CWE

Common Weakness Enumeration

A community-developed list of SW & HW weaknesses that can become vulnerabilities

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Home > CWE List > VIEW SLICE: CWE-884: CWE Cross-section (4.19.1)  
ID

CWE VIEW: CWE Cross-section

View ID: 884
Vulnerability Mapping: PROHIBITED This CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Type: Explicit
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+ Objective
This view contains a selection of weaknesses that represent the variety of weaknesses that are captured in CWE, at a level of abstraction that is likely to be useful to most audiences. It can be used by researchers to determine how broad their theories, models, or tools are. It will also be used by the CWE content team in 2012 to focus quality improvement efforts for individual CWE entries.
+ Membership
Nature Type ID Name
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 14 Compiler Removal of Code to Clear Buffers
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 22 Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 23 Relative Path Traversal
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 36 Absolute Path Traversal
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 41 Improper Resolution of Path Equivalence
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 59 Improper Link Resolution Before File Access ('Link Following')
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 78 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 79 Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 88 Improper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command ('Argument Injection')
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 89 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 90 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an LDAP Query ('LDAP Injection')
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 94 Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 95 Improper Neutralization of Directives in Dynamically Evaluated Code ('Eval Injection')
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 96 Improper Neutralization of Directives in Statically Saved Code ('Static Code Injection')
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 99 Improper Control of Resource Identifiers ('Resource Injection')
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 113 Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences in HTTP Headers ('HTTP Request/Response Splitting')
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 117 Improper Output Neutralization for Logs
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 120 Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input ('Classic Buffer Overflow')
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 129 Improper Validation of Array Index
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 131 Incorrect Calculation of Buffer Size
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 134 Use of Externally-Controlled Format String
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 135 Incorrect Calculation of Multi-Byte String Length
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 170 Improper Null Termination
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 173 Improper Handling of Alternate Encoding
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 174 Double Decoding of the Same Data
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 175 Improper Handling of Mixed Encoding
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 179 Incorrect Behavior Order: Early Validation
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 185 Incorrect Regular Expression
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 190 Integer Overflow or Wraparound
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 191 Integer Underflow (Wrap or Wraparound)
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 193 Off-by-one Error
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 203 Observable Discrepancy
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 209 Generation of Error Message Containing Sensitive Information
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 212 Improper Removal of Sensitive Information Before Storage or Transfer
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 222 Truncation of Security-relevant Information
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 223 Omission of Security-relevant Information
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 228 Improper Handling of Syntactically Invalid Structure
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 244 Improper Clearing of Heap Memory Before Release ('Heap Inspection')
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 248 Uncaught Exception
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 250 Execution with Unnecessary Privileges
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 252 Unchecked Return Value
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 253 Incorrect Check of Function Return Value
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 262 Not Using Password Aging
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 263 Password Aging with Long Expiration
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 266 Incorrect Privilege Assignment
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 267 Privilege Defined With Unsafe Actions
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 268 Privilege Chaining
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 270 Privilege Context Switching Error
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 271 Privilege Dropping / Lowering Errors
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 273 Improper Check for Dropped Privileges
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 283 Unverified Ownership
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 290 Authentication Bypass by Spoofing
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 294 Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 296 Improper Following of a Certificate's Chain of Trust
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 299 Improper Check for Certificate Revocation
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 300 Channel Accessible by Non-Endpoint
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 301 Reflection Attack in an Authentication Protocol
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 304 Missing Critical Step in Authentication
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 306 Missing Authentication for Critical Function
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 307 Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 308 Use of Single-factor Authentication
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 312 Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 319 Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 322 Key Exchange without Entity Authentication
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 323 Reusing a Nonce, Key Pair in Encryption
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 325 Missing Cryptographic Step
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 327 Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 331 Insufficient Entropy
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 334 Small Space of Random Values
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 335 Incorrect Usage of Seeds in Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG)
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 338 Use of Cryptographically Weak Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG)
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 341 Predictable from Observable State
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 347 Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 348 Use of Less Trusted Source
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 349 Acceptance of Extraneous Untrusted Data With Trusted Data
HasMember CompositeComposite - a Compound Element that consists of two or more distinct weaknesses, in which all weaknesses must be present at the same time in order for a potential vulnerability to arise. Removing any of the weaknesses eliminates or sharply reduces the risk. One weakness, X, can be "broken down" into component weaknesses Y and Z. There can be cases in which one weakness might not be essential to a composite, but changes the nature of the composite when it becomes a vulnerability. 352 Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 353 Missing Support for Integrity Check
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 354 Improper Validation of Integrity Check Value
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 364 Signal Handler Race Condition
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 367 Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 369 Divide By Zero
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 390 Detection of Error Condition Without Action
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 392 Missing Report of Error Condition
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 393 Return of Wrong Status Code
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 400 Uncontrolled Resource Consumption
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 406 Insufficient Control of Network Message Volume (Network Amplification)
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 407 Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 408 Incorrect Behavior Order: Early Amplification
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 409 Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification)
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 434 Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 444 Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling')
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 451 User Interface (UI) Misrepresentation of Critical Information
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 453 Insecure Default Variable Initialization
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 454 External Initialization of Trusted Variables or Data Stores
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 455 Non-exit on Failed Initialization
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 456 Missing Initialization of a Variable
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 467 Use of sizeof() on a Pointer Type
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 468 Incorrect Pointer Scaling
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 469 Use of Pointer Subtraction to Determine Size
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 470 Use of Externally-Controlled Input to Select Classes or Code ('Unsafe Reflection')
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 476 NULL Pointer Dereference
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 478 Missing Default Case in Multiple Condition Expression
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 480 Use of Incorrect Operator
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 483 Incorrect Block Delimitation
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 484 Omitted Break Statement in Switch
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 486 Comparison of Classes by Name
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 494 Download of Code Without Integrity Check
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 495 Private Data Structure Returned From A Public Method
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 496 Public Data Assigned to Private Array-Typed Field
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 498 Cloneable Class Containing Sensitive Information
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 499 Serializable Class Containing Sensitive Data
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 502 Deserialization of Untrusted Data
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 521 Weak Password Requirements
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 522 Insufficiently Protected Credentials
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 546 Suspicious Comment
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 547 Use of Hard-coded, Security-relevant Constants
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 561 Dead Code
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 563 Assignment to Variable without Use
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 567 Unsynchronized Access to Shared Data in a Multithreaded Context
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 587 Assignment of a Fixed Address to a Pointer
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 595 Comparison of Object References Instead of Object Contents
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 601 URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 602 Client-Side Enforcement of Server-Side Security
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 605 Multiple Binds to the Same Port
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 617 Reachable Assertion
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 621 Variable Extraction Error
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 627 Dynamic Variable Evaluation
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 628 Function Call with Incorrectly Specified Arguments
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 642 External Control of Critical State Data
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 648 Incorrect Use of Privileged APIs
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 667 Improper Locking
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 672 Operation on a Resource after Expiration or Release
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 674 Uncontrolled Recursion
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 676 Use of Potentially Dangerous Function
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 681 Incorrect Conversion between Numeric Types
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 698 Execution After Redirect (EAR)
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 708 Incorrect Ownership Assignment
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 732 Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 756 Missing Custom Error Page
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 763 Release of Invalid Pointer or Reference
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 770 Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 772 Missing Release of Resource after Effective Lifetime
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 783 Operator Precedence Logic Error
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 786 Access of Memory Location Before Start of Buffer
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 788 Access of Memory Location After End of Buffer
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 798 Use of Hard-coded Credentials
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 805 Buffer Access with Incorrect Length Value
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 807 Reliance on Untrusted Inputs in a Security Decision
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 822 Untrusted Pointer Dereference
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 825 Expired Pointer Dereference
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 829 Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 835 Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop')
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 838 Inappropriate Encoding for Output Context
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 839 Numeric Range Comparison Without Minimum Check
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 841 Improper Enforcement of Behavioral Workflow
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 862 Missing Authorization
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 863 Incorrect Authorization
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes

Usage: PROHIBITED

(this CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)

Reason: View

Rationale:

This entry is a View. Views are not weaknesses and therefore inappropriate to describe the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments:

Use this View or other Views to search and navigate for the appropriate weakness.
+ View Metrics
CWEs in this view Total CWEs
Weaknesses 157 out of 944
Categories 0 out of 385
Views 0 out of 54
Total 157 out of 1383
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2011-12-15
(CWE 2.2, 2012-05-14)
CWE Content Team MITRE
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2017-05-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes

View Components

A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z

CWE-36: Absolute Path Traversal

Weakness ID: 36
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that should be within a restricted directory, but it does not properly neutralize absolute path sequences such as "/abs/path" that can resolve to a location that is outside of that directory.
+ Extended Description
This allows attackers to traverse the file system to access files or directories that are outside of the restricted directory.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands

Scope: Integrity, Confidentiality, Availability

The attacker may be able to create or overwrite critical files that are used to execute code, such as programs or libraries.

Modify Files or Directories

Scope: Integrity

The attacker may be able to overwrite or create critical files, such as programs, libraries, or important data. If the targeted file is used for a security mechanism, then the attacker may be able to bypass that mechanism. For example, appending a new account at the end of a password file may allow an attacker to bypass authentication.

Read Files or Directories

Scope: Confidentiality

The attacker may be able read the contents of unexpected files and expose sensitive data. If the targeted file is used for a security mechanism, then the attacker may be able to bypass that mechanism. For example, by reading a password file, the attacker could conduct brute force password guessing attacks in order to break into an account on the system.

DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart

Scope: Availability

The attacker may be able to overwrite, delete, or corrupt unexpected critical files such as programs, libraries, or important data. This may prevent the product from working at all and in the case of a protection mechanisms such as authentication, it has the potential to lockout every user of the product.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.

When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."

Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.

When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.

Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.

Effectiveness: High

Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.

Operation

Strategy: Firewall

Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].

Effectiveness: Moderate

Note: An application firewall might not cover all possible input vectors. In addition, attack techniques might be available to bypass the protection mechanism, such as using malformed inputs that can still be processed by the component that receives those inputs. Depending on functionality, an application firewall might inadvertently reject or modify legitimate requests. Finally, some manual effort may be required for customization.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 22 Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 37 Path Traversal: '/absolute/pathname/here'
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 38 Path Traversal: '\absolute\pathname\here'
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 39 Path Traversal: 'C:dirname'
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 40 Path Traversal: '\\UNC\share\name\' (Windows UNC Share)
+ Relevant to the view "CISQ Quality Measures (2020)" (View-1305)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 22 Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
+ Relevant to the view "CISQ Data Protection Measures" (View-1340)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 22 Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Class: Web Based (Undetermined Prevalence)

AI/ML (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


In the example below, the path to a dictionary file is read from a system property and used to initialize a File object.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
String filename = System.getProperty("com.domain.application.dictionaryFile");
File dictionaryFile = new File(filename);

However, the path is not validated or modified to prevent it from containing relative or absolute path sequences before creating the File object. This allows anyone who can control the system property to determine what file is used. Ideally, the path should be resolved relative to some kind of application or user home directory.



Example 2


This script intends to read a user-supplied file from the current directory. The user inputs the relative path to the file and the script uses Python's os.path.join() function to combine the path to the current working directory with the provided path to the specified file. This results in an absolute path to the desired file. If the file does not exist when the script attempts to read it, an error is printed to the user.

(bad code)
Example Language: Python 
import os
import sys
def main():
filename = sys.argv[1]
path = os.path.join(os.getcwd(), filename)
try:
with open(path, 'r') as f:
file_data = f.read()
except FileNotFoundError as e:
print("Error - file not found")
main()

However, if the user supplies an absolute path, the os.path.join() function will discard the path to the current working directory and use only the absolute path provided. For example, if the current working directory is /home/user/documents, but the user inputs /etc/passwd, os.path.join() will use only /etc/passwd, as it is considered an absolute path. In the above scenario, this would cause the script to access and read the /etc/passwd file.

(good code)
Example Language: Python 
import os
import sys
def main():
filename = sys.argv[1]
path = os.path.normpath(f"{os.getcwd()}{os.sep}{filename}")
if path.startswith("/home/cwe/documents/"):
try:
with open(path, 'r') as f:
file_data = f.read()
except FileNotFoundError as e:
print("Error - file not found")
main()

The constructed path string uses os.sep to add the appropriate separation character for the given operating system (e.g. '\' or '/') and the call to os.path.normpath() removes any additional slashes that may have been entered - this may occur particularly when using a Windows path. The path is checked against an expected directory (/home/cwe/documents); otherwise, an attacker could provide relative path sequences like ".." to cause normpath() to generate paths that are outside the intended directory (CWE-23). By putting the pieces of the path string together in this fashion, the script avoids a call to os.path.join() and any potential issues that might arise if an absolute path is entered. With this version of the script, if the current working directory is /home/cwe/documents, and the user inputs /etc/passwd, the resulting path will be /home/cwe/documents/etc/passwd. The user is therefore contained within the current working directory as intended.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Product for managing datasets for AI model training and evaluation allows both relative (CWE-23) and absolute (CWE-36) path traversal to overwrite files via the Content-Disposition header
Python package constructs filenames using an unsafe os.path.join call on untrusted input, allowing absolute path traversal because os.path.join resets the pathname to an absolute path that is specified as part of the input.
Multiple FTP clients write arbitrary files via absolute paths in server responses
ZIP file extractor allows full path
Path traversal using absolute pathname
Path traversal using absolute pathname
Path traversal using absolute pathname
Arbitrary files may be overwritten via compressed attachments that specify absolute path names for the decompressed output.
Mail client allows remote attackers to overwrite arbitrary files via an e-mail message containing a uuencoded attachment that specifies the full pathname for the file to be modified.
Remote attackers can read arbitrary files via a full pathname to the target file in config parameter.
Remote attackers can read arbitrary files via an absolute pathname.
Remote attackers can read arbitrary files by specifying the drive letter in the requested URL.
FTP server allows remote attackers to list arbitrary directories by using the "ls" command and including the drive letter name (e.g. C:) in the requested pathname.
FTP server allows remote attackers to list the contents of arbitrary drives via a ls command that includes the drive letter as an argument.
Server allows remote attackers to browse arbitrary directories via a full pathname in the arguments to certain dynamic pages.
Remote attackers can read arbitrary files via an HTTP request whose argument is a filename of the form "C:" (Drive letter), "//absolute/path", or ".." .
FTP server read/access arbitrary files using "C:\" filenames
FTP server allows a remote attacker to retrieve privileged web server system information by specifying arbitrary paths in the UNC format (\\computername\sharename).
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Effectiveness: High

+ Functional Areas
  • File Processing
+ Affected Resources
  • File or Directory
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 981 SFP Secondary Cluster: Path Traversal
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1404 Comprehensive Categorization: File Handling
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1436 OWASP Top Ten 2025 Category A01:2025 - Broken Access Control
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
PLOVER Absolute Path Traversal
Software Fault Patterns SFP16 Path Traversal
+ References
[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 9, "Filenames and Paths", Page 503. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
[REF-1448] Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. "Secure by Design Alert: Eliminating Directory Traversal Vulnerabilities in Software". 2024-05-02.
<https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/secure-design-alert-eliminating-directory-traversal-vulnerabilities-software>. (URL validated: 2024-07-14)
[REF-1481] D3FEND. "D3FEND: Application Layer Firewall".
<https://d3fend.mitre.org/dao/artifact/d3f:ApplicationLayerFirewall/>. (URL validated: 2025-09-06)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
PLOVER
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities
2025-09-09
(CWE 4.18, 2025-09-09)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Affected_Resources, Applicable_Platforms, Functional_Areas, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References
2024-11-19
(CWE 4.16, 2024-11-19)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2024-07-16
(CWE 4.15, 2024-07-16)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Detection_Factors, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Description
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2021-03-15 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2020-12-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-08-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms
2017-01-19 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, References, Relationships
2011-09-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2010-06-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description
2010-02-16 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2008-10-14 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
2008-07-01 Sean Eidemiller Cigital
added/updated demonstrative examples

CWE-349: Acceptance of Extraneous Untrusted Data With Trusted Data

Weakness ID: 349
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
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+ Description
The product, when processing trusted data, accepts any untrusted data that is also included with the trusted data, treating the untrusted data as if it were trusted.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Bypass Protection Mechanism; Modify Application Data

Scope: Access Control, Integrity

An attacker could package untrusted data with trusted data to bypass protection mechanisms to gain access to and possibly modify sensitive data.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 345 Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
PeerOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 501 Trust Boundary Violation
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1214 Data Integrity Issues
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1019 Validate Inputs
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Does not verify that trusted entity is authoritative for all entities in its response.
use of extra data in a signature allows certificate signature forging
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 860 The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) Chapter 17 - Runtime Environment (ENV)
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 977 SFP Secondary Cluster: Design
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1150 SEI CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java - Guidelines 16. Runtime Environment (ENV)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1365 ICS Communications: Unreliability
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1366 ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1373 ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Trust Model Problems
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1411 Comprehensive Categorization: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
PLOVER Untrusted Data Appended with Trusted Data
The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) ENV01-J Place all security-sensitive code in a single JAR and sign and seal it
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
PLOVER
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2022-04-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-06-25 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2008-04-11 Untrusted Data Appended with Trusted Data

CWE-788: Access of Memory Location After End of Buffer

Weakness ID: 788
Vulnerability Mapping: DISCOURAGED This CWE ID should not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
The product reads or writes to a buffer using an index or pointer that references a memory location after the end of the buffer.
+ Extended Description
This typically occurs when a pointer or its index is incremented to a position after the buffer; or when pointer arithmetic results in a position after the buffer.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Read Memory

Scope: Confidentiality

For an out-of-bounds read, the attacker may have access to sensitive information. If the sensitive information contains system details, such as the current buffer's position in memory, this knowledge can be used to craft further attacks, possibly with more severe consequences.

Modify Memory; DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart

Scope: Integrity, Availability

Out of bounds memory access will very likely result in the corruption of relevant memory, and perhaps instructions, possibly leading to a crash. Other attacks leading to lack of availability are possible, including putting the program into an infinite loop.

Modify Memory; Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands

Scope: Integrity

If the memory accessible by the attacker can be effectively controlled, it may be possible to execute arbitrary code, as with a standard buffer overflow. If the attacker can overwrite a pointer's worth of memory (usually 32 or 64 bits), they can redirect a function pointer to their own malicious code. Even when the attacker can only modify a single byte arbitrary code execution can be possible. Sometimes this is because the same problem can be exploited repeatedly to the same effect. Other times it is because the attacker can overwrite security-critical application-specific data -- such as a flag indicating whether the user is an administrator.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 121 Stack-based Buffer Overflow
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 122 Heap-based Buffer Overflow
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 126 Buffer Over-read
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1218 Memory Buffer Errors
+ Relevant to the view "CISQ Quality Measures (2020)" (View-1305)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
+ Relevant to the view "CISQ Data Protection Measures" (View-1340)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Memory-Unsafe (Undetermined Prevalence)

C (Often Prevalent)

C++ (Often Prevalent)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


This example takes an IP address from a user, verifies that it is well formed and then looks up the hostname and copies it into a buffer.

(bad code)
Example Language:
void host_lookup(char *user_supplied_addr){
struct hostent *hp;
in_addr_t *addr;
char hostname[64];
in_addr_t inet_addr(const char *cp);

/*routine that ensures user_supplied_addr is in the right format for conversion */

validate_addr_form(user_supplied_addr);
addr = inet_addr(user_supplied_addr);
hp = gethostbyaddr( addr, sizeof(struct in_addr), AF_INET);
strcpy(hostname, hp->h_name);
}

This function allocates a buffer of 64 bytes to store the hostname, however there is no guarantee that the hostname will not be larger than 64 bytes. If an attacker specifies an address which resolves to a very large hostname, then the function may overwrite sensitive data or even relinquish control flow to the attacker.

Note that this example also contains an unchecked return value (CWE-252) that can lead to a NULL pointer dereference (CWE-476).



Example 2


In the following example, it is possible to request that memcpy move a much larger segment of memory than assumed:

(bad code)
Example Language:
int returnChunkSize(void *) {

/* if chunk info is valid, return the size of usable memory,

* else, return -1 to indicate an error

*/
...
}
int main() {
...
memcpy(destBuf, srcBuf, (returnChunkSize(destBuf)-1));
...
}

If returnChunkSize() happens to encounter an error it will return -1. Notice that the return value is not checked before the memcpy operation (CWE-252), so -1 can be passed as the size argument to memcpy() (CWE-805). Because memcpy() assumes that the value is unsigned, it will be interpreted as MAXINT-1 (CWE-195), and therefore will copy far more memory than is likely available to the destination buffer (CWE-787, CWE-788).



Example 3


This example applies an encoding procedure to an input string and stores it into a buffer.

(bad code)
Example Language:
char * copy_input(char *user_supplied_string){
int i, dst_index;
char *dst_buf = (char*)malloc(4*sizeof(char) * MAX_SIZE);
if ( MAX_SIZE <= strlen(user_supplied_string) ){
die("user string too long, die evil hacker!");
}
dst_index = 0;
for ( i = 0; i < strlen(user_supplied_string); i++ ){
if( '&' == user_supplied_string[i] ){
dst_buf[dst_index++] = '&';
dst_buf[dst_index++] = 'a';
dst_buf[dst_index++] = 'm';
dst_buf[dst_index++] = 'p';
dst_buf[dst_index++] = ';';
}
else if ('<' == user_supplied_string[i] ){

/* encode to &lt; */
}
else dst_buf[dst_index++] = user_supplied_string[i];
}
return dst_buf;
}

The programmer attempts to encode the ampersand character in the user-controlled string, however the length of the string is validated before the encoding procedure is applied. Furthermore, the programmer assumes encoding expansion will only expand a given character by a factor of 4, while the encoding of the ampersand expands by 5. As a result, when the encoding procedure expands the string it is possible to overflow the destination buffer if the attacker provides a string of many ampersands.



Example 4


In the following C/C++ example the method processMessageFromSocket() will get a message from a socket, placed into a buffer, and will parse the contents of the buffer into a structure that contains the message length and the message body. A for loop is used to copy the message body into a local character string which will be passed to another method for processing.

(bad code)
Example Language:
int processMessageFromSocket(int socket) {
int success;

char buffer[BUFFER_SIZE];
char message[MESSAGE_SIZE];

// get message from socket and store into buffer

//Ignoring possibliity that buffer > BUFFER_SIZE
if (getMessage(socket, buffer, BUFFER_SIZE) > 0) {

// place contents of the buffer into message structure
ExMessage *msg = recastBuffer(buffer);

// copy message body into string for processing
int index;
for (index = 0; index < msg->msgLength; index++) {
message[index] = msg->msgBody[index];
}
message[index] = '\0';

// process message
success = processMessage(message);
}
return success;
}

However, the message length variable (msgLength) from the structure is used as the condition for ending the for loop without validating that msgLength accurately reflects the actual length of the message body (CWE-606). If msgLength indicates a length that is longer than the size of a message body (CWE-130), then this can result in a buffer over-read by reading past the end of the buffer (CWE-126).



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Classic stack-based buffer overflow in media player using a long entry in a playlist
Heap-based buffer overflow in media player using a long entry in a playlist
large precision value in a format string triggers overflow
attacker-controlled array index leads to code execution
OS kernel trusts userland-supplied length value, allowing reading of sensitive information
Chain: integer signedness error (CWE-195) passes signed comparison, leading to heap overflow (CWE-122)
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Resultant
(where the weakness is typically related to the presence of some other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Fuzzing

Fuzz testing (fuzzing) is a powerful technique for generating large numbers of diverse inputs - either randomly or algorithmically - and dynamically invoking the code with those inputs. Even with random inputs, it is often capable of generating unexpected results such as crashes, memory corruption, or resource consumption. Fuzzing effectively produces repeatable test cases that clearly indicate bugs, which helps developers to diagnose the issues.

Effectiveness: High

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Effectiveness: High

Automated Dynamic Analysis

Use tools that are integrated during compilation to insert runtime error-checking mechanisms related to memory safety errors, such as AddressSanitizer (ASan) for C/C++ [REF-1518].

Effectiveness: Moderate

Note:Crafted inputs are necessary to reach the code containing the error, such as generated by fuzzers. Also, these tools may reduce performance, and they only report the error condition - not the original mistake that led to the error.
+ Functional Areas
  • Memory Management
+ Affected Resources
  • Memory
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1129 CISQ Quality Measures (2016) - Reliability
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1399 Comprehensive Categorization: Memory Safety
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage DISCOURAGED
(this CWE ID should not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reasons Potential Deprecation, Frequent Misuse

Rationale

The CWE entry might be misused when lower-level CWE entries might be available. It also overlaps existing CWE entries and might be deprecated in the future.

Comments

If the "Access" operation is known to be a read or a write, then investigate children of entries such as CWE-787: Out-of-bounds Write and CWE-125: Out-of-bounds Read.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
OMG ASCRM ASCRM-CWE-788
+ References
[REF-961] Object Management Group (OMG). "Automated Source Code Reliability Measure (ASCRM)". ASCRM-CWE-788. 2016-01.
<http://www.omg.org/spec/ASCRM/1.0/>.
[REF-1518] "AddressSanitizer".
<https://clang.llvm.org/docs/AddressSanitizer.html>. (URL validated: 2025-12-10)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2009-10-21
(CWE 1.6, 2009-10-29)
CWE Content Team MITRE
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2022-02-23 Eric Constantin Brinz GENIA-SEC IT-Sicherheitsmanagement GmbH
Suggested corrections to extended description.
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Detection_Factors, References, Time_of_Introduction, Weakness_Ordinalities
2025-09-09
(CWE 4.18, 2025-09-09)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Affected_Resources, Demonstrative_Examples, Functional_Areas
2025-04-03
(CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms
2024-07-16
(CWE 4.15, 2024-07-16)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2022-04-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2021-07-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2020-12-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-08-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-06-25 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples
2017-05-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2015-12-07 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2014-06-23 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2013-02-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences

CWE-786: Access of Memory Location Before Start of Buffer

Weakness ID: 786
Vulnerability Mapping: DISCOURAGED This CWE ID should not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
×

Edit Custom Filter


+ Description
The product reads or writes to a buffer using an index or pointer that references a memory location prior to the beginning of the buffer.
+ Extended Description
This typically occurs when a pointer or its index is decremented to a position before the buffer, when pointer arithmetic results in a position before the beginning of the valid memory location, or when a negative index is used.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Read Memory

Scope: Confidentiality

For an out-of-bounds read, the attacker may have access to sensitive information. If the sensitive information contains system details, such as the current buffer's position in memory, this knowledge can be used to craft further attacks, possibly with more severe consequences.

Modify Memory; DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart

Scope: Integrity, Availability

Out of bounds memory access will very likely result in the corruption of relevant memory, and perhaps instructions, possibly leading to a crash.

Modify Memory; Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands

Scope: Integrity

If the corrupted memory can be effectively controlled, it may be possible to execute arbitrary code. If the corrupted memory is data rather than instructions, the system will continue to function with improper changes, possibly in violation of an implicit or explicit policy.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 124 Buffer Underwrite ('Buffer Underflow')
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 127 Buffer Under-read
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1218 Memory Buffer Errors
+ Relevant to the view "CISQ Quality Measures (2020)" (View-1305)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
+ Relevant to the view "CISQ Data Protection Measures" (View-1340)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Memory-Unsafe (Often Prevalent)

C (Often Prevalent)

C++ (Often Prevalent)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


In the following C/C++ example, a utility function is used to trim trailing whitespace from a character string. The function copies the input string to a local character string and uses a while statement to remove the trailing whitespace by moving backward through the string and overwriting whitespace with a NUL character.

(bad code)
Example Language:
char* trimTrailingWhitespace(char *strMessage, int length) {
char *retMessage;
char *message = malloc(sizeof(char)*(length+1));

// copy input string to a temporary string
char message[length+1];
int index;
for (index = 0; index < length; index++) {
message[index] = strMessage[index];
}
message[index] = '\0';

// trim trailing whitespace
int len = index-1;
while (isspace(message[len])) {
message[len] = '\0';
len--;
}

// return string without trailing whitespace
retMessage = message;
return retMessage;
}

However, this function can cause a buffer underwrite if the input character string contains all whitespace. On some systems the while statement will move backwards past the beginning of a character string and will call the isspace() function on an address outside of the bounds of the local buffer.



Example 2


The following example asks a user for an offset into an array to select an item.

(bad code)
Example Language:

int main (int argc, char **argv) {
char *items[] = {"boat", "car", "truck", "train"};
int index = GetUntrustedOffset();
printf("You selected %s\n", items[index-1]);
}

The programmer allows the user to specify which element in the list to select, however an attacker can provide an out-of-bounds offset, resulting in a buffer over-read (CWE-126).



Example 3


The following is an example of code that may result in a buffer underwrite. This code is attempting to replace the substring "Replace Me" in destBuf with the string stored in srcBuf. It does so by using the function strstr(), which returns a pointer to the found substring in destBuf. Using pointer arithmetic, the starting index of the substring is found.

(bad code)
Example Language:
int main() {
...
char *result = strstr(destBuf, "Replace Me");
int idx = result - destBuf;
strcpy(&destBuf[idx], srcBuf);
...
}

In the case where the substring is not found in destBuf, strstr() will return NULL, causing the pointer arithmetic to be undefined, potentially setting the value of idx to a negative number. If idx is negative, this will result in a buffer underwrite of destBuf.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Unchecked length of SSLv2 challenge value leads to buffer underflow.
Buffer underflow from a small size value with a large buffer (length parameter inconsistency, CWE-130)
Buffer underflow from an all-whitespace string, which causes a counter to be decremented before the buffer while looking for a non-whitespace character.
Buffer underflow resultant from encoded data that triggers an integer overflow.
Product sets an incorrect buffer size limit, leading to "off-by-two" buffer underflow.
Negative value is used in a memcpy() operation, leading to buffer underflow.
Buffer underflow due to mishandled special characters
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Resultant
(where the weakness is typically related to the presence of some other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Fuzzing

Fuzz testing (fuzzing) is a powerful technique for generating large numbers of diverse inputs - either randomly or algorithmically - and dynamically invoking the code with those inputs. Even with random inputs, it is often capable of generating unexpected results such as crashes, memory corruption, or resource consumption. Fuzzing effectively produces repeatable test cases that clearly indicate bugs, which helps developers to diagnose the issues.

Effectiveness: High

Automated Dynamic Analysis

Use tools that are integrated during compilation to insert runtime error-checking mechanisms related to memory safety errors, such as AddressSanitizer (ASan) for C/C++ [REF-1518].

Effectiveness: Moderate

Note:Crafted inputs are necessary to reach the code containing the error, such as generated by fuzzers. Also, these tools may reduce performance, and they only report the error condition - not the original mistake that led to the error.
+ Functional Areas
  • Memory Management
+ Affected Resources
  • Memory
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1160 SEI CERT C Coding Standard - Guidelines 06. Arrays (ARR)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1399 Comprehensive Categorization: Memory Safety
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage DISCOURAGED
(this CWE ID should not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reasons Potential Deprecation, Frequent Misuse

Rationale

The CWE entry might be misused when lower-level CWE entries might be available. It also overlaps existing CWE entries and might be deprecated in the future.

Comments

If the "Access" operation is known to be a read or a write, then investigate children of entries such as CWE-787: Out-of-bounds Write and CWE-125: Out-of-bounds Read.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
CERT C Secure Coding ARR30-C CWE More Specific Do not form or use out-of-bounds pointers or array subscripts
+ References
[REF-1518] "AddressSanitizer".
<https://clang.llvm.org/docs/AddressSanitizer.html>. (URL validated: 2025-12-10)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2009-10-21
(CWE 1.6, 2009-10-29)
CWE Content Team MITRE
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Detection_Factors, References, Time_of_Introduction, Weakness_Ordinalities
2025-09-09
(CWE 4.18, 2025-09-09)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Affected_Resources, Functional_Areas
2025-04-03
(CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms
2024-07-16
(CWE 4.15, 2024-07-16)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2020-12-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-08-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Taxonomy_Mappings
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences

CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling

Weakness ID: 770
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
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+ Description
The product allocates a reusable resource or group of resources on behalf of an actor without imposing any intended restrictions on the size or number of resources that can be allocated. Diagram for CWE-770
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

DoS: Resource Consumption (CPU); DoS: Resource Consumption (Memory); DoS: Resource Consumption (Other)

Scope: Availability

When allocating resources without limits, an attacker could prevent other systems, applications, or processes from accessing the same type of resource. It can be easy for an attacker to consume many resources by rapidly making many requests or causing larger resources to be used than is needed.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Requirements

Clearly specify the minimum and maximum expectations for capabilities, and dictate which behaviors are acceptable when resource allocation reaches limits.

Architecture and Design

Limit the amount of resources that are accessible to unprivileged users. Set per-user limits for resources. Allow the system administrator to define these limits. Be careful to avoid CWE-410.

Architecture and Design

Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place, and it will help the administrator to identify who is committing the abuse. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.

Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.

When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."

Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.

Note: This will only be applicable to cases where user input can influence the size or frequency of resource allocations.

Architecture and Design

For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

Architecture and Design

Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either:

  • recognizes the attack and denies that user further access for a given amount of time, typically by using increasing time delays
  • uniformly throttles all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed.

The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question.

The second solution can be difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply requires more resources on the part of the attacker.

Architecture and Design

Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.

Architecture and Design; Implementation

If the program must fail, ensure that it fails gracefully (fails closed). There may be a temptation to simply let the program fail poorly in cases such as low memory conditions, but an attacker may be able to assert control before the software has fully exited. Alternately, an uncontrolled failure could cause cascading problems with other downstream components; for example, the program could send a signal to a downstream process so the process immediately knows that a problem has occurred and has a better chance of recovery.

Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.

Operation; Architecture and Design

Strategy: Resource Limitation

Use quotas or other resource-limiting settings provided by the operating system or environment. For example, when managing system resources in POSIX, setrlimit() can be used to set limits for certain types of resources, and getrlimit() can determine how many resources are available. However, these functions are not available on all operating systems.

When the current levels get close to the maximum that is defined for the application (see CWE-770), then limit the allocation of further resources to privileged users; alternately, begin releasing resources for less-privileged users. While this mitigation may protect the system from attack, it will not necessarily stop attackers from adversely impacting other users.

Ensure that the application performs the appropriate error checks and error handling in case resources become unavailable (CWE-703).

+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 400 Uncontrolled Resource Consumption
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 665 Improper Initialization
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 774 Allocation of File Descriptors or Handles Without Limits or Throttling
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 789 Memory Allocation with Excessive Size Value
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1325 Improperly Controlled Sequential Memory Allocation
CanFollow Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 20 Improper Input Validation
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 399 Resource Management Errors
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 840 Business Logic Errors
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 400 Uncontrolled Resource Consumption
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1011 Authorize Actors
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design OMISSION: This weakness is caused by missing a security tactic during the architecture and design phase.
Implementation
Operation
System Configuration
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Often Prevalent)

Technologies

Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
High
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


This code allocates a socket and forks each time it receives a new connection.

(bad code)
Example Language:
sock=socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
while (1) {
newsock=accept(sock, ...);
printf("A connection has been accepted\n");
pid = fork();
}

The program does not track how many connections have been made, and it does not limit the number of connections. Because forking is a relatively expensive operation, an attacker would be able to cause the system to run out of CPU, processes, or memory by making a large number of connections. Alternatively, an attacker could consume all available connections, preventing others from accessing the system remotely.



Example 2


In the following example a server socket connection is used to accept a request to store data on the local file system using a specified filename. The method openSocketConnection establishes a server socket to accept requests from a client. When a client establishes a connection to this service the getNextMessage method is first used to retrieve from the socket the name of the file to store the data, the openFileToWrite method will validate the filename and open a file to write to on the local file system. The getNextMessage is then used within a while loop to continuously read data from the socket and output the data to the file until there is no longer any data from the socket.

(bad code)
Example Language:
int writeDataFromSocketToFile(char *host, int port)
{

char filename[FILENAME_SIZE];
char buffer[BUFFER_SIZE];
int socket = openSocketConnection(host, port);

if (socket < 0) {
printf("Unable to open socket connection");
return(FAIL);
}
if (getNextMessage(socket, filename, FILENAME_SIZE) > 0) {
if (openFileToWrite(filename) > 0) {
while (getNextMessage(socket, buffer, BUFFER_SIZE) > 0){
if (!(writeToFile(buffer) > 0))
break;
}
}
closeFile();
}
closeSocket(socket);
}

This example creates a situation where data can be dumped to a file on the local file system without any limits on the size of the file. This could potentially exhaust file or disk resources and/or limit other clients' ability to access the service.



Example 3


In the following example, the processMessage method receives a two dimensional character array containing the message to be processed. The two-dimensional character array contains the length of the message in the first character array and the message body in the second character array. The getMessageLength method retrieves the integer value of the length from the first character array. After validating that the message length is greater than zero, the body character array pointer points to the start of the second character array of the two-dimensional character array and memory is allocated for the new body character array.

(bad code)
Example Language:

/* process message accepts a two-dimensional character array of the form [length][body] containing the message to be processed */
int processMessage(char **message)
{
char *body;

int length = getMessageLength(message[0]);

if (length > 0) {
body = &message[1][0];
processMessageBody(body);
return(SUCCESS);
}
else {
printf("Unable to process message; invalid message length");
return(FAIL);
}
}

This example creates a situation where the length of the body character array can be very large and will consume excessive memory, exhausting system resources. This can be avoided by restricting the length of the second character array with a maximum length check

Also, consider changing the type from 'int' to 'unsigned int', so that you are always guaranteed that the number is positive. This might not be possible if the protocol specifically requires allowing negative values, or if you cannot control the return value from getMessageLength(), but it could simplify the check to ensure the input is positive, and eliminate other errors such as signed-to-unsigned conversion errors (CWE-195) that may occur elsewhere in the code.

(good code)
Example Language:
unsigned int length = getMessageLength(message[0]);
if ((length > 0) && (length < MAX_LENGTH)) {...}


Example 4


In the following example, a server object creates a server socket and accepts client connections to the socket. For every client connection to the socket a separate thread object is generated using the ClientSocketThread class that handles request made by the client through the socket.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
public void acceptConnections() {
try {
ServerSocket serverSocket = new ServerSocket(SERVER_PORT);
int counter = 0;
boolean hasConnections = true;
while (hasConnections) {
Socket client = serverSocket.accept();
Thread t = new Thread(new ClientSocketThread(client));
t.setName(client.getInetAddress().getHostName() + ":" + counter++);
t.start();
}
serverSocket.close();


} catch (IOException ex) {...}
}

In this example there is no limit to the number of client connections and client threads that are created. Allowing an unlimited number of client connections and threads could potentially overwhelm the system and system resources.

The server should limit the number of client connections and the client threads that are created. This can be easily done by creating a thread pool object that limits the number of threads that are generated.

(good code)
Example Language: Java 
public static final int SERVER_PORT = 4444;
public static final int MAX_CONNECTIONS = 10;
...

public void acceptConnections() {
try {
ServerSocket serverSocket = new ServerSocket(SERVER_PORT);
int counter = 0;
boolean hasConnections = true;
while (hasConnections) {
hasConnections = checkForMoreConnections();
Socket client = serverSocket.accept();
Thread t = new Thread(new ClientSocketThread(client));
t.setName(client.getInetAddress().getHostName() + ":" + counter++);
ExecutorService pool = Executors.newFixedThreadPool(MAX_CONNECTIONS);
pool.execute(t);
}
serverSocket.close();


} catch (IOException ex) {...}
}


Example 5


An unnamed web site allowed a user to purchase tickets for an event. A menu option allowed the user to purchase up to 10 tickets, but the back end did not restrict the actual number of tickets that could be purchased.

Example 5 References:
[REF-667] Rafal Los. "Real-Life Example of a 'Business Logic Defect' (Screen Shots!)". 2011. <http://h30501.www3.hp.com/t5/Following-the-White-Rabbit-A/Real-Life-Example-of-a-Business-Logic-Defect-Screen-Shots/ba-p/22581>.


Example 6


Here the problem is that every time a connection is made, more memory is allocated. So if one just opened up more and more connections, eventually the machine would run out of memory.

(bad code)
Example Language:
bar connection() {
foo = malloc(1024);
return foo;
}

endConnection(bar foo) {
free(foo);
}

int main() {
while(1) {
foo=connection();
}

endConnection(foo)
}


+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Chain: Python library does not limit the resources used to process images that specify a very large number of bands (CWE-1284), leading to excessive memory consumption (CWE-789) or an integer overflow (CWE-190).
Language interpreter does not restrict the number of temporary files being created when handling a MIME request with a large number of parts..
Driver does not use a maximum width when invoking sscanf style functions, causing stack consumption.
Large integer value for a length property in an object causes a large amount of memory allocation.
Product allows exhaustion of file descriptors when processing a large number of TCP packets.
Communication product allows memory consumption with a large number of SIP requests, which cause many sessions to be created.
Product allows attackers to cause a denial of service via a large number of directives, each of which opens a separate window.
CMS does not restrict the number of searches that can occur simultaneously, leading to resource exhaustion.
web application scanner attempts to read an excessively large file created by a user, causing process termination
Go-based workload orchestrator does not limit resource usage with unauthenticated connections, allowing a DoS by flooding the service
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Manual Static Analysis

Manual static analysis can be useful for finding this weakness, but it might not achieve desired code coverage within limited time constraints. If denial-of-service is not considered a significant risk, or if there is strong emphasis on consequences such as code execution, then manual analysis may not focus on this weakness at all.

Fuzzing

While fuzzing is typically geared toward finding low-level implementation bugs, it can inadvertently find uncontrolled resource allocation problems. This can occur when the fuzzer generates a large number of test cases but does not restart the targeted product in between test cases. If an individual test case produces a crash, but it does not do so reliably, then an inability to limit resource allocation may be the cause.

When the allocation is directly affected by numeric inputs, then fuzzing may produce indications of this weakness.

Effectiveness: Opportunistic

Automated Dynamic Analysis

Certain automated dynamic analysis techniques may be effective in producing side effects of uncontrolled resource allocation problems, especially with resources such as processes, memory, and connections. The technique may involve generating a large number of requests to the product within a short time frame. Manual analysis is likely required to interpret the results.

Automated Static Analysis

Specialized configuration or tuning may be required to train automated tools to recognize this weakness.

Automated static analysis typically has limited utility in recognizing unlimited allocation problems, except for the missing release of program-independent system resources such as files, sockets, and processes, or unchecked arguments to memory. For system resources, automated static analysis may be able to detect circumstances in which resources are not released after they have expired, or if too much of a resource is requested at once, as can occur with memory. Automated analysis of configuration files may be able to detect settings that do not specify a maximum value.

Automated static analysis tools will not be appropriate for detecting exhaustion of custom resources, such as an intended security policy in which a bulletin board user is only allowed to make a limited number of posts per day.

+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 802 2010 Top 25 - Risky Resource Management
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 857 The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) Chapter 14 - Input Output (FIO)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 858 The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) Chapter 15 - Serialization (SER)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 861 The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) Chapter 18 - Miscellaneous (MSC)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 867 2011 Top 25 - Weaknesses On the Cusp
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 876 CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 08 - Memory Management (MEM)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 877 CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 09 - Input Output (FIO)
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 985 SFP Secondary Cluster: Unrestricted Consumption
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1147 SEI CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java - Guidelines 13. Input Output (FIO)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1148 SEI CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java - Guidelines 14. Serialization (SER)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1152 SEI CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java - Guidelines 49. Miscellaneous (MSC)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1416 Comprehensive Categorization: Resource Lifecycle Management
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1435 Weaknesses in the 2025 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Notes

Relationship

This entry is different from uncontrolled resource consumption (CWE-400) in that there are other weaknesses that are related to inability to control resource consumption, such as holding on to a resource too long after use, or not correctly keeping track of active resources so that they can be managed and released when they are finished (CWE-771).

Theoretical

Vulnerability theory is largely about how behaviors and resources interact. "Resource exhaustion" can be regarded as either a consequence or an attack, depending on the perspective. This entry is an attempt to reflect one of the underlying weaknesses that enable these attacks (or consequences) to take place.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) FIO04-J Close resources when they are no longer needed
The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) SER12-J Avoid memory and resource leaks during serialization
The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) MSC05-J Do not exhaust heap space
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-2 Req CR 7.2
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-2 Req CR 2.7
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-1 Req SI-1
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-1 Req SI-2
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 3-3 Req SR 7.2
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 3-3 Req SR 2.7
+ References
[REF-386] Joao Antunes, Nuno Ferreira Neves and Paulo Verissimo. "Detection and Prediction of Resource-Exhaustion Vulnerabilities". Proceedings of the IEEE International Symposium on Software Reliability Engineering (ISSRE). 2008-11.
<https://www.di.fc.ul.pt/~nuno/PAPERS/ISSRE08.pdf>. (URL validated: 2025-07-24)
[REF-387] D.J. Bernstein. "Resource exhaustion".
<http://cr.yp.to/docs/resources.html>.
[REF-388] Pascal Meunier. "Resource exhaustion". Secure Programming Educational Material. 2004.
<http://homes.cerias.purdue.edu/~pmeunier/secprog/sanitized/class1/6.resource%20exhaustion.ppt>.
[REF-7] Michael Howard and David LeBlanc. "Writing Secure Code". Chapter 17, "Protecting Against Denial of Service Attacks" Page 517. 2nd Edition. Microsoft Press. 2002-12-04.
<https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/store/writing-secure-code-9780735617223>.
[REF-667] Rafal Los. "Real-Life Example of a 'Business Logic Defect' (Screen Shots!)". 2011.
<http://h30501.www3.hp.com/t5/Following-the-White-Rabbit-A/Real-Life-Example-of-a-Business-Logic-Defect-Screen-Shots/ba-p/22581>.
[REF-672] Frank Kim. "Top 25 Series - Rank 22 - Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling". SANS Software Security Institute. 2010-03-23.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20170113055136/https://software-security.sans.org/blog/2010/03/23/top-25-series-rank-22-allocation-of-resources-without-limits-or-throttling/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 10, "Resource Limits", Page 574. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2009-05-13
(CWE 1.4, 2009-05-27)
CWE Content Team MITRE
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2023-11-14
(CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29)
participants in the CWE ICS/OT SIG 62443 Mapping Fall Workshop
Contributed or reviewed taxonomy mappings for ISA/IEC 62443
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities
2025-09-09
(CWE 4.18, 2025-09-09)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Taxonomy_Mappings
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Detection_Factors
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples, References
2021-07-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2020-12-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-06-25 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Description, Maintenance_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, Relationship_Notes, Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2018-03-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Modes_of_Introduction, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2017-05-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2015-12-07 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-06-23 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2014-02-18 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-09-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-03-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Detection_Factors, Relationships
2010-09-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Potential_Mitigations
2010-06-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Potential_Mitigations, References
2010-04-05 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns
2010-02-16 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2009-12-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Detection_Factors, Observed_Examples, References, Time_of_Introduction
2009-10-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2009-07-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns

CWE-587: Assignment of a Fixed Address to a Pointer

Weakness ID: 587
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
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+ Description
The product sets a pointer to a specific address other than NULL or 0.
+ Extended Description
Using a fixed address is not portable, because that address will probably not be valid in all environments or platforms.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands

Scope: Integrity, Confidentiality, Availability

If one executes code at a known location, an attacker might be able to inject code there beforehand.

DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart; Reduce Maintainability; Reduce Reliability

Scope: Availability

If the code is ported to another platform or environment, the pointer is likely to be invalid and cause a crash.

Read Memory; Modify Memory

Scope: Confidentiality, Integrity

The data at a known pointer location can be easily read or influenced by an attacker.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Implementation

Never set a pointer to a fixed address.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 344 Use of Invariant Value in Dynamically Changing Context
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 758 Reliance on Undefined, Unspecified, or Implementation-Defined Behavior
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 465 Pointer Issues
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Memory-Unsafe (Undetermined Prevalence)

C (Undetermined Prevalence)

C++ (Undetermined Prevalence)

C# (Undetermined Prevalence)

Class: Assembly (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


This code assumes a particular function will always be found at a particular address. It assigns a pointer to that address and calls the function.

(bad code)
Example Language:
int (*pt2Function) (float, char, char)=0x08040000;
int result2 = (*pt2Function) (12, 'a', 'b');
// Here we can inject code to execute.

The same function may not always be found at the same memory address. This could lead to a crash, or an attacker may alter the memory at the expected address, leading to arbitrary code execution.



+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Indirect
(where the weakness is a quality issue that might indirectly make it easier to introduce security-relevant weaknesses or make them more difficult to detect)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Automated Dynamic Analysis

Use tools that are integrated during compilation to insert runtime error-checking mechanisms related to memory safety errors, such as AddressSanitizer (ASan) for C/C++ [REF-1518].

Effectiveness: Moderate

Note:Crafted inputs are necessary to reach the code containing the error, such as generated by fuzzers. Also, these tools may reduce performance, and they only report the error condition - not the original mistake that led to the error.
+ Functional Areas
  • Memory Management
+ Affected Resources
  • Memory
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 738 CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 5 - Integers (INT)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 872 CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 04 - Integers (INT)
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 998 SFP Secondary Cluster: Glitch in Computation
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1158 SEI CERT C Coding Standard - Guidelines 04. Integers (INT)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1399 Comprehensive Categorization: Memory Safety
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Variant level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
CERT C Secure Coding INT36-C Imprecise Converting a pointer to integer or integer to pointer
Software Fault Patterns SFP1 Glitch in computation
+ References
[REF-1518] "AddressSanitizer".
<https://clang.llvm.org/docs/AddressSanitizer.html>. (URL validated: 2025-12-10)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-12-15
(CWE Draft 5, 2006-12-15)
CWE Content Team MITRE
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Detection_Factors, References
2025-09-09
(CWE 4.18, 2025-09-09)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Affected_Resources, Functional_Areas
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Time_of_Introduction, Type
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2021-03-15 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Weakness_Ordinalities
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Taxonomy_Mappings, White_Box_Definitions
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships
2011-09-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2009-07-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Other_Notes
2009-03-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2008-11-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Description, Relationships, Other_Notes, Weakness_Ordinalities
2008-08-01 KDM Analytics
added/updated white box definitions
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction

CWE-563: Assignment to Variable without Use

Weakness ID: 563
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
The variable's value is assigned but never used, making it a dead store.
+ Extended Description
After the assignment, the variable is either assigned another value or goes out of scope. It is likely that the variable is simply vestigial, but it is also possible that the unused variable points out a bug.
+ Alternate Terms
Unused Variable
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Quality Degradation; Varies by Context

Scope: Other

This weakness could be an indication of a bug in the program or a deprecated variable that was not removed and is an indication of poor quality. This could lead to further bugs and the introduction of weaknesses.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Implementation

Remove unused variables from the code.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 1164 Irrelevant Code
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1006 Bad Coding Practices
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


The following code excerpt assigns to the variable r and then overwrites the value without using it.

(bad code)
Example Language:
r = getName();
r = getNewBuffer(buf);


+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Indirect
(where the weakness is a quality issue that might indirectly make it easier to introduce security-relevant weaknesses or make them more difficult to detect)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Effectiveness: High

+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 747 CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 14 - Miscellaneous (MSC)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 883 CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 49 - Miscellaneous (MSC)
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 886 SFP Primary Cluster: Unused entities
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1186 SEI CERT Perl Coding Standard - Guidelines 50. Miscellaneous (MSC)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1412 Comprehensive Categorization: Poor Coding Practices
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
CERT C Secure Coding MSC00-C Compile cleanly at high warning levels
SEI CERT Perl Coding Standard MSC01-PL Imprecise Detect and remove unused variables
Software Fault Patterns SFP2 Unused Entities
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
Anonymous Tool Vendor (under NDA)
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships, Type
2021-03-15 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings, Weakness_Ordinalities
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Alternate_Terms, Name, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Taxonomy_Mappings
2014-06-23 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Name, Other_Notes
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships
2011-09-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2009-05-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2008-11-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2014-06-23 Unused Variable
2017-11-08 Assignment to Variable without Use ('Unused Variable')

CWE-294: Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay

Weakness ID: 294
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
A capture-replay flaw exists when the design of the product makes it possible for a malicious user to sniff network traffic and bypass authentication by replaying it to the server in question to the same effect as the original message (or with minor changes).
+ Extended Description
Capture-replay attacks are common and can be difficult to defeat without cryptography. They are a subset of network injection attacks that rely on observing previously-sent valid commands, then changing them slightly if necessary and resending the same commands to the server.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Gain Privileges or Assume Identity

Scope: Access Control

Messages sent with a capture-relay attack allow access to resources which are not otherwise accessible without proper authentication.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design

Utilize some sequence or time stamping functionality along with a checksum which takes this into account in order to ensure that messages can be parsed only once.

Architecture and Design

Since any attacker who can listen to traffic can see sequence numbers, it is necessary to sign messages with some kind of cryptography to ensure that sequence numbers are not simply doctored along with content.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 1390 Weak Authentication
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1211 Authentication Errors
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 287 Improper Authentication
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1010 Authenticate Actors
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design COMMISSION: This weakness refers to an incorrect design related to an architectural security tactic.
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
High
+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
product authentication succeeds if user-provided MD5 hash matches the hash in its database; this can be subjected to replay attacks.
Chain: cleartext transmission of the MD5 hash of password (CWE-319) enables attacks against a server that is susceptible to replay (CWE-294).
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Resultant
(where the weakness is typically related to the presence of some other weaknesses)
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 956 SFP Secondary Cluster: Channel Attack
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1353 OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A07:2021 - Identification and Authentication Failures
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1396 Comprehensive Categorization: Access Control
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1442 OWASP Top Ten 2025 Category A07:2025 - Authentication Failures
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
PLOVER Authentication bypass by replay
CLASP Capture-replay
+ References
[REF-18] Secure Software, Inc.. "The CLASP Application Security Process". 2005.
<https://cwe.mitre.org/documents/sources/TheCLASPApplicationSecurityProcess.pdf>. (URL validated: 2024-11-17)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
PLOVER
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Related_Attack_Patterns
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-08-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships
2017-05-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples
2009-10-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2009-07-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations
2009-05-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings

CWE-290: Authentication Bypass by Spoofing

Weakness ID: 290
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
This attack-focused weakness is caused by incorrectly implemented authentication schemes that are subject to spoofing attacks.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Bypass Protection Mechanism; Gain Privileges or Assume Identity

Scope: Access Control

This weakness can allow an attacker to access resources which are not otherwise accessible without proper authentication.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 1390 Weak Authentication
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 291 Reliance on IP Address for Authentication
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 293 Using Referer Field for Authentication
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 350 Reliance on Reverse DNS Resolution for a Security-Critical Action
PeerOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 602 Client-Side Enforcement of Server-Side Security
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1211 Authentication Errors
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 287 Improper Authentication
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1010 Authenticate Actors
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation
Architecture and Design
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


The following code authenticates users.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
String sourceIP = request.getRemoteAddr();
if (sourceIP != null && sourceIP.equals(APPROVED_IP)) {
authenticated = true;
}

The authentication mechanism implemented relies on an IP address for source validation. If an attacker is able to spoof the IP, they may be able to bypass the authentication mechanism.



Example 2


Both of these examples check if a request is from a trusted address before responding to the request.

(bad code)
Example Language:
sd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
serv.sin_family = AF_INET;
serv.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_ANY);
servr.sin_port = htons(1008);
bind(sd, (struct sockaddr *) & serv, sizeof(serv));

while (1) {
memset(msg, 0x0, MAX_MSG);
clilen = sizeof(cli);
if (inet_ntoa(cli.sin_addr)==getTrustedAddress()) {
n = recvfrom(sd, msg, MAX_MSG, 0, (struct sockaddr *) & cli, &clilen);
}
}
(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
while(true) {
DatagramPacket rp=new DatagramPacket(rData,rData.length);
outSock.receive(rp);
String in = new String(p.getData(),0, rp.getLength());
InetAddress clientIPAddress = rp.getAddress();
int port = rp.getPort();

if (isTrustedAddress(clientIPAddress) & secretKey.equals(in)) {
out = secret.getBytes();
DatagramPacket sp =new DatagramPacket(out,out.length, IPAddress, port); outSock.send(sp);
}
}

The code only verifies the address as stored in the request packet. An attacker can spoof this address, thus impersonating a trusted client.



Example 3


The following code samples use a DNS lookup in order to decide whether or not an inbound request is from a trusted host. If an attacker can poison the DNS cache, they can gain trusted status.

(bad code)
Example Language:
struct hostent *hp;struct in_addr myaddr;
char* tHost = "trustme.example.com";
myaddr.s_addr=inet_addr(ip_addr_string);

hp = gethostbyaddr((char *) &myaddr, sizeof(struct in_addr), AF_INET);
if (hp && !strncmp(hp->h_name, tHost, sizeof(tHost))) {
trusted = true;
} else {
trusted = false;
}
(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
String ip = request.getRemoteAddr();
InetAddress addr = InetAddress.getByName(ip);
if (addr.getCanonicalHostName().endsWith("trustme.com")) {
trusted = true;
}
(bad code)
Example Language: C# 
IPAddress hostIPAddress = IPAddress.Parse(RemoteIpAddress);
IPHostEntry hostInfo = Dns.GetHostByAddress(hostIPAddress);
if (hostInfo.HostName.EndsWith("trustme.com")) {
trusted = true;
}

IP addresses are more reliable than DNS names, but they can also be spoofed. Attackers can easily forge the source IP address of the packets they send, but response packets will return to the forged IP address. To see the response packets, the attacker has to sniff the traffic between the victim machine and the forged IP address. In order to accomplish the required sniffing, attackers typically attempt to locate themselves on the same subnet as the victim machine. Attackers may be able to circumvent this requirement by using source routing, but source routing is disabled across much of the Internet today. In summary, IP address verification can be a useful part of an authentication scheme, but it should not be the single factor required for authentication.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
S-bus functionality in a home automation product performs access control using an IP allowlist, which can be bypassed by a forged IP address.
VOIP product allows authentication bypass using 127.0.0.1 in the Host header.
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Resultant
(where the weakness is typically related to the presence of some other weaknesses)
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 956 SFP Secondary Cluster: Channel Attack
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1353 OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A07:2021 - Identification and Authentication Failures
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1366 ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1396 Comprehensive Categorization: Access Control
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1442 OWASP Top Ten 2025 Category A07:2025 - Authentication Failures
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Notes

Relationship

This can be resultant from insufficient verification.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
PLOVER Authentication bypass by spoofing
+ References
[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 3, "Spoofing and Identification", Page 72. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
PLOVER
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction, Weakness_Ordinalities
2023-10-26 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-07-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships
2017-05-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships
2014-02-18 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2013-07-17 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2009-07-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationship_Notes
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Relationships, Relationship_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
2008-07-01 Sean Eidemiller Cigital
added/updated demonstrative examples

CWE-805: Buffer Access with Incorrect Length Value

Weakness ID: 805
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
The product uses a sequential operation to read or write a buffer, but it uses an incorrect length value that causes it to access memory that is outside of the bounds of the buffer.
+ Extended Description
When the length value exceeds the size of the destination, a buffer overflow could occur.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Read Memory; Modify Memory; Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands

Scope: Integrity, Confidentiality, Availability

Buffer overflows often can be used to execute arbitrary code, which is usually outside the scope of a program's implicit security policy. This can often be used to subvert any other security service.

Modify Memory; DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart; DoS: Resource Consumption (CPU)

Scope: Availability

Buffer overflows generally lead to crashes. Other attacks leading to lack of availability are possible, including putting the program into an infinite loop.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Requirements

Strategy: Language Selection

Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.

Be wary that a language's interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.

Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.

Note: This is not a complete solution, since many buffer overflows are not related to strings.

Operation; Build and Compilation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.

D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.

Effectiveness: Defense in Depth

Note:

This is not necessarily a complete solution, since these mechanisms only detect certain types of overflows. In addition, the result is still a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.

Implementation

Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application's memory:

  • Double check that the buffer is as large as specified.
  • When using functions that accept a number of bytes to copy, such as strncpy(), be aware that if the destination buffer size is equal to the source buffer size, it may not NULL-terminate the string.
  • Check buffer boundaries if accessing the buffer in a loop and make sure there is no danger of writing past the allocated space.
  • If necessary, truncate all input strings to a reasonable length before passing them to the copy and concatenation functions.

Architecture and Design

For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

Operation; Build and Compilation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.

Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.

For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].

Effectiveness: Defense in Depth

Note: These techniques do not provide a complete solution. For instance, exploits frequently use a bug that discloses memory addresses in order to maximize reliability of code execution [REF-1337]. It has also been shown that a side-channel attack can bypass ASLR [REF-1333].

Operation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.

For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].

Effectiveness: Defense in Depth

Note: This is not a complete solution, since buffer overflows could be used to overwrite nearby variables to modify the software's state in dangerous ways. In addition, it cannot be used in cases in which self-modifying code is required. Finally, an attack could still cause a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.

Architecture and Design; Operation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the product or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.

Architecture and Design; Operation

Strategy: Sandbox or Jail

Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.

OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.

This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.

Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.

Effectiveness: Limited

Note: The effectiveness of this mitigation depends on the prevention capabilities of the specific sandbox or jail being used and might only help to reduce the scope of an attack, such as restricting the attacker to certain system calls or limiting the portion of the file system that can be accessed.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 806 Buffer Access Using Size of Source Buffer
CanFollow Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 130 Improper Handling of Length Parameter Inconsistency
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1218 Memory Buffer Errors
+ Relevant to the view "CISQ Quality Measures (2020)" (View-1305)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
+ Relevant to the view "CISQ Data Protection Measures" (View-1340)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Memory-Unsafe (Undetermined Prevalence)

C (Often Prevalent)

C++ (Often Prevalent)

Class: Assembly (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
High
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


This example takes an IP address from a user, verifies that it is well formed and then looks up the hostname and copies it into a buffer.

(bad code)
Example Language:
void host_lookup(char *user_supplied_addr){
struct hostent *hp;
in_addr_t *addr;
char hostname[64];
in_addr_t inet_addr(const char *cp);

/*routine that ensures user_supplied_addr is in the right format for conversion */

validate_addr_form(user_supplied_addr);
addr = inet_addr(user_supplied_addr);
hp = gethostbyaddr( addr, sizeof(struct in_addr), AF_INET);
strcpy(hostname, hp->h_name);
}

This function allocates a buffer of 64 bytes to store the hostname under the assumption that the maximum length value of hostname is 64 bytes, however there is no guarantee that the hostname will not be larger than 64 bytes. If an attacker specifies an address which resolves to a very large hostname, then the function may overwrite sensitive data or even relinquish control flow to the attacker.

Note that this example also contains an unchecked return value (CWE-252) that can lead to a NULL pointer dereference (CWE-476).



Example 2


In the following example, it is possible to request that memcpy move a much larger segment of memory than assumed:

(bad code)
Example Language:
int returnChunkSize(void *) {

/* if chunk info is valid, return the size of usable memory,

* else, return -1 to indicate an error

*/
...
}
int main() {
...
memcpy(destBuf, srcBuf, (returnChunkSize(destBuf)-1));
...
}

If returnChunkSize() happens to encounter an error it will return -1. Notice that the return value is not checked before the memcpy operation (CWE-252), so -1 can be passed as the size argument to memcpy() (CWE-805). Because memcpy() assumes that the value is unsigned, it will be interpreted as MAXINT-1 (CWE-195), and therefore will copy far more memory than is likely available to the destination buffer (CWE-787, CWE-788).



Example 3


In the following example, the source character string is copied to the dest character string using the method strncpy.

(bad code)
Example Language:
...
char source[21] = "the character string";
char dest[12];
strncpy(dest, source, sizeof(source)-1);
...

However, in the call to strncpy the source character string is used within the sizeof call to determine the number of characters to copy. This will create a buffer overflow as the size of the source character string is greater than the dest character string. The dest character string should be used within the sizeof call to ensure that the correct number of characters are copied, as shown below.

(good code)
Example Language:
...
char source[21] = "the character string";
char dest[12];
strncpy(dest, source, sizeof(dest)-1);
...


Example 4


In this example, the method outputFilenameToLog outputs a filename to a log file. The method arguments include a pointer to a character string containing the file name and an integer for the number of characters in the string. The filename is copied to a buffer where the buffer size is set to a maximum size for inputs to the log file. The method then calls another method to save the contents of the buffer to the log file.

(bad code)
Example Language:
#define LOG_INPUT_SIZE 40

// saves the file name to a log file
int outputFilenameToLog(char *filename, int length) {
int success;

// buffer with size set to maximum size for input to log file
char buf[LOG_INPUT_SIZE];

// copy filename to buffer
strncpy(buf, filename, length);

// save to log file
success = saveToLogFile(buf);

return success;
}

However, in this case the string copy method, strncpy, mistakenly uses the length method argument to determine the number of characters to copy rather than using the size of the local character string, buf. This can lead to a buffer overflow if the number of characters contained in character string pointed to by filename is larger then the number of characters allowed for the local character string. The string copy method should use the buf character string within a sizeof call to ensure that only characters up to the size of the buf array are copied to avoid a buffer overflow, as shown below.

(good code)
Example Language:
...
// copy filename to buffer
strncpy(buf, filename, sizeof(buf)-1);
...


Example 5


Windows provides the MultiByteToWideChar(), WideCharToMultiByte(), UnicodeToBytes(), and BytesToUnicode() functions to convert between arbitrary multibyte (usually ANSI) character strings and Unicode (wide character) strings. The size arguments to these functions are specified in different units, (one in bytes, the other in characters) making their use prone to error.

In a multibyte character string, each character occupies a varying number of bytes, and therefore the size of such strings is most easily specified as a total number of bytes. In Unicode, however, characters are always a fixed size, and string lengths are typically given by the number of characters they contain. Mistakenly specifying the wrong units in a size argument can lead to a buffer overflow.

The following function takes a username specified as a multibyte string and a pointer to a structure for user information and populates the structure with information about the specified user. Since Windows authentication uses Unicode for usernames, the username argument is first converted from a multibyte string to a Unicode string.

(bad code)
Example Language:
void getUserInfo(char *username, struct _USER_INFO_2 info){
WCHAR unicodeUser[UNLEN+1];
MultiByteToWideChar(CP_ACP, 0, username, -1, unicodeUser, sizeof(unicodeUser));
NetUserGetInfo(NULL, unicodeUser, 2, (LPBYTE *)&info);
}

This function incorrectly passes the size of unicodeUser in bytes instead of characters. The call to MultiByteToWideChar() can therefore write up to (UNLEN+1)*sizeof(WCHAR) wide characters, or (UNLEN+1)*sizeof(WCHAR)*sizeof(WCHAR) bytes, to the unicodeUser array, which has only (UNLEN+1)*sizeof(WCHAR) bytes allocated.

If the username string contains more than UNLEN characters, the call to MultiByteToWideChar() will overflow the buffer unicodeUser.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Chain: large length value causes buffer over-read (CWE-126)
Use of packet length field to make a calculation, then copy into a fixed-size buffer
Chain: retrieval of length value from an uninitialized memory location
Crafted length value in document reader leads to buffer overflow
SSL server overflow when the sum of multiple length fields exceeds a given value
Language interpreter API function doesn't validate length argument, leading to information exposure
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Resultant
(where the weakness is typically related to the presence of some other weaknesses)
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis

This weakness can often be detected using automated static analysis tools. Many modern tools use data flow analysis or constraint-based techniques to minimize the number of false positives.

Automated static analysis generally does not account for environmental considerations when reporting out-of-bounds memory operations. This can make it difficult for users to determine which warnings should be investigated first. For example, an analysis tool might report buffer overflows that originate from command line arguments in a program that is not expected to run with setuid or other special privileges.

Effectiveness: High

Note:Detection techniques for buffer-related errors are more mature than for most other weakness types.

Automated Dynamic Analysis

This weakness can be detected using dynamic tools and techniques that interact with the product using large test suites with many diverse inputs, such as fuzz testing (fuzzing), robustness testing, and fault injection. The product's operation may slow down, but it should not become unstable, crash, or generate incorrect results.

Effectiveness: Moderate

Note:Without visibility into the code, black box methods may not be able to sufficiently distinguish this weakness from others, requiring manual methods to diagnose the underlying problem.

Manual Analysis

Manual analysis can be useful for finding this weakness, but it might not achieve desired code coverage within limited time constraints. This becomes difficult for weaknesses that must be considered for all inputs, since the attack surface can be too large.

Automated Dynamic Analysis

Use tools that are integrated during compilation to insert runtime error-checking mechanisms related to memory safety errors, such as AddressSanitizer (ASan) for C/C++ [REF-1518].

Effectiveness: Moderate

Note:Crafted inputs are necessary to reach the code containing the error, such as generated by fuzzers. Also, these tools may reduce performance, and they only report the error condition - not the original mistake that led to the error.
+ Functional Areas
  • Memory Management
+ Affected Resources
  • Memory
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 740 CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 7 - Arrays (ARR)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 802 2010 Top 25 - Risky Resource Management
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 867 2011 Top 25 - Weaknesses On the Cusp
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 874 CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 06 - Arrays and the STL (ARR)
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1160 SEI CERT C Coding Standard - Guidelines 06. Arrays (ARR)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1399 Comprehensive Categorization: Memory Safety
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
CERT C Secure Coding ARR38-C Imprecise Guarantee that library functions do not form invalid pointers
+ References
[REF-7] Michael Howard and David LeBlanc. "Writing Secure Code". Chapter 6, "Why ACLs Are Important" Page 171. 2nd Edition. Microsoft Press. 2002-12-04.
<https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/store/writing-secure-code-9780735617223>.
[REF-58] Michael Howard. "Address Space Layout Randomization in Windows Vista".
<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/michael_howard/address-space-layout-randomization-in-windows-vista>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-59] Arjan van de Ven. "Limiting buffer overflows with ExecShield".
<https://archive.is/saAFo>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-60] "PaX".
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executable_space_protection#PaX>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-741] Jason Lam. "Top 25 Series - Rank 12 - Buffer Access with Incorrect Length Value". SANS Software Security Institute. 2010-03-11.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20100316043717/http://blogs.sans.org:80/appsecstreetfighter/2010/03/11/top-25-series-rank-12-buffer-access-with-incorrect-length-value/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-57] Matt Messier and John Viega. "Safe C String Library v1.0.3".
<http://www.gnu-darwin.org/www001/ports-1.5a-CURRENT/devel/safestr/work/safestr-1.0.3/doc/safestr.html>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-56] Microsoft. "Using the Strsafe.h Functions".
<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/menurc/strsafe-ovw?redirectedfrom=MSDN>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-61] Microsoft. "Understanding DEP as a mitigation technology part 1".
<https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2009/06/understanding-dep-as-a-mitigation-technology-part-1/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-76] Sean Barnum and Michael Gegick. "Least Privilege". 2005-09-14.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20211209014121/https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/bsi/articles/knowledge/principles/least-privilege>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-64] Grant Murphy. "Position Independent Executables (PIE)". Red Hat. 2012-11-28.
<https://www.redhat.com/en/blog/position-independent-executables-pie>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-1332] John Richard Moser. "Prelink and address space randomization". 2006-07-05.
<https://lwn.net/Articles/190139/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1333] Dmitry Evtyushkin, Dmitry Ponomarev, Nael Abu-Ghazaleh. "Jump Over ASLR: Attacking Branch Predictors to Bypass ASLR". 2016.
<http://www.cs.ucr.edu/~nael/pubs/micro16.pdf>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1334] D3FEND. "Stack Frame Canary Validation (D3-SFCV)". 2023.
<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:StackFrameCanaryValidation/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1335] D3FEND. "Segment Address Offset Randomization (D3-SAOR)". 2023.
<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:SegmentAddressOffsetRandomization/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1336] D3FEND. "Process Segment Execution Prevention (D3-PSEP)". 2023.
<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:ProcessSegmentExecutionPrevention/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1337] Alexander Sotirov and Mark Dowd. "Bypassing Browser Memory Protections: Setting back browser security by 10 years". Memory information leaks. 2008.
<https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-08/Sotirov_Dowd/bh08-sotirov-dowd.pdf>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1518] "AddressSanitizer".
<https://clang.llvm.org/docs/AddressSanitizer.html>. (URL validated: 2025-12-10)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2010-01-15
(CWE 1.8, 2010-02-16)
CWE Content Team MITRE
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Detection_Factors, References
2025-09-09
(CWE 4.18, 2025-09-09)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Functional_Areas
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2021-07-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Potential_Mitigations
2020-12-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-08-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-06-25 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2018-03-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Causal_Nature, Demonstrative_Examples, Likelihood_of_Exploit, References, Taxonomy_Mappings
2014-06-23 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2014-02-18 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, References
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
2011-09-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2010-12-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2010-09-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2010-06-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Potential_Mitigations, References
2010-04-05 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns

CWE-120: Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input ('Classic Buffer Overflow')

Weakness ID: 120
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities in limited situations requiring careful review (with careful review of mapping notes)
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
The product copies an input buffer to an output buffer without verifying that the size of the input buffer is less than the size of the output buffer. Diagram for CWE-120
+ Alternate Terms
Classic Buffer Overflow
This term was frequently used by vulnerability researchers during approximately 1995 to 2005 to differentiate buffer copies without length checks (which had been known about for decades) from other emerging weaknesses that still involved invalid accesses of buffers, as vulnerability researchers began to develop advanced exploitation techniques.
Unbounded Transfer
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Modify Memory; Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands

Scope: Integrity, Confidentiality, Availability

Buffer overflows often can be used to execute arbitrary code, which is usually outside the scope of the product's implicit security policy. This can often be used to subvert any other security service.

Modify Memory; DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart; DoS: Resource Consumption (CPU)

Scope: Availability

Buffer overflows generally lead to crashes. Other attacks leading to lack of availability are possible, including putting the product into an infinite loop.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Requirements

Strategy: Language Selection

Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.

Be wary that a language's interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.

Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.

Note: This is not a complete solution, since many buffer overflows are not related to strings.

Operation; Build and Compilation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.

D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.

Effectiveness: Defense in Depth

Note:

This is not necessarily a complete solution, since these mechanisms only detect certain types of overflows. In addition, the result is still a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.

Implementation

Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application's memory:

  • Double check that your buffer is as large as you specify.
  • When using functions that accept a number of bytes to copy, such as strncpy(), be aware that if the destination buffer size is equal to the source buffer size, it may not NULL-terminate the string.
  • Check buffer boundaries if accessing the buffer in a loop and make sure there is no danger of writing past the allocated space.
  • If necessary, truncate all input strings to a reasonable length before passing them to the copy and concatenation functions.

Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.

When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."

Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.

Architecture and Design

For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

Operation; Build and Compilation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.

Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.

For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].

Effectiveness: Defense in Depth

Note: These techniques do not provide a complete solution. For instance, exploits frequently use a bug that discloses memory addresses in order to maximize reliability of code execution [REF-1337]. It has also been shown that a side-channel attack can bypass ASLR [REF-1333].

Operation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.

For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].

Effectiveness: Defense in Depth

Note: This is not a complete solution, since buffer overflows could be used to overwrite nearby variables to modify the software's state in dangerous ways. In addition, it cannot be used in cases in which self-modifying code is required. Finally, an attack could still cause a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.

Build and Compilation; Operation

Most mitigating technologies at the compiler or OS level to date address only a subset of buffer overflow problems and rarely provide complete protection against even that subset. It is good practice to implement strategies to increase the workload of an attacker, such as leaving the attacker to guess an unknown value that changes every program execution.

Implementation

Replace unbounded copy functions with analogous functions that support length arguments, such as strcpy with strncpy. Create these if they are not available.

Effectiveness: Moderate

Note: This approach is still susceptible to calculation errors, including issues such as off-by-one errors (CWE-193) and incorrectly calculating buffer lengths (CWE-131).

Architecture and Design

Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion

When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.

Architecture and Design; Operation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.

Architecture and Design; Operation

Strategy: Sandbox or Jail

Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.

OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.

This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.

Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.

Effectiveness: Limited

Note: The effectiveness of this mitigation depends on the prevention capabilities of the specific sandbox or jail being used and might only help to reduce the scope of an attack, such as restricting the attacker to certain system calls or limiting the portion of the file system that can be accessed.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 787 Out-of-bounds Write
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 785 Use of Path Manipulation Function without Maximum-sized Buffer
CanFollow Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 170 Improper Null Termination
CanFollow Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 231 Improper Handling of Extra Values
CanFollow Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 416 Use After Free
CanFollow Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 456 Missing Initialization of a Variable
CanPrecede Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 123 Write-what-where Condition
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1218 Memory Buffer Errors
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
+ Relevant to the view "CISQ Quality Measures (2020)" (View-1305)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 787 Out-of-bounds Write
+ Relevant to the view "CISQ Data Protection Measures" (View-1340)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 787 Out-of-bounds Write
+ Relevant to the view "Seven Pernicious Kingdoms" (View-700)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 20 Improper Input Validation
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Memory-Unsafe (Undetermined Prevalence)

C (Often Prevalent)

C++ (Often Prevalent)

Class: Assembly (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
High
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


The following code asks the user to enter their last name and then attempts to store the value entered in the last_name array.

(bad code)
Example Language:
char last_name[20];
printf ("Enter your last name: ");
scanf ("%s", last_name);

The problem with the code above is that it does not restrict or limit the size of the name entered by the user. If the user enters "Very_very_long_last_name" which is 24 characters long, then a buffer overflow will occur since the array can only hold 20 characters total.



Example 2


The following code attempts to create a local copy of a buffer to perform some manipulations to the data.

(bad code)
Example Language:
void manipulate_string(char * string){
char buf[24];
strcpy(buf, string);
...
}

However, the programmer does not ensure that the size of the data pointed to by string will fit in the local buffer and copies the data with the potentially dangerous strcpy() function. This may result in a buffer overflow condition if an attacker can influence the contents of the string parameter.



Example 3


The code below calls the gets() function to read in data from the command line.

(bad code)
Example Language:
char buf[24];
printf("Please enter your name and press <Enter>\n");
gets(buf);
...
}

However, gets() is inherently unsafe, because it copies all input from STDIN to the buffer without checking size. This allows the user to provide a string that is larger than the buffer size, resulting in an overflow condition.



Example 4


In the following example, a server accepts connections from a client and processes the client request. After accepting a client connection, the program will obtain client information using the gethostbyaddr method, copy the hostname of the client that connected to a local variable and output the hostname of the client to a log file.

(bad code)
Example Language:
...
struct hostent *clienthp;
char hostname[MAX_LEN];

// create server socket, bind to server address and listen on socket
...

// accept client connections and process requests
int count = 0;
for (count = 0; count < MAX_CONNECTIONS; count++) {

int clientlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
int clientsocket = accept(serversocket, (struct sockaddr *)&clientaddr, &clientlen);

if (clientsocket >= 0) {
clienthp = gethostbyaddr((char*) &clientaddr.sin_addr.s_addr, sizeof(clientaddr.sin_addr.s_addr), AF_INET);
strcpy(hostname, clienthp->h_name);
logOutput("Accepted client connection from host ", hostname);

// process client request
...
close(clientsocket);
}
}
close(serversocket);

...

However, the hostname of the client that connected may be longer than the allocated size for the local hostname variable. This will result in a buffer overflow when copying the client hostname to the local variable using the strcpy method.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
buffer overflow using command with long argument
buffer overflow in local program using long environment variable
buffer overflow in comment characters, when product increments a counter for a ">" but does not decrement for "<"
By replacing a valid cookie value with an extremely long string of characters, an attacker may overflow the application's buffers.
By replacing a valid cookie value with an extremely long string of characters, an attacker may overflow the application's buffers.
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Resultant
(where the weakness is typically related to the presence of some other weaknesses)
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis

This weakness can often be detected using automated static analysis tools. Many modern tools use data flow analysis or constraint-based techniques to minimize the number of false positives.

Automated static analysis generally does not account for environmental considerations when reporting out-of-bounds memory operations. This can make it difficult for users to determine which warnings should be investigated first. For example, an analysis tool might report buffer overflows that originate from command line arguments in a program that is not expected to run with setuid or other special privileges.

Effectiveness: High

Note:Detection techniques for buffer-related errors are more mature than for most other weakness types.

Automated Dynamic Analysis

This weakness can be detected using dynamic tools and techniques that interact with the software using large test suites with many diverse inputs, such as fuzz testing (fuzzing), robustness testing, and fault injection. The software's operation may slow down, but it should not become unstable, crash, or generate incorrect results.

Manual Analysis

Manual analysis can be useful for finding this weakness, but it might not achieve desired code coverage within limited time constraints. This becomes difficult for weaknesses that must be considered for all inputs, since the attack surface can be too large.

Automated Dynamic Analysis

Use tools that are integrated during compilation to insert runtime error-checking mechanisms related to memory safety errors, such as AddressSanitizer (ASan) for C/C++ [REF-1518].

Effectiveness: Moderate

Note:Crafted inputs are necessary to reach the code containing the error, such as generated by fuzzers. Also, these tools may reduce performance, and they only report the error condition - not the original mistake that led to the error.

Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
  • Binary Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis

Effectiveness: High

Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Web Application Scanner
  • Web Services Scanner
  • Database Scanners

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Fuzz Tester
  • Framework-based Fuzzer

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Manual Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source
  • Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Automated Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Source code Weakness Analyzer
  • Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer

Effectiveness: High

Architecture or Design Review

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)

Effectiveness: High

+ Functional Areas
  • Memory Management
+ Affected Resources
  • Memory
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 722 OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A1 - Unvalidated Input
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 726 OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A5 - Buffer Overflows
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 741 CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 8 - Characters and Strings (STR)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 802 2010 Top 25 - Risky Resource Management
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 865 2011 Top 25 - Risky Resource Management
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 875 CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 07 - Characters and Strings (STR)
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 970 SFP Secondary Cluster: Faulty Buffer Access
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1129 CISQ Quality Measures (2016) - Reliability
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1131 CISQ Quality Measures (2016) - Security
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1161 SEI CERT C Coding Standard - Guidelines 07. Characters and Strings (STR)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1399 Comprehensive Categorization: Memory Safety
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1435 Weaknesses in the 2025 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED-WITH-REVIEW
(this CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities in limited situations requiring careful review)
Reason Frequent Misuse

Rationale

There are some indications that this CWE ID might be misused and selected simply because it mentions "buffer overflow" - an increasingly vague term. This CWE entry is only appropriate for "Buffer Copy" operations (not buffer reads), in which where there is no "Checking [the] Size of Input", and (by implication of the copy) writing past the end of the buffer.

Comments

If the vulnerability being analyzed involves out-of-bounds reads, then consider CWE-125 or descendants. For root cause analysis: if there is any input validation, consider children of CWE-20 such as CWE-1284. If there is a calculation error for buffer sizes, consider CWE-131 or similar.
+ Notes

Relationship

At the code level, stack-based and heap-based overflows do not differ significantly, so there usually is not a need to distinguish them. From the attacker perspective, they can be quite different, since different techniques are required to exploit them.

Terminology

There is significant inconsistency regarding the "buffer overflow" term, which can have multiple interpretations and uses. Many people mean "writing past the end of a buffer." Others mean "writing past the end of a buffer, or before the beginning of a buffer." Still others might include "read" in the term.

Other

A buffer overflow condition exists when a product attempts to put more data in a buffer than it can hold, or when it attempts to put data in a memory area outside of the boundaries of a buffer. The simplest type of error, and the most common cause of buffer overflows, is the "classic" case in which the product copies the buffer without restricting how much data is copied. Other variants exist, but the existence of a classic overflow strongly suggests that the programmer is not considering even the most basic of security protections.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
PLOVER Unbounded Transfer ('classic overflow')
7 Pernicious Kingdoms Buffer Overflow
CLASP Buffer overflow
OWASP Top Ten 2004 A1 CWE More Specific Unvalidated Input
OWASP Top Ten 2004 A5 CWE More Specific Buffer Overflows
CERT C Secure Coding STR31-C Exact Guarantee that storage for strings has sufficient space for character data and the null terminator
WASC 7 Buffer Overflow
Software Fault Patterns SFP8 Faulty Buffer Access
OMG ASCSM ASCSM-CWE-120
OMG ASCRM ASCRM-CWE-120
+ References
[REF-7] Michael Howard and David LeBlanc. "Writing Secure Code". Chapter 5, "Public Enemy #1: The Buffer Overrun" Page 127. 2nd Edition. Microsoft Press. 2002-12-04.
<https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/store/writing-secure-code-9780735617223>.
[REF-44] Michael Howard, David LeBlanc and John Viega. "24 Deadly Sins of Software Security". "Sin 5: Buffer Overruns." Page 89. McGraw-Hill. 2010.
[REF-56] Microsoft. "Using the Strsafe.h Functions".
<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/menurc/strsafe-ovw?redirectedfrom=MSDN>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-57] Matt Messier and John Viega. "Safe C String Library v1.0.3".
<http://www.gnu-darwin.org/www001/ports-1.5a-CURRENT/devel/safestr/work/safestr-1.0.3/doc/safestr.html>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-58] Michael Howard. "Address Space Layout Randomization in Windows Vista".
<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/michael_howard/address-space-layout-randomization-in-windows-vista>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-59] Arjan van de Ven. "Limiting buffer overflows with ExecShield".
<https://archive.is/saAFo>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-60] "PaX".
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executable_space_protection#PaX>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-74] Jason Lam. "Top 25 Series - Rank 3 - Classic Buffer Overflow". SANS Software Security Institute. 2010-03-02.
<https://www.sans.org/blog/top-25-series-rank-3-classic-buffer-overflow>. (URL validated: 2025-07-29)
[REF-61] Microsoft. "Understanding DEP as a mitigation technology part 1".
<https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2009/06/understanding-dep-as-a-mitigation-technology-part-1/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-76] Sean Barnum and Michael Gegick. "Least Privilege". 2005-09-14.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20211209014121/https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/bsi/articles/knowledge/principles/least-privilege>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 3, "Nonexecutable Stack", Page 76. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 5, "Protection Mechanisms", Page 189. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 8, "C String Handling", Page 388. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
[REF-64] Grant Murphy. "Position Independent Executables (PIE)". Red Hat. 2012-11-28.
<https://www.redhat.com/en/blog/position-independent-executables-pie>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-961] Object Management Group (OMG). "Automated Source Code Reliability Measure (ASCRM)". ASCRM-CWE-120. 2016-01.
<http://www.omg.org/spec/ASCRM/1.0/>.
[REF-962] Object Management Group (OMG). "Automated Source Code Security Measure (ASCSM)". ASCSM-CWE-120. 2016-01.
<http://www.omg.org/spec/ASCSM/1.0/>.
[REF-1332] John Richard Moser. "Prelink and address space randomization". 2006-07-05.
<https://lwn.net/Articles/190139/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1333] Dmitry Evtyushkin, Dmitry Ponomarev, Nael Abu-Ghazaleh. "Jump Over ASLR: Attacking Branch Predictors to Bypass ASLR". 2016.
<http://www.cs.ucr.edu/~nael/pubs/micro16.pdf>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1334] D3FEND. "Stack Frame Canary Validation (D3-SFCV)". 2023.
<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:StackFrameCanaryValidation/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1335] D3FEND. "Segment Address Offset Randomization (D3-SAOR)". 2023.
<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:SegmentAddressOffsetRandomization/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1336] D3FEND. "Process Segment Execution Prevention (D3-PSEP)". 2023.
<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:ProcessSegmentExecutionPrevention/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1337] Alexander Sotirov and Mark Dowd. "Bypassing Browser Memory Protections: Setting back browser security by 10 years". Memory information leaks. 2008.
<https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-08/Sotirov_Dowd/bh08-sotirov-dowd.pdf>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1479] Gregory Larsen, E. Kenneth Hong Fong, David A. Wheeler and Rama S. Moorthy. "State-of-the-Art Resources (SOAR) for Software Vulnerability Detection, Test, and Evaluation". 2014-07.
<https://www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/s/st/stateoftheart-resources-soar-for-software-vulnerability-detection-test-and-evaluation/p-5061.ashx>. (URL validated: 2025-09-05)
[REF-1518] "AddressSanitizer".
<https://clang.llvm.org/docs/AddressSanitizer.html>. (URL validated: 2025-12-10)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
PLOVER
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2026-01-21
(CWE 4.19.1, 2026-01-21)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Detection_Factors, References, Terminology_Notes
2025-09-09
(CWE 4.18, 2025-09-09)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Detection_Factors, Diagram, Other_Notes, References
2025-04-03
(CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Description
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2021-07-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2021-03-15 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2020-12-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships
2020-08-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Alternate_Terms, Relationships
2020-06-25 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Potential_Mitigations
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2018-03-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Causal_Nature, Demonstrative_Examples, Likelihood_of_Exploit, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings, White_Box_Definitions
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2014-02-18 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, References
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2011-09-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2011-03-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description
2010-12-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2010-09-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2010-06-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Potential_Mitigations, References
2010-04-05 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns
2010-02-16 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings, Time_of_Introduction, Type
2009-10-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships
2009-07-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
2009-01-12 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationship_Notes, Relationships
2008-11-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Other_Notes, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-10-14 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Alternate_Terms, Description, Name, Other_Notes, Terminology_Notes
2008-10-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
Changed name and description to more clearly emphasize the "classic" nature of the overflow.
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Alternate_Terms, Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Relationships, Observed_Example, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings, Weakness_Ordinalities
2008-08-15 Veracode
Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping
2008-08-01 KDM Analytics
added/updated white box definitions
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2008-10-14 Unbounded Transfer ('Classic Buffer Overflow')

CWE-300: Channel Accessible by Non-Endpoint

Weakness ID: 300
Vulnerability Mapping: DISCOURAGED This CWE ID should not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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Edit Custom Filter


+ Description
The product does not adequately verify the identity of actors at both ends of a communication channel, or does not adequately ensure the integrity of the channel, in a way that allows the channel to be accessed or influenced by an actor that is not an endpoint.
+ Extended Description
In order to establish secure communication between two parties, it is often important to adequately verify the identity of entities at each end of the communication channel. Inadequate or inconsistent verification may result in insufficient or incorrect identification of either communicating entity. This can have negative consequences such as misplaced trust in the entity at the other end of the channel. An attacker can leverage this by interposing between the communicating entities and masquerading as the original entity. In the absence of sufficient verification of identity, such an attacker can eavesdrop and potentially modify the communication between the original entities.
+ Alternate Terms
Adversary-in-the-Middle / AITM
Attacker-in-the-Middle / AITM
Man-in-the-Middle / MITM
Person-in-the-Middle / PITM
Monkey-in-the-Middle
Monster-in-the-Middle
Manipulator-in-the-Middle
On-path attack
Interception attack
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Read Application Data; Modify Application Data; Gain Privileges or Assume Identity

Scope: Confidentiality, Integrity, Access Control

An attacker could pose as one of the entities and read or possibly modify the communication.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Implementation

Always fully authenticate both ends of any communications channel.

Architecture and Design

Adhere to the principle of complete mediation.

Implementation

A certificate binds an identity to a cryptographic key to authenticate a communicating party. Often, the certificate takes the encrypted form of the hash of the identity of the subject, the public key, and information such as time of issue or expiration using the issuer's private key. The certificate can be validated by deciphering the certificate with the issuer's public key. See also X.509 certificate signature chains and the PGP certification structure.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 923 Improper Restriction of Communication Channel to Intended Endpoints
PeerOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 602 Client-Side Enforcement of Server-Side Security
PeerOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 603 Use of Client-Side Authentication
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1011 Authorize Actors
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


In the Java snippet below, data is sent over an unencrypted channel to a remote server.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
Socket sock;
PrintWriter out;

try {
sock = new Socket(REMOTE_HOST, REMOTE_PORT);
out = new PrintWriter(echoSocket.getOutputStream(), true);

// Write data to remote host via socket output stream.
...
}

By eavesdropping on the communication channel or posing as the endpoint, an attacker would be able to read all of the transmitted data.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Chain: incorrect "goto" in Apple SSL product bypasses certificate validation, allowing Adversary-in-the-Middle (AITM) attack (Apple "goto fail" bug). CWE-705 (Incorrect Control Flow Scoping) -> CWE-561 (Dead Code) -> CWE-295 (Improper Certificate Validation) -> CWE-393 (Return of Wrong Status Code) -> CWE-300 (Channel Accessible by Non-Endpoint). The code's whitespace indentation did not reflect the actual control flow (CWE-1114) and did not explicitly delimit the block (CWE-483), which could have made it more difficult for human code auditors to detect the vulnerability.
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
Resultant
(where the weakness is typically related to the presence of some other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Dynamic Analysis

Some tools can act as proxy servers that allow the tester to intercept packets or messages, inspect them, and modify them before sending them to the destination in order to see if the modified packets are still accepted by the receiving component.

Automated Dynamic Analysis

Dynamic Application Security Testing (DAST) tools can be used to detect network traffic without encryption and/or verification. The affected protocol may be subject to Adversary-in-the-Middle attacks. Some tools act as proxy servers that allow the tester to inspect and modify packets/messages to see if they are still accepted by the receiving component.

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.) The analysis could identify use of protocols that are subject to Adversary-in-the-Middle attacks.

Effectiveness: Moderate

Note:Encryption and other protection mechanisms may be provided in the environment (e.g., by a load balancer or firewall that is positioned in front of a server), but this cannot be detected by SAST tools.
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 859 The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) Chapter 16 - Platform Security (SEC)
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 956 SFP Secondary Cluster: Channel Attack
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1353 OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A07:2021 - Identification and Authentication Failures
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1396 Comprehensive Categorization: Access Control
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1442 OWASP Top Ten 2025 Category A07:2025 - Authentication Failures
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage DISCOURAGED
(this CWE ID should not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Frequent Misuse

Rationale

CWE-300 is commonly misused for vulnerabilities in which the prerequisites for exploitation require the adversary to be in a privileged "in-the-middle" position.

Comments

Consider root-cause weaknesses that allow adversary-in-the-middle attacks to happen, such as CWEs involving poor integrity protection.
+ Notes

Maintenance

The summary identifies multiple distinct possibilities, suggesting that this is a category that must be broken into more specific weaknesses.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
PLOVER Man-in-the-middle (MITM)
WASC 32 Routing Detour
The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) SEC06-J Do not rely on the default automatic signature verification provided by URLClassLoader and java.util.jar
+ References
[REF-244] M. Bishop. "Computer Security: Art and Science". Addison-Wesley. 2003.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
PLOVER
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2024-09-02
(CWE 4.18, 2025-09-09)
Renaud Sauvain West Pharmaceutical Services
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities
2025-09-09
(CWE 4.18, 2025-09-09)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Alternate_Terms, Detection_Factors
2024-07-16
(CWE 4.15, 2024-07-16)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Alternate_Terms
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-07-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Alternate_Terms, Observed_Examples
2021-03-15 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Alternate_Terms, Related_Attack_Patterns
2020-12-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Alternate_Terms, Name, Observed_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Taxonomy_Mappings
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships
2014-06-23 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2014-02-18 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2010-12-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2010-02-16 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Taxonomy_Mappings
2009-05-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Name
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Maintenance_Notes, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
2008-07-01 Sean Eidemiller Cigital
added/updated demonstrative examples
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2008-04-11 Man-in-the-middle (MITM)
2009-05-27 Channel Accessible by Non-Endpoint (aka 'Man-in-the-Middle')
2020-02-24 Channel Accessible by Non-Endpoint ('Man-in-the-Middle')

CWE-312: Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information

Weakness ID: 312
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
The product stores sensitive information in cleartext within a resource that might be accessible to another control sphere. Diagram for CWE-312
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Read Application Data

Scope: Confidentiality

An attacker with access to the system could read sensitive information stored in cleartext (i.e., unencrypted). Even if the information is encoded in a way that is not human-readable, certain techniques could determine which encoding is being used, then decode the information.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Implementation; System Configuration; Operation

When storing data in the cloud (e.g., S3 buckets, Azure blobs, Google Cloud Storage, etc.), use the provider's controls to encrypt the data at rest. [REF-1297] [REF-1299] [REF-1301]

Implementation; System Configuration; Operation

In some systems/environments such as cloud, the use of "double encryption" (at both the software and hardware layer) might be required, and the developer might be solely responsible for both layers, instead of shared responsibility with the administrator of the broader system/environment.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 311 Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 922 Insecure Storage of Sensitive Information
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 313 Cleartext Storage in a File or on Disk
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 314 Cleartext Storage in the Registry
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 315 Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information in a Cookie
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 316 Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information in Memory
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 317 Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information in GUI
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 318 Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information in Executable
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 526 Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information in an Environment Variable
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 199 Information Management Errors
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 311 Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1013 Encrypt Data
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design OMISSION: This weakness is caused by missing a security tactic during the architecture and design phase.
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: Cloud Computing (Undetermined Prevalence)

Class: ICS/OT (Undetermined Prevalence)

Class: Mobile (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


The following code excerpt stores a plaintext user account ID in a browser cookie.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
response.addCookie( new Cookie("userAccountID", acctID);

Because the account ID is in plaintext, the user's account information is exposed if their computer is compromised by an attacker.



Example 2


This code writes a user's login information to a cookie so the user does not have to login again later.

(bad code)
Example Language: PHP 
function persistLogin($username, $password){
$data = array("username" => $username, "password"=> $password);
setcookie ("userdata", $data);
}

The code stores the user's username and password in plaintext in a cookie on the user's machine. This exposes the user's login information if their computer is compromised by an attacker. Even if the user's machine is not compromised, this weakness combined with cross-site scripting (CWE-79) could allow an attacker to remotely copy the cookie.

Also note this example code also exhibits Plaintext Storage in a Cookie (CWE-315).



Example 3


The following code attempts to establish a connection, read in a password, then store it to a buffer.

(bad code)
Example Language:
server.sin_family = AF_INET; hp = gethostbyname(argv[1]);
if (hp==NULL) error("Unknown host");
memcpy( (char *)&server.sin_addr,(char *)hp->h_addr,hp->h_length);
if (argc < 3) port = 80;
else port = (unsigned short)atoi(argv[3]);
server.sin_port = htons(port);
if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&server, sizeof server) < 0) error("Connecting");
...
while ((n=read(sock,buffer,BUFSIZE-1))!=-1) {

write(dfd,password_buffer,n);
...

While successful, the program does not encrypt the data before writing it to a buffer, possibly exposing it to unauthorized actors.



Example 4


The following examples show a portion of properties and configuration files for Java and ASP.NET applications. The files include username and password information but they are stored in cleartext.

This Java example shows a properties file with a cleartext username / password pair.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 

# Java Web App ResourceBundle properties file
...
webapp.ldap.username=secretUsername
webapp.ldap.password=secretPassword
...

The following example shows a portion of a configuration file for an ASP.Net application. This configuration file includes username and password information for a connection to a database but the pair is stored in cleartext.

(bad code)
Example Language: ASP.NET 
...
<connectionStrings>
<add name="ud_DEV" connectionString="connectDB=uDB; uid=db2admin; pwd=password; dbalias=uDB;" providerName="System.Data.Odbc" />
</connectionStrings>
...

Username and password information should not be included in a configuration file or a properties file in cleartext as this will allow anyone who can read the file access to the resource. If possible, encrypt this information.



Example 5


In 2022, the OT:ICEFALL study examined products by 10 different Operational Technology (OT) vendors. The researchers reported 56 vulnerabilities and said that the products were "insecure by design" [REF-1283]. If exploited, these vulnerabilities often allowed adversaries to change how the products operated, ranging from denial of service to changing the code that the products executed. Since these products were often used in industries such as power, electrical, water, and others, there could even be safety implications.

At least one OT product stored a password in plaintext.



Example 6


In 2021, a web site operated by PeopleGIS stored data of US municipalities in Amazon Web Service (AWS) Simple Storage Service (S3) buckets.

(bad code)
Example Language: Other 
A security researcher found 86 S3 buckets that could be accessed without authentication (CWE-306) and stored data unencrypted (CWE-312). These buckets exposed over 1000 GB of data and 1.6 million files including physical addresses, phone numbers, tax documents, pictures of driver's license IDs, etc. [REF-1296] [REF-1295]

While it was not publicly disclosed how the data was protected after discovery, multiple options could have been considered.

(good code)
Example Language: Other 
The sensitive information could have been protected by ensuring that the buckets did not have public read access, e.g., by enabling the s3-account-level-public-access-blocks-periodic rule to Block Public Access. In addition, the data could have been encrypted at rest using the appropriate S3 settings, e.g., by enabling server-side encryption using the s3-bucket-server-side-encryption-enabled setting. Other settings are available to further prevent bucket data from being leaked. [REF-1297]


Example 7


Consider the following PowerShell command examples for encryption scopes of Azure storage objects. In the first example, an encryption scope is set for the storage account.

(bad code)
Example Language: Shell 
New-AzStorageEncryptionScope -ResourceGroupName "MyResourceGroup" -AccountName "MyStorageAccount" -EncryptionScopeName testscope -StorageEncryption

The result (edited and formatted for readability) might be:

(bad code)
Example Language: Other 
ResourceGroupName: MyResourceGroup, StorageAccountName: MyStorageAccount

Name State Source RequireInfrastructureEncryption
testscope Enabled Microsoft.Storage

However, the empty string under RequireInfrastructureEncryption indicates this service was not enabled at the time of creation, because the -RequireInfrastructureEncryption argument was not specified in the command.

Including the -RequireInfrastructureEncryption argument addresses the issue:

(good code)
Example Language: Shell 
New-AzStorageEncryptionScope -ResourceGroupName "MyResourceGroup" -AccountName "MyStorageAccount" -EncryptionScopeName testscope -StorageEncryption -RequireInfrastructureEncryption

This produces the report:

(result)
Example Language: Other 
ResourceGroupName: MyResourceGroup, StorageAccountName: MyStorageAccount

Name State Source RequireInfrastructureEncryption
testscope Enabled Microsoft.Keyvault True

In a scenario where both software and hardware layer encryption is required ("double encryption"), Azure's infrastructure encryption setting can be enabled via the CLI or Portal. An important note is that infrastructure hardware encryption cannot be enabled or disabled after a blob is created. Furthermore, the default value for infrastructure encryption is disabled in blob creations.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
wireless battery product stores credentials and Personal Health Information (PHI) without encryption
Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) uses a driver that relies on a password stored in plaintext.
password and username stored in cleartext in a cookie
password stored in cleartext in a file with insecure permissions
chat program disables SSL in some circumstances even when the user says to use SSL.
Chain: product uses an incorrect public exponent when generating an RSA key, which effectively disables the encryption
storage of unencrypted passwords in a database
storage of unencrypted passwords in a database
product stores a password in cleartext in memory
storage of a secret key in cleartext in a temporary file
SCADA product uses HTTP Basic Authentication, which is not encrypted
login credentials stored unencrypted in a registry key
Plaintext credentials in world-readable file.
Password in cleartext in config file.
Password in cleartext in config file.
Decrypted copy of a message written to disk given a combination of options and when user replies to an encrypted message.
Plaintext storage of private key and passphrase in log file when user imports the key.
Admin password in plaintext in a cookie.
Default configuration has cleartext usernames/passwords in cookie.
Usernames/passwords in cleartext in cookies.
Authentication information stored in cleartext in a cookie.
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Effectiveness: High

+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 816 OWASP Top Ten 2010 Category A7 - Insecure Cryptographic Storage
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 934 OWASP Top Ten 2013 Category A6 - Sensitive Data Exposure
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 963 SFP Secondary Cluster: Exposed Data
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1029 OWASP Top Ten 2017 Category A3 - Sensitive Data Exposure
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1348 OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A04:2021 - Insecure Design
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1366 ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1368 ICS Dependencies (& Architecture): External Digital Systems
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1402 Comprehensive Categorization: Encryption
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1441 OWASP Top Ten 2025 Category A06:2025 - Insecure Design
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Notes

Terminology

Different people use "cleartext" and "plaintext" to mean the same thing: the lack of encryption. However, within cryptography, these have more precise meanings. Plaintext is the information just before it is fed into a cryptographic algorithm, including already-encrypted text. Cleartext is any information that is unencrypted, although it might be in an encoded form that is not easily human-readable (such as base64 encoding).

Other

When organizations adopt cloud services, it can be easier for attackers to access the data from anywhere on the Internet.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
PLOVER Plaintext Storage of Sensitive Information
Software Fault Patterns SFP23 Exposed Data
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-2 Req CR 4.1 a)
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 3-3 Req SR 4.1
+ References
[REF-7] Michael Howard and David LeBlanc. "Writing Secure Code". Chapter 9, "Protecting Secret Data" Page 299. 2nd Edition. Microsoft Press. 2002-12-04.
<https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/store/writing-secure-code-9780735617223>.
[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 2, "Common Vulnerabilities of Encryption", Page 43. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
[REF-172] Chris Wysopal. "Mobile App Top 10 List". 2010-12-13.
<https://www.veracode.com/blog/2010/12/mobile-app-top-10-list>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-1283] Forescout Vedere Labs. "OT:ICEFALL: The legacy of "insecure by design" and its implications for certifications and risk management". 2022-06-20.
<https://www.forescout.com/resources/ot-icefall-report/>.
[REF-1295] WizCase. "Over 80 US Municipalities' Sensitive Information, Including Resident's Personal Data, Left Vulnerable in Massive Data Breach". 2021-07-20.
<https://www.wizcase.com/blog/us-municipality-breach-report/>.
[REF-1296] Jonathan Greig. "1,000 GB of local government data exposed by Massachusetts software company". 2021-07-22.
<https://www.zdnet.com/article/1000-gb-of-local-government-data-exposed-by-massachusetts-software-company/>.
[REF-1297] Amazon. "AWS Foundational Security Best Practices controls". 2022.
<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/securityhub/latest/userguide/securityhub-controls-reference.html>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-1299] Microsoft. "Azure encryption overview". 2022-08-18.
<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security/fundamentals/encryption-overview>. (URL validated: 2022-10-11)
[REF-1301] Google Cloud. "Default encryption at rest". 2022-10-11.
<https://cloud.google.com/docs/security/encryption/default-encryption>. (URL validated: 2022-10-11)
[REF-1307] Center for Internet Security. "CIS Microsoft Azure Foundations Benchmark version 1.5.0". Section 3.2. 2022-08-16.
<https://www.cisecurity.org/benchmark/azure>. (URL validated: 2023-01-19)
[REF-1310] Microsoft. "Enable infrastructure encryption for double encryption of data". 2022-07-14.
<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/common/infrastructure-encryption-enable>. (URL validated: 2023-01-24)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
PLOVER
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2023-04-25 "Mapping CWE to 62443" Sub-Working Group CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT SIG
Suggested mappings to ISA/IEC 62443.
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities
2025-04-03
(CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Taxonomy_Mappings
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, References, Relationships
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References
2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-03-15 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Type
2018-03-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships, Type
2018-01-23 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Abstraction, Relationships
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships
2017-05-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2013-07-17 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Relationships, Terminology_Notes
2013-02-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, References
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2010-06-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2010-02-16 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2009-01-12 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Name
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2009-01-12 Plaintext Storage of Sensitive Information

CWE-319: Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information

Weakness ID: 319
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
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+ Description
The product transmits sensitive or security-critical data in cleartext in a communication channel that can be sniffed by unauthorized actors. Diagram for CWE-319
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Read Application Data; Modify Files or Directories

Scope: Integrity, Confidentiality

Anyone can read the information by gaining access to the channel being used for communication. Many communication channels can be "sniffed" (monitored) by adversaries during data transmission. For example, in networking, packets can traverse many intermediary nodes from the source to the destination, whether across the internet, an internal network, the cloud, etc. Some actors might have privileged access to a network interface or any link along the channel, such as a router, but they might not be authorized to collect the underlying data. As a result, network traffic could be sniffed by adversaries, spilling security-critical data.

Read Application Data; Modify Files or Directories; Other

Scope: Integrity, Confidentiality

When full communications are recorded or logged, such as with a packet dump, an adversary could attempt to obtain the dump long after the transmission has occurred and try to "sniff" the cleartext from the recorded communications in the dump itself. Even if the information is encoded in a way that is not human-readable, certain techniques could determine which encoding is being used, then decode the information.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design

Before transmitting, encrypt the data using reliable, confidentiality-protecting cryptographic protocols.

Implementation

When using web applications with SSL, use SSL for the entire session from login to logout, not just for the initial login page.

Implementation

When designing hardware platforms, ensure that approved encryption algorithms (such as those recommended by NIST) protect paths from security critical data to trusted user applications.

Testing

Use tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session. These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules.

Operation

Configure servers to use encrypted channels for communication, which may include SSL or other secure protocols.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 311 Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 5 J2EE Misconfiguration: Data Transmission Without Encryption
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 614 Sensitive Cookie in HTTPS Session Without 'Secure' Attribute
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1428 Reliance on HTTP instead of HTTPS
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 199 Information Management Errors
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 311 Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1013 Encrypt Data
+ Relevant to the view "Hardware Design" (View-1194)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1207 Debug and Test Problems
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design OMISSION: This weakness is caused by missing a security tactic during the architecture and design phase.
Architecture and Design For hardware, this may be introduced when design does not plan for an attacker having physical access while a legitimate user is remotely operating the device.
Operation
System Configuration
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Class: Cloud Computing (Undetermined Prevalence)

Class: Mobile (Undetermined Prevalence)

Class: ICS/OT (Often Prevalent)

Class: System on Chip (Undetermined Prevalence)

Test/Debug Hardware (Often Prevalent)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
High
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


The following code attempts to establish a connection to a site to communicate sensitive information.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
try {
URL u = new URL("http://www.secret.example.org/");
HttpURLConnection hu = (HttpURLConnection) u.openConnection();
hu.setRequestMethod("PUT");
hu.connect();
OutputStream os = hu.getOutputStream();
hu.disconnect();
}
catch (IOException e) {
//...
}

Though a connection is successfully made, the connection is unencrypted and it is possible that all sensitive data sent to or received from the server will be read by unintended actors.



Example 2


In 2022, the OT:ICEFALL study examined products by 10 different Operational Technology (OT) vendors. The researchers reported 56 vulnerabilities and said that the products were "insecure by design" [REF-1283]. If exploited, these vulnerabilities often allowed adversaries to change how the products operated, ranging from denial of service to changing the code that the products executed. Since these products were often used in industries such as power, electrical, water, and others, there could even be safety implications.

Multiple vendors used cleartext transmission of sensitive information in their OT products.



Example 3


A TAP accessible register is read/written by a JTAG based tool, for internal use by authorized users. However, an adversary can connect a probing device and collect the values from the unencrypted channel connecting the JTAG interface to the authorized user, if no additional protections are employed.



Example 4


The following Azure CLI command lists the properties of a particular storage account:

(informative)
Example Language: Shell 
az storage account show -g {ResourceGroupName} -n {StorageAccountName}

The JSON result might be:

(bad code)
Example Language: JSON 
{
"name": "{StorageAccountName}",
"enableHttpsTrafficOnly": false,
"type": "Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts"
}

The enableHttpsTrafficOnly value is set to false, because the default setting for Secure transfer is set to Disabled. This allows cloud storage resources to successfully connect and transfer data without the use of encryption (e.g., HTTP, SMB 2.1, SMB 3.0, etc.).

Azure's storage accounts can be configured to only accept requests from secure connections made over HTTPS. The secure transfer setting can be enabled using Azure's Portal (GUI) or programmatically by setting the enableHttpsTrafficOnly property to True on the storage account, such as:

(good code)
Example Language: Shell 
az storage account update -g {ResourceGroupName} -n {StorageAccountName} --https-only true

The change can be confirmed from the result by verifying that the enableHttpsTrafficOnly value is true:

(good code)
Example Language: JSON 
{
"name": "{StorageAccountName}",
"enableHttpsTrafficOnly": true,
"type": "Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts"
}

Note: to enable secure transfer using Azure's Portal instead of the command line:

  1. Open the Create storage account pane in the Azure portal.
  2. In the Advanced page, select the Enable secure transfer checkbox.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) sends sensitive information in plaintext, including passwords and session tokens.
Building Controller uses a protocol that transmits authentication credentials in plaintext.
Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) sends password in plaintext.
Passwords transmitted in cleartext.
Chain: Use of HTTPS cookie without "secure" flag causes it to be transmitted across unencrypted HTTP.
Product sends password hash in cleartext in violation of intended policy.
Remote management feature sends sensitive information including passwords in cleartext.
Backup routine sends password in cleartext in email.
Product transmits Blowfish encryption key in cleartext.
Printer sends configuration information, including administrative password, in cleartext.
Chain: cleartext transmission of the MD5 hash of password enables attacks against a server that is susceptible to replay (CWE-294).
Product sends passwords in cleartext to a log server.
Product sends file with cleartext passwords in e-mail message intended for diagnostic purposes.
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
Resultant
(where the weakness is typically related to the presence of some other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Black Box

Use monitoring tools that examine the software's process as it interacts with the operating system and the network. This technique is useful in cases when source code is unavailable, if the software was not developed by you, or if you want to verify that the build phase did not introduce any new weaknesses. Examples include debuggers that directly attach to the running process; system-call tracing utilities such as truss (Solaris) and strace (Linux); system activity monitors such as FileMon, RegMon, Process Monitor, and other Sysinternals utilities (Windows); and sniffers and protocol analyzers that monitor network traffic.

Attach the monitor to the process, trigger the feature that sends the data, and look for the presence or absence of common cryptographic functions in the call tree. Monitor the network and determine if the data packets contain readable commands. Tools exist for detecting if certain encodings are in use. If the traffic contains high entropy, this might indicate the usage of encryption.

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Effectiveness: High

+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 751 2009 Top 25 - Insecure Interaction Between Components
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 818 OWASP Top Ten 2010 Category A9 - Insufficient Transport Layer Protection
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 858 The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) Chapter 15 - Serialization (SER)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 859 The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) Chapter 16 - Platform Security (SEC)
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 934 OWASP Top Ten 2013 Category A6 - Sensitive Data Exposure
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 963 SFP Secondary Cluster: Exposed Data
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1029 OWASP Top Ten 2017 Category A3 - Sensitive Data Exposure
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1148 SEI CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java - Guidelines 14. Serialization (SER)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1346 OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A02:2021 - Cryptographic Failures
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1366 ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1402 Comprehensive Categorization: Encryption
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1439 OWASP Top Ten 2025 Category A04:2025 - Cryptographic Failures
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Notes

Other

Applicable communication channels are not limited to software products. Applicable channels include hardware-specific technologies such as internal hardware networks and external debug channels, supporting remote JTAG debugging. When mitigations are not applied to combat adversaries within the product's threat model, this weakness significantly lowers the difficulty of exploitation by such adversaries.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
PLOVER Plaintext Transmission of Sensitive Information
The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) SEC06-J Do not rely on the default automatic signature verification provided by URLClassLoader and java.util.jar
The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) SER02-J Sign then seal sensitive objects before sending them outside a trust boundary
Software Fault Patterns SFP23 Exposed Data
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 3-3 Req SR 4.1
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-2 Req CR 4.1B
+ References
[REF-271] OWASP. "Top 10 2007-Insecure Communications". 2007.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20160319230109/http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Top_10_2007-A9>. (URL validated: 2025-08-04)
[REF-7] Michael Howard and David LeBlanc. "Writing Secure Code". Chapter 9, "Protecting Secret Data" Page 299. 2nd Edition. Microsoft Press. 2002-12-04.
<https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/store/writing-secure-code-9780735617223>.
[REF-44] Michael Howard, David LeBlanc and John Viega. "24 Deadly Sins of Software Security". "Sin 22: Failing to Protect Network Traffic." Page 337. McGraw-Hill. 2010.
[REF-172] Chris Wysopal. "Mobile App Top 10 List". 2010-12-13.
<https://www.veracode.com/blog/2010/12/mobile-app-top-10-list>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-1283] Forescout Vedere Labs. "OT:ICEFALL: The legacy of "insecure by design" and its implications for certifications and risk management". 2022-06-20.
<https://www.forescout.com/resources/ot-icefall-report/>.
[REF-1307] Center for Internet Security. "CIS Microsoft Azure Foundations Benchmark version 1.5.0". Sections 3.1 and 3.10. 2022-08-16.
<https://www.cisecurity.org/benchmark/azure>. (URL validated: 2023-01-19)
[REF-1309] Microsoft. "Require secure transfer to ensure secure connections". 2022-07-24.
<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/common/storage-require-secure-transfer>. (URL validated: 2023-01-24)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
PLOVER
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2023-01-24 Accellera IP Security Assurance (IPSA) Working Group Accellera Systems Initiative
Submitted original contents of CWE-1324 and reviewed its integration into this entry.
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Maintenance_Notes, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities
2025-09-09
(CWE 4.18, 2025-09-09)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2025-04-03
(CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram, Other_Notes, Relationships
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Mapping_Notes, Relationships
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, References, Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Maintenance_Notes, Modes_of_Introduction, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, References
2022-06-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Type
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2018-03-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships, Type
2018-01-23 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Abstraction
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Likelihood_of_Exploit, Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships
2017-05-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2014-06-23 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-02-18 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2013-07-17 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2013-02-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, References
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-03-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2010-12-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns
2010-06-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships
2010-04-05 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Time_of_Introduction
2010-02-16 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2009-05-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2009-03-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2009-01-12 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Name, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2009-01-12 Plaintext Transmission of Sensitive Information

CWE-602: Client-Side Enforcement of Server-Side Security

Weakness ID: 602
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities in limited situations requiring careful review (with careful review of mapping notes)
Abstraction: Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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Edit Custom Filter


+ Description
The product is composed of a server that relies on the client to implement a mechanism that is intended to protect the server.
+ Extended Description
When the server relies on protection mechanisms placed on the client side, an attacker can modify the client-side behavior to bypass the protection mechanisms, resulting in potentially unexpected interactions between the client and server. The consequences will vary, depending on what the mechanisms are trying to protect.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Bypass Protection Mechanism; DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart

Scope: Access Control, Availability

Client-side validation checks can be easily bypassed, allowing malformed or unexpected input to pass into the application, potentially as trusted data. This may lead to unexpected states, behaviors and possibly a resulting crash.

Bypass Protection Mechanism; Gain Privileges or Assume Identity

Scope: Access Control

Client-side checks for authentication can be easily bypassed, allowing clients to escalate their access levels and perform unintended actions.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design

For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

Even though client-side checks provide minimal benefits with respect to server-side security, they are still useful. First, they can support intrusion detection. If the server receives input that should have been rejected by the client, then it may be an indication of an attack. Second, client-side error-checking can provide helpful feedback to the user about the expectations for valid input. Third, there may be a reduction in server-side processing time for accidental input errors, although this is typically a small savings.

Architecture and Design

If some degree of trust is required between the two entities, then use integrity checking and strong authentication to ensure that the inputs are coming from a trusted source. Design the product so that this trust is managed in a centralized fashion, especially if there are complex or numerous communication channels, in order to reduce the risks that the implementer will mistakenly omit a check in a single code path.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 693 Protection Mechanism Failure
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 565 Reliance on Cookies without Validation and Integrity Checking
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 603 Use of Client-Side Authentication
PeerOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 290 Authentication Bypass by Spoofing
PeerOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 300 Channel Accessible by Non-Endpoint
PeerOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 836 Use of Password Hash Instead of Password for Authentication
CanPrecede Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 471 Modification of Assumed-Immutable Data (MAID)
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1012 Cross Cutting
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design COMMISSION: This weakness refers to an incorrect design related to an architectural security tactic.
Architecture and Design Consider a product that consists of two or more processes or nodes that must interact closely, such as a client/server model. If the product uses protection schemes in the client in order to defend from attacks against the server, and the server does not use the same schemes, then an attacker could modify the client in a way that bypasses those schemes. This is a fundamental design flaw that is primary to many weaknesses.
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: ICS/OT (Undetermined Prevalence)

Class: Mobile (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
Medium
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


This example contains client-side code that checks if the user authenticated successfully before sending a command. The server-side code performs the authentication in one step, and executes the command in a separate step.

CLIENT-SIDE (client.pl)

(good code)
Example Language: Perl 
$server = "server.example.com";
$username = AskForUserName();
$password = AskForPassword();
$address = AskForAddress();
$sock = OpenSocket($server, 1234);
writeSocket($sock, "AUTH $username $password\n");
$resp = readSocket($sock);
if ($resp eq "success") {

# username/pass is valid, go ahead and update the info!
writeSocket($sock, "CHANGE-ADDRESS $username $address\n";
}
else {
print "ERROR: Invalid Authentication!\n";
}

SERVER-SIDE (server.pl):

(bad code)
Example Language: Perl 
$sock = acceptSocket(1234);
($cmd, $args) = ParseClientRequest($sock);
if ($cmd eq "AUTH") {
($username, $pass) = split(/\s+/, $args, 2);
$result = AuthenticateUser($username, $pass);
writeSocket($sock, "$result\n");
# does not close the socket on failure; assumes the

# user will try again
}
elsif ($cmd eq "CHANGE-ADDRESS") {
if (validateAddress($args)) {
$res = UpdateDatabaseRecord($username, "address", $args);
writeSocket($sock, "SUCCESS\n");
}
else {
writeSocket($sock, "FAILURE -- address is malformed\n");
}
}

The server accepts 2 commands, "AUTH" which authenticates the user, and "CHANGE-ADDRESS" which updates the address field for the username. The client performs the authentication and only sends a CHANGE-ADDRESS for that user if the authentication succeeds. Because the client has already performed the authentication, the server assumes that the username in the CHANGE-ADDRESS is the same as the authenticated user. An attacker could modify the client by removing the code that sends the "AUTH" command and simply executing the CHANGE-ADDRESS.



Example 2


In 2022, the OT:ICEFALL study examined products by 10 different Operational Technology (OT) vendors. The researchers reported 56 vulnerabilities and said that the products were "insecure by design" [REF-1283]. If exploited, these vulnerabilities often allowed adversaries to change how the products operated, ranging from denial of service to changing the code that the products executed. Since these products were often used in industries such as power, electrical, water, and others, there could even be safety implications.

Multiple vendors used client-side authentication in their OT products.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Chain: e-commerce product has a "front-end restriction" for coupon use (CWE-602), but the server does not restrict the number of requests for the same coupon (CWE-799)
SCADA system only uses client-side authentication, allowing adversaries to impersonate other users.
ASP program allows upload of .asp files by bypassing client-side checks.
steganography products embed password information in the carrier file, which can be extracted from a modified client.
steganography products embed password information in the carrier file, which can be extracted from a modified client.
client allows server to modify client's configuration and overwrite arbitrary files.
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Fuzzing

Use dynamic tools and techniques that interact with the software using large test suites with many diverse inputs, such as fuzz testing (fuzzing), robustness testing, and fault injection. The software's operation may slow down, but it should not become unstable, crash, or generate incorrect results.

Manual Analysis

Use tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session. These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules.
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 722 OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A1 - Unvalidated Input
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 753 2009 Top 25 - Porous Defenses
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 975 SFP Secondary Cluster: Architecture
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1348 OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A04:2021 - Insecure Design
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1413 Comprehensive Categorization: Protection Mechanism Failure
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1441 OWASP Top Ten 2025 Category A06:2025 - Insecure Design
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED-WITH-REVIEW
(this CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities in limited situations requiring careful review)
Reason Abstraction

Rationale

This CWE entry is a Class and might have Base-level children that would be more appropriate

Comments

Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
OWASP Top Ten 2004 A1 CWE More Specific Unvalidated Input
+ References
[REF-7] Michael Howard and David LeBlanc. "Writing Secure Code". Chapter 23, "Client-Side Security Is an Oxymoron" Page 687. 2nd Edition. Microsoft Press. 2002-12-04.
<https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/store/writing-secure-code-9780735617223>.
[REF-1283] Forescout Vedere Labs. "OT:ICEFALL: The legacy of "insecure by design" and its implications for certifications and risk management". 2022-06-20.
<https://www.forescout.com/resources/ot-icefall-report/>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2007-05-07
(CWE Draft 6, 2007-05-07)
CWE Community
Submitted by members of the CWE community to extend early CWE versions
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
2025-04-03
(CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships, Type
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Observed_Examples, References, Relationships
2022-04-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Research_Gaps
2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2018-03-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Enabling_Factors_for_Exploitation, Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships
2017-05-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2011-03-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2010-12-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2010-04-05 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2010-02-16 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2009-10-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Description
2009-07-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2009-05-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2009-03-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2009-01-12 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Name, Observed_Examples, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships, Research_Gaps, Time_of_Introduction
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings, Weakness_Ordinalities
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2008-04-11 Client-Side Enforcement of Server-Side Security
2009-01-12 Design Principle Violation: Client-Side Enforcement of Server-Side Security

CWE-498: Cloneable Class Containing Sensitive Information

Weakness ID: 498
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
The code contains a class with sensitive data, but the class is cloneable. The data can then be accessed by cloning the class.
+ Extended Description
Cloneable classes are effectively open classes, since data cannot be hidden in them. Classes that do not explicitly deny cloning can be cloned by any other class without running the constructor.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Bypass Protection Mechanism

Scope: Access Control

A class that can be cloned can be produced without executing the constructor. This is dangerous since the constructor may perform security-related checks. By allowing the object to be cloned, those checks may be bypassed.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Implementation

If you do make your classes clonable, ensure that your clone method is final and throw super.clone().
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 668 Exposure of Resource to Wrong Sphere
CanPrecede Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 200 Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Object-Oriented (Undetermined Prevalence)

C++ (Undetermined Prevalence)

Java (Undetermined Prevalence)

C# (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
Medium
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


The following example demonstrates the weakness.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
public class CloneClient {
public CloneClient() //throws
java.lang.CloneNotSupportedException {

Teacher t1 = new Teacher("guddu","22,nagar road");
//...
// Do some stuff to remove the teacher.
Teacher t2 = (Teacher)t1.clone();
System.out.println(t2.name);
}
public static void main(String args[]) {

new CloneClient();
}
}
class Teacher implements Cloneable {

public Object clone() {

try {
return super.clone();
}
catch (java.lang.CloneNotSupportedException e) {

throw new RuntimeException(e.toString());
}
}
public String name;
public String clas;
public Teacher(String name,String clas) {

this.name = name;
this.clas = clas;
}
}

Make classes uncloneable by defining a clone function like:

(good code)
Example Language: Java 
public final void clone() throws java.lang.CloneNotSupportedException {
throw new java.lang.CloneNotSupportedException();
}


+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 849 The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) Chapter 6 - Object Orientation (OBJ)
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 963 SFP Secondary Cluster: Exposed Data
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1139 SEI CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java - Guidelines 05. Object Orientation (OBJ)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1403 Comprehensive Categorization: Exposed Resource
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Variant level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
CLASP Information leak through class cloning
The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) OBJ07-J Sensitive classes must not let themselves be copied
Software Fault Patterns SFP23 Exposed Data
+ References
[REF-18] Secure Software, Inc.. "The CLASP Application Security Process". 2005.
<https://cwe.mitre.org/documents/sources/TheCLASPApplicationSecurityProcess.pdf>. (URL validated: 2024-11-17)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
CLASP
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Detection_Factors, Weakness_Ordinalities
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-03-15 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-03-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Name
2009-10-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations
2008-10-14 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Other_Notes
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Description, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2011-03-29 Information Leak through Class Cloning

CWE-486: Comparison of Classes by Name

Weakness ID: 486
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
×

Edit Custom Filter


+ Description
The product compares classes by name, which can cause it to use the wrong class when multiple classes can have the same name.
+ Extended Description
If the decision to trust the methods and data of an object is based on the name of a class, it is possible for malicious users to send objects of the same name as trusted classes and thereby gain the trust afforded to known classes and types.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands

Scope: Integrity, Confidentiality, Availability

If a product relies solely on the name of an object to determine identity, it may execute the incorrect or unintended code.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Implementation

Use class equivalency to determine type. Rather than use the class name to determine if an object is of a given type, use the getClass() method, and == operator.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1025 Comparison Using Wrong Factors
PeerOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 386 Symbolic Name not Mapping to Correct Object
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Java (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
High
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


In this example, the expression in the if statement compares the class of the inputClass object to a trusted class by comparing the class names.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
if (inputClass.getClass().getName().equals("TrustedClassName")) {

// Do something assuming you trust inputClass

// ...
}

However, multiple classes can have the same name therefore comparing an object's class by name can allow untrusted classes of the same name as the trusted class to be use to execute unintended or incorrect code. To compare the class of an object to the intended class the getClass() method and the comparison operator "==" should be used to ensure the correct trusted class is used, as shown in the following example.

(good code)
Example Language: Java 
if (inputClass.getClass() == TrustedClass.class) {

// Do something assuming you trust inputClass

// ...
}


Example 2


In this example, the Java class, TrustedClass, overrides the equals method of the parent class Object to determine equivalence of objects of the class. The overridden equals method first determines if the object, obj, is the same class as the TrustedClass object and then compares the object's fields to determine if the objects are equivalent.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
public class TrustedClass {
...

@Override
public boolean equals(Object obj) {
boolean isEquals = false;

// first check to see if the object is of the same class
if (obj.getClass().getName().equals(this.getClass().getName())) {

// then compare object fields
...
if (...) {
isEquals = true;
}
}

return isEquals;
}

...
}

However, the equals method compares the class names of the object, obj, and the TrustedClass object to determine if they are the same class. As with the previous example using the name of the class to compare the class of objects can lead to the execution of unintended or incorrect code if the object passed to the equals method is of another class with the same name. To compare the class of an object to the intended class, the getClass() method and the comparison operator "==" should be used to ensure the correct trusted class is used, as shown in the following example.

(good code)
Example Language: Java 
public boolean equals(Object obj) {
...

// first check to see if the object is of the same class
if (obj.getClass() == this.getClass()) {
...
}

...
}


+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Effectiveness: High

+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 485 7PK - Encapsulation
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 849 The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) Chapter 6 - Object Orientation (OBJ)
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 998 SFP Secondary Cluster: Glitch in Computation
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1139 SEI CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java - Guidelines 05. Object Orientation (OBJ)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1397 Comprehensive Categorization: Comparison
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Variant level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
7 Pernicious Kingdoms Comparing Classes by Name
CLASP Comparing classes by name
The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) OBJ09-J Compare classes and not class names
Software Fault Patterns SFP1 Glitch in computation
+ References
[REF-6] Katrina Tsipenyuk, Brian Chess and Gary McGraw. "Seven Pernicious Kingdoms: A Taxonomy of Software Security Errors". NIST Workshop on Software Security Assurance Tools Techniques and Metrics. NIST. 2005-11-07.
<https://samate.nist.gov/SSATTM_Content/papers/Seven%20Pernicious%20Kingdoms%20-%20Taxonomy%20of%20Sw%20Security%20Errors%20-%20Tsipenyuk%20-%20Chess%20-%20McGraw.pdf>.
[REF-18] Secure Software, Inc.. "The CLASP Application Security Process". 2005.
<https://cwe.mitre.org/documents/sources/TheCLASPApplicationSecurityProcess.pdf>. (URL validated: 2024-11-17)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
7 Pernicious Kingdoms
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Weakness_Ordinalities
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Description
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2018-03-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Relevant_Properties
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2009-07-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2009-03-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Other_Notes
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Relationships, Other_Notes, Relevant_Properties, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2008-04-11 Comparing Classes by Name

CWE-595: Comparison of Object References Instead of Object Contents

Weakness ID: 595
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
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+ Description
The product compares object references instead of the contents of the objects themselves, preventing it from detecting equivalent objects.
+ Extended Description
For example, in Java, comparing objects using == usually produces deceptive results, since the == operator compares object references rather than values; often, this means that using == for strings is actually comparing the strings' references, not their values.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Varies by Context

Scope: Other

This weakness can lead to erroneous results that can cause unexpected application behaviors.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Implementation

In Java, use the equals() method to compare objects instead of the == operator. If using ==, it is important for performance reasons that your objects are created by a static factory, not by a constructor.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1025 Comparison Using Wrong Factors
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 597 Use of Wrong Operator in String Comparison
+ Relevant to the view "CISQ Quality Measures (2020)" (View-1305)
Nature Type ID Name
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 597 Use of Wrong Operator in String Comparison
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1097 Persistent Storable Data Element without Associated Comparison Control Element
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Java (Undetermined Prevalence)

JavaScript (Undetermined Prevalence)

PHP (Undetermined Prevalence)

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


In the example below, two Java String objects are declared and initialized with the same string values. An if statement is used to determine if the strings are equivalent.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
String str1 = new String("Hello");
String str2 = new String("Hello");
if (str1 == str2) {
System.out.println("str1 == str2");
}

However, the if statement will not be executed as the strings are compared using the "==" operator. For Java objects, such as String objects, the "==" operator compares object references, not object values. While the two String objects above contain the same string values, they refer to different object references, so the System.out.println statement will not be executed. To compare object values, the previous code could be modified to use the equals method:

(good code)
Example Language: Java 
if (str1.equals(str2)) {
System.out.println("str1 equals str2");
}


Example 2


In the following Java example, two BankAccount objects are compared in the isSameAccount method using the == operator.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
public boolean isSameAccount(BankAccount accountA, BankAccount accountB) {
return accountA == accountB;
}

Using the == operator to compare objects may produce incorrect or deceptive results by comparing object references rather than values. The equals() method should be used to ensure correct results or objects should contain a member variable that uniquely identifies the object.

The following example shows the use of the equals() method to compare the BankAccount objects and the next example uses a class get method to retrieve the bank account number that uniquely identifies the BankAccount object to compare the objects.

(good code)
Example Language: Java 
public boolean isSameAccount(BankAccount accountA, BankAccount accountB) {
return accountA.equals(accountB);
}


+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Effectiveness: High

+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 847 The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) Chapter 4 - Expressions (EXP)
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 977 SFP Secondary Cluster: Design
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1136 SEI CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java - Guidelines 02. Expressions (EXP)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1306 CISQ Quality Measures - Reliability
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1397 Comprehensive Categorization: Comparison
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Variant level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) EXP02-J Use the two-argument Arrays.equals() method to compare the contents of arrays
The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) EXP02-J Use the two-argument Arrays.equals() method to compare the contents of arrays
The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) EXP03-J Do not use the equality operators when comparing values of boxed primitives
+ References
[REF-954] Mozilla MDN. "Equality comparisons and sameness".
<https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/JavaScript/Guide/Equality_comparisons_and_sameness>. (URL validated: 2025-08-04)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-12-15
(CWE Draft 5, 2006-12-15)
CWE Content Team MITRE
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Weakness_Ordinalities
2025-09-09
(CWE 4.18, 2025-09-09)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2025-04-03
(CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2021-03-15 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2020-08-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2018-03-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Description, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships, Type
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-06-23 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2010-12-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2009-05-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Name
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Relationships, Other_Notes
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
2008-07-01 Sean Eidemiller Cigital
added/updated demonstrative examples
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2008-04-11 Incorrect Object Comparison: Syntactic
2009-05-27 Incorrect Syntactic Object Comparison

CWE-14: Compiler Removal of Code to Clear Buffers

Weakness ID: 14
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
Sensitive memory is cleared according to the source code, but compiler optimizations leave the memory untouched when it is not read from again, aka "dead store removal."
+ Extended Description

This compiler optimization error occurs when:

  1. Secret data are stored in memory.
  2. The secret data are scrubbed from memory by overwriting its contents.
  3. The source code is compiled using an optimizing compiler, which identifies and removes the function that overwrites the contents as a dead store because the memory is not used subsequently.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Read Memory; Bypass Protection Mechanism

Scope: Confidentiality, Access Control

This weakness will allow data that has not been cleared from memory to be read. If this data contains sensitive password information, then an attacker can read the password and use the information to bypass protection mechanisms.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Implementation

Store the sensitive data in a "volatile" memory location if available.

Build and Compilation

If possible, configure your compiler so that it does not remove dead stores.

Architecture and Design

Where possible, encrypt sensitive data that are used by a software system.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 733 Compiler Optimization Removal or Modification of Security-critical Code
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation
Build and Compilation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

C (Undetermined Prevalence)

C++ (Undetermined Prevalence)

Class: Compiled (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


The following code reads a password from the user, uses the password to connect to a back-end mainframe, and then attempts to scrub the password from memory using memset().

(bad code)
Example Language:
void GetData(char *MFAddr) {
char pwd[64];
if (GetPasswordFromUser(pwd, sizeof(pwd))) {
if (ConnectToMainframe(MFAddr, pwd)) {
// Interaction with mainframe
}
}
memset(pwd, 0, sizeof(pwd));
}

The code in the example will behave correctly if it is executed verbatim, but if the code is compiled using an optimizing compiler, then the call to memset() might be removed as a dead store, because the buffer pwd is not used after its value is overwritten. Because the buffer pwd contains a sensitive value, the application may be vulnerable to attack if the data are left memory resident. If attackers are able to access the correct region of memory, they may use the recovered password to gain control of the system.

It is common practice to overwrite sensitive data manipulated in memory, such as passwords or cryptographic keys, in order to prevent attackers from learning system secrets. However, with the advent of optimizing compilers, programs do not always behave as their source code alone would suggest. In the example, the compiler interprets the call to memset() as dead code because the memory being written to is not subsequently used, despite the fact that there is clearly a security motivation for the operation to occur. The problem here is that many compilers, and in fact many programming languages, do not take this and other security concerns into consideration in their efforts to improve efficiency.

Attackers typically exploit this type of vulnerability by using a core dump or runtime mechanism to access the memory used by a particular application and recover the secret information. Once an attacker has access to the secret information, it is relatively straightforward to further exploit the system and possibly compromise other resources with which the application interacts.



+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Black Box

This specific weakness is impossible to detect using black box methods. While an analyst could examine memory to see that it has not been scrubbed, an analysis of the executable would not be successful. This is because the compiler has already removed the relevant code. Only the source code shows whether the programmer intended to clear the memory or not, so this weakness is indistinguishable from others.

Effectiveness: Limited

White Box

This weakness is only detectable using white box methods (see black box detection factor). Careful analysis is required to determine if the code is likely to be removed by the compiler.
+ Affected Resources
  • Memory
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 2 7PK - Environment
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 729 OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A8 - Insecure Storage
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 747 CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 14 - Miscellaneous (MSC)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 883 CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 49 - Miscellaneous (MSC)
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 963 SFP Secondary Cluster: Exposed Data
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1398 Comprehensive Categorization: Component Interaction
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Variant level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
7 Pernicious Kingdoms Insecure Compiler Optimization
PLOVER Sensitive memory uncleared by compiler optimization
OWASP Top Ten 2004 A8 CWE More Specific Insecure Storage
CERT C Secure Coding MSC06-C Be aware of compiler optimization when dealing with sensitive data
Software Fault Patterns SFP23 Exposed Data
+ References
[REF-6] Katrina Tsipenyuk, Brian Chess and Gary McGraw. "Seven Pernicious Kingdoms: A Taxonomy of Software Security Errors". NIST Workshop on Software Security Assurance Tools Techniques and Metrics. NIST. 2005-11-07.
<https://samate.nist.gov/SSATTM_Content/papers/Seven%20Pernicious%20Kingdoms%20-%20Taxonomy%20of%20Sw%20Security%20Errors%20-%20Tsipenyuk%20-%20Chess%20-%20McGraw.pdf>.
[REF-7] Michael Howard and David LeBlanc. "Writing Secure Code". Chapter 9, "A Compiler Optimization Caveat" Page 322. 2nd Edition. Microsoft Press. 2002-12-04.
<https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/store/writing-secure-code-9780735617223>.
[REF-124] Michael Howard. "When scrubbing secrets in memory doesn't work". BugTraq. 2002-11-05.
<https://seclists.org/bugtraq/2002/Nov/48>. (URL validated: 2025-07-24)
[REF-125] Michael Howard. "Some Bad News and Some Good News". Microsoft. 2002-10-21.
<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/ms972826(v=msdn.10)>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-126] Joseph Wagner. "GNU GCC: Optimizer Removes Code Necessary for Security". Bugtraq. 2002-11-16.
<https://seclists.org/bugtraq/2002/Nov/266>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
7 Pernicious Kingdoms
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Detection_Factors, Weakness_Ordinalities
2025-09-09
(CWE 4.18, 2025-09-09)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2018-03-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Type
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2017-01-19 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, References, Relationships
2011-09-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2010-02-16 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2009-05-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2008-11-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Description, Detection_Factors, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings, Time_of_Introduction
2008-10-14 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2008-04-11 Insecure Compiler Optimization

CWE-352: Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)

Weakness ID: 352 (Structure: Composite) Composite - a Compound Element that consists of two or more distinct weaknesses, in which all weaknesses must be present at the same time in order for a potential vulnerability to arise. Removing any of the weaknesses eliminates or sharply reduces the risk. One weakness, X, can be "broken down" into component weaknesses Y and Z. There can be cases in which one weakness might not be essential to a composite, but changes the nature of the composite when it becomes a vulnerability.
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
The web application does not, or cannot, sufficiently verify whether a request was intentionally provided by the user who sent the request, which could have originated from an unauthorized actor. Diagram for CWE-352
+ Alternate Terms
Session Riding
Cross Site Reference Forgery
XSRF
CSRF
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Gain Privileges or Assume Identity; Bypass Protection Mechanism; Read Application Data; Modify Application Data; DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart

Scope: Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability, Non-Repudiation, Access Control

The consequences will vary depending on the nature of the functionality that is vulnerable to CSRF. An attacker could trick a client into making an unintentional request to the web server via a URL, image load, XMLHttpRequest, etc., which would then be treated as an authentic request from the client - effectively performing any operations as the victim, leading to an exposure of data, unintended code execution, etc. If the victim is an administrator or privileged user, the consequences may include obtaining complete control over the web application - deleting or stealing data, uninstalling the product, or using it to launch other attacks against all of the product's users. Because the attacker has the identity of the victim, the scope of CSRF is limited only by the victim's privileges.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].

For example, use anti-CSRF packages such as the OWASP CSRFGuard. [REF-330]

Another example is the ESAPI Session Management control, which includes a component for CSRF. [REF-45]

Implementation

Ensure that the application is free of cross-site scripting issues (CWE-79), because most CSRF defenses can be bypassed using attacker-controlled script.

Architecture and Design

Generate a unique nonce for each form, place the nonce into the form, and verify the nonce upon receipt of the form. Be sure that the nonce is not predictable (CWE-330). [REF-332]
Note: Note that this can be bypassed using XSS (CWE-79).

Architecture and Design

Identify especially dangerous operations. When the user performs a dangerous operation, send a separate confirmation request to ensure that the user intended to perform that operation.
Note: Note that this can be bypassed using XSS (CWE-79).

Architecture and Design

Use the "double-submitted cookie" method as described by Felten and Zeller:

When a user visits a site, the site should generate a pseudorandom value and set it as a cookie on the user's machine. The site should require every form submission to include this value as a form value and also as a cookie value. When a POST request is sent to the site, the request should only be considered valid if the form value and the cookie value are the same.

Because of the same-origin policy, an attacker cannot read or modify the value stored in the cookie. To successfully submit a form on behalf of the user, the attacker would have to correctly guess the pseudorandom value. If the pseudorandom value is cryptographically strong, this will be prohibitively difficult.

This technique requires Javascript, so it may not work for browsers that have Javascript disabled. [REF-331]

Note: Note that this can probably be bypassed using XSS (CWE-79), or when using web technologies that enable the attacker to read raw headers from HTTP requests.

Architecture and Design

Do not use the GET method for any request that triggers a state change.

Implementation

Check the HTTP Referer header to see if the request originated from an expected page. This could break legitimate functionality, because users or proxies may have disabled sending the Referer for privacy reasons.
Note: Note that this can be bypassed using XSS (CWE-79). An attacker could use XSS to generate a spoofed Referer, or to generate a malicious request from a page whose Referer would be allowed.
+ Composite Components
Nature Type ID Name
Requires ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 346 Origin Validation Error
Requires ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 441 Unintended Proxy or Intermediary ('Confused Deputy')
Requires BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 613 Insufficient Session Expiration
Requires ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 642 External Control of Critical State Data
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 345 Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
PeerOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 79 Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')
CanFollow Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1275 Sensitive Cookie with Improper SameSite Attribute
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 345 Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1019 Validate Inputs
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: Web Based (Undetermined Prevalence)

Web Server (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
Medium
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


This example PHP code attempts to secure the form submission process by validating that the user submitting the form has a valid session. A CSRF attack would not be prevented by this countermeasure because the attacker forges a request through the user's web browser in which a valid session already exists.

The following HTML is intended to allow a user to update a profile.

(bad code)
Example Language: HTML 
<form action="/url/profile.php" method="post">
<input type="text" name="firstname"/>
<input type="text" name="lastname"/>
<br/>
<input type="text" name="email"/>
<input type="submit" name="submit" value="Update"/>
</form>

profile.php contains the following code.

(bad code)
Example Language: PHP 
// initiate the session in order to validate sessions

session_start();

//if the session is registered to a valid user then allow update

if (! session_is_registered("username")) {

echo "invalid session detected!";

// Redirect user to login page
[...]

exit;
}

// The user session is valid, so process the request

// and update the information

update_profile();

function update_profile {

// read in the data from $POST and send an update

// to the database
SendUpdateToDatabase($_SESSION['username'], $_POST['email']);
[...]
echo "Your profile has been successfully updated.";
}

This code may look protected since it checks for a valid session. However, CSRF attacks can be staged from virtually any tag or HTML construct, including image tags, links, embed or object tags, or other attributes that load background images.

The attacker can then host code that will silently change the username and email address of any user that visits the page while remaining logged in to the target web application. The code might be an innocent-looking web page such as:

(attack code)
Example Language: HTML 
<SCRIPT>
function SendAttack () {
form.email = "attacker@example.com";
// send to profile.php
form.submit();
}
</SCRIPT>

<BODY onload="javascript:SendAttack();">

<form action="http://victim.example.com/profile.php" id="form" method="post">
<input type="hidden" name="firstname" value="Funny">
<input type="hidden" name="lastname" value="Joke">
<br/>
<input type="hidden" name="email">
</form>

Notice how the form contains hidden fields, so when it is loaded into the browser, the user will not notice it. Because SendAttack() is defined in the body's onload attribute, it will be automatically called when the victim loads the web page.

Assuming that the user is already logged in to victim.example.com, profile.php will see that a valid user session has been established, then update the email address to the attacker's own address. At this stage, the user's identity has been compromised, and messages sent through this profile could be sent to the attacker's address.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Add user accounts via a URL in an img tag
Add user accounts via a URL in an img tag
Arbitrary code execution by specifying the code in a crafted img tag or URL
Gain administrative privileges via a URL in an img tag
Delete a victim's information via a URL or an img tag
Change another user's settings via a URL or an img tag
Perform actions as administrator via a URL or an img tag
modify password for the administrator
CMS allows modification of configuration via CSRF attack against the administrator
web interface allows password changes or stopping a virtual machine via CSRF
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
Resultant
(where the weakness is typically related to the presence of some other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Manual Analysis

This weakness can be detected using tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session.

Specifically, manual analysis can be useful for finding this weakness, and for minimizing false positives assuming an understanding of business logic. However, it might not achieve desired code coverage within limited time constraints. For black-box analysis, if credentials are not known for privileged accounts, then the most security-critical portions of the application may not receive sufficient attention.

Consider using OWASP CSRFTester to identify potential issues and aid in manual analysis.

Effectiveness: High

Note:These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules.

Automated Static Analysis

CSRF is currently difficult to detect reliably using automated techniques. This is because each application has its own implicit security policy that dictates which requests can be influenced by an outsider and automatically performed on behalf of a user, versus which requests require strong confidence that the user intends to make the request. For example, a keyword search of the public portion of a web site is typically expected to be encoded within a link that can be launched automatically when the user clicks on the link.

Effectiveness: Limited

Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
  • Binary Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Web Application Scanner

Effectiveness: High

Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Fuzz Tester
  • Framework-based Fuzzer

Effectiveness: High

Manual Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source
  • Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Automated Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Source code Weakness Analyzer
  • Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Architecture or Design Review

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)
  • Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 635 Weaknesses Originally Used by NVD from 2008 to 2016
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 716 OWASP Top Ten 2007 Category A5 - Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 751 2009 Top 25 - Insecure Interaction Between Components
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 801 2010 Top 25 - Insecure Interaction Between Components
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 814 OWASP Top Ten 2010 Category A5 - Cross-Site Request Forgery(CSRF)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 864 2011 Top 25 - Insecure Interaction Between Components
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 936 OWASP Top Ten 2013 Category A8 - Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1200 Weaknesses in the 2019 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1337 Weaknesses in the 2021 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1345 OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A01:2021 - Broken Access Control
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1350 Weaknesses in the 2020 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1387 Weaknesses in the 2022 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1411 Comprehensive Categorization: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1425 Weaknesses in the 2023 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1430 Weaknesses in the 2024 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1435 Weaknesses in the 2025 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1436 OWASP Top Ten 2025 Category A01:2025 - Broken Access Control
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Other

Rationale

This is a well-known Composite of multiple weaknesses that must all occur simultaneously, although it is attack-oriented in nature.

Comments

While attack-oriented composites are supported in CWE, they have not been a focus of research. There is a chance that future research or CWE scope clarifications will change or deprecate them. Perform root-cause analysis to determine if other weaknesses allow CSRF attacks to occur, and map to those weaknesses. For example, predictable CSRF tokens might allow bypass of CSRF protection mechanisms; if this occurs, they might be better characterized as randomness/predictability weaknesses.
+ Notes

Relationship

There can be a close relationship between XSS and CSRF (CWE-352). An attacker might use CSRF in order to trick the victim into submitting requests to the server in which the requests contain an XSS payload. A well-known example of this was the Samy worm on MySpace [REF-956]. The worm used XSS to insert malicious HTML sequences into a user's profile and add the attacker as a MySpace friend. MySpace friends of that victim would then execute the payload to modify their own profiles, causing the worm to propagate exponentially. Since the victims did not intentionally insert the malicious script themselves, CSRF was a root cause.

Theoretical

The CSRF topology is multi-channel:

  • Attacker (as outsider) to intermediary (as user). The interaction point is either an external or internal channel.
  • Intermediary (as user) to server (as victim). The activation point is an internal channel.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
PLOVER Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
OWASP Top Ten 2007 A5 Exact Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
WASC 9 Cross-site Request Forgery
+ References
[REF-44] Michael Howard, David LeBlanc and John Viega. "24 Deadly Sins of Software Security". "Sin 2: Web-Server Related Vulnerabilities (XSS, XSRF, and Response Splitting)." Page 37. McGraw-Hill. 2010.
[REF-329] Peter W. "Cross-Site Request Forgeries (Re: The Dangers of Allowing Users to Post Images)". Bugtraq.
<https://marc.info/?l=bugtraq&m=99263135911884&w=2>. (URL validated: 2025-07-24)
[REF-330] OWASP. "Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) Prevention Cheat Sheet".
<https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Cross-Site_Request_Forgery_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html>. (URL validated: 2025-07-24)
[REF-331] Edward W. Felten and William Zeller. "Cross-Site Request Forgeries: Exploitation and Prevention". 2008-10-18.
<https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.147.1445>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-332] Robert Auger. "CSRF - The Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF/XSRF) FAQ".
<https://www.cgisecurity.com/csrf-faq.html>. (URL validated: 2025-07-24)
[REF-333] "Cross-site request forgery". Wikipedia. 2008-12-22.
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-site_request_forgery>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-334] Jason Lam. "Top 25 Series - Rank 4 - Cross Site Request Forgery". SANS Software Security Institute. 2010-03-03.
<https://www.sans.org/blog/top-25-series-rank-4-cross-site-request-forgery>. (URL validated: 2025-07-29)
[REF-335] Jeff Atwood. "Preventing CSRF and XSRF Attacks". 2008-10-14.
<https://blog.codinghorror.com/preventing-csrf-and-xsrf-attacks/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-45] OWASP. "OWASP Enterprise Security API (ESAPI) Project".
<https://owasp.org/www-project-enterprise-security-api/>. (URL validated: 2025-07-24)
[REF-956] Wikipedia. "Samy (computer worm)".
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Samy_(computer_worm)>. (URL validated: 2018-01-16)
[REF-1479] Gregory Larsen, E. Kenneth Hong Fong, David A. Wheeler and Rama S. Moorthy. "State-of-the-Art Resources (SOAR) for Software Vulnerability Detection, Test, and Evaluation". 2014-07.
<https://www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/s/st/stateoftheart-resources-soar-for-software-vulnerability-detection-test-and-evaluation/p-5061.ashx>. (URL validated: 2025-09-05)
[REF-1482] D3FEND. "D3FEND: D3-TL Trusted Library".
<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:TrustedLibrary/>. (URL validated: 2025-09-06)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
PLOVER
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03)
Abhi Balakrishnan
Contributed usability diagram concepts used by the CWE team.
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities
2025-09-09
(CWE 4.18, 2025-09-09)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References
2025-04-03
(CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Alternate_Terms, Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram
2024-11-19
(CWE 4.16, 2024-11-19)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2022-06-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-07-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-08-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-06-25 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Theoretical_Notes
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2019-09-19 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2018-03-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationship_Notes, Research_Gaps
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships
2015-12-07 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors
2013-07-17 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2013-02-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2011-09-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, References
2011-06-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2011-03-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2010-09-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2010-06-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
2010-02-16 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Detection_Factors, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2009-12-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Detection_Factors, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction
2009-05-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns
2009-05-20 Tom Stracener
Added demonstrative example for profile.
2009-03-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2009-01-12 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Description, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Observed_Examples, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationship_Notes, Relationships, Research_Gaps, Theoretical_Notes
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Alternate_Terms, Description, Relationships, Other_Notes, Relationship_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction

CWE-561: Dead Code

Weakness ID: 561
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
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+ Description
The product contains dead code, which can never be executed.
+ Extended Description
Dead code is code that can never be executed in a running program. The surrounding code makes it impossible for a section of code to ever be executed.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Quality Degradation

Scope: Other

Dead code that results from code that can never be executed is an indication of problems with the source code that needs to be fixed and is an indication of poor quality.

Reduce Maintainability

Scope: Other

+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Implementation

Remove dead code before deploying the application.

Testing

Use a static analysis tool to spot dead code.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 1164 Irrelevant Code
CanFollow Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 570 Expression is Always False
CanFollow Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 571 Expression is Always True
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1006 Bad Coding Practices
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


The condition for the second if statement is impossible to satisfy. It requires that the variables be non-null. However, on the only path where s can be assigned a non-null value, there is a return statement.

(bad code)
Example Language: C++ 
String s = null;
if (b) {
s = "Yes";
return;
}

if (s != null) {
Dead();
}


Example 2


In the following class, two private methods call each other, but since neither one is ever invoked from anywhere else, they are both dead code.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
public class DoubleDead {
private void doTweedledee() {
doTweedledumb();
}
private void doTweedledumb() {
doTweedledee();
}
public static void main(String[] args) {
System.out.println("running DoubleDead");
}
}

(In this case it is a good thing that the methods are dead: invoking either one would cause an infinite loop.)



Example 3


The field named glue is not used in the following class. The author of the class has accidentally put quotes around the field name, transforming it into a string constant.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
public class Dead {
String glue;

public String getGlue() {
return "glue";
}
}


+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Chain: incorrect "goto" in Apple SSL product bypasses certificate validation, allowing Adversary-in-the-Middle (AITM) attack (Apple "goto fail" bug). CWE-705 (Incorrect Control Flow Scoping) -> CWE-561 (Dead Code) -> CWE-295 (Improper Certificate Validation) -> CWE-393 (Return of Wrong Status Code) -> CWE-300 (Channel Accessible by Non-Endpoint). The code's whitespace indentation did not reflect the actual control flow (CWE-1114) and did not explicitly delimit the block (CWE-483), which could have made it more difficult for human code auditors to detect the vulnerability.
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Indirect
(where the weakness is a quality issue that might indirectly make it easier to introduce security-relevant weaknesses or make them more difficult to detect)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Architecture or Design Review

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)
  • Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Attack Modeling

Effectiveness: High

Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Binary / Bytecode Quality Analysis
  • Compare binary / bytecode to application permission manifest

Effectiveness: High

Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Automated Monitored Execution

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Automated Static Analysis

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Permission Manifest Analysis

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Automated Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Source Code Quality Analyzer
Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Warning Flags
  • Source code Weakness Analyzer
  • Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer

Effectiveness: High

Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Web Application Scanner
  • Web Services Scanner
  • Database Scanners

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Manual Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)
Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source

Effectiveness: High

+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 747 CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 14 - Miscellaneous (MSC)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 883 CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 49 - Miscellaneous (MSC)
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 886 SFP Primary Cluster: Unused entities
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1130 CISQ Quality Measures (2016) - Maintainability
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1186 SEI CERT Perl Coding Standard - Guidelines 50. Miscellaneous (MSC)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1307 CISQ Quality Measures - Maintainability
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1412 Comprehensive Categorization: Poor Coding Practices
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
CERT C Secure Coding MSC07-C Detect and remove dead code
SEI CERT Perl Coding Standard MSC00-PL Exact Detect and remove dead code
Software Fault Patterns SFP2 Unused Entities
OMG ASCMM ASCMM-MNT-20
+ References
[REF-960] Object Management Group (OMG). "Automated Source Code Maintainability Measure (ASCMM)". ASCMM-MNT-20. 2016-01.
<https://www.omg.org/spec/ASCMM/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-1479] Gregory Larsen, E. Kenneth Hong Fong, David A. Wheeler and Rama S. Moorthy. "State-of-the-Art Resources (SOAR) for Software Vulnerability Detection, Test, and Evaluation". 2014-07.
<https://www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/s/st/stateoftheart-resources-soar-for-software-vulnerability-detection-test-and-evaluation/p-5061.ashx>. (URL validated: 2025-09-05)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
Anonymous Tool Vendor (under NDA)
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2025-09-09
(CWE 4.18, 2025-09-09)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, References
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2021-07-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2021-03-15 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-08-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Observed_Examples, Relationships
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Type
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings, Weakness_Ordinalities
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Taxonomy_Mappings
2014-06-23 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships
2011-09-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2009-10-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Other_Notes
2009-07-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2009-05-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2008-11-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction

CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data

Weakness ID: 502
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
The product deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently ensuring that the resulting data will be valid. Diagram for CWE-502
+ Alternate Terms
Marshaling, Unmarshaling
Marshaling and unmarshaling are effectively synonyms for serialization and deserialization, respectively.
Pickling, Unpickling
In Python, the "pickle" functionality is used to perform serialization and deserialization.
PHP Object Injection
Some PHP application researchers use this term when attacking unsafe use of the unserialize() function; but it is also used for CWE-915.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Modify Application Data; Unexpected State

Scope: Integrity

Attackers can modify unexpected objects or data that was assumed to be safe from modification. Deserialized data or code could be modified without using the provided accessor functions, or unexpected functions could be invoked.

DoS: Resource Consumption (CPU)

Scope: Availability

If a function is making an assumption on when to terminate, based on a sentry in a string, it could easily never terminate.

Varies by Context

Scope: Other

The consequences can vary widely, because it depends on which objects or methods are being deserialized, and how they are used. Making an assumption that the code in the deserialized object is valid is dangerous and can enable exploitation. One example is attackers using gadget chains to perform unauthorized actions, such as generating a shell.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design; Implementation

If available, use the signing/sealing features of the programming language to assure that deserialized data has not been tainted. For example, a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) could be used to ensure that data has not been modified.

Implementation

When deserializing data, populate a new object rather than just deserializing. The result is that the data flows through safe input validation and that the functions are safe.

Implementation

Explicitly define a final object() to prevent deserialization.

Architecture and Design; Implementation

Make fields transient to protect them from deserialization.

An attempt to serialize and then deserialize a class containing transient fields will result in NULLs where the transient data should be. This is an excellent way to prevent time, environment-based, or sensitive variables from being carried over and used improperly.

Implementation

Avoid having unnecessary types or gadgets (a sequence of instances and method invocations that can self-execute during the deserialization process, often found in libraries) available that can be leveraged for malicious ends. This limits the potential for unintended or unauthorized types and gadgets to be leveraged by the attacker. Add only acceptable classes to an allowlist. Note: new gadgets are constantly being discovered, so this alone is not a sufficient mitigation.

Architecture and Design; Implementation

Employ cryptography of the data or code for protection. However, it's important to note that it would still be client-side security. This is risky because if the client is compromised then the security implemented on the client (the cryptography) can be bypassed.

Operation

Strategy: Firewall

Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].

Effectiveness: Moderate

Note: An application firewall might not cover all possible input vectors. In addition, attack techniques might be available to bypass the protection mechanism, such as using malformed inputs that can still be processed by the component that receives those inputs. Depending on functionality, an application firewall might inadvertently reject or modify legitimate requests. Finally, some manual effort may be required for customization.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 913 Improper Control of Dynamically-Managed Code Resources
PeerOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 915 Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 399 Resource Management Errors
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 913 Improper Control of Dynamically-Managed Code Resources
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1019 Validate Inputs
+ Background Details
Serialization and deserialization refer to the process of taking program-internal object-related data, packaging it in a way that allows the data to be externally stored or transferred ("serialization"), then extracting the serialized data to reconstruct the original object ("deserialization").
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design OMISSION: This weakness is caused by missing a security tactic during the architecture and design phase.
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Java (Undetermined Prevalence)

Ruby (Undetermined Prevalence)

PHP (Undetermined Prevalence)

Python (Undetermined Prevalence)

JavaScript (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Class: ICS/OT (Often Prevalent)

AI/ML (Often Prevalent)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
Medium
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


This code snippet deserializes an object from a file and uses it as a UI button:

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
try {
File file = new File("object.obj");
ObjectInputStream in = new ObjectInputStream(new FileInputStream(file));
javax.swing.JButton button = (javax.swing.JButton) in.readObject();
in.close();
}

This code does not attempt to verify the source or contents of the file before deserializing it. An attacker may be able to replace the intended file with a file that contains arbitrary malicious code which will be executed when the button is pressed.

To mitigate this, explicitly define final readObject() to prevent deserialization. An example of this is:

(good code)
Example Language: Java 
private final void readObject(ObjectInputStream in) throws java.io.IOException {
throw new java.io.IOException("Cannot be deserialized"); }


Example 2


In Python, the Pickle library handles the serialization and deserialization processes. In this example derived from [REF-467], the code receives and parses data, and afterwards tries to authenticate a user based on validating a token.

(bad code)
Example Language: Python 
try {
class ExampleProtocol(protocol.Protocol):
def dataReceived(self, data):

# Code that would be here would parse the incoming data
# After receiving headers, call confirmAuth() to authenticate

def confirmAuth(self, headers):
try:
token = cPickle.loads(base64.b64decode(headers['AuthToken']))
if not check_hmac(token['signature'], token['data'], getSecretKey()):
raise AuthFail
self.secure_data = token['data']
except:
raise AuthFail
}

Unfortunately, the code does not verify that the incoming data is legitimate. An attacker can construct a illegitimate, serialized object "AuthToken" that instantiates one of Python's subprocesses to execute arbitrary commands. For instance,the attacker could construct a pickle that leverages Python's subprocess module, which spawns new processes and includes a number of arguments for various uses. Since Pickle allows objects to define the process for how they should be unpickled, the attacker can direct the unpickle process to call Popen in the subprocess module and execute /bin/sh.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
insecure deserialization in platform for managing AI/ML applications and models allows code execution via a crafted pickled object in a model file
deserialization of untrusted YAML data in dashboard for data query and visualization of Elasticsearch data
PHP object injection in WordPress plugin for AI-based SEO
chain: bypass of untrusted deserialization issue (CWE-502) by using an assumed-trusted class (CWE-183)
Deserialization issue in commonly-used Java library allows remote execution.
Deserialization issue in commonly-used Java library allows remote execution.
Use of PHP unserialize function on untrusted input allows attacker to modify application configuration.
Use of PHP unserialize function on untrusted input in content management system might allow code execution.
Use of PHP unserialize function on untrusted input in content management system allows code execution using a crafted cookie value.
Content management system written in PHP allows unserialize of arbitrary objects, possibly allowing code execution.
Python script allows local users to execute code via pickled data.
Unsafe deserialization using pickle in a Python script.
Web browser allows execution of native methods via a crafted string to a JavaScript function that deserializes the string.
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
Resultant
(where the weakness is typically related to the presence of some other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Effectiveness: High

+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 858 The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) Chapter 15 - Serialization (SER)
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 994 SFP Secondary Cluster: Tainted Input to Variable
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1034 OWASP Top Ten 2017 Category A8 - Insecure Deserialization
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1148 SEI CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java - Guidelines 14. Serialization (SER)
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1200 Weaknesses in the 2019 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1308 CISQ Quality Measures - Security
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1337 Weaknesses in the 2021 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1340 CISQ Data Protection Measures
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1350 Weaknesses in the 2020 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1354 OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A08:2021 - Software and Data Integrity Failures
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1387 Weaknesses in the 2022 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1415 Comprehensive Categorization: Resource Control
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1425 Weaknesses in the 2023 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1430 Weaknesses in the 2024 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1435 Weaknesses in the 2025 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1443 OWASP Top Ten 2025 Category A08:2025 - Software or Data Integrity Failures
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Notes

Maintenance

The relationships between CWE-502 and CWE-915 need further exploration. CWE-915 is more narrowly scoped to object modification, and is not necessarily used for deserialization.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
CLASP Deserialization of untrusted data
The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) SER01-J Do not deviate from the proper signatures of serialization methods
The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) SER03-J Do not serialize unencrypted, sensitive data
The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) SER06-J Make defensive copies of private mutable components during deserialization
The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) SER08-J Do not use the default serialized form for implementation defined invariants
Software Fault Patterns SFP25 Tainted input to variable
+ References
[REF-18] Secure Software, Inc.. "The CLASP Application Security Process". 2005.
<https://cwe.mitre.org/documents/sources/TheCLASPApplicationSecurityProcess.pdf>. (URL validated: 2024-11-17)
[REF-461] Matthias Kaiser. "Exploiting Deserialization Vulnerabilities in Java". 2015-10-28.
<https://www.slideshare.net/codewhitesec/exploiting-deserialization-vulnerabilities-in-java-54707478>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-462] Sam Thomas. "PHP unserialization vulnerabilities: What are we missing?". 2015-08-27.
<https://www.slideshare.net/_s_n_t/php-unserialization-vulnerabilities-what-are-we-missing>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-463] Gabriel Lawrence and Chris Frohoff. "Marshalling Pickles: How deserializing objects can ruin your day". 2015-01-28.
<https://www.slideshare.net/frohoff1/appseccali-2015-marshalling-pickles>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-464] Heine Deelstra. "Unserializing user-supplied data, a bad idea". 2010-08-25.
<https://drupalsun.com/heine/2010/08/25/unserializing-user-supplied-data-bad-idea>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-465] Manish S. Saindane. "Black Hat EU 2010 - Attacking Java Serialized Communication". 2010-04-26.
<https://www.slideshare.net/msaindane/black-hat-eu-2010-attacking-java-serialized-communication>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-466] Nadia Alramli. "Why Python Pickle is Insecure". 2009-09-09.
<http://michael-rushanan.blogspot.com/2012/10/why-python-pickle-is-insecure.html>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-467] Nelson Elhage. "Exploiting misuse of Python's "pickle"". 2011-03-20.
<https://blog.nelhage.com/2011/03/exploiting-pickle/>.
[REF-468] Chris Frohoff. "Deserialize My Shorts: Or How I Learned to Start Worrying and Hate Java Object Deserialization". 2016-03-21.
<https://speakerdeck.com/frohoff/owasp-sd-deserialize-my-shorts-or-how-i-learned-to-start-worrying-and-hate-java-object-deserialization>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-1481] D3FEND. "D3FEND: Application Layer Firewall".
<https://d3fend.mitre.org/dao/artifact/d3f:ApplicationLayerFirewall/>. (URL validated: 2025-09-06)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
CLASP
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.16, 2024-11-19)
Abhi Balakrishnan
Contributed usability diagram concepts used by the CWE team
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Observed_Examples, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities
2025-09-09
(CWE 4.18, 2025-09-09)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References
2024-11-19
(CWE 4.16, 2024-11-19)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, References, Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms
2022-06-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-07-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-12-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-08-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-06-25 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Alternate_Terms, Potential_Mitigations
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples, References, Relationships
2019-09-19 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Type
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2018-03-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Modes_of_Introduction, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
2017-05-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Potential_Mitigations, References
2015-12-07 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples, References, Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2013-02-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Alternate_Terms, Applicable_Platforms, Background_Details, Common_Consequences, Maintenance_Notes, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2009-10-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction

CWE-390: Detection of Error Condition Without Action

Weakness ID: 390
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
×

Edit Custom Filter


+ Description
The product detects a specific error, but takes no actions to handle the error.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Varies by Context; Unexpected State; Alter Execution Logic

Scope: Integrity, Other

An attacker could utilize an ignored error condition to place the system in an unexpected state that could lead to the execution of unintended logic and could cause other unintended behavior.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Implementation

Properly handle each exception. This is the recommended solution. Ensure that all exceptions are handled in such a way that you can be sure of the state of your system at any given moment.

Implementation

If a function returns an error, it is important to either fix the problem and try again, alert the user that an error has happened and let the program continue, or alert the user and close and cleanup the program.

Testing

Subject the product to extensive testing to discover some of the possible instances of where/how errors or return values are not handled. Consider testing techniques such as ad hoc, equivalence partitioning, robustness and fault tolerance, mutation, and fuzzing.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 755 Improper Handling of Exceptional Conditions
PeerOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 600 Uncaught Exception in Servlet
CanPrecede Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 401 Missing Release of Memory after Effective Lifetime
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 389 Error Conditions, Return Values, Status Codes
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1020 Verify Message Integrity
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
Medium
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


The following example attempts to allocate memory for a character. After the call to malloc, an if statement is used to check whether the malloc function failed.

(bad code)
Example Language:
foo=malloc(sizeof(char)); //the next line checks to see if malloc failed
if (foo==NULL) {
//We do nothing so we just ignore the error.
}

The conditional successfully detects a NULL return value from malloc indicating a failure, however it does not do anything to handle the problem. Unhandled errors may have unexpected results and may cause the program to crash or terminate.

Instead, the if block should contain statements that either attempt to fix the problem or notify the user that an error has occurred and continue processing or perform some cleanup and gracefully terminate the program. The following example notifies the user that the malloc function did not allocate the required memory resources and returns an error code.

(good code)
Example Language:
foo=malloc(sizeof(char)); //the next line checks to see if malloc failed
if (foo==NULL) {
printf("Malloc failed to allocate memory resources");
return -1;
}


Example 2


In the following C++ example the method readFile() will read the file whose name is provided in the input parameter and will return the contents of the file in char string. The method calls open() and read() may result in errors if the file does not exist or does not contain any data to read. These errors will be thrown when the is_open() method and good() method indicate errors opening or reading the file. However, these errors are not handled within the catch statement. Catch statements that do not perform any processing will have unexpected results. In this case an empty char string will be returned, and the file will not be properly closed.

(bad code)
Example Language: C++ 
char* readfile (char *filename) {
try {
// open input file
ifstream infile;
infile.open(filename);

if (!infile.is_open()) {
throw "Unable to open file " + filename;
}

// get length of file
infile.seekg (0, ios::end);
int length = infile.tellg();
infile.seekg (0, ios::beg);

// allocate memory
char *buffer = new char [length];

// read data from file
infile.read (buffer,length);

if (!infile.good()) {
throw "Unable to read from file " + filename;
}

infile.close();

return buffer;
}
catch (...) {
/* bug: insert code to handle this later */
}
}

The catch statement should contain statements that either attempt to fix the problem or notify the user that an error has occurred and continue processing or perform some cleanup and gracefully terminate the program. The following C++ example contains two catch statements. The first of these will catch a specific error thrown within the try block, and the second catch statement will catch all other errors from within the catch block. Both catch statements will notify the user that an error has occurred, close the file, and rethrow to the block that called the readFile() method for further handling or possible termination of the program.

(good code)
Example Language: C++ 
char* readFile (char *filename) {
try {
// open input file
ifstream infile;
infile.open(filename);

if (!infile.is_open()) {
throw "Unable to open file " + filename;
}

// get length of file
infile.seekg (0, ios::end);
int length = infile.tellg();
infile.seekg (0, ios::beg);

// allocate memory
char *buffer = new char [length];

// read data from file
infile.read (buffer,length);

if (!infile.good()) {
throw "Unable to read from file " + filename;
}
infile.close();

return buffer;
}
catch (char *str) {
printf("Error: %s \n", str);
infile.close();
throw str;
}
catch (...) {
printf("Error occurred trying to read from file \n");
infile.close();
throw;
}
}


Example 3


In the following Java example the method readFile will read the file whose name is provided in the input parameter and will return the contents of the file in a String object. The constructor of the FileReader object and the read method call may throw exceptions and therefore must be within a try/catch block. While the catch statement in this example will catch thrown exceptions in order for the method to compile, no processing is performed to handle the thrown exceptions. Catch statements that do not perform any processing will have unexpected results. In this case, this will result in the return of a null String.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
public String readFile(String filename) {
String retString = null;
try {
// initialize File and FileReader objects
File file = new File(filename);
FileReader fr = new FileReader(file);

// initialize character buffer
long fLen = file.length();
char[] cBuf = new char[(int) fLen];

// read data from file
int iRead = fr.read(cBuf, 0, (int) fLen);

// close file
fr.close();

retString = new String(cBuf);
} catch (Exception ex) {
/* do nothing, but catch so it'll compile... */
}
return retString;
}

The catch statement should contain statements that either attempt to fix the problem, notify the user that an exception has been raised and continue processing, or perform some cleanup and gracefully terminate the program. The following Java example contains three catch statements. The first of these will catch the FileNotFoundException that may be thrown by the FileReader constructor called within the try/catch block. The second catch statement will catch the IOException that may be thrown by the read method called within the try/catch block. The third catch statement will catch all other exceptions thrown within the try block. For all catch statements the user is notified that the exception has been thrown and the exception is rethrown to the block that called the readFile() method for further processing or possible termination of the program. Note that with Java it is usually good practice to use the getMessage() method of the exception class to provide more information to the user about the exception raised.

(good code)
Example Language: Java 
public String readFile(String filename) throws FileNotFoundException, IOException, Exception {
String retString = null;
try {
// initialize File and FileReader objects
File file = new File(filename);
FileReader fr = new FileReader(file);

// initialize character buffer
long fLen = file.length();
char [] cBuf = new char[(int) fLen];

// read data from file
int iRead = fr.read(cBuf, 0, (int) fLen);

// close file
fr.close();

retString = new String(cBuf);
} catch (FileNotFoundException ex) {
System.err.println ("Error: FileNotFoundException opening the input file: " + filename );
System.err.println ("" + ex.getMessage() );
throw new FileNotFoundException(ex.getMessage());
} catch (IOException ex) {
System.err.println("Error: IOException reading the input file.\n" + ex.getMessage() );
throw new IOException(ex);
} catch (Exception ex) {
System.err.println("Error: Exception reading the input file.\n" + ex.getMessage() );
throw new Exception(ex);
}
return retString;
}


+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
A GPU data center manager detects an error due to a malformed request but does not act on it, leading to memory corruption.
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Effectiveness: High

+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 728 OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A7 - Improper Error Handling
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 851 The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) Chapter 8 - Exceptional Behavior (ERR)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 880 CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 12 - Exceptions and Error Handling (ERR)
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 962 SFP Secondary Cluster: Unchecked Status Condition
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1306 CISQ Quality Measures - Reliability
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1405 Comprehensive Categorization: Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1445 OWASP Top Ten 2025 Category A10:2025 - Mishandling of Exceptional Conditions
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
CLASP Improper error handling
The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) ERR00-J Do not suppress or ignore checked exceptions
Software Fault Patterns SFP4 Unchecked Status Condition
+ References
[REF-18] Secure Software, Inc.. "The CLASP Application Security Process". 2005.
<https://cwe.mitre.org/documents/sources/TheCLASPApplicationSecurityProcess.pdf>. (URL validated: 2024-11-17)
[REF-44] Michael Howard, David LeBlanc and John Viega. "24 Deadly Sins of Software Security". "Sin 11: Failure to Handle Errors Correctly." Page 183. McGraw-Hill. 2010.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
CLASP
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2023-10-26 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Potential_Mitigations
2020-08-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Type
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Taxonomy_Mappings
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2014-02-18 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, References, Relationships
2011-09-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2009-07-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2009-03-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2008-11-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2008-04-11 Improper Error Handling

CWE-369: Divide By Zero

Weakness ID: 369
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
The product divides a value by zero.
+ Extended Description
This weakness typically occurs when an unexpected value is provided to the product, or if an error occurs that is not properly detected. It frequently occurs in calculations involving physical dimensions such as size, length, width, and height.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart

Scope: Availability

A Divide by Zero results in a crash.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 682 Incorrect Calculation
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 189 Numeric Errors
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 682 Incorrect Calculation
+ Relevant to the view "CISQ Quality Measures (2020)" (View-1305)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 682 Incorrect Calculation
+ Relevant to the view "CISQ Data Protection Measures" (View-1340)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 682 Incorrect Calculation
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
Medium
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


The following Java example contains a function to compute an average but does not validate that the input value used as the denominator is not zero. This will create an exception for attempting to divide by zero. If this error is not handled by Java exception handling, unexpected results can occur.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
public int computeAverageResponseTime (int totalTime, int numRequests) {
return totalTime / numRequests;
}

By validating the input value used as the denominator the following code will ensure that a divide by zero error will not cause unexpected results. The following Java code example will validate the input value, output an error message, and throw an exception.

(good code)
Example Language: Java 
public int computeAverageResponseTime (int totalTime, int numRequests) throws ArithmeticException {
if (numRequests == 0) {
System.out.println("Division by zero attempted!");
throw ArithmeticException;
}
return totalTime / numRequests;
}


Example 2


The following C/C++ example contains a function that divides two numeric values without verifying that the input value used as the denominator is not zero. This will create an error for attempting to divide by zero, if this error is not caught by the error handling capabilities of the language, unexpected results can occur.

(bad code)
Example Language:
double divide(double x, double y){
return x/y;
}

By validating the input value used as the denominator the following code will ensure that a divide by zero error will not cause unexpected results. If the method is called and a zero is passed as the second argument a DivideByZero error will be thrown and should be caught by the calling block with an output message indicating the error.

(good code)
Example Language:
const int DivideByZero = 10;
double divide(double x, double y){
if ( 0 == y ){
throw DivideByZero;
}
return x/y;
}
...
try{
divide(10, 0);
}
catch( int i ){
if(i==DivideByZero) {
cerr<<"Divide by zero error";
}
}
Example 2 References:
[REF-371] Alex Allain. "Handling Errors Exceptionally Well in C++". <https://www.cprogramming.com/tutorial/exceptions.html>. URL validated: 2023-04-07.


Example 3


The following C# example contains a function that divides two numeric values without verifying that the input value used as the denominator is not zero. This will create an error for attempting to divide by zero, if this error is not caught by the error handling capabilities of the language, unexpected results can occur.

(bad code)
Example Language: C# 
int Division(int x, int y){
return (x / y);
}

The method can be modified to raise, catch and handle the DivideByZeroException if the input value used as the denominator is zero.

(good code)
Example Language: C# 
int SafeDivision(int x, int y){
try{
return (x / y);
}
catch (System.DivideByZeroException dbz){
System.Console.WriteLine("Division by zero attempted!");
return 0;
}
}
Example 3 References:
[REF-372] Microsoft. "Exceptions and Exception Handling (C# Programming Guide)". <https://msdn.microsoft.com/pl-pl/library/ms173160(v=vs.100).aspx>.


+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Invalid size value leads to divide by zero.
"Empty" content triggers divide by zero.
Height value of 0 triggers divide by zero.
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Resultant
(where the weakness is typically related to the presence of some other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Effectiveness: High

Fuzzing

Fuzz testing (fuzzing) is a powerful technique for generating large numbers of diverse inputs - either randomly or algorithmically - and dynamically invoking the code with those inputs. Even with random inputs, it is often capable of generating unexpected results such as crashes, memory corruption, or resource consumption. Fuzzing effectively produces repeatable test cases that clearly indicate bugs, which helps developers to diagnose the issues.

Effectiveness: High

+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 730 OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A9 - Denial of Service
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 738 CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 5 - Integers (INT)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 739 CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 6 - Floating Point (FLP)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 848 The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) Chapter 5 - Numeric Types and Operations (NUM)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 872 CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 04 - Integers (INT)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 873 CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 05 - Floating Point Arithmetic (FLP)
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 998 SFP Secondary Cluster: Glitch in Computation
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1137 SEI CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java - Guidelines 03. Numeric Types and Operations (NUM)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1158 SEI CERT C Coding Standard - Guidelines 04. Integers (INT)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1408 Comprehensive Categorization: Incorrect Calculation
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1445 OWASP Top Ten 2025 Category A10:2025 - Mishandling of Exceptional Conditions
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
OWASP Top Ten 2004 A9 CWE More Specific Denial of Service
CERT C Secure Coding FLP03-C Detect and handle floating point errors
CERT C Secure Coding INT33-C Exact Ensure that division and remainder operations do not result in divide-by-zero errors
The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) NUM02-J Ensure that division and modulo operations do not result in divide-by-zero errors
Software Fault Patterns SFP1 Glitch in computation
+ References
[REF-371] Alex Allain. "Handling Errors Exceptionally Well in C++".
<https://www.cprogramming.com/tutorial/exceptions.html>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-372] Microsoft. "Exceptions and Exception Handling (C# Programming Guide)".
<https://msdn.microsoft.com/pl-pl/library/ms173160(v=vs.100).aspx>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2008-04-11
(CWE Draft 9, 2008-04-11)
CWE Community
Submitted by members of the CWE community to extend early CWE versions
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities
2025-04-03
(CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Detection_Factors, References, Relationships
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2020-12-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-08-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Taxonomy_Mappings
2015-12-07 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-09-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2009-10-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Other_Notes
2009-05-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2008-11-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
2008-07-01 Sean Eidemiller Cigital
added/updated demonstrative examples

CWE-174: Double Decoding of the Same Data

Weakness ID: 174
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
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+ Description
The product decodes the same input twice, which can limit the effectiveness of any protection mechanism that occurs in between the decoding operations.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Bypass Protection Mechanism; Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands; Varies by Context

Scope: Access Control, Confidentiality, Availability, Integrity, Other

+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design

Strategy: Input Validation

Avoid making decisions based on names of resources (e.g. files) if those resources can have alternate names.

Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.

When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."

Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.

Implementation

Strategy: Output Encoding

Use and specify an output encoding that can be handled by the downstream component that is reading the output. Common encodings include ISO-8859-1, UTF-7, and UTF-8. When an encoding is not specified, a downstream component may choose a different encoding, either by assuming a default encoding or automatically inferring which encoding is being used, which can be erroneous. When the encodings are inconsistent, the downstream component might treat some character or byte sequences as special, even if they are not special in the original encoding. Attackers might then be able to exploit this discrepancy and conduct injection attacks; they even might be able to bypass protection mechanisms that assume the original encoding is also being used by the downstream component.

Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 172 Encoding Error
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 675 Multiple Operations on Resource in Single-Operation Context
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Forum software improperly URL decodes the highlight parameter when extracting text to highlight, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary PHP code by double-encoding the highlight value so that special characters are inserted into the result.
XSS protection mechanism attempts to remove "/" that could be used to close tags, but it can be bypassed using double encoded slashes (%252F)
Directory traversal using double encoding.
"%2527" (double-encoded single quote) used in SQL injection.
Double hex-encoded data.
Browser executes HTML at higher privileges via URL with hostnames that are double hex encoded, which are decoded twice to generate a malicious hostname.
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 992 SFP Secondary Cluster: Faulty Input Transformation
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1407 Comprehensive Categorization: Improper Neutralization
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Variant level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Notes

Research Gap

Probably under-studied.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
PLOVER Double Encoding
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
PLOVER
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Weakness_Ordinalities
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2020-06-25 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Observed_Examples, Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2011-03-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2009-07-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2008-11-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Observed_Example, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Potential_Mitigations
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2008-04-11 Double Encoding

CWE-494: Download of Code Without Integrity Check

Weakness ID: 494
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
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+ Description
The product downloads source code or an executable from a remote location and executes the code without sufficiently verifying the origin and integrity of the code.
+ Extended Description
An attacker can execute malicious code by compromising the host server, performing DNS spoofing, or modifying the code in transit.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands; Alter Execution Logic; Other

Scope: Integrity, Availability, Confidentiality, Other

Executing untrusted code could compromise the control flow of the program. The untrusted code could execute attacker-controlled commands, read or modify sensitive resources, or prevent the software from functioning correctly for legitimate users.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Implementation

Perform proper forward and reverse DNS lookups to detect DNS spoofing.
Note: This is only a partial solution since it will not prevent your code from being modified on the hosting site or in transit.

Architecture and Design; Operation

Encrypt the code with a reliable encryption scheme before transmitting.

This will only be a partial solution, since it will not detect DNS spoofing and it will not prevent your code from being modified on the hosting site.

Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].

Speficially, it may be helpful to use tools or frameworks to perform integrity checking on the transmitted code.

  • When providing the code that is to be downloaded, such as for automatic updates of the software, then use cryptographic signatures for the code and modify the download clients to verify the signatures. Ensure that the implementation does not contain CWE-295, CWE-320, CWE-347, and related weaknesses.
  • Use code signing technologies such as Authenticode. See references [REF-454] [REF-455] [REF-456].

Architecture and Design; Operation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.

Architecture and Design; Operation

Strategy: Sandbox or Jail

Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.

OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.

This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.

Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.

Effectiveness: Limited

Note: The effectiveness of this mitigation depends on the prevention capabilities of the specific sandbox or jail being used and might only help to reduce the scope of an attack, such as restricting the attacker to certain system calls or limiting the portion of the file system that can be accessed.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 345 Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 669 Incorrect Resource Transfer Between Spheres
CanFollow Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 79 Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1214 Data Integrity Issues
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 669 Incorrect Resource Transfer Between Spheres
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1020 Verify Message Integrity
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design OMISSION: This weakness is caused by missing a security tactic during the architecture and design phase.
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
Medium
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


This example loads an external class from a local subdirectory.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
URL[] classURLs= new URL[]{
new URL("file:subdir/")
};
URLClassLoader loader = new URLClassLoader(classURLs);
Class loadedClass = Class.forName("loadMe", true, loader);

This code does not ensure that the class loaded is the intended one, for example by verifying the class's checksum. An attacker may be able to modify the class file to execute malicious code.



Example 2


This code includes an external script to get database credentials, then authenticates a user against the database, allowing access to the application.

(bad code)
Example Language: PHP 
//assume the password is already encrypted, avoiding CWE-312

function authenticate($username,$password){

include("http://external.example.com/dbInfo.php");

//dbInfo.php makes $dbhost, $dbuser, $dbpass, $dbname available
mysql_connect($dbhost, $dbuser, $dbpass) or die ('Error connecting to mysql');
mysql_select_db($dbname);
$query = 'Select * from users where username='.$username.' And password='.$password;
$result = mysql_query($query);

if(mysql_numrows($result) == 1){
mysql_close();
return true;
}
else{
mysql_close();
return false;
}

}

This code does not verify that the external domain accessed is the intended one. An attacker may somehow cause the external domain name to resolve to an attack server, which would provide the information for a false database. The attacker may then steal the usernames and encrypted passwords from real user login attempts, or simply allow themself to access the application without a real user account.

This example is also vulnerable to an Adversary-in-the-Middle AITM (CWE-300) attack.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Satellite phone does not validate its firmware image.
Chain: router's firmware update procedure uses curl with "-k" (insecure) option that disables certificate validation (CWE-295), allowing adversary-in-the-middle (AITM) compromise with a malicious firmware image (CWE-494).
OS does not verify authenticity of its own updates.
online poker client does not verify authenticity of its own updates.
anti-virus product does not verify automatic updates for itself.
VOIP phone downloads applications from web sites without verifying integrity.
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Manual Analysis

This weakness can be detected using tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session.

Specifically, manual static analysis is typically required to find the behavior that triggers the download of code, and to determine whether integrity-checking methods are in use.

Note:These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules.

Black Box

Use monitoring tools that examine the software's process as it interacts with the operating system and the network. This technique is useful in cases when source code is unavailable, if the software was not developed by you, or if you want to verify that the build phase did not introduce any new weaknesses. Examples include debuggers that directly attach to the running process; system-call tracing utilities such as truss (Solaris) and strace (Linux); system activity monitors such as FileMon, RegMon, Process Monitor, and other Sysinternals utilities (Windows); and sniffers and protocol analyzers that monitor network traffic.

Attach the monitor to the process and also sniff the network connection. Trigger features related to product updates or plugin installation, which is likely to force a code download. Monitor when files are downloaded and separately executed, or if they are otherwise read back into the process. Look for evidence of cryptographic library calls that use integrity checking.

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Effectiveness: High

+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 752 2009 Top 25 - Risky Resource Management
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 802 2010 Top 25 - Risky Resource Management
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 859 The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) Chapter 16 - Platform Security (SEC)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 865 2011 Top 25 - Risky Resource Management
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 991 SFP Secondary Cluster: Tainted Input to Environment
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1354 OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A08:2021 - Software and Data Integrity Failures
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1364 ICS Communications: Zone Boundary Failures
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1411 Comprehensive Categorization: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1443 OWASP Top Ten 2025 Category A08:2025 - Software or Data Integrity Failures
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Notes

Research Gap

This is critical for mobile code, but it is likely to become more and more common as developers continue to adopt automated, network-based product distributions and upgrades. Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) might introduce additional subtleties. Common exploitation scenarios may include ad server compromises and bad upgrades.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
CLASP Invoking untrusted mobile code
The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) SEC06-J Do not rely on the default automatic signature verification provided by URLClassLoader and java.util.jar
Software Fault Patterns SFP27 Tainted input to environment
+ References
[REF-454] Microsoft. "Introduction to Code Signing".
<http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms537361(VS.85).aspx>.
[REF-455] Microsoft. "Authenticode".
<http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms537359(v=VS.85).aspx>.
[REF-456] Apple. "Code Signing Guide". Apple Developer Connection. 2008-11-19.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20080724215143/http://developer.apple.com/documentation/Security/Conceptual/CodeSigningGuide/Introduction/chapter_1_section_1.html>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-457] Anthony Bellissimo, John Burgess and Kevin Fu. "Secure Software Updates: Disappointments and New Challenges".
<https://www.usenix.org/legacy/events/hotsec06/tech/full_papers/bellissimo/bellissimo.pdf>. (URL validated: 2025-07-24)
[REF-44] Michael Howard, David LeBlanc and John Viega. "24 Deadly Sins of Software Security". "Sin 18: The Sins of Mobile Code." Page 267. McGraw-Hill. 2010.
[REF-459] Johannes Ullrich. "Top 25 Series - Rank 20 - Download of Code Without Integrity Check". SANS Software Security Institute. 2010-04-05.
<https://www.sans.org/blog/top-25-series-rank-20-download-of-code-without-integrity-check/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-76] Sean Barnum and Michael Gegick. "Least Privilege". 2005-09-14.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20211209014121/https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/bsi/articles/knowledge/principles/least-privilege>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-18] Secure Software, Inc.. "The CLASP Application Security Process". 2005.
<https://cwe.mitre.org/documents/sources/TheCLASPApplicationSecurityProcess.pdf>. (URL validated: 2024-11-17)
[REF-1482] D3FEND. "D3FEND: D3-TL Trusted Library".
<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:TrustedLibrary/>. (URL validated: 2025-09-06)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
CLASP
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities
2025-09-09
(CWE 4.18, 2025-09-09)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, References
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, References, Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Related_Attack_Patterns
2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
2021-07-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2021-03-15 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Related_Attack_Patterns
2020-12-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2020-08-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Taxonomy_Mappings
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-09-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, References
2011-06-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-03-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2010-12-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2010-09-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, References
2010-06-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References
2010-04-05 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms
2010-02-16 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, References, Relationships
2009-07-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Observed_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns
2009-03-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2009-01-12 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Description, Name, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships, Research_Gaps, Type
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2008-04-11 Mobile Code: Invoking Untrusted Mobile Code
2009-01-12 Download of Untrusted Mobile Code Without Integrity Check

CWE-627: Dynamic Variable Evaluation

Weakness ID: 627
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
In a language where the user can influence the name of a variable at runtime, if the variable names are not controlled, an attacker can read or write to arbitrary variables, or access arbitrary functions.
+ Extended Description
The resultant vulnerabilities depend on the behavior of the application, both at the crossover point and in any control/data flow that is reachable by the related variables or functions.
+ Alternate Terms
Dynamic evaluation
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Modify Application Data; Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands

Scope: Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability

An attacker could gain unauthorized access to internal program variables and execute arbitrary code.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Implementation

Strategy: Refactoring

Refactor the code to avoid dynamic variable evaluation whenever possible.

Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

Use only allowlists of acceptable variable or function names.

Implementation

For function names, ensure that you are only calling functions that accept the proper number of arguments, to avoid unexpected null arguments.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 914 Improper Control of Dynamically-Identified Variables
PeerOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 183 Permissive List of Allowed Inputs
+ Background Details
Many interpreted languages support the use of a "$$varname" construct to set a variable whose name is specified by the $varname variable. In PHP, these are referred to as "variable variables." Functions might also be invoked using similar syntax, such as $$funcname(arg1, arg2).
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

PHP (Undetermined Prevalence)

Perl (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Chain: Dynamic variable evaluation allows resultant remote file inclusion and path traversal.
Chain: dynamic variable evaluation in PHP program used to modify critical, unexpected $_SERVER variable for resultant XSS.
Chain: dynamic variable evaluation in PHP program used to conduct remote file inclusion.
Dynamic variable evaluation in mail program allows reading and modifying attachments and preferences of other users.
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 990 SFP Secondary Cluster: Tainted Input to Command
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1409 Comprehensive Categorization: Injection
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Variant level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Notes

Research Gap

Under-studied, probably under-reported. Few researchers look for this issue; most public reports are for PHP, although other languages are affected. This issue is likely to grow in PHP as developers begin to implement functionality in place of register_globals.
+ References
[REF-517] Steve Christey. "Dynamic Evaluation Vulnerabilities in PHP applications". Full-Disclosure. 2006-05-03.
<https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2006/May/35>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-518] Shaun Clowes. "A Study In Scarlet: Exploiting Common Vulnerabilities in PHP Applications".
<https://securereality.com.au/study-in-scarlett/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2007-05-07
(CWE Draft 6, 2007-05-07)
CWE Content Team MITRE
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships, Type
2020-06-25 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2013-02-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2011-03-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2008-10-14 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Background_Details, Description
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction

CWE-698: Execution After Redirect (EAR)

Weakness ID: 698
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
The web application sends a redirect to another location, but instead of exiting, it executes additional code.
+ Alternate Terms
Redirect Without Exit
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Alter Execution Logic; Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands

Scope: Other, Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability

This weakness could affect the control flow of the application and allow execution of untrusted code.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 670 Always-Incorrect Control Flow Implementation
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 705 Incorrect Control Flow Scoping
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 438 Behavioral Problems
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: Web Based (Undetermined Prevalence)

Web Server (Sometimes Prevalent)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


This code queries a server and displays its status when a request comes from an authorized IP address.

(bad code)
Example Language: PHP 
$requestingIP = $_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR'];
if(!in_array($requestingIP,$ipAllowList)){
echo "You are not authorized to view this page";
http_redirect($errorPageURL);
}
$status = getServerStatus();
echo $status;
...

This code redirects unauthorized users, but continues to execute code after calling http_redirect(). This means even unauthorized users may be able to access the contents of the page or perform a DoS attack on the server being queried. Also, note that this code is vulnerable to an IP address spoofing attack (CWE-212).



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Execution-after-redirect allows access to application configuration details.
chain: library file sends a redirect if it is directly requested but continues to execute, allowing remote file inclusion and path traversal.
Remote attackers can obtain access to administrator functionality through EAR.
Remote attackers can obtain access to administrator functionality through EAR.
Bypass of authentication step through EAR.
Chain: Execution after redirect triggers eval injection.
chain: execution after redirect allows non-administrator to perform static code injection.
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Black Box

This issue might not be detected if testing is performed using a web browser, because the browser might obey the redirect and move the user to a different page before the application has produced outputs that indicate something is amiss.
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 977 SFP Secondary Cluster: Design
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1410 Comprehensive Categorization: Insufficient Control Flow Management
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ References
[REF-565] Adam Doupé, Bryce Boe, Christopher Kruegel and Giovanni Vigna. "Fear the EAR: Discovering and Mitigating Execution After Redirect Vulnerabilities".
<https://sites.cs.ucsb.edu/~chris/research/doc/ccs11_ear.pdf>. (URL validated: 2025-07-29)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2008-09-09
(CWE 1.0, 2008-09-09)
CWE Content Team MITRE
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms
2025-09-09
(CWE 4.18, 2025-09-09)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2023-10-26 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2020-06-25 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2013-02-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Alternate_Terms, Name, Observed_Examples, References
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2013-02-21 Redirect Without Exit

CWE-250: Execution with Unnecessary Privileges

Weakness ID: 250
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
The product performs an operation at a privilege level that is higher than the minimum level required, which creates new weaknesses or amplifies the consequences of other weaknesses. Diagram for CWE-250
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Gain Privileges or Assume Identity; Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands; Read Application Data; DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart

Scope: Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability, Access Control

An attacker will be able to gain access to any resources that are allowed by the extra privileges. Common results include executing code, disabling services, and reading restricted data. New weaknesses can be exposed because running with extra privileges, such as root or Administrator, can disable the normal security checks being performed by the operating system or surrounding environment. Other pre-existing weaknesses can turn into security vulnerabilities if they occur while operating at raised privileges.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design; Operation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.

Architecture and Design

Strategy: Separation of Privilege

Identify the functionality that requires additional privileges, such as access to privileged operating system resources. Wrap and centralize this functionality if possible, and isolate the privileged code as much as possible from other code [REF-76]. Raise privileges as late as possible, and drop them as soon as possible to avoid CWE-271. Avoid weaknesses such as CWE-288 and CWE-420 by protecting all possible communication channels that could interact with the privileged code, such as a secondary socket that is only intended to be accessed by administrators.

Architecture and Design

Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction

Identify the functionality that requires additional privileges, such as access to privileged operating system resources. Wrap and centralize this functionality if possible, and isolate the privileged code as much as possible from other code [REF-76]. Raise privileges as late as possible, and drop them as soon as possible to avoid CWE-271. Avoid weaknesses such as CWE-288 and CWE-420 by protecting all possible communication channels that could interact with the privileged code, such as a secondary socket that is only intended to be accessed by administrators.

Implementation

Perform extensive input validation for any privileged code that must be exposed to the user and reject anything that does not fit your strict requirements.

Implementation

When dropping privileges, ensure that they have been dropped successfully to avoid CWE-273. As protection mechanisms in the environment get stronger, privilege-dropping calls may fail even if it seems like they would always succeed.

Implementation

If circumstances force you to run with extra privileges, then determine the minimum access level necessary. First identify the different permissions that the software and its users will need to perform their actions, such as file read and write permissions, network socket permissions, and so forth. Then explicitly allow those actions while denying all else [REF-76]. Perform extensive input validation and canonicalization to minimize the chances of introducing a separate vulnerability. This mitigation is much more prone to error than dropping the privileges in the first place.

Operation; System Configuration

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Ensure that the software runs properly under the United States Government Configuration Baseline (USGCB) [REF-199] or an equivalent hardening configuration guide, which many organizations use to limit the attack surface and potential risk of deployed software.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 269 Improper Privilege Management
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 657 Violation of Secure Design Principles
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 265 Privilege Issues
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1015 Limit Access
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation

REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.

Installation
Architecture and Design

If an application has this design problem, then it can be easier for the developer to make implementation-related errors such as CWE-271 (Privilege Dropping / Lowering Errors). In addition, the consequences of Privilege Chaining (CWE-268) can become more severe.

Operation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: Mobile (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
Medium
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


This code temporarily raises the program's privileges to allow creation of a new user folder.

(bad code)
Example Language: Python 
def makeNewUserDir(username):
if invalidUsername(username):

#avoid CWE-22 and CWE-78
print('Usernames cannot contain invalid characters')
return False

try:
raisePrivileges()
os.mkdir('/home/' + username)
lowerPrivileges()

except OSError:
print('Unable to create new user directory for user:' + username)
return False

return True

While the program only raises its privilege level to create the folder and immediately lowers it again, if the call to os.mkdir() throws an exception, the call to lowerPrivileges() will not occur. As a result, the program is indefinitely operating in a raised privilege state, possibly allowing further exploitation to occur.



Example 2


The following code calls chroot() to restrict the application to a subset of the filesystem below APP_HOME in order to prevent an attacker from using the program to gain unauthorized access to files located elsewhere. The code then opens a file specified by the user and processes the contents of the file.

(bad code)
Example Language:
chroot(APP_HOME);
chdir("/");
FILE* data = fopen(argv[1], "r+");
...

Constraining the process inside the application's home directory before opening any files is a valuable security measure. However, the absence of a call to setuid() with some non-zero value means the application is continuing to operate with unnecessary root privileges. Any successful exploit carried out by an attacker against the application can now result in a privilege escalation attack because any malicious operations will be performed with the privileges of the superuser. If the application drops to the privilege level of a non-root user, the potential for damage is substantially reduced.



Example 3


This application intends to use a user's location to determine the timezone the user is in:

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
locationClient = new LocationClient(this, this, this);
locationClient.connect();
Location userCurrLocation;
userCurrLocation = locationClient.getLastLocation();
setTimeZone(userCurrLocation);

This is unnecessary use of the location API, as this information is already available using the Android Time API. Always be sure there is not another way to obtain needed information before resorting to using the location API.



Example 4


This code uses location to determine the user's current US State location.

First the application must declare that it requires the ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION permission in the application's manifest.xml:

(bad code)
Example Language: XML 
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION"/>

During execution, a call to getLastLocation() will return a location based on the application's location permissions. In this case the application has permission for the most accurate location possible:

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
locationClient = new LocationClient(this, this, this);
locationClient.connect();
Location userCurrLocation;
userCurrLocation = locationClient.getLastLocation();
deriveStateFromCoords(userCurrLocation);

While the application needs this information, it does not need to use the ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION permission, as the ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION permission will be sufficient to identify which US state the user is in.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
FTP client program on a certain OS runs with setuid privileges and has a buffer overflow. Most clients do not need extra privileges, so an overflow is not a vulnerability for those clients.
Program runs with privileges and calls another program with the same privileges, which allows read of arbitrary files.
OS incorrectly installs a program with setuid privileges, allowing users to gain privileges.
Composite: application running with high privileges (CWE-250) allows user to specify a restricted file to process, which generates a parsing error that leaks the contents of the file (CWE-209).
Program does not drop privileges before calling another program, allowing code execution.
setuid root program allows creation of arbitrary files through command line argument.
Installation script installs some programs as setuid when they shouldn't be.
mail program runs as root but does not drop its privileges before attempting to access a file. Attacker can use a symlink from their home directory to a directory only readable by root, then determine whether the file exists based on the response.
Product launches Help functionality while running with raised privileges, allowing command execution using Windows message to access "open file" dialog.
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Manual Analysis

This weakness can be detected using tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session.
Note:These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules.

Black Box

Use monitoring tools that examine the software's process as it interacts with the operating system and the network. This technique is useful in cases when source code is unavailable, if the software was not developed by you, or if you want to verify that the build phase did not introduce any new weaknesses. Examples include debuggers that directly attach to the running process; system-call tracing utilities such as truss (Solaris) and strace (Linux); system activity monitors such as FileMon, RegMon, Process Monitor, and other Sysinternals utilities (Windows); and sniffers and protocol analyzers that monitor network traffic.

Attach the monitor to the process and perform a login. Look for library functions and system calls that indicate when privileges are being raised or dropped. Look for accesses of resources that are restricted to normal users.

Note:Note that this technique is only useful for privilege issues related to system resources. It is not likely to detect application-level business rules that are related to privileges, such as if a blog system allows a user to delete a blog entry without first checking that the user has administrator privileges.

Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Compare binary / bytecode to application permission manifest
Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
  • Binary Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis

Effectiveness: High

Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Host-based Vulnerability Scanners - Examine configuration for flaws, verifying that audit mechanisms work, ensure host configuration meets certain predefined criteria

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Host Application Interface Scanner

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Manual Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)
Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source

Effectiveness: High

Automated Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Source code Weakness Analyzer
  • Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Automated Static Analysis

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Configuration Checker
  • Permission Manifest Analysis

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Architecture or Design Review

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)
  • Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Attack Modeling

Effectiveness: High

+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 227 7PK - API Abuse
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 753 2009 Top 25 - Porous Defenses
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 815 OWASP Top Ten 2010 Category A6 - Security Misconfiguration
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 858 The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) Chapter 15 - Serialization (SER)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 866 2011 Top 25 - Porous Defenses
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 901 SFP Primary Cluster: Privilege
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1418 Comprehensive Categorization: Violation of Secure Design Principles
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Notes

Relationship

There is a close association with CWE-653 (Insufficient Separation of Privileges). CWE-653 is about providing separate components for each privilege; CWE-250 is about ensuring that each component has the least amount of privileges possible.

Other

Privilege management functions can behave in some less-than-obvious ways, and they have different quirks on different platforms. These inconsistencies are particularly pronounced if you are transitioning from one non-root user to another.

Other

Signal handlers and spawned processes run at the privilege of the owning process, so if a process is running as root when a signal fires or a sub-process is executed, the signal handler or sub-process will operate with root privileges.

Maintenance

CWE-271, CWE-272, and CWE-250 are all closely related and possibly overlapping. CWE-271 is probably better suited as a category. Both CWE-272 and CWE-250 are in active use by the community. The "least privilege" phrase has multiple interpretations.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
7 Pernicious Kingdoms Often Misused: Privilege Management
The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) SER09-J Minimize privileges before deserializing from a privilege context
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 2-4 Req SP.03.05 BR
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 2-4 Req SP.03.08 BR
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 2-4 Req SP.03.08 RE(1)
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 2-4 Req SP.05.07 BR
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 2-4 Req SP.09.02 RE(4)
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 2-4 Req SP.09.03 BR
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 2-4 Req SP.09.04 BR
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 3-3 Req SR 1.1
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 3-3 Req SR 1.2
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 3-3 Req SR 2.1
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 3-3 Req SR 2.1 RE 1
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-1 Req SD-4
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-2 Req CCSC 3
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-2 Req CR 1.1
+ References
[REF-6] Katrina Tsipenyuk, Brian Chess and Gary McGraw. "Seven Pernicious Kingdoms: A Taxonomy of Software Security Errors". NIST Workshop on Software Security Assurance Tools Techniques and Metrics. NIST. 2005-11-07.
<https://samate.nist.gov/SSATTM_Content/papers/Seven%20Pernicious%20Kingdoms%20-%20Taxonomy%20of%20Sw%20Security%20Errors%20-%20Tsipenyuk%20-%20Chess%20-%20McGraw.pdf>.
[REF-196] Jerome H. Saltzer and Michael D. Schroeder. "The Protection of Information in Computer Systems". Proceedings of the IEEE 63. 1975-09.
<http://web.mit.edu/Saltzer/www/publications/protection/>.
[REF-76] Sean Barnum and Michael Gegick. "Least Privilege". 2005-09-14.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20211209014121/https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/bsi/articles/knowledge/principles/least-privilege>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-7] Michael Howard and David LeBlanc. "Writing Secure Code". Chapter 7, "Running with Least Privilege" Page 207. 2nd Edition. Microsoft Press. 2002-12-04.
<https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/store/writing-secure-code-9780735617223>.
[REF-199] NIST. "United States Government Configuration Baseline (USGCB)".
<https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/United-States-Government-Configuration-Baseline>. (URL validated: 2023-03-28)
[REF-44] Michael Howard, David LeBlanc and John Viega. "24 Deadly Sins of Software Security". "Sin 16: Executing Code With Too Much Privilege." Page 243. McGraw-Hill. 2010.
[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 9, "Privilege Vulnerabilities", Page 477. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
[REF-1479] Gregory Larsen, E. Kenneth Hong Fong, David A. Wheeler and Rama S. Moorthy. "State-of-the-Art Resources (SOAR) for Software Vulnerability Detection, Test, and Evaluation". 2014-07.
<https://www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/s/st/stateoftheart-resources-soar-for-software-vulnerability-detection-test-and-evaluation/p-5061.ashx>. (URL validated: 2025-09-05)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
7 Pernicious Kingdoms
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2023-01-24
(CWE 4.10, 2023-01-31)
"Mapping CWE to 62443" Sub-Working Group CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT SIG
Suggested mappings to ISA/IEC 62443.
2023-04-25 "Mapping CWE to 62443" Sub-Working Group CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT SIG
Suggested mappings to ISA/IEC 62443.
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Maintenance_Notes, Weakness_Ordinalities
2025-09-09
(CWE 4.18, 2025-09-09)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Detection_Factors, Diagram, Other_Notes, References
2023-10-26 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Maintenance_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2022-04-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Detection_Factors, Observed_Examples, References, Relationships, Type
2019-09-19 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Taxonomy_Mappings
2018-03-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors
2014-02-18 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2013-07-17 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2011-09-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
2011-06-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-03-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2010-06-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations
2010-02-16 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References
2009-05-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2009-03-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2009-01-12 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Maintenance_Notes, Name, Observed_Examples, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction
2008-10-14 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Maintenance_Notes
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships, Other_Notes, Relationship_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2008-01-30 Often Misused: Privilege Management
2009-01-12 Design Principle Violation: Failure to Use Least Privilege

CWE-825: Expired Pointer Dereference

Weakness ID: 825
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
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+ Description
The product dereferences a pointer that contains a location for memory that was previously valid, but is no longer valid.
+ Extended Description
When a product releases memory, but it maintains a pointer to that memory, then the memory might be re-allocated at a later time. If the original pointer is accessed to read or write data, then this could cause the product to read or modify data that is in use by a different function or process. Depending on how the newly-allocated memory is used, this could lead to a denial of service, information exposure, or code execution.
+ Alternate Terms
Dangling pointer
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Read Memory

Scope: Confidentiality

If the expired pointer is used in a read operation, an attacker might be able to control data read in by the application.

DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart

Scope: Availability

If the expired pointer references a memory location that is not accessible to the product, or points to a location that is "malformed" (such as NULL) or larger than expected by a read or write operation, then a crash may occur.

Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands

Scope: Integrity, Confidentiality, Availability

If the expired pointer is used in a function call, or points to unexpected data in a write operation, then code execution may be possible.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design

Choose a language that provides automatic memory management.

Implementation

When freeing pointers, be sure to set them to NULL once they are freed. However, the utilization of multiple or complex data structures may lower the usefulness of this strategy.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 672 Operation on a Resource after Expiration or Release
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 415 Double Free
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 416 Use After Free
CanFollow Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 562 Return of Stack Variable Address
CanPrecede Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 125 Out-of-bounds Read
CanPrecede Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 787 Out-of-bounds Write
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 465 Pointer Issues
+ Relevant to the view "CISQ Quality Measures (2020)" (View-1305)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
+ Relevant to the view "CISQ Data Protection Measures" (View-1340)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Memory-Unsafe (Undetermined Prevalence)

C (Undetermined Prevalence)

C++ (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


The following code shows a simple example of a use after free error:

(bad code)
Example Language:
char* ptr = (char*)malloc (SIZE);
if (err) {
abrt = 1;
free(ptr);
}
...
if (abrt) {
logError("operation aborted before commit", ptr);
}

When an error occurs, the pointer is immediately freed. However, this pointer is later incorrectly used in the logError function.



Example 2


The following code shows a simple example of a double free error:

(bad code)
Example Language:
char* ptr = (char*)malloc (SIZE);
...
if (abrt) {
free(ptr);
}
...
free(ptr);

Double free vulnerabilities have two common (and sometimes overlapping) causes:

  • Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances
  • Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for freeing the memory

Although some double free vulnerabilities are not much more complicated than the previous example, most are spread out across hundreds of lines of code or even different files. Programmers seem particularly susceptible to freeing global variables more than once.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Chain: IPSec VPN product uses the same variable for multiple purposes in the same function (CWE-1109), leading to incorrect access control (CWE-284) and expired pointer dereference (CWE-825)
access of expired memory address leads to arbitrary code execution
stale pointer issue leads to denial of service and possibly other consequences
Chain: a message having an unknown message type may cause a reference to uninitialized memory resulting in a null pointer dereference (CWE-476) or dangling pointer (CWE-825), possibly crashing the system or causing heap corruption.
read of value at an offset into a structure after the offset is no longer valid
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Resultant
(where the weakness is typically related to the presence of some other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Automated Dynamic Analysis

Use tools that are integrated during compilation to insert runtime error-checking mechanisms related to memory safety errors, such as AddressSanitizer (ASan) for C/C++ [REF-1518].

Effectiveness: Moderate

Note:Crafted inputs are necessary to reach the code containing the error, such as generated by fuzzers. Also, these tools may reduce performance, and they only report the error condition - not the original mistake that led to the error.
+ Functional Areas
  • Memory Management
+ Affected Resources
  • Memory
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 867 2011 Top 25 - Weaknesses On the Cusp
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1399 Comprehensive Categorization: Memory Safety
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Notes

Terminology

Many weaknesses related to pointer dereferences fall under the general term of "memory corruption" or "memory safety." As of September 2010, there is no commonly-used terminology that covers the lower-level variants.

Maintenance

There are close relationships between incorrect pointer dereferences and other weaknesses related to buffer operations. There may not be sufficient community agreement regarding these relationships. Further study is needed to determine when these relationships are chains, composites, perspective/layering, or other types of relationships. As of September 2010, most of the relationships are being captured as chains.
+ References
[REF-1518] "AddressSanitizer".
<https://clang.llvm.org/docs/AddressSanitizer.html>. (URL validated: 2025-12-10)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2010-09-22
(CWE 1.10, 2010-09-27)
CWE Content Team MITRE
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Detection_Factors, Observed_Examples, References, Time_of_Introduction, Weakness_Ordinalities
2025-09-09
(CWE 4.18, 2025-09-09)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Affected_Resources, Functional_Areas
2025-04-03
(CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Description
2022-04-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Research_Gaps
2021-03-15 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2020-12-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-08-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2013-02-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Alternate_Terms
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships
2011-06-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships

CWE-642: External Control of Critical State Data

Weakness ID: 642
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities in limited situations requiring careful review (with careful review of mapping notes)
Abstraction: Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
×

Edit Custom Filter


+ Description
The product stores security-critical state information about its users, or the product itself, in a location that is accessible to unauthorized actors.
+ Extended Description

If an attacker can modify the state information without detection, then it could be used to perform unauthorized actions or access unexpected resources, since the application programmer does not expect that the state can be changed.

State information can be stored in various locations such as a cookie, in a hidden web form field, input parameter or argument, an environment variable, a database record, within a settings file, etc. All of these locations have the potential to be modified by an attacker. When this state information is used to control security or determine resource usage, then it may create a vulnerability. For example, an application may perform authentication, then save the state in an "authenticated=true" cookie. An attacker may simply create this cookie in order to bypass the authentication.

+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Bypass Protection Mechanism; Gain Privileges or Assume Identity

Scope: Access Control

An attacker could potentially modify the state in malicious ways. If the state is related to the privileges or level of authentication that the user has, then state modification might allow the user to bypass authentication or elevate privileges.

Read Application Data

Scope: Confidentiality

The state variables may contain sensitive information that should not be known by the client.

DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart

Scope: Availability

By modifying state variables, the attacker could violate the application's expectations for the contents of the state, leading to a denial of service due to an unexpected error condition.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design

Understand all the potential locations that are accessible to attackers. For example, some programmers assume that cookies and hidden form fields cannot be modified by an attacker, or they may not consider that environment variables can be modified before a privileged program is invoked.

Architecture and Design

Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction

Store state information and sensitive data on the server side only.

Ensure that the system definitively and unambiguously keeps track of its own state and user state and has rules defined for legitimate state transitions. Do not allow any application user to affect state directly in any way other than through legitimate actions leading to state transitions.

If information must be stored on the client, do not do so without encryption and integrity checking, or otherwise having a mechanism on the server side to catch tampering. Use a message authentication code (MAC) algorithm, such as Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) [REF-529]. Apply this against the state or sensitive data that has to be exposed, which can guarantee the integrity of the data - i.e., that the data has not been modified. Ensure that a strong hash function is used (CWE-328).

Architecture and Design

Store state information on the server side only. Ensure that the system definitively and unambiguously keeps track of its own state and user state and has rules defined for legitimate state transitions. Do not allow any application user to affect state directly in any way other than through legitimate actions leading to state transitions.

Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].

With a stateless protocol such as HTTP, use some frameworks can maintain the state for you.

Examples include ASP.NET View State and the OWASP ESAPI Session Management feature.

Be careful of language features that provide state support, since these might be provided as a convenience to the programmer and may not be considering security.

Architecture and Design

For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

Operation; Implementation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.

Testing

Use tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session. These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 668 Exposure of Resource to Wrong Sphere
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 15 External Control of System or Configuration Setting
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 73 External Control of File Name or Path
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 426 Untrusted Search Path
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 472 External Control of Assumed-Immutable Web Parameter
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 565 Reliance on Cookies without Validation and Integrity Checking
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1011 Authorize Actors
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design OMISSION: This weakness is caused by missing a security tactic during the architecture and design phase.
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Web Server (Often Prevalent)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
High
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


In the following example, an authentication flag is read from a browser cookie, thus allowing for external control of user state data.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
Cookie[] cookies = request.getCookies();
for (int i =0; i< cookies.length; i++) {
Cookie c = cookies[i];
if (c.getName().equals("authenticated") && Boolean.TRUE.equals(c.getValue())) {
authenticated = true;
}
}


Example 2


The following code uses input from an HTTP request to create a file name. The programmer has not considered the possibility that an attacker could provide a file name such as "../../tomcat/conf/server.xml", which causes the application to delete one of its own configuration files (CWE-22).

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
String rName = request.getParameter("reportName");
File rFile = new File("/usr/local/apfr/reports/" + rName);
...
rFile.delete();


Example 3


The following code uses input from a configuration file to determine which file to open and echo back to the user. If the program runs with privileges and malicious users can change the configuration file, they can use the program to read any file on the system that ends with the extension .txt.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
fis = new FileInputStream(cfg.getProperty("sub")+".txt");
amt = fis.read(arr);
out.println(arr);


Example 4


This program is intended to execute a command that lists the contents of a restricted directory, then performs other actions. Assume that it runs with setuid privileges in order to bypass the permissions check by the operating system.

(bad code)
Example Language:
#define DIR "/restricted/directory"

char cmd[500];
sprintf(cmd, "ls -l %480s", DIR);
/* Raise privileges to those needed for accessing DIR. */

RaisePrivileges(...);
system(cmd);
DropPrivileges(...);
...

This code may look harmless at first, since both the directory and the command are set to fixed values that the attacker can't control. The attacker can only see the contents for DIR, which is the intended program behavior. Finally, the programmer is also careful to limit the code that executes with raised privileges.

However, because the program does not modify the PATH environment variable, the following attack would work:

(attack code)
 
  • The user sets the PATH to reference a directory under the attacker's control, such as "/my/dir/".
  • The attacker creates a malicious program called "ls", and puts that program in /my/dir
  • The user executes the program.
  • When system() is executed, the shell consults the PATH to find the ls program
  • The program finds the attacker's malicious program, "/my/dir/ls". It doesn't find "/bin/ls" because PATH does not contain "/bin/".
  • The program executes the attacker's malicious program with the raised privileges.


Example 5


The following code segment implements a basic server that uses the "ls" program to perform a directory listing of the directory that is listed in the "HOMEDIR" environment variable. The code intends to allow the user to specify an alternate "LANG" environment variable. This causes "ls" to customize its output based on a given language, which is an important capability when supporting internationalization.

(bad code)
Example Language: Perl 
$ENV{"HOMEDIR"} = "/home/mydir/public/";
my $stream = AcceptUntrustedInputStream();
while (<$stream>) {
chomp;
if (/^ENV ([\w\_]+) (.*)/) {
$ENV{$1} = $2;
}
elsif (/^QUIT/) { ... }
elsif (/^LIST/) {
open($fh, "/bin/ls -l $ENV{HOMEDIR}|");
while (<$fh>) {
SendOutput($stream, "FILEINFO: $_");
}
close($fh);
}
}

The programmer takes care to call a specific "ls" program and sets the HOMEDIR to a fixed value. However, an attacker can use a command such as "ENV HOMEDIR /secret/directory" to specify an alternate directory, enabling a path traversal attack (CWE-22). At the same time, other attacks are enabled as well, such as OS command injection (CWE-78) by setting HOMEDIR to a value such as "/tmp; rm -rf /". In this case, the programmer never intends for HOMEDIR to be modified, so input validation for HOMEDIR is not the solution. A partial solution would be an allowlist that only allows the LANG variable to be specified in the ENV command. Alternately, assuming this is an authenticated user, the language could be stored in a local file so that no ENV command at all would be needed.

While this example may not appear realistic, this type of problem shows up in code fairly frequently. See CVE-1999-0073 in the observed examples for a real-world example with similar behaviors.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Mail client stores password hashes for unrelated accounts in a hidden form field.
Privileged program trusts user-specified environment variable to modify critical configuration settings.
Telnet daemon allows remote clients to specify critical environment variables for the server, leading to code execution.
Untrusted search path vulnerability through modified LD_LIBRARY_PATH environment variable.
Untrusted search path vulnerability through modified LD_LIBRARY_PATH environment variable.
Calendar application allows bypass of authentication by setting a certain cookie value to 1.
Setting of a language preference in a cookie enables path traversal attack.
Application allows admin privileges by setting a cookie value to "admin."
Application allows admin privileges by setting a cookie value to "admin."
Application allows admin privileges by setting a cookie value to "admin."
Shopping cart allows price modification via hidden form field.
Shopping cart allows price modification via hidden form field.
Server allows client to specify the search path, which can be modified to point to a program that the client has uploaded.
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
Resultant
(where the weakness is typically related to the presence of some other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Effectiveness: High

Fuzzing

Use dynamic tools and techniques that interact with the product using large test suites with many diverse inputs, such as fuzz testing (fuzzing), robustness testing, and fault injection. The product's operation may slow down, but it should not become unstable, crash, or generate incorrect results.
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 752 2009 Top 25 - Risky Resource Management
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 963 SFP Secondary Cluster: Exposed Data
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1348 OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A04:2021 - Insecure Design
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1403 Comprehensive Categorization: Exposed Resource
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1441 OWASP Top Ten 2025 Category A06:2025 - Insecure Design
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED-WITH-REVIEW
(this CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities in limited situations requiring careful review)
Reason Abstraction

Rationale

This CWE entry is a Class and might have Base-level children that would be more appropriate

Comments

Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
Software Fault Patterns SFP23 Exposed Data
+ References
[REF-528] OWASP. "Top 10 2007-Insecure Direct Object Reference". 2007.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20160319225940/http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Top_10_2007-A4>. (URL validated: 2025-08-04)
[REF-529] "HMAC". Wikipedia. 2011-08-18.
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMAC>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-44] Michael Howard, David LeBlanc and John Viega. "24 Deadly Sins of Software Security". "Sin 4: Use of Magic URLs, Predictable Cookies, and Hidden Form Fields." Page 75. McGraw-Hill. 2010.
[REF-1482] D3FEND. "D3FEND: D3-TL Trusted Library".
<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:TrustedLibrary/>. (URL validated: 2025-09-06)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2008-01-30
(CWE Draft 8, 2008-01-30)
Evgeny Lebanidze Cigital
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities
2025-09-09
(CWE 4.18, 2025-09-09)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, References
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Potential_Mitigations
2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-03-15 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2020-06-25 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Enabling_Factors_for_Exploitation, Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships, Relevant_Properties
2017-01-19 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2014-02-18 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2010-06-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2010-02-16 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2009-07-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2009-03-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2009-01-12 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Name, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships, Relevant_Properties, Type
2008-10-14 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships
2008-07-01 Sean Eidemiller Cigital
added/updated demonstrative examples
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2008-04-11 Insufficient Management of User State
2009-01-12 External Control of User State Data

CWE-454: External Initialization of Trusted Variables or Data Stores

Weakness ID: 454
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
The product initializes critical internal variables or data stores using inputs that can be modified by untrusted actors.
+ Extended Description
A product system should be reluctant to trust variables that have been initialized outside of its trust boundary, especially if they are initialized by users. The variables may have been initialized incorrectly. If an attacker can initialize the variable, then they can influence what the vulnerable system will do.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Modify Application Data

Scope: Integrity

An attacker could gain access to and modify sensitive data or system information.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

A product system should be reluctant to trust variables that have been initialized outside of its trust boundary. Ensure adequate checking (e.g. input validation) is performed when relying on input from outside a trust boundary.

Architecture and Design

Avoid any external control of variables. If necessary, restrict the variables that can be modified using an allowlist, and use a different namespace or naming convention if possible.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 1419 Incorrect Initialization of Resource
CanAlsoBe Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 456 Missing Initialization of a Variable
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 452 Initialization and Cleanup Errors
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

PHP (Sometimes Prevalent)

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


In the Java example below, a system property controls the debug level of the application.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
int debugLevel = Integer.getInteger("com.domain.application.debugLevel").intValue();

If an attacker is able to modify the system property, then it may be possible to coax the application into divulging sensitive information by virtue of the fact that additional debug information is printed/exposed as the debug level increases.



Example 2


This code checks the HTTP POST request for a debug switch, and enables a debug mode if the switch is set.

(bad code)
Example Language: PHP 
$debugEnabled = false;
if ($_POST["debug"] == "true"){
$debugEnabled = true;
}
/.../

function login($username, $password){
if($debugEnabled){
echo 'Debug Activated';
phpinfo();
$isAdmin = True;
return True;
}
}

Any user can activate the debug mode, gaining administrator privileges. An attacker may also use the information printed by the phpinfo() function to further exploit the system. .

This example also exhibits Information Exposure Through Debug Information (CWE-215)



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
WordPress module sets internal variables based on external inputs, allowing false reporting of the number of views
Does not clear dangerous environment variables, enabling symlink attack.
Specify alternate configuration directory in environment variable, enabling untrusted path.
Dangerous environment variable not cleansed.
Specify arbitrary modules using environment variable.
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
Resultant
(where the weakness is typically related to the presence of some other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 808 2010 Top 25 - Weaknesses On the Cusp
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 994 SFP Secondary Cluster: Tainted Input to Variable
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1416 Comprehensive Categorization: Resource Lifecycle Management
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1441 OWASP Top Ten 2025 Category A06:2025 - Insecure Design
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Notes

Relationship

Overlaps Missing variable initialization, especially in PHP.

Applicable Platform

This is often found in PHP due to register_globals and the common practice of storing library/include files under the web document root so that they are available using a direct request.

+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
PLOVER External initialization of trusted variables or values
Software Fault Patterns SFP25 Tainted input to variable
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
PLOVER
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities
2023-10-26 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Potential_Mitigations
2020-06-25 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-03-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2010-04-05 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples
2010-02-16 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Name, Relationships
2009-10-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Other_Notes, Relationship_Notes
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Description, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction
2008-07-01 Sean Eidemiller Cigital
added/updated demonstrative examples
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2008-04-11 External Initialization of Trusted Variables or Values
2010-02-16 External Initialization of Trusted Variables

CWE-628: Function Call with Incorrectly Specified Arguments

Weakness ID: 628
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
×

Edit Custom Filter


+ Description
The product calls a function, procedure, or routine with arguments that are not correctly specified, leading to always-incorrect behavior and resultant weaknesses.
+ Extended Description

There are multiple ways in which this weakness can be introduced, including:

  • the wrong variable or reference;
  • an incorrect number of arguments;
  • incorrect order of arguments;
  • wrong type of arguments; or
  • wrong value.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Quality Degradation; Gain Privileges or Assume Identity

Scope: Other, Access Control

This weakness can cause unintended behavior and can lead to additional weaknesses such as allowing an attacker to gain unintended access to system resources.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Build and Compilation

Once found, these issues are easy to fix. Use code inspection tools and relevant compiler features to identify potential violations. Pay special attention to code that is not likely to be exercised heavily during QA.

Architecture and Design

Make sure your API's are stable before you use them in production code.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 573 Improper Following of Specification by Caller
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 683 Function Call With Incorrect Order of Arguments
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 685 Function Call With Incorrect Number of Arguments
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 686 Function Call With Incorrect Argument Type
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 687 Function Call With Incorrectly Specified Argument Value
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 688 Function Call With Incorrect Variable or Reference as Argument
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1006 Bad Coding Practices
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


The following PHP method authenticates a user given a username/password combination but is called with the parameters in reverse order.

(bad code)
Example Language: PHP 
function authenticate($username, $password) {

// authenticate user
...
}

authenticate($_POST['password'], $_POST['username']);


Example 2


This Perl code intends to record whether a user authenticated successfully or not, and to exit if the user fails to authenticate. However, when it calls ReportAuth(), the third argument is specified as 0 instead of 1, so it does not exit.

(bad code)
Example Language: Perl 
sub ReportAuth {
my ($username, $result, $fatal) = @_;
PrintLog("auth: username=%s, result=%d", $username, $result);
if (($result ne "success") && $fatal) {
die "Failed!\n";
}
}

sub PrivilegedFunc
{
my $result = CheckAuth($username);
ReportAuth($username, $result, 0);
DoReallyImportantStuff();
}


Example 3


In the following Java snippet, the accessGranted() method is accidentally called with the static ADMIN_ROLES array rather than the user roles.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
private static final String[] ADMIN_ROLES = ...;
public boolean void accessGranted(String resource, String user) {
String[] userRoles = getUserRoles(user);
return accessGranted(resource, ADMIN_ROLES);
}

private boolean void accessGranted(String resource, String[] userRoles) {

// grant or deny access based on user roles
...
}


+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
The method calls the functions with the wrong argument order, which allows remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions.
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
This is usually primary to other weaknesses, but it can be resultant if the function's API or function prototype changes.
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Other

Since these bugs typically introduce incorrect behavior that is obvious to users, they are found quickly, unless they occur in rarely-tested code paths. Managing the correct number of arguments can be made more difficult in cases where format strings are used, or when variable numbers of arguments are supported.
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 736 CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 3 - Declarations and Initialization (DCL)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 737 CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 4 - Expressions (EXP)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 742 CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 9 - Memory Management (MEM)
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 998 SFP Secondary Cluster: Glitch in Computation
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1157 SEI CERT C Coding Standard - Guidelines 03. Expressions (EXP)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1180 SEI CERT Perl Coding Standard - Guidelines 02. Declarations and Initialization (DCL)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1181 SEI CERT Perl Coding Standard - Guidelines 03. Expressions (EXP)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1412 Comprehensive Categorization: Poor Coding Practices
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1441 OWASP Top Ten 2025 Category A06:2025 - Insecure Design
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
CERT C Secure Coding DCL10-C Maintain the contract between the writer and caller of variadic functions
CERT C Secure Coding EXP37-C CWE More Abstract Call functions with the correct number and type of arguments
SEI CERT Perl Coding Standard DCL00-PL CWE More Abstract Do not use subroutine prototypes
SEI CERT Perl Coding Standard EXP33-PL Imprecise Do not invoke a function in a context for which it is not defined
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2007-05-07
(CWE Draft 6, 2007-05-07)
CWE Content Team MITRE
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-03-15 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Taxonomy_Mappings
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships
2011-06-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2010-06-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2010-02-16 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors
2009-10-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Other_Notes, Weakness_Ordinalities
2008-11-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Relationships, Other_Notes, Weakness_Ordinalities
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2008-04-11 Incorrectly Specified Arguments

CWE-209: Generation of Error Message Containing Sensitive Information

Weakness ID: 209
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
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+ Description
The product generates an error message that includes sensitive information about its environment, users, or associated data. Diagram for CWE-209
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Read Application Data

Scope: Confidentiality

Often this will either reveal sensitive information which may be used to launch another, more focused attack or disclose private information stored in the server. For example, an attempt to exploit a path traversal weakness (CWE-22) might yield the full pathname of the installed application. In turn, this could be used to select the proper number of ".." sequences to navigate to the targeted file. An attack using SQL injection (CWE-89) might not initially succeed, but an error message could reveal the malformed query, which would expose query logic and possibly even passwords or other sensitive information used within the query.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Implementation

Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.

If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.

Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.

Implementation

Handle exceptions internally and do not display errors containing potentially sensitive information to a user.

Implementation

Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction

Use naming conventions and strong types to make it easier to spot when sensitive data is being used. When creating structures, objects, or other complex entities, separate the sensitive and non-sensitive data as much as possible.

Effectiveness: Defense in Depth

Note: This makes it easier to spot places in the code where data is being used that is unencrypted.

Implementation; Build and Compilation

Strategy: Compilation or Build Hardening

Debugging information should not make its way into a production release.

Implementation; Build and Compilation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Debugging information should not make its way into a production release.

System Configuration

Where available, configure the environment to use less verbose error messages. For example, in PHP, disable the display_errors setting during configuration, or at runtime using the error_reporting() function.

System Configuration

Create default error pages or messages that do not leak any information.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 200 Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 755 Improper Handling of Exceptional Conditions
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 210 Self-generated Error Message Containing Sensitive Information
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 211 Externally-Generated Error Message Containing Sensitive Information
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 550 Server-generated Error Message Containing Sensitive Information
PeerOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1295 Debug Messages Revealing Unnecessary Information
CanFollow Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 600 Uncaught Exception in Servlet
CanFollow Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 756 Missing Custom Error Page
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 199 Information Management Errors
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 389 Error Conditions, Return Values, Status Codes
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 200 Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1015 Limit Access
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design
Implementation REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.
System Configuration
Operation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

PHP (Often Prevalent)

Java (Often Prevalent)

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
High
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


In the following example, sensitive information might be printed depending on the exception that occurs.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
try {
/.../
}
catch (Exception e) {
System.out.println(e);
}

If an exception related to SQL is handled by the catch, then the output might contain sensitive information such as SQL query structure or private information. If this output is redirected to a web user, this may represent a security problem.



Example 2


This code tries to open a database connection, and prints any exceptions that occur.

(bad code)
Example Language: PHP 
try {
openDbConnection();
}
//print exception message that includes exception message and configuration file location
catch (Exception $e) {
echo 'Caught exception: ', $e->getMessage(), '\n';
echo 'Check credentials in config file at: ', $Mysql_config_location, '\n';
}

If an exception occurs, the printed message exposes the location of the configuration file the script is using. An attacker can use this information to target the configuration file (perhaps exploiting a Path Traversal weakness). If the file can be read, the attacker could gain credentials for accessing the database. The attacker may also be able to replace the file with a malicious one, causing the application to use an arbitrary database.



Example 3


The following code generates an error message that leaks the full pathname of the configuration file.

(bad code)
Example Language: Perl 
$ConfigDir = "/home/myprog/config";
$uname = GetUserInput("username");

# avoid CWE-22, CWE-78, others.
ExitError("Bad hacker!") if ($uname !~ /^\w+$/);
$file = "$ConfigDir/$uname.txt";
if (! (-e $file)) {
ExitError("Error: $file does not exist");
}
...

If this code is running on a server, such as a web application, then the person making the request should not know what the full pathname of the configuration directory is. By submitting a username that does not produce a $file that exists, an attacker could get this pathname. It could then be used to exploit path traversal or symbolic link following problems that may exist elsewhere in the application.



Example 4


In the example below, the method getUserBankAccount retrieves a bank account object from a database using the supplied username and account number to query the database. If an SQLException is raised when querying the database, an error message is created and output to a log file.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
public BankAccount getUserBankAccount(String username, String accountNumber) {
BankAccount userAccount = null;
String query = null;
try {
if (isAuthorizedUser(username)) {
query = "SELECT * FROM accounts WHERE owner = "
+ username + " AND accountID = " + accountNumber;
DatabaseManager dbManager = new DatabaseManager();
Connection conn = dbManager.getConnection();
Statement stmt = conn.createStatement();
ResultSet queryResult = stmt.executeQuery(query);
userAccount = (BankAccount)queryResult.getObject(accountNumber);
}
} catch (SQLException ex) {
String logMessage = "Unable to retrieve account information from database,\nquery: " + query;
Logger.getLogger(BankManager.class.getName()).log(Level.SEVERE, logMessage, ex);
}
return userAccount;
}

The error message that is created includes information about the database query that may contain sensitive information about the database or query logic. In this case, the error message will expose the table name and column names used in the database. This data could be used to simplify other attacks, such as SQL injection (CWE-89) to directly access the database.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
POP3 server reveals a password in an error message after multiple APOP commands are sent. Might be resultant from another weakness.
Program reveals password in error message if attacker can trigger certain database errors.
Composite: application running with high privileges (CWE-250) allows user to specify a restricted file to process, which generates a parsing error that leaks the contents of the file (CWE-209).
Existence of user names can be determined by requesting a nonexistent blog and reading the error message.
Direct request to library file in web application triggers pathname leak in error message.
Malformed input to login page causes leak of full path when IMAP call fails.
Malformed regexp syntax leads to information exposure in error message.
verbose logging stores admin credentials in a world-readablelog file
SSH password for private key stored in build log
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
Resultant
(where the weakness is typically related to the presence of some other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Manual Analysis

This weakness generally requires domain-specific interpretation using manual analysis. However, the number of potential error conditions may be too large to cover completely within limited time constraints.

Effectiveness: High

Automated Analysis

Automated methods may be able to detect certain idioms automatically, such as exposed stack traces or pathnames, but violation of business rules or privacy requirements is not typically feasible.

Effectiveness: Moderate

Automated Dynamic Analysis

This weakness can be detected using dynamic tools and techniques that interact with the software using large test suites with many diverse inputs, such as fuzz testing (fuzzing), robustness testing, and fault injection. The software's operation may slow down, but it should not become unstable, crash, or generate incorrect results.

Error conditions may be triggered with a stress-test by calling the software simultaneously from a large number of threads or processes, and look for evidence of any unexpected behavior.

Effectiveness: Moderate

Manual Dynamic Analysis

Identify error conditions that are not likely to occur during normal usage and trigger them. For example, run the program under low memory conditions, run with insufficient privileges or permissions, interrupt a transaction before it is completed, or disable connectivity to basic network services such as DNS. Monitor the software for any unexpected behavior. If you trigger an unhandled exception or similar error that was discovered and handled by the application's environment, it may still indicate unexpected conditions that were not handled by the application itself.

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 717 OWASP Top Ten 2007 Category A6 - Information Leakage and Improper Error Handling
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 728 OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A7 - Improper Error Handling
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 731 OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A10 - Insecure Configuration Management
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 751 2009 Top 25 - Insecure Interaction Between Components
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 801 2010 Top 25 - Insecure Interaction Between Components
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 815 OWASP Top Ten 2010 Category A6 - Security Misconfiguration
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 851 The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) Chapter 8 - Exceptional Behavior (ERR)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 867 2011 Top 25 - Weaknesses On the Cusp
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 880 CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 12 - Exceptions and Error Handling (ERR)
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 933 OWASP Top Ten 2013 Category A5 - Security Misconfiguration
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 963 SFP Secondary Cluster: Exposed Data
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1032 OWASP Top Ten 2017 Category A6 - Security Misconfiguration
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1348 OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A04:2021 - Insecure Design
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1417 Comprehensive Categorization: Sensitive Information Exposure
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1445 OWASP Top Ten 2025 Category A10:2025 - Mishandling of Exceptional Conditions
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Notes

Other

The sensitive information may be valuable information on its own (such as a password), or it may be useful for launching other, more serious attacks.

The error message may be created in different ways:

  • self-generated: the source code explicitly constructs the error message and delivers it
  • externally-generated: the external environment, such as a language interpreter, handles the error and constructs its own message, whose contents are not under direct control by the programmer
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
CLASP Accidental leaking of sensitive information through error messages
OWASP Top Ten 2007 A6 CWE More Specific Information Leakage and Improper Error Handling
OWASP Top Ten 2004 A7 CWE More Specific Improper Error Handling
OWASP Top Ten 2004 A10 CWE More Specific Insecure Configuration Management
The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) ERR01-J Do not allow exceptions to expose sensitive information
Software Fault Patterns SFP23 Exposed Data
+ References
[REF-174] Web Application Security Consortium. "Information Leakage".
<http://projects.webappsec.org/w/page/13246936/Information%20Leakage>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-175] Brian Chess and Jacob West. "Secure Programming with Static Analysis". Section 9.2, Page 326. Addison-Wesley. 2007.
[REF-176] Michael Howard and David LeBlanc. "Writing Secure Code". Chapter 16, "General Good Practices." Page 415. 1st Edition. Microsoft Press. 2001-11-13.
[REF-44] Michael Howard, David LeBlanc and John Viega. "24 Deadly Sins of Software Security". "Sin 11: Failure to Handle Errors Correctly." Page 183. McGraw-Hill. 2010.
[REF-44] Michael Howard, David LeBlanc and John Viega. "24 Deadly Sins of Software Security". "Sin 12: Information Leakage." Page 191. McGraw-Hill. 2010.
[REF-179] Johannes Ullrich. "Top 25 Series - Rank 16 - Information Exposure Through an Error Message". SANS Software Security Institute. 2010-03-17.
<https://www.sans.org/blog/top-25-series-rank-16-information-exposure-through-an-error-message>.
[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 3, "Overly Verbose Error Messages", Page 75. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
[REF-18] Secure Software, Inc.. "The CLASP Application Security Process". 2005.
<https://cwe.mitre.org/documents/sources/TheCLASPApplicationSecurityProcess.pdf>. (URL validated: 2024-11-17)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
CLASP
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2022-07-11 Nick Johnston
Identified incorrect language tag in demonstrative example.
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships
2025-09-09
(CWE 4.18, 2025-09-09)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram, Other_Notes, References
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, References, Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-07-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-12-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, Related_Attack_Patterns
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Description, Name, Observed_Examples, References, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities
2019-09-19 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Taxonomy_Mappings
2018-03-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2014-06-23 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2013-07-17 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2011-09-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-03-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, Relationships
2010-09-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
2010-09-09 Veracode
Suggested OWASP Top Ten mapping
2010-06-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References
2010-04-05 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2010-02-16 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, References, Relationships
2009-12-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Name, Potential_Mitigations, References, Time_of_Introduction
2009-03-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
2009-01-12 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Name, Observed_Examples, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction
2008-10-14 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-08-15 Veracode
Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2009-01-12 Error Message Information Leaks
2009-12-28 Error Message Information Leak
2020-02-24 Information Exposure Through an Error Message

CWE-299: Improper Check for Certificate Revocation

Weakness ID: 299
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
×

Edit Custom Filter


+ Description
The product does not check or incorrectly checks the revocation status of a certificate, which may cause it to use a certificate that has been compromised.
+ Extended Description
An improper check for certificate revocation is a far more serious flaw than related certificate failures. This is because the use of any revoked certificate is almost certainly malicious. The most common reason for certificate revocation is compromise of the system in question, with the result that no legitimate servers will be using a revoked certificate, unless they are sorely out of sync.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Gain Privileges or Assume Identity

Scope: Access Control

Trust may be assigned to an entity who is not who it claims to be.

Other

Scope: Integrity, Other

Data from an untrusted (and possibly malicious) source may be integrated.

Read Application Data

Scope: Confidentiality

Data may be disclosed to an entity impersonating a trusted entity, resulting in information disclosure.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design

Ensure that certificates are checked for revoked status.

Implementation

If certificate pinning is being used, ensure that all relevant properties of the certificate are fully validated before the certificate is pinned, including the revoked status.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 295 Improper Certificate Validation
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 404 Improper Resource Shutdown or Release
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 370 Missing Check for Certificate Revocation after Initial Check
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1014 Identify Actors
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation When the product uses certificate pinning, the developer might not properly validate all relevant components of the certificate before pinning the certificate. This can make it difficult or expensive to test after the pinning is complete.
Implementation REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Class: Web Based (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
Medium
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


The following OpenSSL code ensures that there is a certificate before continuing execution.

(bad code)
Example Language:
if (cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl)) {

// got a certificate, do secret things

Because this code does not use SSL_get_verify_results() to check the certificate, it could accept certificates that have been revoked (X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED). The product could be communicating with a malicious host.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
LDAP-over-SSL implementation does not check Certificate Revocation List (CRL), allowing spoofing using a revoked certificate.
Operating system does not check Certificate Revocation List (CRL) in some cases, allowing spoofing using a revoked certificate.
Antivirus product does not check whether certificates from signed executables have been revoked.
Web browser does not check if any intermediate certificates are revoked.
chain: Ruby module for OCSP misinterprets a response, preventing detection of a revoked certificate.
chain: incorrect parsing of replies from OCSP responders allows bypass using a revoked certificate.
Router can permanently cache certain public keys, which would allow bypass if the certificate is later revoked.
chain: OS package manager does not properly check the return value, allowing bypass using a revoked certificate.
chain: language interpreter does not properly check the return value from an OSCP function, allowing bypass using a revoked certificate.
chain: web service component does not call the expected method, which prevents a check for revoked certificates.
Certificate revocation list not searched for certain certificates.
Product cannot access certificate revocation list when an HTTP proxy is being used.
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Effectiveness: High

+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 948 SFP Secondary Cluster: Digital Certificate
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1396 Comprehensive Categorization: Access Control
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1442 OWASP Top Ten 2025 Category A07:2025 - Authentication Failures
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
CLASP Failure to check for certificate revocation
+ References
[REF-18] Secure Software, Inc.. "The CLASP Application Security Process". 2005.
<https://cwe.mitre.org/documents/sources/TheCLASPApplicationSecurityProcess.pdf>. (URL validated: 2024-11-17)
[REF-44] Michael Howard, David LeBlanc and John Viega. "24 Deadly Sins of Software Security". "Sin 23: Improper Use of PKI, Especially SSL." Page 347. McGraw-Hill. 2010.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
CLASP
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Modes_of_Introduction
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2019-09-19 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2018-03-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Modes_of_Introduction, Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships, Type
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2013-07-17 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2013-02-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Observed_Examples, Other_Notes, Relationships, Type
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2010-12-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Other_Notes
2009-05-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2009-03-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Name, Relationships
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2009-03-10 Failure to Check for Certificate Revocation

CWE-273: Improper Check for Dropped Privileges

Weakness ID: 273
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
The product attempts to drop privileges but does not check or incorrectly checks to see if the drop succeeded.
+ Extended Description
If the drop fails, the product will continue to run with the raised privileges, which might provide additional access to unprivileged users.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Gain Privileges or Assume Identity

Scope: Access Control

If privileges are not dropped, neither are access rights of the user. Often these rights can be prevented from being dropped.

Gain Privileges or Assume Identity; Hide Activities

Scope: Access Control, Non-Repudiation

If privileges are not dropped, in some cases the system may record actions as the user which is being impersonated rather than the impersonator.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design

Strategy: Separation of Privilege

Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area.

Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.

Implementation

Check the results of all functions that return a value and verify that the value is expected.

Effectiveness: High

Note: Checking the return value of the function will typically be sufficient, however beware of race conditions (CWE-362) in a concurrent environment.

Implementation

In Windows, make sure that the process token has the SeImpersonatePrivilege(Microsoft Server 2003). Code that relies on impersonation for security must ensure that the impersonation succeeded, i.e., that a proper privilege demotion happened.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 271 Privilege Dropping / Lowering Errors
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 754 Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions
PeerOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 252 Unchecked Return Value
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 265 Privilege Issues
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 754 Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1011 Authorize Actors
+ Background Details
In Windows based environments that have access control, impersonation is used so that access checks can be performed on a client identity by a server with higher privileges. By impersonating the client, the server is restricted to client-level security -- although in different threads it may have much higher privileges.
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation

REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.

This issue is likely to occur in restrictive environments in which the operating system or application provides fine-grained control over privilege management.

+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
Medium
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


This code attempts to take on the privileges of a user before creating a file, thus avoiding performing the action with unnecessarily high privileges:

(bad code)
Example Language: C++ 
bool DoSecureStuff(HANDLE hPipe) {
bool fDataWritten = false;
ImpersonateNamedPipeClient(hPipe);
HANDLE hFile = CreateFile(...);
/../
RevertToSelf()
/../
}

The call to ImpersonateNamedPipeClient may fail, but the return value is not checked. If the call fails, the code may execute with higher privileges than intended. In this case, an attacker could exploit this behavior to write a file to a location that the attacker does not have access to.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Program does not check return value when invoking functions to drop privileges, which could leave users with higher privileges than expected by forcing those functions to fail.
Program does not check return value when invoking functions to drop privileges, which could leave users with higher privileges than expected by forcing those functions to fail.
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Effectiveness: High

+ Affected Resources
  • System Process
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 748 CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Appendix - POSIX (POS)
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 962 SFP Secondary Cluster: Unchecked Status Condition
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1171 SEI CERT C Coding Standard - Guidelines 50. POSIX (POS)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1396 Comprehensive Categorization: Access Control
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
CLASP Failure to check whether privileges were dropped successfully
CERT C Secure Coding POS37-C Exact Ensure that privilege relinquishment is successful
Software Fault Patterns SFP4 Unchecked Status Condition
+ References
[REF-18] Secure Software, Inc.. "The CLASP Application Security Process". 2005.
<https://cwe.mitre.org/documents/sources/TheCLASPApplicationSecurityProcess.pdf>. (URL validated: 2024-11-17)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
CLASP
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2020-12-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Causal_Nature, Demonstrative_Examples, Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2014-06-23 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Background_Details, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2009-05-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Name
2009-03-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Name, Relationships
2008-11-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings, Weakness_Ordinalities
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2009-03-10 Failure to Check Whether Privileges Were Dropped Successfully
2009-05-27 Improper Check for Successfully Dropped Privileges

CWE-244: Improper Clearing of Heap Memory Before Release ('Heap Inspection')

Weakness ID: 244
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
×

Edit Custom Filter


+ Description
Using realloc() to resize buffers that store sensitive information can leave the sensitive information exposed to attack, because it is not removed from memory.
+ Extended Description
When sensitive data such as a password or an encryption key is not removed from memory, it could be exposed to an attacker using a "heap inspection" attack that reads the sensitive data using memory dumps or other methods. The realloc() function is commonly used to increase the size of a block of allocated memory. This operation often requires copying the contents of the old memory block into a new and larger block. This operation leaves the contents of the original block intact but inaccessible to the program, preventing the program from being able to scrub sensitive data from memory. If an attacker can later examine the contents of a memory dump, the sensitive data could be exposed.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Read Memory; Other

Scope: Confidentiality, Other

Be careful using vfork() and fork() in security sensitive code. The process state will not be cleaned up and will contain traces of data from past use.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 226 Sensitive Information in Resource Not Removed Before Reuse
CanPrecede Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 669 Incorrect Resource Transfer Between Spheres
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Memory-Unsafe (Undetermined Prevalence)

C (Undetermined Prevalence)

C++ (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


The following code calls realloc() on a buffer containing sensitive data:

(bad code)
Example Language:
cleartext_buffer = get_secret();...
cleartext_buffer = realloc(cleartext_buffer, 1024);
...
scrub_memory(cleartext_buffer, 1024);

There is an attempt to scrub the sensitive data from memory, but realloc() is used, so it could return a pointer to a different part of memory. The memory that was originally allocated for cleartext_buffer could still contain an uncleared copy of the data.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Cryptography library does not clear heap memory before release
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)
+ Functional Areas
  • Memory Management
+ Affected Resources
  • Memory
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 227 7PK - API Abuse
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 742 CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 9 - Memory Management (MEM)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 876 CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 08 - Memory Management (MEM)
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 963 SFP Secondary Cluster: Exposed Data
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1399 Comprehensive Categorization: Memory Safety
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Variant level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
7 Pernicious Kingdoms Heap Inspection
CERT C Secure Coding MEM03-C Clear sensitive information stored in reusable resources returned for reuse
Software Fault Patterns SFP23 Exposed Data
+ References
[REF-6] Katrina Tsipenyuk, Brian Chess and Gary McGraw. "Seven Pernicious Kingdoms: A Taxonomy of Software Security Errors". NIST Workshop on Software Security Assurance Tools Techniques and Metrics. NIST. 2005-11-07.
<https://samate.nist.gov/SSATTM_Content/papers/Seven%20Pernicious%20Kingdoms%20-%20Taxonomy%20of%20Sw%20Security%20Errors%20-%20Tsipenyuk%20-%20Chess%20-%20McGraw.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
7 Pernicious Kingdoms
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Detection_Factors, Weakness_Ordinalities
2025-09-09
(CWE 4.18, 2025-09-09)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Functional_Areas
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings, White_Box_Definitions
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2011-09-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2010-12-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Name
2009-10-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Other_Notes
2009-05-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Name
2008-11-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-10-14 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Name, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-08-01 KDM Analytics
added/updated white box definitions
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2008-04-11 Heap Inspection
2008-09-09 Failure to Clear Heap Memory Before Release
2009-05-27 Failure to Clear Heap Memory Before Release (aka 'Heap Inspection')
2010-12-13 Failure to Clear Heap Memory Before Release ('Heap Inspection')

CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')

Weakness ID: 94
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities in limited situations requiring careful review (with careful review of mapping notes)
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
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+ Description
The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment. Diagram for CWE-94
+ Alternate Terms
Code Injection
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Bypass Protection Mechanism

Scope: Access Control

In some cases, injectable code controls authentication; this may lead to a remote vulnerability.

Gain Privileges or Assume Identity

Scope: Access Control

Injected code can access resources that the attacker is directly prevented from accessing.

Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands

Scope: Integrity, Confidentiality, Availability

When a product allows a user's input to contain code syntax, it might be possible for an attacker to craft the code in such a way that it will alter the intended control flow of the product. As a result, code injection can often result in the execution of arbitrary code. Code injection attacks can also lead to loss of data integrity in nearly all cases, since the control-plane data injected is always incidental to data recall or writing.

Hide Activities

Scope: Non-Repudiation

Often the actions performed by injected control code are unlogged.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design

Refactor your program so that you do not have to dynamically generate code.

Architecture and Design

Run your code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which code can be executed by your product.

Examples include the Unix chroot jail and AppArmor. In general, managed code may provide some protection.

This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of your application may still be subject to compromise.

Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.

Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.

When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."

Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.

To reduce the likelihood of code injection, use stringent allowlists that limit which constructs are allowed. If you are dynamically constructing code that invokes a function, then verifying that the input is alphanumeric might be insufficient. An attacker might still be able to reference a dangerous function that you did not intend to allow, such as system(), exec(), or exit().

Testing

Use automated static analysis tools that target this type of weakness. Many modern techniques use data flow analysis to minimize the number of false positives. This is not a perfect solution, since 100% accuracy and coverage are not feasible.

Testing

Use dynamic tools and techniques that interact with the product using large test suites with many diverse inputs, such as fuzz testing (fuzzing), robustness testing, and fault injection. The product's operation may slow down, but it should not become unstable, crash, or generate incorrect results.

Operation

Strategy: Compilation or Build Hardening

Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).

Operation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).

Implementation

For Python programs, it is frequently encouraged to use the ast.literal_eval() function instead of eval, since it is intentionally designed to avoid executing code. However, an adversary could still cause excessive memory or stack consumption via deeply nested structures [REF-1372], so the python documentation discourages use of ast.literal_eval() on untrusted data [REF-1373].

Effectiveness: Discouraged Common Practice

+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 74 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection')
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 913 Improper Control of Dynamically-Managed Code Resources
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 95 Improper Neutralization of Directives in Dynamically Evaluated Code ('Eval Injection')
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 96 Improper Neutralization of Directives in Statically Saved Code ('Static Code Injection')
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1336 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements Used in a Template Engine
CanFollow Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 98 Improper Control of Filename for Include/Require Statement in PHP Program ('PHP Remote File Inclusion')
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 137 Data Neutralization Issues
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 74 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection')
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1019 Validate Inputs
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Interpreted (Sometimes Prevalent)

Technologies

AI/ML (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
Medium
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


This example attempts to write user messages to a message file and allow users to view them.

(bad code)
Example Language: PHP 
$MessageFile = "messages.out";
if ($_GET["action"] == "NewMessage") {
$name = $_GET["name"];
$message = $_GET["message"];
$handle = fopen($MessageFile, "a+");
fwrite($handle, "<b>$name</b> says '$message'<hr>\n");
fclose($handle);
echo "Message Saved!<p>\n";
}
else if ($_GET["action"] == "ViewMessages") {
include($MessageFile);
}

While the programmer intends for the MessageFile to only include data, an attacker can provide a message such as:

(attack code)
 
name=h4x0r
message=%3C?php%20system(%22/bin/ls%20-l%22);?%3E

which will decode to the following:

(attack code)
 
<?php system("/bin/ls -l");?>

The programmer thought they were just including the contents of a regular data file, but PHP parsed it and executed the code. Now, this code is executed any time people view messages.

Notice that XSS (CWE-79) is also possible in this situation.



Example 2


edit-config.pl: This CGI script is used to modify settings in a configuration file.

(bad code)
Example Language: Perl 
use CGI qw(:standard);

sub config_file_add_key {
my ($fname, $key, $arg) = @_;

# code to add a field/key to a file goes here
}

sub config_file_set_key {
my ($fname, $key, $arg) = @_;

# code to set key to a particular file goes here
}

sub config_file_delete_key {
my ($fname, $key, $arg) = @_;

# code to delete key from a particular file goes here
}

sub handleConfigAction {
my ($fname, $action) = @_;
my $key = param('key');
my $val = param('val');

# this is super-efficient code, especially if you have to invoke


# any one of dozens of different functions!

my $code = "config_file_$action_key(\$fname, \$key, \$val);";
eval($code);
}

$configfile = "/home/cwe/config.txt";
print header;
if (defined(param('action'))) {
handleConfigAction($configfile, param('action'));
}
else {
print "No action specified!\n";
}

The script intends to take the 'action' parameter and invoke one of a variety of functions based on the value of that parameter - config_file_add_key(), config_file_set_key(), or config_file_delete_key(). It could set up a conditional to invoke each function separately, but eval() is a powerful way of doing the same thing in fewer lines of code, especially when a large number of functions or variables are involved. Unfortunately, in this case, the attacker can provide other values in the action parameter, such as:

(attack code)
 
add_key(",","); system("/bin/ls");

This would produce the following string in handleConfigAction():

(result)
 
config_file_add_key(",","); system("/bin/ls");

Any arbitrary Perl code could be added after the attacker has "closed off" the construction of the original function call, in order to prevent parsing errors from causing the malicious eval() to fail before the attacker's payload is activated. This particular manipulation would fail after the system() call, because the "_key(\$fname, \$key, \$val)" portion of the string would cause an error, but this is irrelevant to the attack because the payload has already been activated.



Example 3


This simple python3 script asks a user to supply a comma-separated list of numbers as input and adds them together.

(bad code)
Example Language: Python 
def main():
sum = 0
try:
numbers = eval(input("Enter a comma-separated list of numbers: "))
except SyntaxError:
print("Error: invalid input")
return
for num in numbers:
sum = sum + num
print(f"Sum of {numbers} = {sum}")
main()

The eval() function can take the user-supplied list and convert it into a Python list object, therefore allowing the programmer to use list comprehension methods to work with the data. However, if code is supplied to the eval() function, it will execute that code. For example, a malicious user could supply the following string:

(attack code)
 
__import__('subprocess').getoutput('rm -r *')

This would delete all the files in the current directory. For this reason, it is not recommended to use eval() with untrusted input.

A way to accomplish this without the use of eval() is to apply an integer conversion on the input within a try/except block. If the user-supplied input is not numeric, this will raise a ValueError. By avoiding eval(), there is no opportunity for the input string to be executed as code.

(good code)
Example Language: Python 
def main():
sum = 0
numbers = input("Enter a comma-separated list of numbers: ").split(",")
try:
for num in numbers:
sum = sum + int(num)
print(f"Sum of {numbers} = {sum}")
except ValueError:
print("Error: invalid input")
main()

An alternative, commonly-cited mitigation for this kind of weakness is to use the ast.literal_eval() function, since it is intentionally designed to avoid executing code. However, an adversary could still cause excessive memory or stack consumption via deeply nested structures [REF-1372], so the python documentation discourages use of ast.literal_eval() on untrusted data [REF-1373].



Example 4


The following code is a workflow job written using YAML. The code attempts to download pull request artifacts, unzip from the artifact called pr.zip and extract the value of the file NR into a variable "pr_number" that will be used later in another job. It attempts to create a github workflow environment variable, writing to $GITHUB_ENV. The environment variable value is retrieved from an external resource.

(bad code)
Example Language: Other 
name: Deploy Preview
jobs:
deploy:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: 'Download artifact'
uses: actions/github-script
with:
script: |
var artifacts = await github.actions.listWorkflowRunArtifacts({
owner: context.repo.owner,
repo: context.repo.repo,
run_id: ${{ github.event.workflow_run.id }},
});
var matchPrArtifact = artifacts.data.artifacts.filter((artifact) => {
return artifact.name == "pr"
})[0];
var downloadPr = await github.actions.downloadArtifact({
owner: context.repo.owner,
repo: context.repo.repo,
artifact_id: matchPrArtifact.id,
archive_format: 'zip',
});
var fs = require('fs');
fs.writeFileSync('${{github.workspace}}/pr.zip', Buffer.from(downloadPr.data));
- run: |
unzip pr.zip
echo "pr_number=$(cat NR)" >> $GITHUB_ENV

The code does not neutralize the value of the file NR, e.g. by validating that NR only contains a number (CWE-1284). The NR file is attacker controlled because it originates from a pull request that produced pr.zip.

The attacker could escape the existing pr_number and create a new variable using a "\n" (CWE-93) followed by any environment variable to be added such as:

(attack code)
 
\nNODE_OPTIONS="--experimental-modules --experiments-loader=data:text/javascript,console.log('injected code');//"

This would result in injecting and running javascript code (CWE-94) on the workflow runner with elevated privileges.

(good code)
Example Language: Other 
The code could be modified to validate that the NR file only contains a numeric value, or the code could retrieve the PR number from a more trusted source.


+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Math component in an LLM framework translates user input into a Python expression that is input into the Python exec() method, allowing code execution - one variant of a "prompt injection" attack.
Python-based library uses an LLM prompt containing user input to dynamically generate code that is then fed as input into the Python exec() method, allowing code execution - one variant of a "prompt injection" attack.
Framework for LLM applications allows eval injection via a crafted response from a hosting provider.
Python compiler uses eval() to execute malicious strings as Python code.
Chain: regex in EXIF processor code does not correctly determine where a string ends (CWE-625), enabling eval injection (CWE-95), as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
"Code injection" in VPN product, as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
Eval injection in PHP program.
Eval injection in Perl program.
Eval injection in Perl program using an ID that should only contain hyphens and numbers.
Direct code injection into Perl eval function.
Eval injection in Perl program.
Direct code injection into Perl eval function.
Direct code injection into Perl eval function.
MFV. code injection into PHP eval statement using nested constructs that should not be nested.
MFV. code injection into PHP eval statement using nested constructs that should not be nested.
Code injection into Python eval statement from a field in a formatted file.
Eval injection in Python program.
chain: Resultant eval injection. An invalid value prevents initialization of variables, which can be modified by attacker and later injected into PHP eval statement.
Perl code directly injected into CGI library file from parameters to another CGI program.
Direct PHP code injection into supporting template file.
Direct code injection into PHP script that can be accessed by attacker.
PHP code from User-Agent HTTP header directly inserted into log file implemented as PHP script.
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
Resultant
(where the weakness is typically related to the presence of some other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Effectiveness: High

+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 635 Weaknesses Originally Used by NVD from 2008 to 2016
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 752 2009 Top 25 - Risky Resource Management
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 991 SFP Secondary Cluster: Tainted Input to Environment
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1200 Weaknesses in the 2019 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1347 OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A03:2021 - Injection
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1350 Weaknesses in the 2020 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1387 Weaknesses in the 2022 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1409 Comprehensive Categorization: Injection
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1425 Weaknesses in the 2023 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1430 Weaknesses in the 2024 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1435 Weaknesses in the 2025 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1440 OWASP Top Ten 2025 Category A05:2025 - Injection
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED-WITH-REVIEW
(this CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities in limited situations requiring careful review)
Reasons Frequent Misuse, Frequent Misinterpretation

Rationale

This entry is frequently misused for vulnerabilities with a technical impact of "code execution," which does not by itself indicate a root cause weakness, since dozens of weaknesses can enable code execution.

Comments

This weakness only applies when the product's functionality intentionally constructs all or part of a code segment. It could be that executing code could be the result of other weaknesses that do not involve the construction of code segments.
+ Notes

Theoretical

Injection problems encompass a wide variety of issues -- all mitigated in very different ways. For this reason, the most effective way to discuss these weaknesses is to note the distinct features that classify them as injection weaknesses. The most important issue to note is that all injection problems share one thing in common -- i.e., they allow for the injection of control plane data into the user-controlled data plane. This means that the execution of the process may be altered by sending code in through legitimate data channels, using no other mechanism. While buffer overflows, and many other flaws, involve the use of some further issue to gain execution, injection problems need only for the data to be parsed. The most classic instantiations of this category of weakness are SQL injection and format string vulnerabilities.

+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
PLOVER CODE Code Evaluation and Injection
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-2 Req CR 3.5
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 3-3 Req SR 3.5
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-1 Req SVV-1
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-1 Req SVV-3
+ References
[REF-44] Michael Howard, David LeBlanc and John Viega. "24 Deadly Sins of Software Security". "Sin 3: Web-Client Related Vulnerabilities (XSS)." Page 63. McGraw-Hill. 2010.
[REF-1372] "How ast.literal_eval can cause memory exhaustion". Reddit. 2022-12-14.
<https://www.reddit.com/r/learnpython/comments/zmbhcf/how_astliteral_eval_can_cause_memory_exhaustion/>. (URL validated: 2023-11-03)
[REF-1373] "ast - Abstract Syntax Trees". ast.literal_eval(node_or_string). Python. 2023-11-02.
<https://docs.python.org/3/library/ast.html#ast.literal_eval>. (URL validated: 2023-11-03)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
PLOVER
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2023-06-29
(CWE 4.12, 2023-06-29)
"Mapping CWE to 62443" Sub-Working Group CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT SIG
Suggested mappings to ISA/IEC 62443.
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03)
Abhi Balakrishnan
Contributed usability diagram concepts used by the CWE team.
2025-08-22
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
Matthew A. Pagan Spectrum
Discovered a syntax issue in the Python3 demox (DX-156) and suggested a fix
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities
2025-04-03
(CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Alternate_Terms, Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram, Theoretical_Notes
2024-11-19
(CWE 4.16, 2024-11-19)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
2024-07-16
(CWE 4.15, 2024-07-16)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Observed_Examples
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Detection_Factors, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2022-06-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
2022-04-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Research_Gaps
2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-07-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-03-15 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2020-08-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-06-25 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
2019-09-19 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Type
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships
2015-12-07 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2013-02-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, References, Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2011-03-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Name
2010-06-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Potential_Mitigations
2010-02-16 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2009-05-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Name
2009-03-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2009-01-12 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Name, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships, Research_Gaps, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2009-01-12 Code Injection
2009-05-27 Failure to Control Generation of Code (aka 'Code Injection')
2011-03-29 Failure to Control Generation of Code ('Code Injection')

CWE-99: Improper Control of Resource Identifiers ('Resource Injection')

Weakness ID: 99
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities in limited situations requiring careful review (with careful review of mapping notes)
Abstraction: Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.
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+ Description
The product receives input from an upstream component, but it does not restrict or incorrectly restricts the input before it is used as an identifier for a resource that may be outside the intended sphere of control.
+ Extended Description

A resource injection issue occurs when the following two conditions are met:

  1. An attacker can specify the identifier used to access a system resource. For example, an attacker might be able to specify part of the name of a file to be opened or a port number to be used.
  2. By specifying the resource, the attacker gains a capability that would not otherwise be permitted. For example, the program may give the attacker the ability to overwrite the specified file, run with a configuration controlled by the attacker, or transmit sensitive information to a third-party server.

This may enable an attacker to access or modify otherwise protected system resources.

+ Alternate Terms
Insecure Direct Object Reference
OWASP uses this term, although it is effectively the same as resource injection.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Read Application Data; Modify Application Data; Read Files or Directories; Modify Files or Directories

Scope: Confidentiality, Integrity

An attacker could gain access to or modify sensitive data or system resources. This could allow access to protected files or directories including configuration files and files containing sensitive information.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.

When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."

Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, it can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.

+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 74 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection')
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 641 Improper Restriction of Names for Files and Other Resources
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 694 Use of Multiple Resources with Duplicate Identifier
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 914 Improper Control of Dynamically-Identified Variables
PeerOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 706 Use of Incorrectly-Resolved Name or Reference
CanAlsoBe Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 73 External Control of File Name or Path
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1019 Validate Inputs
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design
Implementation REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
High
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


The following Java code uses input from an HTTP request to create a file name. The programmer has not considered the possibility that an attacker could provide a file name such as "../../tomcat/conf/server.xml", which causes the application to delete one of its own configuration files.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
String rName = request.getParameter("reportName");
File rFile = new File("/usr/local/apfr/reports/" + rName);
...
rFile.delete();


Example 2


The following code uses input from the command line to determine which file to open and echo back to the user. If the program runs with privileges and malicious users can create soft links to the file, they can use the program to read the first part of any file on the system.

(bad code)
Example Language: C++ 
ifstream ifs(argv[0]);
string s;
ifs >> s;
cout << s;

The kind of resource the data affects indicates the kind of content that may be dangerous. For example, data containing special characters like period, slash, and backslash, are risky when used in methods that interact with the file system. (Resource injection, when it is related to file system resources, sometimes goes by the name "path manipulation.") Similarly, data that contains URLs and URIs is risky for functions that create remote connections.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
chain: mobile OS verifies cryptographic signature of file in an archive, but then installs a different file with the same name that is also listed in the archive.
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Effectiveness: High

+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 813 OWASP Top Ten 2010 Category A4 - Insecure Direct Object References
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 932 OWASP Top Ten 2013 Category A4 - Insecure Direct Object References
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 990 SFP Secondary Cluster: Tainted Input to Command
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1005 7PK - Input Validation and Representation
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1131 CISQ Quality Measures (2016) - Security
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1308 CISQ Quality Measures - Security
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1340 CISQ Data Protection Measures
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1347 OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A03:2021 - Injection
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1409 Comprehensive Categorization: Injection
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1440 OWASP Top Ten 2025 Category A05:2025 - Injection
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED-WITH-REVIEW
(this CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities in limited situations requiring careful review)
Reason Abstraction

Rationale

This CWE entry is a Class and might have Base-level children that would be more appropriate

Comments

Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit
+ Notes

Relationship

Resource injection that involves resources stored on the filesystem goes by the name path manipulation (CWE-73).

Maintenance

The relationship between CWE-99 and CWE-610 needs further investigation and clarification. They might be duplicates. CWE-99 "Resource Injection," as originally defined in Seven Pernicious Kingdoms taxonomy, emphasizes the "identifier used to access a system resource" such as a file name or port number, yet it explicitly states that the "resource injection" term does not apply to "path manipulation," which effectively identifies the path at which a resource can be found and could be considered to be one aspect of a resource identifier. Also, CWE-610 effectively covers any type of resource, whether that resource is at the system layer, the application layer, or the code layer.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
7 Pernicious Kingdoms Resource Injection
Software Fault Patterns SFP24 Tainted input to command
OMG ASCSM ASCSM-CWE-99
+ References
[REF-6] Katrina Tsipenyuk, Brian Chess and Gary McGraw. "Seven Pernicious Kingdoms: A Taxonomy of Software Security Errors". NIST Workshop on Software Security Assurance Tools Techniques and Metrics. NIST. 2005-11-07.
<https://samate.nist.gov/SSATTM_Content/papers/Seven%20Pernicious%20Kingdoms%20-%20Taxonomy%20of%20Sw%20Security%20Errors%20-%20Tsipenyuk%20-%20Chess%20-%20McGraw.pdf>.
[REF-962] Object Management Group (OMG). "Automated Source Code Security Measure (ASCSM)". ASCSM-CWE-99. 2016-01.
<http://www.omg.org/spec/ASCSM/1.0/>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
7 Pernicious Kingdoms
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2023-10-26 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team