CWE

Common Weakness Enumeration

A community-developed list of SW & HW weaknesses that can become vulnerabilities

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Home > CWE List > VIEW SLICE: CWE-658: Weaknesses in Software Written in C (4.19)  
ID

CWE VIEW: Weaknesses in Software Written in C

View ID: 658
Vulnerability Mapping: PROHIBITED This CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Type: Implicit
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+ Objective
This view (slice) covers issues that are found in C programs that are not common to all languages.
+ Filter
/Weakness_Catalog/Weaknesses/Weakness[./Applicable_Platforms/Language/@Name='C']
+ Membership
Nature Type ID Name
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 14 Compiler Removal of Code to Clear Buffers
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 120 Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input ('Classic Buffer Overflow')
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 121 Stack-based Buffer Overflow
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 122 Heap-based Buffer Overflow
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 123 Write-what-where Condition
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 124 Buffer Underwrite ('Buffer Underflow')
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 125 Out-of-bounds Read
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 126 Buffer Over-read
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 127 Buffer Under-read
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 128 Wrap-around Error
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 129 Improper Validation of Array Index
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 130 Improper Handling of Length Parameter Inconsistency
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 131 Incorrect Calculation of Buffer Size
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 134 Use of Externally-Controlled Format String
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 135 Incorrect Calculation of Multi-Byte String Length
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 158 Improper Neutralization of Null Byte or NUL Character
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 170 Improper Null Termination
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 188 Reliance on Data/Memory Layout
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 190 Integer Overflow or Wraparound
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 191 Integer Underflow (Wrap or Wraparound)
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 192 Integer Coercion Error
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 193 Off-by-one Error
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 194 Unexpected Sign Extension
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 195 Signed to Unsigned Conversion Error
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 196 Unsigned to Signed Conversion Error
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 197 Numeric Truncation Error
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 242 Use of Inherently Dangerous Function
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 243 Creation of chroot Jail Without Changing Working Directory
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 244 Improper Clearing of Heap Memory Before Release ('Heap Inspection')
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 362 Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 364 Signal Handler Race Condition
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 366 Race Condition within a Thread
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 374 Passing Mutable Objects to an Untrusted Method
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 375 Returning a Mutable Object to an Untrusted Caller
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 401 Missing Release of Memory after Effective Lifetime
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 403 Exposure of File Descriptor to Unintended Control Sphere ('File Descriptor Leak')
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 415 Double Free
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 416 Use After Free
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 457 Use of Uninitialized Variable
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 460 Improper Cleanup on Thrown Exception
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 462 Duplicate Key in Associative List (Alist)
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 463 Deletion of Data Structure Sentinel
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 464 Addition of Data Structure Sentinel
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 466 Return of Pointer Value Outside of Expected Range
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 467 Use of sizeof() on a Pointer Type
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 468 Incorrect Pointer Scaling
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 469 Use of Pointer Subtraction to Determine Size
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 474 Use of Function with Inconsistent Implementations
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 476 NULL Pointer Dereference
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 478 Missing Default Case in Multiple Condition Expression
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 479 Signal Handler Use of a Non-reentrant Function
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 480 Use of Incorrect Operator
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 481 Assigning instead of Comparing
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 482 Comparing instead of Assigning
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 483 Incorrect Block Delimitation
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 484 Omitted Break Statement in Switch
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 495 Private Data Structure Returned From A Public Method
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 496 Public Data Assigned to Private Array-Typed Field
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 558 Use of getlogin() in Multithreaded Application
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 560 Use of umask() with chmod-style Argument
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 562 Return of Stack Variable Address
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 587 Assignment of a Fixed Address to a Pointer
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 588 Attempt to Access Child of a Non-structure Pointer
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 590 Free of Memory not on the Heap
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 617 Reachable Assertion
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 663 Use of a Non-reentrant Function in a Concurrent Context
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 676 Use of Potentially Dangerous Function
HasMember ChainChain - a Compound Element that is a sequence of two or more separate weaknesses that can be closely linked together within software. One weakness, X, can directly create the conditions that are necessary to cause another weakness, Y, to enter a vulnerable condition. When this happens, CWE refers to X as "primary" to Y, and Y is "resultant" from X. Chains can involve more than two weaknesses, and in some cases, they might have a tree-like structure. 680 Integer Overflow to Buffer Overflow
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 681 Incorrect Conversion between Numeric Types
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 685 Function Call With Incorrect Number of Arguments
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 688 Function Call With Incorrect Variable or Reference as Argument
HasMember CompositeComposite - a Compound Element that consists of two or more distinct weaknesses, in which all weaknesses must be present at the same time in order for a potential vulnerability to arise. Removing any of the weaknesses eliminates or sharply reduces the risk. One weakness, X, can be "broken down" into component weaknesses Y and Z. There can be cases in which one weakness might not be essential to a composite, but changes the nature of the composite when it becomes a vulnerability. 689 Permission Race Condition During Resource Copy
HasMember ChainChain - a Compound Element that is a sequence of two or more separate weaknesses that can be closely linked together within software. One weakness, X, can directly create the conditions that are necessary to cause another weakness, Y, to enter a vulnerable condition. When this happens, CWE refers to X as "primary" to Y, and Y is "resultant" from X. Chains can involve more than two weaknesses, and in some cases, they might have a tree-like structure. 690 Unchecked Return Value to NULL Pointer Dereference
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 704 Incorrect Type Conversion or Cast
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 733 Compiler Optimization Removal or Modification of Security-critical Code
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 761 Free of Pointer not at Start of Buffer
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 762 Mismatched Memory Management Routines
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 763 Release of Invalid Pointer or Reference
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 768 Incorrect Short Circuit Evaluation
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 781 Improper Address Validation in IOCTL with METHOD_NEITHER I/O Control Code
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 782 Exposed IOCTL with Insufficient Access Control
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 783 Operator Precedence Logic Error
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 785 Use of Path Manipulation Function without Maximum-sized Buffer
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 786 Access of Memory Location Before Start of Buffer
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 787 Out-of-bounds Write
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 788 Access of Memory Location After End of Buffer
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 789 Memory Allocation with Excessive Size Value
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 805 Buffer Access with Incorrect Length Value
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 806 Buffer Access Using Size of Source Buffer
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 822 Untrusted Pointer Dereference
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 823 Use of Out-of-range Pointer Offset
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 824 Access of Uninitialized Pointer
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 825 Expired Pointer Dereference
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 828 Signal Handler with Functionality that is not Asynchronous-Safe
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 839 Numeric Range Comparison Without Minimum Check
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 843 Access of Resource Using Incompatible Type ('Type Confusion')
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 910 Use of Expired File Descriptor
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 911 Improper Update of Reference Count
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1325 Improperly Controlled Sequential Memory Allocation
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1335 Incorrect Bitwise Shift of Integer
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1341 Multiple Releases of Same Resource or Handle
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1429 Missing Security-Relevant Feedback for Unexecuted Operations in Hardware Interface
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes

Usage: PROHIBITED

(this CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)

Reason: View

Rationale:

This entry is a View. Views are not weaknesses and therefore inappropriate to describe the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments:

Use this View or other Views to search and navigate for the appropriate weakness.
+ View Metrics
CWEs in this view Total CWEs
Weaknesses 103 out of 944
Categories 0 out of 385
Views 0 out of 54
Total 103 out of 1383
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2008-04-11
(CWE Draft 9, 2008-04-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Name, View_Filter, View_Structure
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2008-09-09 Weaknesses found in the C Language

View Components

A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z

CWE-788: Access of Memory Location After End of Buffer

Weakness ID: 788
Vulnerability Mapping: DISCOURAGED This CWE ID should not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
The product reads or writes to a buffer using an index or pointer that references a memory location after the end of the buffer.
+ Extended Description
This typically occurs when a pointer or its index is incremented to a position after the buffer; or when pointer arithmetic results in a position after the buffer.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Read Memory

Scope: Confidentiality

For an out-of-bounds read, the attacker may have access to sensitive information. If the sensitive information contains system details, such as the current buffer's position in memory, this knowledge can be used to craft further attacks, possibly with more severe consequences.

Modify Memory; DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart

Scope: Integrity, Availability

Out of bounds memory access will very likely result in the corruption of relevant memory, and perhaps instructions, possibly leading to a crash. Other attacks leading to lack of availability are possible, including putting the program into an infinite loop.

Modify Memory; Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands

Scope: Integrity

If the memory accessible by the attacker can be effectively controlled, it may be possible to execute arbitrary code, as with a standard buffer overflow. If the attacker can overwrite a pointer's worth of memory (usually 32 or 64 bits), they can redirect a function pointer to their own malicious code. Even when the attacker can only modify a single byte arbitrary code execution can be possible. Sometimes this is because the same problem can be exploited repeatedly to the same effect. Other times it is because the attacker can overwrite security-critical application-specific data -- such as a flag indicating whether the user is an administrator.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 121 Stack-based Buffer Overflow
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 122 Heap-based Buffer Overflow
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 126 Buffer Over-read
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1218 Memory Buffer Errors
+ Relevant to the view "CISQ Quality Measures (2020)" (View-1305)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
+ Relevant to the view "CISQ Data Protection Measures" (View-1340)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Memory-Unsafe (Undetermined Prevalence)

C (Often Prevalent)

C++ (Often Prevalent)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


This example takes an IP address from a user, verifies that it is well formed and then looks up the hostname and copies it into a buffer.

(bad code)
Example Language:
void host_lookup(char *user_supplied_addr){
struct hostent *hp;
in_addr_t *addr;
char hostname[64];
in_addr_t inet_addr(const char *cp);

/*routine that ensures user_supplied_addr is in the right format for conversion */

validate_addr_form(user_supplied_addr);
addr = inet_addr(user_supplied_addr);
hp = gethostbyaddr( addr, sizeof(struct in_addr), AF_INET);
strcpy(hostname, hp->h_name);
}

This function allocates a buffer of 64 bytes to store the hostname, however there is no guarantee that the hostname will not be larger than 64 bytes. If an attacker specifies an address which resolves to a very large hostname, then the function may overwrite sensitive data or even relinquish control flow to the attacker.

Note that this example also contains an unchecked return value (CWE-252) that can lead to a NULL pointer dereference (CWE-476).



Example 2


In the following example, it is possible to request that memcpy move a much larger segment of memory than assumed:

(bad code)
Example Language:
int returnChunkSize(void *) {

/* if chunk info is valid, return the size of usable memory,

* else, return -1 to indicate an error

*/
...
}
int main() {
...
memcpy(destBuf, srcBuf, (returnChunkSize(destBuf)-1));
...
}

If returnChunkSize() happens to encounter an error it will return -1. Notice that the return value is not checked before the memcpy operation (CWE-252), so -1 can be passed as the size argument to memcpy() (CWE-805). Because memcpy() assumes that the value is unsigned, it will be interpreted as MAXINT-1 (CWE-195), and therefore will copy far more memory than is likely available to the destination buffer (CWE-787, CWE-788).



Example 3


This example applies an encoding procedure to an input string and stores it into a buffer.

(bad code)
Example Language:
char * copy_input(char *user_supplied_string){
int i, dst_index;
char *dst_buf = (char*)malloc(4*sizeof(char) * MAX_SIZE);
if ( MAX_SIZE <= strlen(user_supplied_string) ){
die("user string too long, die evil hacker!");
}
dst_index = 0;
for ( i = 0; i < strlen(user_supplied_string); i++ ){
if( '&' == user_supplied_string[i] ){
dst_buf[dst_index++] = '&';
dst_buf[dst_index++] = 'a';
dst_buf[dst_index++] = 'm';
dst_buf[dst_index++] = 'p';
dst_buf[dst_index++] = ';';
}
else if ('<' == user_supplied_string[i] ){

/* encode to &lt; */
}
else dst_buf[dst_index++] = user_supplied_string[i];
}
return dst_buf;
}

The programmer attempts to encode the ampersand character in the user-controlled string, however the length of the string is validated before the encoding procedure is applied. Furthermore, the programmer assumes encoding expansion will only expand a given character by a factor of 4, while the encoding of the ampersand expands by 5. As a result, when the encoding procedure expands the string it is possible to overflow the destination buffer if the attacker provides a string of many ampersands.



Example 4


In the following C/C++ example the method processMessageFromSocket() will get a message from a socket, placed into a buffer, and will parse the contents of the buffer into a structure that contains the message length and the message body. A for loop is used to copy the message body into a local character string which will be passed to another method for processing.

(bad code)
Example Language:
int processMessageFromSocket(int socket) {
int success;

char buffer[BUFFER_SIZE];
char message[MESSAGE_SIZE];

// get message from socket and store into buffer

//Ignoring possibliity that buffer > BUFFER_SIZE
if (getMessage(socket, buffer, BUFFER_SIZE) > 0) {

// place contents of the buffer into message structure
ExMessage *msg = recastBuffer(buffer);

// copy message body into string for processing
int index;
for (index = 0; index < msg->msgLength; index++) {
message[index] = msg->msgBody[index];
}
message[index] = '\0';

// process message
success = processMessage(message);
}
return success;
}

However, the message length variable (msgLength) from the structure is used as the condition for ending the for loop without validating that msgLength accurately reflects the actual length of the message body (CWE-606). If msgLength indicates a length that is longer than the size of a message body (CWE-130), then this can result in a buffer over-read by reading past the end of the buffer (CWE-126).



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Classic stack-based buffer overflow in media player using a long entry in a playlist
Heap-based buffer overflow in media player using a long entry in a playlist
large precision value in a format string triggers overflow
attacker-controlled array index leads to code execution
OS kernel trusts userland-supplied length value, allowing reading of sensitive information
Chain: integer signedness error (CWE-195) passes signed comparison, leading to heap overflow (CWE-122)
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Resultant
(where the weakness is typically related to the presence of some other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Fuzzing

Fuzz testing (fuzzing) is a powerful technique for generating large numbers of diverse inputs - either randomly or algorithmically - and dynamically invoking the code with those inputs. Even with random inputs, it is often capable of generating unexpected results such as crashes, memory corruption, or resource consumption. Fuzzing effectively produces repeatable test cases that clearly indicate bugs, which helps developers to diagnose the issues.

Effectiveness: High

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Effectiveness: High

Automated Dynamic Analysis

Use tools that are integrated during compilation to insert runtime error-checking mechanisms related to memory safety errors, such as AddressSanitizer (ASan) for C/C++ [REF-1518].

Effectiveness: Moderate

Note:Crafted inputs are necessary to reach the code containing the error, such as generated by fuzzers. Also, these tools may reduce performance, and they only report the error condition - not the original mistake that led to the error.
+ Functional Areas
  • Memory Management
+ Affected Resources
  • Memory
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1129 CISQ Quality Measures (2016) - Reliability
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1399 Comprehensive Categorization: Memory Safety
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage DISCOURAGED
(this CWE ID should not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reasons Potential Deprecation, Frequent Misuse

Rationale

The CWE entry might be misused when lower-level CWE entries might be available. It also overlaps existing CWE entries and might be deprecated in the future.

Comments

If the "Access" operation is known to be a read or a write, then investigate children of entries such as CWE-787: Out-of-bounds Write and CWE-125: Out-of-bounds Read.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
OMG ASCRM ASCRM-CWE-788
+ References
[REF-961] Object Management Group (OMG). "Automated Source Code Reliability Measure (ASCRM)". ASCRM-CWE-788. 2016-01.
<http://www.omg.org/spec/ASCRM/1.0/>.
[REF-1518] "AddressSanitizer".
<https://clang.llvm.org/docs/AddressSanitizer.html>. (URL validated: 2025-12-10)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2009-10-21
(CWE 1.6, 2009-10-29)
CWE Content Team MITRE
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2022-02-23 Eric Constantin Brinz GENIA-SEC IT-Sicherheitsmanagement GmbH
Suggested corrections to extended description.
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Detection_Factors, References, Time_of_Introduction, Weakness_Ordinalities
2025-09-09
(CWE 4.18, 2025-09-09)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Affected_Resources, Demonstrative_Examples, Functional_Areas
2025-04-03
(CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms
2024-07-16
(CWE 4.15, 2024-07-16)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2022-04-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2021-07-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2020-12-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-08-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-06-25 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples
2017-05-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2015-12-07 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2014-06-23 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2013-02-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences

CWE-786: Access of Memory Location Before Start of Buffer

Weakness ID: 786
Vulnerability Mapping: DISCOURAGED This CWE ID should not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
×

Edit Custom Filter


+ Description
The product reads or writes to a buffer using an index or pointer that references a memory location prior to the beginning of the buffer.
+ Extended Description
This typically occurs when a pointer or its index is decremented to a position before the buffer, when pointer arithmetic results in a position before the beginning of the valid memory location, or when a negative index is used.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Read Memory

Scope: Confidentiality

For an out-of-bounds read, the attacker may have access to sensitive information. If the sensitive information contains system details, such as the current buffer's position in memory, this knowledge can be used to craft further attacks, possibly with more severe consequences.

Modify Memory; DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart

Scope: Integrity, Availability

Out of bounds memory access will very likely result in the corruption of relevant memory, and perhaps instructions, possibly leading to a crash.

Modify Memory; Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands

Scope: Integrity

If the corrupted memory can be effectively controlled, it may be possible to execute arbitrary code. If the corrupted memory is data rather than instructions, the system will continue to function with improper changes, possibly in violation of an implicit or explicit policy.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 124 Buffer Underwrite ('Buffer Underflow')
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 127 Buffer Under-read
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1218 Memory Buffer Errors
+ Relevant to the view "CISQ Quality Measures (2020)" (View-1305)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
+ Relevant to the view "CISQ Data Protection Measures" (View-1340)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Memory-Unsafe (Often Prevalent)

C (Often Prevalent)

C++ (Often Prevalent)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


In the following C/C++ example, a utility function is used to trim trailing whitespace from a character string. The function copies the input string to a local character string and uses a while statement to remove the trailing whitespace by moving backward through the string and overwriting whitespace with a NUL character.

(bad code)
Example Language:
char* trimTrailingWhitespace(char *strMessage, int length) {
char *retMessage;
char *message = malloc(sizeof(char)*(length+1));

// copy input string to a temporary string
char message[length+1];
int index;
for (index = 0; index < length; index++) {
message[index] = strMessage[index];
}
message[index] = '\0';

// trim trailing whitespace
int len = index-1;
while (isspace(message[len])) {
message[len] = '\0';
len--;
}

// return string without trailing whitespace
retMessage = message;
return retMessage;
}

However, this function can cause a buffer underwrite if the input character string contains all whitespace. On some systems the while statement will move backwards past the beginning of a character string and will call the isspace() function on an address outside of the bounds of the local buffer.



Example 2


The following example asks a user for an offset into an array to select an item.

(bad code)
Example Language:

int main (int argc, char **argv) {
char *items[] = {"boat", "car", "truck", "train"};
int index = GetUntrustedOffset();
printf("You selected %s\n", items[index-1]);
}

The programmer allows the user to specify which element in the list to select, however an attacker can provide an out-of-bounds offset, resulting in a buffer over-read (CWE-126).



Example 3


The following is an example of code that may result in a buffer underwrite. This code is attempting to replace the substring "Replace Me" in destBuf with the string stored in srcBuf. It does so by using the function strstr(), which returns a pointer to the found substring in destBuf. Using pointer arithmetic, the starting index of the substring is found.

(bad code)
Example Language:
int main() {
...
char *result = strstr(destBuf, "Replace Me");
int idx = result - destBuf;
strcpy(&destBuf[idx], srcBuf);
...
}

In the case where the substring is not found in destBuf, strstr() will return NULL, causing the pointer arithmetic to be undefined, potentially setting the value of idx to a negative number. If idx is negative, this will result in a buffer underwrite of destBuf.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Unchecked length of SSLv2 challenge value leads to buffer underflow.
Buffer underflow from a small size value with a large buffer (length parameter inconsistency, CWE-130)
Buffer underflow from an all-whitespace string, which causes a counter to be decremented before the buffer while looking for a non-whitespace character.
Buffer underflow resultant from encoded data that triggers an integer overflow.
Product sets an incorrect buffer size limit, leading to "off-by-two" buffer underflow.
Negative value is used in a memcpy() operation, leading to buffer underflow.
Buffer underflow due to mishandled special characters
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Resultant
(where the weakness is typically related to the presence of some other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Fuzzing

Fuzz testing (fuzzing) is a powerful technique for generating large numbers of diverse inputs - either randomly or algorithmically - and dynamically invoking the code with those inputs. Even with random inputs, it is often capable of generating unexpected results such as crashes, memory corruption, or resource consumption. Fuzzing effectively produces repeatable test cases that clearly indicate bugs, which helps developers to diagnose the issues.

Effectiveness: High

Automated Dynamic Analysis

Use tools that are integrated during compilation to insert runtime error-checking mechanisms related to memory safety errors, such as AddressSanitizer (ASan) for C/C++ [REF-1518].

Effectiveness: Moderate

Note:Crafted inputs are necessary to reach the code containing the error, such as generated by fuzzers. Also, these tools may reduce performance, and they only report the error condition - not the original mistake that led to the error.
+ Functional Areas
  • Memory Management
+ Affected Resources
  • Memory
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1160 SEI CERT C Coding Standard - Guidelines 06. Arrays (ARR)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1399 Comprehensive Categorization: Memory Safety
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage DISCOURAGED
(this CWE ID should not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reasons Potential Deprecation, Frequent Misuse

Rationale

The CWE entry might be misused when lower-level CWE entries might be available. It also overlaps existing CWE entries and might be deprecated in the future.

Comments

If the "Access" operation is known to be a read or a write, then investigate children of entries such as CWE-787: Out-of-bounds Write and CWE-125: Out-of-bounds Read.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
CERT C Secure Coding ARR30-C CWE More Specific Do not form or use out-of-bounds pointers or array subscripts
+ References
[REF-1518] "AddressSanitizer".
<https://clang.llvm.org/docs/AddressSanitizer.html>. (URL validated: 2025-12-10)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2009-10-21
(CWE 1.6, 2009-10-29)
CWE Content Team MITRE
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Detection_Factors, References, Time_of_Introduction, Weakness_Ordinalities
2025-09-09
(CWE 4.18, 2025-09-09)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Affected_Resources, Functional_Areas
2025-04-03
(CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms
2024-07-16
(CWE 4.15, 2024-07-16)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2020-12-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-08-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Taxonomy_Mappings
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences

CWE-843: Access of Resource Using Incompatible Type ('Type Confusion')

Weakness ID: 843
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
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+ Description
The product allocates or initializes a resource such as a pointer, object, or variable using one type, but it later accesses that resource using a type that is incompatible with the original type.
+ Extended Description

When the product accesses the resource using an incompatible type, this could trigger logical errors because the resource does not have expected properties. In languages without memory safety, such as C and C++, type confusion can lead to out-of-bounds memory access.

While this weakness is frequently associated with unions when parsing data with many different embedded object types in C, it can be present in any application that can interpret the same variable or memory location in multiple ways.

This weakness is not unique to C and C++. For example, errors in PHP applications can be triggered by providing array parameters when scalars are expected, or vice versa. Languages such as Perl, which perform automatic conversion of a variable of one type when it is accessed as if it were another type, can also contain these issues.

+ Alternate Terms
Object Type Confusion
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Read Memory; Modify Memory; Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands; DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart

Scope: Availability, Integrity, Confidentiality

When a memory buffer is accessed using the wrong type, it could read or write memory out of the bounds of the buffer, if the allocated buffer is smaller than the type that the code is attempting to access, leading to a crash and possibly code execution.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 704 Incorrect Type Conversion or Cast
PeerOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1287 Improper Validation of Specified Type of Input
CanPrecede Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 136 Type Errors
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 704 Incorrect Type Conversion or Cast
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

C (Undetermined Prevalence)

C++ (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


The following code uses a union to support the representation of different types of messages. It formats messages differently, depending on their type.

(bad code)
Example Language:
#define NAME_TYPE 1
#define ID_TYPE 2

struct MessageBuffer
{
int msgType;
union {
char *name;
int nameID;
};
};


int main (int argc, char **argv) {
struct MessageBuffer buf;
char *defaultMessage = "Hello World";

buf.msgType = NAME_TYPE;
buf.name = defaultMessage;
printf("Pointer of buf.name is %p\n", buf.name);
/* This particular value for nameID is used to make the code architecture-independent. If coming from untrusted input, it could be any value. */

buf.nameID = (int)(defaultMessage + 1);
printf("Pointer of buf.name is now %p\n", buf.name);
if (buf.msgType == NAME_TYPE) {
printf("Message: %s\n", buf.name);
}
else {
printf("Message: Use ID %d\n", buf.nameID);
}
}

The code intends to process the message as a NAME_TYPE, and sets the default message to "Hello World." However, since both buf.name and buf.nameID are part of the same union, they can act as aliases for the same memory location, depending on memory layout after compilation.

As a result, modification of buf.nameID - an int - can effectively modify the pointer that is stored in buf.name - a string.

Execution of the program might generate output such as:

Pointer of name is 10830
Pointer of name is now 10831
Message: ello World

Notice how the pointer for buf.name was changed, even though buf.name was not explicitly modified.

In this case, the first "H" character of the message is omitted. However, if an attacker is able to fully control the value of buf.nameID, then buf.name could contain an arbitrary pointer, leading to out-of-bounds reads or writes.



Example 2


The following PHP code accepts a value, adds 5, and prints the sum.

(bad code)
Example Language: PHP 
$value = $_GET['value'];
$sum = $value + 5;
echo "value parameter is '$value'<p>";
echo "SUM is $sum";

When called with the following query string:

value=123

the program calculates the sum and prints out:

SUM is 128

However, the attacker could supply a query string such as:

value[]=123

The "[]" array syntax causes $value to be treated as an array type, which then generates a fatal error when calculating $sum:

Fatal error: Unsupported operand types in program.php on line 2



Example 3


The following Perl code is intended to look up the privileges for user ID's between 0 and 3, by performing an access of the $UserPrivilegeArray reference. It is expected that only userID 3 is an admin (since this is listed in the third element of the array).

(bad code)
Example Language: Perl 
my $UserPrivilegeArray = ["user", "user", "admin", "user"];

my $userID = get_current_user_ID();

if ($UserPrivilegeArray eq "user") {
print "Regular user!\n";
}
else {
print "Admin!\n";
}

print "\$UserPrivilegeArray = $UserPrivilegeArray\n";

In this case, the programmer intended to use "$UserPrivilegeArray->{$userID}" to access the proper position in the array. But because the subscript was omitted, the "user" string was compared to the scalar representation of the $UserPrivilegeArray reference, which might be of the form "ARRAY(0x229e8)" or similar.

Since the logic also "fails open" (CWE-636), the result of this bug is that all users are assigned administrator privileges.

While this is a forced example, it demonstrates how type confusion can have security consequences, even in memory-safe languages.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Type confusion in PHP app allows authentication bypass when users have passwords whose MD5 hashes can be interpreted as numbers
Type confusion in CSS sequence leads to out-of-bounds read.
Size inconsistency allows code execution, first discovered when it was actively exploited in-the-wild.
Improperly-parsed file containing records of different types leads to code execution when a memory location is interpreted as a different object than intended.
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
Resultant
(where the weakness is typically related to the presence of some other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Effectiveness: High

+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1157 SEI CERT C Coding Standard - Guidelines 03. Expressions (EXP)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1416 Comprehensive Categorization: Resource Lifecycle Management
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Notes

Applicable Platform

This weakness is possible in any type-unsafe programming language.

Research Gap

Type confusion weaknesses have received some attention by applied researchers and major software vendors for C and C++ code. Some publicly-reported vulnerabilities probably have type confusion as a root-cause weakness, but these may be described as "memory corruption" instead.

For other languages, there are very few public reports of type confusion weaknesses. These are probably under-studied. Since many programs rely directly or indirectly on loose typing, a potential "type confusion" behavior might be intentional, possibly requiring more manual analysis.

+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
CERT C Secure Coding EXP39-C Exact Do not access a variable through a pointer of an incompatible type
+ References
[REF-811] Mark Dowd, Ryan Smith and David Dewey. "Attacking Interoperability". "Type Confusion Vulnerabilities," page 59. 2009.
<http://hustlelabs.com/stuff/bh2009_dowd_smith_dewey.pdf>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 7, "Type Confusion", Page 319. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2011-05-15
(CWE 1.13, 2011-06-01)
CWE Content Team MITRE
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Observed_Examples, Weakness_Ordinalities
2023-10-26 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2022-04-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Research_Gaps
2020-06-25 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Taxonomy_Mappings
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References

CWE-824: Access of Uninitialized Pointer

Weakness ID: 824
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
The product accesses or uses a pointer that has not been initialized.
+ Extended Description

If the pointer contains an uninitialized value, then the value might not point to a valid memory location. This could cause the product to read from or write to unexpected memory locations, leading to a denial of service. If the uninitialized pointer is used as a function call, then arbitrary functions could be invoked. If an attacker can influence the portion of uninitialized memory that is contained in the pointer, this weakness could be leveraged to execute code or perform other attacks.

Depending on memory layout, associated memory management behaviors, and product operation, the attacker might be able to influence the contents of the uninitialized pointer, thus gaining more fine-grained control of the memory location to be accessed.

+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Read Memory

Scope: Confidentiality

If the uninitialized pointer is used in a read operation, an attacker might be able to read sensitive portions of memory.

DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart

Scope: Availability

If the uninitialized pointer references a memory location that is not accessible to the product, or points to a location that is "malformed" (such as NULL) or larger than expected by a read or write operation, then a crash may occur.

Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands

Scope: Integrity, Confidentiality, Availability

If the uninitialized pointer is used in a function call, or points to unexpected data in a write operation, then code execution may be possible.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
CanPrecede Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 125 Out-of-bounds Read
CanPrecede Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 787 Out-of-bounds Write
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 465 Pointer Issues
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
+ Relevant to the view "CISQ Quality Measures (2020)" (View-1305)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
+ Relevant to the view "CISQ Data Protection Measures" (View-1340)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Memory-Unsafe (Undetermined Prevalence)

C (Undetermined Prevalence)

C++ (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
LLM product has a free of an uninitialized pointer
Chain: secure communications library does not initialize a local variable for a data structure (CWE-456), leading to access of an uninitialized pointer (CWE-824).
Chain: C union member is not initialized (CWE-456), leading to access of invalid pointer (CWE-824)
chain: unchecked return value (CWE-252) leads to free of invalid, uninitialized pointer (CWE-824).
Pointer in structure is not initialized, leading to NULL pointer dereference (CWE-476) and system crash.
Free of an uninitialized pointer.
Improper handling of invalid signatures leads to free of invalid pointer.
Invalid encoding triggers free of uninitialized pointer.
Crafted PNG image leads to free of uninitialized pointer.
Crafted GIF image leads to free of uninitialized pointer.
Access of uninitialized pointer might lead to code execution.
Step-based manipulation: invocation of debugging function before the primary initialization function leads to access of an uninitialized pointer and code execution.
Unchecked return values can lead to a write to an uninitialized pointer.
zero-length input leads to free of uninitialized pointer.
Crafted font leads to uninitialized function pointer.
Uninitialized function pointer in freed memory is invoked
LDAP server mishandles malformed BER queries, leading to free of uninitialized memory
Firewall can crash with certain ICMP packets that trigger access of an uninitialized pointer.
LDAP server does not initialize members of structs, which leads to free of uninitialized pointer if an LDAP request fails.
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Resultant
(where the weakness is typically related to the presence of some other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Effectiveness: High

Automated Dynamic Analysis

Use tools that are integrated during compilation to insert runtime error-checking mechanisms related to memory safety errors, such as AddressSanitizer (ASan) for C/C++ [REF-1518].

Effectiveness: Moderate

Note:Crafted inputs are necessary to reach the code containing the error, such as generated by fuzzers. Also, these tools may reduce performance, and they only report the error condition - not the original mistake that led to the error.
+ Functional Areas
  • Memory Management
+ Affected Resources
  • Memory
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1399 Comprehensive Categorization: Memory Safety
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Notes

Terminology

Many weaknesses related to pointer dereferences fall under the general term of "memory corruption" or "memory safety." As of September 2010, there is no commonly-used terminology that covers the lower-level variants.

Maintenance

There are close relationships between incorrect pointer dereferences and other weaknesses related to buffer operations. There may not be sufficient community agreement regarding these relationships. Further study is needed to determine when these relationships are chains, composites, perspective/layering, or other types of relationships. As of September 2010, most of the relationships are being captured as chains.
+ References
[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 7, "Variable Initialization", Page 312. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
[REF-1518] "AddressSanitizer".
<https://clang.llvm.org/docs/AddressSanitizer.html>. (URL validated: 2025-12-10)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2010-09-22
(CWE 1.10, 2010-09-27)
CWE Content Team MITRE
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Detection_Factors, References, Time_of_Introduction, Weakness_Ordinalities
2025-09-09
(CWE 4.18, 2025-09-09)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Affected_Resources, Functional_Areas
2025-04-03
(CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Observed_Examples
2024-07-16
(CWE 4.15, 2024-07-16)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Description
2022-04-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Research_Gaps
2020-12-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-08-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2015-12-07 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References

CWE-464: Addition of Data Structure Sentinel

Weakness ID: 464
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
×

Edit Custom Filter


+ Description
The accidental addition of a data-structure sentinel can cause serious programming logic problems.
+ Extended Description
Data-structure sentinels are often used to mark the structure of data. A common example of this is the null character at the end of strings or a special sentinel to mark the end of a linked list. It is dangerous to allow this type of control data to be easily accessible. Therefore, it is important to protect from the addition or modification of sentinels.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Modify Application Data

Scope: Integrity

Generally this error will cause the data structure to not work properly by truncating the data.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Implementation; Architecture and Design

Encapsulate the user from interacting with data sentinels. Validate user input to verify that sentinels are not present.

Implementation

Proper error checking can reduce the risk of inadvertently introducing sentinel values into data. For example, if a parsing function fails or encounters an error, it might return a value that is the same as the sentinel.

Architecture and Design

Use an abstraction library to abstract away risky APIs. This is not a complete solution.

Operation

Use OS-level preventative functionality. This is not a complete solution.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 138 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements
PeerOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 170 Improper Null Termination
PeerOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 463 Deletion of Data Structure Sentinel
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 137 Data Neutralization Issues
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

C (Undetermined Prevalence)

C++ (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
High
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


The following example assigns some character values to a list of characters and prints them each individually, and then as a string. The third character value is intended to be an integer taken from user input and converted to an int. The first print statement will print each character separated by a space.

(bad code)
Example Language:
char *foo;
foo=malloc(sizeof(char)*5);
foo[0]='a';
foo[1]='a';
foo[2]=fgetc(stdin);
foo[3]='c';
foo[4]='\0';
printf("%c %c %c %c %c \n",foo[0],foo[1],foo[2],foo[3],foo[4]);
printf("%s\n",foo);

However, if a NULL byte is read from stdin by fgetc, then it will return 0. When foo is printed as a string, the 0 at character foo[2] will act as a NULL terminator, and the second printf() statement will not print foo[3].



+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
Resultant
(where the weakness is typically related to the presence of some other weaknesses)
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 741 CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 8 - Characters and Strings (STR)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 875 CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 07 - Characters and Strings (STR)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 977 SFP Secondary Cluster: Design
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1407 Comprehensive Categorization: Improper Neutralization
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
CLASP Addition of data-structure sentinel
CERT C Secure Coding STR03-C Do not inadvertently truncate a null-terminated byte string
CERT C Secure Coding STR06-C Do not assume that strtok() leaves the parse string unchanged
+ References
[REF-18] Secure Software, Inc.. "The CLASP Application Security Process". 2005.
<https://cwe.mitre.org/documents/sources/TheCLASPApplicationSecurityProcess.pdf>. (URL validated: 2024-11-17)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
CLASP
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2024-07-20
(CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03)
Jason Xu
Reported compilation error with demonstrative example.
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Weakness_Ordinalities
2025-04-03
(CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Time_of_Introduction
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Taxonomy_Mappings
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2011-09-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2009-07-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
2008-11-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2008-04-11 Addition of Data-structure Sentinel

CWE-481: Assigning instead of Comparing

Weakness ID: 481
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
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+ Description
The code uses an operator for assignment when the intention was to perform a comparison.
+ Extended Description
In many languages the compare statement is very close in appearance to the assignment statement and are often confused. This bug is generally the result of a typo and usually causes obvious problems with program execution. If the comparison is in an if statement, the if statement will usually evaluate the value of the right-hand side of the predicate.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Alter Execution Logic

Scope: Other

+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Testing

Many IDEs and static analysis products will detect this problem.

Implementation

Place constants on the left. If one attempts to assign a constant with a variable, the compiler will produce an error.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 480 Use of Incorrect Operator
CanPrecede Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 697 Incorrect Comparison
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

C (Undetermined Prevalence)

C++ (Undetermined Prevalence)

Java (Undetermined Prevalence)

C# (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
Low
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


The following C/C++ and C# examples attempt to validate an int input parameter against the integer value 100.

(bad code)
Example Language:
int isValid(int value) {
if (value=100) {
printf("Value is valid\n");
return(1);
}
printf("Value is not valid\n");
return(0);
}
(bad code)
Example Language: C# 
bool isValid(int value) {
if (value=100) {
Console.WriteLine("Value is valid.");
return true;
}
Console.WriteLine("Value is not valid.");
return false;
}

However, the expression to be evaluated in the if statement uses the assignment operator "=" rather than the comparison operator "==". The result of using the assignment operator instead of the comparison operator causes the int variable to be reassigned locally and the expression in the if statement will always evaluate to the value on the right hand side of the expression. This will result in the input value not being properly validated, which can cause unexpected results.



Example 2


In this example, we show how assigning instead of comparing can impact code when values are being passed by reference instead of by value. Consider a scenario in which a string is being processed from user input. Assume the string has already been formatted such that different user inputs are concatenated with the colon character. When the processString function is called, the test for the colon character will result in an insertion of the colon character instead, adding new input separators. Since the string was passed by reference, the data sentinels will be inserted in the original string (CWE-464), and further processing of the inputs will be altered, possibly malformed..

(bad code)
Example Language:
void processString (char *str) {
int i;

for(i=0; i<strlen(str); i++) {
if (isalnum(str[i])){
processChar(str[i]);
}
else if (str[i] = ':') {
movingToNewInput();}
}
}
}


Example 3


The following Java example attempts to perform some processing based on the boolean value of the input parameter. However, the expression to be evaluated in the if statement uses the assignment operator "=" rather than the comparison operator "==". As with the previous examples, the variable will be reassigned locally and the expression in the if statement will evaluate to true and unintended processing may occur.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
public void checkValid(boolean isValid) {
if (isValid = true) {
System.out.println("Performing processing");
doSomethingImportant();
}
else {
System.out.println("Not Valid, do not perform processing");
return;
}
}

While most Java compilers will catch the use of an assignment operator when a comparison operator is required, for boolean variables in Java the use of the assignment operator within an expression is allowed. If possible, try to avoid using comparison operators on boolean variables in java. Instead, let the values of the variables stand for themselves, as in the following code.

(good code)
Example Language: Java 
public void checkValid(boolean isValid) {
if (isValid) {
System.out.println("Performing processing");
doSomethingImportant();
}
else {
System.out.println("Not Valid, do not perform processing");
return;
}
}

Alternatively, to test for false, just use the boolean NOT operator.

(good code)
Example Language: Java 
public void checkValid(boolean isValid) {
if (!isValid) {
System.out.println("Not Valid, do not perform processing");
return;
}
System.out.println("Performing processing");
doSomethingImportant();
}


Example 4


The following example demonstrates the weakness.

(bad code)
Example Language:
void called(int foo){
if (foo=1) printf("foo\n");
}
int main() {

called(2);
return 0;
}


+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Effectiveness: High

+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 998 SFP Secondary Cluster: Glitch in Computation
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1157 SEI CERT C Coding Standard - Guidelines 03. Expressions (EXP)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1410 Comprehensive Categorization: Insufficient Control Flow Management
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Variant level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
CLASP Assigning instead of comparing
Software Fault Patterns SFP1 Glitch in computation
CERT C Secure Coding EXP45-C CWE More Abstract Do not perform assignments in selection statements
+ References
[REF-18] Secure Software, Inc.. "The CLASP Application Security Process". 2005.
<https://cwe.mitre.org/documents/sources/TheCLASPApplicationSecurityProcess.pdf>. (URL validated: 2024-11-17)
[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 6, "Typos", Page 289. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
CLASP
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Weakness_Ordinalities
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships
2021-03-15 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Potential_Mitigations
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Taxonomy_Mappings
2017-01-19 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2009-07-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Other_Notes
2009-05-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Description, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction

CWE-587: Assignment of a Fixed Address to a Pointer

Weakness ID: 587
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
The product sets a pointer to a specific address other than NULL or 0.
+ Extended Description
Using a fixed address is not portable, because that address will probably not be valid in all environments or platforms.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands

Scope: Integrity, Confidentiality, Availability

If one executes code at a known location, an attacker might be able to inject code there beforehand.

DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart; Reduce Maintainability; Reduce Reliability

Scope: Availability

If the code is ported to another platform or environment, the pointer is likely to be invalid and cause a crash.

Read Memory; Modify Memory

Scope: Confidentiality, Integrity

The data at a known pointer location can be easily read or influenced by an attacker.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Implementation

Never set a pointer to a fixed address.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 344 Use of Invariant Value in Dynamically Changing Context
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 758 Reliance on Undefined, Unspecified, or Implementation-Defined Behavior
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 465 Pointer Issues
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Memory-Unsafe (Undetermined Prevalence)

C (Undetermined Prevalence)

C++ (Undetermined Prevalence)

C# (Undetermined Prevalence)

Class: Assembly (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


This code assumes a particular function will always be found at a particular address. It assigns a pointer to that address and calls the function.

(bad code)
Example Language:
int (*pt2Function) (float, char, char)=0x08040000;
int result2 = (*pt2Function) (12, 'a', 'b');
// Here we can inject code to execute.

The same function may not always be found at the same memory address. This could lead to a crash, or an attacker may alter the memory at the expected address, leading to arbitrary code execution.



+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Indirect
(where the weakness is a quality issue that might indirectly make it easier to introduce security-relevant weaknesses or make them more difficult to detect)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Automated Dynamic Analysis

Use tools that are integrated during compilation to insert runtime error-checking mechanisms related to memory safety errors, such as AddressSanitizer (ASan) for C/C++ [REF-1518].

Effectiveness: Moderate

Note:Crafted inputs are necessary to reach the code containing the error, such as generated by fuzzers. Also, these tools may reduce performance, and they only report the error condition - not the original mistake that led to the error.
+ Functional Areas
  • Memory Management
+ Affected Resources
  • Memory
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 738 CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 5 - Integers (INT)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 872 CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 04 - Integers (INT)
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 998 SFP Secondary Cluster: Glitch in Computation
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1158 SEI CERT C Coding Standard - Guidelines 04. Integers (INT)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1399 Comprehensive Categorization: Memory Safety
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Variant level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
CERT C Secure Coding INT36-C Imprecise Converting a pointer to integer or integer to pointer
Software Fault Patterns SFP1 Glitch in computation
+ References
[REF-1518] "AddressSanitizer".
<https://clang.llvm.org/docs/AddressSanitizer.html>. (URL validated: 2025-12-10)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-12-15
(CWE Draft 5, 2006-12-15)
CWE Content Team MITRE
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Detection_Factors, References
2025-09-09
(CWE 4.18, 2025-09-09)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Affected_Resources, Functional_Areas
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Time_of_Introduction, Type
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2021-03-15 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Weakness_Ordinalities
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Taxonomy_Mappings, White_Box_Definitions
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships
2011-09-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2009-07-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Other_Notes
2009-03-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2008-11-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Description, Relationships, Other_Notes, Weakness_Ordinalities
2008-08-01 KDM Analytics
added/updated white box definitions
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction

CWE-588: Attempt to Access Child of a Non-structure Pointer

Weakness ID: 588
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
Casting a non-structure type to a structure type and accessing a field can lead to memory access errors or data corruption.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Modify Memory

Scope: Integrity

Adjacent variables in memory may be corrupted by assignments performed on fields after the cast.

DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart

Scope: Availability

Execution may end due to a memory access error.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Requirements

The choice could be made to use a language that is not susceptible to these issues.

Implementation

Review of type casting operations can identify locations where incompatible types are cast.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 704 Incorrect Type Conversion or Cast
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 758 Reliance on Undefined, Unspecified, or Implementation-Defined Behavior
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

C (Undetermined Prevalence)

C++ (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


The following example demonstrates the weakness.

(bad code)
Example Language:
struct foo
{
int i;
}
...
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
*foo = (struct foo *)main;
foo->i = 2;
return foo->i;
}


+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
JSON decoder accesses a C union using an invalid offset to an object
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
Resultant
(where the weakness is typically related to the presence of some other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 971 SFP Secondary Cluster: Faulty Pointer Use
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1416 Comprehensive Categorization: Resource Lifecycle Management
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Variant level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
Software Fault Patterns SFP7 Faulty Pointer Use
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-12-15
(CWE Draft 5, 2006-12-15)
CWE Community
Submitted by members of the CWE community to extend early CWE versions
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Detection_Factors, Weakness_Ordinalities
2023-10-26 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Time_of_Introduction
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2009-07-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Other_Notes
2009-03-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Other_Notes
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction

CWE-806: Buffer Access Using Size of Source Buffer

Weakness ID: 806
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
The product uses the size of a source buffer when reading from or writing to a destination buffer, which may cause it to access memory that is outside of the bounds of the buffer.
+ Extended Description
When the size of the destination is smaller than the size of the source, a buffer overflow could occur.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Modify Memory; DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart; DoS: Resource Consumption (CPU)

Scope: Availability

Buffer overflows generally lead to crashes. Other attacks leading to lack of availability are possible, including putting the program into an infinite loop.

Read Memory; Modify Memory; Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands

Scope: Integrity, Confidentiality, Availability

Buffer overflows often can be used to execute arbitrary code, which is usually outside the scope of a program's implicit security policy.

Bypass Protection Mechanism

Scope: Access Control

When the consequence is arbitrary code execution, this can often be used to subvert any other security service.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design

Use an abstraction library to abstract away risky APIs. Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Viega, and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft. This is not a complete solution, since many buffer overflows are not related to strings.

Operation; Build and Compilation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.

D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.

Effectiveness: Defense in Depth

Note:

This is not necessarily a complete solution, since these mechanisms only detect certain types of overflows. In addition, the result is still a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.

Implementation

Programmers should adhere to the following rules when allocating and managing their applications memory: Double check that your buffer is as large as you specify. When using functions that accept a number of bytes to copy, such as strncpy(), be aware that if the destination buffer size is equal to the source buffer size, it may not NULL-terminate the string. Check buffer boundaries if calling this function in a loop and make sure there is no danger of writing past the allocated space. Truncate all input strings to a reasonable length before passing them to the copy and concatenation functions.

Operation; Build and Compilation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.

Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.

For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].

Effectiveness: Defense in Depth

Note: These techniques do not provide a complete solution. For instance, exploits frequently use a bug that discloses memory addresses in order to maximize reliability of code execution [REF-1337]. It has also been shown that a side-channel attack can bypass ASLR [REF-1333].

Operation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.

For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].

Effectiveness: Defense in Depth

Note: This is not a complete solution, since buffer overflows could be used to overwrite nearby variables to modify the software's state in dangerous ways. In addition, it cannot be used in cases in which self-modifying code is required. Finally, an attack could still cause a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.

Build and Compilation; Operation

Most mitigating technologies at the compiler or OS level to date address only a subset of buffer overflow problems and rarely provide complete protection against even that subset. It is good practice to implement strategies to increase the workload of an attacker, such as leaving the attacker to guess an unknown value that changes every program execution.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 805 Buffer Access with Incorrect Length Value
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Memory-Unsafe (Undetermined Prevalence)

C (Sometimes Prevalent)

C++ (Sometimes Prevalent)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


In the following example, the source character string is copied to the dest character string using the method strncpy.

(bad code)
Example Language:
...
char source[21] = "the character string";
char dest[12];
strncpy(dest, source, sizeof(source)-1);
...

However, in the call to strncpy the source character string is used within the sizeof call to determine the number of characters to copy. This will create a buffer overflow as the size of the source character string is greater than the dest character string. The dest character string should be used within the sizeof call to ensure that the correct number of characters are copied, as shown below.

(good code)
Example Language:
...
char source[21] = "the character string";
char dest[12];
strncpy(dest, source, sizeof(dest)-1);
...


Example 2


In this example, the method outputFilenameToLog outputs a filename to a log file. The method arguments include a pointer to a character string containing the file name and an integer for the number of characters in the string. The filename is copied to a buffer where the buffer size is set to a maximum size for inputs to the log file. The method then calls another method to save the contents of the buffer to the log file.

(bad code)
Example Language:
#define LOG_INPUT_SIZE 40

// saves the file name to a log file
int outputFilenameToLog(char *filename, int length) {
int success;

// buffer with size set to maximum size for input to log file
char buf[LOG_INPUT_SIZE];

// copy filename to buffer
strncpy(buf, filename, length);

// save to log file
success = saveToLogFile(buf);

return success;
}

However, in this case the string copy method, strncpy, mistakenly uses the length method argument to determine the number of characters to copy rather than using the size of the local character string, buf. This can lead to a buffer overflow if the number of characters contained in character string pointed to by filename is larger then the number of characters allowed for the local character string. The string copy method should use the buf character string within a sizeof call to ensure that only characters up to the size of the buf array are copied to avoid a buffer overflow, as shown below.

(good code)
Example Language:
...
// copy filename to buffer
strncpy(buf, filename, sizeof(buf)-1);
...


+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Resultant
(where the weakness is typically related to the presence of some other weaknesses)
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Effectiveness: High

Automated Dynamic Analysis

Use tools that are integrated during compilation to insert runtime error-checking mechanisms related to memory safety errors, such as AddressSanitizer (ASan) for C/C++ [REF-1518].

Effectiveness: Moderate

Note:Crafted inputs are necessary to reach the code containing the error, such as generated by fuzzers. Also, these tools may reduce performance, and they only report the error condition - not the original mistake that led to the error.
+ Functional Areas
  • Memory Management
+ Affected Resources
  • Memory
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1399 Comprehensive Categorization: Memory Safety
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Variant level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ References
[REF-56] Microsoft. "Using the Strsafe.h Functions".
<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/menurc/strsafe-ovw?redirectedfrom=MSDN>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-57] Matt Messier and John Viega. "Safe C String Library v1.0.3".
<http://www.gnu-darwin.org/www001/ports-1.5a-CURRENT/devel/safestr/work/safestr-1.0.3/doc/safestr.html>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-58] Michael Howard. "Address Space Layout Randomization in Windows Vista".
<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/michael_howard/address-space-layout-randomization-in-windows-vista>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-59] Arjan van de Ven. "Limiting buffer overflows with ExecShield".
<https://archive.is/saAFo>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-60] "PaX".
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executable_space_protection#PaX>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-61] Microsoft. "Understanding DEP as a mitigation technology part 1".
<https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2009/06/understanding-dep-as-a-mitigation-technology-part-1/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-64] Grant Murphy. "Position Independent Executables (PIE)". Red Hat. 2012-11-28.
<https://www.redhat.com/en/blog/position-independent-executables-pie>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-1332] John Richard Moser. "Prelink and address space randomization". 2006-07-05.
<https://lwn.net/Articles/190139/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1333] Dmitry Evtyushkin, Dmitry Ponomarev, Nael Abu-Ghazaleh. "Jump Over ASLR: Attacking Branch Predictors to Bypass ASLR". 2016.
<http://www.cs.ucr.edu/~nael/pubs/micro16.pdf>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1334] D3FEND. "Stack Frame Canary Validation (D3-SFCV)". 2023.
<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:StackFrameCanaryValidation/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1335] D3FEND. "Segment Address Offset Randomization (D3-SAOR)". 2023.
<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:SegmentAddressOffsetRandomization/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1336] D3FEND. "Process Segment Execution Prevention (D3-PSEP)". 2023.
<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:ProcessSegmentExecutionPrevention/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1337] Alexander Sotirov and Mark Dowd. "Bypassing Browser Memory Protections: Setting back browser security by 10 years". Memory information leaks. 2008.
<https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-08/Sotirov_Dowd/bh08-sotirov-dowd.pdf>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1518] "AddressSanitizer".
<https://clang.llvm.org/docs/AddressSanitizer.html>. (URL validated: 2025-12-10)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2010-01-15
(CWE 1.8, 2010-02-16)
CWE Content Team MITRE
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Detection_Factors, References
2025-09-09
(CWE 4.18, 2025-09-09)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Functional_Areas
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2021-07-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2020-06-25 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Causal_Nature, Demonstrative_Examples, Likelihood_of_Exploit, References
2014-02-18 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, References
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, References
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2011-03-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples

CWE-805: Buffer Access with Incorrect Length Value

Weakness ID: 805
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
The product uses a sequential operation to read or write a buffer, but it uses an incorrect length value that causes it to access memory that is outside of the bounds of the buffer.
+ Extended Description
When the length value exceeds the size of the destination, a buffer overflow could occur.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Read Memory; Modify Memory; Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands

Scope: Integrity, Confidentiality, Availability

Buffer overflows often can be used to execute arbitrary code, which is usually outside the scope of a program's implicit security policy. This can often be used to subvert any other security service.

Modify Memory; DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart; DoS: Resource Consumption (CPU)

Scope: Availability

Buffer overflows generally lead to crashes. Other attacks leading to lack of availability are possible, including putting the program into an infinite loop.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Requirements

Strategy: Language Selection

Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.

Be wary that a language's interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.

Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.

Note: This is not a complete solution, since many buffer overflows are not related to strings.

Operation; Build and Compilation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.

D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.

Effectiveness: Defense in Depth

Note:

This is not necessarily a complete solution, since these mechanisms only detect certain types of overflows. In addition, the result is still a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.

Implementation

Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application's memory:

  • Double check that the buffer is as large as specified.
  • When using functions that accept a number of bytes to copy, such as strncpy(), be aware that if the destination buffer size is equal to the source buffer size, it may not NULL-terminate the string.
  • Check buffer boundaries if accessing the buffer in a loop and make sure there is no danger of writing past the allocated space.
  • If necessary, truncate all input strings to a reasonable length before passing them to the copy and concatenation functions.

Architecture and Design

For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

Operation; Build and Compilation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.

Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.

For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].

Effectiveness: Defense in Depth

Note: These techniques do not provide a complete solution. For instance, exploits frequently use a bug that discloses memory addresses in order to maximize reliability of code execution [REF-1337]. It has also been shown that a side-channel attack can bypass ASLR [REF-1333].

Operation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.

For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].

Effectiveness: Defense in Depth

Note: This is not a complete solution, since buffer overflows could be used to overwrite nearby variables to modify the software's state in dangerous ways. In addition, it cannot be used in cases in which self-modifying code is required. Finally, an attack could still cause a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.

Architecture and Design; Operation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the product or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.

Architecture and Design; Operation

Strategy: Sandbox or Jail

Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.

OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.

This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.

Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.

Effectiveness: Limited

Note: The effectiveness of this mitigation depends on the prevention capabilities of the specific sandbox or jail being used and might only help to reduce the scope of an attack, such as restricting the attacker to certain system calls or limiting the portion of the file system that can be accessed.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 806 Buffer Access Using Size of Source Buffer
CanFollow Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 130 Improper Handling of Length Parameter Inconsistency
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1218 Memory Buffer Errors
+ Relevant to the view "CISQ Quality Measures (2020)" (View-1305)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
+ Relevant to the view "CISQ Data Protection Measures" (View-1340)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Memory-Unsafe (Undetermined Prevalence)

C (Often Prevalent)

C++ (Often Prevalent)

Class: Assembly (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
High
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


This example takes an IP address from a user, verifies that it is well formed and then looks up the hostname and copies it into a buffer.

(bad code)
Example Language:
void host_lookup(char *user_supplied_addr){
struct hostent *hp;
in_addr_t *addr;
char hostname[64];
in_addr_t inet_addr(const char *cp);

/*routine that ensures user_supplied_addr is in the right format for conversion */

validate_addr_form(user_supplied_addr);
addr = inet_addr(user_supplied_addr);
hp = gethostbyaddr( addr, sizeof(struct in_addr), AF_INET);
strcpy(hostname, hp->h_name);
}

This function allocates a buffer of 64 bytes to store the hostname under the assumption that the maximum length value of hostname is 64 bytes, however there is no guarantee that the hostname will not be larger than 64 bytes. If an attacker specifies an address which resolves to a very large hostname, then the function may overwrite sensitive data or even relinquish control flow to the attacker.

Note that this example also contains an unchecked return value (CWE-252) that can lead to a NULL pointer dereference (CWE-476).



Example 2


In the following example, it is possible to request that memcpy move a much larger segment of memory than assumed:

(bad code)
Example Language:
int returnChunkSize(void *) {

/* if chunk info is valid, return the size of usable memory,

* else, return -1 to indicate an error

*/
...
}
int main() {
...
memcpy(destBuf, srcBuf, (returnChunkSize(destBuf)-1));
...
}

If returnChunkSize() happens to encounter an error it will return -1. Notice that the return value is not checked before the memcpy operation (CWE-252), so -1 can be passed as the size argument to memcpy() (CWE-805). Because memcpy() assumes that the value is unsigned, it will be interpreted as MAXINT-1 (CWE-195), and therefore will copy far more memory than is likely available to the destination buffer (CWE-787, CWE-788).



Example 3


In the following example, the source character string is copied to the dest character string using the method strncpy.

(bad code)
Example Language:
...
char source[21] = "the character string";
char dest[12];
strncpy(dest, source, sizeof(source)-1);
...

However, in the call to strncpy the source character string is used within the sizeof call to determine the number of characters to copy. This will create a buffer overflow as the size of the source character string is greater than the dest character string. The dest character string should be used within the sizeof call to ensure that the correct number of characters are copied, as shown below.

(good code)
Example Language:
...
char source[21] = "the character string";
char dest[12];
strncpy(dest, source, sizeof(dest)-1);
...


Example 4


In this example, the method outputFilenameToLog outputs a filename to a log file. The method arguments include a pointer to a character string containing the file name and an integer for the number of characters in the string. The filename is copied to a buffer where the buffer size is set to a maximum size for inputs to the log file. The method then calls another method to save the contents of the buffer to the log file.

(bad code)
Example Language:
#define LOG_INPUT_SIZE 40

// saves the file name to a log file
int outputFilenameToLog(char *filename, int length) {
int success;

// buffer with size set to maximum size for input to log file
char buf[LOG_INPUT_SIZE];

// copy filename to buffer
strncpy(buf, filename, length);

// save to log file
success = saveToLogFile(buf);

return success;
}

However, in this case the string copy method, strncpy, mistakenly uses the length method argument to determine the number of characters to copy rather than using the size of the local character string, buf. This can lead to a buffer overflow if the number of characters contained in character string pointed to by filename is larger then the number of characters allowed for the local character string. The string copy method should use the buf character string within a sizeof call to ensure that only characters up to the size of the buf array are copied to avoid a buffer overflow, as shown below.

(good code)
Example Language:
...
// copy filename to buffer
strncpy(buf, filename, sizeof(buf)-1);
...


Example 5


Windows provides the MultiByteToWideChar(), WideCharToMultiByte(), UnicodeToBytes(), and BytesToUnicode() functions to convert between arbitrary multibyte (usually ANSI) character strings and Unicode (wide character) strings. The size arguments to these functions are specified in different units, (one in bytes, the other in characters) making their use prone to error.

In a multibyte character string, each character occupies a varying number of bytes, and therefore the size of such strings is most easily specified as a total number of bytes. In Unicode, however, characters are always a fixed size, and string lengths are typically given by the number of characters they contain. Mistakenly specifying the wrong units in a size argument can lead to a buffer overflow.

The following function takes a username specified as a multibyte string and a pointer to a structure for user information and populates the structure with information about the specified user. Since Windows authentication uses Unicode for usernames, the username argument is first converted from a multibyte string to a Unicode string.

(bad code)
Example Language:
void getUserInfo(char *username, struct _USER_INFO_2 info){
WCHAR unicodeUser[UNLEN+1];
MultiByteToWideChar(CP_ACP, 0, username, -1, unicodeUser, sizeof(unicodeUser));
NetUserGetInfo(NULL, unicodeUser, 2, (LPBYTE *)&info);
}

This function incorrectly passes the size of unicodeUser in bytes instead of characters. The call to MultiByteToWideChar() can therefore write up to (UNLEN+1)*sizeof(WCHAR) wide characters, or (UNLEN+1)*sizeof(WCHAR)*sizeof(WCHAR) bytes, to the unicodeUser array, which has only (UNLEN+1)*sizeof(WCHAR) bytes allocated.

If the username string contains more than UNLEN characters, the call to MultiByteToWideChar() will overflow the buffer unicodeUser.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Chain: large length value causes buffer over-read (CWE-126)
Use of packet length field to make a calculation, then copy into a fixed-size buffer
Chain: retrieval of length value from an uninitialized memory location
Crafted length value in document reader leads to buffer overflow
SSL server overflow when the sum of multiple length fields exceeds a given value
Language interpreter API function doesn't validate length argument, leading to information exposure
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Resultant
(where the weakness is typically related to the presence of some other weaknesses)
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis

This weakness can often be detected using automated static analysis tools. Many modern tools use data flow analysis or constraint-based techniques to minimize the number of false positives.

Automated static analysis generally does not account for environmental considerations when reporting out-of-bounds memory operations. This can make it difficult for users to determine which warnings should be investigated first. For example, an analysis tool might report buffer overflows that originate from command line arguments in a program that is not expected to run with setuid or other special privileges.

Effectiveness: High

Note:Detection techniques for buffer-related errors are more mature than for most other weakness types.

Automated Dynamic Analysis

This weakness can be detected using dynamic tools and techniques that interact with the product using large test suites with many diverse inputs, such as fuzz testing (fuzzing), robustness testing, and fault injection. The product's operation may slow down, but it should not become unstable, crash, or generate incorrect results.

Effectiveness: Moderate

Note:Without visibility into the code, black box methods may not be able to sufficiently distinguish this weakness from others, requiring manual methods to diagnose the underlying problem.

Manual Analysis

Manual analysis can be useful for finding this weakness, but it might not achieve desired code coverage within limited time constraints. This becomes difficult for weaknesses that must be considered for all inputs, since the attack surface can be too large.

Automated Dynamic Analysis

Use tools that are integrated during compilation to insert runtime error-checking mechanisms related to memory safety errors, such as AddressSanitizer (ASan) for C/C++ [REF-1518].

Effectiveness: Moderate

Note:Crafted inputs are necessary to reach the code containing the error, such as generated by fuzzers. Also, these tools may reduce performance, and they only report the error condition - not the original mistake that led to the error.
+ Functional Areas
  • Memory Management
+ Affected Resources
  • Memory
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 740 CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 7 - Arrays (ARR)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 802 2010 Top 25 - Risky Resource Management
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 867 2011 Top 25 - Weaknesses On the Cusp
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 874 CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 06 - Arrays and the STL (ARR)
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1160 SEI CERT C Coding Standard - Guidelines 06. Arrays (ARR)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1399 Comprehensive Categorization: Memory Safety
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
CERT C Secure Coding ARR38-C Imprecise Guarantee that library functions do not form invalid pointers
+ References
[REF-7] Michael Howard and David LeBlanc. "Writing Secure Code". Chapter 6, "Why ACLs Are Important" Page 171. 2nd Edition. Microsoft Press. 2002-12-04.
<https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/store/writing-secure-code-9780735617223>.
[REF-58] Michael Howard. "Address Space Layout Randomization in Windows Vista".
<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/michael_howard/address-space-layout-randomization-in-windows-vista>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-59] Arjan van de Ven. "Limiting buffer overflows with ExecShield".
<https://archive.is/saAFo>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-60] "PaX".
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executable_space_protection#PaX>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-741] Jason Lam. "Top 25 Series - Rank 12 - Buffer Access with Incorrect Length Value". SANS Software Security Institute. 2010-03-11.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20100316043717/http://blogs.sans.org:80/appsecstreetfighter/2010/03/11/top-25-series-rank-12-buffer-access-with-incorrect-length-value/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-57] Matt Messier and John Viega. "Safe C String Library v1.0.3".
<http://www.gnu-darwin.org/www001/ports-1.5a-CURRENT/devel/safestr/work/safestr-1.0.3/doc/safestr.html>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-56] Microsoft. "Using the Strsafe.h Functions".
<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/menurc/strsafe-ovw?redirectedfrom=MSDN>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-61] Microsoft. "Understanding DEP as a mitigation technology part 1".
<https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2009/06/understanding-dep-as-a-mitigation-technology-part-1/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-76] Sean Barnum and Michael Gegick. "Least Privilege". 2005-09-14.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20211209014121/https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/bsi/articles/knowledge/principles/least-privilege>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-64] Grant Murphy. "Position Independent Executables (PIE)". Red Hat. 2012-11-28.
<https://www.redhat.com/en/blog/position-independent-executables-pie>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-1332] John Richard Moser. "Prelink and address space randomization". 2006-07-05.
<https://lwn.net/Articles/190139/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1333] Dmitry Evtyushkin, Dmitry Ponomarev, Nael Abu-Ghazaleh. "Jump Over ASLR: Attacking Branch Predictors to Bypass ASLR". 2016.
<http://www.cs.ucr.edu/~nael/pubs/micro16.pdf>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1334] D3FEND. "Stack Frame Canary Validation (D3-SFCV)". 2023.
<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:StackFrameCanaryValidation/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1335] D3FEND. "Segment Address Offset Randomization (D3-SAOR)". 2023.
<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:SegmentAddressOffsetRandomization/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1336] D3FEND. "Process Segment Execution Prevention (D3-PSEP)". 2023.
<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:ProcessSegmentExecutionPrevention/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1337] Alexander Sotirov and Mark Dowd. "Bypassing Browser Memory Protections: Setting back browser security by 10 years". Memory information leaks. 2008.
<https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-08/Sotirov_Dowd/bh08-sotirov-dowd.pdf>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1518] "AddressSanitizer".
<https://clang.llvm.org/docs/AddressSanitizer.html>. (URL validated: 2025-12-10)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2010-01-15
(CWE 1.8, 2010-02-16)
CWE Content Team MITRE
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Detection_Factors, References
2025-09-09
(CWE 4.18, 2025-09-09)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Functional_Areas
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2021-07-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Potential_Mitigations
2020-12-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-08-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-06-25 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2018-03-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Causal_Nature, Demonstrative_Examples, Likelihood_of_Exploit, References, Taxonomy_Mappings
2014-06-23 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2014-02-18 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, References
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
2011-09-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2010-12-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2010-09-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2010-06-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Potential_Mitigations, References
2010-04-05 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns

CWE-120: Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input ('Classic Buffer Overflow')

Weakness ID: 120
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities in limited situations requiring careful review (with careful review of mapping notes)
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
The product copies an input buffer to an output buffer without verifying that the size of the input buffer is less than the size of the output buffer. Diagram for CWE-120
+ Alternate Terms
Classic Buffer Overflow
This term was frequently used by vulnerability researchers during approximately 1995 to 2005 to differentiate buffer copies without length checks (which had been known about for decades) from other emerging weaknesses that still involved invalid accesses of buffers, as vulnerability researchers began to develop advanced exploitation techniques.
Unbounded Transfer
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Modify Memory; Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands

Scope: Integrity, Confidentiality, Availability

Buffer overflows often can be used to execute arbitrary code, which is usually outside the scope of the product's implicit security policy. This can often be used to subvert any other security service.

Modify Memory; DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart; DoS: Resource Consumption (CPU)

Scope: Availability

Buffer overflows generally lead to crashes. Other attacks leading to lack of availability are possible, including putting the product into an infinite loop.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Requirements

Strategy: Language Selection

Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.

Be wary that a language's interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.

Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.

Note: This is not a complete solution, since many buffer overflows are not related to strings.

Operation; Build and Compilation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.

D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.

Effectiveness: Defense in Depth

Note:

This is not necessarily a complete solution, since these mechanisms only detect certain types of overflows. In addition, the result is still a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.

Implementation

Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application's memory:

  • Double check that your buffer is as large as you specify.
  • When using functions that accept a number of bytes to copy, such as strncpy(), be aware that if the destination buffer size is equal to the source buffer size, it may not NULL-terminate the string.
  • Check buffer boundaries if accessing the buffer in a loop and make sure there is no danger of writing past the allocated space.
  • If necessary, truncate all input strings to a reasonable length before passing them to the copy and concatenation functions.

Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.

When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."

Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.

Architecture and Design

For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

Operation; Build and Compilation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.

Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.

For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].

Effectiveness: Defense in Depth

Note: These techniques do not provide a complete solution. For instance, exploits frequently use a bug that discloses memory addresses in order to maximize reliability of code execution [REF-1337]. It has also been shown that a side-channel attack can bypass ASLR [REF-1333].

Operation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.

For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].

Effectiveness: Defense in Depth

Note: This is not a complete solution, since buffer overflows could be used to overwrite nearby variables to modify the software's state in dangerous ways. In addition, it cannot be used in cases in which self-modifying code is required. Finally, an attack could still cause a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.

Build and Compilation; Operation

Most mitigating technologies at the compiler or OS level to date address only a subset of buffer overflow problems and rarely provide complete protection against even that subset. It is good practice to implement strategies to increase the workload of an attacker, such as leaving the attacker to guess an unknown value that changes every program execution.

Implementation

Replace unbounded copy functions with analogous functions that support length arguments, such as strcpy with strncpy. Create these if they are not available.

Effectiveness: Moderate

Note: This approach is still susceptible to calculation errors, including issues such as off-by-one errors (CWE-193) and incorrectly calculating buffer lengths (CWE-131).

Architecture and Design

Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion

When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.

Architecture and Design; Operation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.

Architecture and Design; Operation

Strategy: Sandbox or Jail

Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.

OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.

This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.

Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.

Effectiveness: Limited

Note: The effectiveness of this mitigation depends on the prevention capabilities of the specific sandbox or jail being used and might only help to reduce the scope of an attack, such as restricting the attacker to certain system calls or limiting the portion of the file system that can be accessed.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 787 Out-of-bounds Write
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 785 Use of Path Manipulation Function without Maximum-sized Buffer
CanFollow Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 170 Improper Null Termination
CanFollow Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 231 Improper Handling of Extra Values
CanFollow Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 416 Use After Free
CanFollow Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 456 Missing Initialization of a Variable
CanPrecede Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 123 Write-what-where Condition
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1218 Memory Buffer Errors
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
+ Relevant to the view "CISQ Quality Measures (2020)" (View-1305)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 787 Out-of-bounds Write
+ Relevant to the view "CISQ Data Protection Measures" (View-1340)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 787 Out-of-bounds Write
+ Relevant to the view "Seven Pernicious Kingdoms" (View-700)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 20 Improper Input Validation
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Memory-Unsafe (Undetermined Prevalence)

C (Often Prevalent)

C++ (Often Prevalent)

Class: Assembly (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
High
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


The following code asks the user to enter their last name and then attempts to store the value entered in the last_name array.

(bad code)
Example Language:
char last_name[20];
printf ("Enter your last name: ");
scanf ("%s", last_name);

The problem with the code above is that it does not restrict or limit the size of the name entered by the user. If the user enters "Very_very_long_last_name" which is 24 characters long, then a buffer overflow will occur since the array can only hold 20 characters total.



Example 2


The following code attempts to create a local copy of a buffer to perform some manipulations to the data.

(bad code)
Example Language:
void manipulate_string(char * string){
char buf[24];
strcpy(buf, string);
...
}

However, the programmer does not ensure that the size of the data pointed to by string will fit in the local buffer and copies the data with the potentially dangerous strcpy() function. This may result in a buffer overflow condition if an attacker can influence the contents of the string parameter.



Example 3


The code below calls the gets() function to read in data from the command line.

(bad code)
Example Language:
char buf[24];
printf("Please enter your name and press <Enter>\n");
gets(buf);
...
}

However, gets() is inherently unsafe, because it copies all input from STDIN to the buffer without checking size. This allows the user to provide a string that is larger than the buffer size, resulting in an overflow condition.



Example 4


In the following example, a server accepts connections from a client and processes the client request. After accepting a client connection, the program will obtain client information using the gethostbyaddr method, copy the hostname of the client that connected to a local variable and output the hostname of the client to a log file.

(bad code)
Example Language:
...
struct hostent *clienthp;
char hostname[MAX_LEN];

// create server socket, bind to server address and listen on socket
...

// accept client connections and process requests
int count = 0;
for (count = 0; count < MAX_CONNECTIONS; count++) {

int clientlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
int clientsocket = accept(serversocket, (struct sockaddr *)&clientaddr, &clientlen);

if (clientsocket >= 0) {
clienthp = gethostbyaddr((char*) &clientaddr.sin_addr.s_addr, sizeof(clientaddr.sin_addr.s_addr), AF_INET);
strcpy(hostname, clienthp->h_name);
logOutput("Accepted client connection from host ", hostname);

// process client request
...
close(clientsocket);
}
}
close(serversocket);

...

However, the hostname of the client that connected may be longer than the allocated size for the local hostname variable. This will result in a buffer overflow when copying the client hostname to the local variable using the strcpy method.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
buffer overflow using command with long argument
buffer overflow in local program using long environment variable
buffer overflow in comment characters, when product increments a counter for a ">" but does not decrement for "<"
By replacing a valid cookie value with an extremely long string of characters, an attacker may overflow the application's buffers.
By replacing a valid cookie value with an extremely long string of characters, an attacker may overflow the application's buffers.
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Resultant
(where the weakness is typically related to the presence of some other weaknesses)
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis

This weakness can often be detected using automated static analysis tools. Many modern tools use data flow analysis or constraint-based techniques to minimize the number of false positives.

Automated static analysis generally does not account for environmental considerations when reporting out-of-bounds memory operations. This can make it difficult for users to determine which warnings should be investigated first. For example, an analysis tool might report buffer overflows that originate from command line arguments in a program that is not expected to run with setuid or other special privileges.

Effectiveness: High

Note:Detection techniques for buffer-related errors are more mature than for most other weakness types.

Automated Dynamic Analysis

This weakness can be detected using dynamic tools and techniques that interact with the software using large test suites with many diverse inputs, such as fuzz testing (fuzzing), robustness testing, and fault injection. The software's operation may slow down, but it should not become unstable, crash, or generate incorrect results.

Manual Analysis

Manual analysis can be useful for finding this weakness, but it might not achieve desired code coverage within limited time constraints. This becomes difficult for weaknesses that must be considered for all inputs, since the attack surface can be too large.

Automated Dynamic Analysis

Use tools that are integrated during compilation to insert runtime error-checking mechanisms related to memory safety errors, such as AddressSanitizer (ASan) for C/C++ [REF-1518].

Effectiveness: Moderate

Note:Crafted inputs are necessary to reach the code containing the error, such as generated by fuzzers. Also, these tools may reduce performance, and they only report the error condition - not the original mistake that led to the error.

Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
  • Binary Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis

Effectiveness: High

Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Web Application Scanner
  • Web Services Scanner
  • Database Scanners

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Fuzz Tester
  • Framework-based Fuzzer

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Manual Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source
  • Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Automated Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Source code Weakness Analyzer
  • Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer

Effectiveness: High

Architecture or Design Review

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)

Effectiveness: High

+ Functional Areas
  • Memory Management
+ Affected Resources
  • Memory
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 722 OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A1 - Unvalidated Input
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 726 OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A5 - Buffer Overflows
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 741 CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 8 - Characters and Strings (STR)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 802 2010 Top 25 - Risky Resource Management
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 865 2011 Top 25 - Risky Resource Management
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 875 CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 07 - Characters and Strings (STR)
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 970 SFP Secondary Cluster: Faulty Buffer Access
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1129 CISQ Quality Measures (2016) - Reliability
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1131 CISQ Quality Measures (2016) - Security
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1161 SEI CERT C Coding Standard - Guidelines 07. Characters and Strings (STR)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1399 Comprehensive Categorization: Memory Safety
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED-WITH-REVIEW
(this CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities in limited situations requiring careful review)
Reason Frequent Misuse

Rationale

There are some indications that this CWE ID might be misused and selected simply because it mentions "buffer overflow" - an increasingly vague term. This CWE entry is only appropriate for "Buffer Copy" operations (not buffer reads), in which where there is no "Checking [the] Size of Input", and (by implication of the copy) writing past the end of the buffer.

Comments

If the vulnerability being analyzed involves out-of-bounds reads, then consider CWE-125 or descendants. For root cause analysis: if there is any input validation, consider children of CWE-20 such as CWE-1284. If there is a calculation error for buffer sizes, consider CWE-131 or similar.
+ Notes

Relationship

At the code level, stack-based and heap-based overflows do not differ significantly, so there usually is not a need to distinguish them. From the attacker perspective, they can be quite different, since different techniques are required to exploit them.

Terminology

There is significant inconsistency regarding the "buffer overflow" term, which can have multiple interpretations and uses. Many people mean "writing past the end of a buffer." Others mean "writing past the end of a buffer, or before the beginning of a buffer." Still others might include "read" in the term.

Other

A buffer overflow condition exists when a product attempts to put more data in a buffer than it can hold, or when it attempts to put data in a memory area outside of the boundaries of a buffer. The simplest type of error, and the most common cause of buffer overflows, is the "classic" case in which the product copies the buffer without restricting how much data is copied. Other variants exist, but the existence of a classic overflow strongly suggests that the programmer is not considering even the most basic of security protections.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
PLOVER Unbounded Transfer ('classic overflow')
7 Pernicious Kingdoms Buffer Overflow
CLASP Buffer overflow
OWASP Top Ten 2004 A1 CWE More Specific Unvalidated Input
OWASP Top Ten 2004 A5 CWE More Specific Buffer Overflows
CERT C Secure Coding STR31-C Exact Guarantee that storage for strings has sufficient space for character data and the null terminator
WASC 7 Buffer Overflow
Software Fault Patterns SFP8 Faulty Buffer Access
OMG ASCSM ASCSM-CWE-120
OMG ASCRM ASCRM-CWE-120
+ References
[REF-7] Michael Howard and David LeBlanc. "Writing Secure Code". Chapter 5, "Public Enemy #1: The Buffer Overrun" Page 127. 2nd Edition. Microsoft Press. 2002-12-04.
<https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/store/writing-secure-code-9780735617223>.
[REF-44] Michael Howard, David LeBlanc and John Viega. "24 Deadly Sins of Software Security". "Sin 5: Buffer Overruns." Page 89. McGraw-Hill. 2010.
[REF-56] Microsoft. "Using the Strsafe.h Functions".
<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/menurc/strsafe-ovw?redirectedfrom=MSDN>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-57] Matt Messier and John Viega. "Safe C String Library v1.0.3".
<http://www.gnu-darwin.org/www001/ports-1.5a-CURRENT/devel/safestr/work/safestr-1.0.3/doc/safestr.html>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-58] Michael Howard. "Address Space Layout Randomization in Windows Vista".
<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/michael_howard/address-space-layout-randomization-in-windows-vista>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-59] Arjan van de Ven. "Limiting buffer overflows with ExecShield".
<https://archive.is/saAFo>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-60] "PaX".
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executable_space_protection#PaX>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-74] Jason Lam. "Top 25 Series - Rank 3 - Classic Buffer Overflow". SANS Software Security Institute. 2010-03-02.
<https://www.sans.org/blog/top-25-series-rank-3-classic-buffer-overflow>. (URL validated: 2025-07-29)
[REF-61] Microsoft. "Understanding DEP as a mitigation technology part 1".
<https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2009/06/understanding-dep-as-a-mitigation-technology-part-1/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-76] Sean Barnum and Michael Gegick. "Least Privilege". 2005-09-14.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20211209014121/https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/bsi/articles/knowledge/principles/least-privilege>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 3, "Nonexecutable Stack", Page 76. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 5, "Protection Mechanisms", Page 189. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 8, "C String Handling", Page 388. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
[REF-64] Grant Murphy. "Position Independent Executables (PIE)". Red Hat. 2012-11-28.
<https://www.redhat.com/en/blog/position-independent-executables-pie>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-961] Object Management Group (OMG). "Automated Source Code Reliability Measure (ASCRM)". ASCRM-CWE-120. 2016-01.
<http://www.omg.org/spec/ASCRM/1.0/>.
[REF-962] Object Management Group (OMG). "Automated Source Code Security Measure (ASCSM)". ASCSM-CWE-120. 2016-01.
<http://www.omg.org/spec/ASCSM/1.0/>.
[REF-1332] John Richard Moser. "Prelink and address space randomization". 2006-07-05.
<https://lwn.net/Articles/190139/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1333] Dmitry Evtyushkin, Dmitry Ponomarev, Nael Abu-Ghazaleh. "Jump Over ASLR: Attacking Branch Predictors to Bypass ASLR". 2016.
<http://www.cs.ucr.edu/~nael/pubs/micro16.pdf>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1334] D3FEND. "Stack Frame Canary Validation (D3-SFCV)". 2023.
<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:StackFrameCanaryValidation/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1335] D3FEND. "Segment Address Offset Randomization (D3-SAOR)". 2023.
<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:SegmentAddressOffsetRandomization/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1336] D3FEND. "Process Segment Execution Prevention (D3-PSEP)". 2023.
<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:ProcessSegmentExecutionPrevention/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1337] Alexander Sotirov and Mark Dowd. "Bypassing Browser Memory Protections: Setting back browser security by 10 years". Memory information leaks. 2008.
<https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-08/Sotirov_Dowd/bh08-sotirov-dowd.pdf>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1479] Gregory Larsen, E. Kenneth Hong Fong, David A. Wheeler and Rama S. Moorthy. "State-of-the-Art Resources (SOAR) for Software Vulnerability Detection, Test, and Evaluation". 2014-07.
<https://www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/s/st/stateoftheart-resources-soar-for-software-vulnerability-detection-test-and-evaluation/p-5061.ashx>. (URL validated: 2025-09-05)
[REF-1518] "AddressSanitizer".
<https://clang.llvm.org/docs/AddressSanitizer.html>. (URL validated: 2025-12-10)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
PLOVER
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Detection_Factors, References, Terminology_Notes
2025-09-09
(CWE 4.18, 2025-09-09)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Detection_Factors, Diagram, Other_Notes, References
2025-04-03
(CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Description
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2021-07-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2021-03-15 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2020-12-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships
2020-08-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Alternate_Terms, Relationships
2020-06-25 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Potential_Mitigations
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2018-03-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Causal_Nature, Demonstrative_Examples, Likelihood_of_Exploit, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings, White_Box_Definitions
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2014-02-18 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, References
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2011-09-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2011-03-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description
2010-12-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2010-09-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2010-06-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Potential_Mitigations, References
2010-04-05 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns
2010-02-16 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings, Time_of_Introduction, Type
2009-10-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships
2009-07-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
2009-01-12 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationship_Notes, Relationships
2008-11-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Other_Notes, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-10-14 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Alternate_Terms, Description, Name, Other_Notes, Terminology_Notes
2008-10-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
Changed name and description to more clearly emphasize the "classic" nature of the overflow.
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Alternate_Terms, Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Relationships, Observed_Example, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings, Weakness_Ordinalities
2008-08-15 Veracode
Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping
2008-08-01 KDM Analytics
added/updated white box definitions
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2008-10-14 Unbounded Transfer ('Classic Buffer Overflow')

CWE-126: Buffer Over-read

Weakness ID: 126
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
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+ Description
The product reads from a buffer using buffer access mechanisms such as indexes or pointers that reference memory locations after the targeted buffer. Diagram for CWE-126
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Read Memory

Scope: Confidentiality

Bypass Protection Mechanism

Scope: Confidentiality

By reading out-of-bounds memory, an attacker might be able to get secret values, such as memory addresses, which can bypass protection mechanisms such as ASLR in order to improve the reliability and likelihood of exploiting a separate weakness to achieve code execution instead of just denial of service.

DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart

Scope: Availability, Integrity

An attacker might be able to cause a crash or other denial of service by causing the product to read a memory location that is not allowed (such as a segmentation fault), or to cause other conditions in which the read operation returns more data than is expected.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 125 Out-of-bounds Read
ChildOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 788 Access of Memory Location After End of Buffer
CanFollow Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 170 Improper Null Termination
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Memory-Unsafe (Undetermined Prevalence)

C (Undetermined Prevalence)

C++ (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


In the following C/C++ example the method processMessageFromSocket() will get a message from a socket, placed into a buffer, and will parse the contents of the buffer into a structure that contains the message length and the message body. A for loop is used to copy the message body into a local character string which will be passed to another method for processing.

(bad code)
Example Language:
int processMessageFromSocket(int socket) {
int success;

char buffer[BUFFER_SIZE];
char message[MESSAGE_SIZE];

// get message from socket and store into buffer

//Ignoring possibliity that buffer > BUFFER_SIZE
if (getMessage(socket, buffer, BUFFER_SIZE) > 0) {

// place contents of the buffer into message structure
ExMessage *msg = recastBuffer(buffer);

// copy message body into string for processing
int index;
for (index = 0; index < msg->msgLength; index++) {
message[index] = msg->msgBody[index];
}
message[index] = '\0';

// process message
success = processMessage(message);
}
return success;
}

However, the message length variable (msgLength) from the structure is used as the condition for ending the for loop without validating that msgLength accurately reflects the actual length of the message body (CWE-606). If msgLength indicates a length that is longer than the size of a message body (CWE-130), then this can result in a buffer over-read by reading past the end of the buffer (CWE-126).



Example 2


The following C/C++ example demonstrates a buffer over-read due to a missing NULL terminator. The main method of a pattern matching utility that looks for a specific pattern within a specific file uses the string strncopy() method to copy the command line user input file name and pattern to the Filename and Pattern character arrays respectively.

(bad code)
Example Language:
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
char Filename[256];
char Pattern[32];

/* Validate number of parameters and ensure valid content */
...

/* copy filename parameter to variable, may cause off-by-one overflow */
strncpy(Filename, argv[1], sizeof(Filename));

/* copy pattern parameter to variable, may cause off-by-one overflow */
strncpy(Pattern, argv[2], sizeof(Pattern));

printf("Searching file: %s for the pattern: %s\n", Filename, Pattern);
Scan_File(Filename, Pattern);
}

However, the code do not take into account that strncpy() will not add a NULL terminator when the source buffer is equal in length of longer than that provide size attribute. Therefore if a user enters a filename or pattern that are the same size as (or larger than) their respective character arrays, a NULL terminator will not be added (CWE-170) which leads to the printf() read beyond the expected end of the Filename and Pattern buffers.

To fix this problem, be sure to subtract 1 from the sizeof() call to allow room for the null byte to be added.

(good code)
Example Language:
/* copy filename parameter to variable, no off-by-one overflow */
strncpy(Filename, argv[2], sizeof(Filename)-1);
Filename[255]='\0';

/* copy pattern parameter to variable, no off-by-one overflow */
strncpy(Pattern, argv[3], sizeof(Pattern)-1);
Pattern[31]='\0';


+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Text editor has out-of-bounds read past end of line while indenting C code
Chain: "Heartbleed" bug receives an inconsistent length parameter (CWE-130) enabling an out-of-bounds read (CWE-126), returning memory that could include private cryptographic keys and other sensitive data.
Chain: product does not handle when an input string is not NULL terminated, leading to buffer over-read or heap-based buffer overflow.
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Effectiveness: High

Automated Dynamic Analysis

Use tools that are integrated during compilation to insert runtime error-checking mechanisms related to memory safety errors, such as AddressSanitizer (ASan) for C/C++ [REF-1518].

Effectiveness: Moderate

Note:Crafted inputs are necessary to reach the code containing the error, such as generated by fuzzers. Also, these tools may reduce performance, and they only report the error condition - not the original mistake that led to the error.
+ Functional Areas
  • Memory Management
+ Affected Resources
  • Memory
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 970 SFP Secondary Cluster: Faulty Buffer Access
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1399 Comprehensive Categorization: Memory Safety
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Variant level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Notes

Relationship

These problems may be resultant from missing sentinel values (CWE-463) or trusting a user-influenced input length variable.

Other

A buffer over-read typically occurs when the pointer or its index is incremented to a position past the end of the buffer or when pointer arithmetic results in a position after the valid memory location.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
PLOVER Buffer over-read
Software Fault Patterns SFP8 Faulty Buffer Access
+ References
[REF-1034] Raoul Strackx, Yves Younan, Pieter Philippaerts, Frank Piessens, Sven Lachmund and Thomas Walter. "Breaking the memory secrecy assumption". ACM. 2009-03-31.
<https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/1519144.1519145>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-1035] Fermin J. Serna. "The info leak era on software exploitation". 2012-07-25.
<https://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-12/Briefings/Serna/BH_US_12_Serna_Leak_Era_Slides.pdf>.
[REF-44] Michael Howard, David LeBlanc and John Viega. "24 Deadly Sins of Software Security". "Sin 5: Buffer Overruns." Page 89. McGraw-Hill. 2010.
[REF-1518] "AddressSanitizer".
<https://clang.llvm.org/docs/AddressSanitizer.html>. (URL validated: 2025-12-10)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
PLOVER
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2025-03-18
(CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03)
Abhi Balakrishnan
Provided diagram to improve CWE usability.
2025-07-10
(CWE 4.18, 2025-08-28)
Chris Harding Security Journey
Suggested CWE mapping change for the description for an observed example
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Detection_Factors, References
2025-09-09
(CWE 4.18, 2025-09-09)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Affected_Resources, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Functional_Areas
2025-04-03
(CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram, Other_Notes
2023-10-26 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, References, Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2020-06-25 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2019-09-19 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, References
2018-03-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Causal_Nature, Demonstrative_Examples
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2014-06-23 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2011-03-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2009-10-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Relationship_Notes, Relationships
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings, Weakness_Ordinalities

CWE-127: Buffer Under-read

Weakness ID: 127
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
The product reads from a buffer using buffer access mechanisms such as indexes or pointers that reference memory locations prior to the targeted buffer.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Read Memory

Scope: Confidentiality

Bypass Protection Mechanism

Scope: Confidentiality

By reading out-of-bounds memory, an attacker might be able to get secret values, such as memory addresses, which can bypass protection mechanisms such as ASLR in order to improve the reliability and likelihood of exploiting a separate weakness to achieve code execution instead of just denial of service.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 125 Out-of-bounds Read
ChildOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 786 Access of Memory Location Before Start of Buffer
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation This typically occurs when the pointer or its index is decremented to a position before the buffer, when pointer arithmetic results in a position before the beginning of the valid memory location, or when a negative index is used. This may result in exposure of sensitive information or possibly a crash.
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Memory-Unsafe (Undetermined Prevalence)

C (Undetermined Prevalence)

C++ (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


In the following code, the method retrieves a value from an array at a specific array index location that is given as an input parameter to the method

(bad code)
Example Language:
int getValueFromArray(int *array, int len, int index) {

int value;

// check that the array index is less than the maximum

// length of the array
if (index < len) {

// get the value at the specified index of the array
value = array[index];
}
// if array index is invalid then output error message

// and return value indicating error
else {
printf("Value is: %d\n", array[index]);
value = -1;
}

return value;
}

However, this method only verifies that the given array index is less than the maximum length of the array but does not check for the minimum value (CWE-839). This will allow a negative value to be accepted as the input array index, which will result in reading data before the beginning of the buffer (CWE-127) and may allow access to sensitive memory. The input array index should be checked to verify that is within the maximum and minimum range required for the array (CWE-129). In this example the if statement should be modified to include a minimum range check, as shown below.

(good code)
Example Language:

...

// check that the array index is within the correct

// range of values for the array
if (index >= 0 && index < len) {

...


+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
HTML conversion package has a buffer under-read, allowing a crash
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Effectiveness: High

Automated Dynamic Analysis

Use tools that are integrated during compilation to insert runtime error-checking mechanisms related to memory safety errors, such as AddressSanitizer (ASan) for C/C++ [REF-1518].

Effectiveness: Moderate

Note:Crafted inputs are necessary to reach the code containing the error, such as generated by fuzzers. Also, these tools may reduce performance, and they only report the error condition - not the original mistake that led to the error.
+ Functional Areas
  • Memory Management
+ Affected Resources
  • Memory
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 970 SFP Secondary Cluster: Faulty Buffer Access
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1399 Comprehensive Categorization: Memory Safety
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Variant level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Notes

Research Gap

Under-studied.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
PLOVER Buffer under-read
Software Fault Patterns SFP8 Faulty Buffer Access
+ References
[REF-1034] Raoul Strackx, Yves Younan, Pieter Philippaerts, Frank Piessens, Sven Lachmund and Thomas Walter. "Breaking the memory secrecy assumption". ACM. 2009-03-31.
<https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/1519144.1519145>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-1035] Fermin J. Serna. "The info leak era on software exploitation". 2012-07-25.
<https://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-12/Briefings/Serna/BH_US_12_Serna_Leak_Era_Slides.pdf>.
[REF-44] Michael Howard, David LeBlanc and John Viega. "24 Deadly Sins of Software Security". "Sin 5: Buffer Overruns." Page 89. McGraw-Hill. 2010.
[REF-1518] "AddressSanitizer".
<https://clang.llvm.org/docs/AddressSanitizer.html>. (URL validated: 2025-12-10)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
PLOVER
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Description, Detection_Factors, Modes_of_Introduction, References
2025-09-09
(CWE 4.18, 2025-09-09)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Affected_Resources, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Functional_Areas
2023-10-26 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2019-09-19 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, References
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Causal_Nature
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2009-10-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Relationships
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings, Weakness_Ordinalities

CWE-124: Buffer Underwrite ('Buffer Underflow')

Weakness ID: 124
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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Edit Custom Filter


+ Description
The product writes to a buffer using an index or pointer that references a memory location prior to the beginning of the buffer.
+ Alternate Terms
buffer underrun
Some prominent vendors and researchers use the term "buffer underrun". "Buffer underflow" is more commonly used, although both terms are also sometimes used to describe a buffer under-read (CWE-127).
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Modify Memory; DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart

Scope: Integrity, Availability

Out of bounds memory access will very likely result in the corruption of relevant memory, and perhaps instructions, possibly leading to a crash.

Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands; Modify Memory; Bypass Protection Mechanism; Other

Scope: Integrity, Confidentiality, Availability, Access Control, Other

If the corrupted memory can be effectively controlled, it may be possible to execute arbitrary code. If the corrupted memory is data rather than instructions, the system will continue to function with improper changes, possibly in violation of an implicit or explicit policy. The consequences would only be limited by how the affected data is used, such as an adjacent memory location that is used to specify whether the user has special privileges.

Bypass Protection Mechanism; Other

Scope: Access Control, Other

When the consequence is arbitrary code execution, this can often be used to subvert any other security service.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Requirements

Choose a language that is not susceptible to these issues.

Implementation

All calculated values that are used as index or for pointer arithmetic should be validated to ensure that they are within an expected range.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 786 Access of Memory Location Before Start of Buffer
ChildOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 787 Out-of-bounds Write
CanFollow Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 839 Numeric Range Comparison Without Minimum Check
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1218 Memory Buffer Errors
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation This typically occurs when a pointer or its index is decremented to a position before the buffer, when pointer arithmetic results in a position before the beginning of the valid memory location, or when a negative index is used.
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Memory-Unsafe (Undetermined Prevalence)

C (Undetermined Prevalence)

C++ (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
Medium
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


In the following C/C++ example, a utility function is used to trim trailing whitespace from a character string. The function copies the input string to a local character string and uses a while statement to remove the trailing whitespace by moving backward through the string and overwriting whitespace with a NUL character.

(bad code)
Example Language:
char* trimTrailingWhitespace(char *strMessage, int length) {
char *retMessage;
char *message = malloc(sizeof(char)*(length+1));

// copy input string to a temporary string
char message[length+1];
int index;
for (index = 0; index < length; index++) {
message[index] = strMessage[index];
}
message[index] = '\0';

// trim trailing whitespace
int len = index-1;
while (isspace(message[len])) {
message[len] = '\0';
len--;
}

// return string without trailing whitespace
retMessage = message;
return retMessage;
}

However, this function can cause a buffer underwrite if the input character string contains all whitespace. On some systems the while statement will move backwards past the beginning of a character string and will call the isspace() function on an address outside of the bounds of the local buffer.



Example 2


The following is an example of code that may result in a buffer underwrite. This code is attempting to replace the substring "Replace Me" in destBuf with the string stored in srcBuf. It does so by using the function strstr(), which returns a pointer to the found substring in destBuf. Using pointer arithmetic, the starting index of the substring is found.

(bad code)
Example Language:
int main() {
...
char *result = strstr(destBuf, "Replace Me");
int idx = result - destBuf;
strcpy(&destBuf[idx], srcBuf);
...
}

In the case where the substring is not found in destBuf, strstr() will return NULL, causing the pointer arithmetic to be undefined, potentially setting the value of idx to a negative number. If idx is negative, this will result in a buffer underwrite of destBuf.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
buffer underwrite in firmware verification routine allows code execution via a crafted firmware image
Unchecked length of SSLv2 challenge value leads to buffer underflow.
Buffer underflow from a small size value with a large buffer (length parameter inconsistency, CWE-130)
Buffer underflow from an all-whitespace string, which causes a counter to be decremented before the buffer while looking for a non-whitespace character.
Buffer underflow resultant from encoded data that triggers an integer overflow.
Product sets an incorrect buffer size limit, leading to "off-by-two" buffer underflow.
Negative value is used in a memcpy() operation, leading to buffer underflow.
Buffer underflow due to mishandled special characters
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Effectiveness: High

Automated Dynamic Analysis

Use tools that are integrated during compilation to insert runtime error-checking mechanisms related to memory safety errors, such as AddressSanitizer (ASan) for C/C++ [REF-1518].

Effectiveness: Moderate

Note:Crafted inputs are necessary to reach the code containing the error, such as generated by fuzzers. Also, these tools may reduce performance, and they only report the error condition - not the original mistake that led to the error.
+ Functional Areas
  • Memory Management
+ Affected Resources
  • Memory
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 970 SFP Secondary Cluster: Faulty Buffer Access
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1399 Comprehensive Categorization: Memory Safety
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Notes

Relationship

This could be resultant from several errors, including a bad offset or an array index that decrements before the beginning of the buffer (see CWE-129).
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
PLOVER UNDER - Boundary beginning violation ('buffer underflow'?)
CLASP Buffer underwrite
Software Fault Patterns SFP8 Faulty Buffer Access
+ References
[REF-90] "Buffer UNDERFLOWS: What do you know about it?". Vuln-Dev Mailing List. 2004-01-10.
<https://seclists.org/vuln-dev/2004/Jan/22>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-44] Michael Howard, David LeBlanc and John Viega. "24 Deadly Sins of Software Security". "Sin 5: Buffer Overruns." Page 89. McGraw-Hill. 2010.
[REF-1518] "AddressSanitizer".
<https://clang.llvm.org/docs/AddressSanitizer.html>. (URL validated: 2025-12-10)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
PLOVER
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2023-02-06 Muchen Xu Naive Systems
Pointed out that the demonstrative example #2 was incorrect and instead demonstrated a Buffer Under-read.
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Description, Detection_Factors, Modes_of_Introduction, References
2025-09-09
(CWE 4.18, 2025-09-09)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Affected_Resources, Functional_Areas
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2022-04-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Research_Gaps
2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2021-03-15 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Causal_Nature, Demonstrative_Examples, References
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, References, Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2011-03-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships
2009-10-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Name, Relationships
2009-01-12 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Alternate_Terms, Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Description, Relationships, Relationship_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings, Weakness_Ordinalities
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2009-10-29 Boundary Beginning Violation ('Buffer Underwrite')

CWE-482: Comparing instead of Assigning

Weakness ID: 482
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
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+ Description
The code uses an operator for comparison when the intention was to perform an assignment.
+ Extended Description
In many languages, the compare statement is very close in appearance to the assignment statement; they are often confused.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Unexpected State

Scope: Availability, Integrity

The assignment will not take place, which should cause obvious program execution problems.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Testing

Many IDEs and static analysis products will detect this problem.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 480 Use of Incorrect Operator
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation This bug primarily originates from a typo.
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

C (Undetermined Prevalence)

C++ (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
Low
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


The following example demonstrates the weakness.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
void called(int foo) {
foo==1;
if (foo==1) System.out.println("foo\n");
}
int main() {

called(2);
return 0;
}


Example 2


The following C/C++ example shows a simple implementation of a stack that includes methods for adding and removing integer values from the stack. The example uses pointers to add and remove integer values to the stack array variable.

(bad code)
Example Language:
#define SIZE 50
int *tos, *p1, stack[SIZE];

void push(int i) {
p1++;
if(p1==(tos+SIZE)) {

// Print stack overflow error message and exit
}
*p1 == i;
}

int pop(void) {
if(p1==tos) {

// Print stack underflow error message and exit
}
p1--;
return *(p1+1);
}

int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {

// initialize tos and p1 to point to the top of stack
tos = stack;
p1 = stack;
// code to add and remove items from stack
...
return 0;
}

The push method includes an expression to assign the integer value to the location in the stack pointed to by the pointer variable.

However, this expression uses the comparison operator "==" rather than the assignment operator "=". The result of using the comparison operator instead of the assignment operator causes erroneous values to be entered into the stack and can cause unexpected results.



+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Effectiveness: High

+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 747 CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 14 - Miscellaneous (MSC)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 883 CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 49 - Miscellaneous (MSC)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 886 SFP Primary Cluster: Unused entities
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1410 Comprehensive Categorization: Insufficient Control Flow Management
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Variant level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
CLASP Comparing instead of assigning
Software Fault Patterns SFP2 Unused Entities
+ References
[REF-18] Secure Software, Inc.. "The CLASP Application Security Process". 2005.
<https://cwe.mitre.org/documents/sources/TheCLASPApplicationSecurityProcess.pdf>. (URL validated: 2024-11-17)
[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 6, "Typos", Page 289. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
CLASP
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Weakness_Ordinalities
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Taxonomy_Mappings
2017-01-19 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Taxonomy_Mappings
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2011-09-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2009-10-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Other_Notes
2009-07-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Modes_of_Introduction
2008-11-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Description, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction

CWE-733: Compiler Optimization Removal or Modification of Security-critical Code

Weakness ID: 733
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
The developer builds a security-critical protection mechanism into the software, but the compiler optimizes the program such that the mechanism is removed or modified.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Bypass Protection Mechanism; Alter Execution Logic

Scope: Access Control, Other

+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 1038 Insecure Automated Optimizations
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 14 Compiler Removal of Code to Clear Buffers
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 438 Behavioral Problems
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Build and Compilation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

C (Often Prevalent)

C++ (Often Prevalent)

Class: Compiled (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


The following code reads a password from the user, uses the password to connect to a back-end mainframe, and then attempts to scrub the password from memory using memset().

(bad code)
Example Language:
void GetData(char *MFAddr) {
char pwd[64];
if (GetPasswordFromUser(pwd, sizeof(pwd))) {
if (ConnectToMainframe(MFAddr, pwd)) {
// Interaction with mainframe
}
}
memset(pwd, 0, sizeof(pwd));
}

The code in the example will behave correctly if it is executed verbatim, but if the code is compiled using an optimizing compiler, then the call to memset() might be removed as a dead store, because the buffer pwd is not used after its value is overwritten. Because the buffer pwd contains a sensitive value, the application may be vulnerable to attack if the data are left memory resident. If attackers are able to access the correct region of memory, they may use the recovered password to gain control of the system.

It is common practice to overwrite sensitive data manipulated in memory, such as passwords or cryptographic keys, in order to prevent attackers from learning system secrets. However, with the advent of optimizing compilers, programs do not always behave as their source code alone would suggest. In the example, the compiler interprets the call to memset() as dead code because the memory being written to is not subsequently used, despite the fact that there is clearly a security motivation for the operation to occur. The problem here is that many compilers, and in fact many programming languages, do not take this and other security concerns into consideration in their efforts to improve efficiency.

Attackers typically exploit this type of vulnerability by using a core dump or runtime mechanism to access the memory used by a particular application and recover the secret information. Once an attacker has access to the secret information, it is relatively straightforward to further exploit the system and possibly compromise other resources with which the application interacts.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
C compiler optimization, as allowed by specifications, removes code that is used to perform checks to detect integer overflows.
Chain: compiler optimization (CWE-733) removes or modifies code used to detect integer overflow (CWE-190), allowing out-of-bounds write (CWE-787).
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Black Box

This specific weakness is impossible to detect using black box methods. While an analyst could examine memory to see that it has not been scrubbed, an analysis of the executable would not be successful. This is because the compiler has already removed the relevant code. Only the source code shows whether the programmer intended to clear the memory or not, so this weakness is indistinguishable from others.

Effectiveness: Limited

White Box

This weakness is only detectable using white box methods (see black box detection factor). Careful analysis is required to determine if the code is likely to be removed by the compiler.
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 976 SFP Secondary Cluster: Compiler
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1398 Comprehensive Categorization: Component Interaction
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ References
[REF-7] Michael Howard and David LeBlanc. "Writing Secure Code". Chapter 9, "A Compiler Optimization Caveat" Page 322. 2nd Edition. Microsoft Press. 2002-12-04.
<https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/store/writing-secure-code-9780735617223>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2008-10-01
(CWE 1.0.1, 2008-10-14)
CWE Content Team MITRE
new weakness-focused entry for Research view closes the gap between 14 and 435.
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Detection_Factors, Time_of_Introduction, Weakness_Ordinalities
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-06-25 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2018-03-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2017-01-19 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2010-02-16 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2009-03-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Observed_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2008-11-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors

CWE-14: Compiler Removal of Code to Clear Buffers

Weakness ID: 14
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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Edit Custom Filter


+ Description
Sensitive memory is cleared according to the source code, but compiler optimizations leave the memory untouched when it is not read from again, aka "dead store removal."
+ Extended Description

This compiler optimization error occurs when:

  1. Secret data are stored in memory.
  2. The secret data are scrubbed from memory by overwriting its contents.
  3. The source code is compiled using an optimizing compiler, which identifies and removes the function that overwrites the contents as a dead store because the memory is not used subsequently.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Read Memory; Bypass Protection Mechanism

Scope: Confidentiality, Access Control

This weakness will allow data that has not been cleared from memory to be read. If this data contains sensitive password information, then an attacker can read the password and use the information to bypass protection mechanisms.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Implementation

Store the sensitive data in a "volatile" memory location if available.

Build and Compilation

If possible, configure your compiler so that it does not remove dead stores.

Architecture and Design

Where possible, encrypt sensitive data that are used by a software system.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 733 Compiler Optimization Removal or Modification of Security-critical Code
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation
Build and Compilation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

C (Undetermined Prevalence)

C++ (Undetermined Prevalence)

Class: Compiled (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


The following code reads a password from the user, uses the password to connect to a back-end mainframe, and then attempts to scrub the password from memory using memset().

(bad code)
Example Language:
void GetData(char *MFAddr) {
char pwd[64];
if (GetPasswordFromUser(pwd, sizeof(pwd))) {
if (ConnectToMainframe(MFAddr, pwd)) {
// Interaction with mainframe
}
}
memset(pwd, 0, sizeof(pwd));
}

The code in the example will behave correctly if it is executed verbatim, but if the code is compiled using an optimizing compiler, then the call to memset() might be removed as a dead store, because the buffer pwd is not used after its value is overwritten. Because the buffer pwd contains a sensitive value, the application may be vulnerable to attack if the data are left memory resident. If attackers are able to access the correct region of memory, they may use the recovered password to gain control of the system.

It is common practice to overwrite sensitive data manipulated in memory, such as passwords or cryptographic keys, in order to prevent attackers from learning system secrets. However, with the advent of optimizing compilers, programs do not always behave as their source code alone would suggest. In the example, the compiler interprets the call to memset() as dead code because the memory being written to is not subsequently used, despite the fact that there is clearly a security motivation for the operation to occur. The problem here is that many compilers, and in fact many programming languages, do not take this and other security concerns into consideration in their efforts to improve efficiency.

Attackers typically exploit this type of vulnerability by using a core dump or runtime mechanism to access the memory used by a particular application and recover the secret information. Once an attacker has access to the secret information, it is relatively straightforward to further exploit the system and possibly compromise other resources with which the application interacts.



+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Black Box

This specific weakness is impossible to detect using black box methods. While an analyst could examine memory to see that it has not been scrubbed, an analysis of the executable would not be successful. This is because the compiler has already removed the relevant code. Only the source code shows whether the programmer intended to clear the memory or not, so this weakness is indistinguishable from others.

Effectiveness: Limited

White Box

This weakness is only detectable using white box methods (see black box detection factor). Careful analysis is required to determine if the code is likely to be removed by the compiler.
+ Affected Resources
  • Memory
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 2 7PK - Environment
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 729 OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A8 - Insecure Storage
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 747 CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 14 - Miscellaneous (MSC)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 883 CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 49 - Miscellaneous (MSC)
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 963 SFP Secondary Cluster: Exposed Data
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1398 Comprehensive Categorization: Component Interaction
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Variant level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
7 Pernicious Kingdoms Insecure Compiler Optimization
PLOVER Sensitive memory uncleared by compiler optimization
OWASP Top Ten 2004 A8 CWE More Specific Insecure Storage
CERT C Secure Coding MSC06-C Be aware of compiler optimization when dealing with sensitive data
Software Fault Patterns SFP23 Exposed Data
+ References
[REF-6] Katrina Tsipenyuk, Brian Chess and Gary McGraw. "Seven Pernicious Kingdoms: A Taxonomy of Software Security Errors". NIST Workshop on Software Security Assurance Tools Techniques and Metrics. NIST. 2005-11-07.
<https://samate.nist.gov/SSATTM_Content/papers/Seven%20Pernicious%20Kingdoms%20-%20Taxonomy%20of%20Sw%20Security%20Errors%20-%20Tsipenyuk%20-%20Chess%20-%20McGraw.pdf>.
[REF-7] Michael Howard and David LeBlanc. "Writing Secure Code". Chapter 9, "A Compiler Optimization Caveat" Page 322. 2nd Edition. Microsoft Press. 2002-12-04.
<https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/store/writing-secure-code-9780735617223>.
[REF-124] Michael Howard. "When scrubbing secrets in memory doesn't work". BugTraq. 2002-11-05.
<https://seclists.org/bugtraq/2002/Nov/48>. (URL validated: 2025-07-24)
[REF-125] Michael Howard. "Some Bad News and Some Good News". Microsoft. 2002-10-21.
<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/ms972826(v=msdn.10)>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-126] Joseph Wagner. "GNU GCC: Optimizer Removes Code Necessary for Security". Bugtraq. 2002-11-16.
<https://seclists.org/bugtraq/2002/Nov/266>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
7 Pernicious Kingdoms
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Detection_Factors, Weakness_Ordinalities
2025-09-09
(CWE 4.18, 2025-09-09)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2018-03-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Type
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2017-01-19 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, References, Relationships
2011-09-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2010-02-16 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2009-05-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2008-11-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Description, Detection_Factors, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings, Time_of_Introduction
2008-10-14 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2008-04-11 Insecure Compiler Optimization

CWE-362: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')

Weakness ID: 362
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities in limited situations requiring careful review (with careful review of mapping notes)
Abstraction: Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.
View customized information:
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+ Description
The product contains a concurrent code sequence that requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence operating concurrently. Diagram for CWE-362
+ Extended Description

A race condition occurs within concurrent environments, and it is effectively a property of a code sequence. Depending on the context, a code sequence may be in the form of a function call, a small number of instructions, a series of program invocations, etc.

A race condition violates these properties, which are closely related:

  • Exclusivity - the code sequence is given exclusive access to the shared resource, i.e., no other code sequence can modify properties of the shared resource before the original sequence has completed execution.
  • Atomicity - the code sequence is behaviorally atomic, i.e., no other thread or process can concurrently execute the same sequence of instructions (or a subset) against the same resource.

A race condition exists when an "interfering code sequence" can still access the shared resource, violating exclusivity.

The interfering code sequence could be "trusted" or "untrusted." A trusted interfering code sequence occurs within the product; it cannot be modified by the attacker, and it can only be invoked indirectly. An untrusted interfering code sequence can be authored directly by the attacker, and typically it is external to the vulnerable product.

+ Alternate Terms
Race Condition
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

DoS: Resource Consumption (CPU); DoS: Resource Consumption (Memory); DoS: Resource Consumption (Other)

Scope: Availability

When a race condition makes it possible to bypass a resource cleanup routine or trigger multiple initialization routines, it may lead to resource exhaustion.

DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart; DoS: Instability

Scope: Availability

When a race condition allows multiple control flows to access a resource simultaneously, it might lead the product(s) into unexpected states, possibly resulting in a crash.

Read Files or Directories; Read Application Data

Scope: Confidentiality, Integrity

When a race condition is combined with predictable resource names and loose permissions, it may be possible for an attacker to overwrite or access confidential data (CWE-59).

Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands; Gain Privileges or Assume Identity; Bypass Protection Mechanism

Scope: Access Control

This can have security implications when the expected synchronization is in security-critical code, such as recording whether a user is authenticated or modifying important state information that should not be influenced by an outsider.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design

In languages that support it, use synchronization primitives. Only wrap these around critical code to minimize the impact on performance.

Architecture and Design

Use thread-safe capabilities such as the data access abstraction in Spring.

Architecture and Design

Minimize the usage of shared resources in order to remove as much complexity as possible from the control flow and to reduce the likelihood of unexpected conditions occurring.

Additionally, this will minimize the amount of synchronization necessary and may even help to reduce the likelihood of a denial of service where an attacker may be able to repeatedly trigger a critical section (CWE-400).

Implementation

When using multithreading and operating on shared variables, only use thread-safe functions.

Implementation

Use atomic operations on shared variables. Be wary of innocent-looking constructs such as "x++". This may appear atomic at the code layer, but it is actually non-atomic at the instruction layer, since it involves a read, followed by a computation, followed by a write.

Implementation

Use a mutex if available, but be sure to avoid related weaknesses such as CWE-412.

Implementation

Avoid double-checked locking (CWE-609) and other implementation errors that arise when trying to avoid the overhead of synchronization.

Implementation

Disable interrupts or signals over critical parts of the code, but also make sure that the code does not go into a large or infinite loop.

Implementation

Use the volatile type modifier for critical variables to avoid unexpected compiler optimization or reordering. This does not necessarily solve the synchronization problem, but it can help.

Architecture and Design; Operation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 662 Improper Synchronization
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 364 Signal Handler Race Condition
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 366 Race Condition within a Thread
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 367 Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 368 Context Switching Race Condition
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 421 Race Condition During Access to Alternate Channel
ParentOf Composite Composite - a Compound Element that consists of two or more distinct weaknesses, in which all weaknesses must be present at the same time in order for a potential vulnerability to arise. Removing any of the weaknesses eliminates or sharply reduces the risk. One weakness, X, can be "broken down" into component weaknesses Y and Z. There can be cases in which one weakness might not be essential to a composite, but changes the nature of the composite when it becomes a vulnerability. 689 Permission Race Condition During Resource Copy
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1223 Race Condition for Write-Once Attributes
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1298 Hardware Logic Contains Race Conditions
CanFollow Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 662 Improper Synchronization
CanPrecede Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 416 Use After Free
CanPrecede Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 476 NULL Pointer Dereference
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf View View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1003 Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 367 Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design
Implementation Programmers may assume that certain code sequences execute too quickly to be affected by an interfering code sequence; when they are not, this violates atomicity. For example, the single "x++" statement may appear atomic at the code layer, but it is actually non-atomic at the instruction layer, since it involves a read (the original value of x), followed by a computation (x+1), followed by a write (save the result to x).
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

C (Sometimes Prevalent)

C++ (Sometimes Prevalent)

Java (Sometimes Prevalent)

Technologies

Class: Mobile (Undetermined Prevalence)

Class: ICS/OT (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
Medium
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


This code could be used in an e-commerce application that supports transfers between accounts. It takes the total amount of the transfer, sends it to the new account, and deducts the amount from the original account.

(bad code)
Example Language: Perl 
$transfer_amount = GetTransferAmount();
$balance = GetBalanceFromDatabase();

if ($transfer_amount < 0) {
FatalError("Bad Transfer Amount");
}
$newbalance = $balance - $transfer_amount;
if (($balance - $transfer_amount) < 0) {
FatalError("Insufficient Funds");
}
SendNewBalanceToDatabase($newbalance);
NotifyUser("Transfer of $transfer_amount succeeded.");
NotifyUser("New balance: $newbalance");

A race condition could occur between the calls to GetBalanceFromDatabase() and SendNewBalanceToDatabase().

Suppose the balance is initially 100.00. An attack could be constructed as follows:

(attack code)
Example Language: Other 
In the following pseudocode, the attacker makes two simultaneous calls of the program, CALLER-1 and CALLER-2. Both callers are for the same user account.
CALLER-1 (the attacker) is associated with PROGRAM-1 (the instance that handles CALLER-1). CALLER-2 is associated with PROGRAM-2.
CALLER-1 makes a transfer request of 80.00.
PROGRAM-1 calls GetBalanceFromDatabase and sets $balance to 100.00
PROGRAM-1 calculates $newbalance as 20.00, then calls SendNewBalanceToDatabase().
Due to high server load, the PROGRAM-1 call to SendNewBalanceToDatabase() encounters a delay.
CALLER-2 makes a transfer request of 1.00.
PROGRAM-2 calls GetBalanceFromDatabase() and sets $balance to 100.00. This happens because the previous PROGRAM-1 request was not processed yet.
PROGRAM-2 determines the new balance as 99.00.
After the initial delay, PROGRAM-1 commits its balance to the database, setting it to 20.00.
PROGRAM-2 sends a request to update the database, setting the balance to 99.00

At this stage, the attacker should have a balance of 19.00 (due to 81.00 worth of transfers), but the balance is 99.00, as recorded in the database.

To prevent this weakness, the programmer has several options, including using a lock to prevent multiple simultaneous requests to the web application, or using a synchronization mechanism that includes all the code between GetBalanceFromDatabase() and SendNewBalanceToDatabase().



Example 2


The following function attempts to acquire a lock in order to perform operations on a shared resource.

(bad code)
Example Language:
void f(pthread_mutex_t *mutex) {
pthread_mutex_lock(mutex);

/* access shared resource */


pthread_mutex_unlock(mutex);
}

However, the code does not check the value returned by pthread_mutex_lock() for errors. If pthread_mutex_lock() cannot acquire the mutex for any reason, the function may introduce a race condition into the program and result in undefined behavior.

In order to avoid data races, correctly written programs must check the result of thread synchronization functions and appropriately handle all errors, either by attempting to recover from them or reporting them to higher levels.

(good code)
Example Language:
int f(pthread_mutex_t *mutex) {
int result;

result = pthread_mutex_lock(mutex);
if (0 != result)
return result;


/* access shared resource */


return pthread_mutex_unlock(mutex);
}


Example 3


Suppose a processor's Memory Management Unit (MMU) has 5 other shadow MMUs to distribute its workload for its various cores. Each MMU has the start address and end address of "accessible" memory. Any time this accessible range changes (as per the processor's boot status), the main MMU sends an update message to all the shadow MMUs.

Suppose the interconnect fabric does not prioritize such "update" packets over other general traffic packets. This introduces a race condition. If an attacker can flood the target with enough messages so that some of those attack packets reach the target before the new access ranges gets updated, then the attacker can leverage this scenario.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Go application for cloud management creates a world-writable sudoers file that allows local attackers to inject sudo rules and escalate privileges to root by winning a race condition.
Chain: improper locking (CWE-667) leads to race condition (CWE-362), as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
Chain: mobile platform race condition (CWE-362) leading to use-after-free (CWE-416), as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
Chain: race condition (CWE-362) leads to use-after-free (CWE-416), as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
chain: JTAG interface is not disabled (CWE-1191) during ROM code execution, introducing a race condition (CWE-362) to extract encryption keys
Chain: race condition (CWE-362) in anti-malware product allows deletion of files by creating a junction (CWE-1386) and using hard links during the time window in which a temporary file is created and deleted.
TOCTOU in sandbox process allows installation of untrusted browser add-ons by replacing a file after it has been verified, but before it is executed
Chain: chipset has a race condition (CWE-362) between when an interrupt handler detects an attempt to write-enable the BIOS (in violation of the lock bit), and when the handler resets the write-enable bit back to 0, allowing attackers to issue BIOS writes during the timing window [REF-1237].
Race condition leading to a crash by calling a hook removal procedure while other activities are occurring at the same time.
chain: time-of-check time-of-use (TOCTOU) race condition in program allows bypass of protection mechanism that was designed to prevent symlink attacks.
chain: time-of-check time-of-use (TOCTOU) race condition in program allows bypass of protection mechanism that was designed to prevent symlink attacks.
Unsynchronized caching operation enables a race condition that causes messages to be sent to a deallocated object.
Race condition during initialization triggers a buffer overflow.
Daemon crash by quickly performing operations and undoing them, which eventually leads to an operation that does not acquire a lock.
chain: race condition triggers NULL pointer dereference
Race condition in library function could cause data to be sent to the wrong process.
Race condition in file parser leads to heap corruption.
chain: race condition allows attacker to access an object while it is still being initialized, causing software to access uninitialized memory.
chain: race condition for an argument value, possibly resulting in NULL dereference
Chain: race condition (CWE-362) might allow resource to be released before operating on it, leading to NULL dereference (CWE-476)
Chain: Signal handler contains too much functionality (CWE-828), introducing a race condition (CWE-362) that leads to a double free (CWE-415).
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
Resultant
(where the weakness is typically related to the presence of some other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Black Box

Black box methods may be able to identify evidence of race conditions via methods such as multiple simultaneous connections, which may cause the software to become instable or crash. However, race conditions with very narrow timing windows would not be detectable.

White Box

Common idioms are detectable in white box analysis, such as time-of-check-time-of-use (TOCTOU) file operations (CWE-367), or double-checked locking (CWE-609).

Automated Dynamic Analysis

This weakness can be detected using dynamic tools and techniques that interact with the software using large test suites with many diverse inputs, such as fuzz testing (fuzzing), robustness testing, and fault injection. The software's operation may slow down, but it should not become unstable, crash, or generate incorrect results.

Race conditions may be detected with a stress-test by calling the software simultaneously from a large number of threads or processes, and look for evidence of any unexpected behavior.

Insert breakpoints or delays in between relevant code statements to artificially expand the race window so that it will be easier to detect.

Effectiveness: Moderate

Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Binary Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis

Effectiveness: High

Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Web Application Scanner
  • Web Services Scanner
  • Database Scanners

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Framework-based Fuzzer
Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Fuzz Tester
  • Monitored Virtual Environment - run potentially malicious code in sandbox / wrapper / virtual machine, see if it does anything suspicious

Effectiveness: High

Manual Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)
Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source

Effectiveness: High

Automated Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Source code Weakness Analyzer
  • Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer

Effectiveness: High

Architecture or Design Review

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)

Effectiveness: High

+ Affected Resources
  • File or Directory
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 635 Weaknesses Originally Used by NVD from 2008 to 2016
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 743 CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 10 - Input Output (FIO)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 751 2009 Top 25 - Insecure Interaction Between Components
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 801 2010 Top 25 - Insecure Interaction Between Components
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 852 The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) Chapter 9 - Visibility and Atomicity (VNA)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 867 2011 Top 25 - Weaknesses On the Cusp
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 877 CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 09 - Input Output (FIO)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 882 CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 14 - Concurrency (CON)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 988 SFP Secondary Cluster: Race Condition Window
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1142 SEI CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java - Guidelines 08. Visibility and Atomicity (VNA)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1364 ICS Communications: Zone Boundary Failures
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1365 ICS Communications: Unreliability
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1366 ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1376 ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Security Gaps in Commissioning
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1387 Weaknesses in the 2022 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1401 Comprehensive Categorization: Concurrency
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1425 Weaknesses in the 2023 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1441 OWASP Top Ten 2025 Category A06:2025 - Insecure Design
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED-WITH-REVIEW
(this CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities in limited situations requiring careful review)
Reason Abstraction

Rationale

This CWE entry is a Class and might have Base-level children that would be more appropriate

Comments

Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit
+ Notes

Research Gap

Race conditions in web applications are under-studied and probably under-reported. However, in 2008 there has been growing interest in this area.

Research Gap

Much of the focus of race condition research has been in Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) variants (CWE-367), but many race conditions are related to synchronization problems that do not necessarily require a time-of-check.

Research Gap

From a classification/taxonomy perspective, the relationships between concurrency and program state need closer investigation and may be useful in organizing related issues.

Maintenance

The relationship between race conditions and synchronization problems (CWE-662) needs to be further developed. They are not necessarily two perspectives of the same core concept, since synchronization is only one technique for avoiding race conditions, and synchronization can be used for other purposes besides race condition prevention.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
PLOVER Race Conditions
The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) VNA03-J Do not assume that a group of calls to independently atomic methods is atomic
+ References
[REF-44] Michael Howard, David LeBlanc and John Viega. "24 Deadly Sins of Software Security". "Sin 13: Race Conditions." Page 205. McGraw-Hill. 2010.
[REF-349] Andrei Alexandrescu. "volatile - Multithreaded Programmer's Best Friend". Dr. Dobb's. 2008-02-01.
<https://drdobbs.com/cpp/volatile-the-multithreaded-programmers-b/184403766>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-350] Steven Devijver. "Thread-safe webapps using Spring".
<https://web.archive.org/web/20170609174845/http://www.javalobby.org/articles/thread-safe/index.jsp>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-351] David Wheeler. "Prevent race conditions". 2007-10-04.
<https://www.ida.liu.se/~TDDC90/literature/papers/SP-race-conditions.pdf>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-352] Matt Bishop. "Race Conditions, Files, and Security Flaws; or the Tortoise and the Hare Redux". 1995-09.
<https://seclab.cs.ucdavis.edu/projects/vulnerabilities/scriv/ucd-ecs-95-08.pdf>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-353] David Wheeler. "Secure Programming for Linux and Unix HOWTO". 2003-03-03.
<https://dwheeler.com/secure-programs/Secure-Programs-HOWTO/avoid-race.html>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-354] Blake Watts. "Discovering and Exploiting Named Pipe Security Flaws for Fun and Profit". 2002-04.
<https://www.blakewatts.com/blog/discovering-and-exploiting-named-pipe-security-flaws-for-fun-and-profit>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-355] Roberto Paleari, Davide Marrone, Danilo Bruschi and Mattia Monga. "On Race Vulnerabilities in Web Applications".
<http://security.dico.unimi.it/~roberto/pubs/dimva08-web.pdf>.
[REF-356] "Avoiding Race Conditions and Insecure File Operations". Apple Developer Connection.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20081010155022/http://developer.apple.com/documentation/Security/Conceptual/SecureCodingGuide/Articles/RaceConditions.html>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-357] Johannes Ullrich. "Top 25 Series - Rank 25 - Race Conditions". SANS Software Security Institute. 2010-03-26.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20100530231203/http://blogs.sans.org:80/appsecstreetfighter/2010/03/26/top-25-series-rank-25-race-conditions/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-76] Sean Barnum and Michael Gegick. "Least Privilege". 2005-09-14.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20211209014121/https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/bsi/articles/knowledge/principles/least-privilege>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-1237] CERT Coordination Center. "Intel BIOS locking mechanism contains race condition that enables write protection bypass". 2015-01-05.
<https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/766164/>.
[REF-1479] Gregory Larsen, E. Kenneth Hong Fong, David A. Wheeler and Rama S. Moorthy. "State-of-the-Art Resources (SOAR) for Software Vulnerability Detection, Test, and Evaluation". 2014-07.
<https://www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/s/st/stateoftheart-resources-soar-for-software-vulnerability-detection-test-and-evaluation/p-5061.ashx>. (URL validated: 2025-09-05)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
PLOVER
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2010-04-30 Martin Sebor Cisco Systems, Inc.
Provided Demonstrative Example
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.16, 2024-11-19)
Abhi Balakrishnan
Provided diagram to improve CWE usability
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities
2025-09-09
(CWE 4.18, 2025-09-09)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, References
2025-04-03
(CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Affected_Resources
2024-11-19
(CWE 4.16, 2024-11-19)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Alternate_Terms, Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram, Modes_of_Introduction
2024-07-16
(CWE 4.15, 2024-07-16)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Description
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples, References
2022-06-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
2022-04-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples, References
2021-03-15 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2020-08-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, Relationships
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
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2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, References, Research_Gaps, Taxonomy_Mappings
2015-12-07 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
2011-09-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2010-12-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Name, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
2010-09-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
2010-06-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References
2010-02-16 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, References, Relationships
2009-05-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2009-03-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Potential_Mitigations
2009-01-12 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Maintenance_Notes, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships, Research_Gaps
2008-11-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-10-14 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2008-04-11 Race Conditions
2010-12-13 Race Condition

CWE-243: Creation of chroot Jail Without Changing Working Directory

Weakness ID: 243
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
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+ Description
The product uses the chroot() system call to create a jail, but does not change the working directory afterward. This does not prevent access to files outside of the jail.
+ Extended Description
Improper use of chroot() may allow attackers to escape from the chroot jail. The chroot() function call does not change the process's current working directory, so relative paths may still refer to file system resources outside of the chroot jail after chroot() has been called.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Read Files or Directories

Scope: Confidentiality

+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 573 Improper Following of Specification by Caller
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 669 Incorrect Resource Transfer Between Spheres
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 265 Privilege Issues
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1015 Limit Access
+ Background Details
The chroot() system call allows a process to change its perception of the root directory of the file system. After properly invoking chroot(), a process cannot access any files outside the directory tree defined by the new root directory. Such an environment is called a chroot jail and is commonly used to prevent the possibility that a processes could be subverted and used to access unauthorized files. For instance, many FTP servers run in chroot jails to prevent an attacker who discovers a new vulnerability in the server from being able to download the password file or other sensitive files on the system.
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

C (Undetermined Prevalence)

C++ (Undetermined Prevalence)

Operating Systems

Class: Unix (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
High
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


Consider the following source code from a (hypothetical) FTP server:

(bad code)
Example Language:
chroot("/var/ftproot");
...
fgets(filename, sizeof(filename), network);
localfile = fopen(filename, "r");
while ((len = fread(buf, 1, sizeof(buf), localfile)) != EOF) {
fwrite(buf, 1, sizeof(buf), network);
}
fclose(localfile);

This code is responsible for reading a filename from the network, opening the corresponding file on the local machine, and sending the contents over the network. This code could be used to implement the FTP GET command. The FTP server calls chroot() in its initialization routines in an attempt to prevent access to files outside of /var/ftproot. But because the server does not change the current working directory by calling chdir("/"), an attacker could request the file "../../../../../etc/passwd" and obtain a copy of the system password file.



+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Resultant
(where the weakness is typically related to the presence of some other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Effectiveness: High

+ Affected Resources
  • File or Directory
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 227 7PK - API Abuse
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 979 SFP Secondary Cluster: Failed Chroot Jail
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1416 Comprehensive Categorization: Resource Lifecycle Management
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Variant level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
7 Pernicious Kingdoms Directory Restriction
Software Fault Patterns SFP17 Failed chroot jail
+ References
[REF-6] Katrina Tsipenyuk, Brian Chess and Gary McGraw. "Seven Pernicious Kingdoms: A Taxonomy of Software Security Errors". NIST Workshop on Software Security Assurance Tools Techniques and Metrics. NIST. 2005-11-07.
<https://samate.nist.gov/SSATTM_Content/papers/Seven%20Pernicious%20Kingdoms%20-%20Taxonomy%20of%20Sw%20Security%20Errors%20-%20Tsipenyuk%20-%20Chess%20-%20McGraw.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
7 Pernicious Kingdoms
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Affected_Resources, Causal_Nature, Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2010-12-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Name
2009-05-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2009-03-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2008-10-14 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Background_Details, Description, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings, Weakness_Ordinalities
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2008-01-30 Directory Restriction
2010-12-13 Failure to Change Working Directory in chroot Jail

CWE-463: Deletion of Data Structure Sentinel

Weakness ID: 463
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
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+ Description
The accidental deletion of a data-structure sentinel can cause serious programming logic problems.
+ Extended Description
Often times data-structure sentinels are used to mark structure of the data structure. A common example of this is the null character at the end of strings. Another common example is linked lists which may contain a sentinel to mark the end of the list. It is dangerous to allow this type of control data to be easily accessible. Therefore, it is important to protect from the deletion or modification outside of some wrapper interface which provides safety.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Other

Scope: Availability, Other

Generally this error will cause the data structure to not work properly.

Other

Scope: Authorization, Other

If a control character, such as NULL is removed, one may cause resource access control problems.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design

Use an abstraction library to abstract away risky APIs. Not a complete solution.

Build and Compilation

Strategy: Compilation or Build Hardening

Run or compile the software using features or extensions that automatically provide a protection mechanism that mitigates or eliminates buffer overflows.

For example, certain compilers and extensions provide automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are built into the compiled code. Examples include the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice.

Effectiveness: Defense in Depth

Note: This is not necessarily a complete solution, since these mechanisms can only detect certain types of overflows. In addition, an attack could still cause a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.

Operation

Use OS-level preventative functionality. Not a complete solution.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 707 Improper Neutralization
PeerOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 170 Improper Null Termination
PeerOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 464 Addition of Data Structure Sentinel
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 137 Data Neutralization Issues
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

C (Undetermined Prevalence)

C++ (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


This example creates a null terminated string and prints it contents.

(bad code)
Example Language:
char *foo;
int counter;
foo=calloc(sizeof(char)*10);

for (counter=0;counter!=10;counter++) {
foo[counter]='a';

printf("%s\n",foo);
}

The string foo has space for 9 characters and a null terminator, but 10 characters are written to it. As a result, the string foo is not null terminated and calling printf() on it will have unpredictable and possibly dangerous results.



+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
Resultant
(where the weakness is typically related to the presence of some other weaknesses)
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 977 SFP Secondary Cluster: Design
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1407 Comprehensive Categorization: Improper Neutralization
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
CLASP Deletion of data-structure sentinel
+ References
[REF-18] Secure Software, Inc.. "The CLASP Application Security Process". 2005.
<https://cwe.mitre.org/documents/sources/TheCLASPApplicationSecurityProcess.pdf>. (URL validated: 2024-11-17)
[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 8, "NUL-Termination Problems", Page 452. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
CLASP
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Weakness_Ordinalities
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Time_of_Introduction
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples
2009-10-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Other_Notes
2009-07-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2008-04-11 Deletion of Data-structure Sentinel

CWE-415: Double Free

Weakness ID: 415
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
The product calls free() twice on the same memory address. Diagram for CWE-415
+ Alternate Terms
Double-free
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Modify Memory; Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands

Scope: Integrity, Confidentiality, Availability

When a program calls free() twice with the same argument, the program's memory management data structures may become corrupted, potentially leading to the reading or modification of unexpected memory addresses. This corruption can cause the program to crash or, in some circumstances, cause two later calls to malloc() to return the same pointer. If malloc() returns the same value twice and the program later gives the attacker control over the data that is written into this doubly-allocated memory, the program becomes vulnerable to a buffer overflow attack.

Doubly freeing memory may result in a write-what-where condition, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary code.

+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design

Choose a language that provides automatic memory management.

Implementation

Ensure that each allocation is freed only once. After freeing a chunk, set the pointer to NULL to ensure the pointer cannot be freed again. In complicated error conditions, be sure that clean-up routines respect the state of allocation properly. If the language is object oriented, ensure that object destructors delete each chunk of memory only once.

Implementation

Use a static analysis tool to find double free instances.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 666 Operation on Resource in Wrong Phase of Lifetime
ChildOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 825 Expired Pointer Dereference
ChildOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1341 Multiple Releases of Same Resource or Handle
PeerOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 123 Write-what-where Condition
PeerOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 416 Use After Free
CanFollow Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 364 Signal Handler Race Condition
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 672 Operation on a Resource after Expiration or Release
+ Relevant to the view "CISQ Quality Measures (2020)" (View-1305)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 672 Operation on a Resource after Expiration or Release
+ Relevant to the view "CISQ Data Protection Measures" (View-1340)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 672 Operation on a Resource after Expiration or Release
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Memory-Unsafe (Often Prevalent)

C (Undetermined Prevalence)

C++ (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
High
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


The following code shows a simple example of a double free vulnerability.

(bad code)
Example Language:
char* ptr = (char*)malloc (SIZE);
...
if (abrt) {
free(ptr);
}
...
free(ptr);

Double free vulnerabilities have two common (and sometimes overlapping) causes:

  • Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances
  • Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for freeing the memory

Although some double free vulnerabilities are not much more complicated than this example, most are spread out across hundreds of lines of code or even different files. Programmers seem particularly susceptible to freeing global variables more than once.



Example 2


While contrived, this code should be exploitable on Linux distributions that do not ship with heap-chunk check summing turned on.

(bad code)
Example Language:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#define BUFSIZE1 512
#define BUFSIZE2 ((BUFSIZE1/2) - 8)

int main(int argc, char **argv) {
char *buf1R1;
char *buf2R1;
char *buf1R2;
buf1R1 = (char *) malloc(BUFSIZE2);
buf2R1 = (char *) malloc(BUFSIZE2);
free(buf1R1);
free(buf2R1);
buf1R2 = (char *) malloc(BUFSIZE1);
strncpy(buf1R2, argv[1], BUFSIZE1-1);
free(buf2R1);
free(buf1R2);
}


+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Chain: Signal handler contains too much functionality (CWE-828), introducing a race condition (CWE-362) that leads to a double free (CWE-415).
Double free resultant from certain error conditions.
Double free resultant from certain error conditions.
Double free resultant from certain error conditions.
Double free from invalid ASN.1 encoding.
Double free from malformed GIF.
Double free from malformed GIF.
Double free from malformed compressed data.
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Resultant
(where the weakness is typically related to the presence of some other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Fuzzing

Fuzz testing (fuzzing) is a powerful technique for generating large numbers of diverse inputs - either randomly or algorithmically - and dynamically invoking the code with those inputs. Even with random inputs, it is often capable of generating unexpected results such as crashes, memory corruption, or resource consumption. Fuzzing effectively produces repeatable test cases that clearly indicate bugs, which helps developers to diagnose the issues.

Effectiveness: High

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Effectiveness: High

Automated Dynamic Analysis

Use tools that are integrated during compilation to insert runtime error-checking mechanisms related to memory safety errors, such as AddressSanitizer (ASan) for C/C++ [REF-1518].

Effectiveness: Moderate

Note:Crafted inputs are necessary to reach the code containing the error, such as generated by fuzzers. Also, these tools may reduce performance, and they only report the error condition - not the original mistake that led to the error.
+ Functional Areas
  • Memory Management
+ Affected Resources
  • Memory
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 398 7PK - Code Quality
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 742 CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 9 - Memory Management (MEM)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 876 CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 08 - Memory Management (MEM)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 969 SFP Secondary Cluster: Faulty Memory Release
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1162 SEI CERT C Coding Standard - Guidelines 08. Memory Management (MEM)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1237 SFP Primary Cluster: Faulty Resource Release
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1399 Comprehensive Categorization: Memory Safety
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Variant level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Notes

Relationship

This is usually resultant from another weakness, such as an unhandled error or race condition between threads. It could also be primary to weaknesses such as buffer overflows.

Theoretical

It could be argued that Double Free would be most appropriately located as a child of "Use after Free", but "Use" and "Release" are considered to be distinct operations within vulnerability theory, therefore this is more accurately "Release of a Resource after Expiration or Release", which doesn't exist yet.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
PLOVER DFREE - Double-Free Vulnerability
7 Pernicious Kingdoms Double Free
CLASP Doubly freeing memory
CERT C Secure Coding MEM00-C Allocate and free memory in the same module, at the same level of abstraction
CERT C Secure Coding MEM01-C Store a new value in pointers immediately after free()
CERT C Secure Coding MEM30-C CWE More Specific Do not access freed memory
CERT C Secure Coding MEM31-C Free dynamically allocated memory exactly once
Software Fault Patterns SFP12 Faulty Memory Release
+ References
[REF-44] Michael Howard, David LeBlanc and John Viega. "24 Deadly Sins of Software Security". "Sin 8: C++ Catastrophes." Page 143. McGraw-Hill. 2010.
[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 7, "Double Frees", Page 379. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
[REF-18] Secure Software, Inc.. "The CLASP Application Security Process". 2005.
<https://cwe.mitre.org/documents/sources/TheCLASPApplicationSecurityProcess.pdf>. (URL validated: 2024-11-17)
[REF-1518] "AddressSanitizer".
<https://clang.llvm.org/docs/AddressSanitizer.html>. (URL validated: 2025-12-10)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
PLOVER
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Detection_Factors, References, Weakness_Ordinalities
2025-09-09
(CWE 4.18, 2025-09-09)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Functional_Areas
2025-04-03
(CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction
2022-04-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples
2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-03-15 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Maintenance_Notes, Theoretical_Notes
2020-12-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-08-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-06-25 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Likelihood_of_Exploit, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings, White_Box_Definitions
2015-12-07 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2011-09-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2010-12-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
2010-09-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2009-10-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Other_Notes
2009-05-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2008-11-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Description, Maintenance_Notes, Relationships, Other_Notes, Relationship_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-08-01 KDM Analytics
added/updated white box definitions
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction

CWE-462: Duplicate Key in Associative List (Alist)

Weakness ID: 462
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
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+ Description
Duplicate keys in associative lists can lead to non-unique keys being mistaken for an error.
+ Extended Description
A duplicate key entry -- if the alist is designed properly -- could be used as a constant time replace function. However, duplicate key entries could be inserted by mistake. Because of this ambiguity, duplicate key entries in an association list are not recommended and should not be allowed.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Quality Degradation; Varies by Context

Scope: Other

+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design

Use a hash table instead of an alist.

Architecture and Design

Use an alist which checks the uniqueness of hash keys with each entry before inserting the entry.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 694 Use of Multiple Resources with Duplicate Identifier
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

C (Undetermined Prevalence)

C++ (Undetermined Prevalence)

Java (Undetermined Prevalence)

C# (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
Low
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


The following code adds data to a list and then attempts to sort the data.

(bad code)
Example Language: Python 
alist = []
while (foo()): #now assume there is a string data with a key basename
queue.append(basename,data)
queue.sort()

Since basename is not necessarily unique, this may not sort how one would like it to be.



+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 744 CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 11 - Environment (ENV)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 878 CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 10 - Environment (ENV)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 977 SFP Secondary Cluster: Design
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1412 Comprehensive Categorization: Poor Coding Practices
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Variant level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
CLASP Duplicate key in associative list (alist)
CERT C Secure Coding ENV02-C Beware of multiple environment variables with the same effective name
+ References
[REF-18] Secure Software, Inc.. "The CLASP Application Security Process". 2005.
<https://cwe.mitre.org/documents/sources/TheCLASPApplicationSecurityProcess.pdf>. (URL validated: 2024-11-17)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
CLASP
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Weakness_Ordinalities
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Time_of_Introduction, Type
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Taxonomy_Mappings
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2011-09-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2009-10-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Other_Notes
2008-11-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction

CWE-825: Expired Pointer Dereference

Weakness ID: 825
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
The product dereferences a pointer that contains a location for memory that was previously valid, but is no longer valid.
+ Extended Description
When a product releases memory, but it maintains a pointer to that memory, then the memory might be re-allocated at a later time. If the original pointer is accessed to read or write data, then this could cause the product to read or modify data that is in use by a different function or process. Depending on how the newly-allocated memory is used, this could lead to a denial of service, information exposure, or code execution.
+ Alternate Terms
Dangling pointer
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Read Memory

Scope: Confidentiality

If the expired pointer is used in a read operation, an attacker might be able to control data read in by the application.

DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart

Scope: Availability

If the expired pointer references a memory location that is not accessible to the product, or points to a location that is "malformed" (such as NULL) or larger than expected by a read or write operation, then a crash may occur.

Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands

Scope: Integrity, Confidentiality, Availability

If the expired pointer is used in a function call, or points to unexpected data in a write operation, then code execution may be possible.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design

Choose a language that provides automatic memory management.

Implementation

When freeing pointers, be sure to set them to NULL once they are freed. However, the utilization of multiple or complex data structures may lower the usefulness of this strategy.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 672 Operation on a Resource after Expiration or Release
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 415 Double Free
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 416 Use After Free
CanFollow Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 562 Return of Stack Variable Address
CanPrecede Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 125 Out-of-bounds Read
CanPrecede Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 787 Out-of-bounds Write
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 465 Pointer Issues
+ Relevant to the view "CISQ Quality Measures (2020)" (View-1305)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
+ Relevant to the view "CISQ Data Protection Measures" (View-1340)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Memory-Unsafe (Undetermined Prevalence)

C (Undetermined Prevalence)

C++ (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


The following code shows a simple example of a use after free error:

(bad code)
Example Language:
char* ptr = (char*)malloc (SIZE);
if (err) {
abrt = 1;
free(ptr);
}
...
if (abrt) {
logError("operation aborted before commit", ptr);
}

When an error occurs, the pointer is immediately freed. However, this pointer is later incorrectly used in the logError function.



Example 2


The following code shows a simple example of a double free error:

(bad code)
Example Language:
char* ptr = (char*)malloc (SIZE);
...
if (abrt) {
free(ptr);
}
...
free(ptr);

Double free vulnerabilities have two common (and sometimes overlapping) causes:

  • Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances
  • Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for freeing the memory

Although some double free vulnerabilities are not much more complicated than the previous example, most are spread out across hundreds of lines of code or even different files. Programmers seem particularly susceptible to freeing global variables more than once.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Chain: IPSec VPN product uses the same variable for multiple purposes in the same function (CWE-1109), leading to incorrect access control (CWE-284) and expired pointer dereference (CWE-825)
access of expired memory address leads to arbitrary code execution
stale pointer issue leads to denial of service and possibly other consequences
Chain: a message having an unknown message type may cause a reference to uninitialized memory resulting in a null pointer dereference (CWE-476) or dangling pointer (CWE-825), possibly crashing the system or causing heap corruption.
read of value at an offset into a structure after the offset is no longer valid
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Resultant
(where the weakness is typically related to the presence of some other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Automated Dynamic Analysis

Use tools that are integrated during compilation to insert runtime error-checking mechanisms related to memory safety errors, such as AddressSanitizer (ASan) for C/C++ [REF-1518].

Effectiveness: Moderate

Note:Crafted inputs are necessary to reach the code containing the error, such as generated by fuzzers. Also, these tools may reduce performance, and they only report the error condition - not the original mistake that led to the error.
+ Functional Areas
  • Memory Management
+ Affected Resources
  • Memory
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 867 2011 Top 25 - Weaknesses On the Cusp
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1399 Comprehensive Categorization: Memory Safety
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Notes

Terminology

Many weaknesses related to pointer dereferences fall under the general term of "memory corruption" or "memory safety." As of September 2010, there is no commonly-used terminology that covers the lower-level variants.

Maintenance

There are close relationships between incorrect pointer dereferences and other weaknesses related to buffer operations. There may not be sufficient community agreement regarding these relationships. Further study is needed to determine when these relationships are chains, composites, perspective/layering, or other types of relationships. As of September 2010, most of the relationships are being captured as chains.
+ References
[REF-1518] "AddressSanitizer".
<https://clang.llvm.org/docs/AddressSanitizer.html>. (URL validated: 2025-12-10)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2010-09-22
(CWE 1.10, 2010-09-27)
CWE Content Team MITRE
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Detection_Factors, Observed_Examples, References, Time_of_Introduction, Weakness_Ordinalities
2025-09-09
(CWE 4.18, 2025-09-09)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Affected_Resources, Functional_Areas
2025-04-03
(CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Description
2022-04-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Research_Gaps
2021-03-15 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2020-12-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-08-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2013-02-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Alternate_Terms
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships
2011-06-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships

CWE-782: Exposed IOCTL with Insufficient Access Control

Weakness ID: 782
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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Edit Custom Filter


+ Description
The product implements an IOCTL with functionality that should be restricted, but it does not properly enforce access control for the IOCTL.
+ Extended Description

When an IOCTL contains privileged functionality and is exposed unnecessarily, attackers may be able to access this functionality by invoking the IOCTL. Even if the functionality is benign, if the programmer has assumed that the IOCTL would only be accessed by a trusted process, there may be little or no validation of the incoming data, exposing weaknesses that would never be reachable if the attacker cannot call the IOCTL directly.

The implementations of IOCTLs will differ between operating system types and versions, so the methods of attack and prevention may vary widely.

+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Varies by Context

Scope: Integrity, Availability, Confidentiality

Attackers can invoke any functionality that the IOCTL offers. Depending on the functionality, the consequences may include code execution, denial-of-service, and theft of data.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design

In Windows environments, use proper access control for the associated device or device namespace. See References.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 749 Exposed Dangerous Method or Function
CanPrecede Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 781 Improper Address Validation in IOCTL with METHOD_NEITHER I/O Control Code
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1011 Authorize Actors
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design
Implementation REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

C (Often Prevalent)

C++ (Often Prevalent)

Operating Systems

Class: Unix (Undetermined Prevalence)

Class: Windows (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Operating system does not enforce permissions on an IOCTL that can be used to modify network settings.
Device driver does not restrict ioctl calls to its direct rendering manager.
ioctl does not check for a required capability before processing certain requests.
Chain: insecure device permissions allows access to an IOCTL, allowing arbitrary memory to be overwritten.
Chain: anti-virus product uses weak permissions for a device, leading to resultant buffer overflow in an exposed IOCTL.
Chain: sandbox allows opening of a TTY device, enabling shell commands through an exposed ioctl.
Anti-virus product uses insecure security descriptor for a device driver, allowing access to a privileged IOCTL.
Unauthorized user can disable keyboard or mouse by directly invoking a privileged IOCTL.
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1416 Comprehensive Categorization: Resource Lifecycle Management
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Variant level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Notes

Relationship

This can be primary to many other weaknesses when the programmer assumes that the IOCTL can only be accessed by trusted parties. For example, a program or driver might not validate incoming addresses in METHOD_NEITHER IOCTLs in Windows environments (CWE-781), which could allow buffer overflow and similar attacks to take place, even when the attacker never should have been able to access the IOCTL at all.

Applicable Platform

Because IOCTL functionality is typically performing low-level actions and closely interacts with the operating system, this weakness may only appear in code that is written in low-level languages.

+ References
[REF-701] Microsoft. "Securing Device Objects".
<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/kernel/controlling-device-access>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2009-07-15
(CWE 1.5, 2009-07-27)
CWE Content Team MITRE
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Weakness_Ordinalities
2023-10-26 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2021-03-15 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Likelihood_of_Exploit, Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships
2009-12-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Time_of_Introduction

CWE-403: Exposure of File Descriptor to Unintended Control Sphere ('File Descriptor Leak')

Weakness ID: 403
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
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+ Description
A process does not close sensitive file descriptors before invoking a child process, which allows the child to perform unauthorized I/O operations using those descriptors.
+ Extended Description
When a new process is forked or executed, the child process inherits any open file descriptors. When the child process has fewer privileges than the parent process, this might introduce a vulnerability if the child process can access the file descriptor but does not have the privileges to access the associated file.
+ Alternate Terms
File descriptor leak
While this issue is frequently called a file descriptor leak, the "leak" term is often used in two different ways - exposure of a resource, or consumption of a resource. Use of this term could cause confusion.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Read Application Data; Modify Application Data

Scope: Confidentiality, Integrity

+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 402 Transmission of Private Resources into a New Sphere ('Resource Leak')
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 399 Resource Management Errors
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1011 Authorize Actors
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

C (Undetermined Prevalence)

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Operating Systems

Class: Unix (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Server leaks a privileged file descriptor, allowing the server to be hijacked.
File descriptor leak allows read of restricted files.
Access to restricted resource using modified file descriptor for stderr.
Open file descriptor used as alternate channel in complex race condition.
Program does not fully drop privileges after creating a file descriptor, which allows access to the descriptor via a separate vulnerability.
User bypasses restrictions by obtaining a file descriptor then calling setuid program, which does not close the descriptor.
Terminal manager does not properly close file descriptors, allowing attackers to access terminals of other users.
Module opens a file for reading twice, allowing attackers to read files.
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Resultant
(where the weakness is typically related to the presence of some other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Effectiveness: High

+ Functional Areas
  • Program Invocation
+ Affected Resources
  • System Process
  • File or Directory
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 743 CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 10 - Input Output (FIO)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 877 CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 09 - Input Output (FIO)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 963 SFP Secondary Cluster: Exposed Data
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1403 Comprehensive Categorization: Exposed Resource
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
PLOVER UNIX file descriptor leak
CERT C Secure Coding FIO42-C Ensure files are properly closed when they are no longer needed
Software Fault Patterns SFP23 Exposed Data
+ References
[REF-392] Paul Roberts. "File descriptors and setuid applications". 2007-02-05.
<https://blogs.oracle.com/paulr/entry/file_descriptors_and_setuid_applications>.
[REF-393] Apple. "Introduction to Secure Coding Guide". Elevating Privileges Safely.
<https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Security/Conceptual/SecureCodingGuide/Articles/AccessControl.html>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
PLOVER
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Weakness_Ordinalities
2025-09-09
(CWE 4.18, 2025-09-09)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Functional_Areas
2025-04-03
(CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Affected_Resources, Applicable_Platforms, Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2013-02-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Alternate_Terms, Description, Name, Observed_Examples, References
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2011-09-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2011-03-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Name
2008-11-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Affected_Resources, Observed_Examples, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2011-03-29 UNIX File Descriptor Leak
2013-02-21 Exposure of File Descriptor to Unintended Control Sphere

CWE-590: Free of Memory not on the Heap

Weakness ID: 590
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
The product calls free() on a pointer to memory that was not allocated using associated heap allocation functions such as malloc(), calloc(), or realloc().
+ Extended Description
When free() is called on an invalid pointer, the program's memory management data structures may become corrupted. This corruption can cause the program to crash or, in some circumstances, an attacker may be able to cause free() to operate on controllable memory locations to modify critical program variables or execute code.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands; Modify Memory

Scope: Integrity, Confidentiality, Availability

There is the potential for arbitrary code execution with privileges of the vulnerable program via a "write, what where" primitive. If pointers to memory which hold user information are freed, a malicious user will be able to write 4 bytes anywhere in memory.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Implementation

Only free pointers that you have called malloc on previously. This is the recommended solution. Keep track of which pointers point at the beginning of valid chunks and free them only once.

Implementation

Before freeing a pointer, the programmer should make sure that the pointer was previously allocated on the heap and that the memory belongs to the programmer. Freeing an unallocated pointer will cause undefined behavior in the program.

Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

For example, glibc in Linux provides protection against free of invalid pointers.

Architecture and Design

Use a language that provides abstractions for memory allocation and deallocation.

Testing

Use a tool that dynamically detects memory management problems, such as valgrind.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 762 Mismatched Memory Management Routines
CanPrecede Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 123 Write-what-where Condition
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Memory-Unsafe (Undetermined Prevalence)

C (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


In this example, an array of record_t structs, bar, is allocated automatically on the stack as a local variable and the programmer attempts to call free() on the array. The consequences will vary based on the implementation of free(), but it will not succeed in deallocating the memory.

(bad code)
Example Language:
void foo(){
record_t bar[MAX_SIZE];

/* do something interesting with bar */

...
free(bar);
}

This example shows the array allocated globally, as part of the data segment of memory and the programmer attempts to call free() on the array.

(bad code)
Example Language:
record_t bar[MAX_SIZE]; //Global var
void foo(){

/* do something interesting with bar */
...
free(bar);
}

Instead, if the programmer wanted to dynamically manage the memory, malloc() or calloc() should have been used.

(good code)
Example Language:
void foo(){
record_t *bar = (record_t*)malloc(MAX_SIZE*sizeof(record_t));

/* do something interesting with bar */

...
free(bar);
}

Additionally, global variables could be passed to free() when they are pointers to dynamically allocated memory.

(good code)
Example Language:
record_t *bar; //Global var
void foo(){
bar = (record_t*)malloc(MAX_SIZE*sizeof(record_t));

/* do something interesting with bar */

...
free(bar);
}


+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
Resultant
(where the weakness is typically related to the presence of some other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Fuzzing

Fuzz testing (fuzzing) is a powerful technique for generating large numbers of diverse inputs - either randomly or algorithmically - and dynamically invoking the code with those inputs. Even with random inputs, it is often capable of generating unexpected results such as crashes, memory corruption, or resource consumption. Fuzzing effectively produces repeatable test cases that clearly indicate bugs, which helps developers to diagnose the issues.

Effectiveness: High

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Effectiveness: High

Automated Dynamic Analysis

Use tools that are integrated during compilation to insert runtime error-checking mechanisms related to memory safety errors, such as AddressSanitizer (ASan) for C/C++ [REF-1518].

Effectiveness: Moderate

Note:Crafted inputs are necessary to reach the code containing the error, such as generated by fuzzers. Also, these tools may reduce performance, and they only report the error condition - not the original mistake that led to the error.
+ Functional Areas
  • Memory Management
+ Affected Resources
  • Memory
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 742 CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 9 - Memory Management (MEM)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 876 CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 08 - Memory Management (MEM)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 969 SFP Secondary Cluster: Faulty Memory Release
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1162 SEI CERT C Coding Standard - Guidelines 08. Memory Management (MEM)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1172 SEI CERT C Coding Standard - Guidelines 51. Microsoft Windows (WIN)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1399 Comprehensive Categorization: Memory Safety
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Variant level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Notes

Other

In C++, if the new operator was used to allocate the memory, it may be allocated with the malloc(), calloc() or realloc() family of functions in the implementation. Someone aware of this behavior might choose to map this problem to CWE-590 or to its parent, CWE-762, depending on their perspective.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
CERT C Secure Coding MEM34-C Exact Only free memory allocated dynamically
CERT C Secure Coding WIN30-C Imprecise Properly pair allocation and deallocation functions
Software Fault Patterns SFP12 Faulty Memory Release
+ References
[REF-480] "Valgrind".
<https://valgrind.org/>. (URL validated: 2025-07-24)
[REF-1518] "AddressSanitizer".
<https://clang.llvm.org/docs/AddressSanitizer.html>. (URL validated: 2025-12-10)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-12-15
(CWE Draft 5, 2006-12-15)
CWE Community
Submitted by members of the CWE community to extend early CWE versions
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Detection_Factors, References, Weakness_Ordinalities
2025-09-09
(CWE 4.18, 2025-09-09)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Functional_Areas, References
2025-04-03
(CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2021-03-15 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Maintenance_Notes, Other_Notes
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Taxonomy_Mappings
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2014-02-18 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2011-09-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2009-05-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Maintenance_Notes, Name, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
2009-01-12 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2008-11-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Relationships, Other_Notes
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2008-04-11 Improperly Freeing Heap Memory
2009-05-27 Free of Invalid Pointer Not on the Heap
2009-10-29 Free of Memory not on the Heap

CWE-761: Free of Pointer not at Start of Buffer

Weakness ID: 761
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
The product calls free() on a pointer to a memory resource that was allocated on the heap, but the pointer is not at the start of the buffer.
+ Extended Description

This can cause the product to crash, or in some cases, modify critical program variables or execute code.

This weakness often occurs when the memory is allocated explicitly on the heap with one of the malloc() family functions and free() is called, but pointer arithmetic has caused the pointer to be in the interior or end of the buffer.

+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Modify Memory; DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart; Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands

Scope: Integrity, Availability, Confidentiality

+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Implementation

When utilizing pointer arithmetic to traverse a buffer, use a separate variable to track progress through memory and preserve the originally allocated address for later freeing.

Implementation

When programming in C++, consider using smart pointers provided by the boost library to help correctly and consistently manage memory.

Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

For example, glibc in Linux provides protection against free of invalid pointers.

Architecture and Design

Use a language that provides abstractions for memory allocation and deallocation.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 763 Release of Invalid Pointer or Reference
+ Relevant to the view "CISQ Data Protection Measures" (View-1340)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 404 Improper Resource Shutdown or Release
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Memory-Unsafe (Often Prevalent)

C (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


In this example, the programmer dynamically allocates a buffer to hold a string and then searches for a specific character. After completing the search, the programmer attempts to release the allocated memory and return SUCCESS or FAILURE to the caller. Note: for simplification, this example uses a hard-coded "Search Me!" string and a constant string length of 20.

(bad code)
Example Language:
#define SUCCESS (1)
#define FAILURE (0)

int contains_char(char c){
char *str;
str = (char*)malloc(20*sizeof(char));
strcpy(str, "Search Me!");
while( *str != NULL){
if( *str == c ){

/* matched char, free string and return success */
free(str);
return SUCCESS;
}
/* didn't match yet, increment pointer and try next char */

str = str + 1;
}
/* we did not match the char in the string, free mem and return failure */

free(str);
return FAILURE;
}

However, if the character is not at the beginning of the string, or if it is not in the string at all, then the pointer will not be at the start of the buffer when the programmer frees it.

Instead of freeing the pointer in the middle of the buffer, the programmer can use an indexing pointer to step through the memory or abstract the memory calculations by using array indexing.

(good code)
Example Language:
#define SUCCESS (1)
#define FAILURE (0)

int cointains_char(char c){
char *str;
int i = 0;
str = (char*)malloc(20*sizeof(char));
strcpy(str, "Search Me!");
while( i < strlen(str) ){
if( str[i] == c ){

/* matched char, free string and return success */
free(str);
return SUCCESS;
}
/* didn't match yet, increment pointer and try next char */

i = i + 1;
}
/* we did not match the char in the string, free mem and return failure */

free(str);
return FAILURE;
}


Example 2


This code attempts to tokenize a string and place it into an array using the strsep function, which inserts a \0 byte in place of whitespace or a tab character. After finishing the loop, each string in the AP array points to a location within the input string.

(bad code)
Example Language:
char **ap, *argv[10], *inputstring;
for (ap = argv; (*ap = strsep(&inputstring, " \t")) != NULL;)
if (**ap != '\0')
if (++ap >= &argv[10])
break;

/.../
free(ap[4]);

Since strsep is not allocating any new memory, freeing an element in the middle of the array is equivalent to free a pointer in the middle of inputstring.



Example 3


Consider the following code in the context of a parsing application to extract commands out of user data. The intent is to parse each command and add it to a queue of commands to be executed, discarding each malformed entry.

(bad code)
Example Language:

//hardcode input length for simplicity
char* input = (char*) malloc(40*sizeof(char));
char *tok;
char* sep = " \t";

get_user_input( input );

/* The following loop will parse and process each token in the input string */

tok = strtok( input, sep);
while( NULL != tok ){
if( isMalformed( tok ) ){

/* ignore and discard bad data */
free( tok );
}
else{
add_to_command_queue( tok );
}
tok = strtok( NULL, sep));
}

While the above code attempts to free memory associated with bad commands, since the memory was all allocated in one chunk, it must all be freed together.

One way to fix this problem would be to copy the commands into a new memory location before placing them in the queue. Then, after all commands have been processed, the memory can safely be freed.

(good code)
Example Language:

//hardcode input length for simplicity
char* input = (char*) malloc(40*sizeof(char));
char *tok, *command;
char* sep = " \t";

get_user_input( input );

/* The following loop will parse and process each token in the input string */

tok = strtok( input, sep);
while( NULL != tok ){
if( !isMalformed( command ) ){

/* copy and enqueue good data */
command = (char*) malloc( (strlen(tok) + 1) * sizeof(char) );
strcpy( command, tok );
add_to_command_queue( command );
}
tok = strtok( NULL, sep));
}

free( input )


+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
function "internally calls 'calloc' and returns a pointer at an index... inside the allocated buffer. This led to freeing invalid memory."
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Resultant
(where the weakness is typically related to the presence of some other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation

Use a tool that dynamically detects memory management problems, such as valgrind.

Automated Dynamic Analysis

Use tools that are integrated during compilation to insert runtime error-checking mechanisms related to memory safety errors, such as AddressSanitizer (ASan) for C/C++ [REF-1518].

Effectiveness: Moderate

Note:Crafted inputs are necessary to reach the code containing the error, such as generated by fuzzers. Also, these tools may reduce performance, and they only report the error condition - not the original mistake that led to the error.
+ Functional Areas
  • Memory Management
+ Affected Resources
  • Memory
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 969 SFP Secondary Cluster: Faulty Memory Release
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1399 Comprehensive Categorization: Memory Safety
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Variant level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Notes

Maintenance

Currently, CWE-763 is the parent, however it may be desirable to have an intermediate parent which is not function-specific, similar to how CWE-762 is an intermediate parent between CWE-763 and CWE-590.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
Software Fault Patterns SFP12 Faulty Memory Release
+ References
[REF-657] "boost C++ Library Smart Pointers".
<https://www.boost.org/doc/libs/1_38_0/libs/smart_ptr/smart_ptr.htm>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-480] "Valgrind".
<https://valgrind.org/>. (URL validated: 2025-07-24)
[REF-1518] "AddressSanitizer".
<https://clang.llvm.org/docs/AddressSanitizer.html>. (URL validated: 2025-12-10)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2009-05-08
(CWE 1.4, 2009-05-27)
CWE Content Team MITRE
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References, Weakness_Ordinalities
2025-09-09
(CWE 4.18, 2025-09-09)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Functional_Areas, References
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2021-03-15 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2020-12-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2014-02-18 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2010-09-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships

CWE-685: Function Call With Incorrect Number of Arguments

Weakness ID: 685
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
The product calls a function, procedure, or routine, but the caller specifies too many arguments, or too few arguments, which may lead to undefined behavior and resultant weaknesses.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Quality Degradation

Scope: Other

+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Testing

Because this function call often produces incorrect behavior it will usually be detected during testing or normal operation of the product. During testing exercise all possible control paths will typically expose this weakness except in rare cases when the incorrect function call accidentally produces the correct results or if the provided argument type is very similar to the expected argument type.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 628 Function Call with Incorrectly Specified Arguments
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation This problem typically occurs when the programmer makes a typo, or copy and paste errors.
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

C (Undetermined Prevalence)

Perl (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Other

While this weakness might be caught by the compiler in some languages, it can occur more frequently in cases in which the called function accepts variable numbers of arguments, such as format strings in C. It also can occur in languages or environments that do not require that functions always be called with the correct number of arguments, such as Perl.
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 998 SFP Secondary Cluster: Glitch in Computation
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1157 SEI CERT C Coding Standard - Guidelines 03. Expressions (EXP)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1163 SEI CERT C Coding Standard - Guidelines 09. Input Output (FIO)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1412 Comprehensive Categorization: Poor Coding Practices
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Variant level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
Software Fault Patterns SFP1 Glitch in computation
CERT C Secure Coding EXP37-C CWE More Specific Call functions with the correct number and type of arguments
CERT C Secure Coding FIO47-C Imprecise Use valid format strings
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2008-04-11
(CWE Draft 9, 2008-04-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Potential_Mitigations
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Taxonomy_Mappings
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2011-06-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2010-02-16 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors
2009-10-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Modes_of_Introduction, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations
2009-05-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Detection_Factors, Relationships, Other_Notes, Weakness_Ordinalities
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Potential_Mitigations

CWE-688: Function Call With Incorrect Variable or Reference as Argument

Weakness ID: 688
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
×

Edit Custom Filter


+ Description
The product calls a function, procedure, or routine, but the caller specifies the wrong variable or reference as one of the arguments, which may lead to undefined behavior and resultant weaknesses.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Quality Degradation

Scope: Other

+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Testing

Because this function call often produces incorrect behavior it will usually be detected during testing or normal operation of the product. During testing exercise all possible control paths will typically expose this weakness except in rare cases when the incorrect function call accidentally produces the correct results or if the provided argument type is very similar to the expected argument type.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 628 Function Call with Incorrectly Specified Arguments
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation This problem typically occurs when the programmer makes a typo, or copy and paste errors.
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

C (Undetermined Prevalence)

Perl (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


In the following Java snippet, the accessGranted() method is accidentally called with the static ADMIN_ROLES array rather than the user roles.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
private static final String[] ADMIN_ROLES = ...;
public boolean void accessGranted(String resource, String user) {
String[] userRoles = getUserRoles(user);
return accessGranted(resource, ADMIN_ROLES);
}

private boolean void accessGranted(String resource, String[] userRoles) {

// grant or deny access based on user roles
...
}


+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Kernel code specifies the wrong variable in first argument, leading to resultant NULL pointer dereference.
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Other

While this weakness might be caught by the compiler in some languages, it can occur more frequently in cases in which the called function accepts variable numbers of arguments, such as format strings in C. It also can occur in loosely typed languages or environments. This might require an understanding of intended program behavior or design to determine whether the value is incorrect.
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 998 SFP Secondary Cluster: Glitch in Computation
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1412 Comprehensive Categorization: Poor Coding Practices
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Variant level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2008-04-11
(CWE Draft 9, 2008-04-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Potential_Mitigations
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships
2011-06-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2010-02-16 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors
2009-10-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Modes_of_Introduction, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations
2009-05-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Detection_Factors, Relationships, Other_Notes, Weakness_Ordinalities
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Potential_Mitigations
2008-07-01 Sean Eidemiller Cigital
added/updated demonstrative examples

CWE-122: Heap-based Buffer Overflow

Weakness ID: 122
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
×

Edit Custom Filter


+ Description
A heap overflow condition is a buffer overflow, where the buffer that can be overwritten is allocated in the heap portion of memory, generally meaning that the buffer was allocated using a routine such as malloc().
+ Alternate Terms
Heap Overflow
Heap Buffer Overflow
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart; DoS: Resource Consumption (CPU); DoS: Resource Consumption (Memory)

Scope: Availability

Buffer overflows generally lead to crashes. Other attacks leading to lack of availability are possible, including putting the program into an infinite loop.

Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands; Bypass Protection Mechanism; Modify Memory

Scope: Integrity, Confidentiality, Availability, Access Control

Buffer overflows often can be used to execute arbitrary code, which is usually outside the scope of a program's implicit security policy. Besides important user data, heap-based overflows can be used to overwrite function pointers that may be living in memory, pointing it to the attacker's code. Even in applications that do not explicitly use function pointers, the run-time will usually leave many in memory. For example, object methods in C++ are generally implemented using function pointers. Even in C programs, there is often a global offset table used by the underlying runtime.

Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands; Bypass Protection Mechanism; Other

Scope: Integrity, Confidentiality, Availability, Access Control, Other

When the consequence is arbitrary code execution, this can often be used to subvert any other security service.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation
Pre-design: Use a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds checking.

Architecture and Design

Use an abstraction library to abstract away risky APIs. Not a complete solution.

Operation; Build and Compilation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.

D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.

Effectiveness: Defense in Depth

Note:

This is not necessarily a complete solution, since these mechanisms only detect certain types of overflows. In addition, the result is still a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.

Operation; Build and Compilation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.

Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.

For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].

Effectiveness: Defense in Depth

Note: These techniques do not provide a complete solution. For instance, exploits frequently use a bug that discloses memory addresses in order to maximize reliability of code execution [REF-1337]. It has also been shown that a side-channel attack can bypass ASLR [REF-1333].

Implementation

Implement and perform bounds checking on input.

Implementation

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

Do not use dangerous functions such as gets. Look for their safe equivalent, which checks for the boundary.

Operation

Use OS-level preventative functionality. This is not a complete solution, but it provides some defense in depth.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 787 Out-of-bounds Write
ChildOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 788 Access of Memory Location After End of Buffer
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Memory-Unsafe (Often Prevalent)

C (Often Prevalent)

C++ (Often Prevalent)

Technologies

Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
High
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


While buffer overflow examples can be rather complex, it is possible to have very simple, yet still exploitable, heap-based buffer overflows:

(bad code)
Example Language:
#define BUFSIZE 256
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
char *buf;
buf = (char *)malloc(sizeof(char)*BUFSIZE);
strcpy(buf, argv[1]);
}

The buffer is allocated heap memory with a fixed size, but there is no guarantee the string in argv[1] will not exceed this size and cause an overflow.



Example 2


This example applies an encoding procedure to an input string and stores it into a buffer.

(bad code)
Example Language:
char * copy_input(char *user_supplied_string){
int i, dst_index;
char *dst_buf = (char*)malloc(4*sizeof(char) * MAX_SIZE);
if ( MAX_SIZE <= strlen(user_supplied_string) ){
die("user string too long, die evil hacker!");
}
dst_index = 0;
for ( i = 0; i < strlen(user_supplied_string); i++ ){
if( '&' == user_supplied_string[i] ){
dst_buf[dst_index++] = '&';
dst_buf[dst_index++] = 'a';
dst_buf[dst_index++] = 'm';
dst_buf[dst_index++] = 'p';
dst_buf[dst_index++] = ';';
}
else if ('<' == user_supplied_string[i] ){

/* encode to &lt; */
}
else dst_buf[dst_index++] = user_supplied_string[i];
}
return dst_buf;
}

The programmer attempts to encode the ampersand character in the user-controlled string, however the length of the string is validated before the encoding procedure is applied. Furthermore, the programmer assumes encoding expansion will only expand a given character by a factor of 4, while the encoding of the ampersand expands by 5. As a result, when the encoding procedure expands the string it is possible to overflow the destination buffer if the attacker provides a string of many ampersands.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Chain: Javascript engine code does not perform a length check (CWE-1284) leading to integer overflow (CWE-190) causing allocation of smaller buffer than expected (CWE-131) resulting in a heap-based buffer overflow (CWE-122)
Chain: in a web browser, an unsigned 64-bit integer is forcibly cast to a 32-bit integer (CWE-681) and potentially leading to an integer overflow (CWE-190). If an integer overflow occurs, this can cause heap memory corruption (CWE-122)
Chain: integer signedness error (CWE-195) passes signed comparison, leading to heap overflow (CWE-122)
Chain: product does not handle when an input string is not NULL terminated (CWE-170), leading to buffer over-read (CWE-125) or heap-based buffer overflow (CWE-122).
Chain: machine-learning product can have a heap-based buffer overflow (CWE-122) when some integer-oriented bounds are calculated by using ceiling() and floor() on floating point values (CWE-1339)
Chain: integer overflow (CWE-190) causes a negative signed value, which later bypasses a maximum-only check (CWE-839), leading to heap-based buffer overflow (CWE-122).
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Fuzzing

Fuzz testing (fuzzing) is a powerful technique for generating large numbers of diverse inputs - either randomly or algorithmically - and dynamically invoking the code with those inputs. Even with random inputs, it is often capable of generating unexpected results such as crashes, memory corruption, or resource consumption. Fuzzing effectively produces repeatable test cases that clearly indicate bugs, which helps developers to diagnose the issues.

Effectiveness: High

Automated Dynamic Analysis

Use tools that are integrated during compilation to insert runtime error-checking mechanisms related to memory safety errors, such as AddressSanitizer (ASan) for C/C++ [REF-1518].

Effectiveness: Moderate

Note:Crafted inputs are necessary to reach the code containing the error, such as generated by fuzzers. Also, these tools may reduce performance, and they only report the error condition - not the original mistake that led to the error.
+ Functional Areas
  • Memory Management
+ Affected Resources
  • Memory
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 970 SFP Secondary Cluster: Faulty Buffer Access
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1161 SEI CERT C Coding Standard - Guidelines 07. Characters and Strings (STR)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1399 Comprehensive Categorization: Memory Safety
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Variant level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Notes

Terminology

There is significant inconsistency regarding the "buffer overflow" term, which can have multiple interpretations and uses. Many people mean "writing past the end of a buffer." Others mean "writing past the end of a buffer, or before the beginning of a buffer." Still others might include "read" in the term.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
CLASP Heap overflow
Software Fault Patterns SFP8 Faulty Buffer Access
CERT C Secure Coding STR31-C CWE More Specific Guarantee that storage for strings has sufficient space for character data and the null terminator
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-2 Req CR 3.5
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 3-3 Req SR 3.5
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-1 Req SI-1
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-1 Req SI-2
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-1 Req SVV-1
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-1 Req SVV-3
+ References
[REF-7] Michael Howard and David LeBlanc. "Writing Secure Code". Chapter 5, "Heap Overruns" Page 138. 2nd Edition. Microsoft Press. 2002-12-04.
<https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/store/writing-secure-code-9780735617223>.
[REF-44] Michael Howard, David LeBlanc and John Viega. "24 Deadly Sins of Software Security". "Sin 5: Buffer Overruns." Page 89. McGraw-Hill. 2010.
[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 3, "Nonexecutable Stack", Page 76. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 5, "Protection Mechanisms", Page 189. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
[REF-58] Michael Howard. "Address Space Layout Randomization in Windows Vista".
<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/michael_howard/address-space-layout-randomization-in-windows-vista>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-60] "PaX".
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executable_space_protection#PaX>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-64] Grant Murphy. "Position Independent Executables (PIE)". Red Hat. 2012-11-28.
<https://www.redhat.com/en/blog/position-independent-executables-pie>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-18] Secure Software, Inc.. "The CLASP Application Security Process". 2005.
<https://cwe.mitre.org/documents/sources/TheCLASPApplicationSecurityProcess.pdf>. (URL validated: 2024-11-17)
[REF-1337] Alexander Sotirov and Mark Dowd. "Bypassing Browser Memory Protections: Setting back browser security by 10 years". Memory information leaks. 2008.
<https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-08/Sotirov_Dowd/bh08-sotirov-dowd.pdf>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1332] John Richard Moser. "Prelink and address space randomization". 2006-07-05.
<https://lwn.net/Articles/190139/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1333] Dmitry Evtyushkin, Dmitry Ponomarev, Nael Abu-Ghazaleh. "Jump Over ASLR: Attacking Branch Predictors to Bypass ASLR". 2016.
<http://www.cs.ucr.edu/~nael/pubs/micro16.pdf>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1334] D3FEND. "Stack Frame Canary Validation (D3-SFCV)". 2023.
<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:StackFrameCanaryValidation/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1335] D3FEND. "Segment Address Offset Randomization (D3-SAOR)". 2023.
<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:SegmentAddressOffsetRandomization/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1477] Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. "Secure by Design Alert: Eliminating Buffer Overflow Vulnerabilities". 2025-02-12.
<https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/secure-design-alert-eliminating-buffer-overflow-vulnerabilities>. (URL validated: 2025-07-18)
[REF-1518] "AddressSanitizer".
<https://clang.llvm.org/docs/AddressSanitizer.html>. (URL validated: 2025-12-10)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
CLASP
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2023-11-14
(CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29)
participants in the CWE ICS/OT SIG 62443 Mapping Fall Workshop
Contributed or reviewed taxonomy mappings for ISA/IEC 62443
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Alternate_Terms, Applicable_Platforms, Detection_Factors, Observed_Examples, References, Relationship_Notes, Terminology_Notes
2025-09-09
(CWE 4.18, 2025-09-09)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Functional_Areas, References
2025-04-03
(CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples, Taxonomy_Mappings
2023-10-26 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction
2021-07-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2021-03-15 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2018-03-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Causal_Nature, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Observed_Examples, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings, White_Box_Definitions
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2014-06-23 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2013-02-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Potential_Mitigations
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, References, Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2010-02-16 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2009-10-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2009-01-12 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships
2008-11-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Other_Notes, Relationship_Notes
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings, Weakness_Ordinalities
2008-08-01 KDM Analytics
added/updated white box definitions
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction

CWE-781: Improper Address Validation in IOCTL with METHOD_NEITHER I/O Control Code

Weakness ID: 781
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
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+ Description
The product defines an IOCTL that uses METHOD_NEITHER for I/O, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates the addresses that are provided.
+ Extended Description
When an IOCTL uses the METHOD_NEITHER option for I/O control, it is the responsibility of the IOCTL to validate the addresses that have been supplied to it. If validation is missing or incorrect, attackers can supply arbitrary memory addresses, leading to code execution or a denial of service.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Modify Memory; Read Memory; Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands; DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart

Scope: Integrity, Availability, Confidentiality

An attacker may be able to access memory that belongs to another process or user. If the attacker can control the contents that the IOCTL writes, it may lead to code execution at high privilege levels. At the least, a crash can occur.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Implementation

If METHOD_NEITHER is required for the IOCTL, then ensure that all user-space addresses are properly validated before they are first accessed. The ProbeForRead and ProbeForWrite routines are available for this task. Also properly protect and manage the user-supplied buffers, since the I/O Manager does not do this when METHOD_NEITHER is being used. See References.

Architecture and Design

If possible, avoid using METHOD_NEITHER in the IOCTL and select methods that effectively control the buffer size, such as METHOD_BUFFERED, METHOD_IN_DIRECT, or METHOD_OUT_DIRECT.

Architecture and Design; Implementation

If the IOCTL is part of a driver that is only intended to be accessed by trusted users, then use proper access control for the associated device or device namespace. See References.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1285 Improper Validation of Specified Index, Position, or Offset in Input
CanFollow Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 782 Exposed IOCTL with Insufficient Access Control
CanPrecede Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 822 Untrusted Pointer Dereference
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

C (Often Prevalent)

C++ (Often Prevalent)

Operating Systems

Windows NT (Sometimes Prevalent)

+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Driver for file-sharing and messaging protocol allows attackers to execute arbitrary code.
Anti-virus product does not validate addresses, allowing attackers to gain SYSTEM privileges.
DVD software allows attackers to cause a crash.
Personal firewall allows attackers to gain SYSTEM privileges.
chain: device driver for packet-capturing software allows access to an unintended IOCTL with resultant array index error.
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1406 Comprehensive Categorization: Improper Input Validation
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Variant level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Notes

Applicable Platform

Because IOCTL functionality is typically performing low-level actions and closely interacts with the operating system, this weakness may only appear in code that is written in low-level languages.

Research Gap

While this type of issue has been known since 2006, it is probably still under-studied and under-reported. Most of the focus has been on high-profile software and security products, but other kinds of system software also use drivers. Since exploitation requires the development of custom code, it requires some skill to find this weakness.

Because exploitation typically requires local privileges, it might not be a priority for active attackers. However, remote exploitation may be possible for software such as device drivers. Even when remote vectors are not available, it may be useful as the final privilege-escalation step in multi-stage remote attacks against application-layer software, or as the primary attack by a local user on a multi-user system.

+ References
[REF-696] Ruben Santamarta. "Exploiting Common Flaws in Drivers". 2007-07-11.
<http://reversemode.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=38&Itemid=1>.
[REF-697] Yuriy Bulygin. "Remote and Local Exploitation of Network Drivers". 2007-08-01.
<https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-07/Bulygin/Presentation/bh-usa-07-bulygin.pdf>.
[REF-698] Anibal Sacco. "Windows driver vulnerabilities: the METHOD_NEITHER odyssey". 2008-10.
<http://www.net-security.org/dl/insecure/INSECURE-Mag-18.pdf>.
[REF-699] Microsoft. "Buffer Descriptions for I/O Control Codes".
<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/kernel/buffer-descriptions-for-i-o-control-codes>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-700] Microsoft. "Using Neither Buffered Nor Direct I/O".
<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/kernel/using-neither-buffered-nor-direct-i-o>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-701] Microsoft. "Securing Device Objects".
<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/kernel/controlling-device-access>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-702] Piotr Bania. "Exploiting Windows Device Drivers".
<https://www.piotrbania.com/all/articles/ewdd.pdf>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2009-07-15
(CWE 1.5, 2009-07-27)
CWE Content Team MITRE
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Weakness_Ordinalities
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2020-06-25 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Likelihood_of_Exploit, References
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2010-09-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2009-12-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Potential_Mitigations, References, Time_of_Introduction

CWE-460: Improper Cleanup on Thrown Exception

Weakness ID: 460
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
The product does not clean up its state or incorrectly cleans up its state when an exception is thrown, leading to unexpected state or control flow.
+ Extended Description
Often, when functions or loops become complicated, some level of resource cleanup is needed throughout execution. Exceptions can disturb the flow of the code and prevent the necessary cleanup from happening.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Varies by Context

Scope: Other

The code could be left in a bad state.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Implementation

If one breaks from a loop or function by throwing an exception, make sure that cleanup happens or that you should exit the program. Use throwing exceptions sparsely.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 459 Incomplete Cleanup
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 755 Improper Handling of Exceptional Conditions
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1012 Cross Cutting
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

C (Undetermined Prevalence)

C++ (Undetermined Prevalence)

Java (Undetermined Prevalence)

C# (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
Medium
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


The following example demonstrates the weakness.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
public class foo {
public static final void main( String args[] ) {

boolean returnValue;
returnValue=doStuff();
}
public static final boolean doStuff( ) {

boolean threadLock;
boolean truthvalue=true;
try {

while(
//check some condition
) {

threadLock=true; //do some stuff to truthvalue
threadLock=false;
}
}
catch (Exception e){

System.err.println("You did something bad");
if (something) return truthvalue;
}
return truthvalue;
}
}

In this case, a thread might be left locked accidentally.



+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Effectiveness: High

+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 851 The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) Chapter 8 - Exceptional Behavior (ERR)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 880 CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 12 - Exceptions and Error Handling (ERR)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 961 SFP Secondary Cluster: Incorrect Exception Behavior
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1141 SEI CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java - Guidelines 07. Exceptional Behavior (ERR)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1181 SEI CERT Perl Coding Standard - Guidelines 03. Expressions (EXP)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1416 Comprehensive Categorization: Resource Lifecycle Management
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1445 OWASP Top Ten 2025 Category A10:2025 - Mishandling of Exceptional Conditions
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
CLASP Improper cleanup on thrown exception
The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) ERR03-J Restore prior object state on method failure
The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) ERR05-J Do not let checked exceptions escape from a finally block
SEI CERT Perl Coding Standard EXP31-PL Imprecise Do not suppress or ignore exceptions
+ References
[REF-18] Secure Software, Inc.. "The CLASP Application Security Process". 2005.
<https://cwe.mitre.org/documents/sources/TheCLASPApplicationSecurityProcess.pdf>. (URL validated: 2024-11-17)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
CLASP
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships
2021-03-15 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Type
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-06-23 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Other_Notes
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2011-09-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2009-05-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2009-03-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction

CWE-244: Improper Clearing of Heap Memory Before Release ('Heap Inspection')

Weakness ID: 244
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
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+ Description
Using realloc() to resize buffers that store sensitive information can leave the sensitive information exposed to attack, because it is not removed from memory.
+ Extended Description
When sensitive data such as a password or an encryption key is not removed from memory, it could be exposed to an attacker using a "heap inspection" attack that reads the sensitive data using memory dumps or other methods. The realloc() function is commonly used to increase the size of a block of allocated memory. This operation often requires copying the contents of the old memory block into a new and larger block. This operation leaves the contents of the original block intact but inaccessible to the program, preventing the program from being able to scrub sensitive data from memory. If an attacker can later examine the contents of a memory dump, the sensitive data could be exposed.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Read Memory; Other

Scope: Confidentiality, Other

Be careful using vfork() and fork() in security sensitive code. The process state will not be cleaned up and will contain traces of data from past use.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 226 Sensitive Information in Resource Not Removed Before Reuse
CanPrecede Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 669 Incorrect Resource Transfer Between Spheres
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Memory-Unsafe (Undetermined Prevalence)

C (Undetermined Prevalence)

C++ (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


The following code calls realloc() on a buffer containing sensitive data:

(bad code)
Example Language:
cleartext_buffer = get_secret();...
cleartext_buffer = realloc(cleartext_buffer, 1024);
...
scrub_memory(cleartext_buffer, 1024);

There is an attempt to scrub the sensitive data from memory, but realloc() is used, so it could return a pointer to a different part of memory. The memory that was originally allocated for cleartext_buffer could still contain an uncleared copy of the data.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Cryptography library does not clear heap memory before release
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)
+ Functional Areas
  • Memory Management
+ Affected Resources
  • Memory
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 227 7PK - API Abuse
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 742 CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 9 - Memory Management (MEM)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 876 CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 08 - Memory Management (MEM)
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 963 SFP Secondary Cluster: Exposed Data
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1399 Comprehensive Categorization: Memory Safety
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Variant level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
7 Pernicious Kingdoms Heap Inspection
CERT C Secure Coding MEM03-C Clear sensitive information stored in reusable resources returned for reuse
Software Fault Patterns SFP23 Exposed Data
+ References
[REF-6] Katrina Tsipenyuk, Brian Chess and Gary McGraw. "Seven Pernicious Kingdoms: A Taxonomy of Software Security Errors". NIST Workshop on Software Security Assurance Tools Techniques and Metrics. NIST. 2005-11-07.
<https://samate.nist.gov/SSATTM_Content/papers/Seven%20Pernicious%20Kingdoms%20-%20Taxonomy%20of%20Sw%20Security%20Errors%20-%20Tsipenyuk%20-%20Chess%20-%20McGraw.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
7 Pernicious Kingdoms
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Detection_Factors, Weakness_Ordinalities
2025-09-09
(CWE 4.18, 2025-09-09)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Functional_Areas
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings, White_Box_Definitions
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2011-09-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2010-12-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Name
2009-10-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Other_Notes
2009-05-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Name
2008-11-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-10-14 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Name, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-08-01 KDM Analytics
added/updated white box definitions
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2008-04-11 Heap Inspection
2008-09-09 Failure to Clear Heap Memory Before Release
2009-05-27 Failure to Clear Heap Memory Before Release (aka 'Heap Inspection')
2010-12-13 Failure to Clear Heap Memory Before Release ('Heap Inspection')

CWE-130: Improper Handling of Length Parameter Inconsistency

Weakness ID: 130
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
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+ Description
The product parses a formatted message or structure, but it does not handle or incorrectly handles a length field that is inconsistent with the actual length of the associated data.
+ Extended Description
If an attacker can manipulate the length parameter associated with an input such that it is inconsistent with the actual length of the input, this can be leveraged to cause the target application to behave in unexpected, and possibly, malicious ways. One of the possible motives for doing so is to pass in arbitrarily large input to the application. Another possible motivation is the modification of application state by including invalid data for subsequent properties of the application. Such weaknesses commonly lead to attacks such as buffer overflows and execution of arbitrary code.
+ Alternate Terms
length manipulation
length tampering
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Read Memory; Modify Memory; Varies by Context

Scope: Confidentiality, Integrity

+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Implementation

When processing structured incoming data containing a size field followed by raw data, ensure that you identify and resolve any inconsistencies between the size field and the actual size of the data.

Implementation

Do not let the user control the size of the buffer.

Implementation

Validate that the length of the user-supplied data is consistent with the buffer size.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 240 Improper Handling of Inconsistent Structural Elements
CanPrecede Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 805 Buffer Access with Incorrect Length Value
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 19 Data Processing Errors
+ Relevant to the view "CISQ Quality Measures (2020)" (View-1305)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
+ Relevant to the view "CISQ Data Protection Measures" (View-1340)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

C (Sometimes Prevalent)

C++ (Sometimes Prevalent)

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


In the following C/C++ example the method processMessageFromSocket() will get a message from a socket, placed into a buffer, and will parse the contents of the buffer into a structure that contains the message length and the message body. A for loop is used to copy the message body into a local character string which will be passed to another method for processing.

(bad code)
Example Language:
int processMessageFromSocket(int socket) {
int success;

char buffer[BUFFER_SIZE];
char message[MESSAGE_SIZE];

// get message from socket and store into buffer

//Ignoring possibliity that buffer > BUFFER_SIZE
if (getMessage(socket, buffer, BUFFER_SIZE) > 0) {

// place contents of the buffer into message structure
ExMessage *msg = recastBuffer(buffer);

// copy message body into string for processing
int index;
for (index = 0; index < msg->msgLength; index++) {
message[index] = msg->msgBody[index];
}
message[index] = '\0';

// process message
success = processMessage(message);
}
return success;
}

However, the message length variable (msgLength) from the structure is used as the condition for ending the for loop without validating that msgLength accurately reflects the actual length of the message body (CWE-606). If msgLength indicates a length that is longer than the size of a message body (CWE-130), then this can result in a buffer over-read by reading past the end of the buffer (CWE-126).



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Chain: "Heartbleed" bug receives an inconsistent length parameter (CWE-130) enabling an out-of-bounds read (CWE-126), returning memory that could include private cryptographic keys and other sensitive data.
Web application firewall consumes excessive memory when an HTTP request contains a large Content-Length value but no POST data.
Buffer overflow in internal string handling routine allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands via a length argument of zero or less, which disables the length check.
Web server allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via an HTTP request with a content-length value that is larger than the size of the request, which prevents server from timing out the connection.
Service does not properly check the specified length of a cookie, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands via a buffer overflow, or brute force authentication by using a short cookie length.
Traffic analyzer allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service and possibly execute arbitrary code via invalid IPv4 or IPv6 prefix lengths, possibly triggering a buffer overflow.
Chat client allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or execute arbitrary commands via a JPEG image containing a comment with an illegal field length of 1.
Server allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service and possibly execute arbitrary code via a negative Content-Length HTTP header field causing a heap-based buffer overflow.
Help program allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands via a heap-based buffer overflow caused by a .CHM file with a large length field
Name services does not properly validate the length of certain packets, which allows attackers to cause a denial of service and possibly execute arbitrary code. Can overlap zero-length issues
Policy manager allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption and crash) and possibly execute arbitrary code via an HTTP POST request with an invalid Content-Length value.
Heap-based buffer overflow in library allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a modified record length field in an SSLv2 client hello message.
When domain logons are enabled, server allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via a SAM_UAS_CHANGE request with a length value that is larger than the number of structures that are provided.
Multiple SSH2 servers and clients do not properly handle packets or data elements with incorrect length specifiers, which may allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly execute arbitrary code.
Server allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU and memory exhaustion) via a POST request with a Content-Length header set to -1.
Multiple buffer overflows in xml library that may allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via long URLs.
Application does not properly validate the length of a value that is saved in a session file, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a malicious session file (.ht), web site, or Telnet URL contained in an e-mail message, triggering a buffer overflow.
Server allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via a remote password array with an invalid length, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
Product allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service and possibly execute arbitrary code via an SMB packet that specifies a smaller buffer length than is required.
Server allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a LoginExt packet for a Cleartext Password User Authentication Method (UAM) request with a PathName argument that includes an AFPName type string that is longer than the associated length field.
PDF viewer allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a PDF file with a large /Encrypt /Length keyLength value.
SVN client trusts the length field of SVN protocol URL strings, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service and possibly execute arbitrary code via an integer overflow that leads to a heap-based buffer overflow.
Is effectively an accidental double increment of a counter that prevents a length check conditional from exiting a loop.
Length field of a request not verified.
Buffer overflow by modifying a length value.
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Effectiveness: High

+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 990 SFP Secondary Cluster: Tainted Input to Command
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1407 Comprehensive Categorization: Improper Neutralization
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Notes

Relationship

This probably overlaps other categories including zero-length issues.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
PLOVER Length Parameter Inconsistency
Software Fault Patterns SFP24 Tainted Input to Command
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
PLOVER
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Detection_Factors
2025-09-09
(CWE 4.18, 2025-09-09)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Time_of_Introduction
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Taxonomy_Mappings
2020-12-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-08-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-06-25 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Causal_Nature, Demonstrative_Examples
2017-01-19 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Type
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-06-23 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2013-07-17 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Type
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
2011-06-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2011-03-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2010-12-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2010-02-16 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
2009-12-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2009-03-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Name
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Description, Name, Relationships, Observed_Example, Relationship_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings, Weakness_Ordinalities
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2008-09-09 Length Parameter Inconsistency
2009-03-10 Failure to Handle Length Parameter Inconsistency

CWE-158: Improper Neutralization of Null Byte or NUL Character

Weakness ID: 158
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
×

Edit Custom Filter


+ Description
The product receives input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes NUL characters or null bytes when they are sent to a downstream component.
+ Extended Description
As data is parsed, an injected NUL character or null byte may cause the product to believe the input is terminated earlier than it actually is, or otherwise cause the input to be misinterpreted. This could then be used to inject potentially dangerous input that occurs after the null byte or otherwise bypass validation routines and other protection mechanisms.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Unexpected State

Scope: Integrity

+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation
Developers should anticipate that null characters or null bytes will be injected/removed/manipulated in the input vectors of their product. Use an appropriate combination of denylists and allowlists to ensure only valid, expected and appropriate input is processed by the system.

Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.

When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."

Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.

Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 138 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

C (Undetermined Prevalence)

C++ (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
NUL byte in theme name causes directory traversal impact to be worse
Source code disclosure using trailing null.
Source code disclosure using trailing null.
Trailing null allows file include.
Null character in MIME header allows detection bypass.
Web server allows remote attackers to view the source code for CGI programs via a null character (%00) at the end of a URL.
Web server earlier allows allows remote attackers to bypass access restrictions, list directory contents, and read source code by inserting a null character (%00) in the URL.
Logging system allows an attacker to cause a denial of service (hang) by causing null bytes to be placed in log messages.
Web server allows source code for executable programs to be read via a null character (%00) at the end of a request.
Protection mechanism for limiting file access can be bypassed using a null character (%00) at the end of the directory name.
Application server allows remote attackers to read JSP source code via an encoded null byte in an HTTP GET request, which causes the server to send the .JSP file unparsed.
XSS protection mechanism only checks for sequences with an alphabetical character following a (<), so a non-alphabetical or null character (%00) following a < may be processed.
Decoding function in proxy allows regular expression bypass in ACLs via URLs with null characters.
Null byte bypasses PHP regexp check (interaction error).
Null byte bypasses PHP regexp check (interaction error).
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 990 SFP Secondary Cluster: Tainted Input to Command
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1407 Comprehensive Categorization: Improper Neutralization
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Variant level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Notes

Relationship

This can be a factor in multiple interpretation errors, other interaction errors, filename equivalence, etc.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
PLOVER Null Character / Null Byte
WASC 28 Null Byte Injection
Software Fault Patterns SFP24 Tainted input to command
+ References
[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 8, "NUL Character Injection", Page 411. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
[REF-516] ShAnKaR. "ShAnKaR: multiple PHP application poison NULL byte vulnerability".
<https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2006/Sep/185>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-1494] Cyber T. "Null Byte Attacks Explained". 2025-08-28.
<https://medium.com/meetcyber/null-byte-attacks-explained-f032f125b919>. (URL validated: 2025-11-30)
[REF-1495] Twingate. "What Is Null Byte Injection? How It Works & Examples". 2024-08-07.
<https://www.twingate.com/blog/glossary/null%20byte%20injection>. (URL validated: 2025-11-30)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
PLOVER
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, References, Weakness_Ordinalities
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Potential_Mitigations
2020-06-25 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms
2017-05-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples, References, Relationships
2011-06-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2011-03-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2010-04-05 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Name
2010-02-16 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Taxonomy_Mappings
2009-07-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2008-11-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2008-10-14 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Relationship_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Potential_Mitigations
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2008-01-30 Null Character / Null Byte
2008-04-11 Failure to Remove Null Character / Null Byte
2010-04-05 Failure to Sanitize Null Byte or NUL Character

CWE-170: Improper Null Termination

Weakness ID: 170
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
The product does not terminate or incorrectly terminates a string or array with a null character or equivalent terminator.
+ Extended Description
Null termination errors frequently occur in two different ways. An off-by-one error could cause a null to be written out of bounds, leading to an overflow. Or, a program could use a strncpy() function call incorrectly, which prevents a null terminator from being added at all. Other scenarios are possible.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Read Memory; Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands

Scope: Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability

The case of an omitted null character is the most dangerous of the possible issues. This will almost certainly result in information disclosure, and possibly a buffer overflow condition, which may be exploited to execute arbitrary code.

DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart; Read Memory; DoS: Resource Consumption (CPU); DoS: Resource Consumption (Memory)

Scope: Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability

If a null character is omitted from a string, then most string-copying functions will read data until they locate a null character, even outside of the intended boundaries of the string. This could: cause a crash due to a segmentation fault cause sensitive adjacent memory to be copied and sent to an outsider trigger a buffer overflow when the copy is being written to a fixed-size buffer.

Modify Memory; DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart

Scope: Integrity, Availability

Misplaced null characters may result in any number of security problems. The biggest issue is a subset of buffer overflow, and write-what-where conditions, where data corruption occurs from the writing of a null character over valid data, or even instructions. A randomly placed null character may put the system into an undefined state, and therefore make it prone to crashing. A misplaced null character may corrupt other data in memory.

Alter Execution Logic; Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands

Scope: Integrity, Confidentiality, Availability, Access Control, Other

Should the null character corrupt the process flow, or affect a flag controlling access, it may lead to logical errors which allow for the execution of arbitrary code.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Requirements

Use a language that is not susceptible to these issues. However, be careful of null byte interaction errors (CWE-626) with lower-level constructs that may be written in a language that is susceptible.

Implementation

Ensure that all string functions used are understood fully as to how they append null characters. Also, be wary of off-by-one errors when appending nulls to the end of strings.

Implementation

If performance constraints permit, special code can be added that validates null-termination of string buffers, this is a rather naive and error-prone solution.

Implementation

Switch to bounded string manipulation functions. Inspect buffer lengths involved in the buffer overrun trace reported with the defect.

Implementation

Add code that fills buffers with nulls (however, the length of buffers still needs to be inspected, to ensure that the non null-terminated string is not written at the physical end of the buffer).
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 707 Improper Neutralization
PeerOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 463 Deletion of Data Structure Sentinel
PeerOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 464 Addition of Data Structure Sentinel
CanAlsoBe Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 147 Improper Neutralization of Input Terminators
CanFollow Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 193 Off-by-one Error
CanFollow Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 682 Incorrect Calculation
CanPrecede Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 120 Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input ('Classic Buffer Overflow')
CanPrecede Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 126 Buffer Over-read
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 137 Data Neutralization Issues
+ Relevant to the view "Seven Pernicious Kingdoms" (View-700)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 20 Improper Input Validation
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

C (Undetermined Prevalence)

C++ (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
Medium
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


The following code reads from cfgfile and copies the input into inputbuf using strcpy(). The code mistakenly assumes that inputbuf will always contain a NULL terminator.

(bad code)
Example Language:
#define MAXLEN 1024
...
char *pathbuf[MAXLEN];
...
read(cfgfile,inputbuf,MAXLEN); //does not null terminate
strcpy(pathbuf,inputbuf); //requires null terminated input
...

The code above will behave correctly if the data read from cfgfile is null terminated on disk as expected. But if an attacker is able to modify this input so that it does not contain the expected NULL character, the call to strcpy() will continue copying from memory until it encounters an arbitrary NULL character. This will likely overflow the destination buffer and, if the attacker can control the contents of memory immediately following inputbuf, can leave the application susceptible to a buffer overflow attack.



Example 2


In the following code, readlink() expands the name of a symbolic link stored in pathname and puts the absolute path into buf. The length of the resulting value is then calculated using strlen().

(bad code)
Example Language:
char buf[MAXPATH];
...
readlink(pathname, buf, MAXPATH);
int length = strlen(buf);
...

The code above will not always behave correctly as readlink() does not append a NULL byte to buf. Readlink() will stop copying characters once the maximum size of buf has been reached to avoid overflowing the buffer, this will leave the value buf not NULL terminated. In this situation, strlen() will continue traversing memory until it encounters an arbitrary NULL character further on down the stack, resulting in a length value that is much larger than the size of string. Readlink() does return the number of bytes copied, but when this return value is the same as stated buf size (in this case MAXPATH), it is impossible to know whether the pathname is precisely that many bytes long, or whether readlink() has truncated the name to avoid overrunning the buffer. In testing, vulnerabilities like this one might not be caught because the unused contents of buf and the memory immediately following it may be NULL, thereby causing strlen() to appear as if it is behaving correctly.



Example 3


While the following example is not exploitable, it provides a good example of how nulls can be omitted or misplaced, even when "safe" functions are used:

(bad code)
Example Language:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>

int main() {

char longString[] = "String signifying nothing";
char shortString[16];

strncpy(shortString, longString, 16);
printf("The last character in shortString is: %c (%1$x)\n", shortString[15]);
return (0);
}

The above code gives the following output: "The last character in shortString is: n (6e)". So, the shortString array does not end in a NULL character, even though the "safe" string function strncpy() was used. The reason is that strncpy() does not impliciitly add a NULL character at the end of the string when the source is equal in length or longer than the provided size.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Attacker does not null-terminate argv[] when invoking another program.
Interrupted step causes resultant lack of null termination.
Fault causes resultant lack of null termination, leading to buffer expansion.
Multiple vulnerabilities related to improper null termination.
Product does not null terminate a message buffer after snprintf-like call, leading to overflow.
Chain: product does not handle when an input string is not NULL terminated (CWE-170), leading to buffer over-read (CWE-125) or heap-based buffer overflow (CWE-122).
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Resultant
(where the weakness is typically related to the presence of some other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Effectiveness: High

+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 730 OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A9 - Denial of Service
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 741 CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 8 - Characters and Strings (STR)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 748 CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Appendix - POSIX (POS)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 875 CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 07 - Characters and Strings (STR)
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 973 SFP Secondary Cluster: Improper NULL Termination
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1161 SEI CERT C Coding Standard - Guidelines 07. Characters and Strings (STR)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1171 SEI CERT C Coding Standard - Guidelines 50. POSIX (POS)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1306 CISQ Quality Measures - Reliability
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1340 CISQ Data Protection Measures
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1407 Comprehensive Categorization: Improper Neutralization
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Notes

Relationship

Factors: this is usually resultant from other weaknesses such as off-by-one errors, but it can be primary to boundary condition violations such as buffer overflows. In buffer overflows, it can act as an expander for assumed-immutable data.

Relationship

Overlaps missing input terminator.

Applicable Platform

Conceptually, this does not just apply to the C language; any language or representation that involves a terminator could have this type of problem.

Maintenance

As currently described, this entry is more like a category than a weakness.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
PLOVER Improper Null Termination
7 Pernicious Kingdoms String Termination Error
CLASP Miscalculated null termination
OWASP Top Ten 2004 A9 CWE More Specific Denial of Service
CERT C Secure Coding POS30-C CWE More Abstract Use the readlink() function properly
CERT C Secure Coding STR03-C Do not inadvertently truncate a null-terminated byte string
CERT C Secure Coding STR32-C Exact Do not pass a non-null-terminated character sequence to a library function that expects a string
Software Fault Patterns SFP11 Improper Null Termination
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
PLOVER
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2020-12-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-08-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2018-03-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Causal_Nature, Observed_Examples, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings, White_Box_Definitions
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2014-06-23 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2011-09-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2011-03-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2009-10-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2009-07-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, White_Box_Definitions
2009-07-17 KDM Analytics
Improved the White_Box_Definition
2009-05-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2009-03-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2008-11-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Causal_Nature, Common_Consequences, Description, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Maintenance_Notes, Relationships, Other_Notes, Relationship_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings, Weakness_Ordinalities
2008-08-01 KDM Analytics
added/updated white box definitions
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction

CWE-119: Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer

Weakness ID: 119
Vulnerability Mapping: DISCOURAGED This CWE ID should not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
×

Edit Custom Filter


+ Description
The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it reads from or writes to a memory location outside the buffer's intended boundary. This may result in read or write operations on unexpected memory locations that could be linked to other variables, data structures, or internal program data. Diagram for CWE-119
+ Alternate Terms
Buffer Overflow
This term has many different meanings to different audiences. From a CWE mapping perspective, this term should be avoided where possible. Some researchers, developers, and tools intend for it to mean "write past the end of a buffer," whereas others use the same term to mean "any read or write outside the boundaries of a buffer, whether before the beginning of the buffer or after the end of the buffer." Others could mean "any action after the end of a buffer, whether it is a read or write." Since the term is commonly used for exploitation and for vulnerabilities, it further confuses things.
buffer overrun
Some prominent vendors and researchers use the term "buffer overrun," but most people use "buffer overflow." See the alternate term for "buffer overflow" for context.
memory safety
Generally used for techniques that avoid weaknesses related to memory access, such as those identified by CWE-119 and its descendants. However, the term is not formal, and there is likely disagreement between practitioners as to which weaknesses are implicitly covered by the "memory safety" term.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands; Modify Memory

Scope: Integrity, Confidentiality, Availability

If the memory accessible by the attacker can be effectively controlled, it may be possible to execute arbitrary code, as with a standard buffer overflow. If the attacker can overwrite a pointer's worth of memory (usually 32 or 64 bits), they can alter the intended control flow by redirecting a function pointer to their own malicious code. Even when the attacker can only modify a single byte arbitrary code execution can be possible. Sometimes this is because the same problem can be exploited repeatedly to the same effect. Other times it is because the attacker can overwrite security-critical application-specific data -- such as a flag indicating whether the user is an administrator.

Read Memory; DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart; DoS: Resource Consumption (CPU); DoS: Resource Consumption (Memory)

Scope: Availability, Confidentiality

Out of bounds memory access will very likely result in the corruption of relevant memory, and perhaps instructions, possibly leading to a crash. Other attacks leading to lack of availability are possible, including putting the program into an infinite loop.

Read Memory

Scope: Confidentiality

In the case of an out-of-bounds read, the attacker may have access to sensitive information. If the sensitive information contains system details, such as the current buffer's position in memory, this knowledge can be used to craft further attacks, possibly with more severe consequences.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Requirements

Strategy: Language Selection

Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.

Be wary that a language's interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.

Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.

Note: This is not a complete solution, since many buffer overflows are not related to strings.

Operation; Build and Compilation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.

D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.

Effectiveness: Defense in Depth

Note:

This is not necessarily a complete solution, since these mechanisms only detect certain types of overflows. In addition, the result is still a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.

Implementation

Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application's memory:

  • Double check that the buffer is as large as specified.
  • When using functions that accept a number of bytes to copy, such as strncpy(), be aware that if the destination buffer size is equal to the source buffer size, it may not NULL-terminate the string.
  • Check buffer boundaries if accessing the buffer in a loop and make sure there is no danger of writing past the allocated space.
  • If necessary, truncate all input strings to a reasonable length before passing them to the copy and concatenation functions.

Operation; Build and Compilation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.

Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.

For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].

Effectiveness: Defense in Depth

Note: These techniques do not provide a complete solution. For instance, exploits frequently use a bug that discloses memory addresses in order to maximize reliability of code execution [REF-1337]. It has also been shown that a side-channel attack can bypass ASLR [REF-1333].

Operation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.

For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].

Effectiveness: Defense in Depth

Note: This is not a complete solution, since buffer overflows could be used to overwrite nearby variables to modify the software's state in dangerous ways. In addition, it cannot be used in cases in which self-modifying code is required. Finally, an attack could still cause a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.

Implementation

Replace unbounded copy functions with analogous functions that support length arguments, such as strcpy with strncpy. Create these if they are not available.

Effectiveness: Moderate

Note: This approach is still susceptible to calculation errors, including issues such as off-by-one errors (CWE-193) and incorrectly calculating buffer lengths (CWE-131).
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 118 Incorrect Access of Indexable Resource ('Range Error')
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 125 Out-of-bounds Read
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 466 Return of Pointer Value Outside of Expected Range
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 786 Access of Memory Location Before Start of Buffer
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 787 Out-of-bounds Write
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 788 Access of Memory Location After End of Buffer
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 805 Buffer Access with Incorrect Length Value
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 822 Untrusted Pointer Dereference
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 823 Use of Out-of-range Pointer Offset
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 824 Access of Uninitialized Pointer
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 825 Expired Pointer Dereference
CanFollow Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 20 Improper Input Validation
CanFollow Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 128 Wrap-around Error
CanFollow Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 129 Improper Validation of Array Index
CanFollow Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 131 Incorrect Calculation of Buffer Size
CanFollow Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 190 Integer Overflow or Wraparound
CanFollow Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 193 Off-by-one Error
CanFollow Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 195 Signed to Unsigned Conversion Error
CanFollow Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 839 Numeric Range Comparison Without Minimum Check
CanFollow Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 843 Access of Resource Using Incompatible Type ('Type Confusion')
CanFollow Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1257 Improper Access Control Applied to Mirrored or Aliased Memory Regions
CanFollow Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1260 Improper Handling of Overlap Between Protected Memory Ranges
CanFollow Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1339 Insufficient Precision or Accuracy of a Real Number
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf View View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1003 Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 120 Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input ('Classic Buffer Overflow')
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 125 Out-of-bounds Read
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 787 Out-of-bounds Write
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 824 Access of Uninitialized Pointer
+ Relevant to the view "CISQ Quality Measures (2020)" (View-1305)
Nature Type ID Name
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 125 Out-of-bounds Read
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 130 Improper Handling of Length Parameter Inconsistency
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 786 Access of Memory Location Before Start of Buffer
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 787 Out-of-bounds Write
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 788 Access of Memory Location After End of Buffer
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 805 Buffer Access with Incorrect Length Value
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 822 Untrusted Pointer Dereference
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 823 Use of Out-of-range Pointer Offset
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 824 Access of Uninitialized Pointer
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 825 Expired Pointer Dereference
+ Relevant to the view "CISQ Data Protection Measures" (View-1340)
Nature Type ID Name
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 123 Write-what-where Condition
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 125 Out-of-bounds Read
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 130 Improper Handling of Length Parameter Inconsistency
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 786 Access of Memory Location Before Start of Buffer
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 787 Out-of-bounds Write
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 788 Access of Memory Location After End of Buffer
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 805 Buffer Access with Incorrect Length Value
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 822 Untrusted Pointer Dereference
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 823 Use of Out-of-range Pointer Offset
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 824 Access of Uninitialized Pointer
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 825 Expired Pointer Dereference
+ Relevant to the view "Seven Pernicious Kingdoms" (View-700)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 20 Improper Input Validation
+ Background Details
Certain languages allow direct addressing of memory locations and do not automatically ensure that these locations are valid for the memory buffer that is being referenced.
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Memory-Unsafe (Often Prevalent)

C (Often Prevalent)

C++ (Often Prevalent)

Class: Assembly (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
High
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


This example takes an IP address from a user, verifies that it is well formed and then looks up the hostname and copies it into a buffer.

(bad code)
Example Language:
void host_lookup(char *user_supplied_addr){
struct hostent *hp;
in_addr_t *addr;
char hostname[64];
in_addr_t inet_addr(const char *cp);

/*routine that ensures user_supplied_addr is in the right format for conversion */

validate_addr_form(user_supplied_addr);
addr = inet_addr(user_supplied_addr);
hp = gethostbyaddr( addr, sizeof(struct in_addr), AF_INET);
strcpy(hostname, hp->h_name);
}

This function allocates a buffer of 64 bytes to store the hostname, however there is no guarantee that the hostname will not be larger than 64 bytes. If an attacker specifies an address which resolves to a very large hostname, then the function may overwrite sensitive data or even relinquish control flow to the attacker.

Note that this example also contains an unchecked return value (CWE-252) that can lead to a NULL pointer dereference (CWE-476).



Example 2


This example applies an encoding procedure to an input string and stores it into a buffer.

(bad code)
Example Language:
char * copy_input(char *user_supplied_string){
int i, dst_index;
char *dst_buf = (char*)malloc(4*sizeof(char) * MAX_SIZE);
if ( MAX_SIZE <= strlen(user_supplied_string) ){
die("user string too long, die evil hacker!");
}
dst_index = 0;
for ( i = 0; i < strlen(user_supplied_string); i++ ){
if( '&' == user_supplied_string[i] ){
dst_buf[dst_index++] = '&';
dst_buf[dst_index++] = 'a';
dst_buf[dst_index++] = 'm';
dst_buf[dst_index++] = 'p';
dst_buf[dst_index++] = ';';
}
else if ('<' == user_supplied_string[i] ){
/* encode to &lt; */
}
else dst_buf[dst_index++] = user_supplied_string[i];
}
return dst_buf;
}

The programmer attempts to encode the ampersand character in the user-controlled string, however the length of the string is validated before the encoding procedure is applied. Furthermore, the programmer assumes encoding expansion will only expand a given character by a factor of 4, while the encoding of the ampersand expands by 5. As a result, when the encoding procedure expands the string it is possible to overflow the destination buffer if the attacker provides a string of many ampersands.



Example 3


The following example asks a user for an offset into an array to select an item.

(bad code)
Example Language:

int main (int argc, char **argv) {
char *items[] = {"boat", "car", "truck", "train"};
int index = GetUntrustedOffset();
printf("You selected %s\n", items[index-1]);
}

The programmer allows the user to specify which element in the list to select, however an attacker can provide an out-of-bounds offset, resulting in a buffer over-read (CWE-126).



Example 4


In the following code, the method retrieves a value from an array at a specific array index location that is given as an input parameter to the method

(bad code)
Example Language:
int getValueFromArray(int *array, int len, int index) {

int value;

// check that the array index is less than the maximum

// length of the array
if (index < len) {
// get the value at the specified index of the array
value = array[index];
}
// if array index is invalid then output error message
// and return value indicating error
else {
printf("Value is: %d\n", array[index]);
value = -1;
}

return value;
}

However, this method only verifies that the given array index is less than the maximum length of the array but does not check for the minimum value (CWE-839). This will allow a negative value to be accepted as the input array index, which will result in reading data before the beginning of the buffer (CWE-127) and may allow access to sensitive memory. The input array index should be checked to verify that is within the maximum and minimum range required for the array (CWE-129). In this example the if statement should be modified to include a minimum range check, as shown below.

(good code)
Example Language:

...

// check that the array index is within the correct

// range of values for the array
if (index >= 0 && index < len) {

...


Example 5


Windows provides the _mbs family of functions to perform various operations on multibyte strings. When these functions are passed a malformed multibyte string, such as a string containing a valid leading byte followed by a single null byte, they can read or write past the end of the string buffer causing a buffer overflow. The following functions all pose a risk of buffer overflow: _mbsinc _mbsdec _mbsncat _mbsncpy _mbsnextc _mbsnset _mbsrev _mbsset _mbsstr _mbstok _mbccpy _mbslen



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Incorrect URI normalization in application traffic product leads to buffer overflow, as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
Buffer overflow in Wi-Fi router web interface, as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
Classic stack-based buffer overflow in media player using a long entry in a playlist
Heap-based buffer overflow in media player using a long entry in a playlist
large precision value in a format string triggers overflow
negative offset value leads to out-of-bounds read
malformed inputs cause accesses of uninitialized or previously-deleted objects, leading to memory corruption
chain: lack of synchronization leads to memory corruption
Chain: machine-learning product can have a heap-based buffer overflow (CWE-122) when some integer-oriented bounds are calculated by using ceiling() and floor() on floating point values (CWE-1339)
attacker-controlled array index leads to code execution
chain: -1 value from a function call was intended to indicate an error, but is used as an array index instead.
chain: incorrect calculations lead to incorrect pointer dereference and memory corruption
product accepts crafted messages that lead to a dereference of an arbitrary pointer
chain: malformed input causes dereference of uninitialized memory
OS kernel trusts userland-supplied length value, allowing reading of sensitive information
Chain: integer overflow in securely-coded mail program leads to buffer overflow. In 2005, this was regarded as unrealistic to exploit, but in 2020, it was rediscovered to be easier to exploit due to evolutions of the technology.
buffer overflow involving a regular expression with a large number of captures
chain: unchecked message size metadata allows integer overflow (CWE-190) leading to buffer overflow (CWE-119).
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
Resultant
(where the weakness is typically related to the presence of some other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis

This weakness can often be detected using automated static analysis tools. Many modern tools use data flow analysis or constraint-based techniques to minimize the number of false positives.

Automated static analysis generally does not account for environmental considerations when reporting out-of-bounds memory operations. This can make it difficult for users to determine which warnings should be investigated first. For example, an analysis tool might report buffer overflows that originate from command line arguments in a program that is not expected to run with setuid or other special privileges.

Effectiveness: High

Note:Detection techniques for buffer-related errors are more mature than for most other weakness types.

Automated Dynamic Analysis

This weakness can be detected using dynamic tools and techniques that interact with the software using large test suites with many diverse inputs, such as fuzz testing (fuzzing), robustness testing, and fault injection. The software's operation may slow down, but it should not become unstable, crash, or generate incorrect results.

Automated Dynamic Analysis

Use tools that are integrated during compilation to insert runtime error-checking mechanisms related to memory safety errors, such as AddressSanitizer (ASan) for C/C++ [REF-1518].

Effectiveness: Moderate

Note:Crafted inputs are necessary to reach the code containing the error, such as generated by fuzzers. Also, these tools may reduce performance, and they only report the error condition - not the original mistake that led to the error.

Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Binary / Bytecode Quality Analysis
  • Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
  • Binary Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Web Application Scanner
  • Web Services Scanner
  • Database Scanners

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Fuzz Tester
  • Framework-based Fuzzer

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Manual Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source
  • Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Automated Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Source code Weakness Analyzer
  • Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer
Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Source Code Quality Analyzer

Effectiveness: High

Architecture or Design Review

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)

Effectiveness: High

+ Functional Areas
  • Memory Management
+ Affected Resources
  • Memory
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 635 Weaknesses Originally Used by NVD from 2008 to 2016
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 726 OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A5 - Buffer Overflows
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 740 CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 7 - Arrays (ARR)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 741 CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 8 - Characters and Strings (STR)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 742 CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 9 - Memory Management (MEM)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 743 CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 10 - Input Output (FIO)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 744 CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 11 - Environment (ENV)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 752 2009 Top 25 - Risky Resource Management
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 874 CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 06 - Arrays and the STL (ARR)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 875 CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 07 - Characters and Strings (STR)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 876 CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 08 - Memory Management (MEM)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 877 CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 09 - Input Output (FIO)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 878 CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 10 - Environment (ENV)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 970 SFP Secondary Cluster: Faulty Buffer Access
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1157 SEI CERT C Coding Standard - Guidelines 03. Expressions (EXP)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1160 SEI CERT C Coding Standard - Guidelines 06. Arrays (ARR)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1161 SEI CERT C Coding Standard - Guidelines 07. Characters and Strings (STR)
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1200 Weaknesses in the 2019 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1306 CISQ Quality Measures - Reliability
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1308 CISQ Quality Measures - Security
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1337 Weaknesses in the 2021 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1340 CISQ Data Protection Measures
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1350 Weaknesses in the 2020 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1387 Weaknesses in the 2022 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1399 Comprehensive Categorization: Memory Safety
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1425 Weaknesses in the 2023 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1430 Weaknesses in the 2024 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage DISCOURAGED
(this CWE ID should not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Frequent Misuse

Rationale

CWE-119 is commonly misused in low-information vulnerability reports when lower-level CWEs could be used instead, or when more details about the vulnerability are available.

Comments

Look at CWE-119's children and consider mapping to CWEs such as CWE-787: Out-of-bounds Write, CWE-125: Out-of-bounds Read, or others.
+ Notes

Applicable Platform

It is possible in any programming languages without memory management support to attempt an operation outside of the bounds of a memory buffer, but the consequences will vary widely depending on the language, platform, and chip architecture.

+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
OWASP Top Ten 2004 A5 Exact Buffer Overflows
CERT C Secure Coding ARR00-C Understand how arrays work
CERT C Secure Coding ARR30-C CWE More Abstract Do not form or use out-of-bounds pointers or array subscripts
CERT C Secure Coding ARR38-C CWE More Abstract Guarantee that library functions do not form invalid pointers
CERT C Secure Coding ENV01-C Do not make assumptions about the size of an environment variable
CERT C Secure Coding EXP39-C Imprecise Do not access a variable through a pointer of an incompatible type
CERT C Secure Coding FIO37-C Do not assume character data has been read
CERT C Secure Coding STR31-C CWE More Abstract Guarantee that storage for strings has sufficient space for character data and the null terminator
CERT C Secure Coding STR32-C CWE More Abstract Do not pass a non-null-terminated character sequence to a library function that expects a string
WASC 7 Buffer Overflow
Software Fault Patterns SFP8 Faulty Buffer Access
+ References
[REF-1029] Aleph One. "Smashing The Stack For Fun And Profit". Phrack. 1996-11-08.
<https://phrack.org/issues/49/14.html>.
[REF-7] Michael Howard and David LeBlanc. "Writing Secure Code". Chapter 5, "Public Enemy #1: The Buffer Overrun" Page 127; Chapter 14, "Prevent I18N Buffer Overruns" Page 441. 2nd Edition. Microsoft Press. 2002-12-04.
<https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/store/writing-secure-code-9780735617223>.
[REF-56] Microsoft. "Using the Strsafe.h Functions".
<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/menurc/strsafe-ovw?redirectedfrom=MSDN>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-57] Matt Messier and John Viega. "Safe C String Library v1.0.3".
<http://www.gnu-darwin.org/www001/ports-1.5a-CURRENT/devel/safestr/work/safestr-1.0.3/doc/safestr.html>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-58] Michael Howard. "Address Space Layout Randomization in Windows Vista".
<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/michael_howard/address-space-layout-randomization-in-windows-vista>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-59] Arjan van de Ven. "Limiting buffer overflows with ExecShield".
<https://archive.is/saAFo>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-60] "PaX".
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executable_space_protection#PaX>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-61] Microsoft. "Understanding DEP as a mitigation technology part 1".
<https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2009/06/understanding-dep-as-a-mitigation-technology-part-1/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 5, "Memory Corruption", Page 167. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
[REF-64] Grant Murphy. "Position Independent Executables (PIE)". Red Hat. 2012-11-28.
<https://www.redhat.com/en/blog/position-independent-executables-pie>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-1332] John Richard Moser. "Prelink and address space randomization". 2006-07-05.
<https://lwn.net/Articles/190139/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1333] Dmitry Evtyushkin, Dmitry Ponomarev, Nael Abu-Ghazaleh. "Jump Over ASLR: Attacking Branch Predictors to Bypass ASLR". 2016.
<http://www.cs.ucr.edu/~nael/pubs/micro16.pdf>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1334] D3FEND. "Stack Frame Canary Validation (D3-SFCV)". 2023.
<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:StackFrameCanaryValidation/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1335] D3FEND. "Segment Address Offset Randomization (D3-SAOR)". 2023.
<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:SegmentAddressOffsetRandomization/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1336] D3FEND. "Process Segment Execution Prevention (D3-PSEP)". 2023.
<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:ProcessSegmentExecutionPrevention/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1337] Alexander Sotirov and Mark Dowd. "Bypassing Browser Memory Protections: Setting back browser security by 10 years". Memory information leaks. 2008.
<https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-08/Sotirov_Dowd/bh08-sotirov-dowd.pdf>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1477] Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. "Secure by Design Alert: Eliminating Buffer Overflow Vulnerabilities". 2025-02-12.
<https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/secure-design-alert-eliminating-buffer-overflow-vulnerabilities>. (URL validated: 2025-07-18)
[REF-1479] Gregory Larsen, E. Kenneth Hong Fong, David A. Wheeler and Rama S. Moorthy. "State-of-the-Art Resources (SOAR) for Software Vulnerability Detection, Test, and Evaluation". 2014-07.
<https://www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/s/st/stateoftheart-resources-soar-for-software-vulnerability-detection-test-and-evaluation/p-5061.ashx>. (URL validated: 2025-09-05)
[REF-1518] "AddressSanitizer".
<https://clang.llvm.org/docs/AddressSanitizer.html>. (URL validated: 2025-12-10)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
PLOVER
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.15, 2024-07-16)
Abhi Balakrishnan
Provided diagram to improve CWE usability
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Detection_Factors, References, Weakness_Ordinalities
2025-09-09
(CWE 4.18, 2025-09-09)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Detection_Factors, Functional_Areas, References
2025-04-03
(CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2024-11-19
(CWE 4.16, 2024-11-19)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Relationships
2024-07-16
(CWE 4.15, 2024-07-16)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Alternate_Terms, Background_Details, Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Alternate_Terms, Description
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2022-06-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
2021-07-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
2020-12-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Alternate_Terms, Observed_Examples, Relationships
2020-08-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Alternate_Terms, Relationships
2020-06-25 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings, Time_of_Introduction
2019-09-19 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2018-03-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2017-05-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2017-01-19 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2015-12-07 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2014-02-18 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, References
2013-02-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
2011-09-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships
2011-03-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2010-12-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Name
2010-09-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
2010-06-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2010-02-16 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Alternate_Terms, Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2009-12-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Detection_Factors, Observed_Examples
2009-10-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction
2009-07-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2009-05-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2009-03-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2009-01-12 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Name, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
2008-11-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-10-14 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-08-15 Veracode
Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2008-04-11 Buffer Errors
2009-01-12 Failure to Constrain Operations within the Bounds of an Allocated Memory Buffer
2010-12-13 Failure to Constrain Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer

CWE-911: Improper Update of Reference Count

Weakness ID: 911
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
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+ Description
The product uses a reference count to manage a resource, but it does not update or incorrectly updates the reference count.
+ Extended Description
Reference counts can be used when tracking how many objects contain a reference to a particular resource, such as in memory management or garbage collection. When the reference count reaches zero, the resource can be de-allocated or reused because there are no more objects that use it. If the reference count accidentally reaches zero, then the resource might be released too soon, even though it is still in use. If all objects no longer use the resource, but the reference count is not zero, then the resource might not ever be released.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

DoS: Resource Consumption (Memory); DoS: Resource Consumption (Other)

Scope: Availability

Likelihood: High

An adversary that can cause a resource counter to become inaccurate may be able to create situations where resources are not accounted for and not released, thus causing resources to become scarce for future needs.

DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart

Scope: Availability

Likelihood: Low

An adversary that can cause a resource counter to become inaccurate may be able to force an error that causes the product to crash or exit out of its current operation.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 664 Improper Control of a Resource Through its Lifetime
CanPrecede Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 672 Operation on a Resource after Expiration or Release
CanPrecede Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 772 Missing Release of Resource after Effective Lifetime
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 399 Resource Management Errors
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

C (Sometimes Prevalent)

C++ (Sometimes Prevalent)

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
Medium
+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
chain: reference count is not decremented, leading to memory leak in OS by sending ICMP packets.
Reference count for shared memory not decremented when a function fails, potentially allowing unprivileged users to read kernel memory.
chain: improper reference count tracking leads to file descriptor consumption
chain: integer overflow in reference counter causes the same variable to be destroyed twice.
Incorrect reference count calculation leads to improper object destruction and code execution.
chain: incorrect update of reference count leads to memory leak.
chain/composite: use of incorrect data type for a reference counter allows an overflow of the counter, leading to a free of memory that is still in use.
Improper reference counting leads to failure of cryptographic operations.
chain: improper reference counting in a garbage collection routine leads to use-after-free
chain: reference count not correctly maintained when client disconnects during a large operation, leading to a use-after-free.
Reference count not always incremented, leading to crash or code execution.
improper reference counting leads to expired pointer dereference.
OS kernel increments reference count twice but only decrements once, leading to resource consumption and crash.
OS kernel driver allows code execution
improper reference counting leads to exhaustion of IP addresses
Race condition causes reference counter to be decremented prematurely, leading to the destruction of still-active object and an invalid pointer dereference.
improper reference counting leads to use-after-free
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1416 Comprehensive Categorization: Resource Lifecycle Management
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ References
[REF-884] Mateusz "j00ru" Jurczyk. "Windows Kernel Reference Count Vulnerabilities - Case Study". 2012-11.
<https://j00ru.vexillium.org/slides/2012/zeronights.pdf>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2012-12-21
(CWE 2.4, 2013-02-21)
CWE Content Team MITRE
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-04-03
(CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Type
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Type

CWE-129: Improper Validation of Array Index

Weakness ID: 129
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
The product uses untrusted input when calculating or using an array index, but the product does not validate or incorrectly validates the index to ensure the index references a valid position within the array.
+ Alternate Terms
out-of-bounds array index
index-out-of-range
array index underflow
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart

Scope: Integrity, Availability

Use of an index that is outside the bounds of an array will very likely result in the corruption of relevant memory and perhaps instructions, leading to a crash, if the values are outside of the valid memory area.

Modify Memory

Scope: Integrity

If the memory corrupted is data, rather than instructions, the system will continue to function with improper values.

Modify Memory; Read Memory

Scope: Confidentiality, Integrity

Use of an index that is outside the bounds of an array can also trigger out-of-bounds read or write operations, or operations on the wrong objects; i.e., "buffer overflows" are not always the result. This may result in the exposure or modification of sensitive data.

Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands

Scope: Integrity, Confidentiality, Availability

If the memory accessible by the attacker can be effectively controlled, it may be possible to execute arbitrary code, as with a standard buffer overflow and possibly without the use of large inputs if a precise index can be controlled.

DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart; Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands; Read Memory; Modify Memory

Scope: Integrity, Availability, Confidentiality

A single fault could allow either an overflow (CWE-788) or underflow (CWE-786) of the array index. What happens next will depend on the type of operation being performed out of bounds, but can expose sensitive information, cause a system crash, or possibly lead to arbitrary code execution.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design

Strategy: Input Validation

Use an input validation framework such as Struts or the OWASP ESAPI Validation API. Note that using a framework does not automatically address all input validation problems; be mindful of weaknesses that could arise from misusing the framework itself (CWE-1173).

Architecture and Design

For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

Even though client-side checks provide minimal benefits with respect to server-side security, they are still useful. First, they can support intrusion detection. If the server receives input that should have been rejected by the client, then it may be an indication of an attack. Second, client-side error-checking can provide helpful feedback to the user about the expectations for valid input. Third, there may be a reduction in server-side processing time for accidental input errors, although this is typically a small savings.

Requirements

Strategy: Language Selection

Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

For example, Ada allows the programmer to constrain the values of a variable and languages such as Java and Ruby will allow the programmer to handle exceptions when an out-of-bounds index is accessed.

Operation; Build and Compilation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.

Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.

For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].

Effectiveness: Defense in Depth

Note: These techniques do not provide a complete solution. For instance, exploits frequently use a bug that discloses memory addresses in order to maximize reliability of code execution [REF-1337]. It has also been shown that a side-channel attack can bypass ASLR [REF-1333].

Operation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.

For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].

Effectiveness: Defense in Depth

Note: This is not a complete solution, since buffer overflows could be used to overwrite nearby variables to modify the software's state in dangerous ways. In addition, it cannot be used in cases in which self-modifying code is required. Finally, an attack could still cause a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.

Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.

When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."

Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.

When accessing a user-controlled array index, use a stringent range of values that are within the target array. Make sure that you do not allow negative values to be used. That is, verify the minimum as well as the maximum of the range of acceptable values.

Implementation

Be especially careful to validate all input when invoking code that crosses language boundaries, such as from an interpreted language to native code. This could create an unexpected interaction between the language boundaries. Ensure that you are not violating any of the expectations of the language with which you are interfacing. For example, even though Java may not be susceptible to buffer overflows, providing a large argument in a call to native code might trigger an overflow.

Architecture and Design; Operation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.

Architecture and Design; Operation

Strategy: Sandbox or Jail

Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.

OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.

This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.

Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.

Effectiveness: Limited

Note: The effectiveness of this mitigation depends on the prevention capabilities of the specific sandbox or jail being used and might only help to reduce the scope of an attack, such as restricting the attacker to certain system calls or limiting the portion of the file system that can be accessed.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1285 Improper Validation of Specified Index, Position, or Offset in Input
CanPrecede Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
CanPrecede Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 789 Memory Allocation with Excessive Size Value
CanPrecede Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 823 Use of Out-of-range Pointer Offset
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 20 Improper Input Validation
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

C (Often Prevalent)

C++ (Often Prevalent)

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
High
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


In the code snippet below, an untrusted integer value is used to reference an object in an array.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
public String getValue(int index) {
return array[index];
}

If index is outside of the range of the array, this may result in an ArrayIndexOutOfBounds Exception being raised.



Example 2


The following example takes a user-supplied value to allocate an array of objects and then operates on the array.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
private void buildList ( int untrustedListSize ){
if ( 0 > untrustedListSize ){
die("Negative value supplied for list size, die evil hacker!");
}
Widget[] list = new Widget [ untrustedListSize ];
list[0] = new Widget();
}

This example attempts to build a list from a user-specified value, and even checks to ensure a non-negative value is supplied. If, however, a 0 value is provided, the code will build an array of size 0 and then try to store a new Widget in the first location, causing an exception to be thrown.



Example 3


In the following code, the method retrieves a value from an array at a specific array index location that is given as an input parameter to the method

(bad code)
Example Language:
int getValueFromArray(int *array, int len, int index) {

int value;

// check that the array index is less than the maximum

// length of the array
if (index < len) {
// get the value at the specified index of the array
value = array[index];
}
// if array index is invalid then output error message

// and return value indicating error
else {
printf("Value is: %d\n", array[index]);
value = -1;
}

return value;
}

However, this method only verifies that the given array index is less than the maximum length of the array but does not check for the minimum value (CWE-839). This will allow a negative value to be accepted as the input array index, which will result in reading data before the beginning of the buffer (CWE-127) and may allow access to sensitive memory. The input array index should be checked to verify that is within the maximum and minimum range required for the array (CWE-129). In this example the if statement should be modified to include a minimum range check, as shown below.

(good code)
Example Language:

...

// check that the array index is within the correct

// range of values for the array
if (index >= 0 && index < len) {

...


Example 4


The following example retrieves the sizes of messages for a pop3 mail server. The message sizes are retrieved from a socket that returns in a buffer the message number and the message size, the message number (num) and size (size) are extracted from the buffer and the message size is placed into an array using the message number for the array index.

(bad code)
Example Language:

/* capture the sizes of all messages */
int getsizes(int sock, int count, int *sizes) {
...
char buf[BUFFER_SIZE];
int ok;
int num, size;

// read values from socket and added to sizes array
while ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))) == 0)
{
// continue read from socket until buf only contains '.'
if (DOTLINE(buf))
break;
else if (sscanf(buf, "%d %d", &num, &size) == 2)
sizes[num - 1] = size;
}
...
}

In this example the message number retrieved from the buffer could be a value that is outside the allowable range of indices for the array and could possibly be a negative number. Without proper validation of the value to be used for the array index an array overflow could occur and could potentially lead to unauthorized access to memory addresses and system crashes. The value of the array index should be validated to ensure that it is within the allowable range of indices for the array as in the following code.

(good code)
Example Language:

/* capture the sizes of all messages */
int getsizes(int sock, int count, int *sizes) {
...
char buf[BUFFER_SIZE];
int ok;
int num, size;

// read values from socket and added to sizes array
while ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))) == 0)
{

// continue read from socket until buf only contains '.'
if (DOTLINE(buf))
break;

else if (sscanf(buf, "%d %d", &num, &size) == 2) {
if (num > 0 && num <= (unsigned)count)
sizes[num - 1] = size;

else

/* warn about possible attempt to induce buffer overflow */
report(stderr, "Warning: ignoring bogus data for message sizes returned by server.\n");
}
}
...
}


Example 5


In the following example the method displayProductSummary is called from a Web service servlet to retrieve product summary information for display to the user. The servlet obtains the integer value of the product number from the user and passes it to the displayProductSummary method. The displayProductSummary method passes the integer value of the product number to the getProductSummary method which obtains the product summary from the array object containing the project summaries using the integer value of the product number as the array index.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 

// Method called from servlet to obtain product information
public String displayProductSummary(int index) {
String productSummary = new String("");

try {
String productSummary = getProductSummary(index);


} catch (Exception ex) {...}

return productSummary;
}

public String getProductSummary(int index) {
return products[index];
}

In this example the integer value used as the array index that is provided by the user may be outside the allowable range of indices for the array which may provide unexpected results or cause the application to fail. The integer value used for the array index should be validated to ensure that it is within the allowable range of indices for the array as in the following code.

(good code)
Example Language: Java 

// Method called from servlet to obtain product information
public String displayProductSummary(int index) {
String productSummary = new String("");

try {
String productSummary = getProductSummary(index);


} catch (Exception ex) {...}

return productSummary;
}

public String getProductSummary(int index) {
String productSummary = "";

if ((index >= 0) && (index < MAX_PRODUCTS)) {
productSummary = products[index];
}
else {
System.err.println("index is out of bounds");
throw new IndexOutOfBoundsException();
}

return productSummary;
}

An alternative in Java would be to use one of the collection objects such as ArrayList that will automatically generate an exception if an attempt is made to access an array index that is out of bounds.

(good code)
Example Language: Java 
ArrayList productArray = new ArrayList(MAX_PRODUCTS);
...
try {
productSummary = (String) productArray.get(index);
} catch (IndexOutOfBoundsException ex) {...}


Example 6


The following example asks a user for an offset into an array to select an item.

(bad code)
Example Language:

int main (int argc, char **argv) {
char *items[] = {"boat", "car", "truck", "train"};
int index = GetUntrustedOffset();
printf("You selected %s\n", items[index-1]);
}

The programmer allows the user to specify which element in the list to select, however an attacker can provide an out-of-bounds offset, resulting in a buffer over-read (CWE-126).



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
large ID in packet used as array index
negative array index as argument to POP LIST command
Integer signedness error leads to negative array index
product does not properly track a count and a maximum number, which can lead to resultant array index overflow.
Chain: device driver for packet-capturing software allows access to an unintended IOCTL with resultant array index error.
Chain: array index error (CWE-129) leads to deadlock (CWE-833)
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Resultant
(where the weakness is typically related to the presence of some other weaknesses)
The most common condition situation leading to an out-of-bounds array index is the use of loop index variables as buffer indexes. If the end condition for the loop is subject to a flaw, the index can grow or shrink unbounded, therefore causing a buffer overflow or underflow. Another common situation leading to this condition is the use of a function's return value, or the resulting value of a calculation directly as an index in to a buffer.
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis

This weakness can often be detected using automated static analysis tools. Many modern tools use data flow analysis or constraint-based techniques to minimize the number of false positives.

Automated static analysis generally does not account for environmental considerations when reporting out-of-bounds memory operations. This can make it difficult for users to determine which warnings should be investigated first. For example, an analysis tool might report array index errors that originate from command line arguments in a program that is not expected to run with setuid or other special privileges.

Effectiveness: High

Note:This is not a perfect solution, since 100% accuracy and coverage are not feasible.

Automated Dynamic Analysis

This weakness can be detected using dynamic tools and techniques that interact with the software using large test suites with many diverse inputs, such as fuzz testing (fuzzing), robustness testing, and fault injection. The software's operation may slow down, but it should not become unstable, crash, or generate incorrect results.

Automated Dynamic Analysis

Use tools that are integrated during compilation to insert runtime error-checking mechanisms related to memory safety errors, such as AddressSanitizer (ASan) for C/C++ [REF-1518].

Effectiveness: Moderate

Note:Crafted inputs are necessary to reach the code containing the error, such as generated by fuzzers. Also, these tools may reduce performance, and they only report the error condition - not the original mistake that led to the error.

Black Box

Black box methods might not get the needed code coverage within limited time constraints, and a dynamic test might not produce any noticeable side effects even if it is successful.
+ Functional Areas
  • Memory Management
+ Affected Resources
  • Memory
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 738 CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 5 - Integers (INT)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 740 CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 7 - Arrays (ARR)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 802 2010 Top 25 - Risky Resource Management
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 867 2011 Top 25 - Weaknesses On the Cusp
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 872 CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 04 - Integers (INT)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 874 CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 06 - Arrays and the STL (ARR)
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 970 SFP Secondary Cluster: Faulty Buffer Access
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1131 CISQ Quality Measures (2016) - Security
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1160 SEI CERT C Coding Standard - Guidelines 06. Arrays (ARR)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1179 SEI CERT Perl Coding Standard - Guidelines 01. Input Validation and Data Sanitization (IDS)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1308 CISQ Quality Measures - Security
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1340 CISQ Data Protection Measures
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1399 Comprehensive Categorization: Memory Safety
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1440 OWASP Top Ten 2025 Category A05:2025 - Injection
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Variant level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Notes

Relationship

This weakness can precede uncontrolled memory allocation (CWE-789) in languages that automatically expand an array when an index is used that is larger than the size of the array, such as JavaScript.

Theoretical

An improperly validated array index might lead directly to the always-incorrect behavior of "access of array using out-of-bounds index."
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
CLASP Unchecked array indexing
PLOVER INDEX - Array index overflow
CERT C Secure Coding ARR00-C Understand how arrays work
CERT C Secure Coding ARR30-C CWE More Specific Do not form or use out-of-bounds pointers or array subscripts
CERT C Secure Coding ARR38-C Do not add or subtract an integer to a pointer if the resulting value does not refer to a valid array element
CERT C Secure Coding INT32-C Ensure that operations on signed integers do not result in overflow
SEI CERT Perl Coding Standard IDS32-PL Imprecise Validate any integer that is used as an array index
OMG ASCSM ASCSM-CWE-129
Software Fault Patterns SFP8 Faulty Buffer Access
+ References
[REF-7] Michael Howard and David LeBlanc. "Writing Secure Code". Chapter 5, "Array Indexing Errors" Page 144. 2nd Edition. Microsoft Press. 2002-12-04.
<https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/store/writing-secure-code-9780735617223>.
[REF-96] Jason Lam. "Top 25 Series - Rank 14 - Improper Validation of Array Index". SANS Software Security Institute. 2010-03-12.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20100316064026/http://blogs.sans.org/appsecstreetfighter/2010/03/12/top-25-series-rank-14-improper-validation-of-array-index/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-58] Michael Howard. "Address Space Layout Randomization in Windows Vista".
<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/michael_howard/address-space-layout-randomization-in-windows-vista>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-60] "PaX".
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executable_space_protection#PaX>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-61] Microsoft. "Understanding DEP as a mitigation technology part 1".
<https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2009/06/understanding-dep-as-a-mitigation-technology-part-1/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-76] Sean Barnum and Michael Gegick. "Least Privilege". 2005-09-14.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20211209014121/https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/bsi/articles/knowledge/principles/least-privilege>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-44] Michael Howard, David LeBlanc and John Viega. "24 Deadly Sins of Software Security". "Sin 5: Buffer Overruns." Page 89. McGraw-Hill. 2010.
[REF-64] Grant Murphy. "Position Independent Executables (PIE)". Red Hat. 2012-11-28.
<https://www.redhat.com/en/blog/position-independent-executables-pie>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-962] Object Management Group (OMG). "Automated Source Code Security Measure (ASCSM)". ASCSM-CWE-129. 2016-01.
<http://www.omg.org/spec/ASCSM/1.0/>.
[REF-18] Secure Software, Inc.. "The CLASP Application Security Process". 2005.
<https://cwe.mitre.org/documents/sources/TheCLASPApplicationSecurityProcess.pdf>. (URL validated: 2024-11-17)
[REF-1332] John Richard Moser. "Prelink and address space randomization". 2006-07-05.
<https://lwn.net/Articles/190139/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1333] Dmitry Evtyushkin, Dmitry Ponomarev, Nael Abu-Ghazaleh. "Jump Over ASLR: Attacking Branch Predictors to Bypass ASLR". 2016.
<http://www.cs.ucr.edu/~nael/pubs/micro16.pdf>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1335] D3FEND. "Segment Address Offset Randomization (D3-SAOR)". 2023.
<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:SegmentAddressOffsetRandomization/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1336] D3FEND. "Process Segment Execution Prevention (D3-PSEP)". 2023.
<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:ProcessSegmentExecutionPrevention/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1337] Alexander Sotirov and Mark Dowd. "Bypassing Browser Memory Protections: Setting back browser security by 10 years". Memory information leaks. 2008.
<https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-08/Sotirov_Dowd/bh08-sotirov-dowd.pdf>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1518] "AddressSanitizer".
<https://clang.llvm.org/docs/AddressSanitizer.html>. (URL validated: 2025-12-10)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
CLASP
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, References, Relationships
2025-09-09
(CWE 4.18, 2025-09-09)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Functional_Areas
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2021-03-15 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2020-12-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-08-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
2020-06-25 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships, Type
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2019-09-19 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2018-03-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Causal_Nature, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2015-12-07 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2014-02-18 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, References
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
2011-09-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2011-03-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Weakness_Ordinalities
2010-12-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations
2010-09-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationship_Notes, Relationships
2010-06-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Potential_Mitigations, References
2010-04-05 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2010-02-16 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Detection_Factors, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Potential_Mitigations, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2009-12-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Observed_Examples, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, Theoretical_Notes, Weakness_Ordinalities
2009-10-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Name, Relationships
2009-01-12 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2008-11-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Alternate_Terms, Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings, Weakness_Ordinalities
2008-07-01 Sean Eidemiller Cigital
added/updated demonstrative examples
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2009-10-29 Unchecked Array Indexing

CWE-1325: Improperly Controlled Sequential Memory Allocation

Weakness ID: 1325
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
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+ Description
The product manages a group of objects or resources and performs a separate memory allocation for each object, but it does not properly limit the total amount of memory that is consumed by all of the combined objects.
+ Extended Description

While the product might limit the amount of memory that is allocated in a single operation for a single object (such as a malloc of an array), if an attacker can cause multiple objects to be allocated in separate operations, then this might cause higher total memory consumption than the developer intended, leading to a denial of service.

+ Alternate Terms
Stack Exhaustion
When a weakness allocates excessive memory on the stack, it is often described as "stack exhaustion," which is a technical impact of the weakness. This technical impact is often encountered as a consequence of CWE-789 and/or CWE-1325.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

DoS: Resource Consumption (Memory)

Scope: Availability

Not controlling memory allocation can result in a request for too much system memory, possibly leading to a crash of the application due to out-of-memory conditions, or the consumption of a large amount of memory on the system.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Implementation

Ensure multiple allocations of the same kind of object are properly tracked - possibly across multiple sessions, requests, or messages. Define an appropriate strategy for handling requests that exceed the limit, and consider supporting a configuration option so that the administrator can extend the amount of memory to be used if necessary.

Operation

Run the program using system-provided resource limits for memory. This might still cause the program to crash or exit, but the impact to the rest of the system will be minimized.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 770 Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
PeerOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 789 Memory Allocation with Excessive Size Value
CanPrecede Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 476 NULL Pointer Dereference
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

C (Undetermined Prevalence)

C++ (Undetermined Prevalence)

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


This example contains a small allocation of stack memory. When the program was first constructed, the number of times this memory was allocated was probably inconsequential and presented no problem. Over time, as the number of objects in the database grow, the number of allocations will grow - eventually consuming the available stack, i.e. "stack exhaustion." An attacker who is able to add elements to the database could cause stack exhaustion more rapidly than assumed by the developer.

(bad code)
Example Language:
// Gets the size from the number of objects in a database, which over time can conceivably get very large
int end_limit = get_nmbr_obj_from_db();
int i;
int *base = NULL;
int *p =base;
for (i = 0; i < end_limit; i++)
{
*p = alloca(sizeof(int *)); // Allocate memory on the stack
p = *p; // // Point to the next location to be saved
}

Since this uses alloca(), it allocates memory directly on the stack. If end_limit is large enough, then the stack can be entirely consumed.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
JavaScript-based packet decoder uses concatenation of many small strings, causing out-of-memory (OOM) condition
Product allocates a new buffer on the stack for each file in a directory, allowing stack exhaustion
Chain: an integer overflow (CWE-190) in the image size calculation causes an infinite loop (CWE-835) which sequentially allocates buffers without limits (CWE-1325) until the stack is full.
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1416 Comprehensive Categorization: Resource Lifecycle Management
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2020-12-07
(CWE 4.3, 2020-12-10)
CWE Content Team MITRE
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-07-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples

CWE-1335: Incorrect Bitwise Shift of Integer

Weakness ID: 1335
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
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+ Description
An integer value is specified to be shifted by a negative amount or an amount greater than or equal to the number of bits contained in the value causing an unexpected or indeterminate result.
+ Extended Description

Specifying a value to be shifted by a negative amount is undefined in various languages. Various computer architectures implement this action in different ways. The compilers and interpreters when generating code to accomplish a shift generally do not do a check for this issue.

Specifying an over-shift, a shift greater than or equal to the number of bits contained in a value to be shifted, produces a result which varies by architecture and compiler. In some languages, this action is specifically listed as producing an undefined result.

+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart

Scope: Integrity

+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Implementation

Implicitly or explicitly add checks and mitigation for negative or over-shift values.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 682 Incorrect Calculation
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 189 Numeric Errors
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation Adding shifts without properly verifying the size and sign of the shift amount.
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

C (Undetermined Prevalence)

C++ (Undetermined Prevalence)

C# (Undetermined Prevalence)

Java (Undetermined Prevalence)

JavaScript (Undetermined Prevalence)

Operating Systems

Class: Not OS-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


A negative shift amount for an x86 or x86_64 shift instruction will produce the number of bits to be shifted by taking a 2's-complement of the shift amount and effectively masking that amount to the lowest 6 bits for a 64 bit shift instruction.

(bad code)
Example Language:
unsigned int r = 1 << -5;

The example above ends up with a shift amount of -5. The hexadecimal value is FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFD which, when bits above the 6th bit are masked off, the shift amount becomes a binary shift value of 111101 which is 61 decimal. A shift of 61 produces a very different result than -5. The previous example is a very simple version of the following code which is probably more realistic of what happens in a real system.

(bad code)
Example Language:
int choose_bit(int reg_bit, int bit_number_from_elsewhere)
{
if (NEED_TO_SHIFT)
{
reg_bit -= bit_number_from_elsewhere;
}
return reg_bit;
}
unsigned int handle_io_register(unsigned int *r)
{
unsigned int the_bit = 1 << choose_bit(5, 10);
*r |= the_bit;
return the_bit;
}
(good code)
Example Language:
int choose_bit(int reg_bit, int bit_number_from_elsewhere)
{
if (NEED_TO_SHIFT)
{
reg_bit -= bit_number_from_elsewhere;
}
return reg_bit;
}

unsigned int handle_io_register(unsigned int *r)
{
int the_bit_number = choose_bit(5, 10);
if ((the_bit_number > 0) && (the_bit_number < 63))
{
unsigned int the_bit = 1 << the_bit_number;
*r |= the_bit;
}
return the_bit;
}

Note that the good example not only checks for negative shifts and disallows them, but it also checks for over-shifts. No bit operation is done if the shift is out of bounds. Depending on the program, perhaps an error message should be logged.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
An unexpected large value in the ext4 filesystem causes an overshift condition resulting in a divide by zero.
An unexpected large value in the ext4 filesystem causes an overshift condition resulting in a divide by zero - fix of CVE-2009-4307.
An overshift in a kernel allowed out of bounds reads and writes resulting in a root takeover.
Program is not properly handling signed bitwise left-shifts causing an overlapping memcpy memory range error.
Compression function improperly executes a signed left shift of a negative integer.
Some kernels improperly handle right shifts of 32 bit numbers in a 64 bit register.
Putty has an incorrectly sized shift value resulting in an overshift.
LED driver overshifts under certain conditions resulting in a DoS.
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Effectiveness: High

+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1408 Comprehensive Categorization: Incorrect Calculation
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2021-03-29
(CWE 4.5, 2021-07-20)
CWE Content Team MITRE
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Weakness_Ordinalities
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples

CWE-483: Incorrect Block Delimitation

Weakness ID: 483
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
The code does not explicitly delimit a block that is intended to contain 2 or more statements, creating a logic error.
+ Extended Description
In some languages, braces (or other delimiters) are optional for blocks. When the delimiter is omitted, it is possible to insert a logic error in which a statement is thought to be in a block but is not. In some cases, the logic error can have security implications.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Alter Execution Logic

Scope: Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability

This is a general logic error which will often lead to obviously-incorrect behaviors that are quickly noticed and fixed. In lightly tested or untested code, this error may be introduced it into a production environment and provide additional attack vectors by creating a control flow path leading to an unexpected state in the application. The consequences will depend on the types of behaviors that are being incorrectly executed.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Implementation

Always use explicit block delimitation and use static-analysis technologies to enforce this practice.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 670 Always-Incorrect Control Flow Implementation
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 438 Behavioral Problems
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

C (Sometimes Prevalent)

C++ (Sometimes Prevalent)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
Low
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


In this example, the programmer has indented the statements to call Do_X() and Do_Y(), as if the intention is that these functions are only called when the condition is true. However, because there are no braces to signify the block, Do_Y() will always be executed, even if the condition is false.

(bad code)
Example Language:
if (condition==true)
Do_X();
Do_Y();

This might not be what the programmer intended. When the condition is critical for security, such as in making a security decision or detecting a critical error, this may produce a vulnerability.



Example 2


In this example, the programmer has indented the Do_Y() statement as if the intention is that the function should be associated with the preceding conditional and should only be called when the condition is true. However, because Do_X() was called on the same line as the conditional and there are no braces to signify the block, Do_Y() will always be executed, even if the condition is false.

(bad code)
Example Language:
if (condition==true) Do_X();
Do_Y();

This might not be what the programmer intended. When the condition is critical for security, such as in making a security decision or detecting a critical error, this may produce a vulnerability.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Chain: incorrect "goto" in Apple SSL product bypasses certificate validation, allowing Adversary-in-the-Middle (AITM) attack (Apple "goto fail" bug). CWE-705 (Incorrect Control Flow Scoping) -> CWE-561 (Dead Code) -> CWE-295 (Improper Certificate Validation) -> CWE-393 (Return of Wrong Status Code) -> CWE-300 (Channel Accessible by Non-Endpoint). The code's whitespace indentation did not reflect the actual control flow (CWE-1114) and did not explicitly delimit the block (CWE-483), which could have made it more difficult for human code auditors to detect the vulnerability.
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
Indirect
(where the weakness is a quality issue that might indirectly make it easier to introduce security-relevant weaknesses or make them more difficult to detect)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Effectiveness: High

+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 977 SFP Secondary Cluster: Design
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1410 Comprehensive Categorization: Insufficient Control Flow Management
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
CLASP Incorrect block delimitation
+ References
[REF-18] Secure Software, Inc.. "The CLASP Application Security Process". 2005.
<https://cwe.mitre.org/documents/sources/TheCLASPApplicationSecurityProcess.pdf>. (URL validated: 2024-11-17)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
CLASP
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2010-04-28 Michael Koo and Paul Black NIST
Correction to Demonstrative Examples
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2023-10-26 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships, Type
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Weakness_Ordinalities
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-06-23 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2011-06-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2010-06-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Other_Notes
2009-10-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2009-05-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Description, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction

CWE-131: Incorrect Calculation of Buffer Size

Weakness ID: 131
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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Edit Custom Filter


+ Description
The product does not correctly calculate the size to be used when allocating a buffer, which could lead to a buffer overflow.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart; Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands; Read Memory; Modify Memory

Scope: Integrity, Availability, Confidentiality

If the incorrect calculation is used in the context of memory allocation, then the software may create a buffer that is smaller or larger than expected. If the allocated buffer is smaller than expected, this could lead to an out-of-bounds read or write (CWE-119), possibly causing a crash, allowing arbitrary code execution, or exposing sensitive data.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Implementation

When allocating a buffer for the purpose of transforming, converting, or encoding an input, allocate enough memory to handle the largest possible encoding. For example, in a routine that converts "&" characters to "&amp;" for HTML entity encoding, the output buffer needs to be at least 5 times as large as the input buffer.

Implementation

Understand the programming language's underlying representation and how it interacts with numeric calculation (CWE-681). Pay close attention to byte size discrepancies, precision, signed/unsigned distinctions, truncation, conversion and casting between types, "not-a-number" calculations, and how the language handles numbers that are too large or too small for its underlying representation. [REF-7]

Also be careful to account for 32-bit, 64-bit, and other potential differences that may affect the numeric representation.

Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

Perform input validation on any numeric input by ensuring that it is within the expected range. Enforce that the input meets both the minimum and maximum requirements for the expected range.

Architecture and Design

For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

Implementation

When processing structured incoming data containing a size field followed by raw data, identify and resolve any inconsistencies between the size field and the actual size of the data (CWE-130).

Implementation

When allocating memory that uses sentinels to mark the end of a data structure - such as NUL bytes in strings - make sure you also include the sentinel in your calculation of the total amount of memory that must be allocated.

Implementation

Replace unbounded copy functions with analogous functions that support length arguments, such as strcpy with strncpy. Create these if they are not available.

Effectiveness: Moderate

Note: This approach is still susceptible to calculation errors, including issues such as off-by-one errors (CWE-193) and incorrectly calculating buffer lengths (CWE-131). Additionally, this only addresses potential overflow issues. Resource consumption / exhaustion issues are still possible.

Implementation

Use sizeof() on the appropriate data type to avoid CWE-467.

Implementation

Use the appropriate type for the desired action. For example, in C/C++, only use unsigned types for values that could never be negative, such as height, width, or other numbers related to quantity. This will simplify validation and will reduce surprises related to unexpected casting.

Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].

Use libraries or frameworks that make it easier to handle numbers without unexpected consequences, or buffer allocation routines that automatically track buffer size.

Examples include safe integer handling packages such as SafeInt (C++) or IntegerLib (C or C++). [REF-106]

Operation; Build and Compilation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.

D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.

Effectiveness: Defense in Depth

Note:

This is not necessarily a complete solution, since these mechanisms only detect certain types of overflows. In addition, the result is still a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.

Operation; Build and Compilation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.

Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.

For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].

Effectiveness: Defense in Depth

Note: These techniques do not provide a complete solution. For instance, exploits frequently use a bug that discloses memory addresses in order to maximize reliability of code execution [REF-1337]. It has also been shown that a side-channel attack can bypass ASLR [REF-1333].

Operation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.

For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].

Effectiveness: Defense in Depth

Note: This is not a complete solution, since buffer overflows could be used to overwrite nearby variables to modify the software's state in dangerous ways. In addition, it cannot be used in cases in which self-modifying code is required. Finally, an attack could still cause a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.

Implementation

Strategy: Compilation or Build Hardening

Examine compiler warnings closely and eliminate problems with potential security implications, such as signed / unsigned mismatch in memory operations, or use of uninitialized variables. Even if the weakness is rarely exploitable, a single failure may lead to the compromise of the entire system.

Architecture and Design; Operation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.

Architecture and Design; Operation

Strategy: Sandbox or Jail

Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.

OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.

This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.

Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.

Effectiveness: Limited

Note: The effectiveness of this mitigation depends on the prevention capabilities of the specific sandbox or jail being used and might only help to reduce the scope of an attack, such as restricting the attacker to certain system calls or limiting the portion of the file system that can be accessed.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 682 Incorrect Calculation
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 467 Use of sizeof() on a Pointer Type
CanPrecede Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1218 Memory Buffer Errors
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 682 Incorrect Calculation
+ Relevant to the view "CISQ Quality Measures (2020)" (View-1305)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 682 Incorrect Calculation
+ Relevant to the view "CISQ Data Protection Measures" (View-1340)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 682 Incorrect Calculation
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Memory-Unsafe (Undetermined Prevalence)

C (Undetermined Prevalence)

C++ (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
High
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


The following code allocates memory for a maximum number of widgets. It then gets a user-specified number of widgets, making sure that the user does not request too many. It then initializes the elements of the array using InitializeWidget(). Because the number of widgets can vary for each request, the code inserts a NULL pointer to signify the location of the last widget.

(bad code)
Example Language:
int i;
unsigned int numWidgets;
Widget **WidgetList;

numWidgets = GetUntrustedSizeValue();
if ((numWidgets == 0) || (numWidgets > MAX_NUM_WIDGETS)) {
ExitError("Incorrect number of widgets requested!");
}
WidgetList = (Widget **)malloc(numWidgets * sizeof(Widget *));
printf("WidgetList ptr=%p\n", WidgetList);
for(i=0; i<numWidgets; i++) {
WidgetList[i] = InitializeWidget();
}
WidgetList[numWidgets] = NULL;
showWidgets(WidgetList);

However, this code contains an off-by-one calculation error (CWE-193). It allocates exactly enough space to contain the specified number of widgets, but it does not include the space for the NULL pointer. As a result, the allocated buffer is smaller than it is supposed to be (CWE-131). So if the user ever requests MAX_NUM_WIDGETS, there is an out-of-bounds write (CWE-787) when the NULL is assigned. Depending on the environment and compilation settings, this could cause memory corruption.



Example 2


The following image processing code allocates a table for images.

(bad code)
Example Language:
img_t table_ptr; /*struct containing img data, 10kB each*/
int num_imgs;
...
num_imgs = get_num_imgs();
table_ptr = (img_t*)malloc(sizeof(img_t)*num_imgs);
...

This code intends to allocate a table of size num_imgs, however as num_imgs grows large, the calculation determining the size of the list will eventually overflow (CWE-190). This will result in a very small list to be allocated instead. If the subsequent code operates on the list as if it were num_imgs long, it may result in many types of out-of-bounds problems (CWE-119).



Example 3


This example applies an encoding procedure to an input string and stores it into a buffer.

(bad code)
Example Language:
char * copy_input(char *user_supplied_string){
int i, dst_index;
char *dst_buf = (char*)malloc(4*sizeof(char) * MAX_SIZE);
if ( MAX_SIZE <= strlen(user_supplied_string) ){
die("user string too long, die evil hacker!");
}
dst_index = 0;
for ( i = 0; i < strlen(user_supplied_string); i++ ){
if( '&' == user_supplied_string[i] ){
dst_buf[dst_index++] = '&';
dst_buf[dst_index++] = 'a';
dst_buf[dst_index++] = 'm';
dst_buf[dst_index++] = 'p';
dst_buf[dst_index++] = ';';
}
else if ('<' == user_supplied_string[i] ){

/* encode to &lt; */
}
else dst_buf[dst_index++] = user_supplied_string[i];
}
return dst_buf;
}

The programmer attempts to encode the ampersand character in the user-controlled string, however the length of the string is validated before the encoding procedure is applied. Furthermore, the programmer assumes encoding expansion will only expand a given character by a factor of 4, while the encoding of the ampersand expands by 5. As a result, when the encoding procedure expands the string it is possible to overflow the destination buffer if the attacker provides a string of many ampersands.



Example 4


The following code is intended to read an incoming packet from a socket and extract one or more headers.

(bad code)
Example Language:
DataPacket *packet;
int numHeaders;
PacketHeader *headers;

sock=AcceptSocketConnection();
ReadPacket(packet, sock);
numHeaders =packet->headers;

if (numHeaders > 100) {
ExitError("too many headers!");
}
headers = malloc(numHeaders * sizeof(PacketHeader);
ParsePacketHeaders(packet, headers);

The code performs a check to make sure that the packet does not contain too many headers. However, numHeaders is defined as a signed int, so it could be negative. If the incoming packet specifies a value such as -3, then the malloc calculation will generate a negative number (say, -300 if each header can be a maximum of 100 bytes). When this result is provided to malloc(), it is first converted to a size_t type. This conversion then produces a large value such as 4294966996, which may cause malloc() to fail or to allocate an extremely large amount of memory (CWE-195). With the appropriate negative numbers, an attacker could trick malloc() into using a very small positive number, which then allocates a buffer that is much smaller than expected, potentially leading to a buffer overflow.



Example 5


The following code attempts to save three different identification numbers into an array. The array is allocated from memory using a call to malloc().

(bad code)
Example Language:
int *id_sequence;

/* Allocate space for an array of three ids. */


id_sequence = (int*) malloc(3);
if (id_sequence == NULL) exit(1);

/* Populate the id array. */


id_sequence[0] = 13579;
id_sequence[1] = 24680;
id_sequence[2] = 97531;

The problem with the code above is the value of the size parameter used during the malloc() call. It uses a value of '3' which by definition results in a buffer of three bytes to be created. However the intention was to create a buffer that holds three ints, and in C, each int requires 4 bytes worth of memory, so an array of 12 bytes is needed, 4 bytes for each int. Executing the above code could result in a buffer overflow as 12 bytes of data is being saved into 3 bytes worth of allocated space. The overflow would occur during the assignment of id_sequence[0] and would continue with the assignment of id_sequence[1] and id_sequence[2].

The malloc() call could have used '3*sizeof(int)' as the value for the size parameter in order to allocate the correct amount of space required to store the three ints.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Chain: Javascript engine code does not perform a length check (CWE-1284) leading to integer overflow (CWE-190) causing allocation of smaller buffer than expected (CWE-131) resulting in a heap-based buffer overflow (CWE-122)
Font rendering library does not properly handle assigning a signed short value to an unsigned long (CWE-195), leading to an integer wraparound (CWE-190), causing too small of a buffer (CWE-131), leading to an out-of-bounds write (CWE-787).
Chain: integer truncation (CWE-197) causes small buffer allocation (CWE-131) leading to out-of-bounds write (CWE-787) in kernel pool, as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
substitution overflow: buffer overflow using environment variables that are expanded after the length check is performed
substitution overflow: buffer overflow using expansion of environment variables
substitution overflow: buffer overflow using a large number of substitution strings
transformation overflow: product adds extra escape characters to incoming data, but does not account for them in the buffer length
transformation overflow: buffer overflow when expanding ">" to "&gt;", etc.
expansion overflow: buffer overflow using wildcards
expansion overflow: long pathname + glob = overflow
expansion overflow: long pathname + glob = overflow
special characters in argument are not properly expanded
small length value leads to heap overflow
multiple variants
needs closer investigation, but probably expansion-based
needs closer investigation, but probably expansion-based
Chain: Language interpreter calculates wrong buffer size (CWE-131) by using "size = ptr ? X : Y" instead of "size = (ptr ? X : Y)" expression.
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis

This weakness can often be detected using automated static analysis tools. Many modern tools use data flow analysis or constraint-based techniques to minimize the number of false positives.

Automated static analysis generally does not account for environmental considerations when reporting potential errors in buffer calculations. This can make it difficult for users to determine which warnings should be investigated first. For example, an analysis tool might report buffer overflows that originate from command line arguments in a program that is not expected to run with setuid or other special privileges.

Effectiveness: High

Note:Detection techniques for buffer-related errors are more mature than for most other weakness types.

Automated Dynamic Analysis

This weakness can be detected using dynamic tools and techniques that interact with the software using large test suites with many diverse inputs, such as fuzz testing (fuzzing), robustness testing, and fault injection. The software's operation may slow down, but it should not become unstable, crash, or generate incorrect results.

Effectiveness: Moderate

Note:Without visibility into the code, black box methods may not be able to sufficiently distinguish this weakness from others, requiring follow-up manual methods to diagnose the underlying problem.

Automated Dynamic Analysis

Use tools that are integrated during compilation to insert runtime error-checking mechanisms related to memory safety errors, such as AddressSanitizer (ASan) for C/C++ [REF-1518].

Effectiveness: Moderate

Note:Crafted inputs are necessary to reach the code containing the error, such as generated by fuzzers. Also, these tools may reduce performance, and they only report the error condition - not the original mistake that led to the error.

Manual Analysis

Manual analysis can be useful for finding this weakness, but it might not achieve desired code coverage within limited time constraints. This becomes difficult for weaknesses that must be considered for all inputs, since the attack surface can be too large.

Manual Analysis

This weakness can be detected using tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session.

Specifically, manual static analysis is useful for evaluating the correctness of allocation calculations. This can be useful for detecting overflow conditions (CWE-190) or similar weaknesses that might have serious security impacts on the program.

Effectiveness: High

Note:These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules.

Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
  • Binary Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis

Effectiveness: High

Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Manual Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source
  • Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Automated Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Source code Weakness Analyzer
  • Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer
Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Source Code Quality Analyzer

Effectiveness: High

Architecture or Design Review

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)

Effectiveness: High

+ Functional Areas
  • Memory Management
+ Affected Resources
  • Memory
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 742 CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 9 - Memory Management (MEM)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 802 2010 Top 25 - Risky Resource Management
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 865 2011 Top 25 - Risky Resource Management
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 876 CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 08 - Memory Management (MEM)
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 974 SFP Secondary Cluster: Incorrect Buffer Length Computation
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1158 SEI CERT C Coding Standard - Guidelines 04. Integers (INT)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1162 SEI CERT C Coding Standard - Guidelines 08. Memory Management (MEM)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1399 Comprehensive Categorization: Memory Safety
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Notes

Maintenance

This is a broad category. Some examples include:

  • simple math errors,
  • incorrectly updating parallel counters,
  • not accounting for size differences when "transforming" one input to another format (e.g. URL canonicalization or other transformation that can generate a result that's larger than the original input, i.e. "expansion").

This level of detail is rarely available in public reports, so it is difficult to find good examples.

Maintenance

This weakness may be a composite or a chain. It also may contain layering or perspective differences.

This issue may be associated with many different types of incorrect calculations (CWE-682), although the integer overflow (CWE-190) is probably the most prevalent. This can be primary to resource consumption problems (CWE-400), including uncontrolled memory allocation (CWE-789). However, its relationship with out-of-bounds buffer access (CWE-119) must also be considered.

+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
PLOVER Other length calculation error
CERT C Secure Coding INT30-C Imprecise Ensure that unsigned integer operations do not wrap
CERT C Secure Coding MEM35-C CWE More Abstract Allocate sufficient memory for an object
+ References
[REF-106] David LeBlanc and Niels Dekker. "SafeInt".
<https://github.com/dcleblanc/SafeInt/>. (URL validated: 2025-07-29)
[REF-107] Jason Lam. "Top 25 Series - Rank 18 - Incorrect Calculation of Buffer Size". SANS Software Security Institute. 2010-03-19.
<https://www.sans.org/blog/top-25-series-rank-18-incorrect-calculation-of-buffer-size>.
[REF-58] Michael Howard. "Address Space Layout Randomization in Windows Vista".
<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/michael_howard/address-space-layout-randomization-in-windows-vista>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-61] Microsoft. "Understanding DEP as a mitigation technology part 1".
<https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2009/06/understanding-dep-as-a-mitigation-technology-part-1/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-60] "PaX".
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executable_space_protection#PaX>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-76] Sean Barnum and Michael Gegick. "Least Privilege". 2005-09-14.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20211209014121/https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/bsi/articles/knowledge/principles/least-privilege>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-7] Michael Howard and David LeBlanc. "Writing Secure Code". Chapter 20, "Integer Overflows" Page 620. 2nd Edition. Microsoft Press. 2002-12-04.
<https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/store/writing-secure-code-9780735617223>.
[REF-44] Michael Howard, David LeBlanc and John Viega. "24 Deadly Sins of Software Security". "Sin 5: Buffer Overruns." Page 89. McGraw-Hill. 2010.
[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 8, "Incrementing Pointers Incorrectly", Page 401. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
[REF-64] Grant Murphy. "Position Independent Executables (PIE)". Red Hat. 2012-11-28.
<https://www.redhat.com/en/blog/position-independent-executables-pie>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-1332] John Richard Moser. "Prelink and address space randomization". 2006-07-05.
<https://lwn.net/Articles/190139/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1333] Dmitry Evtyushkin, Dmitry Ponomarev, Nael Abu-Ghazaleh. "Jump Over ASLR: Attacking Branch Predictors to Bypass ASLR". 2016.
<http://www.cs.ucr.edu/~nael/pubs/micro16.pdf>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1334] D3FEND. "Stack Frame Canary Validation (D3-SFCV)". 2023.
<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:StackFrameCanaryValidation/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1335] D3FEND. "Segment Address Offset Randomization (D3-SAOR)". 2023.
<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:SegmentAddressOffsetRandomization/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1336] D3FEND. "Process Segment Execution Prevention (D3-PSEP)". 2023.
<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:ProcessSegmentExecutionPrevention/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1337] Alexander Sotirov and Mark Dowd. "Bypassing Browser Memory Protections: Setting back browser security by 10 years". Memory information leaks. 2008.
<https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-08/Sotirov_Dowd/bh08-sotirov-dowd.pdf>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1479] Gregory Larsen, E. Kenneth Hong Fong, David A. Wheeler and Rama S. Moorthy. "State-of-the-Art Resources (SOAR) for Software Vulnerability Detection, Test, and Evaluation". 2014-07.
<https://www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/s/st/stateoftheart-resources-soar-for-software-vulnerability-detection-test-and-evaluation/p-5061.ashx>. (URL validated: 2025-09-05)
[REF-1482] D3FEND. "D3FEND: D3-TL Trusted Library".
<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:TrustedLibrary/>. (URL validated: 2025-09-06)
[REF-1518] "AddressSanitizer".
<https://clang.llvm.org/docs/AddressSanitizer.html>. (URL validated: 2025-12-10)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
PLOVER
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Detection_Factors, Observed_Examples, References, Weakness_Ordinalities
2025-09-09
(CWE 4.18, 2025-09-09)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Affected_Resources, Detection_Factors, Functional_Areas, Potential_Mitigations, References
2025-04-03
(CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2022-06-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2021-03-15 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Potential_Mitigations
2020-12-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-08-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2018-03-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Likelihood_of_Exploit, References, Taxonomy_Mappings
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships
2014-02-18 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, References
2013-07-17 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2013-02-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
2011-09-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2011-03-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Maintenance_Notes
2010-12-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2010-09-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2010-06-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References
2010-04-05 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References, Related_Attack_Patterns
2010-02-16 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Detection_Factors, Maintenance_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2009-12-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations
2008-11-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-10-14 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Maintenance_Notes, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings, Type
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2008-01-30 Other Length Calculation Error

CWE-135: Incorrect Calculation of Multi-Byte String Length

Weakness ID: 135
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
The product does not correctly calculate the length of strings that can contain wide or multi-byte characters.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands

Scope: Integrity, Confidentiality, Availability

This weakness may lead to a buffer overflow. Buffer overflows often can be used to execute arbitrary code, which is usually outside the scope of a program's implicit security policy. This can often be used to subvert any other security service.

Read Memory; DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart; DoS: Resource Consumption (CPU); DoS: Resource Consumption (Memory)

Scope: Availability, Confidentiality

Out of bounds memory access will very likely result in the corruption of relevant memory, and perhaps instructions, possibly leading to a crash. Other attacks leading to lack of availability are possible, including putting the program into an infinite loop.

Read Memory

Scope: Confidentiality

In the case of an out-of-bounds read, the attacker may have access to sensitive information. If the sensitive information contains system details, such as the current buffer's position in memory, this knowledge can be used to craft further attacks, possibly with more severe consequences.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

Always verify the length of the string unit character.

Implementation

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

Use length computing functions (e.g. strlen, wcslen, etc.) appropriately with their equivalent type (e.g.: byte, wchar_t, etc.)
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 682 Incorrect Calculation
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 133 String Errors
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation

There are several ways in which improper string length checking may result in an exploitable condition. All of these, however, involve the introduction of buffer overflow conditions in order to reach an exploitable state.

The first of these issues takes place when the output of a wide or multi-byte character string, string-length function is used as a size for the allocation of memory. While this will result in an output of the number of characters in the string, note that the characters are most likely not a single byte, as they are with standard character strings. So, using the size returned as the size sent to new or malloc and copying the string to this newly allocated memory will result in a buffer overflow.

Another common way these strings are misused involves the mixing of standard string and wide or multi-byte string functions on a single string. Invariably, this mismatched information will result in the creation of a possibly exploitable buffer overflow condition.

+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

C (Undetermined Prevalence)

C++ (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


The following example would be exploitable if any of the commented incorrect malloc calls were used.

(bad code)
Example Language:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <strings.h>
#include <wchar.h>

int main() {

wchar_t wideString[] = L"The spazzy orange tiger jumped " \
"over the tawny jaguar.";
wchar_t *newString;

printf("Strlen() output: %d\nWcslen() output: %d\n",
strlen(wideString), wcslen(wideString));

/* Wrong because the number of chars in a string isn't related to its length in bytes //
newString = (wchar_t *) malloc(strlen(wideString));
*/

/* Wrong because wide characters aren't 1 byte long! //
newString = (wchar_t *) malloc(wcslen(wideString));
*/

/* Wrong because wcslen does not include the terminating null */
newString = (wchar_t *) malloc(wcslen(wideString) * sizeof(wchar_t));

/* correct! */
newString = (wchar_t *) malloc((wcslen(wideString) + 1) * sizeof(wchar_t));

/* ... */
}

The output from the printf() statement would be:

(result)
 
Strlen() output: 0
Wcslen() output: 53


+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Effectiveness: High

+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 741 CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 8 - Characters and Strings (STR)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 857 The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) Chapter 14 - Input Output (FIO)
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 974 SFP Secondary Cluster: Incorrect Buffer Length Computation
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1408 Comprehensive Categorization: Incorrect Calculation
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
CLASP Improper string length checking
The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) FIO10-J Ensure the array is filled when using read() to fill an array
Software Fault Patterns SFP10 Incorrect Buffer Length Computation
+ References
[REF-7] Michael Howard and David LeBlanc. "Writing Secure Code". Chapter 5, "Unicode and ANSI Buffer Size Mismatches" Page 153. 2nd Edition. Microsoft Press. 2002-12-04.
<https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/store/writing-secure-code-9780735617223>.
[REF-18] Secure Software, Inc.. "The CLASP Application Security Process". 2005.
<https://cwe.mitre.org/documents/sources/TheCLASPApplicationSecurityProcess.pdf>. (URL validated: 2024-11-17)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
CLASP
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2010-01-11 Gregory Padgett Unitrends
correction to Demonstrative_Example
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Weakness_Ordinalities
2024-07-16
(CWE 4.15, 2024-07-16)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2021-03-15 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Taxonomy_Mappings
2018-03-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Enabling_Factors_for_Exploitation, Modes_of_Introduction, References, Taxonomy_Mappings
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2014-06-23 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Enabling_Factors_for_Exploitation, Other_Notes
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2010-02-16 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, References
2009-05-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2008-11-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2008-04-11 Improper String Length Checking

CWE-681: Incorrect Conversion between Numeric Types

Weakness ID: 681
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
When converting from one data type to another, such as long to integer, data can be omitted or translated in a way that produces unexpected values. If the resulting values are used in a sensitive context, then dangerous behaviors may occur.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Unexpected State; Quality Degradation

Scope: Other, Integrity

The program could wind up using the wrong number and generate incorrect results. If the number is used to allocate resources or make a security decision, then this could introduce a vulnerability.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Implementation

Avoid making conversion between numeric types. Always check for the allowed ranges.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 704 Incorrect Type Conversion or Cast
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 192 Integer Coercion Error
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 194 Unexpected Sign Extension
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 195 Signed to Unsigned Conversion Error
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 196 Unsigned to Signed Conversion Error
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 197 Numeric Truncation Error
CanPrecede Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 682 Incorrect Calculation
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 136 Type Errors
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 189 Numeric Errors
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 704 Incorrect Type Conversion or Cast
+ Relevant to the view "CISQ Quality Measures (2020)" (View-1305)
Nature Type ID Name
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 194 Unexpected Sign Extension
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 195 Signed to Unsigned Conversion Error
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 196 Unsigned to Signed Conversion Error
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 197 Numeric Truncation Error
+ Relevant to the view "CISQ Data Protection Measures" (View-1340)
Nature Type ID Name
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 194 Unexpected Sign Extension
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 195 Signed to Unsigned Conversion Error
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 196 Unsigned to Signed Conversion Error
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 197 Numeric Truncation Error
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

C (Undetermined Prevalence)

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
High
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


In the following Java example, a float literal is cast to an integer, thus causing a loss of precision.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
int i = (int) 33457.8f;


Example 2


This code adds a float and an integer together, casting the result to an integer.

(bad code)
Example Language: PHP 
$floatVal = 1.8345;
$intVal = 3;
$result = (int)$floatVal + $intVal;

Normally, PHP will preserve the precision of this operation, making $result = 4.8345. After the cast to int, it is reasonable to expect PHP to follow rounding convention and set $result = 5. However, the explicit cast to int always rounds DOWN, so the final value of $result is 4. This behavior may have unintended consequences.



Example 3


In this example the variable amount can hold a negative value when it is returned. Because the function is declared to return an unsigned int, amount will be implicitly converted to unsigned.

(bad code)
Example Language:
unsigned int readdata () {
int amount = 0;
...
if (result == ERROR)
amount = -1;
...
return amount;
}

If the error condition in the code above is met, then the return value of readdata() will be 4,294,967,295 on a system that uses 32-bit integers.



Example 4


In this example, depending on the return value of accecssmainframe(), the variable amount can hold a negative value when it is returned. Because the function is declared to return an unsigned value, amount will be implicitly cast to an unsigned number.

(bad code)
Example Language:
unsigned int readdata () {
int amount = 0;
...
amount = accessmainframe();
...
return amount;
}

If the return value of accessmainframe() is -1, then the return value of readdata() will be 4,294,967,295 on a system that uses 32-bit integers.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Chain: integer coercion error (CWE-192) prevents a return value from indicating an error, leading to out-of-bounds write (CWE-787)
Chain: in a web browser, an unsigned 64-bit integer is forcibly cast to a 32-bit integer (CWE-681) and potentially leading to an integer overflow (CWE-190). If an integer overflow occurs, this can cause heap memory corruption (CWE-122)
Chain: integer signedness error (CWE-195) passes signed comparison, leading to heap overflow (CWE-122)
Chain: signed short width value in image processor is sign extended during conversion to unsigned int, which leads to integer overflow and heap-based buffer overflow.
Integer truncation of length value leads to heap-based buffer overflow.
Size of a particular type changes for 64-bit platforms, leading to an integer truncation in document processor causes incorrect index to be generated.
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Effectiveness: High

+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 738 CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 5 - Integers (INT)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 739 CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 6 - Floating Point (FLP)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 808 2010 Top 25 - Weaknesses On the Cusp
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 848 The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) Chapter 5 - Numeric Types and Operations (NUM)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.