CWE VIEW: Architectural Concepts
This view organizes weaknesses according to common architectural security tactics. It is intended to assist architects in identifying potential mistakes that can be made when designing software.
The following graph shows the tree-like relationships between
weaknesses that exist at different levels of abstraction. At the highest level, categories
and pillars exist to group weaknesses. Categories (which are not technically weaknesses) are
special CWE entries used to group weaknesses that share a common characteristic. Pillars are
weaknesses that are described in the most abstract fashion. Below these top-level entries
are weaknesses are varying levels of abstraction. Classes are still very abstract, typically
independent of any specific language or technology. Base level weaknesses are used to
present a more specific type of weakness. A variant is a weakness that is described at a
very low level of detail, typically limited to a specific language or technology. A chain is
a set of weaknesses that must be reachable consecutively in order to produce an exploitable
vulnerability. While a composite is a set of weaknesses that must all be present
simultaneously in order to produce an exploitable vulnerability.
Show Details:
1008 - Architectural Concepts
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1009
(Audit)
Weaknesses in this category are related to the design and architecture of audit-based components of the system. Frequently these deal with logging user activities in order to identify attackers and modifications to the system. The weaknesses in this category could lead to a degradation of the quality of the audit capability if they are not addressed when designing or implementing a secure architecture.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1009
(Audit) >
117
(Improper Output Neutralization for Logs)
The product constructs a log message from external input, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements when the message is written to a log file.
Log forging
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1009
(Audit) >
223
(Omission of Security-relevant Information)
The product does not record or display information that would be important for identifying the source or nature of an attack, or determining if an action is safe.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1009
(Audit) >
224
(Obscured Security-relevant Information by Alternate Name)
The product records security-relevant information according to an alternate name of the affected entity, instead of the canonical name.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1009
(Audit) >
532
(Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File)
The product writes sensitive information to a log file.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1009
(Audit) >
778
(Insufficient Logging)
When a security-critical event occurs, the product either does not record the event or omits important details about the event when logging it.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1009
(Audit) >
779
(Logging of Excessive Data)
The product logs too much information, making log files hard to process and possibly hindering recovery efforts or forensic analysis after an attack.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1010
(Authenticate Actors)
Weaknesses in this category are related to the design and architecture of authentication components of the system. Frequently these deal with verifying the entity is indeed who it claims to be. The weaknesses in this category could lead to a degradation of the quality of authentication if they are not addressed when designing or implementing a secure architecture.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1010
(Authenticate Actors) >
258
(Empty Password in Configuration File)
Using an empty string as a password is insecure.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1010
(Authenticate Actors) >
259
(Use of Hard-coded Password)
The product contains a hard-coded password, which it uses for its own inbound authentication or for outbound communication to external components.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1010
(Authenticate Actors) >
262
(Not Using Password Aging)
The product does not have a mechanism in place for managing password aging.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1010
(Authenticate Actors) >
263
(Password Aging with Long Expiration)
The product supports password aging, but the expiration period is too long.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1010
(Authenticate Actors) >
287
(Improper Authentication)
When an actor claims to have a given identity, the product does not prove or insufficiently proves that the claim is correct.
authentification
AuthN
AuthC
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1010
(Authenticate Actors) >
288
(Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or Channel)
The product requires authentication, but the product has an alternate path or channel that does not require authentication.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1010
(Authenticate Actors) >
289
(Authentication Bypass by Alternate Name)
The product performs authentication based on the name of a resource being accessed, or the name of the actor performing the access, but it does not properly check all possible names for that resource or actor.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1010
(Authenticate Actors) >
290
(Authentication Bypass by Spoofing)
This attack-focused weakness is caused by incorrectly implemented authentication schemes that are subject to spoofing attacks.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1010
(Authenticate Actors) >
291
(Reliance on IP Address for Authentication)
The product uses an IP address for authentication.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1010
(Authenticate Actors) >
293
(Using Referer Field for Authentication)
The referer field in HTTP requests can be easily modified and, as such, is not a valid means of message integrity checking.
referrer
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1010
(Authenticate Actors) >
294
(Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay)
A capture-replay flaw exists when the design of the product makes it possible for a malicious user to sniff network traffic and bypass authentication by replaying it to the server in question to the same effect as the original message (or with minor changes).
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1010
(Authenticate Actors) >
301
(Reflection Attack in an Authentication Protocol)
Simple authentication protocols are subject to reflection attacks if a malicious user can use the target machine to impersonate a trusted user.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1010
(Authenticate Actors) >
302
(Authentication Bypass by Assumed-Immutable Data)
The authentication scheme or implementation uses key data elements that are assumed to be immutable, but can be controlled or modified by the attacker.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1010
(Authenticate Actors) >
303
(Incorrect Implementation of Authentication Algorithm)
The requirements for the product dictate the use of an established authentication algorithm, but the implementation of the algorithm is incorrect.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1010
(Authenticate Actors) >
304
(Missing Critical Step in Authentication)
The product implements an authentication technique, but it skips a step that weakens the technique.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1010
(Authenticate Actors) >
305
(Authentication Bypass by Primary Weakness)
The authentication algorithm is sound, but the implemented mechanism can be bypassed as the result of a separate weakness that is primary to the authentication error.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1010
(Authenticate Actors) >
306
(Missing Authentication for Critical Function)
The product does not perform any authentication for functionality that requires a provable user identity or consumes a significant amount of resources.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1010
(Authenticate Actors) >
307
(Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts)
The product does not implement sufficient measures to prevent multiple failed authentication attempts within a short time frame.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1010
(Authenticate Actors) >
308
(Use of Single-factor Authentication)
The product uses an authentication algorithm that uses a single factor (e.g., a password) in a security context that should require more than one factor.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1010
(Authenticate Actors) >
322
(Key Exchange without Entity Authentication)
The product performs a key exchange with an actor without verifying the identity of that actor.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1010
(Authenticate Actors) >
521
(Weak Password Requirements)
The product does not require that users should have strong passwords.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1010
(Authenticate Actors) >
593
(Authentication Bypass: OpenSSL CTX Object Modified after SSL Objects are Created)
The product modifies the SSL context after connection creation has begun.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1010
(Authenticate Actors) >
603
(Use of Client-Side Authentication)
A client/server product performs authentication within client code but not in server code, allowing server-side authentication to be bypassed via a modified client that omits the authentication check.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1010
(Authenticate Actors) >
620
(Unverified Password Change)
When setting a new password for a user, the product does not require knowledge of the original password, or using another form of authentication.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1010
(Authenticate Actors) >
640
(Weak Password Recovery Mechanism for Forgotten Password)
The product contains a mechanism for users to recover or change their passwords without knowing the original password, but the mechanism is weak.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1010
(Authenticate Actors) >
798
(Use of Hard-coded Credentials)
The product contains hard-coded credentials, such as a password or cryptographic key.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1010
(Authenticate Actors) >
836
(Use of Password Hash Instead of Password for Authentication)
The product records password hashes in a data store, receives a hash of a password from a client, and compares the supplied hash to the hash obtained from the data store.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1010
(Authenticate Actors) >
916
(Use of Password Hash With Insufficient Computational Effort)
The product generates a hash for a password, but it uses a scheme that does not provide a sufficient level of computational effort that would make password cracking attacks infeasible or expensive.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1011
(Authorize Actors)
Weaknesses in this category are related to the design and architecture of a system's authorization components. Frequently these deal with enforcing that agents have the required permissions before performing certain operations, such as modifying data. The weaknesses in this category could lead to a degradation of quality of the authorization capability if they are not addressed when designing or implementing a secure architecture.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1011
(Authorize Actors) >
114
(Process Control)
Executing commands or loading libraries from an untrusted source or in an untrusted environment can cause an application to execute malicious commands (and payloads) on behalf of an attacker.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1011
(Authorize Actors) >
15
(External Control of System or Configuration Setting)
One or more system settings or configuration elements can be externally controlled by a user.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1011
(Authorize Actors) >
219
(Storage of File with Sensitive Data Under Web Root)
The product stores sensitive data under the web document root with insufficient access control, which might make it accessible to untrusted parties.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1011
(Authorize Actors) >
220
(Storage of File With Sensitive Data Under FTP Root)
The product stores sensitive data under the FTP server root with insufficient access control, which might make it accessible to untrusted parties.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1011
(Authorize Actors) >
266
(Incorrect Privilege Assignment)
A product incorrectly assigns a privilege to a particular actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1011
(Authorize Actors) >
267
(Privilege Defined With Unsafe Actions)
A particular privilege, role, capability, or right can be used to perform unsafe actions that were not intended, even when it is assigned to the correct entity.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1011
(Authorize Actors) >
268
(Privilege Chaining)
Two distinct privileges, roles, capabilities, or rights can be combined in a way that allows an entity to perform unsafe actions that would not be allowed without that combination.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1011
(Authorize Actors) >
269
(Improper Privilege Management)
The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1011
(Authorize Actors) >
270
(Privilege Context Switching Error)
The product does not properly manage privileges while it is switching between different contexts that have different privileges or spheres of control.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1011
(Authorize Actors) >
271
(Privilege Dropping / Lowering Errors)
The product does not drop privileges before passing control of a resource to an actor that does not have those privileges.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1011
(Authorize Actors) >
272
(Least Privilege Violation)
The elevated privilege level required to perform operations such as chroot() should be dropped immediately after the operation is performed.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1011
(Authorize Actors) >
273
(Improper Check for Dropped Privileges)
The product attempts to drop privileges but does not check or incorrectly checks to see if the drop succeeded.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1011
(Authorize Actors) >
274
(Improper Handling of Insufficient Privileges)
The product does not handle or incorrectly handles when it has insufficient privileges to perform an operation, leading to resultant weaknesses.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1011
(Authorize Actors) >
276
(Incorrect Default Permissions)
During installation, installed file permissions are set to allow anyone to modify those files.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1011
(Authorize Actors) >
277
(Insecure Inherited Permissions)
A product defines a set of insecure permissions that are inherited by objects that are created by the program.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1011
(Authorize Actors) >
279
(Incorrect Execution-Assigned Permissions)
While it is executing, the product sets the permissions of an object in a way that violates the intended permissions that have been specified by the user.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1011
(Authorize Actors) >
280
(Improper Handling of Insufficient Permissions or Privileges )
The product does not handle or incorrectly handles when it has insufficient privileges to access resources or functionality as specified by their permissions. This may cause it to follow unexpected code paths that may leave the product in an invalid state.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1011
(Authorize Actors) >
281
(Improper Preservation of Permissions)
The product does not preserve permissions or incorrectly preserves permissions when copying, restoring, or sharing objects, which can cause them to have less restrictive permissions than intended.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1011
(Authorize Actors) >
282
(Improper Ownership Management)
The product assigns the wrong ownership, or does not properly verify the ownership, of an object or resource.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1011
(Authorize Actors) >
283
(Unverified Ownership)
The product does not properly verify that a critical resource is owned by the proper entity.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1011
(Authorize Actors) >
284
(Improper Access Control)
The product does not restrict or incorrectly restricts access to a resource from an unauthorized actor.
Authorization
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1011
(Authorize Actors) >
285
(Improper Authorization)
The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.
AuthZ
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1011
(Authorize Actors) >
286
(Incorrect User Management)
The product does not properly manage a user within its environment.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1011
(Authorize Actors) >
300
(Channel Accessible by Non-Endpoint)
The product does not adequately verify the identity of actors at both ends of a communication channel, or does not adequately ensure the integrity of the channel, in a way that allows the channel to be accessed or influenced by an actor that is not an endpoint.
Adversary-in-the-Middle / AITM
Attacker-in-the-Middle / AITM
Man-in-the-Middle / MITM
Person-in-the-Middle / PITM
Monkey-in-the-Middle
Monster-in-the-Middle
Manipulator-in-the-Middle
On-path attack
Interception attack
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1011
(Authorize Actors) >
341
(Predictable from Observable State)
A number or object is predictable based on observations that the attacker can make about the state of the system or network, such as time, process ID, etc.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1011
(Authorize Actors) >
359
(Exposure of Private Personal Information to an Unauthorized Actor)
The product does not properly prevent a person's private, personal information from being accessed by actors who either (1) are not explicitly authorized to access the information or (2) do not have the implicit consent of the person about whom the information is collected.
Privacy violation
Privacy leak / Privacy leakage
PPI
PII
PHI
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1011
(Authorize Actors) >
403
(Exposure of File Descriptor to Unintended Control Sphere ('File Descriptor Leak'))
A process does not close sensitive file descriptors before invoking a child process, which allows the child to perform unauthorized I/O operations using those descriptors.
File descriptor leak
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1011
(Authorize Actors) >
419
(Unprotected Primary Channel)
The product uses a primary channel for administration or restricted functionality, but it does not properly protect the channel.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1011
(Authorize Actors) >
420
(Unprotected Alternate Channel)
The product protects a primary channel, but it does not use the same level of protection for an alternate channel.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1011
(Authorize Actors) >
425
(Direct Request ('Forced Browsing'))
The web application does not adequately enforce appropriate authorization on all restricted URLs, scripts, or files.
forced browsing
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1011
(Authorize Actors) >
426
(Untrusted Search Path)
The product searches for critical resources using an externally-supplied search path that can point to resources that are not under the product's direct control.
Untrusted Path
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1011
(Authorize Actors) >
434
(Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type)
The product allows the upload or transfer of dangerous file types that are automatically processed within its environment.
Unrestricted File Upload
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1011
(Authorize Actors) >
527
(Exposure of Version-Control Repository to an Unauthorized Control Sphere)
The product stores a CVS, git, or other repository in a directory, archive, or other resource that is stored, transferred, or otherwise made accessible to unauthorized actors.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1011
(Authorize Actors) >
528
(Exposure of Core Dump File to an Unauthorized Control Sphere)
The product generates a core dump file in a directory, archive, or other resource that is stored, transferred, or otherwise made accessible to unauthorized actors.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1011
(Authorize Actors) >
529
(Exposure of Access Control List Files to an Unauthorized Control Sphere)
The product stores access control list files in a directory or other container that is accessible to actors outside of the intended control sphere.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1011
(Authorize Actors) >
530
(Exposure of Backup File to an Unauthorized Control Sphere)
A backup file is stored in a directory or archive that is made accessible to unauthorized actors.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1011
(Authorize Actors) >
538
(Insertion of Sensitive Information into Externally-Accessible File or Directory)
The product places sensitive information into files or directories that are accessible to actors who are allowed to have access to the files, but not to the sensitive information.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1011
(Authorize Actors) >
551
(Incorrect Behavior Order: Authorization Before Parsing and Canonicalization)
If a web server does not fully parse requested URLs before it examines them for authorization, it may be possible for an attacker to bypass authorization protection.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1011
(Authorize Actors) >
552
(Files or Directories Accessible to External Parties)
The product makes files or directories accessible to unauthorized actors, even though they should not be.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1011
(Authorize Actors) >
566
(Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled SQL Primary Key)
The product uses a database table that includes records that should not be accessible to an actor, but it executes a SQL statement with a primary key that can be controlled by that actor.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1011
(Authorize Actors) >
639
(Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key)
The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data.
Insecure Direct Object Reference / IDOR
Broken Object Level Authorization / BOLA
Horizontal Authorization
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1011
(Authorize Actors) >
642
(External Control of Critical State Data)
The product stores security-critical state information about its users, or the product itself, in a location that is accessible to unauthorized actors.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1011
(Authorize Actors) >
647
(Use of Non-Canonical URL Paths for Authorization Decisions)
The product defines policy namespaces and makes authorization decisions based on the assumption that a URL is canonical. This can allow a non-canonical URL to bypass the authorization.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1011
(Authorize Actors) >
653
(Improper Isolation or Compartmentalization)
The product does not properly compartmentalize or isolate functionality, processes, or resources that require different privilege levels, rights, or permissions.
Separation of Privilege
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1011
(Authorize Actors) >
656
(Reliance on Security Through Obscurity)
The product uses a protection mechanism whose strength depends heavily on its obscurity, such that knowledge of its algorithms or key data is sufficient to defeat the mechanism.
Never Assuming your secrets are safe
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1011
(Authorize Actors) >
668
(Exposure of Resource to Wrong Sphere)
The product exposes a resource to the wrong control sphere, providing unintended actors with inappropriate access to the resource.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1011
(Authorize Actors) >
669
(Incorrect Resource Transfer Between Spheres)
The product does not properly transfer a resource/behavior to another sphere, or improperly imports a resource/behavior from another sphere, in a manner that provides unintended control over that resource.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1011
(Authorize Actors) >
671
(Lack of Administrator Control over Security)
The product uses security features in a way that prevents the product's administrator from tailoring security settings to reflect the environment in which the product is being used. This introduces resultant weaknesses or prevents it from operating at a level of security that is desired by the administrator.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1011
(Authorize Actors) >
673
(External Influence of Sphere Definition)
The product does not prevent the definition of control spheres from external actors.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1011
(Authorize Actors) >
708
(Incorrect Ownership Assignment)
The product assigns an owner to a resource, but the owner is outside of the intended control sphere.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1011
(Authorize Actors) >
732
(Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource)
The product specifies permissions for a security-critical resource in a way that allows that resource to be read or modified by unintended actors.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1011
(Authorize Actors) >
770
(Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling)
The product allocates a reusable resource or group of resources on behalf of an actor without imposing any intended restrictions on the size or number of resources that can be allocated.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1011
(Authorize Actors) >
782
(Exposed IOCTL with Insufficient Access Control)
The product implements an IOCTL with functionality that should be restricted, but it does not properly enforce access control for the IOCTL.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1011
(Authorize Actors) >
827
(Improper Control of Document Type Definition)
The product does not restrict a reference to a Document Type Definition (DTD) to the intended control sphere. This might allow attackers to reference arbitrary DTDs, possibly causing the product to expose files, consume excessive system resources, or execute arbitrary http requests on behalf of the attacker.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1011
(Authorize Actors) >
862
(Missing Authorization)
The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.
AuthZ
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1011
(Authorize Actors) >
863
(Incorrect Authorization)
The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check.
AuthZ
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1011
(Authorize Actors) >
921
(Storage of Sensitive Data in a Mechanism without Access Control)
The product stores sensitive information in a file system or device that does not have built-in access control.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1011
(Authorize Actors) >
923
(Improper Restriction of Communication Channel to Intended Endpoints)
The product establishes a communication channel to (or from) an endpoint for privileged or protected operations, but it does not properly ensure that it is communicating with the correct endpoint.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1011
(Authorize Actors) >
939
(Improper Authorization in Handler for Custom URL Scheme)
The product uses a handler for a custom URL scheme, but it does not properly restrict which actors can invoke the handler using the scheme.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1011
(Authorize Actors) >
942
(Permissive Cross-domain Security Policy with Untrusted Domains)
The product uses a web-client protection
mechanism such as a Content Security Policy (CSP) or
cross-domain policy file, but the policy includes untrusted
domains with which the web client is allowed to
communicate.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1012
(Cross Cutting)
Weaknesses in this category are related to the design and architecture of multiple security tactics and how they affect a system. For example, information exposure can impact the Limit Access and Limit Exposure security tactics. The weaknesses in this category could lead to a degradation of the quality of many capabilities if they are not addressed when designing or implementing a secure architecture.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1012
(Cross Cutting) >
208
(Observable Timing Discrepancy)
Two separate operations in a product require different amounts of time to complete, in a way that is observable to an actor and reveals security-relevant information about the state of the product, such as whether a particular operation was successful or not.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1012
(Cross Cutting) >
392
(Missing Report of Error Condition)
The product encounters an error but does not provide a status code or return value to indicate that an error has occurred.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1012
(Cross Cutting) >
460
(Improper Cleanup on Thrown Exception)
The product does not clean up its state or incorrectly cleans up its state when an exception is thrown, leading to unexpected state or control flow.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1012
(Cross Cutting) >
544
(Missing Standardized Error Handling Mechanism)
The product does not use a standardized method for handling errors throughout the code, which might introduce inconsistent error handling and resultant weaknesses.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1012
(Cross Cutting) >
602
(Client-Side Enforcement of Server-Side Security)
The product is composed of a server that relies on the client to implement a mechanism that is intended to protect the server.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1012
(Cross Cutting) >
703
(Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions)
The product does not properly anticipate or handle exceptional conditions that rarely occur during normal operation of the product.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1012
(Cross Cutting) >
754
(Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions)
The product does not check or incorrectly checks for unusual or exceptional conditions that are not expected to occur frequently during day to day operation of the product.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1012
(Cross Cutting) >
784
(Reliance on Cookies without Validation and Integrity Checking in a Security Decision)
The product uses a protection mechanism that relies on the existence or values of a cookie, but it does not properly ensure that the cookie is valid for the associated user.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1012
(Cross Cutting) >
807
(Reliance on Untrusted Inputs in a Security Decision)
The product uses a protection mechanism that relies on the existence or values of an input, but the input can be modified by an untrusted actor in a way that bypasses the protection mechanism.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1013
(Encrypt Data)
Weaknesses in this category are related to the design and architecture of data confidentiality in a system. Frequently these deal with the use of encryption libraries. The weaknesses in this category could lead to a degradation of the quality data encryption if they are not addressed when designing or implementing a secure architecture.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1013
(Encrypt Data) >
256
(Plaintext Storage of a Password)
The product stores a password in plaintext within resources such as memory or files.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1013
(Encrypt Data) >
257
(Storing Passwords in a Recoverable Format)
The storage of passwords in a recoverable format makes them subject to password reuse attacks by malicious users. In fact, it should be noted that recoverable encrypted passwords provide no significant benefit over plaintext passwords since they are subject not only to reuse by malicious attackers but also by malicious insiders. If a system administrator can recover a password directly, or use a brute force search on the available information, the administrator can use the password on other accounts.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1013
(Encrypt Data) >
260
(Password in Configuration File)
The product stores a password in a configuration file that might be accessible to actors who do not know the password.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1013
(Encrypt Data) >
261
(Weak Encoding for Password)
Obscuring a password with a trivial encoding does not protect the password.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1013
(Encrypt Data) >
311
(Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data)
The product does not encrypt sensitive or critical information before storage or transmission.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1013
(Encrypt Data) >
312
(Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information)
The product stores sensitive information in cleartext within a resource that might be accessible to another control sphere.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1013
(Encrypt Data) >
313
(Cleartext Storage in a File or on Disk)
The product stores sensitive information in cleartext in a file, or on disk.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1013
(Encrypt Data) >
314
(Cleartext Storage in the Registry)
The product stores sensitive information in cleartext in the registry.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1013
(Encrypt Data) >
315
(Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information in a Cookie)
The product stores sensitive information in cleartext in a cookie.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1013
(Encrypt Data) >
316
(Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information in Memory)
The product stores sensitive information in cleartext in memory.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1013
(Encrypt Data) >
317
(Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information in GUI)
The product stores sensitive information in cleartext within the GUI.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1013
(Encrypt Data) >
318
(Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information in Executable)
The product stores sensitive information in cleartext in an executable.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1013
(Encrypt Data) >
319
(Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information)
The product transmits sensitive or security-critical data in cleartext in a communication channel that can be sniffed by unauthorized actors.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1013
(Encrypt Data) >
321
(Use of Hard-coded Cryptographic Key)
The product uses a hard-coded, unchangeable cryptographic key.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1013
(Encrypt Data) >
323
(Reusing a Nonce, Key Pair in Encryption)
Nonces should be used for the present occasion and only once.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1013
(Encrypt Data) >
324
(Use of a Key Past its Expiration Date)
The product uses a cryptographic key or password past its expiration date, which diminishes its safety significantly by increasing the timing window for cracking attacks against that key.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1013
(Encrypt Data) >
325
(Missing Cryptographic Step)
The product does not implement a required step in a cryptographic algorithm, resulting in weaker encryption than advertised by the algorithm.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1013
(Encrypt Data) >
326
(Inadequate Encryption Strength)
The product stores or transmits sensitive data using an encryption scheme that is theoretically sound, but is not strong enough for the level of protection required.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1013
(Encrypt Data) >
327
(Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm)
The product uses a broken or risky cryptographic algorithm or protocol.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1013
(Encrypt Data) >
328
(Use of Weak Hash)
The product uses an algorithm that produces a digest (output value) that does not meet security expectations for a hash function that allows an adversary to reasonably determine the original input (preimage attack), find another input that can produce the same hash (2nd preimage attack), or find multiple inputs that evaluate to the same hash (birthday attack).
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1013
(Encrypt Data) >
330
(Use of Insufficiently Random Values)
The product uses insufficiently random numbers or values in a security context that depends on unpredictable numbers.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1013
(Encrypt Data) >
331
(Insufficient Entropy)
The product uses an algorithm or scheme that produces insufficient entropy, leaving patterns or clusters of values that are more likely to occur than others.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1013
(Encrypt Data) >
332
(Insufficient Entropy in PRNG)
The lack of entropy available for, or used by, a Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG) can be a stability and security threat.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1013
(Encrypt Data) >
333
(Improper Handling of Insufficient Entropy in TRNG)
True random number generators (TRNG) generally have a limited source of entropy and therefore can fail or block.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1013
(Encrypt Data) >
334
(Small Space of Random Values)
The number of possible random values is smaller than needed by the product, making it more susceptible to brute force attacks.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1013
(Encrypt Data) >
335
(Incorrect Usage of Seeds in Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG))
The product uses a Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG) but does not correctly manage seeds.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1013
(Encrypt Data) >
336
(Same Seed in Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG))
A Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG) uses the same seed each time the product is initialized.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1013
(Encrypt Data) >
337
(Predictable Seed in Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG))
A Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG) is initialized from a predictable seed, such as the process ID or system time.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1013
(Encrypt Data) >
338
(Use of Cryptographically Weak Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG))
The product uses a Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG) in a security context, but the PRNG's algorithm is not cryptographically strong.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1013
(Encrypt Data) >
339
(Small Seed Space in PRNG)
A Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG) uses a relatively small seed space, which makes it more susceptible to brute force attacks.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1013
(Encrypt Data) >
347
(Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature)
The product does not verify, or incorrectly verifies, the cryptographic signature for data.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1013
(Encrypt Data) >
522
(Insufficiently Protected Credentials)
The product transmits or stores authentication credentials, but it uses an insecure method that is susceptible to unauthorized interception and/or retrieval.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1013
(Encrypt Data) >
523
(Unprotected Transport of Credentials)
Login pages do not use adequate measures to protect the user name and password while they are in transit from the client to the server.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1013
(Encrypt Data) >
757
(Selection of Less-Secure Algorithm During Negotiation ('Algorithm Downgrade'))
A protocol or its implementation supports interaction between multiple actors and allows those actors to negotiate which algorithm should be used as a protection mechanism such as encryption or authentication, but it does not select the strongest algorithm that is available to both parties.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1013
(Encrypt Data) >
759
(Use of a One-Way Hash without a Salt)
The product uses a one-way cryptographic hash against an input that should not be reversible, such as a password, but the product does not also use a salt as part of the input.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1013
(Encrypt Data) >
760
(Use of a One-Way Hash with a Predictable Salt)
The product uses a one-way cryptographic hash against an input that should not be reversible, such as a password, but the product uses a predictable salt as part of the input.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1013
(Encrypt Data) >
780
(Use of RSA Algorithm without OAEP)
The product uses the RSA algorithm but does not incorporate Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP), which might weaken the encryption.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1013
(Encrypt Data) >
922
(Insecure Storage of Sensitive Information)
The product stores sensitive information without properly limiting read or write access by unauthorized actors.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1014
(Identify Actors)
Weaknesses in this category are related to the design and architecture of a system's identification management components. Frequently these deal with verifying that external agents provide inputs into the system. The weaknesses in this category could lead to a degradation of the quality of identification management if they are not addressed when designing or implementing a secure architecture.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1014
(Identify Actors) >
295
(Improper Certificate Validation)
The product does not validate, or incorrectly validates, a certificate.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1014
(Identify Actors) >
296
(Improper Following of a Certificate's Chain of Trust)
The product does not follow, or incorrectly follows, the chain of trust for a certificate back to a trusted root certificate, resulting in incorrect trust of any resource that is associated with that certificate.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1014
(Identify Actors) >
297
(Improper Validation of Certificate with Host Mismatch)
The product communicates with a host that provides a certificate, but the product does not properly ensure that the certificate is actually associated with that host.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1014
(Identify Actors) >
298
(Improper Validation of Certificate Expiration)
A certificate expiration is not validated or is incorrectly validated, so trust may be assigned to certificates that have been abandoned due to age.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1014
(Identify Actors) >
299
(Improper Check for Certificate Revocation)
The product does not check or incorrectly checks the revocation status of a certificate, which may cause it to use a certificate that has been compromised.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1014
(Identify Actors) >
345
(Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity)
The product does not sufficiently verify the origin or authenticity of data, in a way that causes it to accept invalid data.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1014
(Identify Actors) >
346
(Origin Validation Error)
The product does not properly verify that the source of data or communication is valid.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1014
(Identify Actors) >
370
(Missing Check for Certificate Revocation after Initial Check)
The product does not check the revocation status of a certificate after its initial revocation check, which can cause the product to perform privileged actions even after the certificate is revoked at a later time.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1014
(Identify Actors) >
441
(Unintended Proxy or Intermediary ('Confused Deputy'))
The product receives a request, message, or directive from an upstream component, but the product does not sufficiently preserve the original source of the request before forwarding the request to an external actor that is outside of the product's control sphere. This causes the product to appear to be the source of the request, leading it to act as a proxy or other intermediary between the upstream component and the external actor.
Confused Deputy
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1014
(Identify Actors) >
599
(Missing Validation of OpenSSL Certificate)
The product uses OpenSSL and trusts or uses a certificate without using the SSL_get_verify_result() function to ensure that the certificate satisfies all necessary security requirements.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1014
(Identify Actors) >
940
(Improper Verification of Source of a Communication Channel)
The product establishes a communication channel to handle an incoming request that has been initiated by an actor, but it does not properly verify that the request is coming from the expected origin.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1014
(Identify Actors) >
941
(Incorrectly Specified Destination in a Communication Channel)
The product creates a communication channel to initiate an outgoing request to an actor, but it does not correctly specify the intended destination for that actor.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1015
(Limit Access)
Weaknesses in this category are related to the design and architecture of system resources. Frequently these deal with restricting the amount of resources that are accessed by actors, such as memory, network connections, CPU or access points. The weaknesses in this category could lead to a degradation of the quality of authentication if they are not addressed when designing or implementing a secure architecture.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1015
(Limit Access) >
201
(Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Sent Data)
The code transmits data to another actor, but a portion of the data includes sensitive information that should not be accessible to that actor.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1015
(Limit Access) >
209
(Generation of Error Message Containing Sensitive Information)
The product generates an error message that includes sensitive information about its environment, users, or associated data.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1015
(Limit Access) >
212
(Improper Removal of Sensitive Information Before Storage or Transfer)
The product stores, transfers, or shares a resource that contains sensitive information, but it does not properly remove that information before the product makes the resource available to unauthorized actors.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1015
(Limit Access) >
243
(Creation of chroot Jail Without Changing Working Directory)
The product uses the chroot() system call to create a jail, but does not change the working directory afterward. This does not prevent access to files outside of the jail.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1015
(Limit Access) >
250
(Execution with Unnecessary Privileges)
The product performs an operation at a privilege level that is higher than the minimum level required, which creates new weaknesses or amplifies the consequences of other weaknesses.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1015
(Limit Access) >
610
(Externally Controlled Reference to a Resource in Another Sphere)
The product uses an externally controlled name or reference that resolves to a resource that is outside of the intended control sphere.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1015
(Limit Access) >
611
(Improper Restriction of XML External Entity Reference)
The product processes an XML document that can contain XML entities with URIs that resolve to documents outside of the intended sphere of control, causing the product to embed incorrect documents into its output.
XXE
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1015
(Limit Access) >
73
(External Control of File Name or Path)
The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1016
(Limit Exposure)
Weaknesses in this category are related to the design and architecture of the entry points to a system. Frequently these deal with minimizing the attack surface through designing the system with the least needed amount of entry points. The weaknesses in this category could lead to a degradation of a system's defenses if they are not addressed when designing or implementing a secure architecture.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1016
(Limit Exposure) >
210
(Self-generated Error Message Containing Sensitive Information)
The product identifies an error condition and creates its own diagnostic or error messages that contain sensitive information.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1016
(Limit Exposure) >
211
(Externally-Generated Error Message Containing Sensitive Information)
The product performs an operation that triggers an external diagnostic or error message that is not directly generated or controlled by the product, such as an error generated by the programming language interpreter that a software application uses. The error can contain sensitive system information.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1016
(Limit Exposure) >
214
(Invocation of Process Using Visible Sensitive Information)
A process is invoked with sensitive command-line arguments, environment variables, or other elements that can be seen by other processes on the operating system.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1016
(Limit Exposure) >
550
(Server-generated Error Message Containing Sensitive Information)
Certain conditions, such as network failure, will cause a server error message to be displayed.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1016
(Limit Exposure) >
829
(Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere)
The product imports, requires, or includes executable functionality (such as a library) from a source that is outside of the intended control sphere.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1016
(Limit Exposure) >
830
(Inclusion of Web Functionality from an Untrusted Source)
The product includes web functionality (such as a web widget) from another domain, which causes it to operate within the domain of the product, potentially granting total access and control of the product to the untrusted source.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1017
(Lock Computer)
Weaknesses in this category are related to the design and architecture of a system's lockout mechanism. Frequently these deal with scenarios that take effect in case of multiple failed attempts to access a given resource. The weaknesses in this category could lead to a degradation of access to system assets if they are not addressed when designing or implementing a secure architecture.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1017
(Lock Computer) >
645
(Overly Restrictive Account Lockout Mechanism)
The product contains an account lockout protection mechanism, but the mechanism is too restrictive and can be triggered too easily, which allows attackers to deny service to legitimate users by causing their accounts to be locked out.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1018
(Manage User Sessions)
Weaknesses in this category are related to the design and architecture of session management. Frequently these deal with the information or status about each user and their access rights for the duration of multiple requests. The weaknesses in this category could lead to a degradation of the quality of session management if they are not addressed when designing or implementing a secure architecture.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1018
(Manage User Sessions) >
384
(Session Fixation)
Authenticating a user, or otherwise establishing a new user session, without invalidating any existing session identifier gives an attacker the opportunity to steal authenticated sessions.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1018
(Manage User Sessions) >
488
(Exposure of Data Element to Wrong Session)
The product does not sufficiently enforce boundaries between the states of different sessions, causing data to be provided to, or used by, the wrong session.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1018
(Manage User Sessions) >
579
(J2EE Bad Practices: Non-serializable Object Stored in Session)
The product stores a non-serializable object as an HttpSession attribute, which can hurt reliability.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1018
(Manage User Sessions) >
6
(J2EE Misconfiguration: Insufficient Session-ID Length)
The J2EE application is configured to use an insufficient session ID length.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1018
(Manage User Sessions) >
613
(Insufficient Session Expiration)
According to WASC, "Insufficient Session Expiration is when a web site permits an attacker to reuse old session credentials or session IDs for authorization."
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1018
(Manage User Sessions) >
841
(Improper Enforcement of Behavioral Workflow)
The product supports a session in which more than one behavior must be performed by an actor, but it does not properly ensure that the actor performs the behaviors in the required sequence.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1019
(Validate Inputs)
Weaknesses in this category are related to the design and architecture of a system's input validation components. Frequently these deal with sanitizing, neutralizing and validating any externally provided inputs to minimize malformed data from entering the system and preventing code injection in the input data. The weaknesses in this category could lead to a degradation of the quality of data flow in a system if they are not addressed when designing or implementing a secure architecture.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1019
(Validate Inputs) >
138
(Improper Neutralization of Special Elements)
The product receives input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could be interpreted as control elements or syntactic markers when they are sent to a downstream component.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1019
(Validate Inputs) >
150
(Improper Neutralization of Escape, Meta, or Control Sequences)
The product receives input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could be interpreted as escape, meta, or control character sequences when they are sent to a downstream component.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1019
(Validate Inputs) >
20
(Improper Input Validation)
The product receives input or data, but it does
not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the
properties that are required to process the data safely and
correctly.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1019
(Validate Inputs) >
349
(Acceptance of Extraneous Untrusted Data With Trusted Data)
The product, when processing trusted data, accepts any untrusted data that is also included with the trusted data, treating the untrusted data as if it were trusted.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1019
(Validate Inputs) >
352
(Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF))
The web application does not, or cannot, sufficiently verify whether a request was intentionally provided by the user who sent the request, which could have originated from an unauthorized actor.
Session Riding
Cross Site Reference Forgery
XSRF
CSRF
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1019
(Validate Inputs) >
472
(External Control of Assumed-Immutable Web Parameter)
The web application does not sufficiently verify inputs that are assumed to be immutable but are actually externally controllable, such as hidden form fields.
Assumed-Immutable Parameter Tampering
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1019
(Validate Inputs) >
473
(PHP External Variable Modification)
A PHP application does not properly protect against the modification of variables from external sources, such as query parameters or cookies. This can expose the application to numerous weaknesses that would not exist otherwise.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1019
(Validate Inputs) >
502
(Deserialization of Untrusted Data)
The product deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently ensuring that the resulting data will be valid.
Marshaling, Unmarshaling
Pickling, Unpickling
PHP Object Injection
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1019
(Validate Inputs) >
59
(Improper Link Resolution Before File Access ('Link Following'))
The product attempts to access a file based on the filename, but it does not properly prevent that filename from identifying a link or shortcut that resolves to an unintended resource.
insecure temporary file
Zip Slip
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1019
(Validate Inputs) >
601
(URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect'))
The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect.
Open Redirect
Cross-site Redirect
Cross-domain Redirect
Unvalidated Redirect
Drive-by download
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1019
(Validate Inputs) >
641
(Improper Restriction of Names for Files and Other Resources)
The product constructs the name of a file or other resource using input from an upstream component, but it does not restrict or incorrectly restricts the resulting name.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1019
(Validate Inputs) >
643
(Improper Neutralization of Data within XPath Expressions ('XPath Injection'))
The product uses external input to dynamically construct an XPath expression used to retrieve data from an XML database, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes that input. This allows an attacker to control the structure of the query.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1019
(Validate Inputs) >
652
(Improper Neutralization of Data within XQuery Expressions ('XQuery Injection'))
The product uses external input to dynamically construct an XQuery expression used to retrieve data from an XML database, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes that input. This allows an attacker to control the structure of the query.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1019
(Validate Inputs) >
74
(Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection'))
The product constructs all or part of a command, data structure, or record using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify how it is parsed or interpreted when it is sent to a downstream component.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1019
(Validate Inputs) >
75
(Failure to Sanitize Special Elements into a Different Plane (Special Element Injection))
The product does not adequately filter user-controlled input for special elements with control implications.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1019
(Validate Inputs) >
76
(Improper Neutralization of Equivalent Special Elements)
The product correctly neutralizes certain special elements, but it improperly neutralizes equivalent special elements.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1019
(Validate Inputs) >
77
(Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection'))
The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component.
Command injection
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1019
(Validate Inputs) >
78
(Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection'))
The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component.
Shell injection
Shell metacharacters
OS Command Injection
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1019
(Validate Inputs) >
79
(Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting'))
The product does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes user-controllable input before it is placed in output that is used as a web page that is served to other users.
XSS
HTML Injection
Reflected XSS / Non-Persistent XSS / Type 1 XSS
Stored XSS / Persistent XSS / Type 2 XSS
DOM-Based XSS / Type 0 XSS
CSS
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1019
(Validate Inputs) >
790
(Improper Filtering of Special Elements)
The product receives data from an upstream component, but does not filter or incorrectly filters special elements before sending it to a downstream component.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1019
(Validate Inputs) >
791
(Incomplete Filtering of Special Elements)
The product receives data from an upstream component, but does not completely filter special elements before sending it to a downstream component.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1019
(Validate Inputs) >
792
(Incomplete Filtering of One or More Instances of Special Elements)
The product receives data from an upstream component, but does not completely filter one or more instances of special elements before sending it to a downstream component.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1019
(Validate Inputs) >
793
(Only Filtering One Instance of a Special Element)
The product receives data from an upstream component, but only filters a single instance of a special element before sending it to a downstream component.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1019
(Validate Inputs) >
794
(Incomplete Filtering of Multiple Instances of Special Elements)
The product receives data from an upstream component, but does not filter all instances of a special element before sending it to a downstream component.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1019
(Validate Inputs) >
795
(Only Filtering Special Elements at a Specified Location)
The product receives data from an upstream component, but only accounts for special elements at a specified location, thereby missing remaining special elements that may exist before sending it to a downstream component.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1019
(Validate Inputs) >
796
(Only Filtering Special Elements Relative to a Marker)
The product receives data from an upstream component, but only accounts for special elements positioned relative to a marker (e.g. "at the beginning/end of a string; the second argument"), thereby missing remaining special elements that may exist before sending it to a downstream component.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1019
(Validate Inputs) >
797
(Only Filtering Special Elements at an Absolute Position)
The product receives data from an upstream component, but only accounts for special elements at an absolute position (e.g. "byte number 10"), thereby missing remaining special elements that may exist before sending it to a downstream component.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1019
(Validate Inputs) >
88
(Improper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command ('Argument Injection'))
The product constructs a string for a command to be executed by a separate component
in another control sphere, but it does not properly delimit the
intended arguments, options, or switches within that command string.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1019
(Validate Inputs) >
89
(Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection'))
The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data.
SQL injection
SQLi
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1019
(Validate Inputs) >
90
(Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an LDAP Query ('LDAP Injection'))
The product constructs all or part of an LDAP query using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended LDAP query when it is sent to a downstream component.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1019
(Validate Inputs) >
91
(XML Injection (aka Blind XPath Injection))
The product does not properly neutralize special elements that are used in XML, allowing attackers to modify the syntax, content, or commands of the XML before it is processed by an end system.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1019
(Validate Inputs) >
93
(Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences ('CRLF Injection'))
The product uses CRLF (carriage return line feeds) as a special element, e.g. to separate lines or records, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes CRLF sequences from inputs.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1019
(Validate Inputs) >
94
(Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection'))
The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment.
Code Injection
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1019
(Validate Inputs) >
943
(Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Data Query Logic)
The product generates a query intended to access or manipulate data in a data store such as a database, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that can modify the intended logic of the query.
NoSQL Injection, NoSQLi
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1019
(Validate Inputs) >
95
(Improper Neutralization of Directives in Dynamically Evaluated Code ('Eval Injection'))
The product receives input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes code syntax before using the input in a dynamic evaluation call (e.g. "eval").
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1019
(Validate Inputs) >
96
(Improper Neutralization of Directives in Statically Saved Code ('Static Code Injection'))
The product receives input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes code syntax before inserting the input into an executable resource, such as a library, configuration file, or template.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1019
(Validate Inputs) >
97
(Improper Neutralization of Server-Side Includes (SSI) Within a Web Page)
The product generates a web page, but does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes user-controllable input that could be interpreted as a server-side include (SSI) directive.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1019
(Validate Inputs) >
98
(Improper Control of Filename for Include/Require Statement in PHP Program ('PHP Remote File Inclusion'))
The PHP application receives input from an upstream component, but it does not restrict or incorrectly restricts the input before its usage in "require," "include," or similar functions.
Remote file include
RFI
Local file inclusion
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1019
(Validate Inputs) >
99
(Improper Control of Resource Identifiers ('Resource Injection'))
The product receives input from an upstream component, but it does not restrict or incorrectly restricts the input before it is used as an identifier for a resource that may be outside the intended sphere of control.
Insecure Direct Object Reference
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1020
(Verify Message Integrity)
Weaknesses in this category are related to the design and architecture of a system's data integrity components. Frequently these deal with ensuring integrity of data, such as messages, resource files, deployment files, and configuration files. The weaknesses in this category could lead to a degradation of data integrity quality if they are not addressed when designing or implementing a secure architecture.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1020
(Verify Message Integrity) >
353
(Missing Support for Integrity Check)
The product uses a transmission protocol that does not include a mechanism for verifying the integrity of the data during transmission, such as a checksum.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1020
(Verify Message Integrity) >
354
(Improper Validation of Integrity Check Value)
The product does not validate or incorrectly validates the integrity check values or "checksums" of a message. This may prevent it from detecting if the data has been modified or corrupted in transmission.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1020
(Verify Message Integrity) >
390
(Detection of Error Condition Without Action)
The product detects a specific error, but takes no actions to handle the error.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1020
(Verify Message Integrity) >
391
(Unchecked Error Condition)
[PLANNED FOR DEPRECATION. SEE MAINTENANCE NOTES AND CONSIDER CWE-252, CWE-248, OR CWE-1069.] Ignoring exceptions and other error conditions may allow an attacker to induce unexpected behavior unnoticed.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1020
(Verify Message Integrity) >
494
(Download of Code Without Integrity Check)
The product downloads source code or an executable from a remote location and executes the code without sufficiently verifying the origin and integrity of the code.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1020
(Verify Message Integrity) >
565
(Reliance on Cookies without Validation and Integrity Checking)
The product relies on the existence or values of cookies when performing security-critical operations, but it does not properly ensure that the setting is valid for the associated user.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1020
(Verify Message Integrity) >
649
(Reliance on Obfuscation or Encryption of Security-Relevant Inputs without Integrity Checking)
The product uses obfuscation or encryption of inputs that should not be mutable by an external actor, but the product does not use integrity checks to detect if those inputs have been modified.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1020
(Verify Message Integrity) >
707
(Improper Neutralization)
The product does not ensure or incorrectly ensures that structured messages or data are well-formed and that certain security properties are met before being read from an upstream component or sent to a downstream component.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1020
(Verify Message Integrity) >
755
(Improper Handling of Exceptional Conditions)
The product does not handle or incorrectly handles an exceptional condition.
1008
(Architectural Concepts) >
1020
(Verify Message Integrity) >
924
(Improper Enforcement of Message Integrity During Transmission in a Communication Channel)
The product establishes a communication channel with an endpoint and receives a message from that endpoint, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the message was not modified during transmission.
Other
The top level categories in this view represent the individual tactics that are part of a secure-by-design approach to software development. The weaknesses that are members of each category contain information about how each is introduced relative to the software's architecture. Three different modes of introduction are used: Omission - caused by missing a security tactic when it is necessary. Commission - refers to incorrect choice of tactics which could result in undesirable consequences. Realization - appropriate security tactics are adopted but are incorrectly implemented.
View ComponentsA | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z
CWE-349: Acceptance of Extraneous Untrusted Data With Trusted Data
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Edit Custom FilterThe product, when processing trusted data, accepts any untrusted data that is also included with the trusted data, treating the untrusted data as if it were trusted.
This table specifies different individual consequences
associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is
violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an
adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about
how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other
consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be
exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to
achieve a different impact.
This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this
weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to
similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition,
relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user
may want to explore.
Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
The different Modes of Introduction provide information
about how and when this
weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which
introduction
may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the
given
phase.
This listing shows possible areas for which the given
weakness could appear. These
may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms,
Technologies,
or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given
weakness appears for that instance.
Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.
This MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that
reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a
weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
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Edit Custom Filter This table specifies different individual consequences
associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is
violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an
adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about
how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other
consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be
exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to
achieve a different impact.
This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this
weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to
similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition,
relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user
may want to explore.
Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
The different Modes of Introduction provide information
about how and when this
weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which
introduction
may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the
given
phase.
This listing shows possible areas for which the given
weakness could appear. These
may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms,
Technologies,
or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given
weakness appears for that instance.
Example 1 This code allocates a socket and forks each time it receives a new connection. (bad code)
Example Language: C
sock=socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
while (1) { newsock=accept(sock, ...); }printf("A connection has been accepted\n"); pid = fork(); The program does not track how many connections have been made, and it does not limit the number of connections. Because forking is a relatively expensive operation, an attacker would be able to cause the system to run out of CPU, processes, or memory by making a large number of connections. Alternatively, an attacker could consume all available connections, preventing others from accessing the system remotely. Example 2 In the following example a server socket connection is used to accept a request to store data on the local file system using a specified filename. The method openSocketConnection establishes a server socket to accept requests from a client. When a client establishes a connection to this service the getNextMessage method is first used to retrieve from the socket the name of the file to store the data, the openFileToWrite method will validate the filename and open a file to write to on the local file system. The getNextMessage is then used within a while loop to continuously read data from the socket and output the data to the file until there is no longer any data from the socket. (bad code)
Example Language: C
int writeDataFromSocketToFile(char *host, int port)
{ char filename[FILENAME_SIZE]; char buffer[BUFFER_SIZE]; int socket = openSocketConnection(host, port); if (socket < 0) { printf("Unable to open socket connection"); }return(FAIL); if (getNextMessage(socket, filename, FILENAME_SIZE) > 0) { if (openFileToWrite(filename) > 0) {
while (getNextMessage(socket, buffer, BUFFER_SIZE) > 0){
if (!(writeToFile(buffer) > 0)) }break;
closeFile(); closeSocket(socket); This example creates a situation where data can be dumped to a file on the local file system without any limits on the size of the file. This could potentially exhaust file or disk resources and/or limit other clients' ability to access the service. Example 3 In the following example, the processMessage method receives a two dimensional character array containing the message to be processed. The two-dimensional character array contains the length of the message in the first character array and the message body in the second character array. The getMessageLength method retrieves the integer value of the length from the first character array. After validating that the message length is greater than zero, the body character array pointer points to the start of the second character array of the two-dimensional character array and memory is allocated for the new body character array. (bad code)
Example Language: C
/* process message accepts a two-dimensional character array of the form [length][body] containing the message to be processed */ int processMessage(char **message) { char *body;
int length = getMessageLength(message[0]); if (length > 0) { body = &message[1][0]; }processMessageBody(body); return(SUCCESS); else { printf("Unable to process message; invalid message length"); }return(FAIL); This example creates a situation where the length of the body character array can be very large and will consume excessive memory, exhausting system resources. This can be avoided by restricting the length of the second character array with a maximum length check Also, consider changing the type from 'int' to 'unsigned int', so that you are always guaranteed that the number is positive. This might not be possible if the protocol specifically requires allowing negative values, or if you cannot control the return value from getMessageLength(), but it could simplify the check to ensure the input is positive, and eliminate other errors such as signed-to-unsigned conversion errors (CWE-195) that may occur elsewhere in the code. (good code)
Example Language: C
unsigned int length = getMessageLength(message[0]);
if ((length > 0) && (length < MAX_LENGTH)) {...} Example 4 In the following example, a server object creates a server socket and accepts client connections to the socket. For every client connection to the socket a separate thread object is generated using the ClientSocketThread class that handles request made by the client through the socket. (bad code)
Example Language: Java
public void acceptConnections() {
try {
ServerSocket serverSocket = new ServerSocket(SERVER_PORT);
int counter = 0; boolean hasConnections = true; while (hasConnections) { Socket client = serverSocket.accept(); }Thread t = new Thread(new ClientSocketThread(client)); t.setName(client.getInetAddress().getHostName() + ":" + counter++); t.start(); serverSocket.close(); } catch (IOException ex) {...} In this example there is no limit to the number of client connections and client threads that are created. Allowing an unlimited number of client connections and threads could potentially overwhelm the system and system resources. The server should limit the number of client connections and the client threads that are created. This can be easily done by creating a thread pool object that limits the number of threads that are generated. (good code)
Example Language: Java
public static final int SERVER_PORT = 4444;
public static final int MAX_CONNECTIONS = 10; ... public void acceptConnections() { try {
ServerSocket serverSocket = new ServerSocket(SERVER_PORT);
int counter = 0; boolean hasConnections = true; while (hasConnections) { hasConnections = checkForMoreConnections(); }Socket client = serverSocket.accept(); Thread t = new Thread(new ClientSocketThread(client)); t.setName(client.getInetAddress().getHostName() + ":" + counter++); ExecutorService pool = Executors.newFixedThreadPool(MAX_CONNECTIONS); pool.execute(t); serverSocket.close(); } catch (IOException ex) {...} Example 5 An unnamed web site allowed a user to purchase tickets for an event. A menu option allowed the user to purchase up to 10 tickets, but the back end did not restrict the actual number of tickets that could be purchased.
Example 6 Here the problem is that every time a connection is made, more memory is allocated. So if one just opened up more and more connections, eventually the machine would run out of memory. (bad code)
Example Language: C
bar connection() {
foo = malloc(1024); }return foo; endConnection(bar foo) { free(foo); }int main() { while(1) { }foo=connection(); }endConnection(foo) Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.
This MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that
reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a
weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Relationship
This entry is different from uncontrolled resource consumption (CWE-400) in that there are other weaknesses that are related to inability to control resource consumption, such as holding on to a resource too long after use, or not correctly keeping track of active resources so that they can be managed and released when they are finished (CWE-771).
Theoretical
Vulnerability theory is largely about how behaviors and resources interact. "Resource exhaustion" can be regarded as either a consequence or an attack, depending on the perspective. This entry is an attempt to reflect one of the underlying weaknesses that enable these attacks (or consequences) to take place.
CWE CATEGORY: Audit
Weaknesses in this category are related to the design and architecture of audit-based components of the system. Frequently these deal with logging user activities in order to identify attackers and modifications to the system. The weaknesses in this category could lead to a degradation of the quality of the audit capability if they are not addressed when designing or implementing a secure architecture.
CWE CATEGORY: Authenticate Actors
Weaknesses in this category are related to the design and architecture of authentication components of the system. Frequently these deal with verifying the entity is indeed who it claims to be. The weaknesses in this category could lead to a degradation of the quality of authentication if they are not addressed when designing or implementing a secure architecture.
CWE-289: Authentication Bypass by Alternate Name
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Edit Custom FilterThe product performs authentication based on the name of a resource being accessed, or the name of the actor performing the access, but it does not properly check all possible names for that resource or actor.
This table specifies different individual consequences
associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is
violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an
adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about
how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other
consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be
exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to
achieve a different impact.
This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this
weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to
similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition,
relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user
may want to explore.
Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
The different Modes of Introduction provide information
about how and when this
weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which
introduction
may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the
given
phase.
This listing shows possible areas for which the given
weakness could appear. These
may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms,
Technologies,
or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given
weakness appears for that instance.
Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.
This MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that
reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a
weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Relationship
Overlaps equivalent encodings, canonicalization, authorization, multiple trailing slash, trailing space, mixed case, and other equivalence issues.
Theoretical
Alternate names are useful in data driven manipulation attacks, not just for authentication.
CWE-302: Authentication Bypass by Assumed-Immutable Data
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Edit Custom FilterThe authentication scheme or implementation uses key data elements that are assumed to be immutable, but can be controlled or modified by the attacker.
This table specifies different individual consequences
associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is
violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an
adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about
how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other
consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be
exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to
achieve a different impact.
This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this
weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to
similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition,
relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user
may want to explore.
Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
The different Modes of Introduction provide information
about how and when this
weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which
introduction
may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the
given
phase.
This listing shows possible areas for which the given
weakness could appear. These
may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms,
Technologies,
or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given
weakness appears for that instance.
Example 1 In the following example, an "authenticated" cookie is used to determine whether or not a user should be granted access to a system. (bad code)
Example Language: Java
boolean authenticated = new Boolean(getCookieValue("authenticated")).booleanValue();
if (authenticated) { ... }Modifying the value of a cookie on the client-side is trivial, but many developers assume that cookies are essentially immutable. Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.
This MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that
reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a
weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
CWE-294: Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay
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Edit Custom FilterA capture-replay flaw exists when the design of the product makes it possible for a malicious user to sniff network traffic and bypass authentication by replaying it to the server in question to the same effect as the original message (or with minor changes).
Capture-replay attacks are common and can be difficult to defeat without cryptography. They are a subset of network injection attacks that rely on observing previously-sent valid commands, then changing them slightly if necessary and resending the same commands to the server.
This table specifies different individual consequences
associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is
violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an
adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about
how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other
consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be
exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to
achieve a different impact.
This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this
weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to
similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition,
relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user
may want to explore.
Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
The different Modes of Introduction provide information
about how and when this
weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which
introduction
may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the
given
phase.
This listing shows possible areas for which the given
weakness could appear. These
may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms,
Technologies,
or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given
weakness appears for that instance.
Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.
This MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that
reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a
weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
CWE-305: Authentication Bypass by Primary Weakness
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For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers.
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Edit Custom FilterThe authentication algorithm is sound, but the implemented mechanism can be bypassed as the result of a separate weakness that is primary to the authentication error.
This table specifies different individual consequences
associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is
violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an
adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about
how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other
consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be
exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to
achieve a different impact.
This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this
weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to
similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition,
relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user
may want to explore.
Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
The different Modes of Introduction provide information
about how and when this
weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which
introduction
may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the
given
phase.
This listing shows possible areas for which the given
weakness could appear. These
may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms,
Technologies,
or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given
weakness appears for that instance.
Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.
This MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that
reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a
weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
CWE-290: Authentication Bypass by Spoofing
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Edit Custom FilterThis attack-focused weakness is caused by incorrectly implemented authentication schemes that are subject to spoofing attacks.
This table specifies different individual consequences
associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is
violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an
adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about
how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other
consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be
exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to
achieve a different impact.
This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this
weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to
similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition,
relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user
may want to explore.
Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
The different Modes of Introduction provide information
about how and when this
weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which
introduction
may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the
given
phase.
This listing shows possible areas for which the given
weakness could appear. These
may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms,
Technologies,
or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given
weakness appears for that instance.
Example 1 The following code authenticates users. (bad code)
Example Language: Java
String sourceIP = request.getRemoteAddr();
if (sourceIP != null && sourceIP.equals(APPROVED_IP)) { authenticated = true; }The authentication mechanism implemented relies on an IP address for source validation. If an attacker is able to spoof the IP, they may be able to bypass the authentication mechanism. Example 2 Both of these examples check if a request is from a trusted address before responding to the request. (bad code)
Example Language: C
sd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
serv.sin_family = AF_INET; serv.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_ANY); servr.sin_port = htons(1008); bind(sd, (struct sockaddr *) & serv, sizeof(serv)); while (1) { memset(msg, 0x0, MAX_MSG); }clilen = sizeof(cli); if (inet_ntoa(cli.sin_addr)==getTrustedAddress()) { n = recvfrom(sd, msg, MAX_MSG, 0, (struct sockaddr *) & cli, &clilen); }(bad code)
Example Language: Java
while(true) {
DatagramPacket rp=new DatagramPacket(rData,rData.length);
outSock.receive(rp); String in = new String(p.getData(),0, rp.getLength()); InetAddress clientIPAddress = rp.getAddress(); int port = rp.getPort(); if (isTrustedAddress(clientIPAddress) & secretKey.equals(in)) { out = secret.getBytes(); }DatagramPacket sp =new DatagramPacket(out,out.length, IPAddress, port); outSock.send(sp); The code only verifies the address as stored in the request packet. An attacker can spoof this address, thus impersonating a trusted client. Example 3 The following code samples use a DNS lookup in order to decide whether or not an inbound request is from a trusted host. If an attacker can poison the DNS cache, they can gain trusted status. (bad code)
Example Language: C
struct hostent *hp;struct in_addr myaddr;
char* tHost = "trustme.example.com"; myaddr.s_addr=inet_addr(ip_addr_string); hp = gethostbyaddr((char *) &myaddr, sizeof(struct in_addr), AF_INET); if (hp && !strncmp(hp->h_name, tHost, sizeof(tHost))) { trusted = true; } else {trusted = false; }(bad code)
Example Language: Java
String ip = request.getRemoteAddr();
InetAddress addr = InetAddress.getByName(ip); if (addr.getCanonicalHostName().endsWith("trustme.com")) { trusted = true; }(bad code)
Example Language: C#
IPAddress hostIPAddress = IPAddress.Parse(RemoteIpAddress);
IPHostEntry hostInfo = Dns.GetHostByAddress(hostIPAddress); if (hostInfo.HostName.EndsWith("trustme.com")) { trusted = true; }IP addresses are more reliable than DNS names, but they can also be spoofed. Attackers can easily forge the source IP address of the packets they send, but response packets will return to the forged IP address. To see the response packets, the attacker has to sniff the traffic between the victim machine and the forged IP address. In order to accomplish the required sniffing, attackers typically attempt to locate themselves on the same subnet as the victim machine. Attackers may be able to circumvent this requirement by using source routing, but source routing is disabled across much of the Internet today. In summary, IP address verification can be a useful part of an authentication scheme, but it should not be the single factor required for authentication. Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.
This MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that
reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a
weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
CWE-288: Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or Channel
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Edit Custom Filter This table specifies different individual consequences
associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is
violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an
adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about
how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other
consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be
exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to
achieve a different impact.
This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this
weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to
similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition,
relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user
may want to explore.
Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Relevant to the view "CISQ Data Protection Measures" (View-1340)
The different Modes of Introduction provide information
about how and when this
weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which
introduction
may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the
given
phase.
This listing shows possible areas for which the given
weakness could appear. These
may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms,
Technologies,
or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given
weakness appears for that instance.
Example 1
Register SECURE_ME is located at address 0xF00. A mirror of this register called COPY_OF_SECURE_ME is at location 0x800F00. The register SECURE_ME is protected from malicious agents and only allows access to select, while COPY_OF_SECURE_ME is not. Access control is implemented using an allowlist (as indicated by acl_oh_allowlist). The identity of the initiator of the transaction is indicated by the one hot input, incoming_id. This is checked against the acl_oh_allowlist (which contains a list of initiators that are allowed to access the asset). Though this example is shown in Verilog, it will apply to VHDL as well. (informative)
Example Language: Verilog
module foo_bar(data_out, data_in, incoming_id, address, clk, rst_n);
output [31:0] data_out; input [31:0] data_in, incoming_id, address; input clk, rst_n; wire write_auth, addr_auth; reg [31:0] data_out, acl_oh_allowlist, q; assign write_auth = | (incoming_id & acl_oh_allowlist) ? 1 : 0; always @*
acl_oh_allowlist <= 32'h8312;
assign addr_auth = (address == 32'hF00) ? 1: 0;always @ (posedge clk or negedge rst_n)
if (!rst_n)
endmodule
begin
else
q <= 32'h0;
enddata_out <= 32'h0;
begin
end
q <= (addr_auth & write_auth) ? data_in: q;
enddata_out <= q; (bad code)
Example Language: Verilog
assign addr_auth = (address == 32'hF00) ? 1: 0;
The bugged line of code is repeated in the Bad example above. Weakness arises from the fact that the SECURE_ME register can be modified by writing to the shadow register COPY_OF_SECURE_ME, the address of COPY_OF_SECURE_ME should also be included in the check. That buggy line of code should instead be replaced as shown in the Good Code Snippet below. (good code)
Example Language: Verilog
assign addr_auth = (address == 32'hF00 || address == 32'h800F00) ? 1: 0;
Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.
This MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that
reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a
weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
CWE-593: Authentication Bypass: OpenSSL CTX Object Modified after SSL Objects are Created
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If the program modifies the SSL_CTX object after creating SSL objects from it, there is the possibility that older SSL objects created from the original context could all be affected by that change.
This table specifies different individual consequences
associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is
violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an
adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about
how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other
consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be
exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to
achieve a different impact.
This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this
weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to
similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition,
relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user
may want to explore.
Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
The different Modes of Introduction provide information
about how and when this
weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which
introduction
may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the
given
phase.
This listing shows possible areas for which the given
weakness could appear. These
may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms,
Technologies,
or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given
weakness appears for that instance.
Example 1 The following example demonstrates the weakness. (bad code)
Example Language: C
#define CERT "secret.pem"
#define CERT2 "secret2.pem" int main(){ SSL_CTX *ctx;
SSL *ssl; init_OpenSSL(); seed_prng(); ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_method()); if (SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(ctx, CERT) != 1) int_error("Error loading certificate from file");
if (SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(ctx, CERT, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) != 1) int_error("Error loading private key from file");
if (!(ssl = SSL_new(ctx))) int_error("Error creating an SSL context");
if ( SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(ctx, "new default password" != 1)) int_error("Doing something which is dangerous to do anyways");
if (!(ssl2 = SSL_new(ctx))) int_error("Error creating an SSL context");
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reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a
weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
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Edit Custom FilterThe system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data.
Retrieval of a user record occurs in the system based on some key value that is under user control. The key would typically identify a user-related record stored in the system and would be used to lookup that record for presentation to the user. It is likely that an attacker would have to be an authenticated user in the system. However, the authorization process would not properly check the data access operation to ensure that the authenticated user performing the operation has sufficient entitlements to perform the requested data access, hence bypassing any other authorization checks present in the system. For example, attackers can look at places where user specific data is retrieved (e.g. search screens) and determine whether the key for the item being looked up is controllable externally. The key may be a hidden field in the HTML form field, might be passed as a URL parameter or as an unencrypted cookie variable, then in each of these cases it will be possible to tamper with the key value. One manifestation of this weakness is when a system uses sequential or otherwise easily-guessable session IDs that would allow one user to easily switch to another user's session and read/modify their data.
This table specifies different individual consequences
associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is
violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an
adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about
how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other
consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be
exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to
achieve a different impact.
This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this
weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to
similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition,
relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user
may want to explore.
Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Relevant to the view "CISQ Data Protection Measures" (View-1340)
The different Modes of Introduction provide information
about how and when this
weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which
introduction
may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the
given
phase.
This listing shows possible areas for which the given
weakness could appear. These
may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms,
Technologies,
or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given
weakness appears for that instance.
Example 1 The following code uses a parameterized statement, which escapes metacharacters and prevents SQL injection vulnerabilities, to construct and execute a SQL query that searches for an invoice matching the specified identifier [1]. The identifier is selected from a list of all invoices associated with the current authenticated user. (bad code)
Example Language: C#
...
conn = new SqlConnection(_ConnectionString); conn.Open(); int16 id = System.Convert.ToInt16(invoiceID.Text); SqlCommand query = new SqlCommand( "SELECT * FROM invoices WHERE id = @id", conn); query.Parameters.AddWithValue("@id", id); SqlDataReader objReader = objCommand.ExecuteReader(); ... The problem is that the developer has not considered all of the possible values of id. Although the interface generates a list of invoice identifiers that belong to the current user, an attacker can bypass this interface to request any desired invoice. Because the code in this example does not check to ensure that the user has permission to access the requested invoice, it will display any invoice, even if it does not belong to the current user. Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.
This MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that
reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a
weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
CWE-566: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled SQL Primary Key
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Edit Custom FilterThe product uses a database table that includes records that should not be accessible to an actor, but it executes a SQL statement with a primary key that can be controlled by that actor.
When a user can set a primary key to any value, then the user can modify the key to point to unauthorized records. Database access control errors occur when:
This table specifies different individual consequences
associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is
violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an
adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about
how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other
consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be
exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to
achieve a different impact.
This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this
weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to
similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition,
relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user
may want to explore.
Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
The different Modes of Introduction provide information
about how and when this
weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which
introduction
may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the
given
phase.
This listing shows possible areas for which the given
weakness could appear. These
may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms,
Technologies,
or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given
weakness appears for that instance.
Example 1 The following code uses a parameterized statement, which escapes metacharacters and prevents SQL injection vulnerabilities, to construct and execute a SQL query that searches for an invoice matching the specified identifier [1]. The identifier is selected from a list of all invoices associated with the current authenticated user. (bad code)
Example Language: C#
...
conn = new SqlConnection(_ConnectionString); conn.Open(); int16 id = System.Convert.ToInt16(invoiceID.Text); SqlCommand query = new SqlCommand( "SELECT * FROM invoices WHERE id = @id", conn); query.Parameters.AddWithValue("@id", id); SqlDataReader objReader = objCommand.ExecuteReader(); ... The problem is that the developer has not considered all of the possible values of id. Although the interface generates a list of invoice identifiers that belong to the current user, an attacker can bypass this interface to request any desired invoice. Because the code in this example does not check to ensure that the user has permission to access the requested invoice, it will display any invoice, even if it does not belong to the current user.
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reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a
weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
CWE CATEGORY: Authorize Actors
Weaknesses in this category are related to the design and architecture of a system's authorization components. Frequently these deal with enforcing that agents have the required permissions before performing certain operations, such as modifying data. The weaknesses in this category could lead to a degradation of quality of the authorization capability if they are not addressed when designing or implementing a secure architecture.
CWE-300: Channel Accessible by Non-Endpoint
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Edit Custom FilterThe product does not adequately verify the identity of actors at both ends of a communication channel, or does not adequately ensure the integrity of the channel, in a way that allows the channel to be accessed or influenced by an actor that is not an endpoint.
In order to establish secure communication between two parties, it is often important to adequately verify the identity of entities at each end of the communication channel. Inadequate or inconsistent verification may result in insufficient or incorrect identification of either communicating entity. This can have negative consequences such as misplaced trust in the entity at the other end of the channel. An attacker can leverage this by interposing between the communicating entities and masquerading as the original entity. In the absence of sufficient verification of identity, such an attacker can eavesdrop and potentially modify the communication between the original entities.
This table specifies different individual consequences
associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is
violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an
adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about
how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other
consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be
exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to
achieve a different impact.
This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this
weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to
similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition,
relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user
may want to explore.
Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
The different Modes of Introduction provide information
about how and when this
weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which
introduction
may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the
given
phase.
This listing shows possible areas for which the given
weakness could appear. These
may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms,
Technologies,
or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given
weakness appears for that instance.
Example 1 In the Java snippet below, data is sent over an unencrypted channel to a remote server. (bad code)
Example Language: Java
Socket sock;
PrintWriter out; try { sock = new Socket(REMOTE_HOST, REMOTE_PORT);
out = new PrintWriter(echoSocket.getOutputStream(), true); // Write data to remote host via socket output stream. ... By eavesdropping on the communication channel or posing as the endpoint, an attacker would be able to read all of the transmitted data. Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.
This MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that
reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a
weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Maintenance
The summary identifies multiple distinct possibilities, suggesting that this is a category that must be broken into more specific weaknesses.
CWE-313: Cleartext Storage in a File or on Disk
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The sensitive information could be read by attackers with access to the file, or with physical or administrator access to the raw disk. Even if the information is encoded in a way that is not human-readable, certain techniques could determine which encoding is being used, then decode the information.
This table specifies different individual consequences
associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is
violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an
adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about
how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other
consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be
exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to
achieve a different impact.
This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this
weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to
similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition,
relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user
may want to explore.
Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
The different Modes of Introduction provide information
about how and when this
weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which
introduction
may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the
given
phase.
This listing shows possible areas for which the given
weakness could appear. These
may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms,
Technologies,
or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given
weakness appears for that instance.
Example 1 The following examples show a portion of properties and configuration files for Java and ASP.NET applications. The files include username and password information but they are stored in cleartext. This Java example shows a properties file with a cleartext username / password pair. (bad code)
Example Language: Java
# Java Web App ResourceBundle properties file ... webapp.ldap.username=secretUsername webapp.ldap.password=secretPassword ... The following example shows a portion of a configuration file for an ASP.Net application. This configuration file includes username and password information for a connection to a database but the pair is stored in cleartext. (bad code)
Example Language: ASP.NET
...
<connectionStrings> <add name="ud_DEV" connectionString="connectDB=uDB; uid=db2admin; pwd=password; dbalias=uDB;" providerName="System.Data.Odbc" /> </connectionStrings>... Username and password information should not be included in a configuration file or a properties file in cleartext as this will allow anyone who can read the file access to the resource. If possible, encrypt this information. Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.
This MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that
reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a
weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Terminology
Different people use "cleartext" and "plaintext" to mean the same thing: the lack of encryption. However, within cryptography, these have more precise meanings. Plaintext is the information just before it is fed into a cryptographic algorithm, including already-encrypted text. Cleartext is any information that is unencrypted, although it might be in an encoded form that is not easily human-readable (such as base64 encoding).
CWE-314: Cleartext Storage in the Registry
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Attackers can read the information by accessing the registry key. Even if the information is encoded in a way that is not human-readable, certain techniques could determine which encoding is being used, then decode the information.
This table specifies different individual consequences
associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is
violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an
adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about
how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other
consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be
exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to
achieve a different impact.
This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this
weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to
similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition,
relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user
may want to explore.
Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
The different Modes of Introduction provide information
about how and when this
weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which
introduction
may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the
given
phase.
This listing shows possible areas for which the given
weakness could appear. These
may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms,
Technologies,
or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given
weakness appears for that instance.
Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.
This MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that
reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a
weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Terminology
Different people use "cleartext" and "plaintext" to mean the same thing: the lack of encryption. However, within cryptography, these have more precise meanings. Plaintext is the information just before it is fed into a cryptographic algorithm, including already-encrypted text. Cleartext is any information that is unencrypted, although it might be in an encoded form that is not easily human-readable (such as base64 encoding).
CWE-312: Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information
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Edit Custom Filter This table specifies different individual consequences
associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is
violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an
adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about
how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other
consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be
exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to
achieve a different impact.
This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this
weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to
similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition,
relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user
may want to explore.
Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
The different Modes of Introduction provide information
about how and when this
weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which
introduction
may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the
given
phase.
This listing shows possible areas for which the given
weakness could appear. These
may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms,
Technologies,
or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given
weakness appears for that instance.
Example 1 The following code excerpt stores a plaintext user account ID in a browser cookie. (bad code)
Example Language: Java
response.addCookie( new Cookie("userAccountID", acctID);
Because the account ID is in plaintext, the user's account information is exposed if their computer is compromised by an attacker. Example 2 This code writes a user's login information to a cookie so the user does not have to login again later. (bad code)
Example Language: PHP
function persistLogin($username, $password){
$data = array("username" => $username, "password"=> $password); }setcookie ("userdata", $data); The code stores the user's username and password in plaintext in a cookie on the user's machine. This exposes the user's login information if their computer is compromised by an attacker. Even if the user's machine is not compromised, this weakness combined with cross-site scripting (CWE-79) could allow an attacker to remotely copy the cookie. Also note this example code also exhibits Plaintext Storage in a Cookie (CWE-315). Example 3 The following code attempts to establish a connection, read in a password, then store it to a buffer. (bad code)
Example Language: C
server.sin_family = AF_INET; hp = gethostbyname(argv[1]);
if (hp==NULL) error("Unknown host"); memcpy( (char *)&server.sin_addr,(char *)hp->h_addr,hp->h_length); if (argc < 3) port = 80; else port = (unsigned short)atoi(argv[3]); server.sin_port = htons(port); if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&server, sizeof server) < 0) error("Connecting"); ... while ((n=read(sock,buffer,BUFSIZE-1))!=-1) { write(dfd,password_buffer,n); ... While successful, the program does not encrypt the data before writing it to a buffer, possibly exposing it to unauthorized actors. Example 4 The following examples show a portion of properties and configuration files for Java and ASP.NET applications. The files include username and password information but they are stored in cleartext. This Java example shows a properties file with a cleartext username / password pair. (bad code)
Example Language: Java
# Java Web App ResourceBundle properties file ... webapp.ldap.username=secretUsername webapp.ldap.password=secretPassword ... The following example shows a portion of a configuration file for an ASP.Net application. This configuration file includes username and password information for a connection to a database but the pair is stored in cleartext. (bad code)
Example Language: ASP.NET
...
<connectionStrings> <add name="ud_DEV" connectionString="connectDB=uDB; uid=db2admin; pwd=password; dbalias=uDB;" providerName="System.Data.Odbc" /> </connectionStrings>... Username and password information should not be included in a configuration file or a properties file in cleartext as this will allow anyone who can read the file access to the resource. If possible, encrypt this information. Example 5 In 2022, the OT:ICEFALL study examined products by 10 different Operational Technology (OT) vendors. The researchers reported 56 vulnerabilities and said that the products were "insecure by design" [REF-1283]. If exploited, these vulnerabilities often allowed adversaries to change how the products operated, ranging from denial of service to changing the code that the products executed. Since these products were often used in industries such as power, electrical, water, and others, there could even be safety implications. At least one OT product stored a password in plaintext. Example 6 In 2021, a web site operated by PeopleGIS stored data of US municipalities in Amazon Web Service (AWS) Simple Storage Service (S3) buckets. (bad code)
Example Language: Other
A security researcher found 86 S3 buckets that could be accessed without authentication (CWE-306) and stored data unencrypted (CWE-312). These buckets exposed over 1000 GB of data and 1.6 million files including physical addresses, phone numbers, tax documents, pictures of driver's license IDs, etc. [REF-1296] [REF-1295]
While it was not publicly disclosed how the data was protected after discovery, multiple options could have been considered. (good code)
Example Language: Other
The sensitive information could have been protected by ensuring that the buckets did not have public read access, e.g., by enabling the s3-account-level-public-access-blocks-periodic rule to Block Public Access. In addition, the data could have been encrypted at rest using the appropriate S3 settings, e.g., by enabling server-side encryption using the s3-bucket-server-side-encryption-enabled setting. Other settings are available to further prevent bucket data from being leaked. [REF-1297]
Example 7 Consider the following PowerShell command examples for encryption scopes of Azure storage objects. In the first example, an encryption scope is set for the storage account. (bad code)
Example Language: Shell
New-AzStorageEncryptionScope -ResourceGroupName "MyResourceGroup" -AccountName "MyStorageAccount" -EncryptionScopeName testscope -StorageEncryption
The result (edited and formatted for readability) might be: (bad code)
Example Language: Other
ResourceGroupName: MyResourceGroup, StorageAccountName: MyStorageAccount
However, the empty string under RequireInfrastructureEncryption indicates this service was not enabled at the time of creation, because the -RequireInfrastructureEncryption argument was not specified in the command. Including the -RequireInfrastructureEncryption argument addresses the issue: (good code)
Example Language: Shell
New-AzStorageEncryptionScope -ResourceGroupName "MyResourceGroup" -AccountName "MyStorageAccount" -EncryptionScopeName testscope -StorageEncryption -RequireInfrastructureEncryption
This produces the report: (result)
Example Language: Other
ResourceGroupName: MyResourceGroup, StorageAccountName: MyStorageAccount
In a scenario where both software and hardware layer encryption is required ("double encryption"), Azure's infrastructure encryption setting can be enabled via the CLI or Portal. An important note is that infrastructure hardware encryption cannot be enabled or disabled after a blob is created. Furthermore, the default value for infrastructure encryption is disabled in blob creations. Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.
This MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that
reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a
weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Terminology
Different people use "cleartext" and "plaintext" to mean the same thing: the lack of encryption. However, within cryptography, these have more precise meanings. Plaintext is the information just before it is fed into a cryptographic algorithm, including already-encrypted text. Cleartext is any information that is unencrypted, although it might be in an encoded form that is not easily human-readable (such as base64 encoding).
Other
When organizations adopt cloud services, it can be easier for attackers to access the data from anywhere on the Internet.
CWE-315: Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information in a Cookie
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Attackers can use widely-available tools to view the cookie and read the sensitive information. Even if the information is encoded in a way that is not human-readable, certain techniques could determine which encoding is being used, then decode the information.
This table specifies different individual consequences
associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is
violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an
adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about
how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other
consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be
exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to
achieve a different impact.
This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this
weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to
similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition,
relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user
may want to explore.
Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
The different Modes of Introduction provide information
about how and when this
weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which
introduction
may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the
given
phase.
This listing shows possible areas for which the given
weakness could appear. These
may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms,
Technologies,
or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given
weakness appears for that instance.
Example 1 The following code excerpt stores a plaintext user account ID in a browser cookie. (bad code)
Example Language: Java
response.addCookie( new Cookie("userAccountID", acctID) );
Because the account ID is in plaintext, the user's account information is exposed if their computer is compromised by an attacker. Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.
This MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that
reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a
weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Terminology
Different people use "cleartext" and "plaintext" to mean the same thing: the lack of encryption. However, within cryptography, these have more precise meanings. Plaintext is the information just before it is fed into a cryptographic algorithm, including already-encrypted text. Cleartext is any information that is unencrypted, although it might be in an encoded form that is not easily human-readable (such as base64 encoding).
CWE-318: Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information in Executable
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Attackers can reverse engineer binary code to obtain secret data. This is especially easy when the cleartext is plain ASCII. Even if the information is encoded in a way that is not human-readable, certain techniques could determine which encoding is being used, then decode the information.
This table specifies different individual consequences
associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is
violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an
adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about
how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other
consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be
exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to
achieve a different impact.
This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this
weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to
similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition,
relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user
may want to explore.
Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
The different Modes of Introduction provide information
about how and when this
weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which
introduction
may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the
given
phase.
This listing shows possible areas for which the given
weakness could appear. These
may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms,
Technologies,
or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given
weakness appears for that instance.
Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.
This MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that
reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a
weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Terminology
Different people use "cleartext" and "plaintext" to mean the same thing: the lack of encryption. However, within cryptography, these have more precise meanings. Plaintext is the information just before it is fed into a cryptographic algorithm, including already-encrypted text. Cleartext is any information that is unencrypted, although it might be in an encoded form that is not easily human-readable (such as base64 encoding).
CWE-317: Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information in GUI
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For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers.
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An attacker can often obtain data from a GUI, even if hidden, by using an API to directly access GUI objects such as windows and menus. Even if the information is encoded in a way that is not human-readable, certain techniques could determine which encoding is being used, then decode the information.
This table specifies different individual consequences
associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is
violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an
adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about
how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other
consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be
exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to
achieve a different impact.
This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this
weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to
similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition,
relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user
may want to explore.
Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
The different Modes of Introduction provide information
about how and when this
weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which
introduction
may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the
given
phase.
This listing shows possible areas for which the given
weakness could appear. These
may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms,
Technologies,
or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given
weakness appears for that instance.
Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.
This MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that
reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a
weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Terminology
Different people use "cleartext" and "plaintext" to mean the same thing: the lack of encryption. However, within cryptography, these have more precise meanings. Plaintext is the information just before it is fed into a cryptographic algorithm, including already-encrypted text. Cleartext is any information that is unencrypted, although it might be in an encoded form that is not easily human-readable (such as base64 encoding).
CWE-316: Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information in Memory
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Edit Custom FilterThe sensitive memory might be saved to disk, stored in a core dump, or remain uncleared if the product crashes, or if the programmer does not properly clear the memory before freeing it. It could be argued that such problems are usually only exploitable by those with administrator privileges. However, swapping could cause the memory to be written to disk and leave it accessible to physical attack afterwards. Core dump files might have insecure permissions or be stored in archive files that are accessible to untrusted people. Or, uncleared sensitive memory might be inadvertently exposed to attackers due to another weakness. This table specifies different individual consequences
associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is
violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an
adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about
how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other
consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be
exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to
achieve a different impact.
This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this
weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to
similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition,
relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user
may want to explore.
Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
The different Modes of Introduction provide information
about how and when this
weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which
introduction
may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the
given
phase.
This listing shows possible areas for which the given
weakness could appear. These
may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms,
Technologies,
or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given
weakness appears for that instance.
Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.
This MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that
reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a
weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Relationship
This could be a resultant weakness, e.g. if the compiler removes code that was intended to wipe memory.
Terminology
Different people use "cleartext" and "plaintext" to mean the same thing: the lack of encryption. However, within cryptography, these have more precise meanings. Plaintext is the information just before it is fed into a cryptographic algorithm, including already-encrypted text. Cleartext is any information that is unencrypted, although it might be in an encoded form that is not easily human-readable (such as base64 encoding).
CWE-319: Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information
View customized information:
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For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers.
For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry.
For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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Edit Custom Filter This table specifies different individual consequences
associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is
violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an
adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about
how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other
consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be
exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to
achieve a different impact.
This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this
weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to
similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition,
relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user
may want to explore.
Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Relevant to the view "Hardware Design" (View-1194)
The different Modes of Introduction provide information
about how and when this
weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which
introduction
may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the
given
phase.
This listing shows possible areas for which the given
weakness could appear. These
may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms,
Technologies,
or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given
weakness appears for that instance.
Example 1 The following code attempts to establish a connection to a site to communicate sensitive information. (bad code)
Example Language: Java
try {
URL u = new URL("http://www.secret.example.org/"); }HttpURLConnection hu = (HttpURLConnection) u.openConnection(); hu.setRequestMethod("PUT"); hu.connect(); OutputStream os = hu.getOutputStream(); hu.disconnect(); catch (IOException e) {
//...
}Though a connection is successfully made, the connection is unencrypted and it is possible that all sensitive data sent to or received from the server will be read by unintended actors. Example 2 In 2022, the OT:ICEFALL study examined products by 10 different Operational Technology (OT) vendors. The researchers reported 56 vulnerabilities and said that the products were "insecure by design" [REF-1283]. If exploited, these vulnerabilities often allowed adversaries to change how the products operated, ranging from denial of service to changing the code that the products executed. Since these products were often used in industries such as power, electrical, water, and others, there could even be safety implications. Multiple vendors used cleartext transmission of sensitive information in their OT products. Example 3 A TAP accessible register is read/written by a JTAG based tool, for internal use by authorized users. However, an adversary can connect a probing device and collect the values from the unencrypted channel connecting the JTAG interface to the authorized user, if no additional protections are employed. Example 4 The following Azure CLI command lists the properties of a particular storage account: (informative)
Example Language: Shell
az storage account show -g {ResourceGroupName} -n {StorageAccountName}
The JSON result might be: (bad code)
Example Language: JSON
{
"name": "{StorageAccountName}",
}
"enableHttpsTrafficOnly": false, "type": "Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts" The enableHttpsTrafficOnly value is set to false, because the default setting for Secure transfer is set to Disabled. This allows cloud storage resources to successfully connect and transfer data without the use of encryption (e.g., HTTP, SMB 2.1, SMB 3.0, etc.). Azure's storage accounts can be configured to only accept requests from secure connections made over HTTPS. The secure transfer setting can be enabled using Azure's Portal (GUI) or programmatically by setting the enableHttpsTrafficOnly property to True on the storage account, such as: (good code)
Example Language: Shell
az storage account update -g {ResourceGroupName} -n {StorageAccountName} --https-only true
The change can be confirmed from the result by verifying that the enableHttpsTrafficOnly value is true: (good code)
Example Language: JSON
{
"name": "{StorageAccountName}",
}
"enableHttpsTrafficOnly": true, "type": "Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts"
Note: to enable secure transfer using Azure's Portal instead of the command line:
Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.
This MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that
reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a
weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Other
Applicable communication channels are not limited to software products. Applicable channels include hardware-specific technologies such as internal hardware networks and external debug channels, supporting remote JTAG debugging. When mitigations are not applied to combat adversaries within the product's threat model, this weakness significantly lowers the difficulty of exploitation by such adversaries.
CWE-602: Client-Side Enforcement of Server-Side Security
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Edit Custom FilterThe product is composed of a server that relies on the client to implement a mechanism that is intended to protect the server.
When the server relies on protection mechanisms placed on the client side, an attacker can modify the client-side behavior to bypass the protection mechanisms, resulting in potentially unexpected interactions between the client and server. The consequences will vary, depending on what the mechanisms are trying to protect.
This table specifies different individual consequences
associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is
violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an
adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about
how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other
consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be
exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to
achieve a different impact.
This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this
weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to
similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition,
relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user
may want to explore.
Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
The different Modes of Introduction provide information
about how and when this
weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which
introduction
may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the
given
phase.
This listing shows possible areas for which the given
weakness could appear. These
may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms,
Technologies,
or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given
weakness appears for that instance.
Example 1 This example contains client-side code that checks if the user authenticated successfully before sending a command. The server-side code performs the authentication in one step, and executes the command in a separate step. CLIENT-SIDE (client.pl) (good code)
Example Language: Perl
$server = "server.example.com";
$username = AskForUserName(); $password = AskForPassword(); $address = AskForAddress(); $sock = OpenSocket($server, 1234); writeSocket($sock, "AUTH $username $password\n"); $resp = readSocket($sock); if ($resp eq "success") { # username/pass is valid, go ahead and update the info! writeSocket($sock, "CHANGE-ADDRESS $username $address\n"; else { print "ERROR: Invalid Authentication!\n"; }SERVER-SIDE (server.pl): (bad code)
Example Language: Perl
$sock = acceptSocket(1234);
($cmd, $args) = ParseClientRequest($sock); if ($cmd eq "AUTH") { ($username, $pass) = split(/\s+/, $args, 2);
$result = AuthenticateUser($username, $pass); writeSocket($sock, "$result\n"); # does not close the socket on failure; assumes the # user will try again elsif ($cmd eq "CHANGE-ADDRESS") { if (validateAddress($args)) { }$res = UpdateDatabaseRecord($username, "address", $args); }writeSocket($sock, "SUCCESS\n"); else { writeSocket($sock, "FAILURE -- address is malformed\n"); }The server accepts 2 commands, "AUTH" which authenticates the user, and "CHANGE-ADDRESS" which updates the address field for the username. The client performs the authentication and only sends a CHANGE-ADDRESS for that user if the authentication succeeds. Because the client has already performed the authentication, the server assumes that the username in the CHANGE-ADDRESS is the same as the authenticated user. An attacker could modify the client by removing the code that sends the "AUTH" command and simply executing the CHANGE-ADDRESS. Example 2 In 2022, the OT:ICEFALL study examined products by 10 different Operational Technology (OT) vendors. The researchers reported 56 vulnerabilities and said that the products were "insecure by design" [REF-1283]. If exploited, these vulnerabilities often allowed adversaries to change how the products operated, ranging from denial of service to changing the code that the products executed. Since these products were often used in industries such as power, electrical, water, and others, there could even be safety implications. Multiple vendors used client-side authentication in their OT products. Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.
This MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that
reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a
weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
CWE-243: Creation of chroot Jail Without Changing Working Directory
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Edit Custom FilterThe product uses the chroot() system call to create a jail, but does not change the working directory afterward. This does not prevent access to files outside of the jail.
Improper use of chroot() may allow attackers to escape from the chroot jail. The chroot() function call does not change the process's current working directory, so relative paths may still refer to file system resources outside of the chroot jail after chroot() has been called.
This table specifies different individual consequences
associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is
violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an
adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about
how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other
consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be
exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to
achieve a different impact.
This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this
weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to
similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition,
relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user
may want to explore.
Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
The different Modes of Introduction provide information
about how and when this
weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which
introduction
may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the
given
phase.
This listing shows possible areas for which the given
weakness could appear. These
may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms,
Technologies,
or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given
weakness appears for that instance.
Example 1 Consider the following source code from a (hypothetical) FTP server: (bad code)
Example Language: C
chroot("/var/ftproot");
... fgets(filename, sizeof(filename), network); localfile = fopen(filename, "r"); while ((len = fread(buf, 1, sizeof(buf), localfile)) != EOF) { fwrite(buf, 1, sizeof(buf), network); }fclose(localfile); This code is responsible for reading a filename from the network, opening the corresponding file on the local machine, and sending the contents over the network. This code could be used to implement the FTP GET command. The FTP server calls chroot() in its initialization routines in an attempt to prevent access to files outside of /var/ftproot. But because the server does not change the current working directory by calling chdir("/"), an attacker could request the file "../../../../../etc/passwd" and obtain a copy of the system password file.
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reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a
weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
CWE CATEGORY: Cross Cutting
Weaknesses in this category are related to the design and architecture of multiple security tactics and how they affect a system. For example, information exposure can impact the Limit Access and Limit Exposure security tactics. The weaknesses in this category could lead to a degradation of the quality of many capabilities if they are not addressed when designing or implementing a secure architecture.
CWE-352: Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
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Edit Custom Filter This table specifies different individual consequences
associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is
violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an
adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about
how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other
consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be
exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to
achieve a different impact.
This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this
weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to
similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition,
relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user
may want to explore.
Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
The different Modes of Introduction provide information
about how and when this
weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which
introduction
may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the
given
phase.
This listing shows possible areas for which the given
weakness could appear. These
may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms,
Technologies,
or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given
weakness appears for that instance.
Example 1 This example PHP code attempts to secure the form submission process by validating that the user submitting the form has a valid session. A CSRF attack would not be prevented by this countermeasure because the attacker forges a request through the user's web browser in which a valid session already exists. The following HTML is intended to allow a user to update a profile. (bad code)
Example Language: HTML
<form action="/url/profile.php" method="post">
<input type="text" name="firstname"/> <input type="text" name="lastname"/> <br/> <input type="text" name="email"/> <input type="submit" name="submit" value="Update"/> </form> profile.php contains the following code. (bad code)
Example Language: PHP
// initiate the session in order to validate sessions
session_start(); //if the session is registered to a valid user then allow update if (! session_is_registered("username")) { echo "invalid session detected!"; // Redirect user to login page [...] exit; // The user session is valid, so process the request // and update the information update_profile(); function update_profile { // read in the data from $POST and send an update // to the database SendUpdateToDatabase($_SESSION['username'], $_POST['email']); [...] echo "Your profile has been successfully updated."; This code may look protected since it checks for a valid session. However, CSRF attacks can be staged from virtually any tag or HTML construct, including image tags, links, embed or object tags, or other attributes that load background images. The attacker can then host code that will silently change the username and email address of any user that visits the page while remaining logged in to the target web application. The code might be an innocent-looking web page such as: (attack code)
Example Language: HTML
<SCRIPT>
function SendAttack () { form.email = "attacker@example.com"; }// send to profile.php form.submit(); </SCRIPT> <BODY onload="javascript:SendAttack();"> <form action="http://victim.example.com/profile.php" id="form" method="post"> <input type="hidden" name="firstname" value="Funny"> <input type="hidden" name="lastname" value="Joke"> <br/> <input type="hidden" name="email"> </form> Notice how the form contains hidden fields, so when it is loaded into the browser, the user will not notice it. Because SendAttack() is defined in the body's onload attribute, it will be automatically called when the victim loads the web page. Assuming that the user is already logged in to victim.example.com, profile.php will see that a valid user session has been established, then update the email address to the attacker's own address. At this stage, the user's identity has been compromised, and messages sent through this profile could be sent to the attacker's address. Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.
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reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a
weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Relationship There can be a close relationship between XSS and CSRF (CWE-352). An attacker might use CSRF in order to trick the victim into submitting requests to the server in which the requests contain an XSS payload. A well-known example of this was the Samy worm on MySpace [REF-956]. The worm used XSS to insert malicious HTML sequences into a user's profile and add the attacker as a MySpace friend. MySpace friends of that victim would then execute the payload to modify their own profiles, causing the worm to propagate exponentially. Since the victims did not intentionally insert the malicious script themselves, CSRF was a root cause. Theoretical The CSRF topology is multi-channel:
CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data
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This table specifies different individual consequences
associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is
violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an
adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about
how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other
consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be
exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to
achieve a different impact.
This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this
weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to
similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition,
relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user
may want to explore.
Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
The different Modes of Introduction provide information
about how and when this
weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which
introduction
may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the
given
phase.
This listing shows possible areas for which the given
weakness could appear. These
may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms,
Technologies,
or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given
weakness appears for that instance.
Example 1 This code snippet deserializes an object from a file and uses it as a UI button: (bad code)
Example Language: Java
try {
File file = new File("object.obj"); }ObjectInputStream in = new ObjectInputStream(new FileInputStream(file)); javax.swing.JButton button = (javax.swing.JButton) in.readObject(); in.close(); This code does not attempt to verify the source or contents of the file before deserializing it. An attacker may be able to replace the intended file with a file that contains arbitrary malicious code which will be executed when the button is pressed. To mitigate this, explicitly define final readObject() to prevent deserialization. An example of this is: (good code)
Example Language: Java
private final void readObject(ObjectInputStream in) throws java.io.IOException {
throw new java.io.IOException("Cannot be deserialized"); } Example 2 In Python, the Pickle library handles the serialization and deserialization processes. In this example derived from [REF-467], the code receives and parses data, and afterwards tries to authenticate a user based on validating a token. (bad code)
Example Language: Python
try {
class ExampleProtocol(protocol.Protocol):
def dataReceived(self, data): # Code that would be here would parse the incoming data # After receiving headers, call confirmAuth() to authenticate def confirmAuth(self, headers): try: token = cPickle.loads(base64.b64decode(headers['AuthToken'])) if not check_hmac(token['signature'], token['data'], getSecretKey()): raise AuthFail self.secure_data = token['data'] except: raise AuthFail Unfortunately, the code does not verify that the incoming data is legitimate. An attacker can construct a illegitimate, serialized object "AuthToken" that instantiates one of Python's subprocesses to execute arbitrary commands. For instance,the attacker could construct a pickle that leverages Python's subprocess module, which spawns new processes and includes a number of arguments for various uses. Since Pickle allows objects to define the process for how they should be unpickled, the attacker can direct the unpickle process to call Popen in the subprocess module and execute /bin/sh. Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.
This MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that
reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a
weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
CWE-390: Detection of Error Condition Without Action
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Edit Custom Filter This table specifies different individual consequences
associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is
violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an
adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about
how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other
consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be
exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to
achieve a different impact.
This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this
weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to
similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition,
relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user
may want to explore.
Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
The different Modes of Introduction provide information
about how and when this
weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which
introduction
may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the
given
phase.
This listing shows possible areas for which the given
weakness could appear. These
may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms,
Technologies,
or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given
weakness appears for that instance.
Example 1 The following example attempts to allocate memory for a character. After the call to malloc, an if statement is used to check whether the malloc function failed. (bad code)
Example Language: C
foo=malloc(sizeof(char)); //the next line checks to see if malloc failed
if (foo==NULL) { //We do nothing so we just ignore the error. }The conditional successfully detects a NULL return value from malloc indicating a failure, however it does not do anything to handle the problem. Unhandled errors may have unexpected results and may cause the program to crash or terminate. Instead, the if block should contain statements that either attempt to fix the problem or notify the user that an error has occurred and continue processing or perform some cleanup and gracefully terminate the program. The following example notifies the user that the malloc function did not allocate the required memory resources and returns an error code. (good code)
Example Language: C
foo=malloc(sizeof(char)); //the next line checks to see if malloc failed
if (foo==NULL) { printf("Malloc failed to allocate memory resources"); }return -1; Example 2 In the following C++ example the method readFile() will read the file whose name is provided in the input parameter and will return the contents of the file in char string. The method calls open() and read() may result in errors if the file does not exist or does not contain any data to read. These errors will be thrown when the is_open() method and good() method indicate errors opening or reading the file. However, these errors are not handled within the catch statement. Catch statements that do not perform any processing will have unexpected results. In this case an empty char string will be returned, and the file will not be properly closed. (bad code)
Example Language: C++
char* readfile (char *filename) {
try {
// open input file
ifstream infile; infile.open(filename); if (!infile.is_open()) { throw "Unable to open file " + filename; }// get length of file infile.seekg (0, ios::end); int length = infile.tellg(); infile.seekg (0, ios::beg); // allocate memory char *buffer = new char [length]; // read data from file infile.read (buffer,length); if (!infile.good()) { throw "Unable to read from file " + filename; }infile.close(); return buffer; catch (...) { /* bug: insert code to handle this later */ }The catch statement should contain statements that either attempt to fix the problem or notify the user that an error has occurred and continue processing or perform some cleanup and gracefully terminate the program. The following C++ example contains two catch statements. The first of these will catch a specific error thrown within the try block, and the second catch statement will catch all other errors from within the catch block. Both catch statements will notify the user that an error has occurred, close the file, and rethrow to the block that called the readFile() method for further handling or possible termination of the program. (good code)
Example Language: C++
char* readFile (char *filename) {
try {
// open input file
ifstream infile; infile.open(filename); if (!infile.is_open()) { throw "Unable to open file " + filename; }// get length of file infile.seekg (0, ios::end); int length = infile.tellg(); infile.seekg (0, ios::beg); // allocate memory char *buffer = new char [length]; // read data from file infile.read (buffer,length); if (!infile.good()) { throw "Unable to read from file " + filename; }infile.close(); return buffer; catch (char *str) { printf("Error: %s \n", str); }infile.close(); throw str; catch (...) { printf("Error occurred trying to read from file \n"); }infile.close(); throw; Example 3 In the following Java example the method readFile will read the file whose name is provided in the input parameter and will return the contents of the file in a String object. The constructor of the FileReader object and the read method call may throw exceptions and therefore must be within a try/catch block. While the catch statement in this example will catch thrown exceptions in order for the method to compile, no processing is performed to handle the thrown exceptions. Catch statements that do not perform any processing will have unexpected results. In this case, this will result in the return of a null String. (bad code)
Example Language: Java
public String readFile(String filename) {
String retString = null;
try { // initialize File and FileReader objects
File file = new File(filename); FileReader fr = new FileReader(file); // initialize character buffer long fLen = file.length(); char[] cBuf = new char[(int) fLen]; // read data from file int iRead = fr.read(cBuf, 0, (int) fLen); // close file fr.close(); retString = new String(cBuf); /* do nothing, but catch so it'll compile... */ }return retString; The catch statement should contain statements that either attempt to fix the problem, notify the user that an exception has been raised and continue processing, or perform some cleanup and gracefully terminate the program. The following Java example contains three catch statements. The first of these will catch the FileNotFoundException that may be thrown by the FileReader constructor called within the try/catch block. The second catch statement will catch the IOException that may be thrown by the read method called within the try/catch block. The third catch statement will catch all other exceptions thrown within the try block. For all catch statements the user is notified that the exception has been thrown and the exception is rethrown to the block that called the readFile() method for further processing or possible termination of the program. Note that with Java it is usually good practice to use the getMessage() method of the exception class to provide more information to the user about the exception raised. (good code)
Example Language: Java
public String readFile(String filename) throws FileNotFoundException, IOException, Exception {
String retString = null;
try { // initialize File and FileReader objects
File file = new File(filename); FileReader fr = new FileReader(file); // initialize character buffer long fLen = file.length(); char [] cBuf = new char[(int) fLen]; // read data from file int iRead = fr.read(cBuf, 0, (int) fLen); // close file fr.close(); retString = new String(cBuf); System.err.println ("Error: FileNotFoundException opening the input file: " + filename ); } catch (IOException ex) {System.err.println ("" + ex.getMessage() ); throw new FileNotFoundException(ex.getMessage()); System.err.println("Error: IOException reading the input file.\n" + ex.getMessage() ); } catch (Exception ex) {throw new IOException(ex); System.err.println("Error: Exception reading the input file.\n" + ex.getMessage() ); }throw new Exception(ex); return retString; Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.
This MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that
reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a
weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
CWE-425: Direct Request ('Forced Browsing')
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Edit Custom FilterThe web application does not adequately enforce appropriate authorization on all restricted URLs, scripts, or files.
Web applications susceptible to direct request attacks often make the false assumption that such resources can only be reached through a given navigation path and so only apply authorization at certain points in the path.
This table specifies different individual consequences
associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is
violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an
adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about
how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other
consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be
exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to
achieve a different impact.
This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this
weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to
similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition,
relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user
may want to explore.
Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
The different Modes of Introduction provide information
about how and when this
weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which
introduction
may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the
given
phase.
This listing shows possible areas for which the given
weakness could appear. These
may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms,
Technologies,
or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given
weakness appears for that instance.
Example 1 If forced browsing is possible, an attacker may be able to directly access a sensitive page by entering a URL similar to the following. (attack code)
Example Language: JSP
http://somesite.com/someapplication/admin.jsp
Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.
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Relationship
Overlaps Modification of Assumed-Immutable Data (MAID), authorization errors, container errors; often primary to other weaknesses such as XSS and SQL injection.
Theoretical
"Forced browsing" is a step-based manipulation involving the omission of one or more steps, whose order is assumed to be immutable. The application does not verify that the first step was performed successfully before the second step. The consequence is typically "authentication bypass" or "path disclosure," although it can be primary to all kinds of weaknesses, especially in languages such as PHP, which allow external modification of assumed-immutable variables.
CWE-494: Download of Code Without Integrity Check
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Edit Custom FilterThe product downloads source code or an executable from a remote location and executes the code without sufficiently verifying the origin and integrity of the code.
An attacker can execute malicious code by compromising the host server, performing DNS spoofing, or modifying the code in transit.
This table specifies different individual consequences
associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is
violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an
adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about
how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other
consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be
exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to
achieve a different impact.
This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this
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Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
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weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which
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given
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weakness could appear. These
may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms,
Technologies,
or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given
weakness appears for that instance.
Example 1 This example loads an external class from a local subdirectory. (bad code)
Example Language: Java
URL[] classURLs= new URL[]{
new URL("file:subdir/") };URLClassLoader loader = new URLClassLoader(classURLs); Class loadedClass = Class.forName("loadMe", true, loader); This code does not ensure that the class loaded is the intended one, for example by verifying the class's checksum. An attacker may be able to modify the class file to execute malicious code. Example 2 This code includes an external script to get database credentials, then authenticates a user against the database, allowing access to the application. (bad code)
Example Language: PHP
//assume the password is already encrypted, avoiding CWE-312
function authenticate($username,$password){ include("http://external.example.com/dbInfo.php"); //dbInfo.php makes $dbhost, $dbuser, $dbpass, $dbname available mysql_connect($dbhost, $dbuser, $dbpass) or die ('Error connecting to mysql'); mysql_select_db($dbname); $query = 'Select * from users where username='.$username.' And password='.$password; $result = mysql_query($query); if(mysql_numrows($result) == 1){ mysql_close(); }return true; else{ mysql_close(); }return false; } This code does not verify that the external domain accessed is the intended one. An attacker may somehow cause the external domain name to resolve to an attack server, which would provide the information for a false database. The attacker may then steal the usernames and encrypted passwords from real user login attempts, or simply allow themself to access the application without a real user account. This example is also vulnerable to an Adversary-in-the-Middle AITM (CWE-300) attack. Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.
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Research Gap
This is critical for mobile code, but it is likely to become more and more common as developers continue to adopt automated, network-based product distributions and upgrades. Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) might introduce additional subtleties. Common exploitation scenarios may include ad server compromises and bad upgrades.
CWE-258: Empty Password in Configuration File
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Edit Custom Filter This table specifies different individual consequences
associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is
violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an
adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about
how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other
consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be
exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to
achieve a different impact.
This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this
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similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition,
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weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which
introduction
may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the
given
phase.
This listing shows possible areas for which the given
weakness could appear. These
may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms,
Technologies,
or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given
weakness appears for that instance.
Example 1 The following examples show a portion of properties and configuration files for Java and ASP.NET applications. The files include username and password information but the password is provided as an empty string. This Java example shows a properties file with an empty password string. (bad code)
Example Language: Java
# Java Web App ResourceBundle properties file ... webapp.ldap.username=secretUsername webapp.ldap.password= ... The following example shows a portion of a configuration file for an ASP.Net application. This configuration file includes username and password information for a connection to a database and the password is provided as an empty string. (bad code)
Example Language: ASP.NET
...
<connectionStrings> <add name="ud_DEV" connectionString="connectDB=uDB; uid=db2admin; pwd=; dbalias=uDB;" providerName="System.Data.Odbc" /> </connectionStrings> ... An empty string should never be used as a password as this can allow unauthorized access to the application. Username and password information should not be included in a configuration file or a properties file in clear text. If possible, encrypt this information and avoid CWE-260 and CWE-13. Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.
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CWE CATEGORY: Encrypt Data
Weaknesses in this category are related to the design and architecture of data confidentiality in a system. Frequently these deal with the use of encryption libraries. The weaknesses in this category could lead to a degradation of the quality data encryption if they are not addressed when designing or implementing a secure architecture.
CWE-250: Execution with Unnecessary Privileges
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Edit Custom Filter This table specifies different individual consequences
associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is
violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an
adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about
how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other
consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be
exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to
achieve a different impact.
This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this
weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to
similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition,
relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user
may want to explore.
Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
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about how and when this
weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which
introduction
may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the
given
phase.
This listing shows possible areas for which the given
weakness could appear. These
may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms,
Technologies,
or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given
weakness appears for that instance.
Example 1 This code temporarily raises the program's privileges to allow creation of a new user folder. (bad code)
Example Language: Python
def makeNewUserDir(username):
While the program only raises its privilege level to create the folder and immediately lowers it again, if the call to os.mkdir() throws an exception, the call to lowerPrivileges() will not occur. As a result, the program is indefinitely operating in a raised privilege state, possibly allowing further exploitation to occur. Example 2 The following code calls chroot() to restrict the application to a subset of the filesystem below APP_HOME in order to prevent an attacker from using the program to gain unauthorized access to files located elsewhere. The code then opens a file specified by the user and processes the contents of the file. (bad code)
Example Language: C
chroot(APP_HOME);
chdir("/"); FILE* data = fopen(argv[1], "r+"); ... Constraining the process inside the application's home directory before opening any files is a valuable security measure. However, the absence of a call to setuid() with some non-zero value means the application is continuing to operate with unnecessary root privileges. Any successful exploit carried out by an attacker against the application can now result in a privilege escalation attack because any malicious operations will be performed with the privileges of the superuser. If the application drops to the privilege level of a non-root user, the potential for damage is substantially reduced. Example 3 This application intends to use a user's location to determine the timezone the user is in: (bad code)
Example Language: Java
locationClient = new LocationClient(this, this, this);
locationClient.connect(); Location userCurrLocation; userCurrLocation = locationClient.getLastLocation(); setTimeZone(userCurrLocation); This is unnecessary use of the location API, as this information is already available using the Android Time API. Always be sure there is not another way to obtain needed information before resorting to using the location API. Example 4 This code uses location to determine the user's current US State location. First the application must declare that it requires the ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION permission in the application's manifest.xml: (bad code)
Example Language: XML
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION"/>
During execution, a call to getLastLocation() will return a location based on the application's location permissions. In this case the application has permission for the most accurate location possible: (bad code)
Example Language: Java
locationClient = new LocationClient(this, this, this);
locationClient.connect(); Location userCurrLocation; userCurrLocation = locationClient.getLastLocation(); deriveStateFromCoords(userCurrLocation); While the application needs this information, it does not need to use the ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION permission, as the ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION permission will be sufficient to identify which US state the user is in. Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.
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Relationship Other
Privilege management functions can behave in some less-than-obvious ways, and they have different quirks on different platforms. These inconsistencies are particularly pronounced if you are transitioning from one non-root user to another.
Other
Signal handlers and spawned processes run at the privilege of the owning process, so if a process is running as root when a signal fires or a sub-process is executed, the signal handler or sub-process will operate with root privileges.
CWE-782: Exposed IOCTL with Insufficient Access Control
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Edit Custom FilterThe product implements an IOCTL with functionality that should be restricted, but it does not properly enforce access control for the IOCTL.
When an IOCTL contains privileged functionality and is exposed unnecessarily, attackers may be able to access this functionality by invoking the IOCTL. Even if the functionality is benign, if the programmer has assumed that the IOCTL would only be accessed by a trusted process, there may be little or no validation of the incoming data, exposing weaknesses that would never be reachable if the attacker cannot call the IOCTL directly. The implementations of IOCTLs will differ between operating system types and versions, so the methods of attack and prevention may vary widely. This table specifies different individual consequences
associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is
violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an
adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about
how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other
consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be
exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to
achieve a different impact.
This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this
weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to
similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition,
relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user
may want to explore.
Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
The different Modes of Introduction provide information
about how and when this
weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which
introduction
may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the
given
phase.
This listing shows possible areas for which the given
weakness could appear. These
may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms,
Technologies,
or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given
weakness appears for that instance.
Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.
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Relationship
This can be primary to many other weaknesses when the programmer assumes that the IOCTL can only be accessed by trusted parties. For example, a program or driver might not validate incoming addresses in METHOD_NEITHER IOCTLs in Windows environments (CWE-781), which could allow buffer overflow and similar attacks to take place, even when the attacker never should have been able to access the IOCTL at all.
Applicable Platform Because IOCTL functionality is typically performing low-level actions and closely interacts with the operating system, this weakness may only appear in code that is written in low-level languages.
CWE-529: Exposure of Access Control List Files to an Unauthorized Control Sphere
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Edit Custom FilterThe product stores access control list files in a directory or other container that is accessible to actors outside of the intended control sphere.
Exposure of these access control list files may give the attacker information about the configuration of the site or system. This information may then be used to bypass the intended security policy or identify trusted systems from which an attack can be launched.
This table specifies different individual consequences
associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is
violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an
adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about
how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other
consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be
exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to
achieve a different impact.
This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this
weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to
similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition,
relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user
may want to explore.
Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
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weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which
introduction
may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the
given
phase.
This listing shows possible areas for which the given
weakness could appear. These
may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms,
Technologies,
or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given
weakness appears for that instance.
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CWE-530: Exposure of Backup File to an Unauthorized Control Sphere
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Edit Custom FilterA backup file is stored in a directory or archive that is made accessible to unauthorized actors.
Often, older backup files are renamed with an extension such as .~bk to distinguish them from production files. The source code for old files that have been renamed in this manner and left in the webroot can often be retrieved. This renaming may have been performed automatically by the web server, or manually by the administrator.
This table specifies different individual consequences
associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is
violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an
adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about
how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other
consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be
exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to
achieve a different impact.
This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this
weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to
similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition,
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may want to explore.
Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
The different Modes of Introduction provide information
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weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which
introduction
may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the
given
phase.
This listing shows possible areas for which the given
weakness could appear. These
may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms,
Technologies,
or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given
weakness appears for that instance.
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CWE-528: Exposure of Core Dump File to an Unauthorized Control Sphere
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Edit Custom FilterThe product generates a core dump file in a directory, archive, or other resource that is stored, transferred, or otherwise made accessible to unauthorized actors.
This table specifies different individual consequences
associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is
violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an
adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about
how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other
consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be
exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to
achieve a different impact.
This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this
weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to
similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition,
relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user
may want to explore.
Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
The different Modes of Introduction provide information
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weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which
introduction
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given
phase.
This listing shows possible areas for which the given
weakness could appear. These
may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms,
Technologies,
or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given
weakness appears for that instance.
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CWE-488: Exposure of Data Element to Wrong Session
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Edit Custom FilterThe product does not sufficiently enforce boundaries between the states of different sessions, causing data to be provided to, or used by, the wrong session.
Data can "bleed" from one session to another through member variables of singleton objects, such as Servlets, and objects from a shared pool. In the case of Servlets, developers sometimes do not understand that, unless a Servlet implements the SingleThreadModel interface, the Servlet is a singleton; there is only one instance of the Servlet, and that single instance is used and re-used to handle multiple requests that are processed simultaneously by different threads. A common result is that developers use Servlet member fields in such a way that one user may inadvertently see another user's data. In other words, storing user data in Servlet member fields introduces a data access race condition. This table specifies different individual consequences
associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is
violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an
adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about
how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other
consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be
exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to
achieve a different impact.
This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this
weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to
similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition,
relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user
may want to explore.
Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
The different Modes of Introduction provide information
about how and when this
weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which
introduction
may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the
given
phase.
This listing shows possible areas for which the given
weakness could appear. These
may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms,
Technologies,
or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given
weakness appears for that instance.
Example 1 The following Servlet stores the value of a request parameter in a member field and then later echoes the parameter value to the response output stream. (bad code)
Example Language: Java
public class GuestBook extends HttpServlet {
String name;
protected void doPost (HttpServletRequest req, HttpServletResponse res) { name = req.getParameter("name"); }... out.println(name + ", thanks for visiting!"); While this code will work perfectly in a single-user environment, if two users access the Servlet at approximately the same time, it is possible for the two request handler threads to interleave in the following way: Thread 1: assign "Dick" to name Thread 2: assign "Jane" to name Thread 1: print "Jane, thanks for visiting!" Thread 2: print "Jane, thanks for visiting!" Thereby showing the first user the second user's name.
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CWE-403: Exposure of File Descriptor to Unintended Control Sphere ('File Descriptor Leak')
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Edit Custom FilterA process does not close sensitive file descriptors before invoking a child process, which allows the child to perform unauthorized I/O operations using those descriptors.
When a new process is forked or executed, the child process inherits any open file descriptors. When the child process has fewer privileges than the parent process, this might introduce a vulnerability if the child process can access the file descriptor but does not have the privileges to access the associated file.
This table specifies different individual consequences
associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is
violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an
adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about
how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other
consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be
exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to
achieve a different impact.
This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this
weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to
similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition,
relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user
may want to explore.
Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
The different Modes of Introduction provide information
about how and when this
weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which
introduction
may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the
given
phase.
This listing shows possible areas for which the given
weakness could appear. These
may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms,
Technologies,
or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given
weakness appears for that instance.
Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.
This MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that
reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a
weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
CWE-359: Exposure of Private Personal Information to an Unauthorized Actor
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This table specifies different individual consequences
associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is
violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an
adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about
how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other
consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be
exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to
achieve a different impact.
This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this
weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to
similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition,
relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user
may want to explore.
Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
The different Modes of Introduction provide information
about how and when this
weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which
introduction
may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the
given
phase.
This listing shows possible areas for which the given
weakness could appear. These
may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms,
Technologies,
or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given
weakness appears for that instance.
Example 1 The following code contains a logging statement that tracks the contents of records added to a database by storing them in a log file. Among other values that are stored, the getPassword() function returns the user-supplied plaintext password associated with the account. (bad code)
Example Language: C#
pass = GetPassword();
... dbmsLog.WriteLine(id + ":" + pass + ":" + type + ":" + tstamp); The code in the example above logs a plaintext password to the filesystem. Although many developers trust the filesystem as a safe storage location for data, it should not be trusted implicitly, particularly when privacy is a concern. Example 2 This code uses location to determine the user's current US State location. First the application must declare that it requires the ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION permission in the application's manifest.xml: (bad code)
Example Language: XML
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION"/>
During execution, a call to getLastLocation() will return a location based on the application's location permissions. In this case the application has permission for the most accurate location possible: (bad code)
Example Language: Java
locationClient = new LocationClient(this, this, this);
locationClient.connect(); Location userCurrLocation; userCurrLocation = locationClient.getLastLocation(); deriveStateFromCoords(userCurrLocation); While the application needs this information, it does not need to use the ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION permission, as the ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION permission will be sufficient to identify which US state the user is in. Example 3 In 2004, an employee at AOL sold approximately 92 million private customer e-mail addresses to a spammer marketing an offshore gambling web site [REF-338]. In response to such high-profile exploits, the collection and management of private data is becoming increasingly regulated. Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.
This MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that
reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a
weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Other There are many types of sensitive information that products must protect from attackers, including system data, communications, configuration, business secrets, intellectual property, and an individual's personal (private) information. Private personal information (PPI) may include a password, phone number, geographic location, personal messages, credit card number, etc. Private information is important to consider whether the person is a user of the product, or part of a data set that is processed by the product. An exposure of private information does not necessarily prevent the product from working properly, and in fact the exposure might be intended by the developer, e.g. as part of data sharing with other organizations. However, the exposure of personal private information can still be undesirable or explicitly prohibited by law or regulation. Some types of private information include:
Some of this information may be characterized as PII (Personally Identifiable Information), Protected Health Information (PHI), etc. Categories of private information may overlap or vary based on the intended usage or the policies and practices of a particular industry. Sometimes data that is not labeled as private can have a privacy implication in a different context. For example, student identification numbers are usually not considered private because there is no explicit and publicly-available mapping to an individual student's personal information. However, if a school generates identification numbers based on student social security numbers, then the identification numbers should be considered private. Maintenance
This entry overlaps many other
entries that are not organized around the kind of
sensitive information that is exposed, such as CWE-212:
Improper Removal of Sensitive Information Before Storage
or Transfer. However, because privacy is treated with
such importance due to regulations and other factors, and
it may be useful for weakness-finding tools to highlight
capabilities that detect personal private information
instead of system information, it is not clear whether -
or how - this entry should be deprecated.
CWE-668: Exposure of Resource to Wrong Sphere
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Edit Custom FilterThe product exposes a resource to the wrong control sphere, providing unintended actors with inappropriate access to the resource.
Resources such as files and directories may be inadvertently exposed through mechanisms such as insecure permissions, or when a program accidentally operates on the wrong object. For example, a program may intend that private files can only be provided to a specific user. This effectively defines a control sphere that is intended to prevent attackers from accessing these private files. If the file permissions are insecure, then parties other than the user will be able to access those files. A separate control sphere might effectively require that the user can only access the private files, but not any other files on the system. If the program does not ensure that the user is only requesting private files, then the user might be able to access other files on the system. In either case, the end result is that a resource has been exposed to the wrong party. This table specifies different individual consequences
associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is
violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an
adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about
how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other
consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be
exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to
achieve a different impact.
This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this
weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to
similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition,
relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user
may want to explore.
Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
The different Modes of Introduction provide information
about how and when this
weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which
introduction
may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the
given
phase.
This listing shows possible areas for which the given
weakness could appear. These
may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms,
Technologies,
or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given
weakness appears for that instance.
This MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that
reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a
weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Theoretical
A "control sphere" is a set of resources and behaviors that are accessible to a single actor, or a group of actors. A product's security model will typically define multiple spheres, possibly implicitly. For example, a server might define one sphere for "administrators" who can create new user accounts with subdirectories under /home/server/, and a second sphere might cover the set of users who can create or delete files within their own subdirectories. A third sphere might be "users who are authenticated to the operating system on which the product is installed." Each sphere has different sets of actors and allowable behaviors.
CWE-527: Exposure of Version-Control Repository to an Unauthorized Control Sphere
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Edit Custom FilterThe product stores a CVS, git, or other repository in a directory, archive, or other resource that is stored, transferred, or otherwise made accessible to unauthorized actors.
Version control repositories such as CVS or git store version-specific metadata and other details within subdirectories. If these subdirectories are stored on a web server or added to an archive, then these could be used by an attacker. This information may include usernames, filenames, path root, IP addresses, and detailed "diff" data about how files have been changed - which could reveal source code snippets that were never intended to be made public.
This table specifies different individual consequences
associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is
violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an
adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about
how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other
consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be
exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to
achieve a different impact.
This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this
weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to
similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition,
relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user
may want to explore.
Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
The different Modes of Introduction provide information
about how and when this
weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which
introduction
may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the
given
phase.
This listing shows possible areas for which the given
weakness could appear. These
may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms,
Technologies,
or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given
weakness appears for that instance.
This MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that
reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a
weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
CWE-472: External Control of Assumed-Immutable Web Parameter
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Edit Custom FilterThe web application does not sufficiently verify inputs that are assumed to be immutable but are actually externally controllable, such as hidden form fields.
If a web product does not properly protect assumed-immutable values from modification in hidden form fields, parameters, cookies, or URLs, this can lead to modification of critical data. Web applications often mistakenly make the assumption that data passed to the client in hidden fields or cookies is not susceptible to tampering. Improper validation of data that are user-controllable can lead to the application processing incorrect, and often malicious, input. For example, custom cookies commonly store session data or persistent data across sessions. This kind of session data is normally involved in security related decisions on the server side, such as user authentication and access control. Thus, the cookies might contain sensitive data such as user credentials and privileges. This is a dangerous practice, as it can often lead to improper reliance on the value of the client-provided cookie by the server side application. This table specifies different individual consequences
associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is
violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an
adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about
how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other
consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be
exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to
achieve a different impact.
This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this
weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to
similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition,
relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user
may want to explore.
Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
The different Modes of Introduction provide information
about how and when this
weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which
introduction
may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the
given
phase.
This listing shows possible areas for which the given
weakness could appear. These
may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms,
Technologies,
or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given
weakness appears for that instance.
Example 1 In this example, a web application uses the value of a hidden form field (accountID) without having done any input validation because it was assumed to be immutable. (bad code)
Example Language: Java
String accountID = request.getParameter("accountID");
User user = getUserFromID(Long.parseLong(accountID)); Example 2 Hidden fields should not be trusted as secure parameters. An attacker can intercept and alter hidden fields in a post to the server as easily as user input fields. An attacker can simply parse the HTML for the substring: (bad code)
Example Language: HTML
<input type="hidden"
or even just "hidden". Hidden field values displayed later in the session, such as on the following page, can open a site up to cross-site scripting attacks. Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.
This MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that
reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a
weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Relationship
This is a primary weakness for many other weaknesses and functional consequences, including XSS, SQL injection, path disclosure, and file inclusion.
Theoretical
This is a technology-specific MAID problem.
CWE-642: External Control of Critical State Data
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Edit Custom FilterThe product stores security-critical state information about its users, or the product itself, in a location that is accessible to unauthorized actors.
If an attacker can modify the state information without detection, then it could be used to perform unauthorized actions or access unexpected resources, since the application programmer does not expect that the state can be changed. State information can be stored in various locations such as a cookie, in a hidden web form field, input parameter or argument, an environment variable, a database record, within a settings file, etc. All of these locations have the potential to be modified by an attacker. When this state information is used to control security or determine resource usage, then it may create a vulnerability. For example, an application may perform authentication, then save the state in an "authenticated=true" cookie. An attacker may simply create this cookie in order to bypass the authentication. This table specifies different individual consequences
associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is
violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an
adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about
how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other
consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be
exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to
achieve a different impact.
This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this
weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to
similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition,
relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user
may want to explore.
Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
The different Modes of Introduction provide information
about how and when this
weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which
introduction
may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the
given
phase.
This listing shows possible areas for which the given
weakness could appear. These
may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms,
Technologies,
or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given
weakness appears for that instance.
Example 1 In the following example, an authentication flag is read from a browser cookie, thus allowing for external control of user state data. (bad code)
Example Language: Java
Cookie[] cookies = request.getCookies();
for (int i =0; i< cookies.length; i++) { Cookie c = cookies[i]; }if (c.getName().equals("authenticated") && Boolean.TRUE.equals(c.getValue())) { authenticated = true; }Example 2 The following code uses input from an HTTP request to create a file name. The programmer has not considered the possibility that an attacker could provide a file name such as "../../tomcat/conf/server.xml", which causes the application to delete one of its own configuration files (CWE-22). (bad code)
Example Language: Java
String rName = request.getParameter("reportName");
File rFile = new File("/usr/local/apfr/reports/" + rName); ... rFile.delete(); Example 3 The following code uses input from a configuration file to determine which file to open and echo back to the user. If the program runs with privileges and malicious users can change the configuration file, they can use the program to read any file on the system that ends with the extension .txt. (bad code)
Example Language: Java
fis = new FileInputStream(cfg.getProperty("sub")+".txt");
amt = fis.read(arr); out.println(arr); Example 4 This program is intended to execute a command that lists the contents of a restricted directory, then performs other actions. Assume that it runs with setuid privileges in order to bypass the permissions check by the operating system. (bad code)
Example Language: C
#define DIR "/restricted/directory"
char cmd[500]; sprintf(cmd, "ls -l %480s", DIR); /* Raise privileges to those needed for accessing DIR. */ RaisePrivileges(...); system(cmd); DropPrivileges(...); ... This code may look harmless at first, since both the directory and the command are set to fixed values that the attacker can't control. The attacker can only see the contents for DIR, which is the intended program behavior. Finally, the programmer is also careful to limit the code that executes with raised privileges. However, because the program does not modify the PATH environment variable, the following attack would work: (attack code)
Example 5 The following code segment implements a basic server that uses the "ls" program to perform a directory listing of the directory that is listed in the "HOMEDIR" environment variable. The code intends to allow the user to specify an alternate "LANG" environment variable. This causes "ls" to customize its output based on a given language, which is an important capability when supporting internationalization. (bad code)
Example Language: Perl
$ENV{"HOMEDIR"} = "/home/mydir/public/";
my $stream = AcceptUntrustedInputStream(); while (<$stream>) { chomp;
if (/^ENV ([\w\_]+) (.*)/) { $ENV{$1} = $2; }elsif (/^QUIT/) { ... } elsif (/^LIST/) { open($fh, "/bin/ls -l $ENV{HOMEDIR}|"); }while (<$fh>) { SendOutput($stream, "FILEINFO: $_"); }close($fh); The programmer takes care to call a specific "ls" program and sets the HOMEDIR to a fixed value. However, an attacker can use a command such as "ENV HOMEDIR /secret/directory" to specify an alternate directory, enabling a path traversal attack (CWE-22). At the same time, other attacks are enabled as well, such as OS command injection (CWE-78) by setting HOMEDIR to a value such as "/tmp; rm -rf /". In this case, the programmer never intends for HOMEDIR to be modified, so input validation for HOMEDIR is not the solution. A partial solution would be an allowlist that only allows the LANG variable to be specified in the ENV command. Alternately, assuming this is an authenticated user, the language could be stored in a local file so that no ENV command at all would be needed. While this example may not appear realistic, this type of problem shows up in code fairly frequently. See CVE-1999-0073 in the observed examples for a real-world example with similar behaviors. Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.
This MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that
reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a
weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
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