Microsoft Press. 2002-12-04.
<https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/store/writing-secure-code-9780735617223>.
[REF-96] Jason Lam. "Top 25 Series - Rank 14 - Improper Validation of Array Index". SANS Software Security Institute. 2010-03-12.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20100316064026/http://blogs.sans.org/appsecstreetfighter/2010/03/12/top-25-series-rank-14-improper-validation-of-array-index/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-58] Michael Howard. "Address Space Layout Randomization in Windows Vista".
<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/michael_howard/address-space-layout-randomization-in-windows-vista>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-60] "PaX".
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executable_space_protection#PaX>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-61] Microsoft. "Understanding DEP as a mitigation technology part 1".
<https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2009/06/understanding-dep-as-a-mitigation-technology-part-1/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-76] Sean Barnum and Michael Gegick. "Least Privilege". 2005-09-14.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20211209014121/https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/bsi/articles/knowledge/principles/least-privilege>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-44] Michael Howard, David LeBlanc and John Viega. "24 Deadly Sins of Software Security". "Sin 5: Buffer Overruns." Page 89. McGraw-Hill. 2010.
[REF-64] Grant Murphy. "Position Independent Executables (PIE)". Red Hat. 2012-11-28.
<https://www.redhat.com/en/blog/position-independent-executables-pie>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-962] Object Management Group (OMG). "Automated Source Code Security Measure (ASCSM)". ASCSM-CWE-129. 2016-01.
<http://www.omg.org/spec/ASCSM/1.0/>.
[REF-18] Secure Software, Inc.. "The CLASP Application Security Process". 2005.
<https://cwe.mitre.org/documents/sources/TheCLASPApplicationSecurityProcess.pdf>. (URL validated: 2024-11-17)
[REF-1332] John Richard Moser. "Prelink and address space randomization". 2006-07-05.
<https://lwn.net/Articles/190139/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1333] Dmitry Evtyushkin, Dmitry Ponomarev, Nael Abu-Ghazaleh. "Jump Over ASLR: Attacking Branch Predictors to Bypass ASLR". 2016.
<http://www.cs.ucr.edu/~nael/pubs/micro16.pdf>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1335] D3FEND. "Segment Address Offset Randomization (D3-SAOR)". 2023.
<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:SegmentAddressOffsetRandomization/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1336] D3FEND. "Process Segment Execution Prevention (D3-PSEP)". 2023.
<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:ProcessSegmentExecutionPrevention/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1337] Alexander Sotirov and Mark Dowd. "Bypassing Browser Memory Protections: Setting back browser security by 10 years". Memory information leaks. 2008.
<https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-08/Sotirov_Dowd/bh08-sotirov-dowd.pdf>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1518] "AddressSanitizer".
<https://clang.llvm.org/docs/AddressSanitizer.html>. (URL validated: 2025-12-10)
[REF-1534] OMG. "Automated Technical Debt Measure, Version 2". 2024-08.
<https://www.omg.org/spec/ATDM2/1.0/PDF>. (URL validated: 2026-07-16)
[REF-1550] Secure PLC Programming project. "Secure PLC Coding Practices: Top 20 List". 2021-06-15.
<https://plc-security.com/>. (URL validated: 2026-10-07)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
CLASP
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2026-10-28
(CWE 5.0, 2026-10-28)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, References, Relationships
2025-09-09
(CWE 4.18, 2025-09-09)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Functional_Areas
2023-06-29
(CWE 4.12, 2023-06-29)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27
(CWE 4.11, 2023-04-27)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
2022-10-13
(CWE 4.9, 2022-10-13)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2021-03-15
(CWE 4.4, 2021-03-15)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2020-12-10
(CWE 4.3, 2020-12-10)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-08-20
(CWE 4.2, 2020-08-20)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
2020-06-25
(CWE 4.1, 2020-06-25)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships, Type
2020-02-24
(CWE 4.0, 2020-02-24)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2019-09-19
(CWE 3.4, 2019-09-19)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2019-01-03
(CWE 3.2, 2019-01-03)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2018-03-27
(CWE 3.1, 2018-03-27)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2017-11-08
(CWE 3.0, 2017-11-08)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Causal_Nature, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2015-12-07
(CWE 2.9, 2015-12-07)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-07-30
(CWE 2.8, 2014-07-31)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2014-02-18
(CWE 2.6, 2014-02-19)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, References
2012-10-30
(CWE 2.3, 2012-10-30)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11
(CWE 2.2, 2012-05-15)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
2011-09-13
(CWE 2.1, 2011-09-13)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-27
(CWE 2.0, 2011-06-27)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2011-06-01
(CWE 1.13, 2011-06-01)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2011-03-29
(CWE 1.12, 2011-03-30)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Weakness_Ordinalities
2010-12-13
(CWE 1.11, 2010-12-13)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations
2010-09-27
(CWE 1.10, 2010-09-27)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationship_Notes, Relationships
2010-06-21
(CWE 1.9, 2010-06-21)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Potential_Mitigations, References
2010-04-05
(CWE 1.8.1, 2010-04-05)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2010-02-16
(CWE 1.8, 2010-02-16)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Detection_Factors, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Potential_Mitigations, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2009-12-28
(CWE 1.7, 2009-12-28)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Observed_Examples, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, Theoretical_Notes, Weakness_Ordinalities
2009-10-29
(CWE 1.6, 2009-10-29)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Name, Relationships
2009-01-12
(CWE 1.2, 2009-01-12)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2008-11-24
(CWE 1.1, 2008-11-25)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-09-08
(CWE 1.0, 2008-09-09)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Alternate_Terms, Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings, Weakness_Ordinalities
2008-07-01
(CWE 1.0, 2008-09-09)
Sean Eidemiller Cigital
added/updated demonstrative examples
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2009-10-29 Unchecked Array Indexing

CWE-354: Improper Validation of Integrity Check Value

Weakness ID: 354
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
Shows the description and diagram, platforms, mitigations, consequences, relationships, memberships, and content history. For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
×

Edit Custom Filter


+ Description
The product does not validate or incorrectly validates the integrity check values or "checksums" of a message.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Modify Application Data; Other

Scope: Integrity, Other

Integrity checks usually use a secret key that helps authenticate the data origin. Skipping integrity checking generally opens up the possibility that new data from an invalid source can be injected.

Other

Scope: Integrity, Other

Data that is parsed and used may be corrupted.

Hide Activities; Other

Scope: Non-Repudiation, Other

Without a checksum check, it is impossible to determine if any changes have been made to the data after it was sent.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Implementation

The protocol specification describes the algorithm used for calculating the checksum. It is then a matter of implementing the calculation and verifying that the calculated checksum and the received checksum match.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf, Overlaps, and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Complete Weakness Hierarchy" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 345 Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 754 Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions
PeerOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 353 Missing Support for Integrity Check
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Grouping Grouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1214 Data Integrity Issues
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 345 Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Grouping Grouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1020 Verify Message Integrity
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase(s) Note

Architecture and Design

Implementation

REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Type Applicable Platforms Notes
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
Medium
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


The following example demonstrates the weakness.

(bad code)
Example Language: C 
sd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0); serv.sin_family = AF_INET;
serv.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_ANY);
servr.sin_port = htons(1008);
bind(sd, (struct sockaddr *) & serv, sizeof(serv));
while (1) {

memset(msg, 0x0, MAX_MSG);
clilen = sizeof(cli);
if (inet_ntoa(cli.sin_addr)==...) n = recvfrom(sd, msg, MAX_MSG, 0, (struct sockaddr *) & cli, &clilen);
}
(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
while(true) {
DatagramPacket packet = new DatagramPacket(data,data.length,IPAddress, port);
socket.send(sendPacket);
}


+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
network analysis tool does not properly validate an integrity check value, allowing installation of malicious firmware
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 993 SFP Secondary Cluster: Incorrect Input Handling
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1411 Comprehensive Categorization: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1460 Weaknesses Addressed by the Top 20 Secure PLC Coding Practices
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 3-3 Req SR 3.1
CLASP Failure to check integrity check value
PLC Top 20 5 Use cryptographic and / or checksum integrity checks for PLC code
+ References
[REF-18] Secure Software, Inc.. "The CLASP Application Security Process". 2005.
<https://cwe.mitre.org/documents/sources/TheCLASPApplicationSecurityProcess.pdf>. (URL validated: 2024-11-17)
[REF-1550] Secure PLC Programming project. "Secure PLC Coding Practices: Top 20 List". 2021-06-15.
<https://plc-security.com/>. (URL validated: 2026-10-07)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
CLASP
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2023-11-14
(CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29)
participants in the CWE ICS/OT SIG 62443 Mapping Fall Workshop
Contributed or reviewed taxonomy mappings for ISA/IEC 62443
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2026-10-28
(CWE 5.0, 2026-10-28)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2026-04-30
(CWE 4.20, 2026-04-30)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Weakness_Ordinalities
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Taxonomy_Mappings
2023-06-29
(CWE 4.12, 2023-06-29)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27
(CWE 4.11, 2023-04-27)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2023-01-31
(CWE 4.10, 2023-01-31)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2020-02-24
(CWE 4.0, 2020-02-24)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2019-06-20
(CWE 3.3, 2019-06-20)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2017-11-08
(CWE 3.0, 2017-11-08)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships
2014-07-30
(CWE 2.8, 2014-07-31)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2012-05-11
(CWE 2.2, 2012-05-15)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2011-06-01
(CWE 1.13, 2011-06-01)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2010-12-13
(CWE 1.11, 2010-12-13)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2009-10-29
(CWE 1.6, 2009-10-29)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Other_Notes
2009-03-10
(CWE 1.3, 2009-03-10)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Name, Relationships
2008-09-08
(CWE 1.0, 2008-09-09)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-07-01
(CWE 1.0, 2008-09-09)
Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2009-03-10 Failure to Check Integrity Check Value

CWE-778: Insufficient Logging

Weakness ID: 778
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
Shows the description and diagram, platforms, mitigations, consequences, relationships, memberships, and content history. For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
×

Edit Custom Filter


+ Description
When a security-critical event occurs, the product either does not record the event or omits important details about the event when logging it.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Hide Activities

Scope: Non-Repudiation

Malicious behavior can become more difficult to detect, such as a failed login attempt. This may hinder forensic analysis after an attack succeeds. There will be no trail for forensic analysis, and discovering the cause of problems or the source of attacks may become more difficult or impossible.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design

Use a centralized logging mechanism that supports multiple levels of detail.

Implementation

Ensure that all security-related successes and failures can be logged. When storing data in the cloud (e.g., AWS S3 buckets, Azure blobs, Google Cloud Storage, etc.), use the provider's controls to enable and capture detailed logging information.

Operation

Be sure to set the level of logging appropriately in a production environment. Sufficient data should be logged to enable system administrators to detect attacks, diagnose errors, and recover from attacks. At the same time, logging too much data (CWE-779) can cause the same problems, including unexpected costs when using a cloud environment.

Operation

To enable storage logging using Azure's Portal, navigate to the name of the Storage Account, locate Monitoring (CLASSIC) section, and select Diagnostic settings (classic). For each of the various properties (blob, file, table, queue), ensure the status is properly set for the desired logging data. If using PowerShell, the Set-AzStorageServiceLoggingProperty command could be called using appropriate -ServiceType, -LoggingOperations, and -RetentionDays arguments.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf, Overlaps, and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Complete Weakness Hierarchy" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 223 Omission of Security-relevant Information
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Grouping Grouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1210 Audit / Logging Errors
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Grouping Grouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1009 Audit
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase(s) Note

Architecture and Design

As organizations adopt cloud storage resources, these technologies often require configuration changes to enable detailed logging information, since detailed logging can incur additional costs. This could lead to telemetry gaps in critical audit logs. For example, in Azure, the default value for logging is disabled.

Operation

COMMISSION: This weakness refers to an incorrect design related to an architectural security tactic.
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Type Applicable Platforms Notes
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Python (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: Cloud Computing (Undetermined Prevalence)

Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
Medium
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


The example below shows a configuration for the service security audit feature in the Windows Communication Foundation (WCF).

(bad code)
Example Language: XML 
<system.serviceModel>
<behaviors>
<serviceBehaviors>
<behavior name="NewBehavior">
<serviceSecurityAudit auditLogLocation="Default"
suppressAuditFailure="false"
serviceAuthorizationAuditLevel="None"
messageAuthenticationAuditLevel="None" />
...
</system.serviceModel>

The previous configuration file has effectively disabled the recording of security-critical events, which would force the administrator to look to other sources during debug or recovery efforts.

Logging failed authentication attempts can warn administrators of potential brute force attacks. Similarly, logging successful authentication events can provide a useful audit trail when a legitimate account is compromised. The following configuration shows appropriate settings, assuming that the site does not have excessive traffic, which could fill the logs if there are a large number of success or failure events (CWE-779).

(good code)
Example Language: XML 
<system.serviceModel>
<behaviors>
<serviceBehaviors>
<behavior name="NewBehavior">
<serviceSecurityAudit auditLogLocation="Default"
suppressAuditFailure="false"
serviceAuthorizationAuditLevel="SuccessAndFailure"
messageAuthenticationAuditLevel="SuccessAndFailure" />
...
</system.serviceModel>


Example 2


In the following Java example the code attempts to authenticate the user. If the login fails a retry is made. Proper restrictions on the number of login attempts are of course part of the retry functionality. Unfortunately, the failed login is not recorded and there would be no record of an adversary attempting to brute force the program.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
if LoginUser(){
// Login successful
RunProgram();
} else {
// Login unsuccessful
LoginRetry();
}

It is recommended to log the failed login action. Note that unneutralized usernames should not be part of the log message, and passwords should never be part of the log message.

(good code)
Example Language: Java 
if LoginUser(){
// Login successful
log.warn("Login by user successful.");
RunProgram();
} else {
// Login unsuccessful
log.warn("Login attempt by user failed, trying again.");
LoginRetry();
}


Example 3


Consider this command for updating Azure's Storage Logging for Blob service, adapted from [REF-1307]:

(bad code)
Example Language: Shell 
az storage logging update --account-name --account-key --services b --log d --retention 90

The "--log d" portion of the command says to log deletes. However, the argument does not include the logging of writes and reads. Adding the "rw" arguments to the -log parameter will fix the issue:

(good code)
Example Language: Shell 
az storage logging update --account-name --account-key --services b --log rwd --retention 90

To enable Azure's storage analytic logs programmatically using PowerShell:

(good code)
Example Language: Shell 
Set-AzStorageServiceLoggingProperty -ServiceType Queue -LoggingOperations read,write,delete -RetentionDays 5 -Context $MyContextObject

Notice that here, the retention has been limited to 5 days.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
server does not log failed authentication attempts, making it easier for attackers to perform brute force password guessing without being detected
admin interface does not log failed authentication attempts, making it easier for attackers to perform brute force password guessing without being detected
default configuration for POP server does not log source IP or username for login attempts
proxy does not log requests without "http://" in the URL, allowing web surfers to access restricted web content without detection
web server does not log requests for a non-standard request type
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Effectiveness: High

+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1036 OWASP Top Ten 2017 Category A10 - Insufficient Logging & Monitoring
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1308 CISQ Quality Measures - Security
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1355 OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A09:2021 - Security Logging and Monitoring Failures
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1413 Comprehensive Categorization: Protection Mechanism Failure
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1444 OWASP Top Ten 2025 Category A09:2025 - Logging & Alerting Failures
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1456 OpenSSF Secure Coding Guide for Python (2026) - 06 Logging
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1460 Weaknesses Addressed by the Top 20 Secure PLC Coding Practices
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
OpenSSF Secure Coding Guide for Python pyscg-0020 Implement Informative Event Logging
PLC Top 20 17 Log PLC uptime and trend it on the HMI
PLC Top 20 18 Log PLC hard stops and trend them on the HMI
+ References
[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 2, "Accountability", Page 40. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
[REF-1541] OpenSSF. "Secure Coding Guide for Python". 06 Logging.
<https://best.openssf.org/Secure-Coding-Guide-for-Python/>. (URL validated: 2026-10-06)
Rationale: Secure-Development-Rules
[REF-1307] Center for Internet Security. "CIS Microsoft Azure Foundations Benchmark version 1.5.0". Sections 3.5, 3.13, and 3.14. 2022-08-16.
<https://www.cisecurity.org/benchmark/azure>. (URL validated: 2023-01-19)
[REF-1308] Microsoft. "Enable and manage Azure Storage Analytics logs (classic)". 2023-01-23.
<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/common/manage-storage-analytics-logs>. (URL validated: 2023-01-24)
[REF-1534] OMG. "Automated Technical Debt Measure, Version 2". 2024-08.
<https://www.omg.org/spec/ATDM2/1.0/PDF>. (URL validated: 2026-07-16)
[REF-1550] Secure PLC Programming project. "Secure PLC Coding Practices: Top 20 List". 2021-06-15.
<https://plc-security.com/>. (URL validated: 2026-10-07)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2009-07-02
(CWE 1.5, 2009-07-27)
CWE Content Team MITRE
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2022-08-15
(CWE 4.9, 2022-10-13)
Drew Buttner MITRE
Suggested a new demonstrative example and changes to the mitigations.
2009-07-02
(CWE 1.5, 2009-07-27)
Fortify Software
Provided code example and additional information for description and consequences.
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2026-10-28
(CWE 5.0, 2026-10-28)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Description, Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings, Time_of_Introduction
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities
2025-04-03
(CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2023-06-29
(CWE 4.12, 2023-06-29)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27
(CWE 4.11, 2023-04-27)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships
2023-01-31
(CWE 4.10, 2023-01-31)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Potential_Mitigations, References
2022-10-13
(CWE 4.9, 2022-10-13)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Potential_Mitigations
2021-10-28
(CWE 4.6, 2021-10-28)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-08-20
(CWE 4.2, 2020-08-20)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-02-24
(CWE 4.0, 2020-02-24)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2018-03-27
(CWE 3.1, 2018-03-27)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2017-11-08
(CWE 3.0, 2017-11-08)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships
2012-05-11
(CWE 2.2, 2012-05-15)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2011-06-01
(CWE 1.13, 2011-06-01)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences

CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity

Weakness ID: 345
Vulnerability Mapping: DISCOURAGED This CWE ID should not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.
View customized information:
Shows the description and diagram, platforms, mitigations, consequences, relationships, memberships, and content history. For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
×

Edit Custom Filter


+ Description
The product does not sufficiently verify the origin or authenticity of data, in a way that causes it to accept invalid data.
+ Dimensions
Section HelpThe Dimensions table provides information about the different dimensions associated with this weakness. The Type identifies the dimension type, while the Value provides the specific value for that dimension.
TypeValue
Behavior-TypeVerification
Behavior-PropertyInsufficient
Info-TypeData
Info-PropertyAuthenticity
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Varies by Context; Unexpected State

Scope: Integrity, Other

+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf, Overlaps, and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Complete Weakness Hierarchy" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 693 Protection Mechanism Failure
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 346 Origin Validation Error
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 347 Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 348 Use of Less Trusted Source
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 349 Acceptance of Extraneous Untrusted Data With Trusted Data
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 351 Insufficient Type Distinction
ParentOf Composite Composite - a Compound Element that consists of two or more distinct weaknesses, in which all weaknesses must be present at the same time in order for a potential vulnerability to arise. Removing any of the weaknesses eliminates or sharply reduces the risk. One weakness, X, can be "broken down" into component weaknesses Y and Z. There can be cases in which one weakness might not be essential to a composite, but changes the nature of the composite when it becomes a vulnerability. 352 Cross-Site Request Forgery
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 353 Missing Support for Integrity Check
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 354 Improper Validation of Integrity Check Value
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 360 Trust of System Event Data
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 494 Download of Code Without Integrity Check
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 616 Incomplete Identification of Uploaded File Variables (PHP)
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 646 Reliance on File Name or Extension of Externally-Supplied File
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 649 Reliance on Obfuscation or Encryption of Security-Relevant Inputs without Integrity Checking
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 924 Improper Enforcement of Message Integrity During Transmission in a Communication Channel
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1293 Missing Source Correlation of Multiple Independent Data
PeerOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 20 Improper Input Validation
PeerOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1304 Improperly Preserved Integrity of Hardware Configuration State During a Power Save/Restore Operation
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf View View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1003 Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 346 Origin Validation Error
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 347 Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature
ParentOf Composite Composite - a Compound Element that consists of two or more distinct weaknesses, in which all weaknesses must be present at the same time in order for a potential vulnerability to arise. Removing any of the weaknesses eliminates or sharply reduces the risk. One weakness, X, can be "broken down" into component weaknesses Y and Z. There can be cases in which one weakness might not be essential to a composite, but changes the nature of the composite when it becomes a vulnerability. 352 Cross-Site Request Forgery
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 354 Improper Validation of Integrity Check Value
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 924 Improper Enforcement of Message Integrity During Transmission in a Communication Channel
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Grouping Grouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1014 Identify Actors
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase(s) Note

Architecture and Design

Implementation

REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Type Applicable Platforms Notes
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: ICS/OT (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


In 2022, the OT:ICEFALL study examined products by 10 different Operational Technology (OT) vendors. The researchers reported 56 vulnerabilities and said that the products were "insecure by design" [REF-1283]. If exploited, these vulnerabilities often allowed adversaries to change how the products operated, ranging from denial of service to changing the code that the products executed. Since these products were often used in industries such as power, electrical, water, and others, there could even be safety implications.

Multiple vendors did not sign firmware images.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Distributed Control System (DCS) does not sign firmware images and only relies on insecure checksums for integrity checks
Distributed Control System (DCS) does not sign firmware images and only relies on insecure checksums for integrity checks
Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) does not use signatures for firmware images and relies on insecure checksums
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
Resultant
(where the weakness is typically related to the presence of some other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Effectiveness: High

+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 724 OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A3 - Broken Authentication and Session Management
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 949 SFP Secondary Cluster: Faulty Endpoint Authentication
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1354 OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A08:2021 - Software and Data Integrity Failures
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1411 Comprehensive Categorization: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1443 OWASP Top Ten 2025 Category A08:2025 - Software or Data Integrity Failures
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1460 Weaknesses Addressed by the Top 20 Secure PLC Coding Practices
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage DISCOURAGED
(this CWE ID should not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Abstraction

Rationale

This CWE entry is a level-1 Class (i.e., a child of a Pillar). It might have lower-level children that would be more appropriate

Comments

Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit
+ Notes

Relationship

"origin validation" could fall under this.

Maintenance

The specific ways in which the origin is not properly identified should be laid out as separate weaknesses. In some sense, this is more like a category.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
PLOVER Insufficient Verification of Data
OWASP Top Ten 2004 A3 CWE More Specific Broken Authentication and Session Management
WASC 12 Content Spoofing
PLC Top 20 5 Use cryptographic and / or checksum integrity checks for PLC code
+ References
[REF-44] Michael Howard, David LeBlanc and John Viega. "24 Deadly Sins of Software Security". "Sin 15: Not Updating Easily." Page 231. McGraw-Hill. 2010.
[REF-1283] Forescout Vedere Labs. "OT:ICEFALL: The legacy of "insecure by design" and its implications for certifications and risk management". 2022-06-20.
<https://www.forescout.com/resources/ot-icefall-report/>.
[REF-1550] Secure PLC Programming project. "Secure PLC Coding Practices: Top 20 List". 2021-06-15.
<https://plc-security.com/>. (URL validated: 2026-10-07)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
PLOVER
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2026-10-28
(CWE 5.0, 2026-10-28)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Dimensions, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-06-29
(CWE 4.12, 2023-06-29)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27
(CWE 4.11, 2023-04-27)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships
2023-01-31
(CWE 4.10, 2023-01-31)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Observed_Examples, References, Related_Attack_Patterns
2021-10-28
(CWE 4.6, 2021-10-28)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-07-20
(CWE 4.5, 2021-07-20)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2020-08-20
(CWE 4.2, 2020-08-20)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-06-25
(CWE 4.1, 2020-06-25)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-02-24
(CWE 4.0, 2020-02-24)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2019-06-20
(CWE 3.3, 2019-06-20)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2017-11-08
(CWE 3.0, 2017-11-08)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships
2017-05-03
(CWE 2.11, 2017-05-05)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2015-12-07
(CWE 2.9, 2015-12-07)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-07-30
(CWE 2.8, 2014-07-31)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2013-07-17
(CWE 2.5, 2013-07-17)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2012-05-11
(CWE 2.2, 2012-05-15)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2011-06-27
(CWE 2.0, 2011-06-27)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2011-06-01
(CWE 1.13, 2011-06-01)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2010-12-13
(CWE 1.11, 2010-12-13)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2010-04-05
(CWE 1.8.1, 2010-04-05)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2010-02-16
(CWE 1.8, 2010-02-16)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Taxonomy_Mappings
2009-07-27
(CWE 1.5, 2009-07-27)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2009-05-27
(CWE 1.4, 2009-05-27)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2008-09-08
(CWE 1.0, 2008-09-09)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Maintenance_Notes, Relationships, Relationship_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-07-01
(CWE 1.0, 2008-09-09)
Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2008-04-11 Insufficient Verification of Data

CWE-190: Integer Overflow or Wraparound

Weakness ID: 190
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
Shows the description and diagram, platforms, mitigations, consequences, relationships, memberships, and content history. For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
×

Edit Custom Filter


+ Description
The product performs a calculation that can produce an integer overflow or wraparound when the logic assumes that the resulting value will always be larger than the original value. This occurs when an integer value is incremented to a value that is too large to store in the associated representation. When this occurs, the value may become a very small or negative number. Diagram for CWE-190
+ Technical Nuance

While integer overflows are most commonly cited for memory-corruption issues, they can apply to other situations in which the developer assumes certain properties of integer arithmetic that might not hold, e.g., financial calculations, physical dimensions, date/timestamp, etc.

+ Alternate Terms
Overflow

Roles: Multiple-Interpretation

The terms "overflow" and "wraparound" are used interchangeably by some people, but they can have more precise distinctions by others. See Terminology Notes.
Wraparound

Roles: Multiple-Interpretation

The terms "overflow" and "wraparound" are used interchangeably by some people, but they can have more precise distinctions by others. See Terminology Notes.
wrap, wrap-around, wrap around

Roles: Alternate-Spelling

Alternate spellings of "wraparound". See Terminology Notes.
Year 2038 problem, Y2K38, Y2038, Epochalypse

Roles: Common-Name

Common name for integer overflows in certain 32-bit integer values as used on Unix-related systems, which will overflow on January 19, 2038.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart; DoS: Resource Consumption (Memory); DoS: Instability

Scope: Availability

This weakness can generally lead to undefined behavior and therefore crashes. When the calculated result is used for resource allocation, this weakness can cause too many (or too few) resources to be allocated, possibly enabling crashes if the product requests more resources than can be provided. If the calculated result involves time values, then the product might crash when it encounters a time that is less than the previously-calculated time.

Modify Memory

Scope: Integrity

If the value in question is important to data (as opposed to flow), simple data corruption has occurred. Also, if the overflow/wraparound results in other conditions such as buffer overflows, further memory corruption may occur.

Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands; Bypass Protection Mechanism

Scope: Confidentiality, Availability, Access Control

This weakness can sometimes trigger buffer overflows, which can be used to execute arbitrary code. This is usually outside the scope of the product's implicit security policy.

Alter Execution Logic; DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart; DoS: Resource Consumption (CPU)

Scope: Availability, Other

If the overflow/wraparound occurs in a loop index variable, this could cause the loop to terminate at the wrong time - too early, too late, or not at all (i.e., infinite loops). With too many iterations, some loops could consume too many resources such as memory, file handles, etc., possibly leading to a crash or other DoS.

Bypass Protection Mechanism

Scope: Access Control

If integer values are used in security-critical decisions, such as calculating quotas or allocation limits, integer overflows can be used to cause an incorrect security decision.

Bypass Protection Mechanism; DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart

Scope: Access Control

If integer values are used in time-based, security-critical decisions, such as calculating expiration times or determining whether an event occurs within a specific time or date range, to cause an incorrect security decision. The consequences could even include "self-DoS" if the overflow produces a time value that is not accounted for in protection mechanism logic [REF-1570].
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Requirements

Ensure that all protocols are strictly defined, such that all out-of-bounds behavior can be identified simply, and require strict conformance to the protocol.

Requirements

Strategy: Language Selection

Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

If possible, choose a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds checking.

Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].

Use libraries or frameworks that make it easier to handle numbers without unexpected consequences.

Examples include safe integer handling packages such as SafeInt (C++) or IntegerLib (C or C++). [REF-106]

Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

Perform input validation on any numeric input by ensuring that it is within the expected range. Enforce that the input meets both the minimum and maximum requirements for the expected range.

Use unsigned integers where possible. This makes it easier to perform validation for integer overflows. When signed integers are required, ensure that the range check includes minimum values as well as maximum values.

Implementation

Understand the programming language's underlying representation and how it interacts with numeric calculation (CWE-681). Pay close attention to byte size discrepancies, precision, signed/unsigned distinctions, truncation, conversion and casting between types, "not-a-number" calculations, and how the language handles numbers that are too large or too small for its underlying representation. [REF-7]

Also be careful to account for 32-bit, 64-bit, and other potential differences that may affect the numeric representation.

Architecture and Design

For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

Implementation

Strategy: Compilation or Build Hardening

Examine compiler warnings closely and eliminate problems with potential security implications, such as signed / unsigned mismatch in memory operations, or use of uninitialized variables. Even if the weakness is rarely exploitable, a single failure may lead to the compromise of the entire system.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf, Overlaps, and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Complete Weakness Hierarchy" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 682 Incorrect Calculation
ParentOf Chain Chain - a Compound Element that is a sequence of two or more separate weaknesses that can be closely linked together within software. One weakness, X, can directly create the conditions that are necessary to cause another weakness, Y, to enter a vulnerable condition. When this happens, CWE refers to X as "primary" to Y, and Y is "resultant" from X. Chains can involve more than two weaknesses, and in some cases, they might have a tree-like structure. 680 Integer Overflow to Buffer Overflow
PeerOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 128 Wrap-around Error
PeerOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1339 Insufficient Precision or Accuracy of a Real Number
CanPrecede Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Grouping Grouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 189 Numeric Errors
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 682 Incorrect Calculation
+ Relevant to the view "Seven Pernicious Kingdoms" (View-700)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 20 Improper Input Validation
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase(s) Note

Implementation

This weakness may become security-critical when determining the offset or size in behaviors such as memory allocation, copying, and concatenation.

Implementation

This weakness may become security-critical when a security decision is based on time, and the time field is subject to an integer overflow.
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Type Applicable Platforms Notes
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

C (Often Prevalent)

Python (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
Medium
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


The following image processing code allocates a table for images.

(bad code)
Example Language: C 
img_t table_ptr; /*struct containing img data, 10kB each*/
int num_imgs;
...
num_imgs = get_num_imgs();
table_ptr = (img_t*)malloc(sizeof(img_t)*num_imgs);
...

This code intends to allocate a table of size num_imgs, however as num_imgs grows large, the calculation determining the size of the list will eventually overflow (CWE-190). This will result in a very small list to be allocated instead. If the subsequent code operates on the list as if it were num_imgs long, it may result in many types of out-of-bounds problems (CWE-119).



Example 2


The following code excerpt from OpenSSH 3.3 demonstrates a classic case of integer overflow:

(bad code)
Example Language: C 
nresp = packet_get_int();
if (nresp > 0) {
response = xmalloc(nresp*sizeof(char*));
for (i = 0; i < nresp; i++) response[i] = packet_get_string(NULL);
}

If nresp has the value 1073741824 and sizeof(char*) has its typical value of 4, then the result of the operation nresp*sizeof(char*) overflows, and the argument to xmalloc() will be 0. Most malloc() implementations will happily allocate a 0-byte buffer, causing the subsequent loop iterations to overflow the heap buffer response.



Example 3


Integer overflows can be complicated and difficult to detect. The following example is an attempt to show how an integer overflow may lead to undefined looping behavior:

(bad code)
Example Language: C 
short int bytesRec = 0;
char buf[SOMEBIGNUM];

while(bytesRec < MAXGET) {
bytesRec += getFromInput(buf+bytesRec);
}

In the above case, it is entirely possible that bytesRec may overflow, continuously creating a lower number than MAXGET and also overwriting the first MAXGET-1 bytes of buf.



Example 4


In this example the method determineFirstQuarterRevenue is used to determine the first quarter revenue for an accounting/business application. The method retrieves the monthly sales totals for the first three months of the year, calculates the first quarter sales totals from the monthly sales totals, calculates the first quarter revenue based on the first quarter sales, and finally saves the first quarter revenue results to the database.

(bad code)
Example Language: C 
#define JAN 1
#define FEB 2
#define MAR 3

short getMonthlySales(int month) {...}

float calculateRevenueForQuarter(short quarterSold) {...}

int determineFirstQuarterRevenue() {

// Variable for sales revenue for the quarter
float quarterRevenue = 0.0f;

short JanSold = getMonthlySales(JAN); /* Get sales in January */
short FebSold = getMonthlySales(FEB); /* Get sales in February */
short MarSold = getMonthlySales(MAR); /* Get sales in March */

// Calculate quarterly total
short quarterSold = JanSold + FebSold + MarSold;

// Calculate the total revenue for the quarter
quarterRevenue = calculateRevenueForQuarter(quarterSold);

saveFirstQuarterRevenue(quarterRevenue);

return 0;
}

However, in this example the primitive type short int is used for both the monthly and the quarterly sales variables. In C the short int primitive type has a maximum value of 32768. This creates a potential integer overflow if the value for the three monthly sales adds up to more than the maximum value for the short int primitive type. An integer overflow can lead to data corruption, unexpected behavior, infinite loops and system crashes. To correct the situation the appropriate primitive type should be used, as in the example below, and/or provide some validation mechanism to ensure that the maximum value for the primitive type is not exceeded.

(good code)
Example Language: C 
...
float calculateRevenueForQuarter(long quarterSold) {...}

int determineFirstQuarterRevenue() {
...
// Calculate quarterly total
long quarterSold = JanSold + FebSold + MarSold;

// Calculate the total revenue for the quarter
quarterRevenue = calculateRevenueForQuarter(quarterSold);

...
}

Note that an integer overflow could also occur if the quarterSold variable has a primitive type long but the method calculateRevenueForQuarter has a parameter of type short.



Example 5


The "Year 2038 Problem" [REF-1570] [REF-1571] affects systems that store Unix times in a 32-bit signed integer whose epoch begins on January 1, 1970. Once the maximum value of the 32-bit signed integer is reached - early on January 19, 2038 - the time value will overflow into the smallest negative number, producing times beginning on December 13, 1901.

(bad code)
Example Language: Other 
The code runs on a Unix platform and uses a 32-bit signed integer to store a time value that is used for a security-critical decision or security-critical metadata.

Once the time value exceeds the epoch on January 19, 2038, then the value could "flip" to an earlier date. This could change the behavior or security decisions made by the product, possibly leading to a DoS, a failed access control routing that inadvertently blocks out otherwise-valid users, etc. The consequences could vary based on how the expected date/timestamp is used within the product.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Chain: Javascript engine code does not perform a length check (CWE-1284) leading to integer overflow (CWE-190) causing allocation of smaller buffer than expected (CWE-131) resulting in a heap-based buffer overflow (CWE-122)
Tank gauge system relies on Unix time values that "exceed the 2038 epoch rollover," (overflow), leading to authentication failures and other problems in some protection mechanisms.
Font rendering library does not properly handle assigning a signed short value to an unsigned long (CWE-195), leading to an integer wraparound (CWE-190), causing too small of a buffer (CWE-131), leading to an out-of-bounds write (CWE-787).
Chain: in a web browser, an unsigned 64-bit integer is forcibly cast to a 32-bit integer (CWE-681) and potentially leading to an integer overflow (CWE-190). If an integer overflow occurs, this can cause heap memory corruption (CWE-122)
Chain: Python library does not limit the resources used to process images that specify a very large number of bands (CWE-1284), leading to excessive memory consumption (CWE-789) or an integer overflow (CWE-190).
Chain: 3D renderer has an integer overflow (CWE-190) leading to write-what-where condition (CWE-123) using a crafted image.
Chain: improper input validation (CWE-20) leads to integer overflow (CWE-190) in mobile OS, as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
Chain: improper input validation (CWE-20) leads to integer overflow (CWE-190) in mobile OS, as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
Chain: unexpected sign extension (CWE-194) leads to integer overflow (CWE-190), causing an out-of-bounds read (CWE-125)
Chain: compiler optimization (CWE-733) removes or modifies code used to detect integer overflow (CWE-190), allowing out-of-bounds write (CWE-787).
Chain: integer overflow (CWE-190) causes a negative signed value, which later bypasses a maximum-only check (CWE-839), leading to heap-based buffer overflow (CWE-122).
Chain: integer overflow leads to use-after-free
Chain: integer overflow in securely-coded mail program leads to buffer overflow. In 2005, this was regarded as unrealistic to exploit, but in 2020, it was rediscovered to be easier to exploit due to evolutions of the technology.
Integer overflow via a large number of arguments.
Integer overflow in OpenSSH as listed in the demonstrative examples.
Image with large width and height leads to integer overflow.
Length value of -1 leads to allocation of 0 bytes and resultant heap overflow.
Length value of -1 leads to allocation of 0 bytes and resultant heap overflow.
Chain: unchecked message size metadata allows integer overflow (CWE-190) leading to buffer overflow (CWE-119).
Chain: an integer overflow (CWE-190) in the image size calculation causes an infinite loop (CWE-835) which sequentially allocates buffers without limits (CWE-1325) until the stack is full.
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
Resultant
(where the weakness is typically related to the presence of some other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis

This weakness can often be detected using automated static analysis tools. Many modern tools use data flow analysis or constraint-based techniques to minimize the number of false positives.

Effectiveness: High

Black Box

Sometimes, evidence of this weakness can be detected using dynamic tools and techniques that interact with the product using large test suites with many diverse inputs, such as fuzz testing (fuzzing), robustness testing, and fault injection. The product's operation may slow down, but it should not become unstable, crash, or generate incorrect results.

Effectiveness: Moderate

Note:Without visibility into the code, black box methods may not be able to sufficiently distinguish this weakness from others, requiring follow-up manual methods to diagnose the underlying problem.

Manual Analysis

This weakness can be detected using tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session.

Specifically, manual static analysis is useful for evaluating the correctness of allocation calculations. This can be useful for detecting overflow conditions (CWE-190) or similar weaknesses that might have serious security impacts on the program.

Effectiveness: High

Note:These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules.

Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
  • Binary Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis

Effectiveness: High

Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Fuzz Tester
  • Framework-based Fuzzer

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Manual Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Automated Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Source code Weakness Analyzer
  • Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer

Effectiveness: High

Architecture or Design Review

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)

Effectiveness: High

+ Functional Areas
  • Number Processing
  • Memory Management
  • Counters
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 738 CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 5 - Integers (INT)
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 742 CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 9 - Memory Management (MEM)
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 802 2010 Top 25 - Risky Resource Management
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 865 2011 Top 25 - Risky Resource Management
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 872 CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 04 - Integers (INT)
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 876 CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 08 - Memory Management (MEM)
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 998 SFP Secondary Cluster: Glitch in Computation
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1137 SEI CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java - Guidelines 03. Numeric Types and Operations (NUM)
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1158 SEI CERT C Coding Standard - Guidelines 04. Integers (INT)
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1162 SEI CERT C Coding Standard - Guidelines 08. Memory Management (MEM)
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1200 Weaknesses in the 2019 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1337 Weaknesses in the 2021 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1350 Weaknesses in the 2020 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1387 Weaknesses in the 2022 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1408 Comprehensive Categorization: Incorrect Calculation
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1425 Weaknesses in the 2023 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1430 Weaknesses in the 2024 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1453 OpenSSF Secure Coding Guide for Python (2026) - 03 Numbers
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1460 Weaknesses Addressed by the Top 20 Secure PLC Coding Practices
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Be careful of terminology problems with "overflow," "underflow," and "wraparound" - see Terminology Notes. Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.

Suggestions

CWE-ID Comment
CWE-191 Integer Underflow (Wrap or Wraparound). Consider CWE-191 when the result is less than the minimum value that can be represented (sometimes called "underflows").
+ Notes

Relationship

Integer overflows can be primary to buffer overflows when they cause less memory to be allocated than expected.

Terminology

"Integer overflow" is sometimes used to cover several types of errors, including signedness errors, or buffer overflows that involve manipulation of integer data types instead of characters. Part of the confusion results from the fact that 0xffffffff is -1 in a signed context. Other confusion also arises because of the role that integer overflows have in chains.

A "wraparound" is a well-defined, standard behavior that follows specific rules for how to handle situations when the intended numeric value is too large or too small to be represented, as specified in standards such as C11.

"Overflow" is sometimes conflated with "wraparound" but typically indicates a non-standard or undefined behavior.

The "overflow" term is sometimes used to indicate cases where either the maximum or the minimum is exceeded, but others might only use "overflow" to indicate exceeding the maximum while using "underflow" for exceeding the minimum.

Some people use "overflow" to mean any value outside the representable range - whether greater than the maximum, or less than the minimum - but CWE uses "underflow" for cases in which the intended result is less than the minimum.

See [REF-1440] for additional explanation of the ambiguity of terminology.

Other

While there may be circumstances in which the logic intentionally relies on wrapping - such as with modular arithmetic in timers or counters - it can have security consequences if the wrap is unexpected. This is especially the case if the integer overflow can be triggered using user-supplied inputs.

Other

It could be considered by some stakeholders that some time-based overflows would not count as weaknesses or vulnerabilities, especially if there is no influence from an adversary. However, CWE allows for cases in which physical phenomena and measurements can contribute to insecure states, and temporal phenomena - which are outside the direct control of the product - also apply.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
PLOVER Integer overflow (wrap or wraparound)
7 Pernicious Kingdoms Integer Overflow
CLASP Integer overflow
CERT C Secure Coding INT18-C CWE More Abstract Evaluate integer expressions in a larger size before comparing or assigning to that size
CERT C Secure Coding INT30-C CWE More Abstract Ensure that unsigned integer operations do not wrap
CERT C Secure Coding INT32-C Imprecise Ensure that operations on signed integers do not result in overflow
CERT C Secure Coding INT35-C Evaluate integer expressions in a larger size before comparing or assigning to that size
CERT C Secure Coding MEM07-C CWE More Abstract Ensure that the arguments to calloc(), when multiplied, do not wrap
CERT C Secure Coding MEM35-C Allocate sufficient memory for an object
WASC 3 Integer Overflows
Software Fault Patterns SFP1 Glitch in computation
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 3-3 Req SR 3.5
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 3-3 Req SR 7.2
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-1 Req SR-2
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-1 Req SI-2
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-1 Req SVV-1
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-1 Req SVV-3
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-2 Req CR 3.5
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-2 Req CR 7.2
OpenSSF Secure Coding Guide for Python pyscg-0002 Guard Fixed-Width Numbers Against Overflow
PLC Top 20 4 Use PLC flags as integrity checks
+ References
[REF-145] Yves Younan. "An overview of common programming security vulnerabilities and possible solutions". Student thesis section 5.4.3. 2003-08.
<https://fort-knox.org/thesis.pdf>. (URL validated: 2025-07-24)
[REF-146] blexim. "Basic Integer Overflows". Phrack - Issue 60, Chapter 10. 2002-12-28.
<https://phrack.org/issues/60/10>. (URL validated: 2025-07-24)
[REF-7] Michael Howard and David LeBlanc. "Writing Secure Code". Chapter 20, "Integer Overflows" Page 620. 2nd Edition. Microsoft Press. 2002-12-04.
<https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/store/writing-secure-code-9780735617223>.
[REF-44] Michael Howard, David LeBlanc and John Viega. "24 Deadly Sins of Software Security". "Sin 7: Integer Overflows." Page 119. McGraw-Hill. 2010.
[REF-106] David LeBlanc and Niels Dekker. "SafeInt".
<https://github.com/dcleblanc/SafeInt/>. (URL validated: 2025-07-29)
[REF-150] Johannes Ullrich. "Top 25 Series - Rank 17 - Integer Overflow Or Wraparound". SANS Software Security Institute. 2010-03-18.
<http://software-security.sans.org/blog/2010/03/18/top-25-series-rank-17-integer-overflow-or-wraparound>.
[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 6, "Signed Integer Boundaries", Page 220. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
[REF-1440] "Integer overflow". Definition variations and ambiguity. Wikipedia. 2024-06-11.
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Integer_overflow>. (URL validated: 2024-06-30)
[REF-1479] Gregory Larsen, E. Kenneth Hong Fong, David A. Wheeler and Rama S. Moorthy. "State-of-the-Art Resources (SOAR) for Software Vulnerability Detection, Test, and Evaluation". 2014-07.
<https://www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/s/st/stateoftheart-resources-soar-for-software-vulnerability-detection-test-and-evaluation/p-5061.ashx>. (URL validated: 2025-09-05)
[REF-1482] D3FEND. "D3FEND: D3-TL Trusted Library".
<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:TrustedLibrary/>. (URL validated: 2025-09-06)
[REF-1541] OpenSSF. "Secure Coding Guide for Python". 03 Numbers.
<https://best.openssf.org/Secure-Coding-Guide-for-Python/>. (URL validated: 2026-10-06)
Rationale: Secure-Development-Rules
[REF-1550] Secure PLC Programming project. "Secure PLC Coding Practices: Top 20 List". 2021-06-15.
<https://plc-security.com/>. (URL validated: 2026-10-07)
[REF-1570] Eduard Kovacs. "The Y2K38 Bug Is a Vulnerability, Not Just a Date Problem, Researchers Warn".
<https://www.securityweek.com/the-y2k38-bug-is-a-vulnerability-not-just-a-date-problem-researchers-warn/>. (URL validated: 2026-10-24)
[REF-1571] Wikipedia. "Year 2038 problem".
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Year_2038_problem>. (URL validated: 2026-10-24)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
PLOVER
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2026-09-03
(CWE 5.0, 2026-10-28)
CDR Contributor/GitHub User kripthor
Suggested inclusion of time-based observed examples. Note: the CWE Team updated this CWE entry independently without close coordination with the submitter before CWE 5.0 was released.
2025-06-16
(CWE 4.18, 2025-09-09)
Zheng Zhang Purdue University
reported CVE-2022-21668 as an incorrect observed example for this entry, when CVE-2019-19911 was intended
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.15, 2024-07-16)
Abhi Balakrishnan
Provided diagram to improve CWE usability
2023-04-25
(CWE 4.11, 2023-04-27)
"Mapping CWE to 62443" Sub-Working Group CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT SIG
Suggested mappings to ISA/IEC 62443.
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2026-10-28
(CWE 5.0, 2026-10-28)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Alternate_Terms, Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Modes_of_Introduction, Observed_Examples, Other_Notes, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings, Technical_Nuance
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Observed_Examples, Weakness_Ordinalities
2025-09-09
(CWE 4.18, 2025-09-09)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References
2025-04-03
(CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Observed_Examples
2024-11-19
(CWE 4.16, 2024-11-19)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2024-07-16
(CWE 4.15, 2024-07-16)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Alternate_Terms, Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram, Mapping_Notes, Modes_of_Introduction, Other_Notes, References, Relationship_Notes, Terminology_Notes
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2023-10-26
(CWE 4.13, 2023-10-26)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2023-06-29
(CWE 4.12, 2023-06-29)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
2023-04-27
(CWE 4.11, 2023-04-27)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2023-01-31
(CWE 4.10, 2023-01-31)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Detection_Factors
2022-10-13
(CWE 4.9, 2022-10-13)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2022-06-28
(CWE 4.8, 2022-06-28)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
2021-07-20
(CWE 4.5, 2021-07-20)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-03-15
(CWE 4.4, 2021-03-15)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2020-12-10
(CWE 4.3, 2020-12-10)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2020-08-20
(CWE 4.2, 2020-08-20)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-06-25
(CWE 4.1, 2020-06-25)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2020-02-24
(CWE 4.0, 2020-02-24)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2019-09-19
(CWE 3.4, 2019-09-19)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2019-01-03
(CWE 3.2, 2019-01-03)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2018-03-27
(CWE 3.1, 2018-03-27)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2017-11-08
(CWE 3.0, 2017-11-08)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Functional_Areas, Observed_Examples, References, Taxonomy_Mappings
2017-01-19
(CWE 2.10, 2017-01-19)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2015-12-07
(CWE 2.9, 2015-12-07)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-07-30
(CWE 2.8, 2014-07-31)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2013-07-17
(CWE 2.5, 2013-07-17)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2012-10-30
(CWE 2.3, 2012-10-30)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11
(CWE 2.2, 2012-05-15)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, References, Relationships
2011-09-13
(CWE 2.1, 2011-09-13)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-27
(CWE 2.0, 2011-06-27)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2011-06-01
(CWE 1.13, 2011-06-01)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2010-09-27
(CWE 1.10, 2010-09-27)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations
2010-06-21
(CWE 1.9, 2010-06-21)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Potential_Mitigations, References
2010-04-05
(CWE 1.8.1, 2010-04-05)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References, Related_Attack_Patterns
2010-02-16
(CWE 1.8, 2010-02-16)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Detection_Factors, Functional_Areas, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings, Terminology_Notes
2009-10-29
(CWE 1.6, 2009-10-29)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2009-05-27
(CWE 1.4, 2009-05-27)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2009-01-12
(CWE 1.2, 2009-01-12)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Name
2008-11-24
(CWE 1.1, 2008-11-25)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-10-14
(CWE 1.0.1, 2008-10-14)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Potential_Mitigations, Terminology_Notes
2008-09-08
(CWE 1.0, 2008-09-09)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Relationship_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings, Terminology_Notes
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2009-01-12 Integer Overflow (Wrap or Wraparound)

CWE-353: Missing Support for Integrity Check

Weakness ID: 353
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
Shows the description and diagram, platforms, mitigations, consequences, relationships, memberships, and content history. For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
×

Edit Custom Filter


+ Description
The product uses a transmission protocol that does not include a mechanism for verifying the integrity of the data during transmission, such as a checksum.
+ Extended Description
The end-to-end philosophy of checks states that integrity checks should be performed at the lowest level that they can be completely implemented. Excluding further sanity checks and input validation performed by applications, the protocol's checksum is the most important level of checksum, since it can be performed more completely than at any previous level and takes into account entire messages, as opposed to single packets.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Other; Hide Activities

Scope: Non-Repudiation, Integrity, Other

If integrity check values or "checksums" are omitted from a protocol, there is no way of determining if data has been corrupted in transmission, i.e., it is impossible to determine if any changes have been made to the data after it was sent. The lack of checksum functionality in a protocol removes the first application-level check of data that can be used. Data that is parsed and used may be corrupted.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design

Add an appropriately sized checksum to the protocol, ensuring that data received may be simply validated before it is parsed and used.

Implementation

Ensure that the checksums present in the protocol design are properly implemented and added to each message before it is sent.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf, Overlaps, and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Complete Weakness Hierarchy" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 345 Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
PeerOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 354 Improper Validation of Integrity Check Value
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Grouping Grouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1214 Data Integrity Issues
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Grouping Grouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1020 Verify Message Integrity
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase(s) Note

Architecture and Design

OMISSION: This weakness is caused by missing a security tactic during the architecture and design phase.

Implementation

+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Type Applicable Platforms Notes
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
Medium
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


In this example, a request packet is received, and privileged information is sent to the requester:

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
while(true) {
DatagramPacket rp = new DatagramPacket(rData,rData.length);
outSock.receive(rp);
InetAddress IPAddress = rp.getAddress();
int port = rp.getPort();
out = secret.getBytes();
DatagramPacket sp =new DatagramPacket(out, out.length, IPAddress, port);
outSock.send(sp);
}

The response containing secret data has no integrity check associated with it, allowing an attacker to alter the message without detection.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Mesh device uses a cryptographic algorithm without integrity checking, allowing modification of messages
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 957 SFP Secondary Cluster: Protocol Error
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1354 OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A08:2021 - Software and Data Integrity Failures
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1411 Comprehensive Categorization: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1443 OWASP Top Ten 2025 Category A08:2025 - Software or Data Integrity Failures
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1460 Weaknesses Addressed by the Top 20 Secure PLC Coding Practices
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
CLASP Failure to add integrity check value
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 2-4 Req SP.03.03 RE(1)
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 2-4 Req SP.04.02 RE(1)
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 2-4 Req SP.11.06 RE(2)
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 3-3 Req SR 3.1
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-1 Req SD-1
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-2 Req CR 3.1
PLC Top 20 5 Use cryptographic and / or checksum integrity checks for PLC code
+ References
[REF-18] Secure Software, Inc.. "The CLASP Application Security Process". 2005.
<https://cwe.mitre.org/documents/sources/TheCLASPApplicationSecurityProcess.pdf>. (URL validated: 2024-11-17)
[REF-44] Michael Howard, David LeBlanc and John Viega. "24 Deadly Sins of Software Security". "Sin 15: Not Updating Easily." Page 231. McGraw-Hill. 2010.
[REF-1550] Secure PLC Programming project. "Secure PLC Coding Practices: Top 20 List". 2021-06-15.
<https://plc-security.com/>. (URL validated: 2026-10-07)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
CLASP
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2023-04-25
(CWE 4.11, 2023-04-27)
"Mapping CWE to 62443" Sub-Working Group CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT SIG
Suggested mappings to ISA/IEC 62443.
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2026-10-28
(CWE 5.0, 2026-10-28)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Description, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2026-04-30
(CWE 4.20, 2026-04-30)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities
2023-06-29
(CWE 4.12, 2023-06-29)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27
(CWE 4.11, 2023-04-27)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2023-01-31
(CWE 4.10, 2023-01-31)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2021-10-28
(CWE 4.6, 2021-10-28)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-07-20
(CWE 4.5, 2021-07-20)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2020-02-24
(CWE 4.0, 2020-02-24)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2019-06-20
(CWE 3.3, 2019-06-20)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2017-11-08
(CWE 3.0, 2017-11-08)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships
2014-07-30
(CWE 2.8, 2014-07-31)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2012-10-30
(CWE 2.3, 2012-10-30)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2012-05-11
(CWE 2.2, 2012-05-15)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2011-06-01
(CWE 1.13, 2011-06-01)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples
2010-12-13
(CWE 1.11, 2010-12-13)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Name
2009-10-29
(CWE 1.6, 2009-10-29)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Other_Notes
2008-09-08
(CWE 1.0, 2008-09-09)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-07-01
(CWE 1.0, 2008-09-09)
Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2010-12-13 Failure to Add Integrity Check Value

CWE-787: Out-of-bounds Write

Weakness ID: 787
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities in limited situations requiring careful review (with careful review of mapping notes)
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
Shows the description and diagram, platforms, mitigations, consequences, relationships, memberships, and content history. For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
×

Edit Custom Filter


+ Description
The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. Diagram for CWE-787
+ Dimensions
Section HelpThe Dimensions table provides information about the different dimensions associated with this weakness. The Type identifies the dimension type, while the Value provides the specific value for that dimension.
TypeValue
Behavior-TypeWrite
Resource-TypeMemory Buffer
Resource-PropertyOut-of-bounds
+ Alternate Terms
Memory Corruption
Often used to describe the consequences of writing to memory outside the bounds of a buffer, or to memory that is otherwise invalid.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Modify Memory; Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands

Scope: Integrity

Write operations could cause memory corruption. In some cases, an adversary can modify control data such as return addresses in order to execute unexpected code.

DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart

Scope: Availability

Attempting to access out-of-range, invalid, or unauthorized memory could cause the product to crash.

Unexpected State

Scope: Other

Subsequent write operations can produce undefined or unexpected results.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Requirements

Strategy: Language Selection

Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.

Be wary that a language's interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.

Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.

Note: This is not a complete solution, since many buffer overflows are not related to strings.

Operation; Build and Compilation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.

D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.

Effectiveness: Defense in Depth

Note:

This is not necessarily a complete solution, since these mechanisms only detect certain types of overflows. In addition, the result is still a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.

Implementation

Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application's memory:

  • Double check that the buffer is as large as specified.
  • When using functions that accept a number of bytes to copy, such as strncpy(), be aware that if the destination buffer size is equal to the source buffer size, it may not NULL-terminate the string.
  • Check buffer boundaries if accessing the buffer in a loop and make sure there is no danger of writing past the allocated space.
  • If necessary, truncate all input strings to a reasonable length before passing them to the copy and concatenation functions.

Operation; Build and Compilation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.

Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.

For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].

Effectiveness: Defense in Depth

Note: These techniques do not provide a complete solution. For instance, exploits frequently use a bug that discloses memory addresses in order to maximize reliability of code execution [REF-1337]. It has also been shown that a side-channel attack can bypass ASLR [REF-1333].

Operation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.

For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].

Effectiveness: Defense in Depth

Note: This is not a complete solution, since buffer overflows could be used to overwrite nearby variables to modify the software's state in dangerous ways. In addition, it cannot be used in cases in which self-modifying code is required. Finally, an attack could still cause a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.

Implementation

Replace unbounded copy functions with analogous functions that support length arguments, such as strcpy with strncpy. Create these if they are not available.

Effectiveness: Moderate

Note: This approach is still susceptible to calculation errors, including issues such as off-by-one errors (CWE-193) and incorrectly calculating buffer lengths (CWE-131).
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf, Overlaps, and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Complete Weakness Hierarchy" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 120 Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 121 Stack-based Buffer Overflow
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 122 Heap-based Buffer Overflow
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 123 Write-what-where Condition
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 124 Buffer Underwrite
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 785 Use of Path Manipulation Function without Maximum-sized Buffer
Overlaps Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 788 Access of Memory Location After End of Buffer
Dimensions: Behavior-Type: Write
Dimensions: Behavior-Property: Out-of-bounds
CanFollow Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 822 Untrusted Pointer Dereference
CanFollow Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 823 Use of Out-of-range Pointer Offset
CanFollow Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 824 Access of Uninitialized Pointer
CanFollow Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 825 Expired Pointer Dereference
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Grouping Grouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1218 Memory Buffer Errors
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
+ Relevant to the view "CISQ Quality Measures (2020)" (View-1305)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 120 Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 123 Write-what-where Condition
+ Relevant to the view "CISQ Data Protection Measures" (View-1340)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 120 Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase(s) Note

Implementation

+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Type Applicable Platforms Notes
Languages

Class: Memory-Unsafe (Often Prevalent)

C (Often Prevalent)

C++ (Often Prevalent)

Class: Assembly (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: ICS/OT (Often Prevalent)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
High
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


The following code attempts to save four different identification numbers into an array.

(bad code)
Example Language: C 
int id_sequence[3];

/* Populate the id array. */

id_sequence[0] = 123;
id_sequence[1] = 234;
id_sequence[2] = 345;
id_sequence[3] = 456;

Since the array is only allocated to hold three elements, the valid indices are 0 to 2; so, the assignment to id_sequence[3] is out of bounds.



Example 2


In the following code, it is possible to request that memcpy move a much larger segment of memory than assumed:

(bad code)
Example Language: C 
int returnChunkSize(void *) {

/* if chunk info is valid, return the size of usable memory,

* else, return -1 to indicate an error

*/
...
}
int main() {
...
memcpy(destBuf, srcBuf, (returnChunkSize(destBuf)-1));
...
}

If returnChunkSize() happens to encounter an error it will return -1. Notice that the return value is not checked before the memcpy operation (CWE-252), so -1 can be passed as the size argument to memcpy() (CWE-805). Because memcpy() assumes that the value is unsigned, it will be interpreted as MAXINT-1 (CWE-195), and therefore will copy far more memory than is likely available to the destination buffer (CWE-787, CWE-788).



Example 3


This code takes an IP address from the user and verifies that it is well formed. It then looks up the hostname and copies it into a buffer.

(bad code)
Example Language: C 
void host_lookup(char *user_supplied_addr){
struct hostent *hp;
in_addr_t *addr;
char hostname[64];
in_addr_t inet_addr(const char *cp);

/*routine that ensures user_supplied_addr is in the right format for conversion */

validate_addr_form(user_supplied_addr);
addr = inet_addr(user_supplied_addr);
hp = gethostbyaddr( addr, sizeof(struct in_addr), AF_INET);
strcpy(hostname, hp->h_name);
}

This function allocates a buffer of 64 bytes to store the hostname. However, there is no guarantee that the hostname will not be larger than 64 bytes. If an attacker specifies an address which resolves to a very large hostname, then the function may overwrite sensitive data or even relinquish control flow to the attacker.

Note that this example also contains an unchecked return value (CWE-252) that can lead to a NULL pointer dereference (CWE-476).



Example 4


This code applies an encoding procedure to an input string and stores it into a buffer.

(bad code)
Example Language: C 
char * copy_input(char *user_supplied_string){
int i, dst_index;
char *dst_buf = (char*)malloc(4*sizeof(char) * MAX_SIZE);
if ( MAX_SIZE <= strlen(user_supplied_string) ){
die("user string too long, die evil hacker!");
}
dst_index = 0;
for ( i = 0; i < strlen(user_supplied_string); i++ ){
if( '&' == user_supplied_string[i] ){
dst_buf[dst_index++] = '&';
dst_buf[dst_index++] = 'a';
dst_buf[dst_index++] = 'm';
dst_buf[dst_index++] = 'p';
dst_buf[dst_index++] = ';';
}
else if ('<' == user_supplied_string[i] ){

/* encode to &lt; */
}
else dst_buf[dst_index++] = user_supplied_string[i];
}
return dst_buf;
}

The programmer attempts to encode the ampersand character in the user-controlled string. However, the length of the string is validated before the encoding procedure is applied. Furthermore, the programmer assumes encoding expansion will only expand a given character by a factor of 4, while the encoding of the ampersand expands by 5. As a result, when the encoding procedure expands the string it is possible to overflow the destination buffer if the attacker provides a string of many ampersands.



Example 5


In the following C/C++ code, a utility function is used to trim trailing whitespace from a character string. The function copies the input string to a local character string and uses a while statement to remove the trailing whitespace by moving backward through the string and overwriting whitespace with a NUL character.

(bad code)
Example Language: C 
char* trimTrailingWhitespace(char *strMessage, int length) {
char *retMessage;
char *message = malloc(sizeof(char)*(length+1));

// copy input string to a temporary string
char message[length+1];
int index;
for (index = 0; index < length; index++) {
message[index] = strMessage[index];
}
message[index] = '\0';

// trim trailing whitespace
int len = index-1;
while (isspace(message[len])) {
message[len] = '\0';
len--;
}

// return string without trailing whitespace
retMessage = message;
return retMessage;
}

However, this function can cause a buffer underwrite if the input character string contains all whitespace. On some systems the while statement will move backwards past the beginning of a character string and will call the isspace() function on an address outside of the bounds of the local buffer.



Example 6


The following code allocates memory for a maximum number of widgets. It then gets a user-specified number of widgets, making sure that the user does not request too many. It then initializes the elements of the array using InitializeWidget(). Because the number of widgets can vary for each request, the code inserts a NULL pointer to signify the location of the last widget.

(bad code)
Example Language: C 
int i;
unsigned int numWidgets;
Widget **WidgetList;

numWidgets = GetUntrustedSizeValue();
if ((numWidgets == 0) || (numWidgets > MAX_NUM_WIDGETS)) {
ExitError("Incorrect number of widgets requested!");
}
WidgetList = (Widget **)malloc(numWidgets * sizeof(Widget *));
printf("WidgetList ptr=%p\n", WidgetList);
for(i=0; i<numWidgets; i++) {
WidgetList[i] = InitializeWidget();
}
WidgetList[numWidgets] = NULL;
showWidgets(WidgetList);

However, this code contains an off-by-one calculation error (CWE-193). It allocates exactly enough space to contain the specified number of widgets, but it does not include the space for the NULL pointer. As a result, the allocated buffer is smaller than it is supposed to be (CWE-131). So if the user ever requests MAX_NUM_WIDGETS, there is an out-of-bounds write (CWE-787) when the NULL is assigned. Depending on the environment and compilation settings, this could cause memory corruption.



Example 7


The following is an example of code that may result in a buffer underwrite. This code is attempting to replace the substring "Replace Me" in destBuf with the string stored in srcBuf. It does so by using the function strstr(), which returns a pointer to the found substring in destBuf. Using pointer arithmetic, the starting index of the substring is found.

(bad code)
Example Language: C 
int main() {
...
char *result = strstr(destBuf, "Replace Me");
int idx = result - destBuf;
strcpy(&destBuf[idx], srcBuf);
...
}

In the case where the substring is not found in destBuf, strstr() will return NULL, causing the pointer arithmetic to be undefined, potentially setting the value of idx to a negative number. If idx is negative, this will result in a buffer underwrite of destBuf.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Chain: calculation expression does not use parentheses to address operator precedence (CWE-783), causing an incorrect calculation (CWE-682) leading to a buffer overflow (CWE-787).
Font rendering library does not properly handle assigning a signed short value to an unsigned long (CWE-195), leading to an integer wraparound (CWE-190), causing too small of a buffer (CWE-131), leading to an out-of-bounds write (CWE-787).
The reference implementation code for a Trusted Platform Module does not implement length checks on data, allowing for an attacker to write 2 bytes past the end of a buffer.
Chain: insufficient input validation (CWE-20) in browser allows heap corruption (CWE-787), as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
GPU kernel driver allows memory corruption because a user can obtain read/write access to read-only pages, as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
Chain: integer truncation (CWE-197) causes small buffer allocation (CWE-131) leading to out-of-bounds write (CWE-787) in kernel pool, as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
Out-of-bounds write in kernel-mode driver, as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
Escape from browser sandbox using out-of-bounds write due to incorrect bounds check, as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
Memory corruption in web browser scripting engine, as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
Chain: mobile phone Bluetooth implementation does not include offset when calculating packet length (CWE-682), leading to out-of-bounds write (CWE-787)
Chain: compiler optimization (CWE-733) removes or modifies code used to detect integer overflow (CWE-190), allowing out-of-bounds write (CWE-787).
malformed inputs cause accesses of uninitialized or previously-deleted objects, leading to memory corruption
Chain: -1 value from a function call was intended to indicate an error, but is used as an array index instead.
Unchecked length of SSLv2 challenge value leads to buffer underflow.
Buffer underflow from a small size value with a large buffer (length parameter inconsistency, CWE-130)
Chain: integer signedness error (CWE-195) passes signed comparison, leading to heap overflow (CWE-122)
Classic stack-based buffer overflow in media player using a long entry in a playlist
Heap-based buffer overflow in media player using a long entry in a playlist
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Resultant
(where the weakness is typically related to the presence of some other weaknesses)
At the point when the product writes data to an invalid location, it is likely that a separate weakness already occurred earlier. For example, the product might alter an index, perform incorrect pointer arithmetic, initialize or release memory incorrectly, etc., thus referencing a memory location outside the buffer.
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis

This weakness can often be detected using automated static analysis tools. Many modern tools use data flow analysis or constraint-based techniques to minimize the number of false positives.

Automated static analysis generally does not account for environmental considerations when reporting out-of-bounds memory operations. This can make it difficult for users to determine which warnings should be investigated first. For example, an analysis tool might report buffer overflows that originate from command line arguments in a program that is not expected to run with setuid or other special privileges.

Effectiveness: High

Note:Detection techniques for buffer-related errors are more mature than for most other weakness types.

Automated Dynamic Analysis

This weakness can be detected using dynamic tools and techniques that interact with the software using large test suites with many diverse inputs, such as fuzz testing (fuzzing), robustness testing, and fault injection. The software's operation may slow down, but it should not become unstable, crash, or generate incorrect results.

Automated Dynamic Analysis

Use tools that are integrated during compilation to insert runtime error-checking mechanisms related to memory safety errors, such as AddressSanitizer (ASan) for C/C++ [REF-1518].

Effectiveness: Moderate

Note:Crafted inputs are necessary to reach the code containing the error, such as generated by fuzzers. Also, these tools may reduce performance, and they only report the error condition - not the original mistake that led to the error.
+ Functional Areas
  • Memory Management
+ Affected Resources
  • Memory
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1200 Weaknesses in the 2019 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1337 Weaknesses in the 2021 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1350 Weaknesses in the 2020 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1366 ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1387 Weaknesses in the 2022 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1399 Comprehensive Categorization: Memory Safety
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1425 Weaknesses in the 2023 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1430 Weaknesses in the 2024 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1435 Weaknesses in the 2025 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1460 Weaknesses Addressed by the Top 20 Secure PLC Coding Practices
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED-WITH-REVIEW
(this CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities in limited situations requiring careful review)
Reasons Frequent Misuse, Abstraction

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities. However, closer examination is required.

Comments

While this CWE is allowed for mapping, it has more specific children that might be a better fit. Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is appropriate. Consider the root cause errors that have led to the out-of-bounds write by examining "CanFollow" relationships for this entry.

Suggestions

CWE-ID Comment
CWE-120 Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input ('Classic Buffer Overflow')
CWE-121 Stack-based Buffer Overflow
CWE-122 Heap-based Buffer Overflow
CWE-124 Buffer Underwrite ('Buffer Underflow')
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 3-3 Req SR 3.5
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-1 Req SI-1
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-1 Req SI-2
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-1 Req SVV-1
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-1 Req SVV-3
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-2 Req CR 3.5
PLC Top 20 10 Assign designated register blocks by function (read/write/validate)
+ References
[REF-1029] Aleph One. "Smashing The Stack For Fun And Profit". Phrack. 1996-11-08.
<https://phrack.org/issues/49/14.html>.
Rationale: Early-Publication; Influential/Newsworthy
[REF-7] Michael Howard and David LeBlanc. "Writing Secure Code". Chapter 5, "Stack Overruns" Page 129. 2nd Edition. Microsoft Press. 2002-12-04.
<https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/store/writing-secure-code-9780735617223>.
[REF-7] Michael Howard and David LeBlanc. "Writing Secure Code". Chapter 5, "Heap Overruns" Page 138. 2nd Edition. Microsoft Press. 2002-12-04.
<https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/store/writing-secure-code-9780735617223>.
[REF-44] Michael Howard, David LeBlanc and John Viega. "24 Deadly Sins of Software Security". "Sin 5: Buffer Overruns." Page 89. McGraw-Hill. 2010.
[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 3, "Nonexecutable Stack", Page 76. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 5, "Protection Mechanisms", Page 189. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
[REF-90] "Buffer UNDERFLOWS: What do you know about it?". Vuln-Dev Mailing List. 2004-01-10.
<https://seclists.org/vuln-dev/2004/Jan/22>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-56] Microsoft. "Using the Strsafe.h Functions".
<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/menurc/strsafe-ovw?redirectedfrom=MSDN>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-57] Matt Messier and John Viega. "Safe C String Library v1.0.3".
<http://www.gnu-darwin.org/www001/ports-1.5a-CURRENT/devel/safestr/work/safestr-1.0.3/doc/safestr.html>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-58] Michael Howard. "Address Space Layout Randomization in Windows Vista".
<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/michael_howard/address-space-layout-randomization-in-windows-vista>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-60] "PaX".
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executable_space_protection#PaX>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-61] Microsoft. "Understanding DEP as a mitigation technology part 1".
<https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2009/06/understanding-dep-as-a-mitigation-technology-part-1/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-64] Grant Murphy. "Position Independent Executables (PIE)". Red Hat. 2012-11-28.
<https://www.redhat.com/en/blog/position-independent-executables-pie>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-1332] John Richard Moser. "Prelink and address space randomization". 2006-07-05.
<https://lwn.net/Articles/190139/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1333] Dmitry Evtyushkin, Dmitry Ponomarev, Nael Abu-Ghazaleh. "Jump Over ASLR: Attacking Branch Predictors to Bypass ASLR". 2016.
<http://www.cs.ucr.edu/~nael/pubs/micro16.pdf>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1334] D3FEND. "Stack Frame Canary Validation (D3-SFCV)". 2023.
<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:StackFrameCanaryValidation/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1335] D3FEND. "Segment Address Offset Randomization (D3-SAOR)". 2023.
<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:SegmentAddressOffsetRandomization/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1336] D3FEND. "Process Segment Execution Prevention (D3-PSEP)". 2023.
<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:ProcessSegmentExecutionPrevention/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1337] Alexander Sotirov and Mark Dowd. "Bypassing Browser Memory Protections: Setting back browser security by 10 years". Memory information leaks. 2008.
<https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-08/Sotirov_Dowd/bh08-sotirov-dowd.pdf>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1477] Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. "Secure by Design Alert: Eliminating Buffer Overflow Vulnerabilities". 2025-02-12.
<https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/secure-design-alert-eliminating-buffer-overflow-vulnerabilities>. (URL validated: 2025-07-18)
[REF-1518] "AddressSanitizer".
<https://clang.llvm.org/docs/AddressSanitizer.html>. (URL validated: 2025-12-10)
[REF-1534] OMG. "Automated Technical Debt Measure, Version 2". 2024-08.
<https://www.omg.org/spec/ATDM2/1.0/PDF>. (URL validated: 2026-07-16)
[REF-1550] Secure PLC Programming project. "Secure PLC Coding Practices: Top 20 List". 2021-06-15.
<https://plc-security.com/>. (URL validated: 2026-10-07)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2009-10-21
(CWE 1.6, 2009-10-29)
CWE Content Team MITRE
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.15, 2024-07-16)
Abhi Balakrishnan
Provided diagram to improve CWE usability
2023-04-25
(CWE 4.11, 2023-04-27)
"Mapping CWE to 62443" Sub-Working Group CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT SIG
Suggested mappings to ISA/IEC 62443.
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2026-10-28
(CWE 5.0, 2026-10-28)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Dimensions, Observed_Examples, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2026-04-30
(CWE 4.20, 2026-04-30)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Detection_Factors, References, Relationships
2025-09-09
(CWE 4.18, 2025-09-09)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Affected_Resources, Functional_Areas, References
2025-04-03
(CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
2024-11-19
(CWE 4.16, 2024-11-19)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
2024-07-16
(CWE 4.15, 2024-07-16)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Alternate_Terms, Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram, Weakness_Ordinalities
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2023-06-29
(CWE 4.12, 2023-06-29)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2023-04-27
(CWE 4.11, 2023-04-27)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2023-01-31
(CWE 4.10, 2023-01-31)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Alternate_Terms, Demonstrative_Examples, Description
2022-10-13
(CWE 4.9, 2022-10-13)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms
2022-06-28
(CWE 4.8, 2022-06-28)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
2021-07-20
(CWE 4.5, 2021-07-20)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
2021-03-15
(CWE 4.4, 2021-03-15)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2020-12-10
(CWE 4.3, 2020-12-10)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-08-20
(CWE 4.2, 2020-08-20)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Alternate_Terms, Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, Relationships
2020-06-25
(CWE 4.1, 2020-06-25)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2020-02-24
(CWE 4.0, 2020-02-24)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
2019-09-19
(CWE 3.4, 2019-09-19)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Detection_Factors, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction
2018-03-27
(CWE 3.1, 2018-03-27)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2015-12-07
(CWE 2.9, 2015-12-07)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-06-23
(CWE 2.7, 2014-06-23)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2011-06-01
(CWE 1.13, 2011-06-01)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2010-09-27
(CWE 1.10, 2010-09-27)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2010-02-16
(CWE 1.8, 2010-02-16)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples

CWE-128: Wrap-around Error

Weakness ID: 128
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
Shows the description and diagram, platforms, mitigations, consequences, relationships, memberships, and content history. For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
×

Edit Custom Filter


+ Description
Wrap around errors occur whenever a value is incremented past the maximum value for its type and therefore "wraps around" to a very small, negative, or undefined value.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart; DoS: Resource Consumption (CPU); DoS: Resource Consumption (Memory); DoS: Instability

Scope: Availability

This weakness will generally lead to undefined behavior and therefore crashes. In the case of overflows involving loop index variables, the likelihood of infinite loops is also high.

Modify Memory

Scope: Integrity

If the value in question is important to data (as opposed to flow), simple data corruption has occurred. Also, if the wrap around results in other conditions such as buffer overflows, further memory corruption may occur.

Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands; Bypass Protection Mechanism

Scope: Confidentiality, Availability, Access Control

This weakness can sometimes trigger buffer overflows which can be used to execute arbitrary code. This is usually outside the scope of a program's implicit security policy.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Requirements specification: The choice could be made to use a language that is not susceptible to these issues.

Architecture and Design

Provide clear upper and lower bounds on the scale of any protocols designed.

Implementation

Perform validation on all incremented variables to ensure that they remain within reasonable bounds.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf, Overlaps, and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Complete Weakness Hierarchy" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 682 Incorrect Calculation
PeerOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 190 Integer Overflow or Wraparound
CanPrecede Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Grouping Grouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 189 Numeric Errors
+ Background Details
Due to how addition is performed by computers, if a primitive is incremented past the maximum value possible for its storage space, the system will not recognize this, and therefore increment each bit as if it still had extra space. Because of how negative numbers are represented in binary, primitives interpreted as signed may "wrap" to very large negative values.
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase(s) Note

Implementation

+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Type Applicable Platforms Notes
Languages

C (Often Prevalent)

C++ (Often Prevalent)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
Medium
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


The following image processing code allocates a table for images.

(bad code)
Example Language: C 
img_t table_ptr; /*struct containing img data, 10kB each*/
int num_imgs;
...
num_imgs = get_num_imgs();
table_ptr = (img_t*)malloc(sizeof(img_t)*num_imgs);
...

This code intends to allocate a table of size num_imgs, however as num_imgs grows large, the calculation determining the size of the list will eventually overflow (CWE-190). This will result in a very small list to be allocated instead. If the subsequent code operates on the list as if it were num_imgs long, it may result in many types of out-of-bounds problems (CWE-119).



+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Effectiveness: High

+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 742 CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 9 - Memory Management (MEM)
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 876 CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 08 - Memory Management (MEM)
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 998 SFP Secondary Cluster: Glitch in Computation
MemberOf GroupingGrouping - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1408 Comprehensive Categorization: Incorrect Calculation
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1460 Weaknesses Addressed by the Top 20 Secure PLC Coding Practices
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Notes

Relationship

The relationship between overflow and wrap-around needs to be examined more closely, since several entries (including CWE-190) are closely related.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
CLASP Wrap-around error
CERT C Secure Coding MEM07-C Ensure that the arguments to calloc(), when multiplied, can be represented as a size_t
Software Fault Patterns SFP1 Glitch in computation
PLC Top 20 4 Use PLC flags as integrity checks
+ References
[REF-44] Michael Howard, David LeBlanc and John Viega. "24 Deadly Sins of Software Security". "Sin 5: Buffer Overruns." Page 89. McGraw-Hill. 2010.
[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 6, "Signed Integer Boundaries", Page 220. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
[REF-18] Secure Software, Inc.. "The CLASP Application Security Process". 2005.
<https://cwe.mitre.org/documents/sources/TheCLASPApplicationSecurityProcess.pdf>. (URL validated: 2024-11-17)
[REF-1550] Secure PLC Programming project. "Secure PLC Coding Practices: Top 20 List". 2021-06-15.
<https://plc-security.com/>. (URL validated: 2026-10-07)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
CLASP
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2026-10-28
(CWE 5.0, 2026-10-28)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors
2023-06-29
(CWE 4.12, 2023-06-29)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27
(CWE 4.11, 2023-04-27)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-03-15
(CWE 4.4, 2021-03-15)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, References
2020-02-24
(CWE 4.0, 2020-02-24)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2017-11-08
(CWE 3.0, 2017-11-08)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Causal_Nature, Taxonomy_Mappings
2017-01-19
(CWE 2.10, 2017-01-19)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-07-30
(CWE 2.8, 2014-07-31)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2012-05-11
(CWE 2.2, 2012-05-15)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, References, Relationships
2011-09-13
(CWE 2.1, 2011-09-13)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-01
(CWE 1.13, 2011-06-01)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2010-12-13
(CWE 1.11, 2010-12-13)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Background_Details
2009-10-29
(CWE 1.6, 2009-10-29)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships
2008-11-24
(CWE 1.1, 2008-11-25)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-09-08
(CWE 1.0, 2008-09-09)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Background_Details, Common_Consequences, Relationships, Relationship_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings, Weakness_Ordinalities
Page Last Updated: October 29, 2026