CWE - VIEW SLICE: CWE-711: Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004) (4.13)

CWE VIEW: Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)

View ID: 711

Type: Graph

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Objective

CWE entries in this view (graph) are associated with the OWASP Top Ten, as released in 2004, and as required for compliance with PCI DSS version 1.1. This view is considered obsolete as a newer version of the OWASP Top Ten is available.

Audience

Stakeholder	Description
Software Developers	This view outlines the most important issues as identified by the OWASP Top Ten (2004 version), providing a good starting point for web application developers who want to code more securely, as well as complying with PCI DSS 1.1.
Product Customers	This view outlines the most important issues as identified by the OWASP Top Ten, providing customers with a way of asking their software developers to follow minimum expectations for secure code, in compliance with PCI-DSS 1.1.
Educators	Since the OWASP Top Ten covers the most frequently encountered issues, this view can be used by educators as training material for students. However, the 2007 version (CWE-629) might be more appropriate.

Relationships

The following graph shows the tree-like relationships between weaknesses that exist at different levels of abstraction. At the highest level, categories and pillars exist to group weaknesses. Categories (which are not technically weaknesses) are special CWE entries used to group weaknesses that share a common characteristic. Pillars are weaknesses that are described in the most abstract fashion. Below these top-level entries are weaknesses are varying levels of abstraction. Classes are still very abstract, typically independent of any specific language or technology. Base level weaknesses are used to present a more specific type of weakness. A variant is a weakness that is described at a very low level of detail, typically limited to a specific language or technology. A chain is a set of weaknesses that must be reachable consecutively in order to produce an exploitable vulnerability. While a composite is a set of weaknesses that must all be present simultaneously in order to produce an exploitable vulnerability.

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711 - Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)

Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A1 - Unvalidated Input - (722)

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 722 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A1 - Unvalidated Input)

Weaknesses in this category are related to the A1 category in the OWASP Top Ten 2004.

Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.Struts: Duplicate Validation Forms - (102)

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 722 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A1 - Unvalidated Input) > 102 (Struts: Duplicate Validation Forms)

The product uses multiple validation forms with the same name, which might cause the Struts Validator to validate a form that the programmer does not expect.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 722 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A1 - Unvalidated Input) > 103 (Struts: Incomplete validate() Method Definition)

The product has a validator form that either does not define a validate() method, or defines a validate() method but does not call super.validate().

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 722 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A1 - Unvalidated Input) > 104 (Struts: Form Bean Does Not Extend Validation Class)

If a form bean does not extend an ActionForm subclass of the Validator framework, it can expose the application to other weaknesses related to insufficient input validation.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 722 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A1 - Unvalidated Input) > 106 (Struts: Plug-in Framework not in Use)

When an application does not use an input validation framework such as the Struts Validator, there is a greater risk of introducing weaknesses related to insufficient input validation.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 722 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A1 - Unvalidated Input) > 109 (Struts: Validator Turned Off)

Automatic filtering via a Struts bean has been turned off, which disables the Struts Validator and custom validation logic. This exposes the application to other weaknesses related to insufficient input validation.

Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input ('Classic Buffer Overflow') - (120)

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 722 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A1 - Unvalidated Input) > 120 (Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input ('Classic Buffer Overflow'))

The product copies an input buffer to an output buffer without verifying that the size of the input buffer is less than the size of the output buffer, leading to a buffer overflow.Classic Buffer OverflowUnbounded Transfer

Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.Improper Handling of Missing Special Element - (166)

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 722 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A1 - Unvalidated Input) > 166 (Improper Handling of Missing Special Element)

The product receives input from an upstream component, but it does not handle or incorrectly handles when an expected special element is missing.

Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.Improper Handling of Additional Special Element - (167)

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 722 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A1 - Unvalidated Input) > 167 (Improper Handling of Additional Special Element)

The product receives input from an upstream component, but it does not handle or incorrectly handles when an additional unexpected special element is provided.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 722 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A1 - Unvalidated Input) > 179 (Incorrect Behavior Order: Early Validation)

The product validates input before applying protection mechanisms that modify the input, which could allow an attacker to bypass the validation via dangerous inputs that only arise after the modification.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 722 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A1 - Unvalidated Input) > 180 (Incorrect Behavior Order: Validate Before Canonicalize)

The product validates input before it is canonicalized, which prevents the product from detecting data that becomes invalid after the canonicalization step.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 722 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A1 - Unvalidated Input) > 181 (Incorrect Behavior Order: Validate Before Filter)

The product validates data before it has been filtered, which prevents the product from detecting data that becomes invalid after the filtering step.Validate-before-cleanse

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 722 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A1 - Unvalidated Input) > 182 (Collapse of Data into Unsafe Value)

The product filters data in a way that causes it to be reduced or "collapsed" into an unsafe value that violates an expected security property.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 722 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A1 - Unvalidated Input) > 183 (Permissive List of Allowed Inputs)

The product implements a protection mechanism that relies on a list of inputs (or properties of inputs) that are explicitly allowed by policy because the inputs are assumed to be safe, but the list is too permissive - that is, it allows an input that is unsafe, leading to resultant weaknesses.Allowlist / Allow ListSafelist / Safe ListWhitelist / White List

Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.Improper Input Validation - (20)

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 722 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A1 - Unvalidated Input) > 20 (Improper Input Validation)

The product receives input or data, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the properties that are required to process the data safely and correctly.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 722 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A1 - Unvalidated Input) > 425 (Direct Request ('Forced Browsing'))

The web application does not adequately enforce appropriate authorization on all restricted URLs, scripts, or files.forced browsing

Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.External Control of Assumed-Immutable Web Parameter - (472)

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 722 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A1 - Unvalidated Input) > 472 (External Control of Assumed-Immutable Web Parameter)

The web application does not sufficiently verify inputs that are assumed to be immutable but are actually externally controllable, such as hidden form fields.Assumed-Immutable Parameter Tampering

Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect') - (601)

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 722 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A1 - Unvalidated Input) > 601 (URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect'))

A web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a Redirect. This simplifies phishing attacks.Open RedirectCross-site RedirectCross-domain Redirect

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 722 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A1 - Unvalidated Input) > 602 (Client-Side Enforcement of Server-Side Security)

The product is composed of a server that relies on the client to implement a mechanism that is intended to protect the server.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 722 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A1 - Unvalidated Input) > 77 (Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection'))

The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component.

Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting') - (79)

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 722 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A1 - Unvalidated Input) > 79 (Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting'))

The product does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes user-controllable input before it is placed in output that is used as a web page that is served to other users.XSSHTML InjectionCSS

Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection') - (89)

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 722 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A1 - Unvalidated Input) > 89 (Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection'))

The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component.

Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A2 - Broken Access Control - (723)

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 723 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A2 - Broken Access Control)

Weaknesses in this category are related to the A2 category in the OWASP Top Ten 2004.

Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') - (22)

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 723 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A2 - Broken Access Control) > 22 (Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal'))

The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.Directory traversalPath traversal

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 723 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A2 - Broken Access Control) > 266 (Incorrect Privilege Assignment)

A product incorrectly assigns a privilege to a particular actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 723 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A2 - Broken Access Control) > 268 (Privilege Chaining)

Two distinct privileges, roles, capabilities, or rights can be combined in a way that allows an entity to perform unsafe actions that would not be allowed without that combination.

Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.Permission Issues - (275)

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 723 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A2 - Broken Access Control) > 275 (Permission Issues)

Weaknesses in this category are related to improper assignment or handling of permissions.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 723 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A2 - Broken Access Control) > 283 (Unverified Ownership)

The product does not properly verify that a critical resource is owned by the proper entity.

Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things.Improper Access Control - (284)

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 723 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A2 - Broken Access Control) > 284 (Improper Access Control)

The product does not restrict or incorrectly restricts access to a resource from an unauthorized actor.Authorization

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 723 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A2 - Broken Access Control) > 285 (Improper Authorization)

The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.AuthZ

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 723 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A2 - Broken Access Control) > 330 (Use of Insufficiently Random Values)

The product uses insufficiently random numbers or values in a security context that depends on unpredictable numbers.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 723 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A2 - Broken Access Control) > 41 (Improper Resolution of Path Equivalence)

The product is vulnerable to file system contents disclosure through path equivalence. Path equivalence involves the use of special characters in file and directory names. The associated manipulations are intended to generate multiple names for the same object.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 723 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A2 - Broken Access Control) > 425 (Direct Request ('Forced Browsing'))

The web application does not adequately enforce appropriate authorization on all restricted URLs, scripts, or files.forced browsing

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 723 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A2 - Broken Access Control) > 525 (Use of Web Browser Cache Containing Sensitive Information)

The web application does not use an appropriate caching policy that specifies the extent to which each web page and associated form fields should be cached.

Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.Incorrect Behavior Order: Authorization Before Parsing and Canonicalization - (551)

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 723 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A2 - Broken Access Control) > 551 (Incorrect Behavior Order: Authorization Before Parsing and Canonicalization)

If a web server does not fully parse requested URLs before it examines them for authorization, it may be possible for an attacker to bypass authorization protection.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 723 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A2 - Broken Access Control) > 556 (ASP.NET Misconfiguration: Use of Identity Impersonation)

Configuring an ASP.NET application to run with impersonated credentials may give the application unnecessary privileges.

Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key - (639)

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 723 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A2 - Broken Access Control) > 639 (Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key)

The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data.Insecure Direct Object Reference / IDORBroken Object Level Authorization / BOLAHorizontal Authorization

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 723 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A2 - Broken Access Control) > 708 (Incorrect Ownership Assignment)

The product assigns an owner to a resource, but the owner is outside of the intended control sphere.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 723 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A2 - Broken Access Control) > 73 (External Control of File Name or Path)

The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 723 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A2 - Broken Access Control) > 9 (J2EE Misconfiguration: Weak Access Permissions for EJB Methods)

If elevated access rights are assigned to EJB methods, then an attacker can take advantage of the permissions to exploit the product.

Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A3 - Broken Authentication and Session Management - (724)

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 724 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A3 - Broken Authentication and Session Management)

Weaknesses in this category are related to the A3 category in the OWASP Top Ten 2004.

Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.Credentials Management Errors - (255)

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 724 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A3 - Broken Authentication and Session Management) > 255 (Credentials Management Errors)

Weaknesses in this category are related to the management of credentials.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 724 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A3 - Broken Authentication and Session Management) > 259 (Use of Hard-coded Password)

The product contains a hard-coded password, which it uses for its own inbound authentication or for outbound communication to external components.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 724 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A3 - Broken Authentication and Session Management) > 287 (Improper Authentication)

When an actor claims to have a given identity, the product does not prove or insufficiently proves that the claim is correct.authentificationAuthNAuthC

Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.Improper Following of a Certificate's Chain of Trust - (296)

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 724 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A3 - Broken Authentication and Session Management) > 296 (Improper Following of a Certificate's Chain of Trust)

The product does not follow, or incorrectly follows, the chain of trust for a certificate back to a trusted root certificate, resulting in incorrect trust of any resource that is associated with that certificate.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 724 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A3 - Broken Authentication and Session Management) > 298 (Improper Validation of Certificate Expiration)

A certificate expiration is not validated or is incorrectly validated, so trust may be assigned to certificates that have been abandoned due to age.

Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.Authentication Bypass by Assumed-Immutable Data - (302)

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 724 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A3 - Broken Authentication and Session Management) > 302 (Authentication Bypass by Assumed-Immutable Data)

The authentication scheme or implementation uses key data elements that are assumed to be immutable, but can be controlled or modified by the attacker.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 724 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A3 - Broken Authentication and Session Management) > 304 (Missing Critical Step in Authentication)

The product implements an authentication technique, but it skips a step that weakens the technique.

Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts - (307)

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 724 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A3 - Broken Authentication and Session Management) > 307 (Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts)

The product does not implement sufficient measures to prevent multiple failed authentication attempts within a short time frame, making it more susceptible to brute force attacks.

Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.Use of Password System for Primary Authentication - (309)

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 724 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A3 - Broken Authentication and Session Management) > 309 (Use of Password System for Primary Authentication)

The use of password systems as the primary means of authentication may be subject to several flaws or shortcomings, each reducing the effectiveness of the mechanism.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 724 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A3 - Broken Authentication and Session Management) > 345 (Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity)

The product does not sufficiently verify the origin or authenticity of data, in a way that causes it to accept invalid data.

Composite - a Compound Element that consists of two or more distinct weaknesses, in which all weaknesses must be present at the same time in order for a potential vulnerability to arise. Removing any of the weaknesses eliminates or sharply reduces the risk. One weakness, X, can be "broken down" into component weaknesses Y and Z. There can be cases in which one weakness might not be essential to a composite, but changes the nature of the composite when it becomes a vulnerability.Session Fixation - (384)

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 724 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A3 - Broken Authentication and Session Management) > 384 (Session Fixation)

Authenticating a user, or otherwise establishing a new user session, without invalidating any existing session identifier gives an attacker the opportunity to steal authenticated sessions.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 724 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A3 - Broken Authentication and Session Management) > 521 (Weak Password Requirements)

The product does not require that users should have strong passwords, which makes it easier for attackers to compromise user accounts.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 724 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A3 - Broken Authentication and Session Management) > 522 (Insufficiently Protected Credentials)

The product transmits or stores authentication credentials, but it uses an insecure method that is susceptible to unauthorized interception and/or retrieval.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 724 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A3 - Broken Authentication and Session Management) > 525 (Use of Web Browser Cache Containing Sensitive Information)

The web application does not use an appropriate caching policy that specifies the extent to which each web page and associated form fields should be cached.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 724 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A3 - Broken Authentication and Session Management) > 613 (Insufficient Session Expiration)

According to WASC, "Insufficient Session Expiration is when a web site permits an attacker to reuse old session credentials or session IDs for authorization."

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 724 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A3 - Broken Authentication and Session Management) > 620 (Unverified Password Change)

When setting a new password for a user, the product does not require knowledge of the original password, or using another form of authentication.

Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.Weak Password Recovery Mechanism for Forgotten Password - (640)

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 724 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A3 - Broken Authentication and Session Management) > 640 (Weak Password Recovery Mechanism for Forgotten Password)

The product contains a mechanism for users to recover or change their passwords without knowing the original password, but the mechanism is weak.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 724 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A3 - Broken Authentication and Session Management) > 798 (Use of Hard-coded Credentials)

The product contains hard-coded credentials, such as a password or cryptographic key, which it uses for its own inbound authentication, outbound communication to external components, or encryption of internal data.

Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A4 - Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Flaws - (725)

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 725 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A4 - Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Flaws)

Weaknesses in this category are related to the A4 category in the OWASP Top Ten 2004.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 725 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A4 - Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Flaws) > 644 (Improper Neutralization of HTTP Headers for Scripting Syntax)

The product does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes web scripting syntax in HTTP headers that can be used by web browser components that can process raw headers, such as Flash.

Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting') - (79)

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 725 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A4 - Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Flaws) > 79 (Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting'))

The product does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes user-controllable input before it is placed in output that is used as a web page that is served to other users.XSSHTML InjectionCSS

Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A5 - Buffer Overflows - (726)

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 726 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A5 - Buffer Overflows)

Weaknesses in this category are related to the A5 category in the OWASP Top Ten 2004.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 726 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A5 - Buffer Overflows) > 119 (Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer)

The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it can read from or write to a memory location that is outside of the intended boundary of the buffer.Buffer Overflowbuffer overrunmemory safety

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 726 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A5 - Buffer Overflows) > 120 (Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input ('Classic Buffer Overflow'))

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 726 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A5 - Buffer Overflows) > 134 (Use of Externally-Controlled Format String)

The product uses a function that accepts a format string as an argument, but the format string originates from an external source.

Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A6 - Injection Flaws - (727)

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 727 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A6 - Injection Flaws)

Weaknesses in this category are related to the A6 category in the OWASP Top Ten 2004.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 727 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A6 - Injection Flaws) > 117 (Improper Output Neutralization for Logs)

The product does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes output that is written to logs.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 727 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A6 - Injection Flaws) > 74 (Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection'))

The product constructs all or part of a command, data structure, or record using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify how it is parsed or interpreted when it is sent to a downstream component.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 727 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A6 - Injection Flaws) > 77 (Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection'))

Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection') - (78)

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 727 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A6 - Injection Flaws) > 78 (Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection'))

The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component.Shell injectionShell metacharacters

Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection') - (89)

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 727 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A6 - Injection Flaws) > 89 (Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection'))

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 727 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A6 - Injection Flaws) > 91 (XML Injection (aka Blind XPath Injection))

The product does not properly neutralize special elements that are used in XML, allowing attackers to modify the syntax, content, or commands of the XML before it is processed by an end system.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 727 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A6 - Injection Flaws) > 95 (Improper Neutralization of Directives in Dynamically Evaluated Code ('Eval Injection'))

The product receives input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes code syntax before using the input in a dynamic evaluation call (e.g. "eval").

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 727 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A6 - Injection Flaws) > 98 (Improper Control of Filename for Include/Require Statement in PHP Program ('PHP Remote File Inclusion'))

The PHP application receives input from an upstream component, but it does not restrict or incorrectly restricts the input before its usage in "require," "include," or similar functions.Remote file includeRFILocal file inclusion

Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A7 - Improper Error Handling - (728)

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 728 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A7 - Improper Error Handling)

Weaknesses in this category are related to the A7 category in the OWASP Top Ten 2004.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 728 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A7 - Improper Error Handling) > 203 (Observable Discrepancy)

The product behaves differently or sends different responses under different circumstances in a way that is observable to an unauthorized actor, which exposes security-relevant information about the state of the product, such as whether a particular operation was successful or not.Side Channel Attack

Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.Generation of Error Message Containing Sensitive Information - (209)

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 728 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A7 - Improper Error Handling) > 209 (Generation of Error Message Containing Sensitive Information)

The product generates an error message that includes sensitive information about its environment, users, or associated data.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 728 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A7 - Improper Error Handling) > 228 (Improper Handling of Syntactically Invalid Structure)

The product does not handle or incorrectly handles input that is not syntactically well-formed with respect to the associated specification.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 728 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A7 - Improper Error Handling) > 252 (Unchecked Return Value)

The product does not check the return value from a method or function, which can prevent it from detecting unexpected states and conditions.

Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.Error Conditions, Return Values, Status Codes - (389)

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 728 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A7 - Improper Error Handling) > 389 (Error Conditions, Return Values, Status Codes)

This category includes weaknesses that occur if a function does not generate the correct return/status code, or if the application does not handle all possible return/status codes that could be generated by a function. This type of problem is most often found in conditions that are rarely encountered during the normal operation of the product. Presumably, most bugs related to common conditions are found and eliminated during development and testing. In some cases, the attacker can directly control or influence the environment to trigger the rare conditions.

Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.Detection of Error Condition Without Action - (390)

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 728 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A7 - Improper Error Handling) > 390 (Detection of Error Condition Without Action)

The product detects a specific error, but takes no actions to handle the error.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 728 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A7 - Improper Error Handling) > 391 (Unchecked Error Condition)

[PLANNED FOR DEPRECATION. SEE MAINTENANCE NOTES AND CONSIDER CWE-252, CWE-248, OR CWE-1069.] Ignoring exceptions and other error conditions may allow an attacker to induce unexpected behavior unnoticed.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 728 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A7 - Improper Error Handling) > 394 (Unexpected Status Code or Return Value)

The product does not properly check when a function or operation returns a value that is legitimate for the function, but is not expected by the product.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 728 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A7 - Improper Error Handling) > 636 (Not Failing Securely ('Failing Open'))

When the product encounters an error condition or failure, its design requires it to fall back to a state that is less secure than other options that are available, such as selecting the weakest encryption algorithm or using the most permissive access control restrictions.Failing Open

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 728 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A7 - Improper Error Handling) > 7 (J2EE Misconfiguration: Missing Custom Error Page)

The default error page of a web application should not display sensitive information about the product.

Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A8 - Insecure Storage - (729)

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 729 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A8 - Insecure Storage)

Weaknesses in this category are related to the A8 category in the OWASP Top Ten 2004.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 729 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A8 - Insecure Storage) > 14 (Compiler Removal of Code to Clear Buffers)

Sensitive memory is cleared according to the source code, but compiler optimizations leave the memory untouched when it is not read from again, aka "dead store removal."

Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.Sensitive Information in Resource Not Removed Before Reuse - (226)

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 729 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A8 - Insecure Storage) > 226 (Sensitive Information in Resource Not Removed Before Reuse)

The product releases a resource such as memory or a file so that it can be made available for reuse, but it does not clear or "zeroize" the information contained in the resource before the product performs a critical state transition or makes the resource available for reuse by other entities.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 729 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A8 - Insecure Storage) > 261 (Weak Encoding for Password)

Obscuring a password with a trivial encoding does not protect the password.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 729 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A8 - Insecure Storage) > 311 (Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data)

The product does not encrypt sensitive or critical information before storage or transmission.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 729 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A8 - Insecure Storage) > 321 (Use of Hard-coded Cryptographic Key)

The use of a hard-coded cryptographic key significantly increases the possibility that encrypted data may be recovered.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 729 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A8 - Insecure Storage) > 326 (Inadequate Encryption Strength)

The product stores or transmits sensitive data using an encryption scheme that is theoretically sound, but is not strong enough for the level of protection required.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 729 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A8 - Insecure Storage) > 327 (Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm)

The product uses a broken or risky cryptographic algorithm or protocol.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 729 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A8 - Insecure Storage) > 539 (Use of Persistent Cookies Containing Sensitive Information)

The web application uses persistent cookies, but the cookies contain sensitive information.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 729 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A8 - Insecure Storage) > 591 (Sensitive Data Storage in Improperly Locked Memory)

The product stores sensitive data in memory that is not locked, or that has been incorrectly locked, which might cause the memory to be written to swap files on disk by the virtual memory manager. This can make the data more accessible to external actors.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 729 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A8 - Insecure Storage) > 598 (Use of GET Request Method With Sensitive Query Strings)

The web application uses the HTTP GET method to process a request and includes sensitive information in the query string of that request.

Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A9 - Denial of Service - (730)

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 730 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A9 - Denial of Service)

Weaknesses in this category are related to the A9 category in the OWASP Top Ten 2004.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 730 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A9 - Denial of Service) > 170 (Improper Null Termination)

The product does not terminate or incorrectly terminates a string or array with a null character or equivalent terminator.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 730 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A9 - Denial of Service) > 248 (Uncaught Exception)

An exception is thrown from a function, but it is not caught.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 730 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A9 - Denial of Service) > 369 (Divide By Zero)

The product divides a value by zero.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 730 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A9 - Denial of Service) > 382 (J2EE Bad Practices: Use of System.exit())

A J2EE application uses System.exit(), which also shuts down its container.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 730 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A9 - Denial of Service) > 400 (Uncontrolled Resource Consumption)

The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources.Resource Exhaustion

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 730 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A9 - Denial of Service) > 401 (Missing Release of Memory after Effective Lifetime)

The product does not sufficiently track and release allocated memory after it has been used, which slowly consumes remaining memory.Memory Leak

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 730 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A9 - Denial of Service) > 404 (Improper Resource Shutdown or Release)

The product does not release or incorrectly releases a resource before it is made available for re-use.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 730 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A9 - Denial of Service) > 405 (Asymmetric Resource Consumption (Amplification))

The product does not properly control situations in which an adversary can cause the product to consume or produce excessive resources without requiring the adversary to invest equivalent work or otherwise prove authorization, i.e., the adversary's influence is "asymmetric."

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 730 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A9 - Denial of Service) > 410 (Insufficient Resource Pool)

The product's resource pool is not large enough to handle peak demand, which allows an attacker to prevent others from accessing the resource by using a (relatively) large number of requests for resources.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 730 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A9 - Denial of Service) > 412 (Unrestricted Externally Accessible Lock)

The product properly checks for the existence of a lock, but the lock can be externally controlled or influenced by an actor that is outside of the intended sphere of control.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 730 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A9 - Denial of Service) > 476 (NULL Pointer Dereference)

A NULL pointer dereference occurs when the application dereferences a pointer that it expects to be valid, but is NULL, typically causing a crash or exit.NPDnull derefnil pointer dereference

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 730 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A9 - Denial of Service) > 674 (Uncontrolled Recursion)

The product does not properly control the amount of recursion that takes place, consuming excessive resources, such as allocated memory or the program stack.Stack Exhaustion

Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A10 - Insecure Configuration Management - (731)

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 731 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A10 - Insecure Configuration Management)

Weaknesses in this category are related to the A10 category in the OWASP Top Ten 2004.

Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.Generation of Error Message Containing Sensitive Information - (209)

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 731 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A10 - Insecure Configuration Management) > 209 (Generation of Error Message Containing Sensitive Information)

The product generates an error message that includes sensitive information about its environment, users, or associated data.

Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Debugging Code - (215)

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 731 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A10 - Insecure Configuration Management) > 215 (Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Debugging Code)

The product inserts sensitive information into debugging code, which could expose this information if the debugging code is not disabled in production.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 731 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A10 - Insecure Configuration Management) > 219 (Storage of File with Sensitive Data Under Web Root)

The product stores sensitive data under the web document root with insufficient access control, which might make it accessible to untrusted parties.

Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.Permission Issues - (275)

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 731 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A10 - Insecure Configuration Management) > 275 (Permission Issues)

Weaknesses in this category are related to improper assignment or handling of permissions.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 731 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A10 - Insecure Configuration Management) > 295 (Improper Certificate Validation)

The product does not validate, or incorrectly validates, a certificate.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 731 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A10 - Insecure Configuration Management) > 5 (J2EE Misconfiguration: Data Transmission Without Encryption)

Information sent over a network can be compromised while in transit. An attacker may be able to read or modify the contents if the data are sent in plaintext or are weakly encrypted.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 731 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A10 - Insecure Configuration Management) > 555 (J2EE Misconfiguration: Plaintext Password in Configuration File)

The J2EE application stores a plaintext password in a configuration file.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 731 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A10 - Insecure Configuration Management) > 6 (J2EE Misconfiguration: Insufficient Session-ID Length)

The J2EE application is configured to use an insufficient session ID length.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 731 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A10 - Insecure Configuration Management) > 7 (J2EE Misconfiguration: Missing Custom Error Page)

The default error page of a web application should not display sensitive information about the product.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 731 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A10 - Insecure Configuration Management) > 8 (J2EE Misconfiguration: Entity Bean Declared Remote)

When an application exposes a remote interface for an entity bean, it might also expose methods that get or set the bean's data. These methods could be leveraged to read sensitive information, or to change data in ways that violate the application's expectations, potentially leading to other vulnerabilities.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 731 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A10 - Insecure Configuration Management) > 9 (J2EE Misconfiguration: Weak Access Permissions for EJB Methods)

If elevated access rights are assigned to EJB methods, then an attacker can take advantage of the permissions to exploit the product.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 731 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A10 - Insecure Configuration Management) > 459 (Incomplete Cleanup)

The product does not properly "clean up" and remove temporary or supporting resources after they have been used.Insufficient Cleanup

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 731 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A10 - Insecure Configuration Management) > 489 (Active Debug Code)

The product is deployed to unauthorized actors with debugging code still enabled or active, which can create unintended entry points or expose sensitive information.Leftover debug code

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 731 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A10 - Insecure Configuration Management) > 11 (ASP.NET Misconfiguration: Creating Debug Binary)

Debugging messages help attackers learn about the system and plan a form of attack.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 731 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A10 - Insecure Configuration Management) > 12 (ASP.NET Misconfiguration: Missing Custom Error Page)

An ASP .NET application must enable custom error pages in order to prevent attackers from mining information from the framework's built-in responses.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 731 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A10 - Insecure Configuration Management) > 13 (ASP.NET Misconfiguration: Password in Configuration File)

Storing a plaintext password in a configuration file allows anyone who can read the file access to the password-protected resource making them an easy target for attackers.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 731 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A10 - Insecure Configuration Management) > 520 (.NET Misconfiguration: Use of Impersonation)

Allowing a .NET application to run at potentially escalated levels of access to the underlying operating and file systems can be dangerous and result in various forms of attacks.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 731 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A10 - Insecure Configuration Management) > 554 (ASP.NET Misconfiguration: Not Using Input Validation Framework)

The ASP.NET application does not use an input validation framework.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 731 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A10 - Insecure Configuration Management) > 556 (ASP.NET Misconfiguration: Use of Identity Impersonation)

Configuring an ASP.NET application to run with impersonated credentials may give the application unnecessary privileges.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 731 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A10 - Insecure Configuration Management) > 526 (Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information in an Environment Variable)

The product uses an environment variable to store unencrypted sensitive information.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 731 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A10 - Insecure Configuration Management) > 527 (Exposure of Version-Control Repository to an Unauthorized Control Sphere)

The product stores a CVS, git, or other repository in a directory, archive, or other resource that is stored, transferred, or otherwise made accessible to unauthorized actors.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 731 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A10 - Insecure Configuration Management) > 528 (Exposure of Core Dump File to an Unauthorized Control Sphere)

The product generates a core dump file in a directory, archive, or other resource that is stored, transferred, or otherwise made accessible to unauthorized actors.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 731 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A10 - Insecure Configuration Management) > 529 (Exposure of Access Control List Files to an Unauthorized Control Sphere)

The product stores access control list files in a directory or other container that is accessible to actors outside of the intended control sphere.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 731 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A10 - Insecure Configuration Management) > 530 (Exposure of Backup File to an Unauthorized Control Sphere)

A backup file is stored in a directory or archive that is made accessible to unauthorized actors.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 731 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A10 - Insecure Configuration Management) > 531 (Inclusion of Sensitive Information in Test Code)

Accessible test applications can pose a variety of security risks. Since developers or administrators rarely consider that someone besides themselves would even know about the existence of these applications, it is common for them to contain sensitive information or functions.

Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File - (532)

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 731 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A10 - Insecure Configuration Management) > 532 (Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File)

Information written to log files can be of a sensitive nature and give valuable guidance to an attacker or expose sensitive user information.

Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.Inclusion of Sensitive Information in Source Code - (540)

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 731 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A10 - Insecure Configuration Management) > 540 (Inclusion of Sensitive Information in Source Code)

Source code on a web server or repository often contains sensitive information and should generally not be accessible to users.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 731 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A10 - Insecure Configuration Management) > 541 (Inclusion of Sensitive Information in an Include File)

If an include file source is accessible, the file can contain usernames and passwords, as well as sensitive information pertaining to the application and system.

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 731 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A10 - Insecure Configuration Management) > 548 (Exposure of Information Through Directory Listing)

A directory listing is inappropriately exposed, yielding potentially sensitive information to attackers.

Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.Files or Directories Accessible to External Parties - (552)

711 (Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)) > 731 (OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A10 - Insecure Configuration Management) > 552 (Files or Directories Accessible to External Parties)

The product makes files or directories accessible to unauthorized actors, even though they should not be.

Vulnerability Mapping Notes

Usage: Prohibited

(this CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)

Reason: View

Rationale:

This entry is a View. Views are not weaknesses and therefore inappropriate to describe the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments:

Use this View or other Views to search and navigate for the appropriate weakness.

Notes

Relationship

CWE relationships for this view were obtained by examining the OWASP document and mapping to any items that were specifically mentioned within the text of a category. As a result, this mapping is not complete with respect to all of CWE. In addition, some concepts were mentioned in multiple Top Ten items, which caused them to be mapped to multiple CWE categories. For example, SQL injection is mentioned in both A1 (CWE-722) and A6 (CWE-727) categories.

Relationship

As of 2008, some parts of CWE were not fully clarified out in terms of weaknesses. When these areas were mentioned in the OWASP Top Ten, category entries were mapped, although general mapping practice would usually favor mapping only to weaknesses.

References

[REF-570] "Top 10 2004". OWASP. 2004-01-27. <http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Top_10_2004>.

[REF-571] PCI Security Standards Council. "About the PCI Data Security Standard (PCI DSS)". <https://listings.pcisecuritystandards.org/pci_security/>. URL validated: 2023-04-07.

View Metrics

	CWEs in this view		Total CWEs
Weaknesses	117	out of	934
Categories	13	out of	374
Views	0	out of	49
Total	130	out of	1357

Content History

Submissions
Submission Date	Submitter	Organization
2008-08-15 (CWE 1.0, 2008-09-09)		Veracode
2008-08-15 (CWE 1.0, 2008-09-09)	Suggested creation of view and provided mappings
Modifications
Modification Date	Modifier	Organization
2017-11-08	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2017-11-08	updated References
2019-01-03	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2019-01-03	updated Description
2020-02-24	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2020-02-24	updated View_Audience
2021-03-15	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2021-03-15	updated Description, Maintenance_Notes, Relationship_Notes
2023-04-27	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2023-04-27	updated References
2023-06-29	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2023-06-29	updated Mapping_Notes

View Components

Weakness ID: 405

Abstraction: Class
Structure: Simple

View customized information:

For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.

Description

Extended Description

This can lead to poor performance due to "amplification" of resource consumption, typically in a non-linear fashion. This situation is worsened if the product allows malicious users or attackers to consume more resources than their access level permits.

Relationships

This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.

Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (CWE-1000)

Nature	Type	ID	Name
ChildOf	Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.	400	Uncontrolled Resource Consumption
ParentOf	Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.	406	Insufficient Control of Network Message Volume (Network Amplification)
ParentOf	Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.	407	Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity
ParentOf	Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.	408	Incorrect Behavior Order: Early Amplification
ParentOf	Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.	409	Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification)
ParentOf	Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.	776	Improper Restriction of Recursive Entity References in DTDs ('XML Entity Expansion')
ParentOf	Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.	1050	Excessive Platform Resource Consumption within a Loop
ParentOf	Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.	1072	Data Resource Access without Use of Connection Pooling
ParentOf	Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.	1073	Non-SQL Invokable Control Element with Excessive Number of Data Resource Accesses
ParentOf	Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.	1084	Invokable Control Element with Excessive File or Data Access Operations
ParentOf	Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.	1089	Large Data Table with Excessive Number of Indices
ParentOf	Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.	1094	Excessive Index Range Scan for a Data Resource
ParentOf	Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.	1176	Inefficient CPU Computation
PeerOf	Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.	404	Improper Resource Shutdown or Release

Modes Of Introduction

The different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.

Phase	Note
Architecture and Design
Implementation
Operation

Applicable Platforms

This listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.

Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Operating Systems

Class: Not OS-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Architectures

Class: Not Architecture-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Class: Client Server (Undetermined Prevalence)

Common Consequences

This table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.

Scope	Impact	Likelihood
Availability	Technical Impact: DoS: Amplification; DoS: Resource Consumption (CPU); DoS: Resource Consumption (Memory); DoS: Resource Consumption (Other) Sometimes this is a factor in "flood" attacks, but other types of amplification exist.	High

Demonstrative Examples

Example 1

This code listens on a port for DNS requests and sends the result to the requesting address.

(bad code)

Example Language: Python

sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM)
sock.bind( (UDP_IP,UDP_PORT) )
while true:

data = sock.recvfrom(1024)
if not data:

break

(requestIP, nameToResolve) = parseUDPpacket(data)
record = resolveName(nameToResolve)
sendResponse(requestIP,record)

This code sends a DNS record to a requesting IP address. UDP allows the source IP address to be easily changed ('spoofed'), thus allowing an attacker to redirect responses to a target, which may be then be overwhelmed by the network traffic.

Example 2

This data prints the contents of a specified file requested by a user.

(bad code)

Example Language: PHP

function printFile($username,$filename){

//read file into string
$file = file_get_contents($filename);
if ($file && isOwnerOf($username,$filename)){

echo $file;
return true;

}
else{

echo 'You are not authorized to view this file';

}
return false;

}

This code first reads a specified file into memory, then prints the file if the user is authorized to see its contents. The read of the file into memory may be resource intensive and is unnecessary if the user is not allowed to see the file anyway.

Example 3

The DTD and the very brief XML below illustrate what is meant by an XML bomb. The ZERO entity contains one character, the letter A. The choice of entity name ZERO is being used to indicate length equivalent to that exponent on two, that is, the length of ZERO is 2^0. Similarly, ONE refers to ZERO twice, therefore the XML parser will expand ONE to a length of 2, or 2^1. Ultimately, we reach entity THIRTYTWO, which will expand to 2^32 characters in length, or 4 GB, probably consuming far more data than expected.

(attack code)

Example Language: XML

<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE MaliciousDTD [
<!ENTITY ZERO "A">
<!ENTITY ONE "&ZERO;&ZERO;">
<!ENTITY TWO "&ONE;&ONE;">
...
<!ENTITY THIRTYTWO "&THIRTYONE;&THIRTYONE;">
]>
<data>&THIRTYTWO;</data>

Example 4

This example attempts to check if an input string is a "sentence" [REF-1164].

(bad code)

Example Language: JavaScript

var test_string = "Bad characters: $@#";
var bad_pattern = /^(\w+\s?)*$/i;
var result = test_string.search(bad_pattern);

The regular expression has a vulnerable backtracking clause inside (\w+\s?)*$ which can be triggered to cause a Denial of Service by processing particular phrases.

To fix the backtracking problem, backtracking is removed with the ?= portion of the expression which changes it to a lookahead and the \2 which prevents the backtracking. The modified example is:

(good code)

Example Language: JavaScript

var test_string = "Bad characters: $@#";
var good_pattern = /^((?=(\w+))\2\s?)*$/i;
var result = test_string.search(good_pattern);

Note that [REF-1164] has a more thorough (and lengthy) explanation of everything going on within the RegEx.

Example 5

An adversary can cause significant resource consumption on a server by filtering the cryptographic algorithms offered by the client to the ones that are the most resource-intensive on the server side. After discovering which cryptographic algorithms are supported by the server, a malicious client can send the initial cryptographic handshake messages that contains only the resource-intensive algorithms. For some cryptographic protocols, these messages can be completely prefabricated, as the resource-intensive part of the handshake happens on the server-side first (such as TLS), rather than on the client side. In the case of cryptographic protocols where the resource-intensive part should happen on the client-side first (such as SSH), a malicious client can send a forged/precalculated computation result, which seems correct to the server, so the resource-intensive part of the handshake is going to happen on the server side. A malicious client is required to send only the initial messages of a cryptographic handshake to initiate the resource-consuming part of the cryptographic handshake. These messages are usually small, and generating them requires minimal computational effort, enabling a denial-of-service attack. An additional risk is the fact that higher key size increases the effectiveness of the attack. Cryptographic protocols where the clients have influence over the size of the used key (such as TLS 1.3 or SSH) are most at risk, as the client can enforce the highest key size supported by the server.

Observed Examples

Reference	Description
CVE-1999-0513	Classic "Smurf" attack, using spoofed ICMP packets to broadcast addresses.
CVE-2003-1564	Parsing library allows XML bomb
CVE-2004-2458	Tool creates directories before authenticating user.
CVE-2020-10735	Python has "quadratic complexity" issue when converting string to int with many digits in unexpected bases
CVE-2020-5243	server allows ReDOS with crafted User-Agent strings, due to overlapping capture groups that cause excessive backtracking.
CVE-2013-5211	composite: NTP feature generates large responses (high amplification factor) with spoofed UDP source addresses.
CVE-2002-20001	Diffie-Hellman (DHE) Key Agreement Protocol allows attackers to send arbitrary numbers that are not public keys, which causes the server to perform expensive, unnecessary computation of modular exponentiation.
CVE-2022-40735	The Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Protocol allows use of long exponents, which are more computationally expensive than using certain "short exponents" with particular properties.

Potential Mitigations

Phase: Architecture and Design

An application must make resources available to a client commensurate with the client's access level.

Phase: Architecture and Design

An application must, at all times, keep track of allocated resources and meter their usage appropriately.

Phase: System Configuration

Consider disabling resource-intensive algorithms on the server side, such as Diffie-Hellman key exchange.

Effectiveness: High

Note: Business requirements may prevent disabling resource-intensive algorithms.

Memberships

This MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.

Nature	Type	ID	Name
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	730	OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A9 - Denial of Service
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	855	The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) Chapter 12 - Thread Pools (TPS)
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	857	The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) Chapter 14 - Input Output (FIO)
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	977	SFP Secondary Cluster: Design
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	1145	SEI CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java - Guidelines 11. Thread Pools (TPS)
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	1147	SEI CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java - Guidelines 13. Input Output (FIO)
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	1416	Comprehensive Categorization: Resource Lifecycle Management

Vulnerability Mapping Notes

Usage: Allowed-with-Review

(this CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities in limited situations requiring careful review)

Reason: Abstraction

Rationale:

This CWE entry is a Class and might have Base-level children that would be more appropriate

Comments:

Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit

Taxonomy Mappings

Mapped Taxonomy Name	Node ID	Fit	Mapped Node Name
PLOVER			Asymmetric resource consumption (amplification)
OWASP Top Ten 2004	A9	CWE More Specific	Denial of Service
WASC	41		XML Attribute Blowup
The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011)	TPS00-J		Use thread pools to enable graceful degradation of service during traffic bursts
The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011)	FIO04-J		Release resources when they are no longer needed

References

[REF-1164] Ilya Kantor. "Catastrophic backtracking". 2020-12-13. <https://javascript.info/regexp-catastrophic-backtracking>.

Content History

Submissions
Submission Date	Submitter	Organization
2006-07-19 (CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)	PLOVER
2006-07-19 (CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
Contributions
Contribution Date	Contributor	Organization
2021-11-11	Szilárd Pfeiffer	Balasys IT Security
2021-11-11	Submitted content that led to modifications in applicable platforms, common consequences, potential mitigations, demonstrative examples, observed examples.
Modifications
Modification Date	Modifier	Organization
2008-07-01	Eric Dalci	Cigital
2008-07-01	updated Time_of_Introduction
2008-09-08	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2008-09-08	updated Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-10-14	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2008-10-14	updated Description
2009-07-27	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2009-07-27	updated Common_Consequences, Other_Notes
2010-02-16	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2010-02-16	updated Taxonomy_Mappings
2010-12-13	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2010-12-13	updated Description
2011-06-01	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2011-06-01	updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-27	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2011-06-27	updated Common_Consequences
2012-05-11	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2012-05-11	updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2012-10-30	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2012-10-30	updated Potential_Mitigations
2014-07-30	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2014-07-30	updated Relationships
2015-12-07	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2015-12-07	updated Relationships
2017-11-08	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2017-11-08	updated Applicable_Platforms, Functional_Areas
2019-01-03	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2019-01-03	updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2019-06-20	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2019-06-20	updated Relationships
2020-02-24	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2020-02-24	updated Relationships
2023-01-31	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2023-01-31	updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References, Time_of_Introduction
2023-04-27	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2023-04-27	updated Relationships
2023-06-29	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2023-06-29	updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships

Weakness ID: 120

Abstraction: Base
Structure: Simple

View customized information:

Description

The product copies an input buffer to an output buffer without verifying that the size of the input buffer is less than the size of the output buffer, leading to a buffer overflow.

Extended Description

A buffer overflow condition exists when a product attempts to put more data in a buffer than it can hold, or when it attempts to put data in a memory area outside of the boundaries of a buffer. The simplest type of error, and the most common cause of buffer overflows, is the "classic" case in which the product copies the buffer without restricting how much is copied. Other variants exist, but the existence of a classic overflow strongly suggests that the programmer is not considering even the most basic of security protections.

Alternate Terms

Classic Buffer Overflow:	This term was frequently used by vulnerability researchers during approximately 1995 to 2005 to differentiate buffer copies without length checks (which had been known about for decades) from other emerging weaknesses that still involved invalid accesses of buffers, as vulnerability researchers began to develop advanced exploitation techniques.
Unbounded Transfer

Relationships

Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (CWE-1000)

Nature	Type	ID	Name
ChildOf	Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.	119	Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
ParentOf	Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.	785	Use of Path Manipulation Function without Maximum-sized Buffer
CanFollow	Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.	170	Improper Null Termination
CanFollow	Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.	231	Improper Handling of Extra Values
CanFollow	Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.	416	Use After Free
CanFollow	Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.	456	Missing Initialization of a Variable
CanPrecede	Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.	123	Write-what-where Condition

Relevant to the view "Software Development" (CWE-699)

Nature	Type	ID	Name
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	1218	Memory Buffer Errors

Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (CWE-1003)

Nature	Type	ID	Name
ChildOf	Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.	119	Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer

Relevant to the view "CISQ Quality Measures (2020)" (CWE-1305)

Nature	Type	ID	Name
ChildOf	Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.	119	Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer

Relevant to the view "CISQ Data Protection Measures" (CWE-1340)

Nature	Type	ID	Name
ChildOf	Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.	119	Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer

Relevant to the view "Seven Pernicious Kingdoms" (CWE-700)

Nature	Type	ID	Name
ChildOf	Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.	20	Improper Input Validation

Modes Of Introduction

Phase	Note
Implementation

Applicable Platforms

Languages

C (Undetermined Prevalence)

C++ (Undetermined Prevalence)

Class: Assembly (Undetermined Prevalence)

Common Consequences

Scope	Impact	Likelihood
Integrity Confidentiality Availability	Technical Impact: Modify Memory; Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands Buffer overflows often can be used to execute arbitrary code, which is usually outside the scope of the product's implicit security policy. This can often be used to subvert any other security service.
Availability	Technical Impact: Modify Memory; DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart; DoS: Resource Consumption (CPU) Buffer overflows generally lead to crashes. Other attacks leading to lack of availability are possible, including putting the product into an infinite loop.

Likelihood Of Exploit

High

Demonstrative Examples

Example 1

The following code asks the user to enter their last name and then attempts to store the value entered in the last_name array.

(bad code)

Example Language: C

char last_name[20];
printf ("Enter your last name: ");
scanf ("%s", last_name);

The problem with the code above is that it does not restrict or limit the size of the name entered by the user. If the user enters "Very_very_long_last_name" which is 24 characters long, then a buffer overflow will occur since the array can only hold 20 characters total.

Example 2

The following code attempts to create a local copy of a buffer to perform some manipulations to the data.

(bad code)

Example Language: C

void manipulate_string(char * string){

char buf[24];
strcpy(buf, string);
...

}

However, the programmer does not ensure that the size of the data pointed to by string will fit in the local buffer and copies the data with the potentially dangerous strcpy() function. This may result in a buffer overflow condition if an attacker can influence the contents of the string parameter.

Example 3

The code below calls the gets() function to read in data from the command line.

(bad code)

Example Language: C

char buf[24];
printf("Please enter your name and press <Enter>\n");
gets(buf);
...

}

However, gets() is inherently unsafe, because it copies all input from STDIN to the buffer without checking size. This allows the user to provide a string that is larger than the buffer size, resulting in an overflow condition.

Example 4

In the following example, a server accepts connections from a client and processes the client request. After accepting a client connection, the program will obtain client information using the gethostbyaddr method, copy the hostname of the client that connected to a local variable and output the hostname of the client to a log file.

(bad code)

Example Language: C

...

struct hostent *clienthp;
char hostname[MAX_LEN];

// create server socket, bind to server address and listen on socket
...

// accept client connections and process requests
int count = 0;
for (count = 0; count < MAX_CONNECTIONS; count++) {

int clientlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
int clientsocket = accept(serversocket, (struct sockaddr *)&clientaddr, &clientlen);

if (clientsocket >= 0) {

clienthp = gethostbyaddr((char*) &clientaddr.sin_addr.s_addr, sizeof(clientaddr.sin_addr.s_addr), AF_INET);
strcpy(hostname, clienthp->h_name);
logOutput("Accepted client connection from host ", hostname);

// process client request
...
close(clientsocket);

}

}
close(serversocket);

...

However, the hostname of the client that connected may be longer than the allocated size for the local hostname variable. This will result in a buffer overflow when copying the client hostname to the local variable using the strcpy method.

Observed Examples

Reference	Description
CVE-2000-1094	buffer overflow using command with long argument
CVE-1999-0046	buffer overflow in local program using long environment variable
CVE-2002-1337	buffer overflow in comment characters, when product increments a counter for a ">" but does not decrement for "<"
CVE-2003-0595	By replacing a valid cookie value with an extremely long string of characters, an attacker may overflow the application's buffers.
CVE-2001-0191	By replacing a valid cookie value with an extremely long string of characters, an attacker may overflow the application's buffers.

Potential Mitigations

Phase: Requirements

Strategy: Language Selection

Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.

Be wary that a language's interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.

Phase: Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.

Note: This is not a complete solution, since many buffer overflows are not related to strings.

Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.

D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.

Effectiveness: Defense in Depth

Note:

This is not necessarily a complete solution, since these mechanisms only detect certain types of overflows. In addition, the result is still a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.

Phase: Implementation

Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application's memory:

Double check that your buffer is as large as you specify.

When using functions that accept a number of bytes to copy, such as strncpy(), be aware that if the destination buffer size is equal to the source buffer size, it may not NULL-terminate the string.

Check buffer boundaries if accessing the buffer in a loop and make sure there is no danger of writing past the allocated space.

If necessary, truncate all input strings to a reasonable length before passing them to the copy and concatenation functions.

Phase: Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.

When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."

Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.

Phase: Architecture and Design

For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.

Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.

For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].

Effectiveness: Defense in Depth

Note: These techniques do not provide a complete solution. For instance, exploits frequently use a bug that discloses memory addresses in order to maximize reliability of code execution [REF-1337]. It has also been shown that a side-channel attack can bypass ASLR [REF-1333]

Phase: Operation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.

For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].

Effectiveness: Defense in Depth

Note: This is not a complete solution, since buffer overflows could be used to overwrite nearby variables to modify the software's state in dangerous ways. In addition, it cannot be used in cases in which self-modifying code is required. Finally, an attack could still cause a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.

Phases: Build and Compilation; Operation

Most mitigating technologies at the compiler or OS level to date address only a subset of buffer overflow problems and rarely provide complete protection against even that subset. It is good practice to implement strategies to increase the workload of an attacker, such as leaving the attacker to guess an unknown value that changes every program execution.

Phase: Implementation

Replace unbounded copy functions with analogous functions that support length arguments, such as strcpy with strncpy. Create these if they are not available.

Effectiveness: Moderate

Note: This approach is still susceptible to calculation errors, including issues such as off-by-one errors (CWE-193) and incorrectly calculating buffer lengths (CWE-131).

Phase: Architecture and Design

Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion

When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.

Phases: Architecture and Design; Operation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.

Phases: Architecture and Design; Operation

Strategy: Sandbox or Jail

Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.

OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.

This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.

Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.

Effectiveness: Limited

Note: The effectiveness of this mitigation depends on the prevention capabilities of the specific sandbox or jail being used and might only help to reduce the scope of an attack, such as restricting the attacker to certain system calls or limiting the portion of the file system that can be accessed.

Weakness Ordinalities

Ordinality	Description
Resultant	(where the weakness is typically related to the presence of some other weaknesses)
Primary	(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)

Detection Methods

Automated Static Analysis

This weakness can often be detected using automated static analysis tools. Many modern tools use data flow analysis or constraint-based techniques to minimize the number of false positives.

Automated static analysis generally does not account for environmental considerations when reporting out-of-bounds memory operations. This can make it difficult for users to determine which warnings should be investigated first. For example, an analysis tool might report buffer overflows that originate from command line arguments in a program that is not expected to run with setuid or other special privileges.

Effectiveness: High

Note: Detection techniques for buffer-related errors are more mature than for most other weakness types.

Automated Dynamic Analysis

This weakness can be detected using dynamic tools and techniques that interact with the software using large test suites with many diverse inputs, such as fuzz testing (fuzzing), robustness testing, and fault injection. The software's operation may slow down, but it should not become unstable, crash, or generate incorrect results.

Manual Analysis

Manual analysis can be useful for finding this weakness, but it might not achieve desired code coverage within limited time constraints. This becomes difficult for weaknesses that must be considered for all inputs, since the attack surface can be too large.

Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:

Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis

Binary Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis

Effectiveness: High

Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:

Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:

Web Application Scanner

Web Services Scanner

Database Scanners

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:

Fuzz Tester

Framework-based Fuzzer

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Manual Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:

Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source

Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Automated Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:

Source code Weakness Analyzer

Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer

Effectiveness: High

Architecture or Design Review

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:

Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction

Cost effective for partial coverage:

Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)

Effectiveness: High

Functional Areas

Memory Management

Affected Resources

Memory

Memberships

Nature	Type	ID	Name
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	722	OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A1 - Unvalidated Input
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	726	OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A5 - Buffer Overflows
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	741	CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 8 - Characters and Strings (STR)
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	802	2010 Top 25 - Risky Resource Management
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	865	2011 Top 25 - Risky Resource Management
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	875	CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 07 - Characters and Strings (STR)
MemberOf	View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries).	884	CWE Cross-section
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	970	SFP Secondary Cluster: Faulty Buffer Access
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	1129	CISQ Quality Measures (2016) - Reliability
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	1131	CISQ Quality Measures (2016) - Security
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	1161	SEI CERT C Coding Standard - Guidelines 07. Characters and Strings (STR)
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	1399	Comprehensive Categorization: Memory Safety

Vulnerability Mapping Notes

Usage: Allowed-with-Review

(this CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities in limited situations requiring careful review)

Reason: Frequent Misuse

Rationale:

There are some indications that this CWE ID might be misused and selected simply because it mentions "buffer overflow" - an increasingly vague term. This CWE entry is only appropriate for "Buffer Copy" operations (not buffer reads), in which where there is no "Checking [the] Size of Input", and (by implication of the copy) writing past the end of the buffer.

Comments:

If the vulnerability being analyzed involves out-of-bounds reads, then consider CWE-125 or descendants. For root cause analysis: if there is any input validation, consider children of CWE-20 such as CWE-1284. If there is a calculation error for buffer sizes, consider CWE-131 or similar.

Notes

Relationship

At the code level, stack-based and heap-based overflows do not differ significantly, so there usually is not a need to distinguish them. From the attacker perspective, they can be quite different, since different techniques are required to exploit them.

Terminology

Many issues that are now called "buffer overflows" are substantively different than the "classic" overflow, including entirely different bug types that rely on overflow exploit techniques, such as integer signedness errors, integer overflows, and format string bugs. This imprecise terminology can make it difficult to determine which variant is being reported.

Taxonomy Mappings

Mapped Taxonomy Name	Node ID	Fit	Mapped Node Name
PLOVER			Unbounded Transfer ('classic overflow')
7 Pernicious Kingdoms			Buffer Overflow
CLASP			Buffer overflow
OWASP Top Ten 2004	A1	CWE More Specific	Unvalidated Input
OWASP Top Ten 2004	A5	CWE More Specific	Buffer Overflows
CERT C Secure Coding	STR31-C	Exact	Guarantee that storage for strings has sufficient space for character data and the null terminator
WASC	7		Buffer Overflow
Software Fault Patterns	SFP8		Faulty Buffer Access
OMG ASCSM	ASCSM-CWE-120
OMG ASCRM	ASCRM-CWE-120

Related Attack Patterns

CAPEC-ID	Attack Pattern Name
CAPEC-10	Buffer Overflow via Environment Variables
CAPEC-100	Overflow Buffers
CAPEC-14	Client-side Injection-induced Buffer Overflow
CAPEC-24	Filter Failure through Buffer Overflow
CAPEC-42	MIME Conversion
CAPEC-44	Overflow Binary Resource File
CAPEC-45	Buffer Overflow via Symbolic Links
CAPEC-46	Overflow Variables and Tags
CAPEC-47	Buffer Overflow via Parameter Expansion
CAPEC-67	String Format Overflow in syslog()
CAPEC-8	Buffer Overflow in an API Call
CAPEC-9	Buffer Overflow in Local Command-Line Utilities
CAPEC-92	Forced Integer Overflow

References

[REF-7] Michael Howard and David LeBlanc. "Writing Secure Code". Chapter 5, "Public Enemy #1: The Buffer Overrun" Page 127. 2nd Edition. Microsoft Press. 2002-12-04. <https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/store/writing-secure-code-9780735617223>.

[REF-44] Michael Howard, David LeBlanc and John Viega. "24 Deadly Sins of Software Security". "Sin 5: Buffer Overruns." Page 89. McGraw-Hill. 2010.

[REF-56] Microsoft. "Using the Strsafe.h Functions". <https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/menurc/strsafe-ovw?redirectedfrom=MSDN>. URL validated: 2023-04-07.

[REF-57] Matt Messier and John Viega. "Safe C String Library v1.0.3". <http://www.gnu-darwin.org/www001/ports-1.5a-CURRENT/devel/safestr/work/safestr-1.0.3/doc/safestr.html>. URL validated: 2023-04-07.

[REF-58] Michael Howard. "Address Space Layout Randomization in Windows Vista". <https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/michael_howard/address-space-layout-randomization-in-windows-vista>. URL validated: 2023-04-07.

[REF-59] Arjan van de Ven. "Limiting buffer overflows with ExecShield". <https://archive.is/saAFo>. URL validated: 2023-04-07.

[REF-60] "PaX". <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executable_space_protection#PaX>. URL validated: 2023-04-07.

[REF-74] Jason Lam. "Top 25 Series - Rank 3 - Classic Buffer Overflow". SANS Software Security Institute. 2010-03-02. <http://software-security.sans.org/blog/2010/03/02/top-25-series-rank-3-classic-buffer-overflow/>.

[REF-61] Microsoft. "Understanding DEP as a mitigation technology part 1". <https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2009/06/understanding-dep-as-a-mitigation-technology-part-1/>. URL validated: 2023-04-07.

[REF-76] Sean Barnum and Michael Gegick. "Least Privilege". 2005-09-14. <https://web.archive.org/web/20211209014121/https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/bsi/articles/knowledge/principles/least-privilege>. URL validated: 2023-04-07.

[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 3, "Nonexecutable Stack", Page 76. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.

[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 5, "Protection Mechanisms", Page 189. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.

[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 8, "C String Handling", Page 388. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.

[REF-64] Grant Murphy. "Position Independent Executables (PIE)". Red Hat. 2012-11-28. <https://www.redhat.com/en/blog/position-independent-executables-pie>. URL validated: 2023-04-07.

[REF-961] Object Management Group (OMG). "Automated Source Code Reliability Measure (ASCRM)". ASCRM-CWE-120. 2016-01. <http://www.omg.org/spec/ASCRM/1.0/>.

[REF-962] Object Management Group (OMG). "Automated Source Code Security Measure (ASCSM)". ASCSM-CWE-120. 2016-01. <http://www.omg.org/spec/ASCSM/1.0/>.

[REF-1332] John Richard Moser. "Prelink and address space randomization". 2006-07-05. <https://lwn.net/Articles/190139/>. URL validated: 2023-04-26.

[REF-1333] Dmitry Evtyushkin, Dmitry Ponomarev, Nael Abu-Ghazaleh. "Jump Over ASLR: Attacking Branch Predictors to Bypass ASLR". 2016. <http://www.cs.ucr.edu/~nael/pubs/micro16.pdf>. URL validated: 2023-04-26.

[REF-1334] D3FEND. "Stack Frame Canary Validation (D3-SFCV)". 2023. <https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:StackFrameCanaryValidation/>. URL validated: 2023-04-26.

[REF-1335] D3FEND. "Segment Address Offset Randomization (D3-SAOR)". 2023. <https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:SegmentAddressOffsetRandomization/>. URL validated: 2023-04-26.

[REF-1336] D3FEND. "Process Segment Execution Prevention (D3-PSEP)". 2023. <https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:ProcessSegmentExecutionPrevention/>. URL validated: 2023-04-26.

[REF-1337] Alexander Sotirov and Mark Dowd. "Bypassing Browser Memory Protections: Setting back browser security by 10 years". Memory information leaks. 2008. <https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-08/Sotirov_Dowd/bh08-sotirov-dowd.pdf>. URL validated: 2023-04-26.

Content History

Submissions
Submission Date	Submitter	Organization
2006-07-19 (CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)	PLOVER
2006-07-19 (CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
Modifications
Modification Date	Modifier	Organization
2008-07-01	Eric Dalci	Cigital
2008-07-01	updated Time_of_Introduction
2008-08-01		KDM Analytics
2008-08-01	added/updated white box definitions
2008-08-15		Veracode
2008-08-15	Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping
2008-09-08	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2008-09-08	updated Alternate_Terms, Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Relationships, Observed_Example, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings, Weakness_Ordinalities
2008-10-10	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2008-10-10	Changed name and description to more clearly emphasize the "classic" nature of the overflow.
2008-10-14	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2008-10-14	updated Alternate_Terms, Description, Name, Other_Notes, Terminology_Notes
2008-11-24	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2008-11-24	updated Other_Notes, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2009-01-12	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2009-01-12	updated Common_Consequences, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationship_Notes, Relationships
2009-07-27	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2009-07-27	updated Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
2009-10-29	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2009-10-29	updated Common_Consequences, Relationships
2010-02-16	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2010-02-16	updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings, Time_of_Introduction, Type
2010-04-05	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2010-04-05	updated Demonstrative_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns
2010-06-21	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2010-06-21	updated Common_Consequences, Potential_Mitigations, References
2010-09-27	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2010-09-27	updated Potential_Mitigations
2010-12-13	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2010-12-13	updated Potential_Mitigations
2011-03-29	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2011-03-29	updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description
2011-06-01	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2011-06-01	updated Common_Consequences
2011-06-27	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2011-06-27	updated Relationships
2011-09-13	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2011-09-13	updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2012-05-11	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2012-05-11	updated References, Relationships
2012-10-30	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2012-10-30	updated Potential_Mitigations
2014-02-18	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2014-02-18	updated Potential_Mitigations, References
2014-07-30	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2014-07-30	updated Detection_Factors, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2017-11-08	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2017-11-08	updated Applicable_Platforms, Causal_Nature, Demonstrative_Examples, Likelihood_of_Exploit, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings, White_Box_Definitions
2018-03-27	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2018-03-27	updated References
2019-01-03	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2019-01-03	updated References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2019-06-20	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2019-06-20	updated Relationships
2020-02-24	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2020-02-24	updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
2020-06-25	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2020-06-25	updated Common_Consequences, Potential_Mitigations
2020-08-20	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2020-08-20	updated Alternate_Terms, Relationships
2020-12-10	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2020-12-10	updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships
2021-03-15	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2021-03-15	updated Demonstrative_Examples
2021-07-20	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2021-07-20	updated Potential_Mitigations
2022-10-13	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2022-10-13	updated References
2023-01-31	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2023-01-31	updated Common_Consequences, Description
2023-04-27	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2023-04-27	updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
2023-06-29	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2023-06-29	updated Mapping_Notes
Previous Entry Names
Change Date	Previous Entry Name
2008-10-14	Unbounded Transfer ('Classic Buffer Overflow')

Weakness ID: 602

Abstraction: Class
Structure: Simple

View customized information:

Description

The product is composed of a server that relies on the client to implement a mechanism that is intended to protect the server.

Extended Description

When the server relies on protection mechanisms placed on the client side, an attacker can modify the client-side behavior to bypass the protection mechanisms, resulting in potentially unexpected interactions between the client and server. The consequences will vary, depending on what the mechanisms are trying to protect.

Relationships

Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (CWE-1000)

Nature	Type	ID	Name
ChildOf	Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things.	693	Protection Mechanism Failure
ParentOf	Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.	565	Reliance on Cookies without Validation and Integrity Checking
ParentOf	Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.	603	Use of Client-Side Authentication
PeerOf	Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.	290	Authentication Bypass by Spoofing
PeerOf	Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.	300	Channel Accessible by Non-Endpoint
PeerOf	Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.	836	Use of Password Hash Instead of Password for Authentication
CanPrecede	Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.	471	Modification of Assumed-Immutable Data (MAID)

Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (CWE-1008)

Nature	Type	ID	Name
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	1012	Cross Cutting

Modes Of Introduction

Phase

Note

Architecture and Design

COMMISSION: This weakness refers to an incorrect design related to an architectural security tactic.

Architecture and Design

Consider a product that consists of two or more processes or nodes that must interact closely, such as a client/server model. If the product uses protection schemes in the client in order to defend from attacks against the server, and the server does not use the same schemes, then an attacker could modify the client in a way that bypasses those schemes. This is a fundamental design flaw that is primary to many weaknesses.

Applicable Platforms

Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: ICS/OT (Undetermined Prevalence)

Class: Mobile (Undetermined Prevalence)

Common Consequences

Scope	Impact	Likelihood
Access Control Availability	Technical Impact: Bypass Protection Mechanism; DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart Client-side validation checks can be easily bypassed, allowing malformed or unexpected input to pass into the application, potentially as trusted data. This may lead to unexpected states, behaviors and possibly a resulting crash.
Access Control	Technical Impact: Bypass Protection Mechanism; Gain Privileges or Assume Identity Client-side checks for authentication can be easily bypassed, allowing clients to escalate their access levels and perform unintended actions.

Likelihood Of Exploit

Medium

Demonstrative Examples

Example 1

This example contains client-side code that checks if the user authenticated successfully before sending a command. The server-side code performs the authentication in one step, and executes the command in a separate step.

CLIENT-SIDE (client.pl)

(good code)

Example Language: Perl

$server = "server.example.com";
$username = AskForUserName();
$password = AskForPassword();
$address = AskForAddress();
$sock = OpenSocket($server, 1234);
writeSocket($sock, "AUTH $username $password\n");
$resp = readSocket($sock);
if ($resp eq "success") {

# username/pass is valid, go ahead and update the info!
writeSocket($sock, "CHANGE-ADDRESS $username $address\n";

}
else {

print "ERROR: Invalid Authentication!\n";

}

SERVER-SIDE (server.pl):

(bad code)

$sock = acceptSocket(1234);
($cmd, $args) = ParseClientRequest($sock);
if ($cmd eq "AUTH") {

($username, $pass) = split(/\s+/, $args, 2);
$result = AuthenticateUser($username, $pass);
writeSocket($sock, "$result\n");
# does not close the socket on failure; assumes the

# user will try again

}
elsif ($cmd eq "CHANGE-ADDRESS") {

if (validateAddress($args)) {

$res = UpdateDatabaseRecord($username, "address", $args);
writeSocket($sock, "SUCCESS\n");

}
else {

writeSocket($sock, "FAILURE -- address is malformed\n");

}

The server accepts 2 commands, "AUTH" which authenticates the user, and "CHANGE-ADDRESS" which updates the address field for the username. The client performs the authentication and only sends a CHANGE-ADDRESS for that user if the authentication succeeds. Because the client has already performed the authentication, the server assumes that the username in the CHANGE-ADDRESS is the same as the authenticated user. An attacker could modify the client by removing the code that sends the "AUTH" command and simply executing the CHANGE-ADDRESS.

Example 2

In 2022, the OT:ICEFALL study examined products by 10 different Operational Technology (OT) vendors. The researchers reported 56 vulnerabilities and said that the products were "insecure by design" [REF-1283]. If exploited, these vulnerabilities often allowed adversaries to change how the products operated, ranging from denial of service to changing the code that the products executed. Since these products were often used in industries such as power, electrical, water, and others, there could even be safety implications.

Multiple vendors used client-side authentication in their OT products.

Observed Examples

Reference	Description
CVE-2022-33139	SCADA system only uses client-side authentication, allowing adversaries to impersonate other users.
CVE-2006-6994	ASP program allows upload of .asp files by bypassing client-side checks.
CVE-2007-0163	steganography products embed password information in the carrier file, which can be extracted from a modified client.
CVE-2007-0164	steganography products embed password information in the carrier file, which can be extracted from a modified client.
CVE-2007-0100	client allows server to modify client's configuration and overwrite arbitrary files.

Potential Mitigations

Phase: Architecture and Design

For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

Even though client-side checks provide minimal benefits with respect to server-side security, they are still useful. First, they can support intrusion detection. If the server receives input that should have been rejected by the client, then it may be an indication of an attack. Second, client-side error-checking can provide helpful feedback to the user about the expectations for valid input. Third, there may be a reduction in server-side processing time for accidental input errors, although this is typically a small savings.

Phase: Architecture and Design

If some degree of trust is required between the two entities, then use integrity checking and strong authentication to ensure that the inputs are coming from a trusted source. Design the product so that this trust is managed in a centralized fashion, especially if there are complex or numerous communication channels, in order to reduce the risks that the implementer will mistakenly omit a check in a single code path.

Phase: Testing

Use dynamic tools and techniques that interact with the software using large test suites with many diverse inputs, such as fuzz testing (fuzzing), robustness testing, and fault injection. The software's operation may slow down, but it should not become unstable, crash, or generate incorrect results.

Phase: Testing

Use tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session. These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules.

Weakness Ordinalities

Ordinality	Description
Primary	(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)

Memberships

Nature	Type	ID	Name
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	722	OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A1 - Unvalidated Input
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	753	2009 Top 25 - Porous Defenses
MemberOf	View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries).	884	CWE Cross-section
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	975	SFP Secondary Cluster: Architecture
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	1348	OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A04:2021 - Insecure Design
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	1413	Comprehensive Categorization: Protection Mechanism Failure

Vulnerability Mapping Notes

Usage: Allowed-with-Review

(this CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities in limited situations requiring careful review)

Reason: Abstraction

Rationale:

This CWE entry is a Class and might have Base-level children that would be more appropriate

Comments:

Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit

Taxonomy Mappings

Mapped Taxonomy Name	Node ID	Fit	Mapped Node Name
OWASP Top Ten 2004	A1	CWE More Specific	Unvalidated Input

Related Attack Patterns

CAPEC-ID	Attack Pattern Name
CAPEC-162	Manipulating Hidden Fields
CAPEC-202	Create Malicious Client
CAPEC-207	Removing Important Client Functionality
CAPEC-208	Removing/short-circuiting 'Purse' logic: removing/mutating 'cash' decrements
CAPEC-21	Exploitation of Trusted Identifiers
CAPEC-31	Accessing/Intercepting/Modifying HTTP Cookies
CAPEC-383	Harvesting Information via API Event Monitoring
CAPEC-384	Application API Message Manipulation via Man-in-the-Middle
CAPEC-385	Transaction or Event Tampering via Application API Manipulation
CAPEC-386	Application API Navigation Remapping
CAPEC-387	Navigation Remapping To Propagate Malicious Content
CAPEC-388	Application API Button Hijacking

References

[REF-7] Michael Howard and David LeBlanc. "Writing Secure Code". Chapter 23, "Client-Side Security Is an Oxymoron" Page 687. 2nd Edition. Microsoft Press. 2002-12-04. <https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/store/writing-secure-code-9780735617223>.

[REF-1283] Forescout Vedere Labs. "OT:ICEFALL: The legacy of "insecure by design" and its implications for certifications and risk management". 2022-06-20. <https://www.forescout.com/resources/ot-icefall-report/>.

Content History

Submissions
Submission Date	Submitter	Organization
2007-05-07 (CWE Draft 6, 2007-05-07)	CWE Community
2007-05-07 (CWE Draft 6, 2007-05-07)	Submitted by members of the CWE community to extend early CWE versions
Modifications
Modification Date	Modifier	Organization
2008-07-01	Eric Dalci	Cigital
2008-07-01	updated Time_of_Introduction
2008-09-08	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2008-09-08	updated Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings, Weakness_Ordinalities
2009-01-12	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2009-01-12	updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Name, Observed_Examples, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships, Research_Gaps, Time_of_Introduction
2009-03-10	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2009-03-10	updated Potential_Mitigations
2009-05-27	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2009-05-27	updated Demonstrative_Examples
2009-07-27	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2009-07-27	updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2009-10-29	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2009-10-29	updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Description
2010-02-16	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2010-02-16	updated References
2010-04-05	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2010-04-05	updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2010-12-13	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2010-12-13	updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2011-03-29	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2011-03-29	updated Relationships
2011-06-01	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2011-06-01	updated Common_Consequences
2012-05-11	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2012-05-11	updated Relationships
2014-07-30	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2014-07-30	updated Relationships
2017-05-03	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2017-05-03	updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2017-11-08	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2017-11-08	updated Applicable_Platforms, Enabling_Factors_for_Exploitation, Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships
2018-03-27	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2018-03-27	updated References
2019-06-20	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2019-06-20	updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2020-02-24	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2020-02-24	updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships
2021-10-28	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2021-10-28	updated Relationships
2022-04-28	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2022-04-28	updated Research_Gaps
2022-10-13	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2022-10-13	updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Observed_Examples, References, Relationships
2023-01-31	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2023-01-31	updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships, Type
2023-04-27	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2023-04-27	updated Relationships
2023-06-29	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2023-06-29	updated Mapping_Notes
Previous Entry Names
Change Date	Previous Entry Name
2008-04-11	Client-Side Enforcement of Server-Side Security

2009-01-12	Design Principle Violation: Client-Side Enforcement of Server-Side Security

Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE VIEW: Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)

View Components

CWE-489: Active Debug Code

CWE-11: ASP.NET Misconfiguration: Creating Debug Binary

CWE-12: ASP.NET Misconfiguration: Missing Custom Error Page

CWE-554: ASP.NET Misconfiguration: Not Using Input Validation Framework

CWE-13: ASP.NET Misconfiguration: Password in Configuration File

CWE-556: ASP.NET Misconfiguration: Use of Identity Impersonation

CWE-405: Asymmetric Resource Consumption (Amplification)

CWE-302: Authentication Bypass by Assumed-Immutable Data

CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key

CWE-120: Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input ('Classic Buffer Overflow')

CWE-526: Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information in an Environment Variable

CWE-602: Client-Side Enforcement of Server-Side Security

CWE-182: Collapse of Data into Unsafe Value

CWE-14: Compiler Removal of Code to Clear Buffers

CWE CATEGORY: Credentials Management Errors

CWE-390: Detection of Error Condition Without Action

CWE-425: Direct Request ('Forced Browsing')

CWE-369: Divide By Zero

CWE CATEGORY: Error Conditions, Return Values, Status Codes

Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE VIEW: Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2004)

View Components

CWE-489: Active Debug Code

Edit Custom Filter

CWE-11: ASP.NET Misconfiguration: Creating Debug Binary

Edit Custom Filter

CWE-12: ASP.NET Misconfiguration: Missing Custom Error Page

Edit Custom Filter

CWE-554: ASP.NET Misconfiguration: Not Using Input Validation Framework

Edit Custom Filter

CWE-13: ASP.NET Misconfiguration: Password in Configuration File

Edit Custom Filter

CWE-556: ASP.NET Misconfiguration: Use of Identity Impersonation

Edit Custom Filter

CWE-405: Asymmetric Resource Consumption (Amplification)

Edit Custom Filter

CWE-302: Authentication Bypass by Assumed-Immutable Data

Edit Custom Filter

CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key

Edit Custom Filter

CWE-120: Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input ('Classic Buffer Overflow')

Edit Custom Filter

CWE-526: Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information in an Environment Variable

Edit Custom Filter

CWE-602: Client-Side Enforcement of Server-Side Security

Edit Custom Filter

CWE-182: Collapse of Data into Unsafe Value

Edit Custom Filter

CWE-14: Compiler Removal of Code to Clear Buffers

Edit Custom Filter

CWE CATEGORY: Credentials Management Errors

CWE-390: Detection of Error Condition Without Action

Edit Custom Filter

CWE-425: Direct Request ('Forced Browsing')

Edit Custom Filter

CWE-369: Divide By Zero

Edit Custom Filter

CWE CATEGORY: Error Conditions, Return Values, Status Codes