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Home > CWE List > VIEW SLICE: CWE-1358: Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS (4.7)  
ID

CWE VIEW: Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS

View ID: 1358
Type: Graph
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+ Objective
CWE entries in this view (graph) are associated with the Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS, as published by the Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force (SEI ETF) in March 2022. Weaknesses and categories in this view are focused on issues that affect ICS (Industrial Control Systems) but have not been traditionally covered by CWE in the past due to its earlier emphasis on enterprise IT software. Note: weaknesses in this view are based on "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations and other suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
+ Audience
StakeholderDescription
Hardware DesignersICS/OT hardware designers can use this view to ensure a minimal set of weaknesses that should be avoided or mitigated during the design process.
Product VendorsProduct vendors can use this view to ensure that all aspects of the product lifecycle address these weaknesses.
Assessment Tool VendorsAssessment tool vendors that help to assess potential weaknesses, or avoid them, can use this view to improve their tool's coverage to address more weaknesses.
Academic ResearchersAcademic researchers can use this view to identify potential research opportunities that could produce better methods for detection or avoidance of weaknesses in ICS/OT products.
+ Relationships
The following graph shows the tree-like relationships between weaknesses that exist at different levels of abstraction. At the highest level, categories and pillars exist to group weaknesses. Categories (which are not technically weaknesses) are special CWE entries used to group weaknesses that share a common characteristic. Pillars are weaknesses that are described in the most abstract fashion. Below these top-level entries are weaknesses are varying levels of abstraction. Classes are still very abstract, typically independent of any specific language or technology. Base level weaknesses are used to present a more specific type of weakness. A variant is a weakness that is described at a very low level of detail, typically limited to a specific language or technology. A chain is a set of weaknesses that must be reachable consecutively in order to produce an exploitable vulnerability. While a composite is a set of weaknesses that must all be present simultaneously in order to produce an exploitable vulnerability.
Show Details:
1358 - Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS
+CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.ICS Communications - (1359)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications)
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "ICS Communications" super category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022.
+CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.ICS Communications: Zone Boundary Failures - (1364)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1364 (ICS Communications: Zone Boundary Failures)
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Zone Boundary Failures" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022. Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
*ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.Incorrect Resource Transfer Between Spheres - (669)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1364 (ICS Communications: Zone Boundary Failures) > 669 (Incorrect Resource Transfer Between Spheres)
The product does not properly transfer a resource/behavior to another sphere, or improperly imports a resource/behavior from another sphere, in a manner that provides unintended control over that resource.
*ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions - (754)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1364 (ICS Communications: Zone Boundary Failures) > 754 (Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions)
The software does not check or incorrectly checks for unusual or exceptional conditions that are not expected to occur frequently during day to day operation of the software.
*ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.Exposure of Resource to Wrong Sphere - (668)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1364 (ICS Communications: Zone Boundary Failures) > 668 (Exposure of Resource to Wrong Sphere)
The product exposes a resource to the wrong control sphere, providing unintended actors with inappropriate access to the resource.
+CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.ICS Communications: Unreliability - (1365)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1365 (ICS Communications: Unreliability)
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Unreliability" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022. Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
*BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.Improper Handling of Extreme Physical Environment Conditions - (1384)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1365 (ICS Communications: Unreliability) > 1384 (Improper Handling of Extreme Physical Environment Conditions)
The product does not properly detect and handle extreme conditions in the product's physical environment, such as temperature, radiation, humidity, power, or other physical phenomena.
+CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols - (1366)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1366 (ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols)
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Frail Security in Protocols" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022. Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
*ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm - (327)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1366 (ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols) > 327 (Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm)
The use of a broken or risky cryptographic algorithm is an unnecessary risk that may result in the exposure of sensitive information.
*BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.Improperly Implemented Security Check for Standard - (358)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1366 (ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols) > 358 (Improperly Implemented Security Check for Standard)
The software does not implement or incorrectly implements one or more security-relevant checks as specified by the design of a standardized algorithm, protocol, or technique.
+CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.ICS Dependencies (& Architecture) - (1360)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1360 (ICS Dependencies (& Architecture))
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "ICS Dependencies (& Architecture)" super category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022.
+CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.ICS Dependencies (& Architecture): External Physical Systems - (1367)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1360 (ICS Dependencies (& Architecture)) > 1367 (ICS Dependencies (& Architecture): External Physical Systems)
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "External Physical Systems" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022. Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
*ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.Reliance on Uncontrolled Component - (1357)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1360 (ICS Dependencies (& Architecture)) > 1367 (ICS Dependencies (& Architecture): External Physical Systems) > 1357 (Reliance on Uncontrolled Component)
The product's design or architecture is built from multiple separate components, but one or more components are not under complete control of the developer, such as a third-party software library or a physical component that is built by an original equipment manufacturer (OEM).
*BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.Improper Protections Against Hardware Overheating - (1338)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1360 (ICS Dependencies (& Architecture)) > 1367 (ICS Dependencies (& Architecture): External Physical Systems) > 1338 (Improper Protections Against Hardware Overheating)
A hardware device is missing or has inadequate protection features to prevent overheating.
+CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.ICS Dependencies (& Architecture): External Digital Systems - (1368)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1360 (ICS Dependencies (& Architecture)) > 1368 (ICS Dependencies (& Architecture): External Digital Systems)
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "External Digital Systems" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022. Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
*ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.Externally Controlled Reference to a Resource in Another Sphere - (610)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1360 (ICS Dependencies (& Architecture)) > 1368 (ICS Dependencies (& Architecture): External Digital Systems) > 610 (Externally Controlled Reference to a Resource in Another Sphere)
The product uses an externally controlled name or reference that resolves to a resource that is outside of the intended control sphere.
*ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.Reliance on Uncontrolled Component - (1357)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1360 (ICS Dependencies (& Architecture)) > 1368 (ICS Dependencies (& Architecture): External Digital Systems) > 1357 (Reliance on Uncontrolled Component)
The product's design or architecture is built from multiple separate components, but one or more components are not under complete control of the developer, such as a third-party software library or a physical component that is built by an original equipment manufacturer (OEM).
+CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.ICS Supply Chain - (1361)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1361 (ICS Supply Chain)
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "ICS Supply Chain" super category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022.
+CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.ICS Supply Chain: IT/OT Convergence/Expansion - (1369)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1361 (ICS Supply Chain) > 1369 (ICS Supply Chain: IT/OT Convergence/Expansion)
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "IT/OT Convergence/Expansion" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022. Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
*ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.Not Failing Securely ('Failing Open') - (636)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1361 (ICS Supply Chain) > 1369 (ICS Supply Chain: IT/OT Convergence/Expansion) > 636 (Not Failing Securely ('Failing Open'))
When the product encounters an error condition or failure, its design requires it to fall back to a state that is less secure than other options that are available, such as selecting the weakest encryption algorithm or using the most permissive access control restrictions.Failing Open
+CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.ICS Supply Chain: Common Mode Frailties - (1370)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1361 (ICS Supply Chain) > 1370 (ICS Supply Chain: Common Mode Frailties)
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Common Mode Frailties" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022. Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
*VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.Generation of Predictable IV with CBC Mode - (329)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1361 (ICS Supply Chain) > 1370 (ICS Supply Chain: Common Mode Frailties) > 329 (Generation of Predictable IV with CBC Mode)
The product generates and uses a predictable initialization Vector (IV) with Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) Mode, which causes algorithms to be susceptible to dictionary attacks when they are encrypted under the same key.
*ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.Reliance on Uncontrolled Component - (1357)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1361 (ICS Supply Chain) > 1370 (ICS Supply Chain: Common Mode Frailties) > 1357 (Reliance on Uncontrolled Component)
The product's design or architecture is built from multiple separate components, but one or more components are not under complete control of the developer, such as a third-party software library or a physical component that is built by an original equipment manufacturer (OEM).
+CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.ICS Supply Chain: Poorly Documented or Undocumented Features - (1371)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1361 (ICS Supply Chain) > 1371 (ICS Supply Chain: Poorly Documented or Undocumented Features)
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Poorly Documented or Undocumented Features" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022. Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
*ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.Hidden Functionality - (912)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1361 (ICS Supply Chain) > 1371 (ICS Supply Chain: Poorly Documented or Undocumented Features) > 912 (Hidden Functionality)
The software contains functionality that is not documented, not part of the specification, and not accessible through an interface or command sequence that is obvious to the software's users or administrators.
*ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.Insufficient Technical Documentation - (1059)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1361 (ICS Supply Chain) > 1371 (ICS Supply Chain: Poorly Documented or Undocumented Features) > 1059 (Insufficient Technical Documentation)
The product does not contain sufficient technical or engineering documentation (whether on paper or in electronic form) that contains descriptions of all the relevant software/hardware elements of the product, such as its usage, structure, architectural components, interfaces, design, implementation, configuration, operation, etc.
*BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.Inclusion of Undocumented Features or Chicken Bits - (1242)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1361 (ICS Supply Chain) > 1371 (ICS Supply Chain: Poorly Documented or Undocumented Features) > 1242 (Inclusion of Undocumented Features or Chicken Bits)
The device includes chicken bits or undocumented features that can create entry points for unauthorized actors.
+CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.ICS Supply Chain: OT Counterfeit and Malicious Corruption - (1372)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1361 (ICS Supply Chain) > 1372 (ICS Supply Chain: OT Counterfeit and Malicious Corruption)
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "OT Counterfeit and Malicious Corruption" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022. Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
*BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.Missing Protection Against Hardware Reverse Engineering Using Integrated Circuit (IC) Imaging Techniques - (1278)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1361 (ICS Supply Chain) > 1372 (ICS Supply Chain: OT Counterfeit and Malicious Corruption) > 1278 (Missing Protection Against Hardware Reverse Engineering Using Integrated Circuit (IC) Imaging Techniques)
Information stored in hardware may be recovered by an attacker with the capability to capture and analyze images of the integrated circuit using techniques such as scanning electron microscopy.
*CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.Privilege Separation and Access Control Issues - (1198)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1361 (ICS Supply Chain) > 1372 (ICS Supply Chain: OT Counterfeit and Malicious Corruption) > 1198 (Privilege Separation and Access Control Issues)
Weaknesses in this category are related to features and mechanisms providing hardware-based isolation and access control (e.g., identity, policy, locking control) of sensitive shared hardware resources such as registers and fuses.
*BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.Improper Prevention of Lock Bit Modification - (1231)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1361 (ICS Supply Chain) > 1372 (ICS Supply Chain: OT Counterfeit and Malicious Corruption) > 1231 (Improper Prevention of Lock Bit Modification)
The product uses a trusted lock bit for restricting access to registers, address regions, or other resources, but the product does not prevent the value of the lock bit from being modified after it has been set.
*BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.Security-Sensitive Hardware Controls with Missing Lock Bit Protection - (1233)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1361 (ICS Supply Chain) > 1372 (ICS Supply Chain: OT Counterfeit and Malicious Corruption) > 1233 (Security-Sensitive Hardware Controls with Missing Lock Bit Protection)
The product uses a register lock bit protection mechanism, but it does not ensure that the lock bit prevents modification of system registers or controls that perform changes to important hardware system configuration.
+CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.ICS Engineering (Constructions/Deployment) - (1362)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1362 (ICS Engineering (Constructions/Deployment))
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "ICS Engineering (Constructions/Deployment)" super category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022.
+CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Trust Model Problems - (1373)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1362 (ICS Engineering (Constructions/Deployment)) > 1373 (ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Trust Model Problems)
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Trust Model Problems" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022. Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
*ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.Improper Privilege Management - (269)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1362 (ICS Engineering (Constructions/Deployment)) > 1373 (ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Trust Model Problems) > 269 (Improper Privilege Management)
The software does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor.
*BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.Reliance on Untrusted Inputs in a Security Decision - (807)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1362 (ICS Engineering (Constructions/Deployment)) > 1373 (ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Trust Model Problems) > 807 (Reliance on Untrusted Inputs in a Security Decision)
The application uses a protection mechanism that relies on the existence or values of an input, but the input can be modified by an untrusted actor in a way that bypasses the protection mechanism.
*BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.Acceptance of Extraneous Untrusted Data With Trusted Data - (349)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1362 (ICS Engineering (Constructions/Deployment)) > 1373 (ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Trust Model Problems) > 349 (Acceptance of Extraneous Untrusted Data With Trusted Data)
The software, when processing trusted data, accepts any untrusted data that is also included with the trusted data, treating the untrusted data as if it were trusted.
*CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Maker Breaker Blindness - (1374)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1362 (ICS Engineering (Constructions/Deployment)) > 1374 (ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Maker Breaker Blindness)
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Maker Breaker Blindness" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022. Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
*CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Gaps in Details/Data - (1375)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1362 (ICS Engineering (Constructions/Deployment)) > 1375 (ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Gaps in Details/Data)
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Gaps in Details/Data" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022. Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
+CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Security Gaps in Commissioning - (1376)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1362 (ICS Engineering (Constructions/Deployment)) > 1376 (ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Security Gaps in Commissioning)
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Security Gaps in Commissioning" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022. Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
*BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.Incorrect Default Permissions - (276)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1362 (ICS Engineering (Constructions/Deployment)) > 1376 (ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Security Gaps in Commissioning) > 276 (Incorrect Default Permissions)
During installation, installed file permissions are set to allow anyone to modify those files.
*ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition') - (362)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1362 (ICS Engineering (Constructions/Deployment)) > 1376 (ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Security Gaps in Commissioning) > 362 (Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition'))
The program contains a code sequence that can run concurrently with other code, and the code sequence requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence that is operating concurrently.
+CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Inherent Predictability in Design - (1377)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1362 (ICS Engineering (Constructions/Deployment)) > 1377 (ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Inherent Predictability in Design)
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Inherent Predictability in Design" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022. Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
*BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.Missing Protection Against Hardware Reverse Engineering Using Integrated Circuit (IC) Imaging Techniques - (1278)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1362 (ICS Engineering (Constructions/Deployment)) > 1377 (ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Inherent Predictability in Design) > 1278 (Missing Protection Against Hardware Reverse Engineering Using Integrated Circuit (IC) Imaging Techniques)
Information stored in hardware may be recovered by an attacker with the capability to capture and analyze images of the integrated circuit using techniques such as scanning electron microscopy.
+CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.ICS Operations (& Maintenance) - (1363)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1363 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance))
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "ICS Operations (& Maintenance)" super category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022.
*CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Gaps in obligations and training - (1378)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1363 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance)) > 1378 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Gaps in obligations and training)
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Gaps in obligations and training" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022. Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
+CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Human factors in ICS environments - (1379)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1363 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance)) > 1379 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Human factors in ICS environments)
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Human factors in ICS environments" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022. Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
*BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.Insufficient Psychological Acceptability - (655)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1363 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance)) > 1379 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Human factors in ICS environments) > 655 (Insufficient Psychological Acceptability)
The software has a protection mechanism that is too difficult or inconvenient to use, encouraging non-malicious users to disable or bypass the mechanism, whether by accident or on purpose.
*ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.User Interface (UI) Misrepresentation of Critical Information - (451)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1363 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance)) > 1379 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Human factors in ICS environments) > 451 (User Interface (UI) Misrepresentation of Critical Information)
The user interface (UI) does not properly represent critical information to the user, allowing the information - or its source - to be obscured or spoofed. This is often a component in phishing attacks.
*CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Post-analysis changes - (1380)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1363 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance)) > 1380 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Post-analysis changes)
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Post-analysis changes" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022. Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
*CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Exploitable Standard Operational Procedures - (1381)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1363 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance)) > 1381 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Exploitable Standard Operational Procedures)
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Exploitable Standard Operational Procedures" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022. Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
+CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Emerging Energy Technologies - (1382)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1363 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance)) > 1382 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Emerging Energy Technologies)
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Emerging Energy Technologies" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022. Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
*ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.Insufficient Control of Network Message Volume (Network Amplification) - (406)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1363 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance)) > 1382 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Emerging Energy Technologies) > 406 (Insufficient Control of Network Message Volume (Network Amplification))
The software does not sufficiently monitor or control transmitted network traffic volume, so that an actor can cause the software to transmit more traffic than should be allowed for that actor.
*ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.Improper Authorization - (285)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1363 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance)) > 1382 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Emerging Energy Technologies) > 285 (Improper Authorization)
The software does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.AuthZ
*BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.Improper Certificate Validation - (295)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1363 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance)) > 1382 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Emerging Energy Technologies) > 295 (Improper Certificate Validation)
The software does not validate, or incorrectly validates, a certificate.
*ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.Improper Input Validation - (20)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1363 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance)) > 1382 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Emerging Energy Technologies) > 20 (Improper Input Validation)
The product receives input or data, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the properties that are required to process the data safely and correctly.
*BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect') - (601)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1363 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance)) > 1382 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Emerging Energy Technologies) > 601 (URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect'))
A web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a Redirect. This simplifies phishing attacks.Open RedirectCross-site RedirectCross-domain Redirect
*BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.Origin Validation Error - (346)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1363 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance)) > 1382 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Emerging Energy Technologies) > 346 (Origin Validation Error)
The software does not properly verify that the source of data or communication is valid.
*BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.Improper Following of a Certificate's Chain of Trust - (296)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1363 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance)) > 1382 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Emerging Energy Technologies) > 296 (Improper Following of a Certificate's Chain of Trust)
The software does not follow, or incorrectly follows, the chain of trust for a certificate back to a trusted root certificate, resulting in incorrect trust of any resource that is associated with that certificate.
+CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Compliance/Conformance with Regulatory Requirements - (1383)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1363 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance)) > 1383 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Compliance/Conformance with Regulatory Requirements)
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Compliance/Conformance with Regulatory Requirements" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022. Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
*PillarPillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things.Improper Adherence to Coding Standards - (710)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1363 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance)) > 1383 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Compliance/Conformance with Regulatory Requirements) > 710 (Improper Adherence to Coding Standards)
The software does not follow certain coding rules for development, which can lead to resultant weaknesses or increase the severity of the associated vulnerabilities.
+ Notes

Maintenance

This view was created in CWE 4.7 to facilitate and illuminate discussion about weaknesses in ICS. It is under active development. In future versions, new weaknesses will be added based on input from the CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT Special Interest Group (SIG). However, there may be some issues that are outside of the current scope of CWE, which will require consultation with many CWE stakeholders to resolve.
+ References
[REF-1248] Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force (SEI ETF). "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS". 2022-03-09. <https://inl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/SEI-ETF-NCSV-TPT-Categories-of-Security-Vulnerabilities-ICS-v1_03-09-22.pdf>.
+ View Metrics
CWEs in this viewTotal CWEs
Weaknesses32out of 926
Categories26out of 351
Views0out of 47
Total58out of1324
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission DateSubmitterOrganization
2022-03-09New Categories of Security Vulnerabilities (NCSV) Technical Project Team (TPT)Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force

View Components

A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z

CWE-349: Acceptance of Extraneous Untrusted Data With Trusted Data

Weakness ID: 349
Abstraction: Base
Structure: Simple
Presentation Filter:
+ Description
The software, when processing trusted data, accepts any untrusted data that is also included with the trusted data, treating the untrusted data as if it were trusted.
+ Relationships
Section HelpThis table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (CWE-1000)
NatureTypeIDName
ChildOfClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.345Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
Section HelpThis table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (CWE-699)
NatureTypeIDName
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1214Data Integrity Issues
Section HelpThis table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (CWE-1008)
NatureTypeIDName
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1019Validate Inputs
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
PhaseNote
Architecture and DesignOMISSION: This weakness is caused by missing a security tactic during the architecture and design phase.
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.

Languages

Class: Language-Independent (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
ScopeImpactLikelihood
Access Control
Integrity

Technical Impact: Bypass Protection Mechanism; Modify Application Data

An attacker could package untrusted data with trusted data to bypass protection mechanisms to gain access to and possibly modify sensitive data.
+ Observed Examples
ReferenceDescription
Does not verify that trusted entity is authoritative for all entities in its response.
use of extra data in a signature allows certificate signature forging
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
NatureTypeIDName
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.860The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) Chapter 17 - Runtime Environment (ENV)
MemberOfViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries).884CWE Cross-section
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.977SFP Secondary Cluster: Design
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1150SEI CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java - Guidelines 16. Runtime Environment (ENV)
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1373ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Trust Model Problems
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy NameNode IDFitMapped Node Name
PLOVERUntrusted Data Appended with Trusted Data
The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011)ENV01-JPlace all security-sensitive code in a single JAR and sign and seal it
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission DateSubmitterOrganization
2006-07-19PLOVER
+ Modifications
Modification DateModifierOrganization
2008-07-01Eric DalciCigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
2008-09-08CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-01CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2012-05-11CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2014-07-30CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2017-11-08CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships
2019-01-03CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2020-02-24CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2020-06-25CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
2022-04-28CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
+ Previous Entry Names
Change DatePrevious Entry Name
2008-04-11Untrusted Data Appended with Trusted Data

CWE-362: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')

Weakness ID: 362
Abstraction: Class
Structure: Simple
Presentation Filter:
+ Description
The program contains a code sequence that can run concurrently with other code, and the code sequence requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence that is operating concurrently.
+ Extended Description

This can have security implications when the expected synchronization is in security-critical code, such as recording whether a user is authenticated or modifying important state information that should not be influenced by an outsider.

A race condition occurs within concurrent environments, and is effectively a property of a code sequence. Depending on the context, a code sequence may be in the form of a function call, a small number of instructions, a series of program invocations, etc.

A race condition violates these properties, which are closely related:

  • Exclusivity - the code sequence is given exclusive access to the shared resource, i.e., no other code sequence can modify properties of the shared resource before the original sequence has completed execution.
  • Atomicity - the code sequence is behaviorally atomic, i.e., no other thread or process can concurrently execute the same sequence of instructions (or a subset) against the same resource.

A race condition exists when an "interfering code sequence" can still access the shared resource, violating exclusivity. Programmers may assume that certain code sequences execute too quickly to be affected by an interfering code sequence; when they are not, this violates atomicity. For example, the single "x++" statement may appear atomic at the code layer, but it is actually non-atomic at the instruction layer, since it involves a read (the original value of x), followed by a computation (x+1), followed by a write (save the result to x).

The interfering code sequence could be "trusted" or "untrusted." A trusted interfering code sequence occurs within the program; it cannot be modified by the attacker, and it can only be invoked indirectly. An untrusted interfering code sequence can be authored directly by the attacker, and typically it is external to the vulnerable program.

+ Relationships
Section HelpThis table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (CWE-1000)
NatureTypeIDName
ChildOfPillarPillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things.691Insufficient Control Flow Management
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.364Signal Handler Race Condition
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.366Race Condition within a Thread
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.367Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.368Context Switching Race Condition
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.421Race Condition During Access to Alternate Channel
ParentOfCompositeComposite - a Compound Element that consists of two or more distinct weaknesses, in which all weaknesses must be present at the same time in order for a potential vulnerability to arise. Removing any of the weaknesses eliminates or sharply reduces the risk. One weakness, X, can be "broken down" into component weaknesses Y and Z. There can be cases in which one weakness might not be essential to a composite, but changes the nature of the composite when it becomes a vulnerability.689Permission Race Condition During Resource Copy
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.1223Race Condition for Write-Once Attributes
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.1298Hardware Logic Contains Race Conditions
CanFollowClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.662Improper Synchronization
Section HelpThis table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (CWE-1003)
NatureTypeIDName
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.367Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
PhaseNote
Architecture and Design
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.

Languages

C (Sometimes Prevalent)

C++ (Sometimes Prevalent)

Java (Sometimes Prevalent)

Technologies

Class: Mobile (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
ScopeImpactLikelihood
Availability

Technical Impact: DoS: Resource Consumption (CPU); DoS: Resource Consumption (Memory); DoS: Resource Consumption (Other)

When a race condition makes it possible to bypass a resource cleanup routine or trigger multiple initialization routines, it may lead to resource exhaustion (CWE-400).
Availability

Technical Impact: DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart; DoS: Instability

When a race condition allows multiple control flows to access a resource simultaneously, it might lead the program(s) into unexpected states, possibly resulting in a crash.
Confidentiality
Integrity

Technical Impact: Read Files or Directories; Read Application Data

When a race condition is combined with predictable resource names and loose permissions, it may be possible for an attacker to overwrite or access confidential data (CWE-59).
+ Likelihood Of Exploit
Medium
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1

This code could be used in an e-commerce application that supports transfers between accounts. It takes the total amount of the transfer, sends it to the new account, and deducts the amount from the original account.

(bad code)
Example Language: Perl 
$transfer_amount = GetTransferAmount();
$balance = GetBalanceFromDatabase();

if ($transfer_amount < 0) {
FatalError("Bad Transfer Amount");
}
$newbalance = $balance - $transfer_amount;
if (($balance - $transfer_amount) < 0) {
FatalError("Insufficient Funds");
}
SendNewBalanceToDatabase($newbalance);
NotifyUser("Transfer of $transfer_amount succeeded.");
NotifyUser("New balance: $newbalance");

A race condition could occur between the calls to GetBalanceFromDatabase() and SendNewBalanceToDatabase().

Suppose the balance is initially 100.00. An attack could be constructed as follows:

(attack code)
Example Language: Other 
In the following pseudocode, the attacker makes two simultaneous calls of the program, CALLER-1 and CALLER-2. Both callers are for the same user account.
CALLER-1 (the attacker) is associated with PROGRAM-1 (the instance that handles CALLER-1). CALLER-2 is associated with PROGRAM-2.
CALLER-1 makes a transfer request of 80.00.
PROGRAM-1 calls GetBalanceFromDatabase and sets $balance to 100.00
PROGRAM-1 calculates $newbalance as 20.00, then calls SendNewBalanceToDatabase().
Due to high server load, the PROGRAM-1 call to SendNewBalanceToDatabase() encounters a delay.
CALLER-2 makes a transfer request of 1.00.
PROGRAM-2 calls GetBalanceFromDatabase() and sets $balance to 100.00. This happens because the previous PROGRAM-1 request was not processed yet.
PROGRAM-2 determines the new balance as 99.00.
After the initial delay, PROGRAM-1 commits its balance to the database, setting it to 20.00.
PROGRAM-2 sends a request to update the database, setting the balance to 99.00

At this stage, the attacker should have a balance of 19.00 (due to 81.00 worth of transfers), but the balance is 99.00, as recorded in the database.

To prevent this weakness, the programmer has several options, including using a lock to prevent multiple simultaneous requests to the web application, or using a synchronization mechanism that includes all the code between GetBalanceFromDatabase() and SendNewBalanceToDatabase().

Example 2

The following function attempts to acquire a lock in order to perform operations on a shared resource.

(bad code)
Example Language:
void f(pthread_mutex_t *mutex) {
pthread_mutex_lock(mutex);

/* access shared resource */


pthread_mutex_unlock(mutex);
}

However, the code does not check the value returned by pthread_mutex_lock() for errors. If pthread_mutex_lock() cannot acquire the mutex for any reason, the function may introduce a race condition into the program and result in undefined behavior.

In order to avoid data races, correctly written programs must check the result of thread synchronization functions and appropriately handle all errors, either by attempting to recover from them or reporting them to higher levels.

(good code)
Example Language:
int f(pthread_mutex_t *mutex) {
int result;

result = pthread_mutex_lock(mutex);
if (0 != result)
return result;


/* access shared resource */


return pthread_mutex_unlock(mutex);
}

Example 3

Suppose a processor's Memory Management Unit (MMU) has 5 other shadow MMUs to distribute its workload for its various cores. Each MMU has the start address and end address of "accessible" memory. Any time this accessible range changes (as per the processor's boot status), the main MMU sends an update message to all the shadow MMUs.

Suppose the interconnect fabric does not prioritize such "update" packets over other general traffic packets. This introduces a race condition. If an attacker can flood the target with enough messages so that some of those attack packets reach the target before the new access ranges gets updated, then the attacker can leverage this scenario.

+ Observed Examples
ReferenceDescription
chain: JTAG interface is not disabled (CWE-1191) during ROM code execution, introducing a race condition (CWE-362) to extract encryption keys
Chain: chipset has a race condition (CWE-362) between when an interrupt handler detects an attempt to write-enable the BIOS (in violation of the lock bit), and when the handler resets the write-enable bit back to 0, allowing attackers to issue BIOS writes during the timing window [REF-1237].
Race condition leading to a crash by calling a hook removal procedure while other activities are occurring at the same time.
chain: time-of-check time-of-use (TOCTOU) race condition in program allows bypass of protection mechanism that was designed to prevent symlink attacks.
chain: time-of-check time-of-use (TOCTOU) race condition in program allows bypass of protection mechanism that was designed to prevent symlink attacks.
Unsynchronized caching operation enables a race condition that causes messages to be sent to a deallocated object.
Race condition during initialization triggers a buffer overflow.
Daemon crash by quickly performing operations and undoing them, which eventually leads to an operation that does not acquire a lock.
chain: race condition triggers NULL pointer dereference
Race condition in library function could cause data to be sent to the wrong process.
Race condition in file parser leads to heap corruption.
chain: race condition allows attacker to access an object while it is still being initialized, causing software to access uninitialized memory.
chain: race condition for an argument value, possibly resulting in NULL dereference
chain: race condition might allow resource to be released before operating on it, leading to NULL dereference
Chain: Signal handler contains too much functionality (CWE-828), introducing a race condition (CWE-362) that leads to a double free (CWE-415).
+ Potential Mitigations

Phase: Architecture and Design

In languages that support it, use synchronization primitives. Only wrap these around critical code to minimize the impact on performance.

Phase: Architecture and Design

Use thread-safe capabilities such as the data access abstraction in Spring.

Phase: Architecture and Design

Minimize the usage of shared resources in order to remove as much complexity as possible from the control flow and to reduce the likelihood of unexpected conditions occurring.

Additionally, this will minimize the amount of synchronization necessary and may even help to reduce the likelihood of a denial of service where an attacker may be able to repeatedly trigger a critical section (CWE-400).

Phase: Implementation

When using multithreading and operating on shared variables, only use thread-safe functions.

Phase: Implementation

Use atomic operations on shared variables. Be wary of innocent-looking constructs such as "x++". This may appear atomic at the code layer, but it is actually non-atomic at the instruction layer, since it involves a read, followed by a computation, followed by a write.

Phase: Implementation

Use a mutex if available, but be sure to avoid related weaknesses such as CWE-412.

Phase: Implementation

Avoid double-checked locking (CWE-609) and other implementation errors that arise when trying to avoid the overhead of synchronization.

Phase: Implementation

Disable interrupts or signals over critical parts of the code, but also make sure that the code does not go into a large or infinite loop.

Phase: Implementation

Use the volatile type modifier for critical variables to avoid unexpected compiler optimization or reordering. This does not necessarily solve the synchronization problem, but it can help.

Phases: Architecture and Design; Operation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
+ Detection Methods

Black Box

Black box methods may be able to identify evidence of race conditions via methods such as multiple simultaneous connections, which may cause the software to become instable or crash. However, race conditions with very narrow timing windows would not be detectable.

White Box

Common idioms are detectable in white box analysis, such as time-of-check-time-of-use (TOCTOU) file operations (CWE-367), or double-checked locking (CWE-609).

Automated Dynamic Analysis

This weakness can be detected using dynamic tools and techniques that interact with the software using large test suites with many diverse inputs, such as fuzz testing (fuzzing), robustness testing, and fault injection. The software's operation may slow down, but it should not become unstable, crash, or generate incorrect results.

Race conditions may be detected with a stress-test by calling the software simultaneously from a large number of threads or processes, and look for evidence of any unexpected behavior.

Insert breakpoints or delays in between relevant code statements to artificially expand the race window so that it will be easier to detect.

Effectiveness: Moderate

Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Binary Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis

Effectiveness: High

Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Web Application Scanner
  • Web Services Scanner
  • Database Scanners

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Framework-based Fuzzer
Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Fuzz Tester
  • Monitored Virtual Environment - run potentially malicious code in sandbox / wrapper / virtual machine, see if it does anything suspicious

Effectiveness: High

Manual Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)
Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source

Effectiveness: High

Automated Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Source code Weakness Analyzer
  • Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer

Effectiveness: High

Architecture or Design Review

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)

Effectiveness: High

+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
NatureTypeIDName
MemberOfViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries).635Weaknesses Originally Used by NVD from 2008 to 2016
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.743CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 10 - Input Output (FIO)
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.7512009 Top 25 - Insecure Interaction Between Components
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.8012010 Top 25 - Insecure Interaction Between Components
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.852The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) Chapter 9 - Visibility and Atomicity (VNA)
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.8672011 Top 25 - Weaknesses On the Cusp
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.877CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 09 - Input Output (FIO)
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.882CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 14 - Concurrency (CON)
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.988SFP Secondary Cluster: Race Condition Window
MemberOfViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries).1003Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1142SEI CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java - Guidelines 08. Visibility and Atomicity (VNA)
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1376ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Security Gaps in Commissioning
+ Notes

Maintenance

The relationship between race conditions and synchronization problems (CWE-662) needs to be further developed. They are not necessarily two perspectives of the same core concept, since synchronization is only one technique for avoiding race conditions, and synchronization can be used for other purposes besides race condition prevention.

Research Gap

Race conditions in web applications are under-studied and probably under-reported. However, in 2008 there has been growing interest in this area.

Research Gap

Much of the focus of race condition research has been in Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) variants (CWE-367), but many race conditions are related to synchronization problems that do not necessarily require a time-of-check.

Research Gap

From a classification/taxonomy perspective, the relationships between concurrency and program state need closer investigation and may be useful in organizing related issues.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy NameNode IDFitMapped Node Name
PLOVERRace Conditions
The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011)VNA03-JDo not assume that a group of calls to independently atomic methods is atomic
+ References
[REF-44] Michael Howard, David LeBlanc and John Viega. "24 Deadly Sins of Software Security". "Sin 13: Race Conditions." Page 205. McGraw-Hill. 2010.
[REF-349] Andrei Alexandrescu. "volatile - Multithreaded Programmer's Best Friend". Dr. Dobb's. 2008-02-01. <http://www.ddj.com/cpp/184403766>.
[REF-350] Steven Devijver. "Thread-safe webapps using Spring". <http://www.javalobby.org/articles/thread-safe/index.jsp>.
[REF-351] David Wheeler. "Prevent race conditions". 2007-10-04. <http://www.ibm.com/developerworks/library/l-sprace.html>.
[REF-352] Matt Bishop. "Race Conditions, Files, and Security Flaws; or the Tortoise and the Hare Redux". 1995-09. <http://www.cs.ucdavis.edu/research/tech-reports/1995/CSE-95-9.pdf>.
[REF-353] David Wheeler. "Secure Programming for Linux and Unix HOWTO". 2003-03-03. <http://www.dwheeler.com/secure-programs/Secure-Programs-HOWTO/avoid-race.html>.
[REF-354] Blake Watts. "Discovering and Exploiting Named Pipe Security Flaws for Fun and Profit". 2002-04. <http://www.blakewatts.com/namedpipepaper.html>.
[REF-355] Roberto Paleari, Davide Marrone, Danilo Bruschi and Mattia Monga. "On Race Vulnerabilities in Web Applications". <http://security.dico.unimi.it/~roberto/pubs/dimva08-web.pdf>.
[REF-356] "Avoiding Race Conditions and Insecure File Operations". Apple Developer Connection. <http://developer.apple.com/documentation/Security/Conceptual/SecureCodingGuide/Articles/RaceConditions.html>.
[REF-357] Johannes Ullrich. "Top 25 Series - Rank 25 - Race Conditions". SANS Software Security Institute. 2010-03-26. <http://blogs.sans.org/appsecstreetfighter/2010/03/26/top-25-series-rank-25-race-conditions/>.
[REF-76] Sean Barnum and Michael Gegick. "Least Privilege". 2005-09-14. <https://buildsecurityin.us-cert.gov/daisy/bsi/articles/knowledge/principles/351.html>.
[REF-1237] CERT Coordination Center. "Intel BIOS locking mechanism contains race condition that enables write protection bypass". 2015-01-05. <https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/766164/>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission DateSubmitterOrganization
2006-07-19PLOVER
+ Contributions
Contribution DateContributorOrganization
2010-04-30Martin SeborCisco Systems, Inc.
Provided Demonstrative Example
+ Modifications
Modification DateModifierOrganization
2008-07-01Eric DalciCigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
2008-09-08CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-10-14CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2008-11-24CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2009-01-12CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Maintenance_Notes, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships, Research_Gaps
2009-03-10CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Potential_Mitigations
2009-05-27CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2010-02-16CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Detection_Factors, References, Relationships
2010-06-21CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References
2010-09-27CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
2010-12-13CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Name, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
2011-06-01CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-27CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2011-09-13CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2012-05-11CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
2014-07-30CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships
2015-12-07CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2017-11-08CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, References, Research_Gaps, Taxonomy_Mappings
2019-01-03CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2019-06-20CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2020-02-24CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, Relationships
2020-08-20CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2021-03-15CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2021-10-28CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Observed_Examples, References
2022-04-28CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
+ Previous Entry Names
Change DatePrevious Entry Name
2008-04-11Race Conditions
2010-12-13Race Condition

CWE-668: Exposure of Resource to Wrong Sphere

Weakness ID: 668
Abstraction: Class
Structure: Simple
Presentation Filter:
+ Description
The product exposes a resource to the wrong control sphere, providing unintended actors with inappropriate access to the resource.
+ Extended Description

Resources such as files and directories may be inadvertently exposed through mechanisms such as insecure permissions, or when a program accidentally operates on the wrong object. For example, a program may intend that private files can only be provided to a specific user. This effectively defines a control sphere that is intended to prevent attackers from accessing these private files. If the file permissions are insecure, then parties other than the user will be able to access those files.

A separate control sphere might effectively require that the user can only access the private files, but not any other files on the system. If the program does not ensure that the user is only requesting private files, then the user might be able to access other files on the system.

In either case, the end result is that a resource has been exposed to the wrong party.

+ Relationships
Section HelpThis table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (CWE-1000)
NatureTypeIDName
ChildOfPillarPillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things.664Improper Control of a Resource Through its Lifetime
ParentOfVariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.8J2EE Misconfiguration: Entity Bean Declared Remote
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.22Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.134Use of Externally-Controlled Format String
ParentOfClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.200Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.374Passing Mutable Objects to an Untrusted Method
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.375Returning a Mutable Object to an Untrusted Caller
ParentOfClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.377Insecure Temporary File
ParentOfClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.402Transmission of Private Resources into a New Sphere ('Resource Leak')
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.427Uncontrolled Search Path Element
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.428Unquoted Search Path or Element
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.488Exposure of Data Element to Wrong Session
ParentOfVariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.491Public cloneable() Method Without Final ('Object Hijack')
ParentOfVariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.492Use of Inner Class Containing Sensitive Data
ParentOfVariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.493Critical Public Variable Without Final Modifier
ParentOfVariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.498Cloneable Class Containing Sensitive Information
ParentOfVariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.499Serializable Class Containing Sensitive Data
ParentOfClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.522Insufficiently Protected Credentials
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.524Use of Cache Containing Sensitive Information
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.552Files or Directories Accessible to External Parties
ParentOfVariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.582Array Declared Public, Final, and Static
ParentOfVariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.583finalize() Method Declared Public
ParentOfVariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.608Struts: Non-private Field in ActionForm Class
ParentOfClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.642External Control of Critical State Data
ParentOfClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.732Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource
ParentOfVariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.767Access to Critical Private Variable via Public Method
ParentOfVariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.927Use of Implicit Intent for Sensitive Communication
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.1189Improper Isolation of Shared Resources on System-on-a-Chip (SoC)
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.1282Assumed-Immutable Data is Stored in Writable Memory
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.1327Binding to an Unrestricted IP Address
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.1331Improper Isolation of Shared Resources in Network On Chip (NoC)
CanFollowClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.441Unintended Proxy or Intermediary ('Confused Deputy')
CanFollowVariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.942Permissive Cross-domain Policy with Untrusted Domains
Section HelpThis table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (CWE-1003)
NatureTypeIDName
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.134Use of Externally-Controlled Format String
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.426Untrusted Search Path
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.427Uncontrolled Search Path Element
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.428Unquoted Search Path or Element
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.552Files or Directories Accessible to External Parties
Section HelpThis table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (CWE-1008)
NatureTypeIDName
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1011Authorize Actors
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
PhaseNote
Architecture and Design
ImplementationREALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.
Operation
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
ScopeImpactLikelihood
Confidentiality
Integrity
Other

Technical Impact: Read Application Data; Modify Application Data; Other

+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
NatureTypeIDName
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.963SFP Secondary Cluster: Exposed Data
MemberOfViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries).1003Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1345OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A01:2021 - Broken Access Control
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1364ICS Communications: Zone Boundary Failures
+ Notes

Theoretical

A "control sphere" is a set of resources and behaviors that are accessible to a single actor, or a group of actors. A product's security model will typically define multiple spheres, possibly implicitly. For example, a server might define one sphere for "administrators" who can create new user accounts with subdirectories under /home/server/, and a second sphere might cover the set of users who can create or delete files within their own subdirectories. A third sphere might be "users who are authenticated to the operating system on which the product is installed." Each sphere has different sets of actors and allowable behaviors.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission DateSubmitterOrganization
2008-04-11CWE Content TeamMITRE
+ Modifications
Modification DateModifierOrganization
2008-07-01Eric DalciCigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
2008-09-08CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships, Other_Notes
2008-11-24CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2009-05-27CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2009-07-22CWE Content TeamMITRE
Clarified description to include permissions.
2009-07-27CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Description, Relationships
2009-10-29CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Other_Notes, Theoretical_Notes
2009-12-28CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2010-09-27CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2011-03-29CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2011-06-01CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2012-05-11CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2013-02-21CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2013-07-17CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2014-06-23CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2014-07-30CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2015-12-07CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2017-01-19CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2017-11-08CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships, Relevant_Properties
2019-01-03CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2019-06-20CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2020-02-24CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2020-06-25CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2021-03-15CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2021-10-28CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2022-04-28CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships

CWE-610: Externally Controlled Reference to a Resource in Another Sphere

Weakness ID: 610
Abstraction: Class
Structure: Simple
Presentation Filter:
+ Description
The product uses an externally controlled name or reference that resolves to a resource that is outside of the intended control sphere.
+ Relationships
Section HelpThis table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (CWE-1000)
NatureTypeIDName
ChildOfPillarPillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things.664Improper Control of a Resource Through its Lifetime
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.15External Control of System or Configuration Setting
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.73External Control of File Name or Path
ParentOfCompositeComposite - a Compound Element that consists of two or more distinct weaknesses, in which all weaknesses must be present at the same time in order for a potential vulnerability to arise. Removing any of the weaknesses eliminates or sharply reduces the risk. One weakness, X, can be "broken down" into component weaknesses Y and Z. There can be cases in which one weakness might not be essential to a composite, but changes the nature of the composite when it becomes a vulnerability.384Session Fixation
ParentOfClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.441Unintended Proxy or Intermediary ('Confused Deputy')
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.470Use of Externally-Controlled Input to Select Classes or Code ('Unsafe Reflection')
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.601URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.611Improper Restriction of XML External Entity Reference
PeerOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.386Symbolic Name not Mapping to Correct Object
Section HelpThis table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (CWE-1003)
NatureTypeIDName
ParentOfCompositeComposite - a Compound Element that consists of two or more distinct weaknesses, in which all weaknesses must be present at the same time in order for a potential vulnerability to arise. Removing any of the weaknesses eliminates or sharply reduces the risk. One weakness, X, can be "broken down" into component weaknesses Y and Z. There can be cases in which one weakness might not be essential to a composite, but changes the nature of the composite when it becomes a vulnerability.384Session Fixation
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.601URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.611Improper Restriction of XML External Entity Reference
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.918Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.1021Improper Restriction of Rendered UI Layers or Frames
Section HelpThis table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (CWE-1008)
NatureTypeIDName
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1015Limit Access
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
PhaseNote
Architecture and DesignCOMMISSION: This weakness refers to an incorrect design related to an architectural security tactic.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
ScopeImpactLikelihood
Confidentiality
Integrity

Technical Impact: Read Application Data; Modify Application Data

+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
NatureTypeIDName
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.980SFP Secondary Cluster: Link in Resource Name Resolution
MemberOfViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries).1003Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1347OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A03:2021 - Injection
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1368ICS Dependencies (& Architecture): External Digital Systems
+ Notes

Maintenance

The relationship between CWE-99 and CWE-610 needs further investigation and clarification. They might be duplicates. CWE-99 "Resource Injection," as originally defined in Seven Pernicious Kingdoms taxonomy, emphasizes the "identifier used to access a system resource" such as a file name or port number, yet it explicitly states that the "resource injection" term does not apply to "path manipulation," which effectively identifies the path at which a resource can be found and could be considered to be one aspect of a resource identifier. Also, CWE-610 effectively covers any type of resource, whether that resource is at the system layer, the application layer, or the code layer.

Relationship

This is a general class of weakness, but most research is focused on more specialized cases, such as path traversal (CWE-22) and symlink following (CWE-61). A symbolic link has a name; in general, it appears like any other file in the file system. However, the link includes a reference to another file, often in another directory - perhaps in another sphere of control. Many common library functions that accept filenames will "follow" a symbolic link and use the link's target instead.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission DateSubmitterOrganization
2007-05-07Anonymous Tool Vendor (under NDA)
+ Modifications
Modification DateModifierOrganization
2008-09-08CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2009-10-29CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Other_Notes, Relationship_Notes
2010-04-05CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2011-06-01CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2012-05-11CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2013-02-21CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Maintenance_Notes
2014-07-30CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2015-12-07CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2017-01-19CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2017-11-08CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2019-06-20CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2020-02-24CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2021-10-28CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2022-04-28CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
+ Previous Entry Names
Change DatePrevious Entry Name
2008-04-11Externally Controlled Reference to an Internal Resource

CWE-329: Generation of Predictable IV with CBC Mode

Weakness ID: 329
Abstraction: Variant
Structure: Simple
Presentation Filter:
+ Description
The product generates and uses a predictable initialization Vector (IV) with Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) Mode, which causes algorithms to be susceptible to dictionary attacks when they are encrypted under the same key.
+ Extended Description

CBC mode eliminates a weakness of Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode by allowing identical plaintext blocks to be encrypted to different ciphertext blocks. This is possible by the XOR-ing of an IV with the initial plaintext block so that every plaintext block in the chain is XOR'd with a different value before encryption. If IVs are reused, then identical plaintexts would be encrypted to identical ciphertexts. However, even if IVs are not identical but are predictable, then they still break the security of CBC mode against Chosen Plaintext Attacks (CPA).

+ Relationships
Section HelpThis table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (CWE-1000)
NatureTypeIDName
ChildOfClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.573Improper Following of Specification by Caller
ChildOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.1204Generation of Weak Initialization Vector (IV)
+ Background Details

CBC mode is a commonly used mode of operation for a block cipher. It works by XOR-ing an IV with the initial block of a plaintext prior to encryption and then XOR-ing each successive block of plaintext with the previous block of ciphertext before encryption.

C_0 = IV
C_i = E_k{M_i XOR C_{i-1}}

When used properly, CBC mode provides security against chosen plaintext attacks. Having an unpredictable IV is a crucial underpinning of this. See [REF-1171].

+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
PhaseNote
Architecture and DesignDesigners might assume a non-cryptographic context for a cryptographic variable.
ImplementationDevelopers might dismiss the importance of an unpredictable IV and choose an easier implementation to save effort, weakening the scheme in the process.
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.

Languages

Class: Language-Independent (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
ScopeImpactLikelihood
Confidentiality

Technical Impact: Read Application Data

If the IV is not properly initialized, data that is encrypted can be compromised and leak information.
+ Likelihood Of Exploit
Medium
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1

In the following examples, CBC mode is used when encrypting data:

(bad code)
Example Language:
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
RAND_bytes(key, b);
memset(iv,0,EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH);
EVP_EncryptInit(&ctx,EVP_bf_cbc(), key,iv);
(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
public class SymmetricCipherTest {
public static void main() {

byte[] text ="Secret".getBytes();
byte[] iv ={
0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00
};
KeyGenerator kg = KeyGenerator.getInstance("DES");
kg.init(56);
SecretKey key = kg.generateKey();
Cipher cipher = Cipher.getInstance("DES/CBC/PKCS5Padding");
IvParameterSpec ips = new IvParameterSpec(iv);
cipher.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, key, ips);
return cipher.doFinal(inpBytes);
}
}

In both of these examples, the initialization vector (IV) is always a block of zeros. This makes the resulting cipher text much more predictable and susceptible to a dictionary attack.

+ Observed Examples
ReferenceDescription
encryption functionality in an authentication framework uses a fixed null IV with CBC mode, allowing attackers to decrypt traffic in applications that use this functionality
messages for a door-unlocking product use a fixed IV in CBC mode, which is the same after each restart
application uses AES in CBC mode, but the pseudo-random secret and IV are generated using math.random, which is not cryptographically strong.
Blowfish-CBC implementation constructs an IV where each byte is calculated modulo 8 instead of modulo 256, resulting in less than 12 bits for the effective IV length, and less than 4096 possible IV values.
BEAST attack in SSL 3.0 / TLS 1.0. In CBC mode, chained initialization vectors are non-random, allowing decryption of HTTPS traffic using a chosen plaintext attack.
+ Potential Mitigations

Phase: Implementation

NIST recommends two methods of generating unpredictable IVs for CBC mode [REF-1172]. The first is to generate the IV randomly. The second method is to encrypt a nonce with the same key and cipher to be used to encrypt the plaintext. In this case the nonce must be unique but can be predictable, since the block cipher will act as a pseudo random permutation.
+ Functional Areas
  • Cryptography
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
NatureTypeIDName
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.959SFP Secondary Cluster: Weak Cryptography
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1346OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A02:2021 - Cryptographic Failures
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1370ICS Supply Chain: Common Mode Frailties
+ Notes

Maintenance

As of CWE 4.5, terminology related to randomness, entropy, and predictability can vary widely. Within the developer and other communities, "randomness" is used heavily. However, within cryptography, "entropy" is distinct, typically implied as a measurement. There are no commonly-used definitions, even within standards documents and cryptography papers. Future versions of CWE will attempt to define these terms and, if necessary, distinguish between them in ways that are appropriate for different communities but do not reduce the usability of CWE for mapping, understanding, or other scenarios.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy NameNode IDFitMapped Node Name
CLASPNot using a random IV with CBC mode
+ References
[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 2, "Initialization Vectors", Page 42. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
[REF-18] Secure Software, Inc.. "The CLASP Application Security Process". 2005. <https://cwe.mitre.org/documents/sources/TheCLASPApplicationSecurityProcess.pdf>.
[REF-1171] Matthew Green. "Why IND-CPA implies randomized encryption". 2018-08-24. <https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/why-ind-cpa-implies-randomized-encryption/>.
[REF-1172] NIST. "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation". Appendix C. 2001-12. <https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-38a.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission DateSubmitterOrganization
2006-07-19CLASP
+ Modifications
Modification DateModifierOrganization
2008-07-01Eric DalciCigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
2008-09-08CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Background_Details, Common_Consequences, Functional_Areas, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-01CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2012-05-11CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated References, Relationships
2012-10-30CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Potential_Mitigations
2014-07-30CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2017-11-08CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples
2019-06-20CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2020-02-24CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2021-03-15CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Background_Details, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Modes_of_Introduction, Name, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
2021-07-20CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Description, Maintenance_Notes, Name, References
2021-10-28CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2022-04-28CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
+ Previous Entry Names
Change DatePrevious Entry Name
2021-03-15Not Using a Random IV with CBC Mode
2021-07-20Not Using an Unpredictable IV with CBC Mode

CWE-912: Hidden Functionality

Weakness ID: 912
Abstraction: Class
Structure: Simple
Presentation Filter:
+ Description
The software contains functionality that is not documented, not part of the specification, and not accessible through an interface or command sequence that is obvious to the software's users or administrators.
+ Extended Description
Hidden functionality can take many forms, such as intentionally malicious code, "Easter Eggs" that contain extraneous functionality such as games, developer-friendly shortcuts that reduce maintenance or support costs such as hard-coded accounts, etc. From a security perspective, even when the functionality is not intentionally malicious or damaging, it can increase the software's attack surface and expose additional weaknesses beyond what is already exposed by the intended functionality. Even if it is not easily accessible, the hidden functionality could be useful for attacks that modify the control flow of the application.
+ Relationships
Section HelpThis table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (CWE-1000)
NatureTypeIDName
ChildOfClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.684Incorrect Provision of Specified Functionality
ParentOfClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.506Embedded Malicious Code
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
PhaseNote
Architecture and Design
Implementation
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
ScopeImpactLikelihood
Other
Integrity

Technical Impact: Varies by Context; Alter Execution Logic

+ Potential Mitigations

Phase: Installation

Always verify the integrity of the software that is being installed.

Phase: Testing

Conduct a code coverage analysis using live testing, then closely inspect any code that is not covered.
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
NatureTypeIDName
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1371ICS Supply Chain: Poorly Documented or Undocumented Features
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission DateSubmitterOrganization
2012-12-28CWE Content TeamMITRE
+ Modifications
Modification DateModifierOrganization
2017-11-08CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2019-06-20CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2020-02-24CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2022-04-28CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships

CWE CATEGORY: ICS Communications

Category ID: 1359
+ Summary
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "ICS Communications" super category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022.
+ Membership
NatureTypeIDName
MemberOfViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries).1358Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS
HasMemberCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1364ICS Communications: Zone Boundary Failures
HasMemberCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1365ICS Communications: Unreliability
HasMemberCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1366ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols
+ Notes

Maintenance

This category was created in CWE 4.7 to facilitate and illuminate discussion about weaknesses in ICS. It is under active development. In future versions, new weaknesses will be added based on input from the CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT Special Interest Group (SIG). However, there may be some issues that are outside of the current scope of CWE, which will require consultation with many CWE stakeholders to resolve.
+ References
[REF-1248] Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force (SEI ETF). "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS". 2022-03-09. <https://inl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/SEI-ETF-NCSV-TPT-Categories-of-Security-Vulnerabilities-ICS-v1_03-09-22.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission DateSubmitterOrganization
2022-03-09New Categories of Security Vulnerabilities (NCSV) Technical Project Team (TPT)Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force

CWE CATEGORY: ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols

Category ID: 1366
+ Summary
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Frail Security in Protocols" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022. Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
+ Membership
NatureTypeIDName
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1359ICS Communications
HasMemberClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.327Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm
HasMemberBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.358Improperly Implemented Security Check for Standard
+ Notes

Maintenance

This category was created in CWE 4.7 to facilitate and illuminate discussion about weaknesses in ICS. It is under active development. In future versions, new weaknesses will be added based on input from the CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT Special Interest Group (SIG). However, there may be some issues that are outside of the current scope of CWE, which will require consultation with many CWE stakeholders to resolve.
+ References
[REF-1259] Wikipedia. "Transport Layer Security". <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security>.
[REF-1248] Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force (SEI ETF). "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS". ICS Communications. 2022-03-09. <https://inl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/SEI-ETF-NCSV-TPT-Categories-of-Security-Vulnerabilities-ICS-v1_03-09-22.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission DateSubmitterOrganization
2022-03-09New Categories of Security Vulnerabilities (NCSV) Technical Project Team (TPT)Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force

CWE CATEGORY: ICS Communications: Unreliability

Category ID: 1365
+ Summary
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Unreliability" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022. Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
+ Membership
NatureTypeIDName
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1359ICS Communications
HasMemberBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.1384Improper Handling of Extreme Physical Environment Conditions
+ Notes

Maintenance

This category was created in CWE 4.7 to facilitate and illuminate discussion about weaknesses in ICS. It is under active development. In future versions, new weaknesses will be added based on input from the CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT Special Interest Group (SIG). However, there may be some issues that are outside of the current scope of CWE, which will require consultation with many CWE stakeholders to resolve.
+ References
[REF-1258] Wikipedia. "Random early detection". <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Random_early_detection>.
[REF-1248] Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force (SEI ETF). "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS". ICS Communications. 2022-03-09. <https://inl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/SEI-ETF-NCSV-TPT-Categories-of-Security-Vulnerabilities-ICS-v1_03-09-22.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission DateSubmitterOrganization
2022-03-09New Categories of Security Vulnerabilities (NCSV) Technical Project Team (TPT)Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force

CWE CATEGORY: ICS Communications: Zone Boundary Failures

Category ID: 1364
+ Summary
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Zone Boundary Failures" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022. Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
+ Membership
NatureTypeIDName
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1359ICS Communications
HasMemberClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.668Exposure of Resource to Wrong Sphere
HasMemberClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.669Incorrect Resource Transfer Between Spheres
HasMemberClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.754Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions
+ Notes

Maintenance

This category was created in CWE 4.7 to facilitate and illuminate discussion about weaknesses in ICS. It is under active development. In future versions, new weaknesses will be added based on input from the CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT Special Interest Group (SIG). However, there may be some issues that are outside of the current scope of CWE, which will require consultation with many CWE stakeholders to resolve.
+ References
[REF-1248] Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force (SEI ETF). "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS". ICS Communications. 2022-03-09. <https://inl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/SEI-ETF-NCSV-TPT-Categories-of-Security-Vulnerabilities-ICS-v1_03-09-22.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission DateSubmitterOrganization
2022-03-09New Categories of Security Vulnerabilities (NCSV) Technical Project Team (TPT)Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force

CWE CATEGORY: ICS Dependencies (& Architecture)

Category ID: 1360
+ Summary
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "ICS Dependencies (& Architecture)" super category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022.
+ Membership
NatureTypeIDName
MemberOfViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries).1358Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS
HasMemberCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1367ICS Dependencies (& Architecture): External Physical Systems
HasMemberCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1368ICS Dependencies (& Architecture): External Digital Systems
+ Notes

Maintenance

This category was created in CWE 4.7 to facilitate and illuminate discussion about weaknesses in ICS. It is under active development. In future versions, new weaknesses will be added based on input from the CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT Special Interest Group (SIG). However, there may be some issues that are outside of the current scope of CWE, which will require consultation with many CWE stakeholders to resolve.
+ References
[REF-1248] Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force (SEI ETF). "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS". 2022-03-09. <https://inl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/SEI-ETF-NCSV-TPT-Categories-of-Security-Vulnerabilities-ICS-v1_03-09-22.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission DateSubmitterOrganization
2022-03-09New Categories of Security Vulnerabilities (NCSV) Technical Project Team (TPT)Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force

CWE CATEGORY: ICS Dependencies (& Architecture): External Digital Systems

Category ID: 1368
+ Summary
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "External Digital Systems" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022. Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
+ Membership
NatureTypeIDName
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1360ICS Dependencies (& Architecture)
HasMemberClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.610Externally Controlled Reference to a Resource in Another Sphere
HasMemberClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.1357Reliance on Uncontrolled Component
+ Notes

Maintenance

This category was created in CWE 4.7 to facilitate and illuminate discussion about weaknesses in ICS. It is under active development. In future versions, new weaknesses will be added based on input from the CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT Special Interest Group (SIG). However, there may be some issues that are outside of the current scope of CWE, which will require consultation with many CWE stakeholders to resolve.
+ References
[REF-1248] Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force (SEI ETF). "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS". ICS Dependencies (& Architecture). 2022-03-09. <https://inl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/SEI-ETF-NCSV-TPT-Categories-of-Security-Vulnerabilities-ICS-v1_03-09-22.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission DateSubmitterOrganization
2022-03-09New Categories of Security Vulnerabilities (NCSV) Technical Project Team (TPT)Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force

CWE CATEGORY: ICS Dependencies (& Architecture): External Physical Systems

Category ID: 1367
+ Summary
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "External Physical Systems" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022. Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
+ Membership
NatureTypeIDName
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1360ICS Dependencies (& Architecture)
HasMemberBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.1338Improper Protections Against Hardware Overheating
HasMemberClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.1357Reliance on Uncontrolled Component
+ Notes

Maintenance

This category was created in CWE 4.7 to facilitate and illuminate discussion about weaknesses in ICS. It is under active development. In future versions, new weaknesses will be added based on input from the CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT Special Interest Group (SIG). However, there may be some issues that are outside of the current scope of CWE, which will require consultation with many CWE stakeholders to resolve.
+ References
[REF-1248] Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force (SEI ETF). "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS". ICS Dependencies (& Architecture). 2022-03-09. <https://inl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/SEI-ETF-NCSV-TPT-Categories-of-Security-Vulnerabilities-ICS-v1_03-09-22.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission DateSubmitterOrganization
2022-03-09New Categories of Security Vulnerabilities (NCSV) Technical Project Team (TPT)Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force

CWE CATEGORY: ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Gaps in Details/Data

Category ID: 1375
+ Summary
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Gaps in Details/Data" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022. Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
+ Membership
NatureTypeIDName
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1362ICS Engineering (Constructions/Deployment)
+ Notes

Maintenance

This category was created in CWE 4.7 to facilitate and illuminate discussion about weaknesses in ICS. It is under active development. In future versions, new weaknesses will be added based on input from the CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT Special Interest Group (SIG). However, there may be some issues that are outside of the current scope of CWE, which will require consultation with many CWE stakeholders to resolve.
+ References
[REF-1248] Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force (SEI ETF). "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS". Gaps in Details/Data. 2022-03-09. <https://inl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/SEI-ETF-NCSV-TPT-Categories-of-Security-Vulnerabilities-ICS-v1_03-09-22.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission DateSubmitterOrganization
2022-03-09New Categories of Security Vulnerabilities (NCSV) Technical Project Team (TPT)Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force

CWE CATEGORY: ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Inherent Predictability in Design

Category ID: 1377
+ Summary
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Inherent Predictability in Design" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022. Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
+ Membership
NatureTypeIDName
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1362ICS Engineering (Constructions/Deployment)
HasMemberBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.1278Missing Protection Against Hardware Reverse Engineering Using Integrated Circuit (IC) Imaging Techniques
+ Notes

Maintenance

This category was created in CWE 4.7 to facilitate and illuminate discussion about weaknesses in ICS. It is under active development. In future versions, new weaknesses will be added based on input from the CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT Special Interest Group (SIG). However, there may be some issues that are outside of the current scope of CWE, which will require consultation with many CWE stakeholders to resolve.
+ References
[REF-1248] Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force (SEI ETF). "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS". Inherent Predictability in Design. 2022-03-09. <https://inl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/SEI-ETF-NCSV-TPT-Categories-of-Security-Vulnerabilities-ICS-v1_03-09-22.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission DateSubmitterOrganization
2022-03-09New Categories of Security Vulnerabilities (NCSV) Technical Project Team (TPT)Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force

CWE CATEGORY: ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Maker Breaker Blindness

Category ID: 1374
+ Summary
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Maker Breaker Blindness" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022. Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
+ Membership
NatureTypeIDName
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1362ICS Engineering (Constructions/Deployment)
+ Notes

Maintenance

This category was created in CWE 4.7 to facilitate and illuminate discussion about weaknesses in ICS. It is under active development. In future versions, new weaknesses will be added based on input from the CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT Special Interest Group (SIG). However, there may be some issues that are outside of the current scope of CWE, which will require consultation with many CWE stakeholders to resolve.
+ References
[REF-1248] Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force (SEI ETF). "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS". Maker Breaker Blindness. 2022-03-09. <https://inl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/SEI-ETF-NCSV-TPT-Categories-of-Security-Vulnerabilities-ICS-v1_03-09-22.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission DateSubmitterOrganization
2022-03-09New Categories of Security Vulnerabilities (NCSV) Technical Project Team (TPT)Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force

CWE CATEGORY: ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Security Gaps in Commissioning

Category ID: 1376
+ Summary
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Security Gaps in Commissioning" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022. Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
+ Membership
NatureTypeIDName
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1362ICS Engineering (Constructions/Deployment)
HasMemberBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.276Incorrect Default Permissions
HasMemberClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.362Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')
+ Notes

Maintenance

This category was created in CWE 4.7 to facilitate and illuminate discussion about weaknesses in ICS. It is under active development. In future versions, new weaknesses will be added based on input from the CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT Special Interest Group (SIG). However, there may be some issues that are outside of the current scope of CWE, which will require consultation with many CWE stakeholders to resolve.
+ References
[REF-1248] Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force (SEI ETF). "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS". Security Gaps in Commissioning. 2022-03-09. <https://inl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/SEI-ETF-NCSV-TPT-Categories-of-Security-Vulnerabilities-ICS-v1_03-09-22.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission DateSubmitterOrganization
2022-03-09New Categories of Security Vulnerabilities (NCSV) Technical Project Team (TPT)Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force

CWE CATEGORY: ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Trust Model Problems

Category ID: 1373
+ Summary
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Trust Model Problems" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022. Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
+ Membership
NatureTypeIDName
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1362ICS Engineering (Constructions/Deployment)
HasMemberClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.269Improper Privilege Management
HasMemberBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.349Acceptance of Extraneous Untrusted Data With Trusted Data
HasMemberBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.807Reliance on Untrusted Inputs in a Security Decision
+ Notes

Maintenance

This category was created in CWE 4.7 to facilitate and illuminate discussion about weaknesses in ICS. It is under active development. In future versions, new weaknesses will be added based on input from the CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT Special Interest Group (SIG). However, there may be some issues that are outside of the current scope of CWE, which will require consultation with many CWE stakeholders to resolve.
+ References
[REF-1248] Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force (SEI ETF). "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS". Trust Model Problems. 2022-03-09. <https://inl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/SEI-ETF-NCSV-TPT-Categories-of-Security-Vulnerabilities-ICS-v1_03-09-22.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission DateSubmitterOrganization
2022-03-09New Categories of Security Vulnerabilities (NCSV) Technical Project Team (TPT)Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force

CWE CATEGORY: ICS Engineering (Constructions/Deployment)

Category ID: 1362
+ Summary
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "ICS Engineering (Constructions/Deployment)" super category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022.
+ Membership
NatureTypeIDName
MemberOfViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries).1358Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS
HasMemberCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1373ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Trust Model Problems
HasMemberCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1374ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Maker Breaker Blindness
HasMemberCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1375ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Gaps in Details/Data
HasMemberCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1376ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Security Gaps in Commissioning
HasMemberCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1377ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Inherent Predictability in Design
+ Notes

Maintenance

This category was created in CWE 4.7 to facilitate and illuminate discussion about weaknesses in ICS. It is under active development. In future versions, new weaknesses will be added based on input from the CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT Special Interest Group (SIG). However, there may be some issues that are outside of the current scope of CWE, which will require consultation with many CWE stakeholders to resolve.
+ References
[REF-1248] Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force (SEI ETF). "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS". 2022-03-09. <https://inl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/SEI-ETF-NCSV-TPT-Categories-of-Security-Vulnerabilities-ICS-v1_03-09-22.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission DateSubmitterOrganization
2022-03-09New Categories of Security Vulnerabilities (NCSV) Technical Project Team (TPT)Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force

CWE CATEGORY: ICS Operations (& Maintenance)

Category ID: 1363
+ Summary
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "ICS Operations (& Maintenance)" super category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022.
+ Membership
NatureTypeIDName
MemberOfViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries).1358Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS
HasMemberCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1378ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Gaps in obligations and training
HasMemberCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1379ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Human factors in ICS environments
HasMemberCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1380ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Post-analysis changes
HasMemberCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1381ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Exploitable Standard Operational Procedures
HasMemberCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1382ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Emerging Energy Technologies
HasMemberCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1383ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Compliance/Conformance with Regulatory Requirements
+ Notes

Maintenance

This category was created in CWE 4.7 to facilitate and illuminate discussion about weaknesses in ICS. It is under active development. In future versions, new weaknesses will be added based on input from the CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT Special Interest Group (SIG). However, there may be some issues that are outside of the current scope of CWE, which will require consultation with many CWE stakeholders to resolve.
+ References
[REF-1248] Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force (SEI ETF). "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS". 2022-03-09. <https://inl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/SEI-ETF-NCSV-TPT-Categories-of-Security-Vulnerabilities-ICS-v1_03-09-22.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission DateSubmitterOrganization
2022-03-09New Categories of Security Vulnerabilities (NCSV) Technical Project Team (TPT)Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force

CWE CATEGORY: ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Compliance/Conformance with Regulatory Requirements

Category ID: 1383
+ Summary
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Compliance/Conformance with Regulatory Requirements" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022. Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
+ Membership
NatureTypeIDName
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1363ICS Operations (& Maintenance)
HasMemberPillarPillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things.710Improper Adherence to Coding Standards
+ Notes

Maintenance

This category was created in CWE 4.7 to facilitate and illuminate discussion about weaknesses in ICS. It is under active development. In future versions, new weaknesses will be added based on input from the CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT Special Interest Group (SIG). However, there may be some issues that are outside of the current scope of CWE, which will require consultation with many CWE stakeholders to resolve.
+ References
[REF-1248] Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force (SEI ETF). "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS". Compliance/Conformance with Regulatory Requirements. 2022-03-09. <https://inl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/SEI-ETF-NCSV-TPT-Categories-of-Security-Vulnerabilities-ICS-v1_03-09-22.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission DateSubmitterOrganization
2022-03-09New Categories of Security Vulnerabilities (NCSV) Technical Project Team (TPT)Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force

CWE CATEGORY: ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Emerging Energy Technologies

Category ID: 1382
+ Summary
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Emerging Energy Technologies" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022. Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
+ Membership
NatureTypeIDName
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1363ICS Operations (& Maintenance)
HasMemberClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.20Improper Input Validation
HasMemberClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.285Improper Authorization
HasMemberBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.295Improper Certificate Validation
HasMemberBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.296Improper Following of a Certificate's Chain of Trust
HasMemberBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.346Origin Validation Error
HasMemberClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.406Insufficient Control of Network Message Volume (Network Amplification)
HasMemberBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.601URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')
+ Notes

Maintenance

This category was created in CWE 4.7 to facilitate and illuminate discussion about weaknesses in ICS. It is under active development. In future versions, new weaknesses will be added based on input from the CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT Special Interest Group (SIG). However, there may be some issues that are outside of the current scope of CWE, which will require consultation with many CWE stakeholders to resolve.
+ References
[REF-1248] Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force (SEI ETF). "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS". Emerging Energy Technologies. 2022-03-09. <https://inl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/SEI-ETF-NCSV-TPT-Categories-of-Security-Vulnerabilities-ICS-v1_03-09-22.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission DateSubmitterOrganization
2022-03-09New Categories of Security Vulnerabilities (NCSV) Technical Project Team (TPT)Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force

CWE CATEGORY: ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Exploitable Standard Operational Procedures

Category ID: 1381
+ Summary
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Exploitable Standard Operational Procedures" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022. Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
+ Membership
NatureTypeIDName
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1363ICS Operations (& Maintenance)
+ Notes

Maintenance

This category was created in CWE 4.7 to facilitate and illuminate discussion about weaknesses in ICS. It is under active development. In future versions, new weaknesses will be added based on input from the CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT Special Interest Group (SIG). However, there may be some issues that are outside of the current scope of CWE, which will require consultation with many CWE stakeholders to resolve.
+ References
[REF-1248] Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force (SEI ETF). "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS". Exploitable Standard Operational Procedures. 2022-03-09. <https://inl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/SEI-ETF-NCSV-TPT-Categories-of-Security-Vulnerabilities-ICS-v1_03-09-22.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission DateSubmitterOrganization
2022-03-09New Categories of Security Vulnerabilities (NCSV) Technical Project Team (TPT)Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force

CWE CATEGORY: ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Gaps in obligations and training

Category ID: 1378
+ Summary
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Gaps in obligations and training" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022. Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
+ Membership
NatureTypeIDName
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1363ICS Operations (& Maintenance)
+ Notes

Maintenance

This category was created in CWE 4.7 to facilitate and illuminate discussion about weaknesses in ICS. It is under active development. In future versions, new weaknesses will be added based on input from the CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT Special Interest Group (SIG). However, there may be some issues that are outside of the current scope of CWE, which will require consultation with many CWE stakeholders to resolve.
+ References
[REF-1261] Sam Weber, Paul A. Karger and Amit Paradkar. "A Software Flaw Taxonomy: Aiming Tools At Security". 2005. <https://cwe.mitre.org/documents/sources/ASoftwareFlawTaxonomy-AimingToolsatSecurity%5BWeber,Karger,Paradkar%5D.pdf>.
[REF-1248] Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force (SEI ETF). "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS". Gaps in obligations and training. 2022-03-09. <https://inl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/SEI-ETF-NCSV-TPT-Categories-of-Security-Vulnerabilities-ICS-v1_03-09-22.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission DateSubmitterOrganization
2022-03-09New Categories of Security Vulnerabilities (NCSV) Technical Project Team (TPT)Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force

CWE CATEGORY: ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Human factors in ICS environments

Category ID: 1379
+ Summary
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Human factors in ICS environments" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022. Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
+ Membership
NatureTypeIDName
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1363ICS Operations (& Maintenance)
HasMemberClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.451User Interface (UI) Misrepresentation of Critical Information
HasMemberBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.655Insufficient Psychological Acceptability
+ Notes

Maintenance

This category was created in CWE 4.7 to facilitate and illuminate discussion about weaknesses in ICS. It is under active development. In future versions, new weaknesses will be added based on input from the CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT Special Interest Group (SIG). However, there may be some issues that are outside of the current scope of CWE, which will require consultation with many CWE stakeholders to resolve.
+ References
[REF-1248] Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force (SEI ETF). "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS". Human factors in ICS environments. 2022-03-09. <https://inl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/SEI-ETF-NCSV-TPT-Categories-of-Security-Vulnerabilities-ICS-v1_03-09-22.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission DateSubmitterOrganization
2022-03-09New Categories of Security Vulnerabilities (NCSV) Technical Project Team (TPT)Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force

CWE CATEGORY: ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Post-analysis changes

Category ID: 1380
+ Summary
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Post-analysis changes" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022. Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
+ Membership
NatureTypeIDName
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1363ICS Operations (& Maintenance)
+ Notes

Maintenance

This category was created in CWE 4.7 to facilitate and illuminate discussion about weaknesses in ICS. It is under active development. In future versions, new weaknesses will be added based on input from the CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT Special Interest Group (SIG). However, there may be some issues that are outside of the current scope of CWE, which will require consultation with many CWE stakeholders to resolve.
+ References
[REF-1248] Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force (SEI ETF). "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS". Post-analysis changes. 2022-03-09. <https://inl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/SEI-ETF-NCSV-TPT-Categories-of-Security-Vulnerabilities-ICS-v1_03-09-22.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission DateSubmitterOrganization
2022-03-09New Categories of Security Vulnerabilities (NCSV) Technical Project Team (TPT)Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force

CWE CATEGORY: ICS Supply Chain

Category ID: 1361
+ Summary
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "ICS Supply Chain" super category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022.
+ Membership
NatureTypeIDName
MemberOfViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries).1358Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS
HasMemberCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1369ICS Supply Chain: IT/OT Convergence/Expansion
HasMemberCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1370ICS Supply Chain: Common Mode Frailties
HasMemberCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1371ICS Supply Chain: Poorly Documented or Undocumented Features
HasMemberCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1372ICS Supply Chain: OT Counterfeit and Malicious Corruption
+ Notes

Maintenance

This category was created in CWE 4.7 to facilitate and illuminate discussion about weaknesses in ICS. It is under active development. In future versions, new weaknesses will be added based on input from the CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT Special Interest Group (SIG). However, there may be some issues that are outside of the current scope of CWE, which will require consultation with many CWE stakeholders to resolve.
+ References
[REF-1248] Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force (SEI ETF). "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS". 2022-03-09. <https://inl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/SEI-ETF-NCSV-TPT-Categories-of-Security-Vulnerabilities-ICS-v1_03-09-22.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission DateSubmitterOrganization
2022-03-09New Categories of Security Vulnerabilities (NCSV) Technical Project Team (TPT)Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force

CWE CATEGORY: ICS Supply Chain: Common Mode Frailties

Category ID: 1370
+ Summary
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Common Mode Frailties" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022. Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
+ Membership
NatureTypeIDName
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1361ICS Supply Chain
HasMemberVariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.329Generation of Predictable IV with CBC Mode
HasMemberClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.1357Reliance on Uncontrolled Component
+ Notes

Maintenance

This category was created in CWE 4.7 to facilitate and illuminate discussion about weaknesses in ICS. It is under active development. In future versions, new weaknesses will be added based on input from the CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT Special Interest Group (SIG). However, there may be some issues that are outside of the current scope of CWE, which will require consultation with many CWE stakeholders to resolve.
+ References
[REF-1260] Thu T. Pham. "The Great DNS Vulnerability of 2008 by Dan Kaminsky". 2016-04-26. <https://duo.com/blog/the-great-dns-vulnerability-of-2008-by-dan-kaminsky>.
[REF-1248] Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force (SEI ETF). "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS". Common Mode Frailties. 2022-03-09. <https://inl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/SEI-ETF-NCSV-TPT-Categories-of-Security-Vulnerabilities-ICS-v1_03-09-22.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission DateSubmitterOrganization
2022-03-09New Categories of Security Vulnerabilities (NCSV) Technical Project Team (TPT)Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force

CWE CATEGORY: ICS Supply Chain: IT/OT Convergence/Expansion

Category ID: 1369
+ Summary
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "IT/OT Convergence/Expansion" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022. Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
+ Membership
NatureTypeIDName
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1361ICS Supply Chain
HasMemberClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.636Not Failing Securely ('Failing Open')
+ Notes

Maintenance

This category was created in CWE 4.7 to facilitate and illuminate discussion about weaknesses in ICS. It is under active development. In future versions, new weaknesses will be added based on input from the CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT Special Interest Group (SIG). However, there may be some issues that are outside of the current scope of CWE, which will require consultation with many CWE stakeholders to resolve.
+ References
[REF-1248] Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force (SEI ETF). "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS". IT/OT Convergence/Expansion. 2022-03-09. <https://inl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/SEI-ETF-NCSV-TPT-Categories-of-Security-Vulnerabilities-ICS-v1_03-09-22.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission DateSubmitterOrganization
2022-03-09New Categories of Security Vulnerabilities (NCSV) Technical Project Team (TPT)Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force

CWE CATEGORY: ICS Supply Chain: OT Counterfeit and Malicious Corruption

Category ID: 1372
+ Summary
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "OT Counterfeit and Malicious Corruption" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022. Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
+ Membership
NatureTypeIDName
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1361ICS Supply Chain
HasMemberCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1198Privilege Separation and Access Control Issues
HasMemberBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.1231Improper Prevention of Lock Bit Modification
HasMemberBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.1233Security-Sensitive Hardware Controls with Missing Lock Bit Protection
HasMemberBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.1278Missing Protection Against Hardware Reverse Engineering Using Integrated Circuit (IC) Imaging Techniques
+ Notes

Maintenance

This category was created in CWE 4.7 to facilitate and illuminate discussion about weaknesses in ICS. It is under active development. In future versions, new weaknesses will be added based on input from the CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT Special Interest Group (SIG). However, there may be some issues that are outside of the current scope of CWE, which will require consultation with many CWE stakeholders to resolve.
+ References
[REF-1248] Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force (SEI ETF). "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS". OT Counterfeit and Malicious Corruption. 2022-03-09. <https://inl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/SEI-ETF-NCSV-TPT-Categories-of-Security-Vulnerabilities-ICS-v1_03-09-22.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission DateSubmitterOrganization
2022-03-09New Categories of Security Vulnerabilities (NCSV) Technical Project Team (TPT)Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force

CWE CATEGORY: ICS Supply Chain: Poorly Documented or Undocumented Features

Category ID: 1371
+ Summary
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Poorly Documented or Undocumented Features" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022. Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
+ Membership
NatureTypeIDName
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1361ICS Supply Chain
HasMemberClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.912Hidden Functionality
HasMemberClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.1059Insufficient Technical Documentation
HasMemberBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.1242Inclusion of Undocumented Features or Chicken Bits
+ Notes

Maintenance

This category was created in CWE 4.7 to facilitate and illuminate discussion about weaknesses in ICS. It is under active development. In future versions, new weaknesses will be added based on input from the CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT Special Interest Group (SIG). However, there may be some issues that are outside of the current scope of CWE, which will require consultation with many CWE stakeholders to resolve.
+ References
[REF-1248] Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force (SEI ETF). "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS". Poorly Documented or Undocumented Features. 2022-03-09. <https://inl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/SEI-ETF-NCSV-TPT-Categories-of-Security-Vulnerabilities-ICS-v1_03-09-22.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission DateSubmitterOrganization
2022-03-09New Categories of Security Vulnerabilities (NCSV) Technical Project Team (TPT)Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force

CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards

Weakness ID: 710
Abstraction: Pillar
Structure: Simple
Presentation Filter:
+ Description
The software does not follow certain coding rules for development, which can lead to resultant weaknesses or increase the severity of the associated vulnerabilities.
+ Relationships
Section HelpThis table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (CWE-1000)
NatureTypeIDName
MemberOfViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries).1000Research Concepts
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.476NULL Pointer Dereference
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.477Use of Obsolete Function
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.484Omitted Break Statement in Switch
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.489Active Debug Code
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.570Expression is Always False
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.571Expression is Always True
ParentOfClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.573Improper Following of Specification by Caller
ParentOfVariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.594J2EE Framework: Saving Unserializable Objects to Disk
ParentOfClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.657Violation of Secure Design Principles
ParentOfClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.684Incorrect Provision of Specified Functionality
ParentOfClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.758Reliance on Undefined, Unspecified, or Implementation-Defined Behavior
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.1041Use of Redundant Code
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.1044Architecture with Number of Horizontal Layers Outside of Expected Range
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.1048Invokable Control Element with Large Number of Outward Calls
ParentOfClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.1059Insufficient Technical Documentation
ParentOfClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.1061Insufficient Encapsulation
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.1065Runtime Resource Management Control Element in a Component Built to Run on Application Servers
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.1066Missing Serialization Control Element
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.1068Inconsistency Between Implementation and Documented Design
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.1070Serializable Data Element Containing non-Serializable Item Elements
ParentOfClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.1076Insufficient Adherence to Expected Conventions
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.1092Use of Same Invokable Control Element in Multiple Architectural Layers
ParentOfClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.1093Excessively Complex Data Representation
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.1101Reliance on Runtime Component in Generated Code
ParentOfClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.1120Excessive Code Complexity
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.1126Declaration of Variable with Unnecessarily Wide Scope
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.1127Compilation with Insufficient Warnings or Errors
ParentOfClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.1164Irrelevant Code
ParentOfClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.1177Use of Prohibited Code
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.1209Failure to Disable Reserved Bits
ParentOfClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.1357Reliance on Uncontrolled Component
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
PhaseNote
Architecture and Design
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.

Languages

Class: Language-Independent (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: Technology-Independent (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
ScopeImpactLikelihood
Other

Technical Impact: Other

+ Potential Mitigations

Phase: Implementation

Document and closely follow coding standards.

Phases: Testing; Implementation

Where possible, use automated tools to enforce the standards.
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
NatureTypeIDName
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.978SFP Secondary Cluster: Implementation
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1383ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Compliance/Conformance with Regulatory Requirements
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission DateSubmitterOrganization
2008-09-09CWE Content TeamMITRE
+ Modifications
Modification DateModifierOrganization
2009-03-10CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2011-06-01CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2012-05-11CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2012-10-30CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2013-02-21CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2014-07-30CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2017-01-19CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2017-11-08CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Name, Relationships
2019-01-03CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2020-02-24CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships, Type
2022-04-28CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
+ Previous Entry Names
Change DatePrevious Entry Name
2017-11-08Coding Standards Violation

CWE-285: Improper Authorization

Weakness ID: 285
Abstraction: Class
Structure: Simple
Presentation Filter:
+ Description
The software does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.
+ Extended Description

Assuming a user with a given identity, authorization is the process of determining whether that user can access a given resource, based on the user's privileges and any permissions or other access-control specifications that apply to the resource.

When access control checks are not applied consistently - or not at all - users are able to access data or perform actions that they should not be allowed to perform. This can lead to a wide range of problems, including information exposures, denial of service, and arbitrary code execution.

+ Alternate Terms
AuthZ:
"AuthZ" is typically used as an abbreviation of "authorization" within the web application security community. It is distinct from "AuthN" (or, sometimes, "AuthC") which is an abbreviation of "authentication." The use of "Auth" as an abbreviation is discouraged, since it could be used for either authentication or authorization.
+ Relationships
Section HelpThis table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (CWE-1000)
NatureTypeIDName
ChildOfPillarPillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things.284Improper Access Control
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.552Files or Directories Accessible to External Parties
ParentOfClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.732Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource
ParentOfClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.862Missing Authorization
ParentOfClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.863Incorrect Authorization
ParentOfVariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.926Improper Export of Android Application Components
ParentOfVariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.927Use of Implicit Intent for Sensitive Communication
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.1230Exposure of Sensitive Information Through Metadata
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.1256Improper Restriction of Software Interfaces to Hardware Features
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.1297Unprotected Confidential Information on Device is Accessible by OSAT Vendors
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.1328Security Version Number Mutable to Older Versions
Section HelpThis table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (CWE-1008)
NatureTypeIDName
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1011Authorize Actors
Section HelpThis table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "CISQ Data Protection Measures" (CWE-1340)
NatureTypeIDName
ChildOfPillarPillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things.284Improper Access Control
+ Background Details
An access control list (ACL) represents who/what has permissions to a given object. Different operating systems implement (ACLs) in different ways. In UNIX, there are three types of permissions: read, write, and execute. Users are divided into three classes for file access: owner, group owner, and all other users where each class has a separate set of rights. In Windows NT, there are four basic types of permissions for files: "No access", "Read access", "Change access", and "Full control". Windows NT extends the concept of three types of users in UNIX to include a list of users and groups along with their associated permissions. A user can create an object (file) and assign specified permissions to that object.
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
PhaseNote
Implementation

REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.

A developer may introduce authorization weaknesses because of a lack of understanding about the underlying technologies. For example, a developer may assume that attackers cannot modify certain inputs such as headers or cookies.

Architecture and Design

Authorization weaknesses may arise when a single-user application is ported to a multi-user environment.

Operation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.

Languages

Class: Language-Independent (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Web Server (Often Prevalent)

Database Server (Often Prevalent)

+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
ScopeImpactLikelihood
Confidentiality

Technical Impact: Read Application Data; Read Files or Directories

An attacker could read sensitive data, either by reading the data directly from a data store that is not properly restricted, or by accessing insufficiently-protected, privileged functionality to read the data.
Integrity

Technical Impact: Modify Application Data; Modify Files or Directories

An attacker could modify sensitive data, either by writing the data directly to a data store that is not properly restricted, or by accessing insufficiently-protected, privileged functionality to write the data.
Access Control

Technical Impact: Gain Privileges or Assume Identity

An attacker could gain privileges by modifying or reading critical data directly, or by accessing insufficiently-protected, privileged functionality.
+ Likelihood Of Exploit
High
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1

This function runs an arbitrary SQL query on a given database, returning the result of the query.

(bad code)
Example Language: PHP 
function runEmployeeQuery($dbName, $name){
mysql_select_db($dbName,$globalDbHandle) or die("Could not open Database".$dbName);
//Use a prepared statement to avoid CWE-89
$preparedStatement = $globalDbHandle->prepare('SELECT * FROM employees WHERE name = :name');
$preparedStatement->execute(array(':name' => $name));
return $preparedStatement->fetchAll();
}
/.../

$employeeRecord = runEmployeeQuery('EmployeeDB',$_GET['EmployeeName']);

While this code is careful to avoid SQL Injection, the function does not confirm the user sending the query is authorized to do so. An attacker may be able to obtain sensitive employee information from the database.

Example 2

The following program could be part of a bulletin board system that allows users to send private messages to each other. This program intends to authenticate the user before deciding whether a private message should be displayed. Assume that LookupMessageObject() ensures that the $id argument is numeric, constructs a filename based on that id, and reads the message details from that file. Also assume that the program stores all private messages for all users in the same directory.

(bad code)
Example Language: Perl 
sub DisplayPrivateMessage {
my($id) = @_;
my $Message = LookupMessageObject($id);
print "From: " . encodeHTML($Message->{from}) . "<br>\n";
print "Subject: " . encodeHTML($Message->{subject}) . "\n";
print "<hr>\n";
print "Body: " . encodeHTML($Message->{body}) . "\n";
}

my $q = new CGI;
# For purposes of this example, assume that CWE-309 and


# CWE-523 do not apply.
if (! AuthenticateUser($q->param('username'), $q->param('password'))) {
ExitError("invalid username or password");
}

my $id = $q->param('id');
DisplayPrivateMessage($id);

While the program properly exits if authentication fails, it does not ensure that the message is addressed to the user. As a result, an authenticated attacker could provide any arbitrary identifier and read private messages that were intended for other users.

One way to avoid this problem would be to ensure that the "to" field in the message object matches the username of the authenticated user.

+ Observed Examples
ReferenceDescription
Web application does not restrict access to admin scripts, allowing authenticated users to reset administrative passwords.
Web application does not restrict access to admin scripts, allowing authenticated users to modify passwords of other users.
Web application stores database file under the web root with insufficient access control (CWE-219), allowing direct request.
Terminal server does not check authorization for guest access.
Database server does not use appropriate privileges for certain sensitive operations.
Gateway uses default "Allow" configuration for its authorization settings.
Chain: product does not properly interpret a configuration option for a system group, allowing users to gain privileges.
Chain: SNMP product does not properly parse a configuration option for which hosts are allowed to connect, allowing unauthorized IP addresses to connect.
System monitoring software allows users to bypass authorization by creating custom forms.
Chain: reliance on client-side security (CWE-602) allows attackers to bypass authorization using a custom client.
Chain: product does not properly handle wildcards in an authorization policy list, allowing unintended access.
Content management system does not check access permissions for private files, allowing others to view those files.
ACL-based protection mechanism treats negative access rights as if they are positive, allowing bypass of intended restrictions.
Product does not check the ACL of a page accessed using an "include" directive, allowing attackers to read unauthorized files.
Default ACL list for a DNS server does not set certain ACLs, allowing unauthorized DNS queries.
Product relies on the X-Forwarded-For HTTP header for authorization, allowing unintended access by spoofing the header.
OS kernel does not check for a certain privilege before setting ACLs for files.
Chain: file-system code performs an incorrect comparison (CWE-697), preventing default ACLs from being properly applied.
Chain: product does not properly check the result of a reverse DNS lookup because of operator precedence (CWE-783), allowing bypass of DNS-based access restrictions.
+ Potential Mitigations

Phase: Architecture and Design

Divide the software into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries.

Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.

Phase: Architecture and Design

Ensure that you perform access control checks related to your business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that you apply to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor.

Phase: Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].

Phase: Architecture and Design

For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page.

One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.

Phases: System Configuration; Installation

Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.
+ Detection Methods

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis is useful for detecting commonly-used idioms for authorization. A tool may be able to analyze related configuration files, such as .htaccess in Apache web servers, or detect the usage of commonly-used authorization libraries.

Generally, automated static analysis tools have difficulty detecting custom authorization schemes. In addition, the software's design may include some functionality that is accessible to any user and does not require an authorization check; an automated technique that detects the absence of authorization may report false positives.

Effectiveness: Limited

Automated Dynamic Analysis

Automated dynamic analysis may find many or all possible interfaces that do not require authorization, but manual analysis is required to determine if the lack of authorization violates business logic

Manual Analysis

This weakness can be detected using tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session.

Specifically, manual static analysis is useful for evaluating the correctness of custom authorization mechanisms.

Effectiveness: Moderate

Note: These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules. However, manual efforts might not achieve desired code coverage within limited time constraints.

Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Web Application Scanner
  • Web Services Scanner
  • Database Scanners

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Host Application Interface Scanner
  • Fuzz Tester
  • Framework-based Fuzzer
  • Forced Path Execution
  • Monitored Virtual Environment - run potentially malicious code in sandbox / wrapper / virtual machine, see if it does anything suspicious

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Manual Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source
  • Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Automated Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Architecture or Design Review

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)

Effectiveness: High

+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
NatureTypeIDName
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.2547PK - Security Features
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.721OWASP Top Ten 2007 Category A10 - Failure to Restrict URL Access
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.723OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A2 - Broken Access Control
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.7532009 Top 25 - Porous Defenses
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.8032010 Top 25 - Porous Defenses
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.817OWASP Top Ten 2010 Category A8 - Failure to Restrict URL Access
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.935OWASP Top Ten 2013 Category A7 - Missing Function Level Access Control
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.945SFP Secondary Cluster: Insecure Resource Access
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1031OWASP Top Ten 2017 Category A5 - Broken Access Control
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1345OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A01:2021 - Broken Access Control
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1382ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Emerging Energy Technologies
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy NameNode IDFitMapped Node Name
7 Pernicious KingdomsMissing Access Control
OWASP Top Ten 2007A10CWE More SpecificFailure to Restrict URL Access
OWASP Top Ten 2004A2CWE More SpecificBroken Access Control
Software Fault PatternsSFP35Insecure resource access
+ References
[REF-6] Katrina Tsipenyuk, Brian Chess and Gary McGraw. "Seven Pernicious Kingdoms: A Taxonomy of Software Security Errors". NIST Workshop on Software Security Assurance Tools Techniques and Metrics. NIST. 2005-11-07. <https://samate.nist.gov/SSATTM_Content/papers/Seven%20Pernicious%20Kingdoms%20-%20Taxonomy%20of%20Sw%20Security%20Errors%20-%20Tsipenyuk%20-%20Chess%20-%20McGraw.pdf>.
[REF-229] NIST. "Role Based Access Control and Role Based Security". <http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/rbac/>.
[REF-7] Michael Howard and David LeBlanc. "Writing Secure Code". Chapter 4, "Authorization" Page 114; Chapter 6, "Determining Appropriate Access Control" Page 171. 2nd Edition. Microsoft Press. 2002-12-04. <https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/store/writing-secure-code-9780735617223>.
[REF-231] Frank Kim. "Top 25 Series - Rank 5 - Improper Access Control (Authorization)". SANS Software Security Institute. 2010-03-04. <http://blogs.sans.org/appsecstreetfighter/2010/03/04/top-25-series-rank-5-improper-access-control-authorization/>.
[REF-45] OWASP. "OWASP Enterprise Security API (ESAPI) Project". <http://www.owasp.org/index.php/ESAPI>.
[REF-233] Rahul Bhattacharjee. "Authentication using JAAS". <http://www.javaranch.com/journal/2008/04/authentication-using-JAAS.html>.
[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 2, "Common Vulnerabilities of Authorization", Page 39. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 11, "ACL Inheritance", Page 649. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission DateSubmitterOrganization
2006-07-197 Pernicious Kingdoms
+ Modifications
Modification DateModifierOrganization
2008-07-01Eric DalciCigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
2008-08-15Veracode
Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping
2008-09-08CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2009-01-12CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Name, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
2009-03-10CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2009-05-27CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Description, Related_Attack_Patterns
2009-07-27CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2009-10-29CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Type
2009-12-28CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Detection_Factors, Modes_of_Introduction, Observed_Examples, Relationships
2010-02-16CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Alternate_Terms, Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
2010-04-05CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2010-06-21CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Common_Consequences, References, Relationships
2010-09-27CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Description
2011-03-24CWE Content TeamMITRE
Changed name and description; clarified difference between "access control" and "authorization."
2011-03-29CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Background_Details, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Name, Relationships
2011-06-01CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Observed_Examples, Relationships
2012-05-11CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2012-10-30CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2013-07-17CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2014-07-30CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2015-12-07CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2017-11-08CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships
2018-03-27CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated References, Relationships
2019-01-03CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2019-06-20CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2020-02-24CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated References, Relationships
2020-08-20CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2020-12-10CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2021-03-15CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Alternate_Terms
2021-07-20CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2021-10-28CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2022-04-28CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
+ Previous Entry Names
Change DatePrevious Entry Name
2009-01-12Missing or Inconsistent Access Control
2011-03-29Improper Access Control (Authorization)

CWE-295: Improper Certificate Validation

Weakness ID: 295
Abstraction: Base
Structure: Simple
Presentation Filter:
+ Description
The software does not validate, or incorrectly validates, a certificate.
+ Extended Description
When a certificate is invalid or malicious, it might allow an attacker to spoof a trusted entity by interfering in the communication path between the host and client. The software might connect to a malicious host while believing it is a trusted host, or the software might be deceived into accepting spoofed data that appears to originate from a trusted host.
+ Relationships
Section HelpThis table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (CWE-1000)
NatureTypeIDName
ChildOfClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.287Improper Authentication
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.296Improper Following of a Certificate's Chain of Trust
ParentOfVariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.297Improper Validation of Certificate with Host Mismatch
ParentOfVariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.298Improper Validation of Certificate Expiration
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.299Improper Check for Certificate Revocation
ParentOfVariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.599Missing Validation of OpenSSL Certificate
PeerOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.322Key Exchange without Entity Authentication
Section HelpThis table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (CWE-699)
NatureTypeIDName
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1211Authentication Errors
Section HelpThis table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (CWE-1003)
NatureTypeIDName
ChildOfClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.287Improper Authentication
Section HelpThis table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (CWE-1008)
NatureTypeIDName
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1014Identify Actors
+ Background Details
A certificate is a token that associates an identity (principal) to a cryptographic key. Certificates can be used to check if a public key belongs to the assumed owner.
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
PhaseNote
Architecture and Design
ImplementationREALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.
ImplementationWhen the software uses certificate pinning, the developer might not properly validate all relevant components of the certificate before pinning the certificate. This can make it difficult or expensive to test after the pinning is complete.
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.

Languages

Class: Language-Independent (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: Mobile (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
ScopeImpactLikelihood
Integrity
Authentication

Technical Impact: Bypass Protection Mechanism; Gain Privileges or Assume Identity

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1

This code checks the certificate of a connected peer.

(bad code)
Example Language:
if ((cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl)) && host)
foo=SSL_get_verify_result(ssl);

if ((X509_V_OK==foo) || X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN==foo))

// certificate looks good, host can be trusted

In this case, because the certificate is self-signed, there was no external authority that could prove the identity of the host. The program could be communicating with a different system that is spoofing the host, e.g. by poisoning the DNS cache or using an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AITM) attack to modify the traffic from server to client.

Example 2

The following OpenSSL code obtains a certificate and verifies it.

(bad code)
Example Language:
cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl);
if (cert && (SSL_get_verify_result(ssl)==X509_V_OK)) {

// do secret things
}

Even though the "verify" step returns X509_V_OK, this step does not include checking the Common Name against the name of the host. That is, there is no guarantee that the certificate is for the desired host. The SSL connection could have been established with a malicious host that provided a valid certificate.

Example 3

The following OpenSSL code ensures that there is a certificate and allows the use of expired certificates.

(bad code)
Example Language:
if (cert = SSL_get_peer(certificate(ssl)) {
foo=SSL_get_verify_result(ssl);
if ((X509_V_OK==foo) || (X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED==foo))

//do stuff

If the call to SSL_get_verify_result() returns X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED, this means that the certificate has expired. As time goes on, there is an increasing chance for attackers to compromise the certificate.

Example 4

The following OpenSSL code ensures that there is a certificate before continuing execution.

(bad code)
Example Language:
if (cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl)) {

// got a certificate, do secret things

Because this code does not use SSL_get_verify_results() to check the certificate, it could accept certificates that have been revoked (X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED). The software could be communicating with a malicious host.

Example 5

The following OpenSSL code ensures that the host has a certificate.

(bad code)
Example Language:
if (cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl)) {

// got certificate, host can be trusted

//foo=SSL_get_verify_result(ssl);

//if (X509_V_OK==foo) ...
}

Note that the code does not call SSL_get_verify_result(ssl), which effectively disables the validation step that checks the certificate.

+ Observed Examples
ReferenceDescription
chain: incorrect "goto" in Apple SSL product bypasses certificate validation, allowing Adversary-in-the-Middle (AITM) attack (Apple "goto fail" bug). CWE-705 (Incorrect Control Flow Scoping) -> CWE-561 (Dead Code) -> CWE-295 (Improper Certificate Validation) -> CWE-393 (Return of Wrong Status Code) -> CWE-300 (Channel Accessible by Non-Endpoint).
Chain: router's firmware update procedure uses curl with "-k" (insecure) option that disables certificate validation (CWE-295), allowing adversary-in-the-middle (AITM) compromise with a malicious firmware image (CWE-494).
Verification function trusts certificate chains in which the last certificate is self-signed.
Web browser uses a TLS-related function incorrectly, preventing it from verifying that a server's certificate is signed by a trusted certification authority (CA)
Web browser does not check if any intermediate certificates are revoked.
Operating system does not check Certificate Revocation List (CRL) in some cases, allowing spoofing using a revoked certificate.
Mobile banking application does not verify hostname, leading to financial loss.
Cloud-support library written in Python uses incorrect regular expression when matching hostname.
Web browser does not correctly handle '\0' character (NUL) in Common Name, allowing spoofing of https sites.
Smartphone device does not verify hostname, allowing spoofing of mail services.
Application uses third-party library that does not validate hostname.
Cloud storage management application does not validate hostname.
Java library uses JSSE SSLSocket and SSLEngine classes, which do not verify the hostname.
chain: incorrect calculation allows attackers to bypass certificate checks.
LDAP client accepts certificates even if they are not from a trusted CA.
chain: DNS server does not correctly check return value from the OpenSSL EVP_VerifyFinal function allows bypass of validation of the certificate chain.
chain: product checks if client is trusted when it intended to check if the server is trusted, allowing validation of signed code.
Cryptographic API, as used in web browsers, mail clients, and other software, does not properly validate Basic Constraints.
chain: OS package manager does not check properly check the return value, allowing bypass using a revoked certificate.
+ Potential Mitigations

Phases: Architecture and Design; Implementation

Certificates should be carefully managed and checked to assure that data are encrypted with the intended owner's public key.

Phase: Implementation

If certificate pinning is being used, ensure that all relevant properties of the certificate are fully validated before the certificate is pinned, including the hostname.
+ Detection Methods

Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
  • Binary Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Web Application Scanner

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Man-in-the-middle attack tool

Effectiveness: High

Manual Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source
  • Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)

Effectiveness: High

Automated Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Source code Weakness Analyzer
  • Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Architecture or Design Review

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)

Effectiveness: High

+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
NatureTypeIDName
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.731OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A10 - Insecure Configuration Management
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1029OWASP Top Ten 2017 Category A3 - Sensitive Data Exposure
MemberOfViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries).1200Weaknesses in the 2019 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1353OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A07:2021 - Identification and Authentication Failures
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1382ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Emerging Energy Technologies
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy NameNode IDFitMapped Node Name
OWASP Top Ten 2004A10CWE More SpecificInsecure Configuration Management
+ References
[REF-243] Sascha Fahl, Marian Harbach, Thomas Muders, Matthew Smith and Lars Baumgärtner, Bernd Freisleben. "Why Eve and Mallory Love Android: An Analysis of Android SSL (In)Security". 2012-10-16. <http://www2.dcsec.uni-hannover.de/files/android/p50-fahl.pdf>.
[REF-244] M. Bishop. "Computer Security: Art and Science". Addison-Wesley. 2003.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission DateSubmitterOrganization
2006-07-19CWE Community
Submitted by members of the CWE community to extend early CWE versions
+ Modifications
Modification DateModifierOrganization
2008-08-15Veracode
Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping
2008-09-08CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-10-14CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Background_Details, Description
2012-05-11CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2012-12-28CWE Content TeamMITRE
Converted from category to weakness class.
2013-02-21CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Description, Name, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction, Type
2014-06-23CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2014-07-30CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Detection_Factors
2015-12-07CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2017-01-19CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2017-11-08CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships
2018-03-27CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Background_Details, Modes_of_Introduction, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
2019-06-20CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2019-09-19CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships
2020-02-24CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Observed_Examples, Relationships
2020-08-20CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2021-07-20CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples
2021-10-28CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
2022-04-28CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
+ Previous Entry Names
Change DatePrevious Entry Name
2013-02-21Certificate Issues

CWE-754: Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions

Weakness ID: 754
Abstraction: Class
Structure: Simple
Presentation Filter:
+ Description
The software does not check or incorrectly checks for unusual or exceptional conditions that are not expected to occur frequently during day to day operation of the software.
+ Extended Description

The programmer may assume that certain events or conditions will never occur or do not need to be worried about, such as low memory conditions, lack of access to resources due to restrictive permissions, or misbehaving clients or components. However, attackers may intentionally trigger these unusual conditions, thus violating the programmer's assumptions, possibly introducing instability, incorrect behavior, or a vulnerability.

Note that this entry is not exclusively about the use of exceptions and exception handling, which are mechanisms for both checking and handling unusual or unexpected conditions.

+ Relationships
Section HelpThis table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (CWE-1000)
NatureTypeIDName
ChildOfPillarPillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things.703Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.252Unchecked Return Value
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.253Incorrect Check of Function Return Value
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.273Improper Check for Dropped Privileges
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.354Improper Validation of Integrity Check Value
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.391Unchecked Error Condition
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.394Unexpected Status Code or Return Value
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.476NULL Pointer Dereference
Section HelpThis table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (CWE-1003)
NatureTypeIDName
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.252Unchecked Return Value
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.273Improper Check for Dropped Privileges
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.476NULL Pointer Dereference
Section HelpThis table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (CWE-1008)
NatureTypeIDName
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1012Cross Cutting
+ Background Details
Many functions will return some value about the success of their actions. This will alert the program whether or not to handle any errors caused by that function.
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
PhaseNote
ImplementationREALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.

Languages

Class: Language-Independent (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
ScopeImpactLikelihood
Integrity
Availability

Technical Impact: DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart; Unexpected State

The data which were produced as a result of a function call could be in a bad state upon return. If the return value is not checked, then this bad data may be used in operations, possibly leading to a crash or other unintended behaviors.
+ Likelihood Of Exploit
Medium
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1

Consider the following code segment:

(bad code)
Example Language:
char buf[10], cp_buf[10];
fgets(buf, 10, stdin);
strcpy(cp_buf, buf);

The programmer expects that when fgets() returns, buf will contain a null-terminated string of length 9 or less. But if an I/O error occurs, fgets() will not null-terminate buf. Furthermore, if the end of the file is reached before any characters are read, fgets() returns without writing anything to buf. In both of these situations, fgets() signals that something unusual has happened by returning NULL, but in this code, the warning will not be noticed. The lack of a null terminator in buf can result in a buffer overflow in the subsequent call to strcpy().

Example 2

The following code does not check to see if memory allocation succeeded before attempting to use the pointer returned by malloc().

(bad code)
Example Language:
buf = (char*) malloc(req_size);
strncpy(buf, xfer, req_size);

The traditional defense of this coding error is: "If my program runs out of memory, it will fail. It doesn't matter whether I handle the error or simply allow the program to die with a segmentation fault when it tries to dereference the null pointer." This argument ignores three important considerations:

  • Depending upon the type and size of the application, it may be possible to free memory that is being used elsewhere so that execution can continue.
  • It is impossible for the program to perform a graceful exit if required. If the program is performing an atomic operation, it can leave the system in an inconsistent state.
  • The programmer has lost the opportunity to record diagnostic information. Did the call to malloc() fail because req_size was too large or because there were too many requests being handled at the same time? Or was it caused by a memory leak that has built up over time? Without handling the error, there is no way to know.

Example 3

The following examples read a file into a byte array.

(bad code)
Example Language: C# 
char[] byteArray = new char[1024];
for (IEnumerator i=users.GetEnumerator(); i.MoveNext() ;i.Current()) {
String userName = (String) i.Current();
String pFileName = PFILE_ROOT + "/" + userName;
StreamReader sr = new StreamReader(pFileName);
sr.Read(byteArray,0,1024);//the file is always 1k bytes
sr.Close();
processPFile(userName, byteArray);
}
(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
FileInputStream fis;
byte[] byteArray = new byte[1024];
for (Iterator i=users.iterator(); i.hasNext();) {
String userName = (String) i.next();
String pFileName = PFILE_ROOT + "/" + userName;
FileInputStream fis = new FileInputStream(pFileName);
fis.read(byteArray); // the file is always 1k bytes
fis.close();
processPFile(userName, byteArray);

The code loops through a set of users, reading a private data file for each user. The programmer assumes that the files are always 1 kilobyte in size and therefore ignores the return value from Read(). If an attacker can create a smaller file, the program will recycle the remainder of the data from the previous user and treat it as though it belongs to the attacker.

Example 4

The following code does not check to see if the string returned by getParameter() is null before calling the member function compareTo(), potentially causing a NULL dereference.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
String itemName = request.getParameter(ITEM_NAME);
if (itemName.compareTo(IMPORTANT_ITEM) == 0) {
...
}
...

The following code does not check to see if the string returned by the Item property is null before calling the member function Equals(), potentially causing a NULL dereference.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
String itemName = request.Item(ITEM_NAME);
if (itemName.Equals(IMPORTANT_ITEM)) {
...
}
...

The traditional defense of this coding error is: "I know the requested value will always exist because.... If it does not exist, the program cannot perform the desired behavior so it doesn't matter whether I handle the error or simply allow the program to die dereferencing a null value." But attackers are skilled at finding unexpected paths through programs, particularly when exceptions are involved.

Example 5

The following code shows a system property that is set to null and later dereferenced by a programmer who mistakenly assumes it will always be defined.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
System.clearProperty("os.name");
...
String os = System.getProperty("os.name");
if (os.equalsIgnoreCase("Windows 95")) System.out.println("Not supported");

The traditional defense of this coding error is: "I know the requested value will always exist because.... If it does not exist, the program cannot perform the desired behavior so it doesn't matter whether I handle the error or simply allow the program to die dereferencing a null value." But attackers are skilled at finding unexpected paths through programs, particularly when exceptions are involved.

Example 6

The following VB.NET code does not check to make sure that it has read 50 bytes from myfile.txt. This can cause DoDangerousOperation() to operate on an unexpected value.

(bad code)
Example Language: C# 
Dim MyFile As New FileStream("myfile.txt", FileMode.Open, FileAccess.Read, FileShare.Read)
Dim MyArray(50) As Byte
MyFile.Read(MyArray, 0, 50)
DoDangerousOperation(MyArray(20))

In .NET, it is not uncommon for programmers to misunderstand Read() and related methods that are part of many System.IO classes. The stream and reader classes do not consider it to be unusual or exceptional if only a small amount of data becomes available. These classes simply add the small amount of data to the return buffer, and set the return value to the number of bytes or characters read. There is no guarantee that the amount of data returned is equal to the amount of data requested.

Example 7

This example takes an IP address from a user, verifies that it is well formed and then looks up the hostname and copies it into a buffer.

(bad code)
Example Language:
void host_lookup(char *user_supplied_addr){
struct hostent *hp;
in_addr_t *addr;
char hostname[64];
in_addr_t inet_addr(const char *cp);

/*routine that ensures user_supplied_addr is in the right format for conversion */

validate_addr_form(user_supplied_addr);
addr = inet_addr(user_supplied_addr);
hp = gethostbyaddr( addr, sizeof(struct in_addr), AF_INET);
strcpy(hostname, hp->h_name);
}

If an attacker provides an address that appears to be well-formed, but the address does not resolve to a hostname, then the call to gethostbyaddr() will return NULL. Since the code does not check the return value from gethostbyaddr (CWE-252), a NULL pointer dereference (CWE-476) would then occur in the call to strcpy().

Note that this code is also vulnerable to a buffer overflow (CWE-119).

Example 8

In the following C/C++ example the method outputStringToFile opens a file in the local filesystem and outputs a string to the file. The input parameters output and filename contain the string to output to the file and the name of the file respectively.

(bad code)
Example Language: C++ 
int outputStringToFile(char *output, char *filename) {

openFileToWrite(filename);
writeToFile(output);
closeFile(filename);
}

However, this code does not check the return values of the methods openFileToWrite, writeToFile, closeFile to verify that the file was properly opened and closed and that the string was successfully written to the file. The return values for these methods should be checked to determine if the method was successful and allow for detection of errors or unexpected conditions as in the following example.

(good code)
Example Language: C++ 
int outputStringToFile(char *output, char *filename) {
int isOutput = SUCCESS;

int isOpen = openFileToWrite(filename);
if (isOpen == FAIL) {
printf("Unable to open file %s", filename);
isOutput = FAIL;
}
else {
int isWrite = writeToFile(output);
if (isWrite == FAIL) {
printf("Unable to write to file %s", filename);
isOutput = FAIL;
}

int isClose = closeFile(filename);
if (isClose == FAIL)
isOutput = FAIL;
}
return isOutput;
}

Example 9

In the following Java example the method readFromFile uses a FileReader object to read the contents of a file. The FileReader object is created using the File object readFile, the readFile object is initialized using the setInputFile method. The setInputFile method should be called before calling the readFromFile method.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
private File readFile = null;

public void setInputFile(String inputFile) {

// create readFile File object from string containing name of file
}

public void readFromFile() {
try {
reader = new FileReader(readFile);

// read input file
} catch (FileNotFoundException ex) {...}
}

However, the readFromFile method does not check to see if the readFile object is null, i.e. has not been initialized, before creating the FileReader object and reading from the input file. The readFromFile method should verify whether the readFile object is null and output an error message and raise an exception if the readFile object is null, as in the following code.

(good code)
Example Language: Java 
private File readFile = null;

public void setInputFile(String inputFile) {

// create readFile File object from string containing name of file
}

public void readFromFile() {
try {
if (readFile == null) {
System.err.println("Input file has not been set, call setInputFile method before calling openInputFile");
throw NullPointerException;
}

reader = new FileReader(readFile);

// read input file
} catch (FileNotFoundException ex) {...}
catch (NullPointerException ex) {...}
}
+ Observed Examples
ReferenceDescription
Unchecked return value leads to resultant integer overflow and code execution.
Program does not check return value when invoking functions to drop privileges, which could leave users with higher privileges than expected by forcing those functions to fail.
Program does not check return value when invoking functions to drop privileges, which could leave users with higher privileges than expected by forcing those functions to fail.
+ Potential Mitigations

Phase: Requirements

Strategy: Language Selection

Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

Choose languages with features such as exception handling that force the programmer to anticipate unusual conditions that may generate exceptions. Custom exceptions may need to be developed to handle unusual business-logic conditions. Be careful not to pass sensitive exceptions back to the user (CWE-209, CWE-248).

Phase: Implementation

Check the results of all functions that return a value and verify that the value is expected.

Effectiveness: High

Note: Checking the return value of the function will typically be sufficient, however beware of race conditions (CWE-362) in a concurrent environment.

Phase: Implementation

If using exception handling, catch and throw specific exceptions instead of overly-general exceptions (CWE-396, CWE-397). Catch and handle exceptions as locally as possible so that exceptions do not propagate too far up the call stack (CWE-705). Avoid unchecked or uncaught exceptions where feasible (CWE-248).

Effectiveness: High

Note: Using specific exceptions, and ensuring that exceptions are checked, helps programmers to anticipate and appropriately handle many unusual events that could occur.

Phase: Implementation

Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.

If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.

Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.

Exposing additional information to a potential attacker in the context of an exceptional condition can help the attacker determine what attack vectors are most likely to succeed beyond DoS.

Phase: Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.

When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."

Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.

Note: Performing extensive input validation does not help with handling unusual conditions, but it will minimize their occurrences and will make it more difficult for attackers to trigger them.

Phases: Architecture and Design; Implementation

If the program must fail, ensure that it fails gracefully (fails closed). There may be a temptation to simply let the program fail poorly in cases such as low memory conditions, but an attacker may be able to assert control before the software has fully exited. Alternately, an uncontrolled failure could cause cascading problems with other downstream components; for example, the program could send a signal to a downstream process so the process immediately knows that a problem has occurred and has a better chance of recovery.

Phase: Architecture and Design

Use system limits, which should help to prevent resource exhaustion. However, the software should still handle low resource conditions since they may still occur.
+ Detection Methods

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis may be useful for detecting unusual conditions involving system resources or common programming idioms, but not for violations of business rules.

Effectiveness: Moderate

Manual Dynamic Analysis

Identify error conditions that are not likely to occur during normal usage and trigger them. For example, run the program under low memory conditions, run with insufficient privileges or permissions, interrupt a transaction before it is completed, or disable connectivity to basic network services such as DNS. Monitor the software for any unexpected behavior. If you trigger an unhandled exception or similar error that was discovered and handled by the application's environment, it may still indicate unexpected conditions that were not handled by the application itself.
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
NatureTypeIDName
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.742CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 9 - Memory Management (MEM)
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.8022010 Top 25 - Risky Resource Management
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.8672011 Top 25 - Weaknesses On the Cusp
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.876CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 08 - Memory Management (MEM)
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.880CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 12 - Exceptions and Error Handling (ERR)
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.962SFP Secondary Cluster: Unchecked Status Condition
MemberOfViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries).1003Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1141SEI CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java - Guidelines 07. Exceptional Behavior (ERR)
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1181SEI CERT Perl Coding Standard - Guidelines 03. Expressions (EXP)
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1364ICS Communications: Zone Boundary Failures
+ Notes

Relationship

Sometimes, when a return value can be used to indicate an error, an unchecked return value is a code-layer instance of a missing application-layer check for exceptional conditions. However, return values are not always needed to communicate exceptional conditions. For example, expiration of resources, values passed by reference, asynchronously modified data, sockets, etc. may indicate exceptional conditions without the use of a return value.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy NameNode IDFitMapped Node Name
SEI CERT Perl Coding StandardEXP31-PLCWE More AbstractDo not suppress or ignore exceptions
+ References
[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 7, "Program Building Blocks" Page 341. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 1, "Exceptional Conditions," Page 22. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
[REF-44] Michael Howard, David LeBlanc and John Viega. "24 Deadly Sins of Software Security". "Sin 11: Failure to Handle Errors Correctly." Page 183. McGraw-Hill. 2010.
[REF-622] Frank Kim. "Top 25 Series - Rank 15 - Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions". SANS Software Security Institute. 2010-03-15. <http://blogs.sans.org/appsecstreetfighter/2010/03/15/top-25-series-rank-15-improper-check-for-unusual-or-exceptional-conditions/>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission DateSubmitterOrganization
2009-03-03CWE Content TeamMITRE
New entry for reorganization of CWE-703.
+ Modifications
Modification DateModifierOrganization
2009-07-27CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2009-12-28CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Time_of_Introduction
2010-02-16CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Background_Details, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Detection_Factors, Name, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationship_Notes, Relationships
2010-04-05CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns
2010-06-21CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References
2010-09-27CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2010-12-13CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationship_Notes
2011-03-29CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Description, Relationships
2011-06-01CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2011-06-27CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2011-09-13CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2012-05-11CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2012-10-30CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2013-02-21CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2014-07-30CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships
2015-12-07CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2017-01-19CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2017-11-08CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2019-01-03CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2019-06-20CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Description, Relationships
2020-02-24CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
2020-06-25CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2020-12-10CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2021-03-15CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships
2021-07-20CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2022-04-28CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
+ Previous Entry Names
Change DatePrevious Entry Name
2010-02-16Improper Check for Exceptional Conditions

CWE-296: Improper Following of a Certificate's Chain of Trust

Weakness ID: 296
Abstraction: Base
Structure: Simple
Presentation Filter:
+ Description
The software does not follow, or incorrectly follows, the chain of trust for a certificate back to a trusted root certificate, resulting in incorrect trust of any resource that is associated with that certificate.
+ Extended Description

If a system does not follow the chain of trust of a certificate to a root server, the certificate loses all usefulness as a metric of trust. Essentially, the trust gained from a certificate is derived from a chain of trust -- with a reputable trusted entity at the end of that list. The end user must trust that reputable source, and this reputable source must vouch for the resource in question through the medium of the certificate.

In some cases, this trust traverses several entities who vouch for one another. The entity trusted by the end user is at one end of this trust chain, while the certificate-wielding resource is at the other end of the chain. If the user receives a certificate at the end of one of these trust chains and then proceeds to check only that the first link in the chain, no real trust has been derived, since the entire chain must be traversed back to a trusted source to verify the certificate.

There are several ways in which the chain of trust might be broken, including but not limited to:

  • Any certificate in the chain is self-signed, unless it the root.
  • Not every intermediate certificate is checked, starting from the original certificate all the way up to the root certificate.
  • An intermediate, CA-signed certificate does not have the expected Basic Constraints or other important extensions.
  • The root certificate has been compromised or authorized to the wrong party.
+ Relationships
Section HelpThis table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (CWE-1000)
NatureTypeIDName
ChildOfClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.573Improper Following of Specification by Caller
ChildOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.295Improper Certificate Validation
PeerOfVariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.370Missing Check for Certificate Revocation after Initial Check
Section HelpThis table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (CWE-699)
NatureTypeIDName
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1211Authentication Errors
Section HelpThis table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (CWE-1008)
NatureTypeIDName
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1014Identify Actors
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
PhaseNote
Architecture and DesignREALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.
ImplementationWhen the software uses certificate pinning, the developer might not properly validate all relevant components of the certificate before pinning the certificate. This can make it difficult or expensive to test after the pinning is complete.
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.

Languages

Class: Language-Independent (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
ScopeImpactLikelihood
Non-Repudiation

Technical Impact: Hide Activities

Exploitation of this flaw can lead to the trust of data that may have originated with a spoofed source.
Integrity
Confidentiality
Availability
Access Control

Technical Impact: Gain Privileges or Assume Identity; Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands

Data, requests, or actions taken by the attacking entity can be carried out as a spoofed benign entity.
+ Likelihood Of Exploit
Low
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1

This code checks the certificate of a connected peer.

(bad code)
Example Language:
if ((cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl)) && host)
foo=SSL_get_verify_result(ssl);

if ((X509_V_OK==foo) || X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN==foo))

// certificate looks good, host can be trusted

In this case, because the certificate is self-signed, there was no external authority that could prove the identity of the host. The program could be communicating with a different system that is spoofing the host, e.g. by poisoning the DNS cache or using an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AITM) attack to modify the traffic from server to client.

+ Observed Examples
ReferenceDescription
Server allows bypass of certificate pinning by sending a chain of trust that includes a trusted CA that is not pinned.
Verification function trusts certificate chains in which the last certificate is self-signed.
Chain: Web browser uses a TLS-related function incorrectly, preventing it from verifying that a server's certificate is signed by a trusted certification authority (CA).
Web browser does not check if any intermediate certificates are revoked.
chain: DNS server does not correctly check return value from the OpenSSL EVP_VerifyFinal function allows bypass of validation of the certificate chain.
chain: incorrect check of return value from the OpenSSL EVP_VerifyFinal function allows bypass of validation of the certificate chain.
File-transfer software does not validate Basic Constraints of an intermediate CA-signed certificate.
Cryptographic API, as used in web browsers, mail clients, and other software, does not properly validate Basic Constraints.
+ Potential Mitigations

Phase: Architecture and Design

Ensure that proper certificate checking is included in the system design.

Phase: Implementation

Understand, and properly implement all checks necessary to ensure the integrity of certificate trust integrity.

Phase: Implementation

If certificate pinning is being used, ensure that all relevant properties of the certificate are fully validated before the certificate is pinned, including the full chain of trust.
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
NatureTypeIDName
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.724OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A3 - Broken Authentication and Session Management
MemberOfViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries).884CWE Cross-section
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.948SFP Secondary Cluster: Digital Certificate
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1346OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A02:2021 - Cryptographic Failures
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1382ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Emerging Energy Technologies
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy NameNode IDFitMapped Node Name
CLASPFailure to follow chain of trust in certificate validation
+ References
[REF-18] Secure Software, Inc.. "The CLASP Application Security Process". 2005. <https://cwe.mitre.org/documents/sources/TheCLASPApplicationSecurityProcess.pdf>.
[REF-245] Martin Georgiev, Subodh Iyengar, Suman Jana, Rishita Anubhai, Dan Boneh and Vitaly Shmatikov. "The Most Dangerous Code in the World: Validating SSL Certificates in Non-Browser Software". 2012-10-25. <http://www.cs.utexas.edu/~shmat/shmat_ccs12.pdf>.
[REF-44] Michael Howard, David LeBlanc and John Viega. "24 Deadly Sins of Software Security". "Sin 23: Improper Use of PKI, Especially SSL." Page 347. McGraw-Hill. 2010.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission DateSubmitterOrganization
2006-07-19CLASP
+ Modifications
Modification DateModifierOrganization
2008-07-01Eric DalciCigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
2008-09-08CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2009-03-10CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Description, Name, Relationships
2009-05-27CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2009-07-27CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2010-12-13CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Other_Notes
2011-06-01CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2012-05-11CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated References, Relationships
2013-02-21CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Name, Observed_Examples, Other_Notes, References, Relationships
2013-07-17CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2014-07-30CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships
2017-11-08CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships
2018-03-27CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Modes_of_Introduction, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction
2019-09-19CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2020-02-24CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, References, Relationships
2021-07-20CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2021-10-28CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2022-04-28CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
+ Previous Entry Names
Change DatePrevious Entry Name
2009-03-10Failure to Follow Chain of Trust in Certificate Validation
2013-02-21Improper Following of Chain of Trust for Certificate Validation

CWE-1384: Improper Handling of Extreme Physical Environment Conditions

Weakness ID: 1384
Abstraction: Base
Structure: Simple
Presentation Filter:
+ Description
The product does not properly detect and handle extreme conditions in the product's physical environment, such as temperature, radiation, humidity, power, or other physical phenomena.
+ Extended Description

Hardware products are typically only guaranteed to behave correctly within certain environmental limits, such as running between minimum and maximum temperatures. Such products cannot necessarily control the external conditions that they are subjected to. However, the inability to detect and handle such conditions can cause the product to produce security-critical errors, e.g., flipping a bit that is used for an authentication decision. In addition, these physical conditions could be intentionally manipulated by an adversary to directly trigger such errors, although it might be technically difficult to do so.

+ Relationships
Section HelpThis table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (CWE-1000)
NatureTypeIDName
ChildOfPillarPillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things.703Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.1247Improper Protection Against Voltage and Clock Glitches
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.1261Improper Handling of Single Event Upsets
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.1332Improper Handling of Faults that Lead to Instruction Skips
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.1351Improper Handling of Hardware Behavior in Exceptionally Cold Environments
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
PhaseNote
Architecture and DesignThe product’s design might not consider checking and handling extreme conditions.
ManufacturingFor hardware manufacturing, sub-par components might be chosen that are not able to handle the expected environmental conditions.
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.

Technologies

Class: System on Chip (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
ScopeImpactLikelihood
Confidentiality
Integrity
Availability

Technical Impact: Varies by Context; Unexpected State

Consequences of this weakness are highly dependent on the role of affected components within the larger product.
+ Potential Mitigations

Phase: Requirements

In requirements, be specific about expectations for how the product will perform when it exceeds high environmental conditions, e.g., by shutting down.

Phases: Architecture and Design; Implementation

Where possible, include independent components that can detect excess environmental conditions and have the capability to shut down the product.

Phases: Architecture and Design; Implementation

Where possible, use shielding or other materials that can increase the adversary's workload and reduce the likelihood of being able to successfully trigger a security-related failure.
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
NatureTypeIDName
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1365ICS Communications: Unreliability
+ References
[REF-1248] Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force (SEI ETF). "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS". ICS Communications / 2. Unreliability. 2022-03-09. <https://inl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/SEI-ETF-NCSV-TPT-Categories-of-Security-Vulnerabilities-ICS-v1_03-09-22.pdf>.
[REF-1255] Sergei P. Skorobogatov. "Semi-invasive attacks – A new approach to hardware security analysis". 2005-04. <https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/techreports/UCAM-CL-TR-630.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission DateSubmitterOrganization
2022-04-21CWE Content TeamMITRE

CWE-20: Improper Input Validation

Weakness ID: 20
Abstraction: Class
Structure: Simple
Presentation Filter:
+ Description
The product receives input or data, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the properties that are required to process the data safely and correctly.
+ Extended Description

Input validation is a frequently-used technique for checking potentially dangerous inputs in order to ensure that the inputs are safe for processing within the code, or when communicating with other components. When software does not validate input properly, an attacker is able to craft the input in a form that is not expected by the rest of the application. This will lead to parts of the system receiving unintended input, which may result in altered control flow, arbitrary control of a resource, or arbitrary code execution.

Input validation is not the only technique for processing input, however. Other techniques attempt to transform potentially-dangerous input into something safe, such as filtering (CWE-790) - which attempts to remove dangerous inputs - or encoding/escaping (CWE-116), which attempts to ensure that the input is not misinterpreted when it is included in output to another component. Other techniques exist as well (see CWE-138 for more examples.)

Input validation can be applied to:

  • raw data - strings, numbers, parameters, file contents, etc.
  • metadata - information about the raw data, such as headers or size

Data can be simple or structured. Structured data can be composed of many nested layers, composed of combinations of metadata and raw data, with other simple or structured data.

Many properties of raw data or metadata may need to be validated upon entry into the code, such as:

  • specified quantities such as size, length, frequency, price, rate, number of operations, time, etc.
  • implied or derived quantities, such as the actual size of a file instead of a specified size
  • indexes, offsets, or positions into more complex data structures
  • symbolic keys or other elements into hash tables, associative arrays, etc.
  • well-formedness, i.e. syntactic correctness - compliance with expected syntax
  • lexical token correctness - compliance with rules for what is treated as a token
  • specified or derived type - the actual type of the input (or what the input appears to be)
  • consistency - between individual data elements, between raw data and metadata, between references, etc.
  • conformance to domain-specific rules, e.g. business logic
  • equivalence - ensuring that equivalent inputs are treated the same
  • authenticity, ownership, or other attestations about the input, e.g. a cryptographic signature to prove the source of the data

Implied or derived properties of data must often be calculated or inferred by the code itself. Errors in deriving properties may be considered a contributing factor to improper input validation.

Note that "input validation" has very different meanings to different people, or within different classification schemes. Caution must be used when referencing this CWE entry or mapping to it. For example, some weaknesses might involve inadvertently giving control to an attacker over an input when they should not be able to provide an input at all, but sometimes this is referred to as input validation.

Finally, it is important to emphasize that the distinctions between input validation and output escaping are often blurred, and developers must be careful to understand the difference, including how input validation is not always sufficient to prevent vulnerabilities, especially when less stringent data types must be supported, such as free-form text. Consider a SQL injection scenario in which a person's last name is inserted into a query. The name "O'Reilly" would likely pass the validation step since it is a common last name in the English language. However, this valid name cannot be directly inserted into the database because it contains the "'" apostrophe character, which would need to be escaped or otherwise transformed. In this case, removing the apostrophe might reduce the risk of SQL injection, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the wrong name would be recorded.

+ Relationships
Section HelpThis table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (CWE-1000)
NatureTypeIDName
ChildOfPillarPillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things.707Improper Neutralization
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.179Incorrect Behavior Order: Early Validation
ParentOfVariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.622Improper Validation of Function Hook Arguments
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.1173Improper Use of Validation Framework
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.1284Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.1285Improper Validation of Specified Index, Position, or Offset in Input
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.1286Improper Validation of Syntactic Correctness of Input
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.1287Improper Validation of Specified Type of Input
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.1288Improper Validation of Consistency within Input
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.1289Improper Validation of Unsafe Equivalence in Input
PeerOfClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.345Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
CanPrecedeBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.22Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
CanPrecedeBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.41Improper Resolution of Path Equivalence
CanPrecedeClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.74Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection')
CanPrecedeClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.119Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
CanPrecedeBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.770Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
Section HelpThis table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (CWE-1003)
NatureTypeIDName
ParentOfVariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.129Improper Validation of Array Index
Section HelpThis table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (CWE-1008)
NatureTypeIDName
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1019Validate Inputs
Section HelpThis table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Seven Pernicious Kingdoms" (CWE-700)
NatureTypeIDName
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.15External Control of System or Configuration Setting
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.73External Control of File Name or Path
ParentOfVariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.102Struts: Duplicate Validation Forms
ParentOfVariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.103Struts: Incomplete validate() Method Definition
ParentOfVariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.104Struts: Form Bean Does Not Extend Validation Class
ParentOfVariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.105Struts: Form Field Without Validator
ParentOfVariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.106Struts: Plug-in Framework not in Use
ParentOfVariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.107Struts: Unused Validation Form
ParentOfVariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.108Struts: Unvalidated Action Form
ParentOfVariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.109Struts: Validator Turned Off
ParentOfVariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.110Struts: Validator Without Form Field
ParentOfVariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.111Direct Use of Unsafe JNI
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.112Missing XML Validation
ParentOfVariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.113Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences in HTTP Headers ('HTTP Response Splitting')
ParentOfClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.114Process Control
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.117Improper Output Neutralization for Logs
ParentOfClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.119Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.120Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input ('Classic Buffer Overflow')
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.134Use of Externally-Controlled Format String
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.170Improper Null Termination
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.190Integer Overflow or Wraparound
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.466Return of Pointer Value Outside of Expected Range
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.470Use of Externally-Controlled Input to Select Classes or Code ('Unsafe Reflection')
ParentOfVariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.785Use of Path Manipulation Function without Maximum-sized Buffer
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
PhaseNote
Architecture and Design
Implementation

REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.

If a programmer believes that an attacker cannot modify certain inputs, then the programmer might not perform any input validation at all. For example, in web applications, many programmers believe that cookies and hidden form fields can not be modified from a web browser (CWE-472), although they can be altered using a proxy or a custom program. In a client-server architecture, the programmer might assume that client-side security checks cannot be bypassed, even when a custom client could be written that skips those checks (CWE-602).

+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.

Languages

Class: Language-Independent (Often Prevalent)

+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
ScopeImpactLikelihood
Availability

Technical Impact: DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart; DoS: Resource Consumption (CPU); DoS: Resource Consumption (Memory)

An attacker could provide unexpected values and cause a program crash or excessive consumption of resources, such as memory and CPU.
Confidentiality

Technical Impact: Read Memory; Read Files or Directories

An attacker could read confidential data if they are able to control resource references.
Integrity
Confidentiality
Availability

Technical Impact: Modify Memory; Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands

An attacker could use malicious input to modify data or possibly alter control flow in unexpected ways, including arbitrary command execution.
+ Likelihood Of Exploit
High
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1

This example demonstrates a shopping interaction in which the user is free to specify the quantity of items to be purchased and a total is calculated.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
...
public static final double price = 20.00;
int quantity = currentUser.getAttribute("quantity");
double total = price * quantity;
chargeUser(total);
...

The user has no control over the price variable, however the code does not prevent a negative value from being specified for quantity. If an attacker were to provide a negative value, then the user would have their account credited instead of debited.

Example 2

This example asks the user for a height and width of an m X n game board with a maximum dimension of 100 squares.

(bad code)
Example Language:
...
#define MAX_DIM 100
...
/* board dimensions */

int m,n, error;
board_square_t *board;
printf("Please specify the board height: \n");
error = scanf("%d", &m);
if ( EOF == error ){
die("No integer passed: Die evil hacker!\n");
}
printf("Please specify the board width: \n");
error = scanf("%d", &n);
if ( EOF == error ){
die("No integer passed: Die evil hacker!\n");
}
if ( m > MAX_DIM || n > MAX_DIM ) {
die("Value too large: Die evil hacker!\n");
}
board = (board_square_t*) malloc( m * n * sizeof(board_square_t));
...

While this code checks to make sure the user cannot specify large, positive integers and consume too much memory, it does not check for negative values supplied by the user. As a result, an attacker can perform a resource consumption (CWE-400) attack against this program by specifying two, large negative values that will not overflow, resulting in a very large memory allocation (CWE-789) and possibly a system crash. Alternatively, an attacker can provide very large negative values which will cause an integer overflow (CWE-190) and unexpected behavior will follow depending on how the values are treated in the remainder of the program.

Example 3

The following example shows a PHP application in which the programmer attempts to display a user's birthday and homepage.

(bad code)
Example Language: PHP 
$birthday = $_GET['birthday'];
$homepage = $_GET['homepage'];
echo "Birthday: $birthday<br>Homepage: <a href=$homepage>click here</a>"

The programmer intended for $birthday to be in a date format and $homepage to be a valid URL. However, since the values are derived from an HTTP request, if an attacker can trick a victim into clicking a crafted URL with <script> tags providing the values for birthday and / or homepage, then the script will run on the client's browser when the web server echoes the content. Notice that even if the programmer were to defend the $birthday variable by restricting input to integers and dashes, it would still be possible for an attacker to provide a string of the form:

(attack code)
 
2009-01-09--

If this data were used in a SQL statement, it would treat the remainder of the statement as a comment. The comment could disable other security-related logic in the statement. In this case, encoding combined with input validation would be a more useful protection mechanism.

Furthermore, an XSS (CWE-79) attack or SQL injection (CWE-89) are just a few of the potential consequences when input validation is not used. Depending on the context of the code, CRLF Injection (CWE-93), Argument Injection (CWE-88), or Command Injection (CWE-77) may also be possible.

Example 4

The following example takes a user-supplied value to allocate an array of objects and then operates on the array.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
private void buildList ( int untrustedListSize ){
if ( 0 > untrustedListSize ){
die("Negative value supplied for list size, die evil hacker!");
}
Widget[] list = new Widget [ untrustedListSize ];
list[0] = new Widget();
}

This example attempts to build a list from a user-specified value, and even checks to ensure a non-negative value is supplied. If, however, a 0 value is provided, the code will build an array of size 0 and then try to store a new Widget in the first location, causing an exception to be thrown.

Example 5

This Android application has registered to handle a URL when sent an intent:

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 

...
IntentFilter filter = new IntentFilter("com.example.URLHandler.openURL");
MyReceiver receiver = new MyReceiver();
registerReceiver(receiver, filter);
...

public class UrlHandlerReceiver extends BroadcastReceiver {
@Override
public void onReceive(Context context, Intent intent) {
if("com.example.URLHandler.openURL".equals(intent.getAction())) {
String URL = intent.getStringExtra("URLToOpen");
int length = URL.length();

...
}
}
}

The application assumes the URL will always be included in the intent. When the URL is not present, the call to getStringExtra() will return null, thus causing a null pointer exception when length() is called.

+ Observed Examples
ReferenceDescription
Eval injection in Perl program using an ID that should only contain hyphens and numbers.
SQL injection through an ID that was supposed to be numeric.
lack of input validation in spreadsheet program leads to buffer overflows, integer overflows, array index errors, and memory corruption.
insufficient validation enables XSS
driver in security product allows code execution due to insufficient validation
infinite loop from DNS packet with a label that points to itself
infinite loop from DNS packet with a label that points to itself
missing parameter leads to crash
HTTP request with missing protocol version number leads to crash
request with missing parameters leads to information exposure
system crash with offset value that is inconsistent with packet size
size field that is inconsistent with packet size leads to buffer over-read
product uses a denylist to identify potentially dangerous content, allowing attacker to bypass a warning
security bypass via an extra header
empty packet triggers reboot
incomplete denylist allows SQL injection
NUL byte in theme name causes directory traversal impact to be worse
kernel does not validate an incoming pointer before dereferencing it
anti-virus product has insufficient input validation of hooked SSDT functions, allowing code execution
anti-virus product allows DoS via zero-length field
driver does not validate input from userland to the kernel
kernel does not validate parameters sent in from userland, allowing code execution
lack of validation of string length fields allows memory consumption or buffer over-read
lack of validation of length field leads to infinite loop
lack of validation of input to an IOCTL allows code execution
zero-length attachment causes crash
zero-length input causes free of uninitialized pointer
crash via a malformed frame structure
infinite loop from a long SMTP request
router crashes with a malformed packet
packet with invalid version number leads to NULL pointer dereference
crash via multiple "." characters in file extension
+ Potential Mitigations

Phase: Architecture and Design

Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction

Consider using language-theoretic security (LangSec) techniques that characterize inputs using a formal language and build "recognizers" for that language. This effectively requires parsing to be a distinct layer that effectively enforces a boundary between raw input and internal data representations, instead of allowing parser code to be scattered throughout the program, where it could be subject to errors or inconsistencies that create weaknesses. [REF-1109] [REF-1110] [REF-1111]

Phase: Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

Use an input validation framework such as Struts or the OWASP ESAPI Validation API. Note that using a framework does not automatically address all input validation problems; be mindful of weaknesses that could arise from misusing the framework itself (CWE-1173).

Phases: Architecture and Design; Implementation

Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction

Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter your software: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls.

Phase: Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.

When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."

Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.

Effectiveness: High

Phase: Architecture and Design

For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

Even though client-side checks provide minimal benefits with respect to server-side security, they are still useful. First, they can support intrusion detection. If the server receives input that should have been rejected by the client, then it may be an indication of an attack. Second, client-side error-checking can provide helpful feedback to the user about the expectations for valid input. Third, there may be a reduction in server-side processing time for accidental input errors, although this is typically a small savings.

Phase: Implementation

When your application combines data from multiple sources, perform the validation after the sources have been combined. The individual data elements may pass the validation step but violate the intended restrictions after they have been combined.

Phase: Implementation

Be especially careful to validate all input when invoking code that crosses language boundaries, such as from an interpreted language to native code. This could create an unexpected interaction between the language boundaries. Ensure that you are not violating any of the expectations of the language with which you are interfacing. For example, even though Java may not be susceptible to buffer overflows, providing a large argument in a call to native code might trigger an overflow.

Phase: Implementation

Directly convert your input type into the expected data type, such as using a conversion function that translates a string into a number. After converting to the expected data type, ensure that the input's values fall within the expected range of allowable values and that multi-field consistencies are maintained.

Phase: Implementation

Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180, CWE-181). Make sure that your application does not inadvertently decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked. Use libraries such as the OWASP ESAPI Canonicalization control.

Consider performing repeated canonicalization until your input does not change any more. This will avoid double-decoding and similar scenarios, but it might inadvertently modify inputs that are allowed to contain properly-encoded dangerous content.

Phase: Implementation

When exchanging data between components, ensure that both components are using the same character encoding. Ensure that the proper encoding is applied at each interface. Explicitly set the encoding you are using whenever the protocol allows you to do so.
+ Detection Methods

Automated Static Analysis

Some instances of improper input validation can be detected using automated static analysis.

A static analysis tool might allow the user to specify which application-specific methods or functions perform input validation; the tool might also have built-in knowledge of validation frameworks such as Struts. The tool may then suppress or de-prioritize any associated warnings. This allows the analyst to focus on areas of the software in which input validation does not appear to be present.

Except in the cases described in the previous paragraph, automated static analysis might not be able to recognize when proper input validation is being performed, leading to false positives - i.e., warnings that do not have any security consequences or require any code changes.

Manual Static Analysis

When custom input validation is required, such as when enforcing business rules, manual analysis is necessary to ensure that the validation is properly implemented.

Fuzzing

Fuzzing techniques can be useful for detecting input validation errors. When unexpected inputs are provided to the software, the software should not crash or otherwise become unstable, and it should generate application-controlled error messages. If exceptions or interpreter-generated error messages occur, this indicates that the input was not detected and handled within the application logic itself.

Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
  • Binary Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Web Application Scanner
  • Web Services Scanner
  • Database Scanners

Effectiveness: High

Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Fuzz Tester
  • Framework-based Fuzzer
Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Host Application Interface Scanner
  • Monitored Virtual Environment - run potentially malicious code in sandbox / wrapper / virtual machine, see if it does anything suspicious

Effectiveness: High

Manual Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source
  • Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)

Effectiveness: High

Automated Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Source code Weakness Analyzer
  • Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer

Effectiveness: High

Architecture or Design Review

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)
  • Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Attack Modeling

Effectiveness: High

+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
NatureTypeIDName
MemberOfViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries).635Weaknesses Originally Used by NVD from 2008 to 2016
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.722OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A1 - Unvalidated Input
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.738CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 5 - Integers (INT)
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.742CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 9 - Memory Management (MEM)
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.746CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 13 - Error Handling (ERR)
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.747CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 14 - Miscellaneous (MSC)
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.7512009 Top 25 - Insecure Interaction Between Components
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.872CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 04 - Integers (INT)
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.876CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 08 - Memory Management (MEM)
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.883CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 49 - Miscellaneous (MSC)
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.994SFP Secondary Cluster: Tainted Input to Variable
MemberOfViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries).1003Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.10057PK - Input Validation and Representation
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1163SEI CERT C Coding Standard - Guidelines 09. Input Output (FIO)
MemberOfViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries).1200Weaknesses in the 2019 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors
MemberOfViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries).1337Weaknesses in the 2021 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1347OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A03:2021 - Injection
MemberOfViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries).1350Weaknesses in the 2020 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1382ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Emerging Energy Technologies
+ Notes

Maintenance

As of 2020, this entry is used more often than preferred, and it is a source of frequent confusion. It is being actively modified for CWE 4.1 and subsequent versions.

Maintenance

Concepts such as validation, data transformation, and neutralization are being refined, so relationships between CWE-20 and other entries such as CWE-707 may change in future versions, along with an update to the Vulnerability Theory document.

Maintenance

Input validation - whether missing or incorrect - is such an essential and widespread part of secure development that it is implicit in many different weaknesses. Traditionally, problems such as buffer overflows and XSS have been classified as input validation problems by many security professionals. However, input validation is not necessarily the only protection mechanism available for avoiding such problems, and in some cases it is not even sufficient. The CWE team has begun capturing these subtleties in chains within the Research Concepts view (CWE-1000), but more work is needed.

Relationship

CWE-116 and CWE-20 have a close association because, depending on the nature of the structured message, proper input validation can indirectly prevent special characters from changing the meaning of a structured message. For example, by validating that a numeric ID field should only contain the 0-9 characters, the programmer effectively prevents injection attacks.

Terminology

The "input validation" term is extremely common, but it is used in many different ways. In some cases its usage can obscure the real underlying weakness or otherwise hide chaining and composite relationships.

Some people use "input validation" as a general term that covers many different neutralization techniques for ensuring that input is appropriate, such as filtering, canonicalization, and escaping. Others use the term in a more narrow context to simply mean "checking if an input conforms to expectations without changing it." CWE uses this more narrow interpretation.

+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy NameNode IDFitMapped Node Name
7 Pernicious KingdomsInput validation and representation
OWASP Top Ten 2004A1CWE More SpecificUnvalidated Input
CERT C Secure CodingERR07-CPrefer functions that support error checking over equivalent functions that don't
CERT C Secure CodingFIO30-CCWE More AbstractExclude user input from format strings
CERT C Secure CodingMEM10-CDefine and use a pointer validation function
WASC20Improper Input Handling
Software Fault PatternsSFP25Tainted input to variable
+ References
[REF-6] Katrina Tsipenyuk, Brian Chess and Gary McGraw. "Seven Pernicious Kingdoms: A Taxonomy of Software Security Errors". NIST Workshop on Software Security Assurance Tools Techniques and Metrics. NIST. 2005-11-07. <https://samate.nist.gov/SSATTM_Content/papers/Seven%20Pernicious%20Kingdoms%20-%20Taxonomy%20of%20Sw%20Security%20Errors%20-%20Tsipenyuk%20-%20Chess%20-%20McGraw.pdf>.
[REF-166] Jim Manico. "Input Validation with ESAPI - Very Important". 2008-08-15. <http://manicode.blogspot.com/2008/08/input-validation-with-esapi.html>.
[REF-45] OWASP. "OWASP Enterprise Security API (ESAPI) Project". <http://www.owasp.org/index.php/ESAPI>.
[REF-168] Joel Scambray, Mike Shema and Caleb Sima. "Hacking Exposed Web Applications, Second Edition". Input Validation Attacks. McGraw-Hill. 2006-06-05.
[REF-48] Jeremiah Grossman. "Input validation or output filtering, which is better?". 2007-01-30. <http://jeremiahgrossman.blogspot.com/2007/01/input-validation-or-output-filtering.html>.
[REF-170] Kevin Beaver. "The importance of input validation". 2006-09-06. <http://searchsoftwarequality.techtarget.com/tip/0,289483,sid92_gci1214373,00.html>.
[REF-7] Michael Howard and David LeBlanc. "Writing Secure Code". Chapter 10, "All Input Is Evil!" Page 341. 2nd Edition. Microsoft Press. 2002-12-04. <https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/store/writing-secure-code-9780735617223>.
[REF-1109] "LANGSEC: Language-theoretic Security". <http://langsec.org/>.
[REF-1110] "LangSec: Recognition, Validation, and Compositional Correctness for Real World Security". <http://langsec.org/bof-handout.pdf>.
[REF-1111] Sergey Bratus, Lars Hermerschmidt, Sven M. Hallberg, Michael E. Locasto, Falcon D. Momot, Meredith L. Patterson and Anna Shubina. "Curing the Vulnerable Parser: Design Patterns for Secure Input Handling". USENIX ;login:. 2017. <https://www.usenix.org/system/files/login/articles/login_spring17_08_bratus.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission DateSubmitterOrganization
2006-07-197 Pernicious Kingdoms
+ Modifications
Modification DateModifierOrganization
2008-07-01Eric DalciCigital
updated Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction
2008-08-15Veracode
Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping
2008-09-08CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-11-24CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2009-01-12CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Name, Observed_Examples, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationship_Notes, Relationships
2009-03-10CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Description, Potential_Mitigations
2009-05-27CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2009-07-27CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2009-10-29CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Maintenance_Notes, Modes_of_Introduction, Observed_Examples, Relationships, Research_Gaps, Terminology_Notes
2009-12-28CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Detection_Factors
2010-02-16CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References, Taxonomy_Mappings
2010-04-05CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2010-06-21CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, Research_Gaps, Terminology_Notes
2010-09-27CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
2010-12-13CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description
2011-03-29CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2011-06-01CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Relationship_Notes
2011-09-13CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2012-05-11CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2012-10-30CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2013-02-21CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2013-07-17CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2014-02-18CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns
2014-07-30CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2015-12-07CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2017-01-19CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2017-05-03CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2017-11-08CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2018-03-27CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated References
2019-01-03CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2019-06-20CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2019-09-19CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2020-02-24CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2020-06-25CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Maintenance_Notes, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationship_Notes, Relationships, Research_Gaps, Terminology_Notes
2020-08-20CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2021-03-15CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Description, Potential_Mitigations
2021-07-20CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2021-10-28CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
2022-04-28CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Relationships
+ Previous Entry Names
Change DatePrevious Entry Name
2009-01-12Insufficient Input Validation

CWE-1231: Improper Prevention of Lock Bit Modification

Weakness ID: 1231
Abstraction: Base
Structure: Simple
Presentation Filter:
+ Description
The product uses a trusted lock bit for restricting access to registers, address regions, or other resources, but the product does not prevent the value of the lock bit from being modified after it has been set.
+ Extended Description

In integrated circuits and hardware intellectual property (IP) cores, device configuration controls are commonly programmed after a device power reset by a trusted firmware or software module (e.g., BIOS/bootloader) and then locked from any further modification.

This behavior is commonly implemented using a trusted lock bit. When set, the lock bit disables writes to a protected set of registers or address regions. Design or coding errors in the implementation of the lock bit protection feature may allow the lock bit to be modified or cleared by software after it has been set. Attackers might be able to unlock the system and features that the bit is intended to protect.

+ Relationships
Section HelpThis table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (CWE-1000)
NatureTypeIDName
ChildOfPillarPillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things.284Improper Access Control
Section HelpThis table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Hardware Design" (CWE-1194)
NatureTypeIDName
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1199General Circuit and Logic Design Concerns
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
PhaseNote
Architecture and DesignSuch issues could be introduced during hardware architecture and design and identified later during Testing or System Configuration phases.
ImplementationSuch issues could be introduced during implementation and identified later during Testing or System Configuration phases.
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.

Languages

Class: Language-Independent (Undetermined Prevalence)

Operating Systems

Class: OS-Independent (Undetermined Prevalence)

Architectures

Class: Architecture-Independent (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: Technology-Independent (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
ScopeImpactLikelihood
Access Control

Technical Impact: Modify Memory

Registers protected by lock bit can be modified even when lock is set.
High
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1

Consider the example design below for a digital thermal sensor that detects overheating of the silicon and triggers system shutdown. The system critical temperature limit (CRITICAL_TEMP_LIMIT) and thermal sensor calibration (TEMP_SENSOR_CALIB) data have to be programmed by firmware, and then the register needs to be locked (TEMP_SENSOR_LOCK).

(bad code)
Example Language: Other 
Register Field description
CRITICAL_TEMP_LIMIT [31:8] Reserved field; Read only; Default 0

[7:0] Critical temp 0-255 Centigrade; Read-write-lock; Default 125
TEMP_SENSOR_CALIB [31:0] Thermal sensor calibration data. Slope value used to map sensor reading to degrees Centigrade.
TEMP_SENSOR_LOCK [31:1] Reserved field; Read only; Default 0

[0] Lock bit, locks CRITICAL_TEMP_LIMIT and TEMP_SENSOR_CALIB registers; Write-1-once; Default 0
TEMP_HW_SHUTDOWN [31:2] Reserved field; Read only; Default 0

[1] Enable hardware shutdown on critical temperature detection; Read-write; Default 0
CURRENT_TEMP [31:8] Reserved field; Read only; Default 0

[7:0] Current Temp 0-255 Centigrade; Read-only; Default 0

In this example, note that if the system heats to critical temperature, the response of the system is controlled by the TEMP_HW_SHUTDOWN bit [1], which is not lockable. Thus, the intended security property of the critical temperature sensor cannot be fully protected, since software can misconfigure the TEMP_HW_SHUTDOWN register even after the lock bit is set to disable the shutdown response.

(good code)
 

To fix this weakness, one could change the TEMP_HW_SHUTDOWN field to be locked by TEMP_SENSOR_LOCK.

TEMP_HW_SHUTDOWN [31:2] Reserved field; Read only; Default 0

[1] Enable hardware shutdown on critical temperature detection; Read-write-Lock; Default 0

[0] Locked by TEMP_SENSOR_LOCK
+ Observed Examples
ReferenceDescription
chip reset clears critical read/write lock permissions for RSA function
+ Potential Mitigations

Phases: Architecture and Design; Implementation; Testing

  • Security lock bit protections must be reviewed for design inconsistency and common weaknesses.
  • Security lock programming flow and lock properties must be tested in pre-silicon and post-silicon testing.

Effectiveness: High

+ Weakness Ordinalities
OrdinalityDescription
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods

Manual Analysis

Set the lock bit. Power cycle the device. Attempt to clear the lock bit. If the information is changed, implement a design fix. Retest. Also, attempt to indirectly clear the lock bit or bypass it.

Effectiveness: High

+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
NatureTypeIDName
MemberOfViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries).1343Weaknesses in the 2021 CWE Most Important Hardware Weaknesses List
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1372ICS Supply Chain: OT Counterfeit and Malicious Corruption
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission DateSubmitterOrganization
2020-01-15Arun Kanuparthi, Hareesh Khattri, Parbati Kumar Manna, Narasimha Kumar V MangipudiIntel Corporation
+ Contributions
Contribution DateContributorOrganization
2021-10-20Narasimha Kumar V MangipudiLattice Semiconductor
reviewed content changes
2021-10-22Hareesh KhattriIntel Corporation
provided observed example
+ Modifications
Modification DateModifierOrganization
2020-06-25CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2020-08-20CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2021-10-28CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Detection_Factors, Name, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities
2022-04-28CWE Content TeamMITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
+ Previous Entry Names
Change DatePrevious Entry Name
2021-10-28Improper Implementation of Lock Protection Registers

CWE-269: Improper Privilege Management

Weakness ID: 269
Abstraction: Class
Structure: Simple
Presentation Filter:
+ Description
The software does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor.
+ Relationships
Section HelpThis table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (CWE-1000)
NatureTypeIDName
ChildOfPillarPillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things.284Improper Access Control
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.250Execution with Unnecessary Privileges
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.266Incorrect Privilege Assignment
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.267Privilege Defined With Unsafe Actions
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.268Privilege Chaining
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.270Privilege Context Switching Error
ParentOfClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.271Privilege Dropping / Lowering Errors
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.274Improper Handling of Insufficient Privileges
ParentOfBaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.648Incorrect Use of Privileged APIs
Section HelpThis table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (CWE-1008)
NatureTypeIDName
MemberOfCategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1011Authorize Actors
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
PhaseNote
Architecture and Design
ImplementationREALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.
Operation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.

Languages

Class: Language-Independent (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
ScopeImpactLikelihood
Access Control

Technical Impact: Gain Privileges or Assume Identity

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
Medium
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1

This code temporarily raises the program's privileges to allow creation of a new user folder.

(bad code)
Example Language: Python 
def makeNewUserDir(username):
if invalidUsername(username):

#avoid CWE-22 and CWE-78
print('Usernames cannot contain invalid characters')
return False

try:
raisePri